| Herold, Florian (2005): The Evolution of Reciprocity, Trust, and the Separation of Powers: Essays on Strategic Interactions under Incomplete Contracting. Dissertation, LMU München: Faculty of Economics |
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Herold_Florian.pdf 668kB |
DOI: 10.5282/edoc.3247
Abstract
This dissertation is composed of three self-contained essays on strategic interactions under incomplete contracting. Chapter 1 considers the evolution of reciprocal preferences in a setting where individuals live in separate groups. Chapter 2 analyzes the costs and benefits of a separation of powers in an incomplete contracts framework. Chapter 3 finally shows that, even when important parts of a relationship could be arranged perfectly by a complete contract, contractual incompleteness can arise endogenously if the proposal of a complete contract is perceived as a signal of distrust.
| Item Type: | Theses (Dissertation, LMU Munich) |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | Evolution of Reciprocity, Trust, Incomplete Contracts, Separation of Powers |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Faculties: | Faculty of Economics |
| Language: | English |
| Date of oral examination: | 27. January 2005 |
| 1. Referee: | Schmidt, Klaus M. |
| MD5 Checksum of the PDF-file: | 6794577fef357a4ad2afd3ed86693a95 |
| Signature of the printed copy: | 0001/UMC 14398 |
| ID Code: | 3247 |
| Deposited On: | 16. Mar 2005 |
| Last Modified: | 24. Oct 2020 10:46 |
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