Neurophilosophy and ethics of false memories and false beliefs

Retkoceri, Urim (2020): Neurophilosophy and ethics of false memories and false beliefs. Dissertation, LMU München: Graduate School of Systemic Neurosciences (GSN)

Abstract

Memory is incredibly important for human life. Because of this importance, memory has been studied for as long as philosophy and science have existed. But, there are many questions left to be answered and many more left to be discovered. In this thesis I mainly focus on the phenomenon of false memory and its implications, and aim to give an interdisciplinary analysis of it. To understand what false memory is, or what it could be, I first take a look at memory in general. For this, I outline different ideas of what kinds of memories there are and introduce three contemporary theories of what it means to remember: the causal theory of memory, the simulation theory of memory and the hybrid theory of memory. After briefly pointing out some possible differences between false memory and confabulation, I describe how those three theories of memory characterize false memory. Having set the stage, three chapters follow which deal with different topics that developed out of what is still missing in the contemporary study of memory and false memory. First, I develop a conceptual account of what it means to falsely remember how to do something. I characterize genuine remembering how as the performance of an act for which a specific ability has been acquired which is necessary to perform that act. False remembering how on the other hand is, crudely put, characterized as the performance of an act that was not tried to be performed but for which the relevant ability has still been acquired. Second, I take a look at what it might mean to remember emotions. For this I look at two components often attributed to emotions, certain physiological or behavioral responses (which I call implicit emotions) and certain conscious experiences (which I call explicit emotions). I describe what it might mean to remember each of these parts and bring them together in a framework that also includes other aspects that are often attributed to emotions. A brief suggestion of what it might mean to falsely remember emotions follows. Third, I tread into the intersection between memory, false memory and moral responsibility. Here I answer the question if you are morally responsibility for the veracity of your memories, that is, if you are morally responsible to ensure that your memories stand in the alleged relation to their purported content. I argue that this can be the case under certain conditions, but only if the moral responsibility is derived from something other than ensuring the veracity of the memory in question. Finally, I discuss how the ideas presented in this thesis could be developed further to understand memory and false memory better. There are still many intriguing questions left to be answered in the interdisciplinary study of false memories, and these questions will guide where we go from here.

• Dokumententyp: Dissertationen (Dissertation, LMU München)
• Keywords: Memory, False Memory, Confabulation, Illusion of Memory, Habit Memory, Procedural Memory, False Procedural Memory, Emotions, Memory of Emotion, Affective Memory, Memory and Morality
• Themengebiete: 500 Naturwissenschaften und Mathematik ; 500 Naturwissenschaften und Mathematik > 570 Biowissenschaften, Biologie
• Fakultäten: Graduate School of Systemic Neurosciences (GSN)
• Sprache der Hochschulschrift: Englisch
• Datum der mündlichen Prüfung: 27. November 2020
• 1. Bericht­erstatter:in: Sellmaier, Stephan