Political Institutions and Incentives for Economic Reforms

Börner, Kira Astrid (2005): Political Institutions and Incentives for Economic Reforms. Dissertation, LMU München: Faculty of Economics

Abstract

Political institutions matter for the incentives of politicians to implement economic reforms. This dissertation presents tools of analysis for understanding how political institutions constrain and shape the incentives of political decision-makers. Thus, it identifies reasons for why current governments might not enact sufficiently large economic reforms, delay necessary reforms, or take the wrong reform steps, as they are commonly perceived to do. In particular, the dissertation analyzes the incentives to privatize state-owned enterprises, to enact reforms in the presence of influential interest gropus, and to implement anti-corruption measures.

• Item Type: Theses (Dissertation, LMU Munich)
• Keywords: political economy, political institutions, privatization, interest groups, corruption
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences; 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• Faculties: Faculty of Economics
• Language: English
• Date of oral examination: 26. January 2005
• 1. Referee: Schnitzer, Monika
• Signature of the printed copy: 0001/UMC 14289