Logo Logo
Hilfe
Kontakt
Switch language to English
The Evolution of Reciprocity, Trust, and the Separation of Powers. Essays on Strategic Interactions under Incomplete Contracting
The Evolution of Reciprocity, Trust, and the Separation of Powers. Essays on Strategic Interactions under Incomplete Contracting
This dissertation is composed of three self-contained essays on strategic interactions under incomplete contracting. Chapter 1 considers the evolution of reciprocal preferences in a setting where individuals live in separate groups. Chapter 2 analyzes the costs and benefits of a separation of powers in an incomplete contracts framework. Chapter 3 finally shows that, even when important parts of a relationship could be arranged perfectly by a complete contract, contractual incompleteness can arise endogenously if the proposal of a complete contract is perceived as a signal of distrust.
Evolution of Reciprocity, Trust, Incomplete Contracts, Separation of Powers
Herold, Florian
2005
Englisch
Universitätsbibliothek der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Herold, Florian (2005): The Evolution of Reciprocity, Trust, and the Separation of Powers: Essays on Strategic Interactions under Incomplete Contracting. Dissertation, LMU München: Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
[img]
Vorschau
PDF
Herold_Florian.pdf

668kB

Abstract

This dissertation is composed of three self-contained essays on strategic interactions under incomplete contracting. Chapter 1 considers the evolution of reciprocal preferences in a setting where individuals live in separate groups. Chapter 2 analyzes the costs and benefits of a separation of powers in an incomplete contracts framework. Chapter 3 finally shows that, even when important parts of a relationship could be arranged perfectly by a complete contract, contractual incompleteness can arise endogenously if the proposal of a complete contract is perceived as a signal of distrust.