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Bailouts in Federations. The Role of Elections, Restrictions and Information Asymmetries
Bailouts in Federations. The Role of Elections, Restrictions and Information Asymmetries
This dissertation deals with the topic of bailouts in federations. Institutions and instruments helping to alleviate the incentive problems arising from bailouts are analyzed. In particular, the role of the timing of elections, bailout restrictions and the exploitation of budgetary information from comparable jurisdictions is considered.
Federations, Bailouts, Commitment Problem, Timing of Elections, Budgetary Crisis
Kaiser, Karolina
2010
English
Universitätsbibliothek der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Kaiser, Karolina (2010): Bailouts in Federations: The Role of Elections, Restrictions and Information Asymmetries. Dissertation, LMU München: Faculty of Economics
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Abstract

This dissertation deals with the topic of bailouts in federations. Institutions and instruments helping to alleviate the incentive problems arising from bailouts are analyzed. In particular, the role of the timing of elections, bailout restrictions and the exploitation of budgetary information from comparable jurisdictions is considered.