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Political Institutions and Incentives for Economic Reforms
Political Institutions and Incentives for Economic Reforms
Political institutions matter for the incentives of politicians to implement economic reforms. This dissertation presents tools of analysis for understanding how political institutions constrain and shape the incentives of political decision-makers. Thus, it identifies reasons for why current governments might not enact sufficiently large economic reforms, delay necessary reforms, or take the wrong reform steps, as they are commonly perceived to do. In particular, the dissertation analyzes the incentives to privatize state-owned enterprises, to enact reforms in the presence of influential interest gropus, and to implement anti-corruption measures.
political economy, political institutions, privatization, interest groups, corruption
Börner, Kira Astrid
2005
Englisch
Universitätsbibliothek der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Börner, Kira Astrid (2005): Political Institutions and Incentives for Economic Reforms. Dissertation, LMU München: Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
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Abstract

Political institutions matter for the incentives of politicians to implement economic reforms. This dissertation presents tools of analysis for understanding how political institutions constrain and shape the incentives of political decision-makers. Thus, it identifies reasons for why current governments might not enact sufficiently large economic reforms, delay necessary reforms, or take the wrong reform steps, as they are commonly perceived to do. In particular, the dissertation analyzes the incentives to privatize state-owned enterprises, to enact reforms in the presence of influential interest gropus, and to implement anti-corruption measures.