The Evolution of Reciprocity, Trust, and the Separation of Powers

Herold, Florian (2005): The Evolution of Reciprocity, Trust, and the Separation of Powers: Essays on Strategic Interactions under Incomplete Contracting. Dissertation, LMU München: Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät

Abstract

This dissertation is composed of three self-contained essays on strategic interactions under incomplete contracting. Chapter 1 considers the evolution of reciprocal preferences in a setting where individuals live in separate groups. Chapter 2 analyzes the costs and benefits of a separation of powers in an incomplete contracts framework. Chapter 3 finally shows that, even when important parts of a relationship could be arranged perfectly by a complete contract, contractual incompleteness can arise endogenously if the proposal of a complete contract is perceived as a signal of distrust.

• Dokumententyp: Dissertationen (Dissertation, LMU München)
• Keywords: Evolution of Reciprocity, Trust, Incomplete Contracts, Separation of Powers
• Themengebiete: 300 Sozialwissenschaften ; 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Economics
• Fakultäten: Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
• Sprache der Hochschulschrift: Englisch
• Datum der mündlichen Prüfung: 27. Januar 2005
• 1. Bericht­erstatter:in: Schmidt, Klaus M.