Names and Predicates

A Critique of Predicativism

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Contents

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Deutschsprachige Zusammenfassung

Die vorliegende Dissertation befasst sich mit dem Verhältnis von Eigennamen (im Folgenden 'Namen') und Prädikaten. Ein besonderer Fokus liegt dabei auf der These, dass Namen nicht–wie herkömmlich angenommen–singuläre Terme sind, sondern eine Klasse von Prädikaten bilden. Eine Version dieser These vertritt der Prädikativismus (*predicativism*): Laut Prädikativismus sind Namen metalinguistische Prädikate, und der semantische Gehalt eines Namens *N* ist schlichtweg die Eigenschaft, *N* zu heißen (bzw. ein Träger des Namens *N* zu sein). Eine zentrale Motivation des Prädikativismus sind Vorkommnisse von Namen als zählbare Substantive (*count nouns*): etwa die Vorkommnisse des Namens 'Otto' in Sätzen wie 'Ich kenne einen Otto' oder 'Ich kenne mindestens drei Ottos'; oder der Plural von 'Maria' in 'die drei Marien am Grab'. Meine Arbeit formuliert erstens eine ausführliche Kritik des Prädikativismus und versucht zweitens das Verhältnis von Namen und Prädikaten neu zu bestimmen.

Die Arbeit gliedert sich in sieben Kapitel, wobei Kapitel 1 (*Introduction*) eine knappe Einleitung und Kapitel 7 (*Conclusion*) ein Fazit beinhalten. Im Folgenden umreiße ich die restlichen Kapitel der Arbeit und ihre zentralen Thesen und Argumente. Kapitel 2 und 3 bieten eine Übersicht zu zwei zentralen Aufgaben der Namenstheorie: der *Klassifizierung* und der *semantischen Analyse* von Eigennamen. Beide Kapitel haben einführenden Charakter und bestehen großenteils aus einer historischen Rekonstruktion der analytischen Namenstheorie, von ihren deskriptivistischen Anfängen bei Frege und Russell über Kripkes Kritik des Deskriptivismus bis hin zu neo-deskriptivistischen und prädikativistischen Ansätzen der letzten Jahrzehnte. Kapitel 2 (*Singular Terms vs. Predicates: The Classification of Names*) geht der Frage nach: 'Zu welcher Klasse von sprachlichen Ausdrücken zählen Namen?' und stellt drei mögliche Antworten vor: gemäß der ersten Antwort sind Namen singuläre Terme; gemäß der zweiten Prädikate (und konkreter: zählbare Substantive); die dritte schlägt einen Mittelweg ein und klassifiziert manche Vorkommnisse von Namen als singuläre Terme und andere als Prädikate, womit sich Namen als ambivalent zwischen zwei semantischen Typen erweisen (ich spreche von der *type-ambiguity view*). Kapitel 3 (*From Descriptivism to Predicativism: The Analysis of Names*) zeichnet im Anschluss die Entwicklung der semantischen Analyse von Namen nach, mit einem Schwerpunkt auf Deskriptivismus und Prädikativismus: Manche (nicht alle) Versionen des Prädikativismus lassen sich als verfeinerte Varianten des Deskriptivismus auffassen. In diesem Kontext argumentiere ich u.a., dass der Prädikativismus immun ist gegen einen Großteil von Kripke's Kritik des Deskriptivismus. Außerdem bewerte ich das Verhältnis zwischen den beiden prominentesten Versionen des Prädikativismus, die sich lediglich in ihrer Analyse von referentiellen Namensvorkommnissen unterscheiden: die erste Version (*'the'-predicativism*) analysiert referentielle Vorkommisse als unvollständige definite Kennzeichnungen (*incomplete descriptions*), die zweite Version (*'that'-predicativism*) als komplexe Demonstrativa (*complex demonstratives*). Bereits in Kapitel 3 bringe ich ausführliche Argumente gegen die zweite Version vor und konzentriere meine Diskussion des Prädikativismus in den folgenden Kapiteln daher auf die erste Version.

Kapitel 4 bis 6 entwickeln eine umfangreiche Kritik des Prädikativismus, in detaillierter Auseinandersetzung mit prädikativen Vorkommnissen von Eigennamen. In Kapitel 4 (*The Limits of Predicativism*) gebe ich einen Überblick über mögliche Einwände gegen

den Prädikativismus, wobei Einwände gegen vier Teilkomponenten des Prädikativismus unterschieden werden: gegen die Klassifikation von Namen als Prädikate und zählbare Substantive; die syntaktische Analyse von Namen, insbesondere die Analyse von referentiellen Namensvorkommissen als *incomplete descriptions*; die Paraphrase eines Namens *N* als Phrase der Form 'Träger des Namens *N*'; und die semantische Analyse/Interpretation von Namen, laut der die Eigenschaft, *N* zu heißen, der semantische Gehalt eines Namens *N* ist. Gegen jede dieser Komponenten des Prädikativismus werden Beispiele angeführt, aus dem Englischen wie auch aus anderen Sprachen. Kapitel 5 (*Using Names as Predicates*) stellt die wichtigsten prädikativen Verwendungsweisen von Namen vor, mit einem Fokus auf Verwendungen von Namen als zählbare Substantive mit einer *nicht*-metalinguistischen Bedeutung. Beispiele wären die Verwendung des Familiennamens 'Kennedy' in 'Maria Shriver ist eine Kennedy (ein Mitglied der Kennedy-Familie)' oder die Verwendung des Namens 'Leonardo' in 'Die National Gallery besitzt zwei Leonardos (zwei Kunstwerke/Gemälde von Leonardo da Vinci)'. In diesem Kontext argumentiere ich gegen den Prädikativismus und stattdessen für eine Variante der *type-ambiguity view*. Kapitel 6 (*Names in Labelling Constructions: Referential Mentions or Predicative Uses?*) widmet sich den Vorkommnissen von Namen in sogenannten *labelling constructions*, d.h. in Konstruktionen, die ausdrücken, wie ein Objekt *bezeichnet* wird. Beispiele wären das Vorkommnis des Namens 'Christina' in 'Meine Mutter heißt Christina' oder das Vorkommnis des Namens 'Peter der Große' in 'Historiker nennen Zar Peter I. auch Peter den Großen'. Die Standardauffassung würde besagen, dass derartige Namensvorkommnisse Erwähnungen, nicht Verwendungen sind (und daher eigentlich in Anführungsstriche gesetzt werden müssten); und dass sie als Argumente eines Prädikats fungieren, nicht als Prädikate–die Prädikate der angeführten Sätze wären die Verbformen 'heißt' und 'nennen'. Einige Prädikativisten argumentieren gegen die Standardauffassung, insbesondere mit dem Hinweis, dass Erwähnungen von Namen gewöhnlich im Nominativ stehen, während Namen in *labelling constructions* auch in anderen grammatischen Fällen stehen können (siehe den Akkusativ 'Peter den Großen' im zweiten Beispielsatz). Kapitel 6 dagegen verteidigt die Standardauffassung mit neuen Argumenten. Ein kurzer Appendix (*Names in Noun-Noun Compounds*) widmet sich schließlich der Rolle von Namen in einer spezifischen Art von prädikativer Phrase, nämlich in Komposita, die aus zwei Nomen bestehen. Ich zeige, dass Namen in Komposita nicht jede der Funktionen von zählbaren Substantiven übernehmen können.

1) Introduction

Names are metalinguistic predicates: this, in a nutshell, is the account of proper names defended by predicativists. While most linguists and philosophers treat names as singular terms, predicativists argue that each name *N* is a predicate expressing a metalinguistic property: specifically, the property of being named *N* or, equivalently, of being a bearer of the name *N*. On this account, the name 'Mary', for instance, simply expresses the property of being a bearer of the name 'Mary'.[1]

Predicativism, in its modern form, originated in 1969 with Clarence Sloat's paper on "Proper Nouns".[2] Here and in later versions, predicativism is largely motivated by the observation that names can be used as count nouns, in which case they appear to be used predicatively. Think of the use of 'Mary' in sentences like:

1) There is a Mary in my class.
2) There are two or three Marys in my class.
3) Marys tend to be smart.

In each case, 'Mary' seems to be used as a count noun: e.g., in pluralized form ('Marys') or combined with an indefinite article ('a Mary'). And each such occurrence of 'Mary(s)' can be replaced with a predicative phrase, such as 'bearer(s) of the name 'Mary'' or 'person(s) named 'Mary'', e.g.:

1*) There is a bearer of the name 'Mary' in my class./There is a person named 'Mary' in my class.
2*) There are two or three persons named 'Mary' in my class.
3*) Persons named 'Mary' tend to be smart.

From the early 1970s on, predicativism gained momentum as a middle course between the two main rivals in the theory of names: descriptivism on one side and referentialism or Millianism on the other. In comparison to these two dominating views, predicativism can be seen as having three main advantages. First, predicativism is best suited to giving an integrated analysis of *all* name-uses, that is, of referential and predicative name-uses alike. This is an advantage over both descriptivism and referentialism: historically, the theory of names has focused on referential uses, while predicative uses have largely been neglected. Second, predicativism retains some of the advantages of descriptivism over referentialism: e.g., it solves at least some of Frege's puzzles. Third, predicativism retains some of the advantages of referentialism over the traditional versions of descriptivism: most importantly, predicativism accounts for the modal and epistemic profile of names that had motivated Kripke's critique of descriptivism in *Naming and Necessity*.

This dissertation is a study of the relationship between names and predicates. More specifically, we have two main objectives. The first is to provide *new arguments against predicativism*, the second to develop an extensive *account of predicative uses of names*: that is, occurrences of a name *N* where *N* is used as a predicate or, equivalently, where *N*

[1] See, e.g., Graff Fara 2015a, 70; Bach 2015, 774f.; Burge 1973, 430 (where the name 'Jones' in the phrase 'a Jones' is substituted with the "roughly co-extensive predicate expression 'entity called "Jones"'").

[2] Quine's (1948, 27) analysis of names is sometimes seen as a precursor of predicativism. Quine analyzes names as descriptions, not as predicates; but those descriptions in turn contain predicates artificially derived from the name in question: e.g., 'Pegasus' would be analyzed as 'the thing that is-Pegasus' or 'the thing that pegasizes', containing the artificially derived predicates 'is-Pegasus'/'pegasizes'. Also, different from predicativism as we define it, the predicates in Quine's analysis are non-metalinguistic.

is used to convey a property or relation. As we just saw, both topics–predicativism and predicative name-uses–are closely intertwined: the existence of predicative name-uses is the main piece of evidence for predicativism. At the same time, we consider predicative name-uses a subject in its own right: a subject that both among linguists and philosophers of language has not received the attention it deserves.

1.1) Overview of the Thesis

Against this background, let us give a brief overview of the remaining chapters of this study. Chapters 2 and 3 have an introductory character: they will provide a more general introduction into the theory of names and its historic development since Frege, focusing on two questions: what class of linguistic expressions do names belong to? And how should names be analyzed, or more specifically: what is the semantic content of names? Chapter 2 (*Singular Terms vs. Predicates: The Classification of Names*) deals with the *classification* of names: here, we show how predicativism breaks with the long-established standard in linguistics and philosophy to classify names as singular terms; instead, predicativism classifies names as predicates and, more specifically, as count nouns. By contrast, chapter 3 (*From Descriptivism to Predicativism: The Analysis of Names*) deals with the *semantic analysis* of names: here, we contrast predicativism with alternative approaches in the theory of names, especially with earlier versions of descriptivism, which predicativists–to some extent–aim to revive. We argue that predicativism evades at least some of Kripke's critique of descriptivism.

By contrast, chapters 4 to 6 contain an extensive critique of predicativism, combined with an account of predicative name-uses. Chapter 4 (*The Limits of Predicativism*) begins with an overview of possible objections against predicativism, distinguishing four main components of predicativism: the classification, syntactic analysis, paraphrase, and semantic analysis/interpretation of names. As we will see, some, but not all, of these challenges can be met by refining the predicativist account. Chapter 5 (*Predicative Uses of Names*) provides a detailed theory of predicative name-uses: the focus will be on uses of names as count nouns and, more specifically, on uses whose content is *not* metalinguistic. Here, we argue–against predicativism–that referential name-uses should not be analyzed on the model of metalinguistic predicative name-uses: rather, metalinguistic predicative name-uses should be analyzed as metonymies, just like most *non*-metalinguistic predicative name-uses; and referential name-uses should be analyzed as referential, not as predicative–just as one would intuitively expect. Chapter 6 (*Names in Labelling Constructions: Referential Mentions or Predicative Uses?*) deals with a more remote topic: with occurrences of names in labelling constructions, e.g., the occurrences of the name 'Mary' in constructions like 'She is called 'Mary'' or 'Her parents named her 'Mary''. Some predicativists have forcefully argued that such occurrences of 'Mary' are not mentions that refer to the name 'Mary' itself, but should rather be analyzed as predicative uses that express a metalinguistic relation. Here, we defend the orthodox view against predicativism: names in labelling constructions are referential mentions, not predicative uses. Finally, chapter 7 draws a conclusion, after which we add a brief appendix on the role of names in one particular type of predicative phrases, namely in noun-noun compounds.

2) Singular Terms vs. Predicates: The Classification of Names

By classifying names as predicates, predicativists give a controversial answer to one of the fundamental questions in the theory of names:

- What class of linguistic expressions do names belong to?

In this section, we briefly review a number of different classifications. We begin with the standard view that names are singular terms (2.1), then introduce the distinction between apparent referential and apparent predicative name-uses (2.2), and consider what effect the existence of apparent predicative name-uses has on the classification of names (2.3). Next, we will look at the view that names are predicates (2.4), the closely connected view that names are count nouns (2.5), and the view that names are predicates on some of their uses, and singular terms on others (2.6). Finally, section 2.7 adds three related issues: 2.7.1 deals with the question of how to individuate names, which will give us a more general perspective on their classification. 2.7.2 gives a brief overview of the morpho-syntactic variety of names and name-uses, which will be relevant to the distinction between referential and predicative name-uses. And 2.7.3 briefly discusses some defining features of proper names and demarcates them from proper nouns.

Before we begin, let us insert a more general observation: some of the classifications of names we are going to encounter are semantic/pragmatic, while others are morphosyntactic. E.g., the classifications of names as singular terms or as predicates typically conceive of the two notions in semantic/pragmatic terms.[3] Roughly, singular terms would here be defined as expressions used to refer to individual objects,[4] and predicates (or general terms) as expressions used to express properties or relations. These conceptions will largely suffice for our purposes.[5] Also, we will largely bracket the question whether reference is only a pragmatic or also a semantic phenomenon: e.g., we will not decide whether a singular term is only a tool by which *speakers* refer, or whether also the singular term *itself* refers (or at least its uses or tokens/utterances).[6] On the other hand, we will also encounter *morphosyntactic* classifications of names, especially the classification of names as count nouns: here, count nouns are typically conceived in morphosyntactic terms, namely as nouns that can be pluralized (a morphological criterion), can be combined with numerals (a syntactic criterion), etc. Against this background, let us look at the classification of names in more detail.

2.1) The Singular Term View

Historically, names have mostly been classified as singular terms: we call this classification the *singular term view*. At first glance, the singular term view seems compelling: after all, we mostly use names to refer to unique objects. E.g., in ‘My friend Mary is coming for dinner’ or ‘I saw Mary today’, the name ‘Mary’ is used to refer to a unique

[3] E.g., predicativists typically do not assume a syntactic conception of predicates as the head of a clause or, alternatively, as the head of a verb phrase. See Carnie 2007, 57f.; Pullum/Huddleston 2002, 24.
[4] For two related conceptions, see Bach (2008: 14: singular terms are expressions “that can be used to refer”, where the notion of reference is restricted to *singular* reference) and Lycan (2000: 9: singular terms are expressions “that purport to refer to single individuals”).
[5] Especially the conception of singular terms leaves room for improvement: e.g., we might want to account for *empty/non-referring* singular terms, for the use of singular terms in fictional discourse, etc. For simplicity, we will assume that singular terms in such contexts are used to refer to *abstract* objects.
[6] See Bach 2008, 14.

object (here: person). In ‘Paris is beautiful’ or ‘I currently live in Paris’, the name ‘Paris’ is used to refer to a unique object (here: city). In ‘Apple’s stock dropped by 2%’ or ‘Steve Jobs was the founder of Apple’, the name ‘Apple’ is used to refer to a unique object (here: company). Obviously, each of these names can be used to refer to different objects on different occasions: more than one object is named ‘Mary’, more than one object is named ‘Paris’ (Paris, France; Paris, Texas; Paris Hilton), etc. But still, on each occasion we utter any of the sentences just quoted, we use the respective name to refer to exactly one object.

The singular term view comes in a number of different versions.[7] Most versions classify names as belonging to a larger class of singular terms, in particular to the classes of definite descriptions, indexicals, individual constants, or variables. Let us call these versions the *description view*, the *indexical view*, the *constant view*, and the *variable view*. Note that the description view and the indexical view assimilate names to other singular terms of *natural* languages, while the constant view and the variable view assimilate names to singular terms of *formal* languages. The description view is defended by most descriptivists; the indexical view by François Recanati (1993) and Robert Brandom (2001), among others; the constant view by most referentialists; and the variable view, e.g., by Samuel Cumming (2008). Finally, some might classify names as singular terms *sui generis*, rather than as belonging to any larger class of singular terms; we will set this version aside and instead focus on the four previous versions.

Proponents of the description view conceive of definite descriptions as being associated with properties: e.g., the definite description ‘the inventor of the lightning rod’ is associated with the property of having invented the lightning rod. The semantics of descriptions then stipulates that for all definite descriptions *D* and all *x*: *D* refers to *x* iff only *x* exemplifies the property associated with *D*. E.g., for all *x*: the description ‘the inventor of the lightning rod’ refers to *x* iff *x* uniquely exemplifies the property of having invented the lightning rod (that is, iff *x* is the inventor of the lightning rod). Proponents of the description view would then argue that names are definite descriptions ‘in disguise’. That is, like ‘ordinary’ definite descriptions, names are associated with properties, and their reference depends on the unique exemplification of those properties: so, for all names *N* and all *x*: *N* refers to *x* iff only *x* exemplifies the property associated with *N*. Defenders of the description view might still concede that there are major differences between names and ordinary definite descriptions; let us mention three such differences. First, in the case of ordinary definite descriptions, the associated property is expressed by a predicative term/phrase that is *part* of the description: e.g., in the case of the description ‘the inventor of the lightning rod’, the associated property of having invented the lightning rod is expressed by the count noun phrase ‘inventor of the lightning rod’. By contrast, names typically do not contain such predicative parts. Second, all competent users of an ordinary definite description will associate the description with the *same* property: e.g., all competent users of the description ‘the inventor of the lightning rod’ will associate the description with the property of having invented the lightning rod. By contrast, different competent users of a name may associate the name with different properties: e.g., I might associate the name ‘Benjamin Franklin’ with the property of having invented the lightning

[7] For in large part similar remarks, see Rami 2022, 2.

rod, while you associate it with the property of having been the first postmaster general of the United States–both properties are uniquely exemplified by Benjamin Franklin. Third, the classification of names as disguised definite descriptions abstracts away from the *morphological* differences between names and ordinary definite descriptions. E.g., many names consist only of proper nouns, while all ordinary definite descriptions (at least in English) contain a definite article or a possessive pronoun. Also, names typically do not morphologically *abbreviate* any definite descriptions. E.g., according to proponents of the description view, I can associate the name 'Benjamin Franklin' with the property of having invented the lightning rod, but clearly, the name is not morphologically derived from the description 'the inventor of the lightning rod', nor vice versa. For a side note, observe that descriptivism does not *entail* the description view: descriptivists might claim that names behave semantically largely like definite descriptions, while also maintaining that the differences between names and ordinary definite descriptions outweigh their similarities; in that case, they might refuse to classify names as definite descriptions and instead limit the class of definite descriptions to *ordinary* definite descriptions.

Next, consider the indexical view, which comes in two main versions; we call them the *contextual view* (defended, e.g., by Recanati) and the *anaphoric view* (defended, e.g., by Brandom). The contextual view proposes that names, like indexicals, are associated with Kaplanian characters: that is, with functions from contexts of utterance to objects.[8] For a paradigm example of indexicals, take the personal pronoun 'I': according to theorists like Kaplan, 'I' is associated with a function that maps every context in which 'I' is uttered to the person making that utterance.[9] E.g., a context in which Obama says 'I am American' will be mapped to Obama, ensuring that Obama uses the indexical 'I' to refer to himself. Similarly, a name *N* can be associated with a function that maps every context in which *N* is uttered to the bearer of *N* in that context. E.g., assume I say 'Obama is American' in a context of talking about US politics; in that context, the bearer of the name 'Obama' is, say, Barack Obama; so, the function associated with the name 'Obama' will map that context to Barack Obama. (To be sure, matters are a little more complicated: the name 'Obama' may have *more than one* bearer in a given context. To account for this, Recanati speaks of the convention that is "operative" in a context.[10])

By contrast, the anaphoric view likens names to anaphoric uses of indexicals: that is, to uses of indexicals that inherit their reference from an antecedent, an expression previously used in the discourse.[11] Think of the sentence 'Mary likes her bike', where the indexical 'her' is used anaphorically and inherits its reference from the antecedent 'Mary'. Following Kripke,[12] Brandom then suggests that a name (or a specific *use* of a name) is typically introduced in an initial baptism, where the reference of the name is fixed by a reference-fixer–an indexical or a definite description. This way, the reference-fixer becomes the antecedent to later tokens of the name, which again inherit their reference from the reference-fixer.[13] E.g., to name my newborn daughter, I might point at her and say

[8] See, e.g., Recanati 1993, 140-146; Pelczar/Rainsbury 1998.
[9] See Kaplan 1989, 505f.
[10] Recanati 1993, 141.
[11] See Brandom 2001, 579-583.
[12] See Kripke 1980, 96f.
[13] See Brandom 2001, 580f.

'She shall be named 'Mary''; here, the pronoun 'she' (an indexical) acts as the reference-fixer for a specific use of the name 'Mary'. On the indexical view, when speakers later utter tokens of 'Mary' with the intention to refer to my daughter, the reference-fixer 'she' will act as the antecedent from which the tokens of 'Mary' inherit their reference.

Again, proponents of either version of the indexical view may concede that there are crucial differences between names and 'ordinary' indexicals. First, Recanati argues that the character of an ordinary indexical concerns *tokens* of the indexical, while the character of a name concerns the name itself, that is, an expression *type* rather than an expression token. E.g., the character of the ordinary indexical 'I' maps any context to the speaker who utters a *token* of 'I' in that context; by contrast, the supposed character of the name 'Obama' maps any context to the object bearing the name-*type* 'Obama' in that context.[14] Second, in the case of anaphoric uses of indexicals, the antecedent typically belongs to the immediate discourse context, e.g., is part of a conversation or text that also contains the anaphorically used indexical. This is not the case for names: a name's reference-fixer might be temporally remote from a particular token of the name–the reference-fixer for our use of the name 'Leonardo' for Leonardo da Vinci was presumably uttered more than five centuries ago, around the time of his birth in 1452.

The constant view differs from the description and indexical views by drawing a clear line between names and any other singular terms of natural languages. Proponents of the constant view might argue against the previous views for either of two reasons. Either they deny the supposed similarities between names and ordinary descriptions/indexicals: e.g., they would typically deny that names are associated with properties, as suggested by the description view. Or they concede those similarities, but take the similarities to be outweighed by differences: e.g., the differences between names and ordinary definite descriptions might outweigh their similarities, which might be a sufficient reason not to subsume names under the type of definite descriptions. The perhaps clearest version of the constant view is Barcan Marcus' famed suggestion that names are mere "tags":[15] that is, names are expressions that objects are tagged with, without any associated properties, associated functions from contexts to objects, or the like.

The variable view (defended, e.g., by Cumming) is more isolated. According to this view, names are variables, and like any variable, they can have free and bound occurrences. In typical referential uses, names are free variables. E.g., assume I begin a conversation about politics by saying 'Trump talked to Putin today': so, both my utterance of 'Trump' and my utterance of 'Putin' would be discourse-initial.[16] In such a context, Cumming would analyze the sentence as '*x* talked to *y* today', where the two variables '*x*' and '*y*' are free. Formally: '$T_{today}(x, y)$', where 'T' stands for the two-place predicate 'talk to'.[17] By contrast, take a sentence like 'An uncle of mine is named 'John', and John turned sixty today', where the use of 'John' in the second conjunct anaphorically depends on the phrase 'an uncle of mine' in the first conjunct. Cumming suggests analyzing such anaphoric name-uses as bound variables: so, the sentence would be analyzed as 'There is an *x* s.t. *x* is an uncle of mine, *x* is named 'John', and *x* turned sixty today', where all

[14] See Recanati 1993, 401.
[15] See Barcan Marcus 1961, 308-310.
[16] On discourse-initial utterances of names, see also Cumming 2007, 2f., 15f.
[17] For similar examples, see Cumming 2008, 540-542.

occurrences of '*x*' are bound by the existential quantifier. Formally: '$\exists x(\mathrm{U}(x, \mathrm{I}) \wedge \mathrm{N}(x,$ 'John') $\wedge \mathrm{S}_{\mathrm{today}}(x))$', where 'U' stands for the two-place predicate 'being an uncle of', 'N' for the two-place predicate 'being named', and 'S' for the one-place predicate 'turn sixty', while 'I' is the first-person pronoun.[18]

2.2) Apparent Referential vs. Apparent Predicative Name-Uses

The different versions of the singular term view that we looked at in the previous section have one important feature in common: they classify names based on the same type of utterances and occurrences, namely utterances/occurrences where a name is used to refer to a particular object, specifically to one of the name's bearers. Predicativists, by contrast, direct our attention to occurrences of names that are predicative rather than referential. We already pointed to some such occurrences: recall the occurrences of 'Mary(s)' in sentences like 'There is a Mary in my class', 'There are two or three Marys in my class', or 'Marys tend to be smart': all these occurrences convey a property, specifically the metalinguistic property of being a bearer of the name 'Mary'. Since predicativists classify all name-uses as predicative and none as referential, it has become standard to distinguish not just between referential and predicative uses, but between *apparent referential* and *apparent predicative* uses: predicativists argue that the name-uses traditionally classified as referential *appear* to be referential, but are *in fact* predicative.[19] Also, it might turn out that some occurrences that appear to be referential or predicative name-uses are, in fact, not even uses of *names*, but of expressions merely *homophonous* with names; hence, we will also speak of *apparent name-uses*.

In the remainder of this section, we will look at two ways to distinguish apparent referential name-uses and apparent predicative name-uses: first, we distinguish between name-uses that are bare singulars and ones that are plurals or non-bare singulars. Second, we distinguish between name-uses in argument position and name-uses in predicate position. The first distinction is morphosyntactic, the second semantic. To illustrate the first distinction, consider a few example sentences:[20]

1) Mary is a friend of mine.
2) I met Mary today.
3) I gave Mary the keys.
4) The trip with Mary was fun.
5) Mary's brother came over.

In sentences **(1-5)**, the name 'Mary' occurs as a bare singular, that is, as a singular that is not combined with any determiners–with any articles, possessives, demonstrative pronouns, etc. (Note that bare singulars are not necessarily in the lexical form, as shown by the genitive 'Mary's' in **(5)**.) Compare these sentences to the following:

6) There is a Mary in my class.
7) There is exactly one Mary in my class.
8) The two Marys in my class are smart.
9) Marys tend to be smart.

[18] For similar examples, see Cumming 2008, 542f.
[19] See also Leckie 2013, 1140f.
[20] For a similar set of sentences, see Graff Fara 2015a, 69.

Sentence **(6)** contains a non-bare singular occurrence of 'Mary', combined with an indefinite article. Similarly for **(7)**, where the non-bare singular occurrence of 'Mary' is combined with the quantifier phrase 'exactly one'. **(8)** contains a non-bare plural occurrence of 'Mary', combined with the numeral 'two', and **(9)** contains a bare plural occurrence.

The second distinction is illustrated by **(1-9)** as well. In **(1)**, 'Mary' occurs as subject argument, in **(2)** as direct object argument, in **(3)** as indirect object argument, in **(4)** as prepositional complement, and in **(5)** as possessive determiner. Arguably, in all five cases, 'Mary' occurs in argument position. Specifically, subject and object arguments are arguments of a sentence/clause predicate: e.g., in **(1)**, the sentence predicate is 'is a friend of mine', in **(2)** 'met', and in **(3)** 'gave'. Similarly, prepositional complements can be treated as object arguments of prepositions. E.g., in a construction like **(4)**, one might suggest that the preposition 'with' expresses a function that maps the referent of 'Mary' to the extension of the phrase 'with Mary'; this way, 'Mary' is analyzed as an argument of 'with'.[21] Finally, in constructions like **(5)**, the possessive determiner phrase 'Mary's brother' is best analyzed as a covert definite description ('the brother of Mary'), in which case 'Mary' can be treated as an argument of 'brother'.[22] In each of these examples, the semantic type of 'Mary' would be e. By contrast, in sentences **(6-9)**, 'Mary' clearly occurs in predicative position: observe how 'Mary' can be grammatically replaced with common nouns like 'girl' ('There is a girl in my class', 'Girls tend to be smart', etc.). The semantic type of these occurrences would be <e,t>.

2.3) Responding to Apparent Predicative Name-Uses

Let us return to the central question of this section: what class of expressions do names belong to? As is now obvious, the answer to this question depends at least in part on how we respond to the distinction between apparent referential name-uses and apparent predicative name-uses. For one possible response, we might argue that things are just as they appear: apparent referential name-uses are indeed referential uses of names, and apparent predicative name-uses are indeed predicative uses of names. In that case, it would seem plausible that names are singular terms on some of their uses, and predicates on others. Then again, appearances can be deceptive: e.g., defenders of the singular term view might argue that apparent predicative name-uses are not even uses of *names*, but of predicates that are merely *derived* from names; by contrast, critics of the singular term view might argue that apparent referential name-uses are in fact predicative name-uses in disguise. In the first case, names would be singular terms on all their uses; in the second, they would be predicates on all their uses.

And matters might get more intricate. First, the classification of an expression might in part depend on which uses of the expression are *literal*. E.g., assume that only referential name-uses are literal, while predicative name-uses are not: in that case, names would have to be classified as singular terms, not as predicates. Second, the classification of an expression might in part depend on which uses of the expression are *most common* or *most basic*. For comparison, think of adjectives: the expression 'rich' can be used as a noun ranging over the set of rich people ('The rich are getting richer'); but on its most

[21] See also Heim/Kratzer 1998, 63-66.
[22] See Heim/Kratzer 1998, 106, 161.

common/most basic uses, 'rich' is used as an adjective, and hence we classify 'rich' as an adjective, not as a noun. The same reasoning might be applied to names: e.g., most would argue that on their most common uses, names are used referentially, that is, as singular terms; so, by this reasoning, names should be classified as singular terms, not as predicates–no matter if they also have predicative uses or not.

In the literature, one finds mainly two responses to the distinction between apparent referential name-uses and apparent predicative name-uses. According to the first, all apparent name-uses are what they appear to be: apparent referential name-uses are referential name-uses, apparent predicative name-uses are predicative name-uses, and neither kind of use takes precedence over the other. So, names are both singular terms and predicates–they are singular terms on referential uses, and predicates on predicative uses. This view has variously been called *polysemy view* and *type-ambiguity view*; we will mostly use the latter term. According to the second response, all apparent name-uses, including apparent referential name-uses, are predicative name-uses; hence, names are predicates, not singular terms. We call this view the *predicate view*.[23] Both the type-ambiguity view and the predicate view are *semantically* motivated. At the same time, the predicate view has a *morphosyntactic* variant: the view that names are count nouns on all their uses. We call this latter view the *count noun view*. Typically, predicativists defend both the predicate view and the count noun view.

The type-ambiguity view seems to be the more intuitive choice: it simply follows the appearances that already guided our pre-theoretic distinction between apparent referential name-uses and apparent predicative name-uses. The predicate view and the count noun view are less intuitive, especially regarding their signature claim that apparent referential name-uses should be analyzed as predicates and, more specifically, as count nouns. In the next three sections, we will first have a closer look at the predicate view, then at the count noun view, and lastly at the type-ambiguity view.

2.4) Predicativism and the Predicate View

Observe the difference in how we defined predicativism and the predicate view: the predicate view states that names are predicates, while predicativism states that names are *metalinguistic* predicates. So, predicativism entails the predicate view, but not vice versa: e.g., the predicate view would be compatible with the view that names are metalinguistic predicates on some uses, but *non-metalinguistic* predicates on others. Still, among contemporary linguistics and philosophers, predicativists are the only defenders of the predicate view; hence, we will focus on the predicativist version of the predicate view.

The greatest challenge in defending the predicate view is to explain how apparent referential name-uses can be predicative. Predicativists agree on the following two claims:

- Any name *N* is used predicatively on all its uses, including on apparent referential uses; the content of all occurrences of *N* is the metalinguistic property of being a bearer of the name *N*.

[23] To avoid misunderstandings, note that the term *predicate view* is sometimes used more restrictively, namely to refer simply to predicativism, that is, to the view that names are *metalinguistic* predicates (e.g., Gray 2014, 207). By contrast, we use it to refer to the more general view that names are predicates (metalinguistic or not).

- Apparent referential uses of a name *N* are part of a (denuded) referential determiner phrase of the form '$Ø_{Det}$ + *N*', where $Ø_{Det}$ is a determiner Det that remains unpronounced.[24]

Here, a phrase is said to be 'denuded' iff part of the phrase remains unpronounced.[25] *Unpronounced* is in this context synonymous with *null*, *empty*, *suppressed*, *implicit*, or *covert*.[26]

At the same time, predicativists disagree about the nature of the determiner Det. They offer two versions:[27]

- 'The'-predicativism: Det is a definite article, so '$Ø_{Det}$ + *N*' is a denuded definite description.
- 'That'-predicativism: Det is a demonstrative, so '$Ø_{Det}$ + *N*' is a denuded complex demonstrative.

We will write the first option as $Ø_{the}$ and the second as $Ø_{that}$. 'The'-predicativism is defended by Sloat (1969: 28), Larson/Segal (1995: 352-355), Elbourne (2005: 171-173), Matushansky (2008: 599f.), Bach (2015: 774), and Graff Fara (2015: 81-95), among others; 'that'-predicativism by Sawyer (2010: 206f., 214-217) and potentially by Burge (1973: 426-428).[28]

To illustrate the two versions of the predicate view, consider the apparent referential use of the name 'Mary' in 'Mary is smart'. According to 'that'-predicativists, 'Mary is smart' can be successively analyzed as follows:

- Mary is smart.
- $Ø_{that}$ Mary is smart.
- That bearer of the name 'Mary' is smart.[29]

By contrast, 'the'-predicativists would analyze 'Mary is smart' as follows:

- Mary is smart.
- $Ø_{the}$ Mary is smart.
- The bearer of the name 'Mary' is smart.[30]

At first glance, 'that'-predicativism seems more promising than 'the'-predicativism. After all, we would typically assume that various names–including the name 'Mary'–have *more than one* bearer, and predicativists share that pre-theoretic assumption. This seems compatible with 'that'-predicativism, but not with 'the'-predicativism: a complex demonstrative of the form 'that bearer of the name 'Mary'' has no implications for the number of bearers of 'Mary', while according to the standard Russellian analysis, a definite description of the form 'the bearer of the name 'Mary'' presupposes that 'Mary' has only one bearer. To avoid this consequence, 'the'-predicativists add an important refinement: in their analysis of apparent referential uses of a name *N*, definite descriptions of the form '$Ø_{the}$ *N*' or 'the bearer of the name *N*' are meant as *incomplete* rather than *complete*

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[24] See, e.g., Graff Fara 2015a, 60. We adopt the notation with the empty set symbol (typically used for null allomorphs) from Graff Fara 2015a. Gray 2014 uses a 'null' in the subscript (e.g., 'the_{null}' instead of '$Ø_{the}$').
[25] We adopt the terminology from Graff Fara 2015a, 60.
[26] See, in this order, Sloat 1969, 27; Longobardi 1994, 617; Elugardo 2002, 479; King 2006, 148; Bach 2015, 774.
[27] See Graff Fara 2015a, 60f., 74. The terms *'the'-predicativism* and *'that'-predicativism* are due to Graff Fara 2015a.
[28] Burge (1973: 432f.) only speaks of a "demonstrative element" that combines with apparent referential name-uses. As pointed out by King (2006: 148f.), this does not necessarily mean that the demonstrative is a *syntactic* element–it might also be a *semantic/pragmatic* element, contributing the referent of the phrase; Bach (2015: 774) favors the second reading. Also note that apart from Sawyer and Burge, Elugardo (2002: 480f.) is sympathetic to $Ø_{that}$, but does not give a full endorsement.
[29] See Burge 1973, e.g., 431f. More recent proponents include Elugardo 2002 and Sawyer 2010.
[30] See Graff Fara 2015a, 70.

descriptions.[31] This would apply, e.g., to descriptions like '$Ø_{the}$ Mary' in '$Ø_{the}$ Mary is smart', or 'the bearer of the name 'Mary'' in 'The bearer of the name 'Mary' is smart'. We will work with the following definition of complete and incomplete descriptions:

- A speaker uses the definite description 'the *F*'
  - as a complete description iff the speaker uses 'the *F*' with the intention to refer to whatever individual uniquely exemplifies the property of being an *F*;
  - as an incomplete description iff there is an *x* s.t. *x* is an *F*, and the speaker uses 'the *F*' with the intention to refer to *x*.

As famously observed by Peter Strawson in *On Referring*, we often use definite descriptions as incomplete rather than complete descriptions.[32] For an example not involving names, picture the following scenario: you and I are in my apartment; you ask me, 'Do you have any napkins?', and I answer, 'There are napkins in the kitchen'. My answer contains the definite description 'the kitchen', but obviously, I do not intend to convey that there is *only one* kitchen in the entire universe. Instead, I use the description 'the kitchen' to refer to one *particular* kitchen, namely the one in my apartment. 'The'-predicativists would argue that bare singular occurrences of names–or typical utterances of such occurrences–function roughly the same way: if a speaker utters a bare singular occurrence of a name *N*, then that occurrence is in fact an incomplete use of the denuded description '$Ø_{the}$ *N*', which can be further analyzed as an incomplete use of the description 'the bearer of the name *N*'. E.g., when I utter 'Mary is smart', the utterance of the bare singular occurrence of 'Mary' thereby abbreviates an incomplete use of the description '$Ø_{the}$ Mary' and, under further analysis, of the description 'the bearer of the name 'Mary''.

At this stage, we do not go into detail about the semantics and pragmatics of apparent referential name-uses; we will return to this issue in section 3.4.2 below. Note, however, that in line with much of the literature, we will often tacitly assume the following principle for the reference of incomplete descriptions:

- An utterance of a definite description 'the *F*' as an incomplete description refers to *x* iff *x* is the *most salient F* in the context of utterance.

That is, we explicate the reference of incomplete descriptions in terms of *salience*.[33] E.g., in the kitchen-example, the most salient kitchen in the context of our conversation is the kitchen in my apartment. Similar remarks hold for apparent referential name-uses: when we utter an apparent referential use of a name *N*, that utterance typically refers to (and is intended to refer to) the most salient bearer of *N* in the context of utterance. E.g., if you and I have exactly one common friend named 'Mary' and I tell you, 'Mary is joining us for dinner', our common friend is presumably the salient bearer of 'Mary' in that context; and I can be expected to refer with my utterance of 'Mary' to that Mary.

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[31] See, e.g., Larson/Segal 1995, 352-355 (Larson and Segal speak interchangeably of incomplete descriptions, improper descriptions, referential definites, and the referential *the*); Geurts 1997, 325; Graff Fara 2015a, 97; Bach 2015, 774. The treatment of definite descriptions of the form '$Ø_{the}$ *N*' or 'the bearer of the name *N*' as incomplete also deflects Burge's argument against the version of 'the'-predicativism that he ascribes to Russell and Quine; see Burge 1973, 431.

[32] See Strawson 1950, 332f. (on 'The table is covered with books'). For an extended discussion, see Neale 1990, 93-102.

[33] For the approach of explicating the reference of incomplete descriptions in terms of salience, see, e.g., Lewis 1979, 348; and in the context of predicativism, e.g., Gray 2014, 208f.

2.5) Predicativism and the Count Noun View

In the previous section, we encountered a semantic classification of names defended by predicativists: the classification of names as predicates; and we saw how that classification was motivated by apparent predicative name-uses. In this section, we add a morpho-syntactic classification of names that is again mainly defended by predicativists: the classification of names as count nouns. We will speak of the *count noun view*.

The count noun view is mainly motivated by apparent predicative uses of proper *nouns*. Consider the influential chart by Clarence Sloat, comparing how the proper noun 'Smith' and the common count noun 'man' combine with various determiners and modifiers:[34]

1)	A man stopped by.	A Smith stopped by.
2)	*Some man stopped by.	*Some Smith stopped by.
3)	Sóme man stopped by.	Sóme Smith stopped by.
4)	Some men stopped by.	Some Smiths stopped by.
5)	Sóme men stopped by.	Sóme Smiths stopped by.
6)	Men must breathe.	Smiths must breathe.
7)	The clever man stopped by.	The clever Smith stopped by.
8)	The man who is clever stopped by.	The Smith who is clever stopped by.
9)	A clever man stopped by.	A clever Smith stopped by.
10)	The men stopped by.	The Smiths stopped by.
11)	The man stopped by.	*The Smith stopped by.
12)	*Man stopped by.	Smith stopped by.

In what follows, we will call this chart the *Sloat chart*.[35] Also, we will call uses of names as count nouns simply *count-noun-uses*. One remark on the second to fifth lines: here, 'some' without an accent is meant to be the "low-stressed"[36] version of 'some' that typically combines with singular mass nouns ('I drank some milk'), while the stressed 'sóme' is the version of 'some' typically combined with singular count nouns ('I met some guy'). As can be seen in the chart, Sloat extends both versions of 'some' to plural nouns, where the behavior of the two versions seems to be identical.[37]

We could add several further similarities. E.g., we could add lines using a *stressed* definite article,[38] a demonstrative pronoun, or an interrogative pronoun:

The man stopped by.	*The* Smith stopped by.
That man stopped by.	That Smith stopped by.[39]
Which man stopped by?	Which Smith stopped by?

[34] See Sloat 1969, 27.
[35] In line with Jeshion 2017, 221.
[36] Sloat 1969, 26.
[37] Graff Fara and Jeshion interpret the first version of 'some' as the one that also naturally combines with plural count nouns, and the second as the one standardly analyzed as an existential quantifier. See Graff Fara 2015a, 81 (where the first version of 'some' is spelled 'sm'); Jeshion 2015a, 228 (where the second version of 'some' is spelled '*s*ome'). We are hesitant to adopt this analysis, for two reasons: first, it seems dubious whether there is a difference in stress between a typical utterance of 'I drank some milk' and a typical utterance of 'I met some guy'. Second, there does not seem to be a natural language version of 'some' that combines with plural nouns, but does *not* imply a plural: 'Some men stopped by' will be false if only one man stopped by, no matter if 'some' is stressed or not. By contrast, the existential quantifier does not imply a plural: $\exists x$(x is a man and x stopped by) will be true if more than one man stopped by, but also if only one man stopped by.
[38] Sloat agrees: Sloat 1969, 28.
[39] See Graff Fara 2015a, 82.

(Both in '*the* man' and '*the* Smith', the emphasis on the definite article can convey special importance or fame: *the* Smith is the most important or most famous Smith, just as *the* man is the most important or most famous man.)

Sloat argues that the close similarity in the syntactic behavior of proper nouns and common count nouns indicates that they belong to the same class of nouns: proper nouns, just as common count nouns,[40] simply form a subclass of the class of count nouns.[41] Proper and common count nouns should then be given the same syntactic analysis, which is achieved by analyzing the syntactic differences between them as merely occurring on the level of pronunciation.[42] Again, the most plausible option would then interpret bare singular names as combining with an unpronounced determiner, such $Ø_{the}$ or $Ø_{that}$. Sloat favors $Ø_{the}$ over $Ø_{that}$. To see why, consider the main difference between names and count nouns: on apparent referential uses, most names can occur as bare singulars and most count nouns cannot,[43] while the opposite is true for the combination with a pronounced (and unstressed) definite article:

- bare singular: *I met man. I met Smith.
- definite article: I met the man. *I met the Smith.

Also recall that names with *bare* apparent referential uses typically *do* allow for pronounced demonstratives, as in 'I met that Smith'. Then, the similarity between names and count nouns can be restored if we analyze bare singulars as combining with $Ø_{the}$:

- admissible definite article: I met the man. I met $Ø_{the}$ Smith.
- inadmissible definite article: *I met $Ø_{the}$ man. *I met the Smith.
- demonstrative: I met that man. I met that Smith.

In that case, the only difference between names and count nouns will be that the admissible definite article is pronounced with count nouns and unpronounced with names, and the other way around for the inadmissible definite article. By contrast, the similarity is not restored if we analyze bare singulars as combining with $Ø_{that}$:

- admissible demonstrative: I met that man. I met that/$Ø_{that}$ Smith.
- inadmissible demonstrative: *I met $Ø_{that}$ man. /
- definite article: I met the man. *I met the Smith.

Note that the Sloat chart also motivates the *metalinguistic* component of the predicativist analysis of names: that is, the view that a name *N* expresses the metalinguistic property of being a bearer of *N*. Indeed, it seems that in *most* lines of the Sloat chart, the name 'Smith' simply conveys the metalinguistic property of being a bearer of the name 'Smith'. E.g.:

- A Smith stopped by: A bearer of the name 'Smith' stopped by.
  Sóme Smith stopped by: Sóme bearer of the name 'Smith' stopped by.
  Some Smiths stopped by: Some bearers of the name 'Smith' stopped by.
  Sóme Smiths stopped by: Sóme bearers of the name 'Smith' stopped by.
  Smiths must breathe: Bearers of the name 'Smith' must breathe.
  The Smith who is clever stopped by: The bearer of the name 'Smith' who is clever stopped by.
  A clever Smith stopped by: A clever bearer of the name 'Smith' stopped by.

[40] Sloat 1969, 26, speaks of "ordinary countable nouns".
[41] See Sloat 1969, 30.
[42] See Sloat 1969, 28.
[43] For a possible exception of count nouns that allow for bare singulars in apparent referential uses, consider the use of 'college'/'prison'/'class' in 'Sue took her nephew to college/to prison/to class'; see Carlson/Sussmann (2005: 73).

Same for the lines we added:

- *The* Smith stopped by: *The* bearer of the name 'Smith' stopped by.
- That Smith stopped by: That bearer of the name 'Smith' stopped by.
- Which Smith stopped by?: Which bearer of the name 'Smith' stopped by?

In two lines of the chart, a *non-metalinguistic* interpretation is as plausible as a metalinguistic interpretation:

- The clever Smith stopped by: a) The clever bearer of the name 'Smith' stopped by.
  b) Smith, who is clever, stopped by.
- The Smiths stopped by: a) The bearers of the name 'Smith' stopped by.
  b) The members of the Smith family stopped by.

The occurrence of 'Smith' in 'The clever Smith stopped by' can be read referentially, similar to the occurrence in 'Smith, who is clever, stopped by'. And the combination of the plural 'Smiths' with the definite article in 'The Smiths stopped by' can be interpreted as expressing membership in a Smith family.[44] At least the latter interpretation becomes implausible when we shift from *surnames* like 'Smith' to *given names* like 'Mary':

- The Maries stopped by: The bearers of the name 'Mary' stopped by.
  Not: The members of the Mary family stopped by.

Predicativists take the analysis of the name-uses in the Sloat chart as evidence for their analysis: according to them, the fact that names convey metalinguistic properties in most lines of the Sloat chart indicates that apparent referential name-uses should be interpreted as expressing metalinguistic properties as well. So, e.g.:

- Smith stopped by: The/that bearer of the name 'Smith' stopped by.
- Mary stopped by: The/that bearer of the name 'Mary' stopped by.

For a final remark, note that the predicativist classification of names as count nouns is a somewhat imprecise use of the term 'count noun'.[45] According to standard conceptions, count nouns, like any other nouns, are individual words, while names often consist of more than one word–think of 'Mary Stuart', 'White House', 'Battle of Waterloo', etc. (see 2.7.3). To make sense of the predicativist classification, the term 'count noun' should be extended from count nouns to phrases that share the morphosyntactic properties of count nouns: that is, they can be combined with numerals, they can be pluralized (e.g., by pluralizing their head noun, be it common or proper), and so on.

2.6) The Type-Ambiguity View

Let us turn from predicativism to the type-ambiguity view: the view that combines the predicate view for apparent predicative name-uses with the singular term view for apparent referential name-uses. The type-ambiguity view has been articulated by Gail Leckie (2013) and Anders Schoubye (2017); Leckie speaks of the *polysemy view*, Schoubye of the *type-ambiguity view*.

According to defenders of the type-ambiguity view, names are polysemous: that is, they have several meanings which, however, are closely related–different from the meanings of homonyms like 'bank'. More specifically, according to Schoubye, different name-uses belong to different semantic types and to different lexical categories: referential name-uses belong to the lexical category DP of determiner phrases and are of type e, the

[44] Sloat 1969, 27, n. 1, maintains that the metalinguistic reading is admissible as well.
[45] As in Graff Fara 2015a, 61: "Names are Count Nouns".

type of singular terms; by contrast, predicative name-uses belong to the lexical category NP of noun phrases and are of type <e,t>, a type typically associated with count nouns (among other expressions).[46]

Schoubye suggests that predicative types are obtained from referential types by conversions resp. zero-derivations, that is, by morphological derivations of an expression *e* that do not change the morphology of *e*, but the semantic type of *e*.[47] E.g., some verbs are zero-derived from count nouns: the count noun 'bottle' (as in 'I opened the bottle') allows us to zero-derive the transitive verb 'bottle' (as in 'I bottle the wine'), thereby converting the semantic type of 'bottle' from <e,t> to <e,<e,t>>.[48] Similarly, referential name-uses (as in 'I met Mary today') allow us to zero-derive predicative name-uses (as in 'I met more than one Mary today'), thereby converting the semantic type of 'Mary' from e to <e,t>. From a zero-derived predicative name-use, we can then further morphologically derive forms that add derivational affixes, e.g., the suffix *-s* to indicate the plural (as in 'I met two Marys today').[49]

The versions of the type-ambiguity view by Leckie and Schoubye slightly deviate from one another. First, Leckie suggests that languages like English contain a rule according to which apparent predicative uses of a name *N* mean 'person called *N*'.[50] Schoubye, by contrast, suggests that names are associated with *φ*-features. Standardly, *φ*-features are postulated in the analysis of pronouns: they are semantic constraints on what a pronoun can refer to.[51] E.g., the personal pronoun 'she' is associated with a *φ*-feature that restricts the potential referents of utterances of 'she' to *female* individuals.[52] Simplifying a bit, we will say that the *φ*-feature of 'she' is the property of being female. Analogously, Schoubye suggests that any name *N* is associated with a *φ*-feature that restricts the potential referents of utterances of *N* to bearers of the name *N*–so, the *φ*-feature of *N* is the property of being a bearer of *N*. One main piece of evidence for the analogous treatment of pronouns and names is that both pronouns and names have apparent predicative uses: just as I can say 'My best friend is a Mary' to convey that my best friend is named 'Mary', I can say 'My best friend is a she' to convey that my best friend is female.[53] (Given that pronouns are indexicals, Schoubye's version of the singular term view for apparent referential name-uses is, more specifically, a case of the *indexical view* that we associated with Brandom. Leckie does not explicitly subsume apparent referential name-uses under any more specific subtype of singular terms, but her version seems closer to the *constant view*.)

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[46] See Schoubye 2017, 725, 738f.
[47] See Schoubye 2017, 736f. On conversion more generally, see, e.g., Bauer/Valera 2005a, and therein especially the chapters by Bauer/Valera, Bauer, and Kastovsky.
[48] See Schoubye 2017, 736.
[49] For general remarks, see Schoubye 2017, 736f.
[50] See Leckie 2013, 1153f., especially rule (24) on p. 1154. Note that Leckie speaks of apparent *referring* uses (rather than apparent *referential* uses).
[51] See, e.g., Heim 2008. As Schoubye (2017: 729) points out, *φ*-features are similar to Kaplanian *characters*. The main difference would be that Kaplanian characters suffice to map contexts to referents: e.g., the character of 'she' will map the context of an utterance of 'she' to the most salient female individual in that context. By contrast, *φ*-features merely set *constraints* on reference: the property of being female is a *φ*-feature of 'she', but does not suffice to map every utterance of 'she' to its referent: utterances of 'she' might refer also in contexts where there are *several* (though not several *most salient*) female individuals.
[52] See Schoubye 2017, 728f.
[53] For similar examples, see Schoubye 2017, 735f.

Schoubye argues that the type-ambiguity view retains the virtues but resolves the shortcomings of the singular term view, the predicate view, and the count noun view. E.g., the semantic content of a bare singular use of a name, if analyzed in analogy to uses of pronouns, is still the referent of that use; this way, names are still analyzed as rigid designators, so the type-ambiguity view evades Kripke's modal argument (see 3.2.2).[54] In response to the count noun view, Schoubye observes that some languages do not allow for names to have *all* grammatical forms of count nouns: e.g., in Danish, count nouns can be combined with a suffix ('-en' or '-et') to mark definiteness, while names cannot. This would be hard to explain if names were count nouns on all their uses; by contrast, by the type-ambiguity view, count-noun-uses of names are morphologically derived from referential name-uses, not vice versa–which explains why more liberal languages like English allow for a greater variety of such derivations than less liberal languages like Danish.[55]

2.7) Related Issues

2.7.1) The Individuation of Names

The question of how to *classify* names leads to the more general question of how to *individuate* names: that is, under what conditions should two expressions count as the *same* name (or as *uses* of the same name)? In this section, we briefly consider a few approaches to individuation. (For simplicity, we consider only *spoken* utterances of names, not *written* utterances; hence, we will not consider how names might be individuated in orthographic terms, that is, in terms of their spelling.)

Let us begin by observing that different classifications of names often come along with different individuations of names: e.g., proponents of the predicate view individuate names only in terms of their phonology; by contrast, proponents of the singular term view typically individuate names additionally in terms of their referents or bearers, in a way that every name has *at most one* bearer.[56] To render this more precise, proponents of the predicate view typically subscribe to **(1)**, while proponents of the singular term view typically subscribe to **(2)**:

1) For all names N, N^*: $N = N^*$ iff N and N^* are homophonous (that is, phonologically identical).

2) For all names N, N^*: $N = N^*$ iff N and N^* are homophonous and for all x, y: if x is a bearer of N, and y is a bearer of N^*, then $x = y$.

In what follows, we will say that the predicate view individuates names by a *phonology-criterion*, while the singular term view additionally individuates names by a *bearer-criterion*. More generally, we will speak of *individuation-criteria*.

Let us add four observations. First, **(1)** only implies that a name is identical to any homophonous *name*, not to any homophonous *expression*. Predicativists would deny the second claim: e.g., they would distinguish the name 'Smith' (as in 'Adam Smith') from the homophonous common noun 'smith' in the sense of 'blacksmith'.[57] Second, note that

[54] Schoubye 2017, 730.

[55] See Schoubye 2017, 738f. Leckie (2013: 1158) provides a similar example from French.

[56] See, e.g., Kripke 1980, 7f., or the notion of 'common currency names' in Kaplan 1990, 111.

[57] For an example not involving any orthographic difference (such as differences in capitalization), proponents of the predicate view would typically distinguish between a surname and a homophonous count noun that conveys membership in that family. E.g., they would distinguish between the name 'Kennedy', as in 'Kennedy was the 35th US President', and the count noun 'Kennedy' that conveys membership in the Kennedy family, as in 'Maria Shriver is a Kennedy'.

according to **(2)**, each name has *at most one* bearer. E.g., there will no longer be one unique name 'Smith' with more than one bearer: economist Adam Smith, actor Will Smith, etc. Rather, there will be several homophonous names, each spelled and pronounced 'Smith': one of these names has Adam Smith as its unique bearer, another has Will Smith as its unique bearer, and so on. So, a token of 'Smith' that refers to Adam Smith and a token that refers to Will Smith are not tokens of the same name, but of two different names.

Third, note that **(1)** and **(2)** can be read in at least two different ways. The first reading takes **(1)** and **(2)** to quantify over the *same* set of expressions–over the unique set of all names. In that case, either **(1)** or **(2)**, or both, will make a *false* statement about the set of names. To see why, take again the name 'Smith': defenders of the singular term view and of the predicate view will agree that there is a name 'Smith' whose bearers include Adam Smith, and a homophonous name 'Smith' whose bearers include Will Smith. But according to **(1)**, the two names are identical, while according to **(2)**, they are not. Hence, **(1)** and **(2)** are incompatible, implying that at least one of them is false. An evaluation of **(1)** and **(2)** would then have to decide which of the two individuations makes a false statement about the set of names. By contrast, the second reading takes **(1)** and **(2)** to quantify over two *different* sets of expressions–over two sets of names that have been individuated in different ways. In that case, **(1)** and **(2)** can be understood as (partial)[58] definitions: **(1)** gives us a conception of names individuated only by a phonology-criterion; **(2)** gives us a conception of names individuated by a phonology-criterion and by a bearer-criterion. As definitions, both **(1)** and **(2)** would be trivially true. So, we would not have to choose between **(1)** or **(2)**: we could simply take them to define two different notions that both happen to be called 'names'.

Fourth, note that especially **(2)** still has a number of shortcomings. E.g., **(2)** treats all *empty*/*non-referring* names that are homophonous as identical: for all empty names N and N^*, the clause 'for all x, y: if x is a bearer of N, and y is a bearer of N^*, then $x = y$' will be vacuously true, since the antecedent will be false for all x and y. So, e.g., the name 'Vulcan' as used in 'Vulcan was the Roman god of fire' will be identical to the name 'Vulcan' as used in 'Vulcan is a planet postulated by LeVerrier'; the name 'Emma' as used in Jane Austen's *Emma* will be identical to the name 'Emma' as used in Flaubert's *Madame Bovary*, while the name 'Emma' as used for Emma Thompson will not be identical to the name 'Emma' as used for Emma Stone. One solution to this problem would be to deny that there are non-referring names: perhaps, names commonly treated as non-referring in fact refer to *abstract* objects. Such abstract objects might include Vulcan, the Roman god of fire; Vulcan, the planet postulated by LeVerrier to explain the perturbations in the orbit of Mercury; the protagonist Emma Woodhouse from Jane Austen's *Emma*; and the protagonist Emma Bovary from Flaubert's *Madame Bovary*. Another solution would be to amend **(2)** and individuate names additionally in terms of their *uses*. E.g.:

[58] Clearly, **(1)** and **(2)** should not be understood as *full* definitions. A full definition of a predicate F–such as the predicate 'name'–should have the form: For all x: x is an F iff φ. (E.g.: For all x: x is a name iff x is an expression that has one or more bearers.) By contrast, **(1)** and **(2)** are logically equivalent to statements of the form: For all x, y: if x and y are Fs, then ψ. E.g., **(1)** is equivalent to: For all x, y: if x and y are names, then $x = y$ iff x and y are homophonous.

2*) For all names N, N^*: $N = N^*$ iff N and N^* are homophonous; for all x, y: if x is a bearer of N, and y is a bearer of N^*, then $x = y$; and for all e, e^*: if e is a use of N, and e^* is a use of N^*, then $e = e^*$.

Rendering the notion of a name-use precise goes beyond the scope of this section; we confine ourselves to a few basic remarks.[59] A use u of a name N (in the sense intended in **(2*)**) is an expression *type* and, more specifically, a *subtype* of N: so, all tokens of u are tokens of N. Like names, also name-uses have been individuated in various different ways; for a rough approximation, we might individuate name-uses in terms of a) an introduction in which the reference is fixed and b) a chain of communication leading back to the introduction. 'Introduction' is here meant in a wide sense that allows for *unintended* introductions. Think of Evans' Madagascar-example: originally, the name 'Madagascar' referred to the Somali city of Mogadishu, but due to a misunderstanding among geographers in the 16th century, the name unintendedly shifted its reference to the island we call 'Madagascar' till today; thereby, the use of 'Madagascar' for the island was unintentionally introduced in the 16th century.[60] Also, the chain of communication might be 'empty' if a name is never actually used after its introduction: e.g., my full legal name is 'Felix Nicolai Rohls', so there is a use of this name with me as its bearer; but as far as I know, the name has never been uttered to refer to me, different from names like 'Felix' or 'Felix Rohls'.[61]

Both in linguistics and in everyday speech, names are often individuated in ways different from both **(1)** and **(2)**. Let us consider a few such individuations. First, we sometimes individuate names by the *object categories* that their bearers belong to. In this sense, we would distinguish place names from homophonous personal names, e.g., the place name 'Paris' (whose bearers include Paris, France, and Paris, Texas) from the personal name 'Paris' (whose bearers include Paris Hilton). Second, we sometimes individuate names by the role they play for their bearers: e.g., we would distinguish given names from surnames, as when distinguishing the given name 'Hillary' (whose bearers include Hillary Clinton) from the surname 'Hillary' (whose bearers include Edmund Hillary). Third, we sometimes individuate names by the languages in which they originated, or in which they are used: this way, we can distinguish the German name 'Jacob' from the homophonous Romanian name 'Iacob', both derived from Latin 'Iacobus'. These three individuations have in common that they are more fine-grained than **(2)**, but do not individuate names in terms of their bearers, different from **(1)**.

However, there are also individuations that are more fine-grained than both **(1)** and **(2)**. In particular, we might combine the phonology- and bearer-criteria with any of the individuation-criteria just outlined, e.g., with the distinction between given names and surnames. Take personal names where the given and surname are homophonous, as in 'Ford Maddox Ford' for the British writer or 'Abdullah Abdullah' for the Afghan politician: here, we might want to distinguish Abdullah Abdullah's given name from his surname, even though both **(1)** and **(2)** would treat them as identical–they are homophonous

[59] For more detailed remarks on the definition and individuation of name-uses, see Rami 2022, 68-73, 81-92.
[60] See Evans 1973, 195f.; for a historically more accurate account, see Burgess 2014.
[61] For examples to the same effect, see Graff Fara 2011, 496f.; Gray 2014, 213.

and have the same bearer. Finally, there are individuations that are *less* fine-grained than both **(1)** and **(2)**. E.g., we sometimes treat phonologically distinct names as *one* name if they are etymologically related: in this sense, we would say that the English name 'Steven', the French 'Etienne', the Latin 'Stephanus', etc., are variants of the same name. Such an individuation would violate the phonology-criterion shared by **(1)** and **(2)**.[62]

Let us draw some conclusions. The upshot of this section is that different individuations of names can serve different, but equally legitimate purposes. Hence, in the remainder of this study, we will not use arguments from the individuation of names to decide between different theories of names. In particular, we will not use the individuation presupposed by the predicate view as an argument against predicativism.

2.7.2) The Morphosyntactic Variety of Names and Name-Uses

Looking back at section 2.2, let us consider again the distinction between apparent referential name-uses and apparent predicative name-uses. In particular, consider the morphosyntactic distinction according to which apparent referential name-uses are bare singulars, while apparent predicative name-uses are not (they are plurals or non-bare singulars). In this section, we clarify that the distinction is a mere approximation: it applies to an important subset of names, but by no means to *all* names or name-uses. To show why, we will have a brief look at the morphosyntactic variety of name-uses. We first list three types of apparent referential name-uses that are not bare singulars, then four types of apparent predicative name-uses that are bare singulars.

First, some apparent referential uses of proper nouns are conventionally combined with a definite article. For some proper nouns, the definite article is obligatory, for others it is optional. Proper nouns with an obligatory definite article include the following:[63]

- plural proper nouns:
  - usually referring to mountain ranges ('the Alps') or archipelagos ('the Cyclades');
  - for names of mountain ranges or archipelagos, the form 'definite article + plural proper noun' is the most common type of apparent referential use;
  - more isolated cases include 'the Vedas', 'the Cotswolds';
- some singular proper nouns:
  - usually referring to:
    rivers ('the Thames', 'the Seine', 'the Danube');
    vessels ('the *Mayflower*', 'the *Titanic*');
    sacred scriptures ('the Bible', 'the Torah', 'the Quran');
    epics ('the *Iliad*', 'the *Aeneid*', 'the *Ramayana*', 'the *Shanameh*');
    Alpine mountains ('the Matterhorn', 'the Zugspitze', 'the Großglockner');
    deserts ('the Sahara', 'the Gobi')
    seas/oceans ('the Mediterranean', 'the Pacific');
    countries/states/territories ('the Congo', 'the Vatican', 'the Lateran');
    historical eras and events ('the Renaissance', 'the Baroque', 'the *Reconquista*');
  - for many of these names (e.g., for river names), the form 'definite article + singular proper noun' is among the most common types of apparent referential use;
  - special cases include 'The Hague', 'The Dalles', or 'The Gambia' where the definite article is (more clearly than in the previous examples) part of the name and hence capitalized.

[62] For similar examples, see Rami 2022, 71-73.
[63] See also the discussion of weak vs. strong proper names in Payne/Huddleston 2002, 516-518.

Proper nouns with an optional definite article include, e.g., '(the) Earth' and some country names ('(the) Sudan', '(the) Ukraine', etc.).

A second type of names whose apparent referential uses are combined with a definite article would be capitalized common count noun phrases: what Strawson would call descriptions that 'have grown capital letters'.[64] These include, e.g., most names for states ('the United States', 'the Federal Republic of Germany', 'the Russian Federation'), political/international organizations ('the United Nations'), and historical events ('the Battle of Waterloo'); but also some names for bodies of water ('the Black Sea', 'the Pacific Ocean'), forests ('the Black Forest'), buildings ('the Empire State Building', 'the Dome of the Rock', 'the Hagia Sophia'), etc. More isolated cases include 'the Eternal City' or, as a capitalized description in the plural, 'the Troubles' for the late 20th century conflict in Northern Ireland.

Third, think of non-restrictive uses of phrases that combine a name with a determiner or possessive. E.g.:

- non-restrictive uses of phrases of the form 'determiner/possessive + noun phrase + name': 'the philosopher Wittgenstein'; 'the famous philosopher Wittgenstein'; 'Beethoven's famous opera *Fidelio*'.
- non-restrictive uses of phrases of the form 'determiner/possessive + adjective phrase + name': 'the famous Wittgenstein'; 'Beethoven's famous *Fidelio*'.
- non-restrictive uses of phrases of the form 'determiner/possessive + name': 'that Wittgenstein' as in 'That Wittgenstein sure was a strange fellow';[65] 'Beethoven's *Fidelio*'; arguably also 'the one and only Noam Chomsky' with the idiomatic determiner phrase 'the one and only'.

This list includes definite descriptions, complex demonstratives, but also close appositions: that is, phrases that typically combine a name with a determiner/possessive and a common noun phrase, as in 'the famous philosopher Wittgenstein' (for more on close appositions, see 4.4).[66] Note that the name-uses in these phrases become predicative when the phrases are used *restrictively*. E.g., assume you point at two persons named 'Wittgenstein' and say '*This* Wittgenstein is more famous than *that* Wittgenstein': then, both occurrences of the name 'Wittgenstein' seem to express the property of being a bearer of the name 'Wittgenstein'.

Arguably, apparent referential name-uses can even occur in combination with *indefinite* articles, in indefinite descriptions of the form:

- indefinite article + (adjective phrase) + name + (relative clause).

Consider two types of examples. First, take indefinite descriptions that combine the name with a modifier (here a relative clause and an adjective phrase):[67]

1) In Cambridge, we met a Wittgenstein whose health had severely deteriorated.
2) In Cambridge, we met a very different Wittgenstein than in Vienna the year before.

The two sentences could be reformulated as:

- In Cambridge, we met Wittgenstein whose health had severely deteriorated.
- In Cambridge, we met Wittgenstein who had significantly changed compared to when we had met him in Vienna the year before.

Both reformulations contain apparent referential bare singulars of the name 'Wittgenstein' (referring, e.g., to Ludwig Wittgenstein). These kinds of name-uses are often analyzed as

[64] Strawson 1950, 338.
[65] See Van Langendonck/Van de Velde 2016, 21 ('That George Bush is a nice guy').
[66] For close appositions, see, e.g., Acuña-Fariña 1996; 2016; Keizer 2005; 2007, 22-60.
[67] Compare 'A furious Paul entered' (von Heusinger/Wespel 2007, 337).

ranging over 'aspects' (or 'manifestations') of a particular name-bearer.[68] Another way to put this would be to say that the uses of 'Wittgenstein' range over Wittgenstein *as exemplifying certain properties*: e.g., as exemplifying the property of being someone whose health has severely deteriorated, or as exemplifying the property of having significantly changed. (See also 4.4.2.2.) For a second set of examples, take indefinite descriptions that do not combine the name with any modifiers (this type is less common in English than in other languages, including German):[69]

3) Even a Mozart suffered from impostor syndrome.

A normal utterance of (3) allows for two different reformulations:

- Even Mozart suffered from impostor syndrome.
- Even someone like Mozart suffered from impostor syndrome.

The first reformulation simply omits the indefinite article, resulting in an apparent referential bare singular of 'Mozart'; the second reformulation replaces the indefinite description with a phrase that, if interpreted literally, seems to range over persons who are like Mozart/who resemble Mozart. On typical utterances, however, both the second reformulation and sentence (3) convey that Mozart *himself*–not just anyone *resembling* Mozart–suffered from impostor syndrome. Hence, some linguists would argue that the name 'Mozart' here behaves similarly to the name 'Wittgenstein' in (1/2): that is, 'Mozart' ranges over aspects of Mozart–over Mozart *as exemplifying particular properties*. However, sentence (3) does not combine the name 'Mozart' with any modifier and hence does not make it explicit *which* aspect of Mozart the indefinite description 'a Mozart' ranges over. Hence, that aspect will have to be determined from the sentence/utterance context–it should be a *contextually salient* aspect.[70] In this particular example, a promising candidate for a salient aspect would be the property of being a *genius*: after all, when we say that *even Mozart/a Mozart/someone like Mozart* suffered from impostor syndrome, then typically to make the point that *even geniuses* can suffer from impostor syndrome.

In comparison, apparent predicative name-uses only rarely occur as bare singulars. Consider four potential exceptions where a bare singular name can be replaced with a mass or count noun phrase and hence (arguably) act as a predicate. First, names can be used metonymically as mass nouns (see sections 4.2.3 and 5.3.1). E.g., in the sentence 'I like listening to Bach', the bare singular of 'Bach' is used metonymically for music composed by Johann Sebastian Bach; accordingly, the name can be replaced with the mass noun phrase 'music by Bach': 'I like listening to music by Bach'. Arguably, such mass noun uses are predicative.[71] Second, in 5.3.4, we will encounter metonymies where a bare singular name can be replaced with a count noun phrase. E.g., in the sentences 'Moscow decided to enter peace talks' or 'Lincoln is on every penny',[72] the bare singulars of

[68] See von Heusinger 2010, 90f.
[69] Von Heusinger/Wespel (2007) and von Heusinger (2010) call this type of name-use *quantification over manifestations*. Compare 'Ein George Bush bricht nicht sein Ehrenwort'/'A George Bush does not break his word' (von Heusinger/Wespel 2007: 332). Contrary to the proposal in Kolde (1995: 405), these uses are not restricted to counterfactuals ('Ein de Gaulle hätte da anders reagiert!'/'A de Gaulle would have reacted differently!').
[70] See von Heusinger 2010, 112.
[71] For the difficulties of classifying mass nouns as predicates, see, e.g., Burge 1972, 266f.; Pelletier 1974, 102-106; Bunt 1985, 33-42.
[72] For the latter sentence, see Bach 2015, 780.

'Moscow' and 'Lincoln' can be replaced with the count noun phrases 'the Russian government' and 'a depiction/portrait of Lincoln' respectively. Third, in 5.3.4, we will further encounter bare singular names that are used anaphorically; some of these uses can be given a predicative reading and can be replaced with a count noun phrase. E.g., take the sentence 'If a child is named 'Bambi', then Disney will sue the parents of Bambi',[73] where the bare singular of 'Bambi' is used anaphorically in the consequent and can be replaced with count noun phrases like 'the child named 'Bambi''. Fourth, bare singular names might sometimes be used generically, ranging over bearers of the name; again, such uses can be replaced with count noun phrases. E.g., in 'John is always male', the bare singular of 'John' would range generically over bearers of the name 'John' and can be replaced with the count noun phrase 'a bearer of the name 'John''.[74]

2.7.3) Names and Proper Nouns

In the previous two sections, we dealt with the *individuation* of names and illustrated the *syntactic variety* of names. This leads us to the more general question of the *definition* of names: how is the notion of a proper name to be defined? The question will be of some significance to our counterexamples against predicativism: while predicativists typically focus on names that consist of *proper nouns*, some of our examples will involve other kinds of names, e.g., names that consist of capitalized common noun phrases. Therefore, let us provide some tentative remarks on how to define names, and on how to demarcate them from proper nouns.

Instead of a definition, we list three central features of names that help distinguish them from other kinds of expressions and, more importantly, from other kinds of singular terms:

1) Names are expressions that have *bearers*, which again are typically *individuals*.

2) The main function of names is to *refer* or, for a more cautious formulation, to be used on apparent referential occurrences; an apparent referential occurrence of a name will typically be intended to refer to exactly one of the name's bearers.

3) If an individual bears a name/can be referred to with a name, then typically in virtue of a convention that is *specific* to that individual.

Features **(1-3)** might allow for rare exceptions, but for our purposes, we mostly set them aside. As to feature **(1)**, note that name-bearing individuals belong to a wide range of ontological categories: as we saw in the previous section, they include persons, cities and countries, events, companies, pets, ships, artifacts, and more. The property of name-bearing has been subject to intense discussions;[75] for our purposes, we will leave it undefined. Feature **(2)** would need to be further refined, e.g., to account for names like 'Thames' that on apparent referential uses have to be combined with a pronounced definite article. A possible exception to **(1)** and **(2)** are placeholder names, such as 'John Doe' or 'Jane Doe'. E.g., in legal contexts, 'Jane Doe' is used referentially, to refer to women "whose identity is unknown or deliberately withheld" (*OED*). But the individuals referred to by placeholder names might not be *bearers* of those name: it would be odd to say about a Jane Doe, 'Her name is 'Jane Doe'' or 'She's a bearer of the name 'Jane Doe''. In defense of features **(1)** and **(2)**, one might argue that placeholder names differ from paradigm

[73] After Geurts 1997, 321.
[74] See Geurts 2002, 206. For a critical discussion, see Van Langendonck 2007, 41.
[75] See especially Gray 2014.

examples of names in several crucial ways, and hence form a separate class of referential expressions rather than belonging to the class of names. E.g., different from most names, placeholder names can be used both as bare singulars and in combination with an unstressed definite article. E.g., we can say, 'During the trial, the testimony by the Jane Doe was especially moving'; but if there is a unique Jane Doe in a context (e.g., at a trial), we can also say, 'Jane Doe gave her testimony today'.

To illustrate feature **(3)**, consider a personal first name like 'Barack': Barack Obama is a bearer of the name 'Barack' in virtue of a convention that is specific to him and does not follow from any other convention. E.g., there is no more general convention in virtue of which all American men born in 1960 are named 'Barack', or all male members of the Obama family are named 'Barack', or the like. Rather, the convention was introduced specifically for Obama by baptizing him 'Barack'.[76] This distinguishes names from other singular terms like (ordinary) indexicals and (ordinary) definite descriptions.[77] E.g., Obama can refer to himself with the indexical 'I' simply in virtue of the Kaplanian character of 'I': there is no convention specific to Obama that would make him a referent or bearer of 'I'. Same for our ability to refer to Obama with the indexical 'he'. Similarly, the definite description 'the inventor of the light bulb' refers to Thomas Edison, but again not in virtue of any convention specific to him: the description refers to him simply because of being a function that maps any possible world to whoever in that world uniquely exemplifies the property of having invented the light bulb; in the actual world, that person happens to be Edison. Similar remarks apply also to *incomplete* descriptions: when I'm in my apartment and say, 'I'm in the kitchen', I can thereby refer with 'the kitchen' to the kitchen in my apartment simply because the kitchen in my apartment is the most salient kitchen in the context of utterance, and not because there is any convention specific to the kitchen in my apartment that would make it a referent/bearer of the noun 'kitchen' or of the description 'the kitchen'. Similarly for referentially used descriptions in the sense of Donellan (1966). Say, we are at a party where my friend Steve is drinking water from a martini glass, while everybody else is drinking wine from wine glasses, and I say to you, 'The man drinking a martini is a friend of mine'.[78] Here, I can refer with 'the man drinking a martini' to Steve simply because (roughly speaking) Steve is the most salient man who can be reasonably believed to drink a martini, even though he is not actually drinking a martini. Again, this does not require any convention specific to Steve that would make him a referent or bearer of the description 'the man drinking a martini'.

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[76] To be sure, there are several more general conventions for how to name certain objects: think of the now outdated convention in some regions of Germany to name firstborn sons after their paternal grandfather (*Erbnamensitte*). But such conventions typically allow for exceptions: so, speakers still need to introduce a specific convention for the respective individual to become a bearer of the name. Rare non-specific conventions might include parts of personal names, such as, e.g., surnames or patronyms: Barack Obama has the surname 'Obama' simply in virtue of the fact that his father had the same surname; Lev Nikolayevich Tolstoy is named 'Nikolayevich' in virtue of the fact that his father's first name was 'Nikolay'. But again, such conventions typically allow for exceptions and might be indeterminate in some cases: e.g., the conventions for patronyms are typically indeterminate in the case of adoptions. Also note that a convention specific to an individual does not have to arise from a baptism, but can also arise, e.g., due to unintended reference-shifts.

[77] We cautiously write 'ordinary' indexicals/descriptions to account for the view of some philosophers that names are indexicals/descriptions as well; see 2.1.

[78] For referential uses of definite descriptions (and a similar example), see Donnellan 1966, 287.

By contrast, we will classify capitalized common noun phrases as names. Think of phrases such as 'Lake Ontario', 'Mount Everest', 'White House', 'Oval Office', 'Red Square', 'Museum of Modern Art', 'Ford Motor Company', 'United States of America', or 'United Nations'. There are two major differences between these phrases: first, syntactically, some of them are combined with definite articles in argument position ('the Oval Office', 'the United Nations', etc.), while others are not ('Lake Ontario', 'Mount Everest'). Second, semantically, some of these phrases have been specifically introduced for their bearers, while others might have originated as incomplete descriptions. Names of the former kind include, e.g., 'Mount McKinley', 'Museum of Modern Art', 'Ford Motor Company', 'United States of America', and 'United Nations': such names were most likely introduced in a baptism by specific 'naming authorities'. E.g., Mount McKinley was so named in 1917 by the US Congress; the Museum of Modern Art in New York was so named by its founders; and so on. By contrast, other names usually occurring in phrases of the form 'the *F*', such as 'the White House', 'the Oval Office', or 'the Red Square', might have originated as incomplete descriptions, referring to the most salient *F* in a particular context: to the most salient white-painted house in Washington, the most salient oval-shaped office in the White House, the most salient square with red buildings in Moscow, etc. But clearly, these phrases have since ceased to be incomplete descriptions–they have become names for their bearers, and they can be used to refer to those bearers also in contexts where they are not the most salient *F*, and even if their bearers no longer exemplify *F*. E.g., even in conversations that take place remote from Washington, perhaps even in a context where some other building is the salient white-painted house, the phrase 'the White House' can still be used to refer to the residence of the US president. And even if the president decided to paint the White House in some other color, we might continue to call the White House 'White House'.

Another group of expressions that we include among names are titles of artifacts. (We will use 'artifact' in a broad sense that ranges over all kinds of human creations, including works of the fine arts, but also scientific publications, newspaper articles, etc.) Titles seem to satisfy the name-features **(1-3)** listed above. That is, 1) titles have bearers, and those bearers are individuals (here: artifacts). 2) Titles are usually used referentially to refer to their bearers. And 3) if an artifact bears a title, then in virtue of a convention that is specific to the artifact: e.g., there is no more general convention that would imply that James Joyce's *Ulysses* is a bearer of the title '*Ulysses*'–rather, the use of the noun 'Ulysses' as a title for the novel had to be *specifically introduced*, in this case by the novel's author. Typically, titles have the form of capitalized noun phrases, and they might even have the form of proper nouns, as for *Ulysses*, or Michelangelo's *David*, or Spielberg's *Lincoln*. But titles can also consist, e.g., of adjectives (*Notorious*), verb phrases (*To Kill a Mockingbird*), participle phrases (*Gone with the Wind*), prepositional phrases (*In the Beauty of the Lilies*), clauses (*As I Lay Dying*), declarative sentences (*I confess*), interrogative sentences (*Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf?*), or imperatives (*Dial M for Murder*). Or they might consist of syntactically 'incomplete' clauses or phrases, as in Italo Calvino's *If on a winter's night a traveler*.[79]

[79] See also the examples in Payne/Huddleston 2002, 516f.

As illustrated by these examples, we do not confine the notion of names to proper nouns. But obviously, names often consist of proper nouns or combinations thereof, as typically in the case of personal names (‘Churchill’, ‘Winston Churchill’), city names (‘Munich’), country names (‘Germany’), names of pets (‘Fala’), etc. Against this background, let us briefly address two questions: how should proper nouns be defined? And what is the relation between proper nouns and names? In response to the first question, we will work with a simplified conception in orthographic terms:

- Proper nouns are all and only nouns that are capitalized on all their occurrences.

This conception works fairly well for English and most other languages (a rare exception would be German where *all* nouns are capitalized on all their occurrences). It is crucial that proper nouns are capitalized on *all* their occurrences: this distinguishes proper nouns from the remaining English nouns, all of which are capitalized on *merely some* occurrences: all English nouns are capitalized at sentence-beginnings, and some are additionally capitalized on some further occurrences, e.g., when occurring in headline style (say, in a book title or a newspaper headline) or as part of a name (e.g., the common noun ‘battle’ in ‘the Battle of Waterloo’). To be sure, the orthographic conception of proper nouns still leaves a number of open questions; let us mention two. First, whether a noun is a proper noun will depend to some extent on how nouns are *individuated*. Consider expressions like ‘god’/‘God’: when used predicatively, ‘god’ is lowercased (‘Zeus is a Greek god’); when used referentially, to refer to a particular god in a monotheistic religion, ‘God’ is capitalized (‘Moses spoke to God’). How should ‘god’/‘God’ then be individuated: as one noun or as two? If ‘god’ and ‘God’ are one and the same noun, then by the orthographic conception of proper nouns, ‘god’/‘God’ would be a common noun, capitalized on merely some of its occurrences; if ‘god’ and ‘God’ are two distinct nouns, we would have one common noun ‘god’ and one proper noun ‘God’. For our purposes, we will set this question aside. Second, the orthographic conception does not yet tell us *why* proper nouns are capitalized. For an attempt at an answer, it seems that proper nouns are capitalized precisely to set them apart as nouns whose main function is to be used as names or, more generally speaking, to be used referentially–which would distinguish proper from common nouns whose main function is to express properties/relations.

The second question–about the relation between proper nouns and names–is more intricate. Linguists typically agree that the sets of names and proper nouns are entirely distinct, simply because proper nouns are words, while proper names are phrases; such phrases may consist of only one word, as in ‘Mary’, but also of more than one, as in ‘Mary Stuart’, ‘White House’, or ‘Battle of Waterloo’.[80] The more significant question would then be whether all proper nouns can be *used as* names. It seems that the answer is negative: some proper nouns violate one or more of the name-features **(1-3)**. E.g., in violation of feature **(1)**, some proper nouns clearly have no bearers (and are used referentially only in incomplete descriptions or complex demonstratives). This holds especially for proper nouns that are, in a sense, *derived* from names: ‘a Spaniard’ (derived from ‘Spain’), ‘a Londoner’ (from ‘London’), etc. The noun ‘Spaniard’ does not have any bearers and instead behaves like any other count noun: it has an extension containing all and only

[80] See Payne/Huddleston 2002, 515f.; Cumming 2007, 6f. Our terminology will be looser: for simplicity, we will often speak of proper nouns that *are* names, not of proper nouns that are *used as* names.

Spaniards; and while the incomplete description ‘the Spaniard’ can be used to refer to the most salient Spaniard in a given context, such acts of reference do not require conventions that are specific to whatever Spaniard is referred to in that context (in violation of feature **(3)**). Also, in violation of feature **(2)**, some proper nouns cannot be used referentially– neither in bare form nor as head of referential phrases. This includes, e.g., Russian patronyms, such as ‘Nikolayevich’ in ‘Lev Nikolayevich Tolstoy’, which always have to be combined at least with the first name (‘Lev Nikolayevich’). Also, in the case of some proper nouns that have bearers, it is questionable whether their bearers are *individuals* (as stipulated by feature **(1)**). Think, e.g., of proper nouns for months (‘April’), days of the week (‘Monday’), or holidays (‘Christmas’). We will call such nouns *proper temporal nouns*. Arguably, the bearers of proper temporal nouns are not individuals, but *types* of individuals, specifically, types of time periods. E.g., the bearer of the proper noun ‘April’ is the month of April, where the month of April is a type of time period, instantiated by the individual Aprils of each year; this use of ‘April’ appears in sentences like ‘April is the fourth month in the Gregorian calendar’. In a second step, ‘April’ can then be used in quantified form to range over individual Aprils, as in ‘The last two Aprils were cold’. (For a disclaimer, this last example rests on a few ontologically contentious assumptions: e.g., the month of April might be an *abstract* object, in which case it would count as an individual after all. For more on proper temporal nouns, see 5.4.8.)

3) From Descriptivism to Predicativism: The Analysis of Names

In chapter 2, we addressed the question of how to classify names: what class of expressions do names belong to? As we saw, most classifications of names in the philosophical literature are semantically motivated; hence, in dealing with classificatory questions, we already encountered several proposals for the semantics/analysis of names. E.g., we encountered proposals to analyze names as definite descriptions, as indexicals, or as predicates. Also, we already encountered the core components of the predicativist analysis of names: the analysis of names as metalinguistic predicates, and the analysis of apparent referential name-uses as denuded determiner phrases.

In this section, we have another look at the semantics of names and its historic development from the late 19th century onwards. This will serve a threefold purpose. First, it will provide us with the 'backstory' of predicativism: as we said in the introduction, predicativism to some extent steers a middle course between the two main rivals in the semantics of names, descriptivism and referentialism. Second, and more specifically, it will allow us to compare predicativism to descriptivism: as we already saw, descriptivism is an ancestor of predicativism, in particular of the 'the'-predicativist analysis of apparent referential name-uses as definite descriptions in disguise. At the same time, predicativists react to the critique of descriptivism leveled by referentialists like Kripke. Third, descriptivists typically agree that names are associated with definite descriptions, and by definition, definite descriptions contain predicates: in a phrase of the form 'the *F*', *F* will be a predicate. So, reconstructing different versions of descriptivism will give us a perspective on how the relationship between names and predicates has historically been conceived. Note that we will only reconstruct as much of the historic development of the analysis of names as is relevant to our topic; many intricacies of descriptivism and referentialism will be set aside. Also, our summary of the theory of names *prior* to predicativism is not meant to be original, but mostly reflects the textbook consensus. Only on rare occasions will we add novel arguments to the debate.

Here is an outline of the chapter. 3.1 gives an overview of different versions of descriptivism. 3.2 briefly sketches the pre-Kripkean versions of *non-metalinguistic* descriptivism, their critique by Kripke, and some descriptivist responses. Analogously, 3.3 addresses *metalinguistic* descriptivism and its critique by Kripke. Against this background, 3.4 has a closer look at predicativism. Note that when we speak of *names* in this chapter, we often tacitly confine ourselves to apparent *referential* name-uses which have historically been the focus of the theory of names.

3.1 The Varieties of Descriptivism

Let us begin with a broad overview of descriptivism. Descriptivists agree that names are associated with definite descriptions–or, for a slightly different conception, with properties. Beyond this basic consensus, descriptivism allows for a variety of different versions. Let us briefly spell out six criteria by which those versions can be distinguished:

1) The *role/function* assigned to associated descriptions: e.g., the (semantic) role of semantic content, the (metasemantic) role of reference-determiner, etc. Accordingly, we will speak of *semantic descriptivism*, *metasemantic descriptivism*, and so on.
2) The *type of language* in which names are associated with descriptions: most importantly, names might be associated with descriptions either in public languages–like English–or merely in the

idiolects of individual speakers. Metalinguistic descriptivists typically endorse the former option, non-metalinguistic descriptivists the latter.

3) The *number* of associated descriptions: relative to a given point of time (plus perhaps relative to a given language or speaker), a name is either associated with exactly one description, or with more than one. The former option is endorsed, e.g., by classical descriptivists and by 'the'-predicativists; the latter option, e.g., by cluster theorists.
4) The *scope* of names that are associated with descriptions: either *all* names are associated with descriptions, or just some (e.g., 'descriptive names' in Evans' sense, that is, names whose reference is fixed by an attributively used definite description[81]).
5) The *type of content* expressed by associated descriptions: e.g., associated descriptions can be metalinguistic or non-metalinguistic, essential or non-essential, etc.
6) The *motivation* behind descriptivism: e.g., the motivation to solve Frege's puzzles; to have an integrated account of the semantics and metasemantics of names; or to preserve the link between metaphysical necessity, apriority, and analyticity.[82]

Note that some versions of descriptivism would replace associated descriptions in (1-6) with associated properties or associated intensions. The versions of descriptivism discussed in this chapter will be classified mainly historically and by criterion (5), that is, by the type of content they ascribe to associated descriptions. Since predicativism focuses on the semantic content of names and sets the determination of name-reference mostly aside, our review of descriptivism will focus on semantic descriptivism and largely set metasemantic descriptivism aside.

3.2) Non-Metalinguistic Descriptivism

In this section, we give a brief overview of *non-metalinguistic* versions of descriptivism. 3.2.1 introduces classical descriptivism and 3.2.2 the cluster theory. 3.2.3 summarizes their critique by Kripke. And 3.2.4 looks at four versions of non-metalinguistic descriptivism proposed in reaction to Kripke's critique.

3.2.1) Classical Descriptivism

Classical descriptivism exists in mainly two versions: the initial version by Frege, and the subsequent version by Russell developed to some extent in reaction to Frege. Both share the basic conviction that the names we typically use in natural languages–names like 'Aristotle' for the philosopher, 'Istanbul' for the city, and so on–can be analyzed as definite descriptions: e.g., as descriptions like 'the teacher of Alexander the Great' in the case of 'Aristotle', or 'the largest Turkish city' in the case of 'Istanbul'.

From a post-Kripkean perspective, classical descriptivism can be understood as an attempt to integrate the epistemic, semantic, and metasemantic features of names into a unified account. Most importantly, theories of names are concerned with three features of a name *N*:

- on the epistemic side: the 'cognitive value' or 'cognitive significance' of *N*, that is, what speakers mentally associate with *N*, or how they mentally represent the referent of *N*;[83]
- on the semantic side: the meaning or semantic content of *N*, that is, what *N* contributes to the proposition expressed by sentences that use *N*;

[81] See Evans 1979, 162f.
[82] For the third motivation, see Chalmers 2004, 153f., 157f., 165f. (on the 'golden triangle').
[83] As is standard, we use 'cognitive significance' as translation of Frege's 'Erkenntniswert' (Frege 1892, 25). Cf. Kaplan 1989, 501, n. 26; Salmon 1986, 79; Wettstein 1986, 185; Forbes 1990, 536f. 'Cognitive value' is used, e.g., in Max Black's translation (Frege 1948, 209). Salmon 1986, 25, uses 'cognitive information content' for the *Erkenntniswert* of a sentence.

- on the metasemantic side: the reference-determiner of *N*, that is, the condition an object has to satisfy in order to be the referent of *N*.

This gives us the following more general characterization of classical descriptivism:

CD For every name *N*, there is a definite description *D* s.t. *N* and *D* have the same cognitive, semantic, and metasemantic features: that is, *N* and *D* have the same cognitive significance, the same semantic content, and the same reference-determiner. *D* is then the description *associated* with *N*.

To provide an example, speakers might associate the name 'Istanbul' with the description 'the largest Turkish city'. Then, according to **CD**, the two expressions should have the same cognitive significance, the same semantic content, and the same reference-determiner: that is, we mentally represent the referent of 'Istanbul' in the same way as the referent of 'the largest Turkish city'; both expressions make the same contribution to the propositions expressed by sentences that use these expressions; and the reference of both expressions is determined by the same reference-condition.

Let us get a better understanding of the cognitive significance, semantic content, and reference-determiner of 'Istanbul' and 'the largest Turkish city', according to classical descriptivists. To that end, we add a conception of definite descriptions that is (roughly) in line with Frege and Russell:

- For every definite description *D*, there is a property *F* s.t. the cognitive significance, semantic content, and reference-determiner of *D* each consist in *F* combined with a uniqueness claim. Roughly, if *D* has the form 'the NP', then *F* is the property expressed by the noun phrase NP.

E.g., in the case of the description 'the largest Turkish city', *F* would be the property expressed by the noun phrase 'largest Turkish city', that is, roughly, the property of being a largest Turkish city. If we combine this account of definite descriptions with **CD**, we get:

- For every name *N*, there is a property *F* s.t. the cognitive significance, semantic content, and reference-determiner of *N* each consist in *F* combined with a uniqueness claim.

Assume again that 'Istanbul' is associated with 'the largest Turkish city', and consider the cognitive significance, semantic content, and reference-determiner of the two expressions. First, their cognitive significance: we mentally represent both the referent of 'Istanbul' and the referent of 'the largest Turkish city' as uniquely exemplifying the property of being a largest Turkish city. Second, their meaning: each expression contributes to sentences that use it the property of being a largest Turkish city, combined with a uniqueness claim. And third, their reference-determiner: the condition that an object needs to satisfy to be the referent of the name 'Istanbul' or of the description 'the largest Turkish city' says that the object needs to uniquely exemplify the property of being a largest Turkish city.

Note that the associated description 'the largest Turkish city' in our example is *non-metalinguistic*: in particular, it is not 'about' the name 'Istanbul', it does not mention the name. This coheres with the candidates for associated descriptions cited by Frege and Russell. In Frege, associated descriptions are mostly given in terms of date and place of birth, place of residence, profession, or achievements: e.g., with the name 'Aristotle', speakers might associate descriptions such as 'the pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great' or 'the teacher of Alexander the Great who was born in Stagira'.[84] Similarly, in Russell, associated descriptions often use non-metalinguistic predicates famously

[84] See Frege 1892, 27, footnote (on 'Aristotle'). See also Frege 1918/19, 65f. (on the fictitious name 'Dr. Lauben').

associated with the name's referent: according to Russell, the name 'Apollo' might be associated with the description 'the sun-god';[85] 'Homer' with 'the author of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*';[86] 'Bismarck' with 'the first Chancellor of the German Empire' or, more realistically, with a description that consists of "some more or less vague mass of historical knowledge" about Bismarck.[87] Less often, the associated descriptions proposed by Russell are metalinguistic, as we will see in 3.3.1.

Our general characterization glosses over some of the details of Frege's and Russell's versions of descriptivism, as well over the many differences between them. Let us add a few refinements and caveats, numbered **(1-6)**. **1)** The epistemic, semantic, and metasemantic features of names are not neatly kept apart in either Frege or Russell. Rather, in Frege, these features are subsumed under the notion of sense, in Russell under the notion of meaning.[88] **2)** There is a broad consensus that according to both Frege[89] and Russell,[90] a name can be associated with *different* descriptions by different speakers. To account for this, **CD** can be modified by quantifying not just over names, but over uses of names by speakers. E.g.:

- For every name *N*, every speaker *A*, and every use *u* of *N* by *A*, there is a definite description *D* s.t. *u* and *D* have the same cognitive significance, the same semantic content, and the same reference-determiner.

3) While Russell is *explicit* about analyzing names as descriptions,[91] descriptivism is only *implicit* in Frege. Here is, roughly, how the reading of Frege as a descriptivist is usually motivated. To elucidate the notion of sense, Frege suggests that the sense of an expression 'contains a mode of presentation': a way of presenting an entity.[92] E.g., the sense that Mary associates with the name 'Istanbul' might present the name's referent *as the largest Turkish city*; the sense she associates with 'Constantinople' might present the name's referent *as the former Byzantine capital*. Here, we use definite descriptions to formulate the senses of names: e.g., we use the description 'the largest Turkish city' to formulate the

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[85] See Russell 1905, 491.
[86] See Russell 1993, 178f.
[87] See Russell 1910/11, 115.
[88] For Frege, this explication is defended, e.g., in Salmon 1986, 47. For Russell's 'meaning' as translation of Frege's 'sense', see Russell 1905, 483.
[89] Consider a few passages. In "On Sense and Reference", Frege mentions in passing that the same name can be used with different senses by different speakers, and he takes this to be a flaw of natural languages (see Frege 1892, 27, footnote on 'Aristotle'). In another passage, he explicitly takes it to be unproblematic to speak of *the* sense of an expression, contrary to the different *Vorstellungen* (usually translated as 'ideas') evoked by the expression in different speakers. See Frege 1892, 29: "Während es demnach keinem Bedenken unterliegt, von dem Sinne schlechtweg zu sprechen, muß man bei der Vorstellung genau genommen hinzufügen, wem sie angehört und zu welcher Zeit." (Translation in Frege 1948, 212: "In the light of this, one need have no scruples in speaking simply of *the* sense, whereas in the case of an idea one must, strictly speaking, add to whom it belongs and at what time.") Later, in "Der Gedanke" (1918/19: 65f.), Frege is more explicit about different speakers associating different senses with the same name (on 'Dr. Lauben'). Note that this reading of Frege is almost universally accepted. One exception is Robert May who points out that for Frege, languages are partially individuated by the expressions they contain, and by the senses assigned to those expressions. So, if one speaker uses an expression with a particular sense, and another speaker uses the same expression, but not with the same sense, then the speakers do not even speak the same language. (See May 2006: 112f., 115-117.)
[90] See, e.g., Russell 1993, 140 (on 'Socrates').
[91] See, e.g., Russell 1993, 179; 2010, 79; 2023, 147.
[92] See Frege 1892, 26. 'Mode of presentation' is the standard translation of Frege's phrase 'Art des Gegebenseins'; the more literal translation would be 'mode of being given'.

sense Mary associates with the name 'Istanbul'. Frege does the same.[93] This has usually led exegetes to conclude that Frege takes names and definite descriptions to have the *same* kinds of senses.[94]

4) Frege distinguishes between sense and reference in direct and in indirect speech (*gerade* and *ungerade Rede*).[95] According to Frege, names *change* their sense and reference in indirect speech: in direct speech, they have their 'customary sense' and 'customary reference'; in indirect speech (that is, in propositional attitude reports), they have an 'indirect sense' and 'indirect reference'.[96] Roughly, Frege suggests that we use linguistic expressions in indirect speech to speak about the *senses* these expressions have in *direct* speech, so the indirect referent of an expression is the customary sense of the expression.[97] Also, Frege suggests that the indirect sense of a sentence *s* is identical to the customary sense of the description 'the thought that *s*'.[98] E.g., the indirect sense of the sentence '2 + 2 = 4' is identical to the customary sense of the description 'the thought that 2 + 2 = 4'. To account for this, **CD** can be modified by quantifying not just over names, but over *occurrences* of names.

5) Russell famously distinguishes two kinds of names: names 'in the narrow logical sense', and 'the names that we commonly use'.[99] The literature mostly speaks of *logically* proper names and *ordinary* proper names. Roughly, a speaker uses an expression as logically proper name iff using it to refer to something she is acquainted with, which, according to Russell's epistemology, will only be her immediate sense data.[100] The clearest case of such expressions will be demonstrative pronouns.[101] By contrast, the names of natural language are ordinary proper names: they refer to objects that we, according to Russell, are not immediately acquainted with. Importantly, Russell gives logically proper names a referentialist analysis, so their meaning will simply consist in their referent/denotation. By contrast, ordinary proper names receive a descriptivist analysis: as Russell keeps reminding us, an ordinary proper name is "an abbreviated description",[102] "a sort

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[93] See, e.g., Frege 1892, 27, footnote, on the sense of 'Aristotle': "Bei einem eigentlichen Eigennamen wie „Aristoteles" können freilich die Meinungen über den Sinn auseinander gehen. Man könnte z. B. als solchen annehmen: der Schüler Platos und Lehrer Alexanders des Großen. Wer dies thut, wird mit dem Satze „Aristoteles war aus Stagira gebürtig" einen andern Sinn verbinden als einer, der als Sinn dieses Namens annähme: der aus Stagira gebürtige Lehrer Alexanders des Großen." Frege 1948, 210, n. 2: "In the case of an actual proper name such as "Aristotle" opinions as to the sense may differ. It might, for instance, be taken to be the following: *the pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great*. Anybody who does this will attach another sense to the sentence "Aristotle was born in Stagira" than will a man who takes as the sense of the name: *the teacher of Alexander the Great who was born in Stagira*" (italics added).

[94] E.g., Kripke 1980, 27. Critics of this view include Dummett 1973, 110.

[95] See Frege 1892, 28.

[96] See Frege 1892, 28; Frege 1948, 211f. ('customary' here as translation for 'gewöhnlich').

[97] See Frege 1892, 28.

[98] See Frege 1892, 37.

[99] See Russell 2010, 29. On rare occasions, Russell neglects the distinction between logically and ordinary proper names and gives also ordinary proper names a Millian analysis; see Russell/Whitehead 1997, 66, on 'Socrates'.

[100] See, e.g., Russell 1910/11, 114f.

[101] See the blackboard example in Russell 2010, 28.

[102] Russell 1993, 179.

of truncated description",[103] "a substitute for a description".[104] So, Russell would restrict **CD** to *ordinary* proper names.

6) Russell maintains that definite descriptions–and hence names if analyzed as definite descriptions–have no meaning (or, in our standard contemporary terminology, no semantic content). To see why, consider thar Russell introduces the notion of a denoting phrase: denoting phrases–such as quantifiers or definite descriptions–may have a denotation, but they will not have a meaning, though they contribute to the meaning of the sentences in which they are used.[105] E.g., the denoting phrase 'the largest Turkish city' has the city of Istanbul as its denotation; the denoting phrase 'the round square' has no denotation. At the same time, Russell argues that both phrases have no meaning, as they do not 'stand for' any specific constituents of the propositions expressed by sentences in which those phrases are used.[106] Rather, denoting phrases contribute meaning to sentences only by being analyzed in a way that makes them 'disappear'.[107] E.g., the phrase 'the largest Turkish city' contributes meaning to sentences according to the following schema: 'The largest Turkish city has property *F*' means 'There is an *x* s.t. *x* is a largest Turkish city, and all largest Turkish cities are identical to *x*, and *x* has property *F*'.[108] Note that the way we defined 'semantic content' evades this problem: we defined the semantic content of a subsentential expression *e* as the contribution that *e* makes to the semantic content of sentences that use *e*.

3.2.2) The Cluster Theory

Classical descriptivism met with resistance already prior to the anti-descriptivist critique by Kripke and other proponents of the 'new philosophy of language'. Over the course of the 1940s and 50s, several leading ordinary language philosophers–among them the later Wittgenstein, Peter Srawson, and John Searle–came to reject classical descriptivism as overly idealized.[109] In particular, they challenged the view that any user of a name

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[103] Russell 2010, 79.

[104] Russell 2023, 147. Some passages in Russell suggest that he held this view only for *idiolects*, while in *public* languages, even the meaning of *ordinary* proper names is just their referent. See Sainsbury 2002, 90-95; relying on Russell 1910/11, 114, 116.

[105] See Russell 1905, 480f., 488. We modify Russell's account to some extent, to bring it in line with contemporary terminology. More precisely, Russell would say (on page 480) that *propositions*, not sentences, have meaning–whereas today we would say that propositions *are* the meaning/content of sentences. The same holds if we interpret 'meaning' strictly as Fregean sense: also Fregean senses are not properties of propositions/thoughts, but of sentences–the thought expressed by a sentence *is* the sense of that sentence. Note that Russell in this context does seem to distinguish between propositions and sentences: he says that denoting phrases occur in the *verbal expressions* of propositions, and those verbal expressions would seem to be sentences (it is clear from the context that 'verbal' here just means 'linguistic', not 'oral'). By contrast, Russell sometimes uses 'sentence' and 'proposition' interchangeably: e.g., on page 488 he speaks of phrases occurring in propositions, rather than saying that phrases occur in sentences; in Russell/Whitehead 1997, 67, propositions are implicitly classified as a type of phrases; and in Russell 2010, 10, he explicitly says 'A proposition, one may say, is a sentence in the indicative'.

[106] See Russell 1905, 482.

[107] See Russell/Whitehead 1997, 51, 66. Linguistic expressions that disappear under analysis are also called 'incomplete symbols' in Russell.

[108] See Russell 1905, 482.

[109] See Wittgenstein 1960 [1953], 330 (§79); Strawson 2003, 191f.; Searle 1958. Wittgenstein, Strawson, and Searle do not use the term 'cluster theory' in their original versions of the theory. Also note that Wittgenstein's remarks about names illustrate his notion of family resemblance and concepts with 'blurred edges' (ibid., 324-326, §§67, 71; see also the translation by G. E. M. Anscombe in Wittgenstein 1958, 32, 34).

associates *exactly one* description with that name, and that such a description serves, in a sense, as a *definition* of the name.[110] E.g., Searle argues that classical descriptivism misses the reason why we use names in the first place, instead of just using definite descriptions: one of the benefits of names, according to Searle, is that we can use a name to refer to an object *without* having to agree on any necessary and sufficient conditions for the name's reference.[111] By contrast, we *do* agree on necessary and sufficient conditions for the reference of definite descriptions: a definite description 'the *F*' refers to an object *x* iff *x* uniquely exemplifies the property expressed by the predicate *F*.[112] Instead, Wittgenstein, Strawson, and Searle argue that a speaker associates a name with the cluster, or set, of all descriptions that she believes to be satisfied by the name's referent (or, for an alternative formulation, the set of all properties that she believes to be exemplified by the name's referent). The resulting version of descriptivism is known as the *cluster theory*.[113]

For our purposes, we omit a full reconstruction of the cluster theory and confine ourselves to two of its features. First, cluster theorists suggest, roughly, that the use of a name in a speaker's idiolect refers to the unique object that satisfies *sufficiently many* descriptions in the cluster that the speaker associates with the name; the quantifier 'sufficiently many' is in this context not rendered precise.[114] Second, cluster theorists remain largely silent on the meaning/semantic content of names. We take the cluster theory to be compatible with two main semantic options. First, the content of a name in the idiolect of a speaker might simply be the cluster associated with the name by the speaker.

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[110] See Searle 1958, 166; Searle 1983, 255, 259.

[111] See Searle 1958, 169-172.

[112] See Searle 1958, 171-173. For a side note, Searle makes an analogous claim in object-level terms, specifically in terms of identity-criteria: we can use a name to refer to an object without having to agree on the question which properties constitute the identity of the object. E.g., we can refer with the name 'Aristotle' to Aristotle, the philosopher, without having to agree which properties constitute the identity of Aristotle. By contrast, if we could refer to Aristotle only with a definite description 'the *F*' (say, 'the teacher of Alexander'), we would already have to agree that the property *F* constitutes the identity of Aristotle–that being Aristotle consists in being the *F*.

[113] Early traces of the cluster theory are already found in Russell's "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description": "When we, who did not know Bismarck, make a judgment about him, the description in our minds will probably be some more or less vague mass of historical knowledge–far more, in most cases, than is required to identify him." (Russell 1910/11, 115). The 'mass of historical knowledge' may well be conceived as a cluster associated with the name 'Bismarck'. Also, the fact that this mass of historical knowledge may be vague may be read as an indication that not *all* of that knowledge is true of the referent of 'Bismarck', but only a *sufficient amount*–just as in the cluster theory, the referent of a name has to exemplify only *sufficiently many* descriptions in the cluster associated with the name. Similarly, see Jespersen (1954 [1914]: 80f.) who suggests that a singular use of a proper name "'denotes' one single individual […] and it 'connotes' all those characteristics by which that individual is recognized".

[114] Searle speaks of a 'sufficient but so far unspecified number': "the descriptive force of "This is Aristotle" is to assert that a sufficient but so far unspecified number of these statements are true of this object" (Searle 1958: 171). Strawson speaks of 'some reasonable proportion': "Suppose we take a group of speakers who use, or think they use, the name, 'Socrates', with the same reference. Suppose we then ask each member of the group to write down what he considers to be the salient facts about Socrates, and then form from these lists of facts a composite description incorporating the most frequently mentioned facts. Now it would be too much to say that the success of term-introduction within the group by means of the name requires that there should exist just one person of whom all the propositions in the composite description are true. But it would not be too much to say that it requires that there should exist one and only one person of whom some reasonable proportion of these propositions is true" (Strawson 2003: 191). Also note that neither Searle nor Strawson speak of properties exemplified by an object, but rather of statements, facts, or propositions that are true of an object.

Alternatively, the content of a name *N* might be (roughly speaking) a disjunctive description, ranging over the disjunction of all and only conjunctions C s.t. every conjunct of C is a description belonging to the cluster associated with *N*, and C contains *sufficiently many* descriptions from that cluster. E.g., assume Mary uses the name 'Istanbul'. Also assume there are exactly three descriptions that she believes to be satisfied by the referent of her use of 'Istanbul': the definite descriptions 'the largest Turkish city' and 'the capital of Turkey', and the indefinite description 'an inland city'.[115] Finally, assume (for the sake of the example) that 'sufficiently many' means 'more than 50%'; then, given that Mary's 'Istanbul'-cluster contains exactly three descriptions, 'sufficiently many' is equivalent to 'at least two'. Then, according to the second semantic option, the content of 'Istanbul' in Mary's idiolect would be the following description:

- the *x* s.t. (*x* is the largest Turkish city and the capital of Turkey and an inland city) or (*x* is the largest Turkish city and the capital of Turkey) or (*x* is the largest Turkish city and an inland city) or (*x* is the capital of Turkey and an inland city).

The description is satisfied by Ankara: the only disjunct that is satisfied by any object is the fourth (*x* is the capital of Turkey and an inland city), which is uniquely satisfied by Ankara. We do not decide which of the two versions comes closer to the intentions of cluster theorists.[116]

3.2.3) Kripke's Critique of Non-Metalinguistic Descriptivism

Famously, both classical descriptivism and the cluster theory are challenged by Kripke in his lectures *Naming and Necessity* (held in 1970; first print 1972; expanded second edition 1980). In this section, we summarize Kripke's critique; since the overall focus of this study is on predicativism, and predicativism is a semantic, not a metasemantic theory, we focus on Kripke's critique of *semantic* descriptivism.

In the literature on *Naming and Necessity*, Kripke's main arguments against semantic descriptivism are typically classified into three groups: modal (or metaphysical), epistemic, and semantic arguments.[117] Each of these arguments is meant to show that names do not have the same kind of semantic content as definite descriptions, and hence are not synonymous with any definite descriptions. Roughly, if a name *N* was synonymous with a definite description 'the *F*', then sentences of the form '*N* is the *F*' (or, more cautiously, 'If *N* exists, *N* is the *F*') should be metaphysically necessary, a priori knowable, and analytically true. Kripke argues that sentences of the form '*N* is the *F*' lack all three of these features. Let us briefly reconstruct all three arguments.

First, Kripke's modal argument is given in terms of metaphysical modalities (metaphysical necessity, possibility, etc.). Its upshot is that names do not have the same modal profile as definite descriptions: a name is a rigid designator, that is, it refers at all possible worlds to its actual referent (and perhaps fails to refer at worlds where that referent does

[115] Searle restricts the cluster to *definite* descriptions, while Strawson seems to make no such restriction. See Searle 1958, 171: "To use a proper name referringly is to presuppose the truth of certain uniquely referring descriptive statements, but it is not ordinarily to assert these statements or even to indicate which exactly are presupposed". (Again, Searle's account in terms of descriptive statements is easily reconstructed as an account in terms of *descriptions*.)

[116] Searle 1969, 169, seems to favor the second option: "the disjunction of these descriptions [associated with the name 'Aristotle'] is *analytically tied* to the name "Aristotle"–which is a quasi-affirmative answer to the question, "Do proper names have senses?" in its stronger formulation" (italics added).

[117] See, e.g., Salmon 2005, 23-31.

not exist). Definite descriptions typically do not: they refer to different objects at different worlds *w*, depending on which object in *w* uniquely exemplifies the property associated (in the actual world) with the description.[118] One immediate consequence is that identity statements of the form '*N* is the *F*' (we will use 'is' as untensed) will be contingent rather than necessary. Kripke's modal argument is motivated by intuitions about the modal truth value of name-using sentences. To take up one of Kripke's examples, think of a personal name like 'Aristotle'. Descriptivists would argue that we use 'Aristotle' as synonymous with a definite description or perhaps a cluster of descriptions: e.g., with descriptions like 'the teacher of Alexander the Great', 'the author of the *Metaphysics*', etc.; or a cluster containing all definite descriptions that we believe to be satisfied by the referent of 'Aristote'. Kripke would ask us to consider sentences like 'Aristotle was the teacher of Alexander the Great', 'Aristotle was the author of the *Metaphysics*', 'Aristotle was the founder of the Peripatetic school', etc. Clearly, such sentences are not metaphysically necessary: Aristotle could have died in infancy, in which case he would have neither become a teacher, nor written any philosophy books, nor founded any philosophical schools. The same holds for the cluster version, that is, for sentences like 'Aristotle was the teacher of Alexander the Great or the author of the *Metaphysics* or the founder of the Peripatetic school or…'. Again, Kripke suggests that such a disjunctive sentence is metaphysically contingent: in possible worlds where Aristotle died in infancy, it might well be that none of the descriptions we associate with the name 'Aristotle' are true of Aristotle.

Second, Kripke's epistemic argument can be stated in terms of apriority. Its upshot is that names do not have the same epistemic profile as definite descriptions, and in particular that sentences of the form '*N* is the *F*' are not a priori true (where we assume a standard definition of apriority as knowability independently of experience/knowability based only on reason).[119] E.g., for typical users of the name 'Aristotle', sentences like 'Aristotle was the teacher of Alexander', 'Aristotle was the author of the *Metaphysics*', etc., will be knowable only a posteriori: e.g., based on observing Aristotle teaching Alexander or writing the *Metaphysics*, or based on testimony by others about Aristotle. Or, in terms of propositions rather than sentences: the propositions that Aristotle was the teacher of Alexander, that Aristotle was the author of the *Metaphysics*, etc., are knowable only a posteriori. The same holds for the cluster version: it is not knowable a priori that: Aristotle was the teacher of Alexander or the author of the *Metaphysics* or… A bit more cautiously, we might replace a priori knowability with knowability based only on reason *and on linguistic understanding*. E.g., the sentence 'All bachelors are unmarried' is knowable based on reason and on understanding the sentence. By contrast, the same does not hold for 'Aristotle was the teacher of Alexander': one might correctly understand the sentence (or an utterance thereof) as saying that Aristotle the philosopher was the teacher of Alexander the Great, and one might still fail to know that the sentence is true.[120]

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[118] For the modal argument, see Kripke 1980, e.g., 6f., 57, 61-65, and 74f.
[119] For the epistemic argument, see Kripke 1980, e.g., 65-68, 78, and 87-89.
[120] Note that the understanding of sentences (at least of a *public* language) will be based on experience–on listening to others speak, etc. Hence, by a narrower conception of apriority as knowability independently of experience, the understanding of sentences would be a posteriori.

Third, Kripke's semantic argument is given in terms of analyticity: its upshot is that sentences of the form '*N* is the *F*' are not analytically true.[121] Again, sentences like 'Aristotle was the most famous teacher of Alexander the Great', 'Aristotle was the author of the *Metaphysics*', etc., seem to be synthetically, not analytically true–they do not have the same semantic status as sentences like 'All bachelors are unmarried' or 'If Aristotle was a philosopher, then Aristotle was a philosopher'. Again, the same holds for the cluster version: sentences like 'Aristotle was the most famous teacher of Alexander the Great, or the author of the *Metaphysics*, or…' are not analytically true. Among Kripke's arguments, the semantic argument is least likely to convince descriptivists: e.g., classical descriptivists will object that users of a name *N do* use that name synonymously with certain descriptions 'the *F*', and in the idiolects of those speakers, sentences of the form '*N* is the *F*' *are* analytically true. Similarly, cluster theorists will object that users of a name *N* use that name synonymously with certain cluster of descriptions 'the F_1', 'the F_2', etc., and in the idiolects of those speakers, sentences of the form '*N* is the F_1, or the F_2, or…' are analytically true.

For a potential concern, the sentence '*N* is the *F*' implies the existential statement that there is an *F*, which is neither a priori knowable nor analytic. So, the sentence might not be suited to evaluating whether names are synonymous with descriptions. This concern is easily dispelled if we replace '*N* is the *F*' with the conditional 'If *N* exists, *N* is the *F*'. And all three of Kripke's objections apply also to the conditional. E.g., 'If Aristotle existed, Aristotle was the author of the *Metaphysics*' is still contingent: Aristotle could have died in infancy, in which case he would have existed, but would not have written the *Metaphysics*. Similarly, the sentence is still a posteriori: we can know only based on experience (observation, testimony,…) that if Aristotle existed, he wrote the *Metaphysics*. In what follows, we will often use the shorter '*N* is the *F*' for simplicity.

Also consider an alternative second way of formulating Kripke's arguments: for any name *N* and any definite description 'the *F*', the *substitution* of *N* with 'the *F*', or vice versa, can lead to changes in the modal, epistemic, or semantic profile of a sentence. In particular, such a substitution can turn necessary, a priori, and analytic sentences into contingent, a posteriori, and synthetic ones, or vice versa. Take the sentence 'If Aristotle existed, Aristotle taught Alexander' and substitute 'Aristotle' with 'the teacher of Alexander': 'If the teacher of Alexander existed, the teacher of Alexander taught Alexander'. The original sentence is contingent, a posteriori, and synthetic, while the resulting sentence is necessary, a priori, and analytic. In our discussion of Kripke's arguments, we will sometimes use the first formulation, sometimes the second.

As we said above, our summary of Kripke's critique of classical descriptivism and the cluster theory was confined to the critique of *semantic* descriptivism. For the sake of completeness, let us briefly mention Kripke's objections against *metasemantic* descriptivism. Kripke's main objections are commonly known as *examples of ignorance and error*.[122] Both kinds of examples suggest that descriptivism does not work as a theory of reference-determination: in at least some cases, the descriptivist verdict about a name's

[121] For the semantic argument, see Kripke 1980, e.g., 58f., 72.
[122] See Devitt/Sterelny 1999, 54-57. For Kripke's examples, see Kripke 1980, 81, 83-85, 87, 90f. (e.g., the examples of ignorance about Feynman and Jonah, and the examples of error about Gödel and Peano).

reference does not cohere with the intuitive verdict. In examples of ignorance, the description associated with a name is not uniquely satisfied by any object; in examples of error, the description is uniquely satisfied, but not by the name's referent. Or, applied to the cluster theory: in examples of ignorance, there is no unique object that uniquely satisfies sufficiently many descriptions in the cluster associated with a name; in examples of error, there is such a unique object, but that object is not the name's referent. We will mostly set metasemantic descriptivism aside for the remainder of this study; this includes post-Kripkean versions, such as, most prominently, *causal descriptivism*.[123]

3.2.4) Descriptivist Responses to Kripke's Critique

In response to *Naming and Necessity*, descriptivists either rejected Kripke's objections as unfounded or aimed to refine their theories to evade those objections. In this section, we address a number of descriptivist responses, focusing again on *semantic* descriptivism.

The responses to Kripke's critique of semantic descriptivism focus on the modal argument and mostly set the epistemic and semantic arguments aside. Some post-Kripkean descriptivists reject Kripke's modal argument, others accept it. The ones who reject it typically argue that associated descriptions always take wide scope. So, the candidates for associated descriptions that pre-Kripkean descriptivists suggest need not be replaced: e.g., 'Aristotle' could still be analyzed as a description like 'the teacher of Alexander the Great'. We call this approach *wide scope descriptivism* (3.2.4.1). By contrast, descriptivists who accept the modal argument suggest replacing the descriptions proposed by pre-Kripkean descriptivists with descriptions that designate rigidly, that is, that have the same referent at all possible worlds. In this section, we look at three versions of this approach. We call them *rigidified descriptivism*, *essential descriptivism*, and *identity descriptivism*. The former will be addressed in 3.2.4.2, the latter two in 3.2.4.3.

3.2.4.1) Wide Scope Descriptivism

As we said, wide scope descriptivism analyzes names as definite descriptions that (usually) take wide scope. E.g., if the name 'Constantinople' is analyzed as the description 'the former Byzantine capital', then wide scope descriptivism would analyze the true sentence:

- In some possible worlds, Constantinople was never a capital,

as the true sentence:

- There is an *x* s.t. only *x* is a former Byzantine capital, and in some possible worlds, *x* was never a capital.

And not as the false sentence:

- In some possible worlds, there is an *x* s.t. only *x* is a former Byzantine capital and *x* was never a capital.

Or, if 'Constantinople' is analyzed as the metalinguistic description 'the entity called 'Constantinople'', then wide scope descriptivism would analyze the true sentence:

- In some possible worlds, Constantinople is not called 'Constantinople'.

as the true sentence:

- There is an *x* s.t. only *x* is an entity called 'Constantinople', and in some possible worlds, *x* is not called 'Constantinople'.

[123] Defenders of causal descriptivism include, e.g., Loar 1976; McKinsey 1978; Lewis 1984; Kroon 1987; Chalmers 2002, 171; Jackson 2010, 4-7, 114.

And not as the false sentence:

- In some possible worlds, there is an *x* s.t. only *x* is an entity called 'Constantinople' and *x* is not called 'Constantinople'.

Thereby, Kripke's modal argument is evaded. The upshot of the modal argument was, roughly, that a name has the same referent at every possible world, while a definite description might have different referents at different possible worlds, depending on which object the description is true of at the respective world. 'Constantinople' refers at every possible world to the city of Istanbul, while 'the former Byzantine capital' refers at every possible world to whatever in that world uniquely exemplifies the property of being a former Byzantine capital–a property that is uniquely exemplified by Istanbul in some worlds, by Rome in others, and so on. Wide scope descriptivism, however, ensures that the referent of a definite description in modal sentences is still the *actual* referent of that description–the object that the description is true of in *our* world. And the analysis does so by removing the description from the scope of any modal operators.

Wide scope descriptivism has been defended, among others, by Michael Dummett and David Sosa,[124] and is extensively criticized by Kripke in the 1980 preface to *Naming and Necessity*.[125] Let us briefly summarize Kripke's arguments.

First, Kripke argues that scope distinctions are not applicable to simple sentences, that is, to sentences that do not contain any operators, such as negation operators or modal operators.[126] E.g., the sentences 'The former Byzantine capital lies in Turkey' or 'The sum of 2 and 2 is even' do not allow for different scope readings of the descriptions 'the former Byzantine capital' or 'the sum of 2 and 2'–the notion of scope is simply not applicable to the occurrences of descriptions in such sentences. By contrast, the notion of rigidity applies even to simple sentences. E.g., the name 'Constantinople' is a rigid designator also if used in the simple sentence 'Constantinople lies in Turkey', and the description 'the sum of 2 and 2' is a rigid designator also if used in the simple sentence 'The sum of 2 and 2 is even': if we evaluate these sentences at other possible worlds, the descriptions will still refer to their actual referents, that is, to the city of Istanbul and to the natural number 4 respectively.

Second, Kripke argues that sentences involving a scope-ambiguity can be reformulated in a way that eliminates the ambiguity. E.g., the ambiguous sentence:

- The former Byzantine capital was in some possible worlds never a capital.

can be given either of the two following reformulations:

- The former Byzantine capital is an *x* such that: in some possible worlds, *x* was never a capital.
- In some possible worlds: the former Byzantine capital was never a capital. (Or more explicitly: In some possible worlds *w*: the entity that in *w* uniquely exemplifies the property of being a former Byzantine capital was in *w* never a capital.)

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[124] See Dummett 1973, 112-116, 128; Sosa 1996 (unprinted), chapter 3; Sosa 2001. Dummett 1973, 113, 128, refines the wide scope analysis by suggesting that in some cases, the description used to analyze a name might have to be given narrow scope. E.g. (to slightly expand on his example), if we fix the reference of 'St. Anne' with the description 'the mother of Mary', an assertion of the sentence 'St. Anne is necessarily a parent' is probably meant to be analyzed as 'In all possible worlds *w*, the object that in *w* exemplifies the property of being a mother of Mary is in *w* a parent'.

[125] See Kripke 1980, 11-14.

[126] See Kripke 1980, 11f.

The description ‘the former Byzantine capital’ unambiguously takes wide scope in the first reformulation and unambiguously takes narrow scope in the second. The second sentence is false: it implies that some possible worlds *w* contain an entity that is in *w* a former capital, but was in *w* never a capital–and hence that contradictions are possibly true. By contrast, if we substitute the description in *either* of these unambiguous sentences with a name, the name is still a rigid designator, and both resulting sentences are true: in particular, the name still refers to its actual referent in a sentence where the corresponding description takes narrow scope and hence might *not* refer to its actual referent. E.g., in the sentence ‘In some possible worlds: Constantinople was never a capital’, the name ‘Constantinople’ still refers to its referent in the *actual* world, that is, to the city of Istanbul. And hence, the sentence is true: there are possible worlds where *this* city–the city of Istanbul–never became a capital.[127]

In response to Kripke’s critique, defenders of wide scope descriptivism might refine their analysis. E.g., they might suggest that while names do not strictly speaking have the same meaning as descriptions, the meaning of any *name-using sentence* can still be analyzed in entirely descriptive terms. Here is one way to render this precise: every name N corresponds to a description D_N; and every sentence that uses N can be analyzed as a sentence that replaces every occurrence of N in the sentence with an occurrence of D_N that is given wide scope. E.g., while ‘Constantinople’ might not have the same meaning as ‘the former Byzantine capital’ (the former is a rigid designator, the latter is not), any sentence that uses ‘Constantinople’ can be analyzed as a sentence that replaces every occurrence of ‘Constantinople’ in the sentence with an occurrence of ‘the former Byzantine capital’ that is given wide scope. For the purposes of this study, we do not decide if this strategy is viable.

3.2.4.2) Rigidified Descriptivism

Let us turn to rigidified descriptivism. According to rigidified descriptivism, the descriptions used to analyze names should be rigid designators which can be achieved, e.g., by relativizing them to the actual world. So, e.g., ‘Istanbul’ would no longer be analyzed as ‘the largest Turkish city’, but as ‘the largest Turkish city *in the actual world*’. Rigidified descriptivism has been defended, among others, by Leonard Linsky and Alvin Plantinga.[128] A rigidified version of the cluster theory (according to which every description in the cluster associated with a name is relativized to the actual world) is suggested by Searle.[129]

Much of the critique of rigidified descriptivism is due to Soames’ 1998 paper “The Modal Argument: Wide Scope and Rigidified Descriptions”. The upshot of Soames’ central argument is that rigidified descriptivism ties the semantic content of names too closely to the actual world. Consider the following scenario: Mary associates the name ‘Istanbul’ with the description ‘the largest Turkish city *in the actual world*’. Given that Mary does so in *our* world (by assumption), her use of the phrase ‘the actual world’ refers to our world. In line with most contemporary philosophers, Soames argues that the most promising semantics of actuality operators like ‘in the actual world’ is that their semantic

[127] For the basic points of this argument, see Kripke 1980, 13, 61f.
[128] See Linsky 1977, 84; Plantinga 1978, 132-134.
[129] See Searle 1983, 258.

content is simply their referent: so, what 'the actual world' contributes to the semantic content of 'the largest Turkish city in the actual world' is simply *our* world. Now, consider worlds that are just slightly different from ours: e.g., a world that is exactly like the actual world except that I didn't spill my tea just now. Soames would argue that in a world this close to the actual world, speakers are still able to use the names they use in the actual world with the same semantic content as in the actual world–e.g., in such a world, Mary might still use the name 'Istanbul' with the same content as in the actual world. However, in worlds other than the actual world, it is implausible that speakers are familiar with *our* world. Hence, it is implausible that in such worlds, speakers use names as expressing a content that is relativized to our world, such as the content (actually) expressed by the description 'the largest Turkish city in the actual world' that Mary is supposed to associate with 'Istanbul', according to rigidified descriptivism. More generally, rigidified descriptivism seems to entail that if the world was just slightly different, we would be unlikely to use a name with the same meaning as we actually do.[130]

3.2.4.3) Essential Descriptivism and Identity Descriptivism

Finally, essential descriptivism and identity descriptivism are both best formulated in terms of properties, not descriptions. Essential descriptivism is the view that a name expresses all essential properties of the name's referent. Plantinga promotes essential descriptivism in *The Nature of Necessity* (1974)[131] and later partially revokes it in "The Boethian Compromise" (1978).[132] Identity descriptivism, by contrast, is mainly associated with Michael Lockwood and posits that a name expresses the property of being identical to a, where a is the name's referent.[133]

The main advantage of both versions of essential descriptivism is that they evade Kripke's modal argument: after all, for all objects x, the essential properties of x are simply the ones that x exemplifies in all possible worlds (or at least in all possible worlds where x exists); also, the essential properties of x include the property of being identical to x. On the other hand, essential descriptivism and identity descriptivism still face epistemic and semantic arguments similar to Kripke's. Let us begin with essential descriptivism and the epistemic argument: as conceded by Plantinga, speakers who refer with a name to an object cannot be expected to know *all* the object's essential properties.[134] The semantic argument is a bit more intricate and will have to be modified to work against essential descriptivism. To that end, consider how Plantinga motivates essential descriptivism: according to Plantinga, a term t expresses a property F iff a sentence of the form 't is $\bar{F}$' is necessarily false, where $\bar{F}$ expresses the complement of F.[135] E.g., 'The inventor

[130] For a more extensive version of this argument, see Soames 1998, 13-17.
[131] See Plantinga 1974, 77-87. E.g., page 80: "'Socrates' expresses the essence of Socrates–more exactly and more pedantically, it expresses each of his essences."
[132] See Plantinga 1978, 135.
[133] See Lockwood 1975, 494-498. Identity descriptivism comes close to the view that a name expresses the *haecceity* of the name's referent, that is, the property of being *that very object*. Salmon (2005: 21f.) classifies such a view as non-descriptivist.
[134] See Plantinga 1978, 133.
[135] See Plantinga 1974, 78; 1978, 132. We simplify Plantinga's presentation (Plantinga replaces '$\bar{F}$' in 't is $\bar{F}$' with a predicate expressing $\bar{F}$).

of the light bulb is an *x* s.t. *x* is not the inventor of the light bulb' is necessarily false;[136] hence, the description 'the inventor of the light bulb' expresses the property of being the inventor of the light bulb (whose complement is the property of being an *x* s.t. *x* is not the inventor of the light bulb). Similarly, 'The inventor of the light bulb is an *x* s.t. *x* is not an inventor' is necessarily false, so 'the inventor of the light bulb' also expresses the property of being an inventor. As the example shows, Plantinga suggests that a term (even if disambiguated) might express several properties at the same time. Against this background, consider names. Plantinga agrees with Kripke that names are rigid designators. Hence, statements of the form '*N* is $\bar{F}$' will be necessarily false (false at all possible worlds) iff the actual referent *r* of *N* does not exemplify $\bar{F}$ in *any* possible world; that is, iff *r* exemplifies *F* in all possible worlds where *r* exists; that is, iff *F* is an essential property of *r*. So, a name expresses a property *F* iff *F* is an essential property of the name's referent. E.g., 'Socrates is an *x* s.t. *x* is not identical to Socrates' is necessarily false, so the name 'Socrates' expresses the property of being identical to Socrates. And analogously for any other essential property of Socrates. E.g., assume the property of being human is essential to Socrates; then, 'Socrates is an *x* s.t. *x* is not human' is necessarily false, so the name 'Socrates' also expresses the property of being human. Let us level two semantic objections against this picture. First, as Plantinga later acknowledges,[137] essential descriptivism individuates the content of names in a coarse-grained way: in particular, all coreferential names will have the same content. Thereby, essential descriptivism fails to solve Frege's puzzles of informative identity statements of the form '*N* = *N**'–historically one of the main motivations for descriptivism. Second, on a more general note, Plantinga explains the necessary truth/falsehood of a sentence solely in terms of the sentence's content: e.g., Plantinga's account implies that the necessary falsehood of the sentence 'Socrates is an *x* s.t. *x* is not human' is fully grounded in the content of the sentence, namely in the fact that the sentence implies the contradiction 'Something human is an *x* s.t. *x* is not human'. This approach is overly restrictive in reducing the notion of a necessarily true/false sentence to a sentence that is *logically* true/false at every world. In particular, it seems that Plantinga would subscribe to the following principle: a sentence is necessarily false iff the sentence is contradictory at every possible world. This account contrasts with the contemporary mainstream approach that takes the set of metaphysically possible worlds to be a proper subset of the set of logically possible worlds. The referentialist analysis of names, according to which a name contributes only its referent to the meaning of a sentence in which the name is used, would allow for such a distinction between metaphysically and logically possible worlds. Referentialists would agree that it is necessarily false that Socrates exists without being human (that is, that Socrates exemplifies the complement of the property of being human); but they would argue that this is fully grounded in the fact that we use 'Socrates' as rigid designator for Socrates, plus by non-linguistic facts about Socrates, namely which properties are part of his essence. This amounts to a version of the semantic argument: Plantinga would classify sentences like 'Socrates is an *x* s.t. *x*

[136] Plantinga's formulation would be slightly different from ours: 'The inventor of the light bulb exemplifies the complement of the property of being the inventor of the light bulb'.
[137] See Plantinga 1978, 133.

is not human' as logically and hence analytically false, while referentialists would argue that they are synthetically false.

Let us turn to identity descriptivism. First, identity descriptivism might evade Kripke's epistemic argument: it would seem that competent users of *N*, who use *N* as referring to object *a*, can be expected to know a priori that the referent of *N* exemplifies the property of being identical to *a*. Or, for a more cautious formulation, they can be expected to know this simply in virtue of being competent users of *N*, that is, in virtue of knowing the content of *N*. Referentialists like Kripke would agree with this claim, given that they identify the content of *N* with the referent of *N*. However, identity descriptivism still faces a related objection: historically, a main motivation for a descriptivist analysis of names was to capture ways in which users of a name mentally represent the name's referent. By contrast, according to identity descriptivism, a name's referent is *part* of the content of the name: the name's referent *a* is part of the property of being identical to *a*. Also, identity descriptivism faces a variation of Kripke's semantic argument: if two distinct names *N* and *N** both refer to the same object *a*, then they have the same content, namely the property of being identical to *a*. In that case, a sentence like '*N* = *N**' or 'If *N* exists, *N** exists' is synonymous with (has the same content as) the logically true sentences '*N* = *N*' or 'If *N* exists, *N* exists'. Hence, under identity descriptivism, sentences like '*N* = *N**' and 'If *N* exists, *N** exists' will come out as analytic, contrary to the traditional descriptivist verdict that they are synthetic.

3.3) Metalinguistic Descriptivism

The versions of descriptivism we looked at so far had in common that they were non-metalinguistic: they agreed that the descriptions associated with a name are not 'about' the name–they do not *mention* the name. Instead, they were about the extralinguistic world: about who taught Alexander, about who wrote the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, about which city is the largest among the cities in Turkey, and the like. To get one step closer to predicativism, let us now turn to *metalinguistic* descriptivism. In this section, we first reconstruct the *semantic* version of metalinguistic descriptivism (3.3.1) and summarize Kripke's critique (3.3.2).

3.3.1) A Brief Reconstruction

Roughly, pre-Kripkean metalinguistic descriptivism connects the meaning or semantic content of a name *N* to the metalinguistic property of being called *N*.[138] In its simplest form, this view can be stated as follows:

- *N* is synonymous with the definite description 'the individual called *N*'.

Metalinguistic descriptivism in this simple version is mainly associated with William Kneale.[139] Kneale's motivation to endorse metalinguistic descriptivism goes roughly as follows: it seems trifling/uninformative to tell an interlocutor '*N* is called *N*' (where the

[138] Some metalinguistic descriptivists interchangeably speak of the property of being a bearer of the name *N*. See, e.g., Bach 1981, 371; Graff Fara 2015a, 61, 70.

[139] See the brief remarks in Kneale 1962, 629f. Alonzo Church (1956: 5, including n. 10) makes a similar point, though less explicitly, when he claims that some names "have as part of their meaning that the denotation is so called or is or was entitled to be so called". E.g., he would suggest that it is "contained in the meaning" of the name 'Sir Walter Scott' that "the person named […] has the given name "Walter" and surname "Scott"".

name *N* is used on the first occurrence and mentioned on the second); and the reason why this is trifling is that in order to understand the first occurrence of *N*, the interlocutor already needs to know that *N* means 'the individual called *N*'. E.g., it seems trifling to tell an interlocutor 'Socrates is called 'Socrates'' since in order to understand the first occurrence of 'Socrates', the interlocutor already needs to know that 'Socrates' means 'the individual called 'Socrates''.[140]

For a weaker alternative to Kneale's view, take Russell who occasionally suggests that *some* speakers might use *some* names synonymously with a description like 'the individual called *N*', without demanding that *all* speakers use *all* names in that way. E.g., in *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism*, Russell says:

> "the name "Romulus" is not really a name but a sort of truncated description. It stands for a person who did such-and-such things, who killed Remus, and founded Rome, and so on. It is short for that description; if you like, it is short for "the person who was called 'Romulus'"."[141]

Russell also contends that in many cases, such a metalinguistic description might be the only description that a speaker believes to be uniquely true of the name's referent. See the following quote from "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description":

> "Now I am admitting, and indeed contending, that in order to discover what is actually in my mind when I judge about Julius Caesar, we must substitute for the proper name a description made up of some of the things I know about him. (A description which will often serve to express my thought is "the man whose name was Julius Caesar." For whatever else I may have forgotten about him, it is plain that when I mention him I have not forgotten that that was his name.)"[142]

3.3.2) Kripke's Critique

In his critique of metalinguistic descriptivism, Kripke focuses on two objections that we call *circularity argument* and *overgeneralization argument*.[143] In addition, we argue that metalinguistic descriptivism in its pre-Kripkean version does not evade Kripke's objections against non-metalinguistic descriptivism, most prominently the modal, epistemic, and semantic arguments.[144]

Let us briefly summarize the circularity and overgeneralization arguments. According to Kripke's circularity argument, metalinguistic descriptivism fails as a theory of reference-determination–not because it provides the *wrong* reference (as other versions of descriptivism do, according to Kripke), but because it does not provide *any* reference. Let us reconstruct the argument.[145] Metalinguistic descriptivism seems to suggest the following reference-conditions:

a) *x* is the referent of a name *N* iff *x* is the individual called *N*.

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[140] Note that Kneale uses the definite description 'the individual called Socrates' without quotes around 'Socrates'.
[141] Russell 2010, 79.
[142] Russell 1910/11, 119. Russell puts no quotation marks around 'Julius Caesar' in the description 'the man whose name was Julius Caesar' (different from the Romulus-example cited before); on the following page, 120, 'Julius Caesar' is spelled in italics.
[143] Recanati (1993: 158-164) speaks of the circularity and generality arguments, Elbourne (2005: 177f.) of the circularity and generality objections.
[144] We set some minor objections aside. E.g., as Kripke points out, Kneele says that it is trifling that Socrates *was* called 'Socrates'. Kripke rightly objects that claims about what Socrates *was* called in the past are not trifling–e.g., the Greeks did not call Socrates 'Socrates', at least not with the name's English pronunciation. But Kripke concedes that it is trifling, for any speaker *A* who uses 'Socrates' as name for Socrates, that Socrates is called 'Socrates' *by A*. See Kripke 1980, 69, 72.
[145] See Kripke 1980, 70. A similar argument is given in Searle 1969, 170.

Kripke would assume an *epistemic* interpretation of these reference-conditions: more specifically, he would interpret **(a)** as follows: in order to find out that *x* is the referent of a name *N*, we need to find out first that *x* is the individual called *N*. At the same time, Kripke would argue that the property of being an individual called *N* is *identical* to the property of being a referent of *N*. So, in order to find out that *x* is the referent of *N*, we first need to find out that *x* is the individual called *N*. Thus, we end up in a circle. Compare this to the reference-conditions in classical descriptivism. E.g., for the name 'Socrates', some classical descriptivists would have suggested:

b) *x* is the referent of 'Socrates' iff *x* is the teacher of Plato.

Here, in order to find out that *x* is the teacher of Plato, we do *not* need to find out that *x* is the referent of 'Socrates'–we might know who the teacher of Plato was even if we are not aware that Plato's teacher was named 'Socrates'. Instead, we can simply look at the extralinguistic world, at the life of Plato, and find out whether *x* was the teacher of Plato.

Next, according to Kripke's overgeneralization argument, Kneale's argument for metalinguistic descriptivism equally applies to expressions *e* whose meaning is clearly *not* the property of being called *e*. E.g., it is trifling to be told 'Horses are called 'horse(s)'', but clearly, the meaning of 'horse(s)' is not the property of being called 'horses(s)', but rather the property of being a horse, that is, of belonging to the natural kind *horse*.[146] Note that the overgeneralization argument does not refute metalinguistic descriptivism as such, but merely Kneale's *argument* for it. So, it does not rule out that there is additional evidence in favor of metalinguistic descriptivism: predicativists would argue that the existence of apparent predicative name-uses ('I know two Marys') provides such additional evidence.

In discussing metalinguistic descriptivism, Kripke focuses on the circularity and overgeneralization arguments; still, also his modal, epistemic, and semantic arguments seem applicable to metalinguistic descriptivism, or at least to the pre-Kripkean version thereof. Take again sentences of the form '*N* is the *F*' (or, more cautiously, 'If *N* exists, *N* is the *F*'). The instances of these sentences that we need to consider in the context of metalinguistic descriptivism would be '*N* is the individual called *N*', '*N* is the bearer of the name *N*', or the like (in both sentences, *N* is first used, then mentioned). Then, at first glance, the modal, epistemic, and semantic arguments all apply to metalinguistic descriptivism, for the simple reason that names often have more than one bearer: for such names, the predicate 'is the individual called *N*' is not satisfied by any object, so sentences of the form '*N* is the individual called *N*' will be false and hence neither necessarily true, nor a priori true, nor analytically true.[147] Metalinguistic descriptivists might respond to this critique in at least two ways. The first response would be to individuate names in terms of their bearers and not just, e.g., in terms of their phonology (see 2.7.1); this would entail that no name has more than one bearer. An alternative second response would be to replace the description 'the individual called *N*' with an analogous description that is relativized to a particular context of utterance: 'the individual called *N* in this utterance', 'the

[146] See Kripke 1980, 69.

[147] The same holds for sentences of the form 'If *N* exists, *N* is the individual called *N*', if *N* is disambiguated and the referent of *N* exists. Assume 'Obama' is disambiguated to refer to Barack Obama; then, 'If Obama exists, Obama is the individual called 'Obama'' has a true antecedent (Barack Obama exists), but the consequent will be false, since several individuals are called 'Obama'.

individual called *N* by me right now', or the like.[148] We will set aside whether these responses help the metalinguistic descriptivist to evade the epistemic and semantic arguments. More importantly, they will not refute the modal argument, simply because properties like being called *N* (or being a bearer of *N*) are not essential: for any individual *x* that is *actually* called *N*, there are possible worlds in which *x* exists, but is *not* called *N*. So, '*N* is the individual called *N*' is not necessarily true, no matter if *N* is individuated in terms of its bearers or not; the same holds for analogous sentences that are relativized to contexts, as in '*N* is the individual called *N* in this utterance/by me right now/…'. In the next section, we will see how predicativists counter Kripke's objections.

3.4) From Metalinguistic Descriptivism to Predicativism

Against this background, let us return to predicativism. In this section, we first argue that predicativism evades Kripke's critique of descriptivism, in particular of metalinguistic descriptivism (3.4.1). Then, we have a closer look at the relationship between predicativism and (semantic) content (3.4.2). In a third step, we have a closer look at how predicativism relates to descriptivism and referentialism, e.g., when it comes to Frege's puzles (3.4.3). Finally, we weigh 'the'- and 'that'-predicativism against each other (3.4.4).

3.4.1) Predicativism and Kripke's Critique of Metalinguistic Descriptivism

As we saw in section 2.4, predicativism comes in two versions: 'the'-predicativism and 'that'-predicativism. The former is a descendant of pre-Kripkean metalinguistic descriptivism, and at first glance, it seems to face the same objections, simply because it seems to retain the analysis of apparent *referential* name-uses that pre-Kripkean versions of metalinguistic descriptivism had put forward. Still, 'the'-predicativists would argue that they evade Kripke's objections. In this section, let us go through each of the objections: the circularity, overgeneralization, modal, epistemic, and semantic arguments. For brevity, we will speak of predicativism when we mean, more specifically, 'the'-predicativism. Also note that while we focus on predicativism, the predicativist defense against Kripke's objections equally applies to post-Kripkean metalinguistic descriptivism, as defended by Bach (1981; 2002) before his turn to predicativism.[149]

In the case of Kripke's circularity argument, there seem to be two ways out for predicativists. First, they might agree with Kripke that treating metalinguistic descriptivism or predicativism as theories of reference-determination leads to a vicious circle, but they might insist that metalinguistic descriptivism and predicativism are intended only as theories of meaning/semantic content, not as theories of reference-determination. In fact, as Graff Fara rightly points out, predicativism can easily be combined with non-descriptivist theories of reference-determination, e.g., with the causal-historical picture of reference-determination sketched by Kripke.[150] For a second way out, predicativists can go even further. Predicativists typically hold, contrary to Kripke, that the property of being a bearer of *N* is *not* identical to the property of being a referent of *N*.[151] In that case,

[148] Kripke (1980: 69) concedes the second option to the metalinguistic descriptivist.
[149] Many thanks to Martin Fischer for pointing this out.
[150] See Graff Fara 2015a, 73. For Kripke's picture, see Kripke 1980, 96f.
[151] See, e.g., Recanati 1993, 158-161; Kratz 2001, 140f.; Bach 2002, 83f.; Elbourne 2005, 177; Graff Fara 2015a, 73. On name-bearing, see Gray 2014.

predicativism might have to be supplemented with a theory of what it is to be a bearer of *N*–but that is no reason against treating predicativism as a theory of reference-determination: on the contrary, analogous requirements have to be met by other theories of reference-determination as well, descriptivist and non-descriptivist alike. E.g., a descriptivist theory that determines the reference of names in terms of associated properties will have to be supplemented with a theory of associated properties. And a non-descriptivist theory that determines the reference of names in terms of chains of communication leading back to initial baptisms will have to be supplemented with a theory of chains of communications and baptisms. Even a theory that determines the reference of a name like 'Aristotle' by analyzing it as the description 'the teacher of Alexander' might have to be supplemented with a theory of what it is to be a teacher of Alexander.[152]

Second, in response to Kripke's overgeneralization argument, predicativists will point out that predicates other than names–e.g., the predicate 'horse' in Kripke's example–are not normally used with a metalinguistic meaning: if I say 'I own a horse', this utterance does not have a natural reading on which it only conveys that I own a bearer of the noun 'horse' or an entity called 'horse', without conveying that this bearer belongs to the natural kind *horse*.[153] By contrast, names *do* have uses with a metalinguistic meaning, namely in the apparent predicative uses discussed in 2.1: if I say 'I know a Mary', all I convey is that I know a bearer of the name 'Mary'.

Third, consider Kripke's modal, epistemic, and semantic arguments. As before, we will focus on the modal argument. In the previous section 3.3.2, we addressed a simple objection against metalinguistic descriptivism: some names have more than one bearer, and for those names, sentences like '*N* is the bearer of the name *N*' or '*N* is the individual called *N*' are plainly false and hence neither necessarily true, nor a priori true, nor analytically true. We also looked at two possible responses by metalinguistic descriptivists–neither of these responses, however, evaded Kripke's modal argument.

In the predicativist literature, we encounter two alternative solutions. The first solution is associated with Paul Elbourne. Elbourne would paraphrase an apparent referential use *u* of a name *N* as a complete description that rigidly designates the intended referent of *u*, e.g., by directly referring to that referent. One such description (that comes close to the one proposed by Elbourne) would be 'the entity that is identical to *a* and that in the actual world is called *N*', where *a* is an individual constant rigidly designating the referent of *u*.[154] Such a description will be uniquely satisfied by the referent of *u* if *u* has a referent; and it will not be satisfied by any object if *u* does not have a referent. The second solution is associated with Kent Bach, among others. Bach would stick to Kneale's proposal and paraphrase an apparent referential use *u* of *N* as a description along the lines of 'the individual called *N*' or 'the bearer of the name *N*'; at the same time, Bach would treat such paraphrastic descriptions as *incomplete*: that is, they are used to refer to a particular bearer

[152] Related arguments have been put forward by several predicativists and metalinguistic descriptivists, e.g., in Bach 2002, 83f.
[153] Compare the similar examples in Searle 1969, 171; Kripke 1980, 69f., 72.
[154] This line is taken by Elbourne 2005, 173f. (with a slightly different formulation, replacing the individual constant *a* with a use of *N*), 217, n. 9.

of the name *N*, just like apparent referential uses of *N*.[155] Relative to any context, the incomplete use of such a description will have the same referent as an apparent referential use of *N*.

Both predicativist solutions–the one by Elbourne and the one by Bach–are meant to evade Kripke's modal argument. The first solution evades the modal argument by rigidifying the periphrastic description, the second solution simply because incomplete descriptions–like apparent referential name-uses–are typically rigid designators.[156] To illustrate the rigidity of incomplete descriptions, take a modified version of the kitchen-example from section 2.4. Let *k* be the actual kitchen in my apartment. While talking about *k*, I might say 'We could have painted the kitchen yellow' (or, more explicitly: 'There are possible worlds where we painted the kitchen yellow'). Then, my utterance is intended to convey (roughly) that in some possible worlds, we painted *k* yellow; and not, e.g., that in some possible world, we painted the only kitchen existing in that world yellow. Here, the incomplete description 'the kitchen' designates rigidly: it refers to the same entity at all possible worlds, namely to the entity that, in the *actual* context of utterance, is the most salient kitchen.

Elbourne's solution faces some of the objections that we levelled against rigidified descriptivism in 3.2.4.2. E.g., recall the objection by Soames: it seems that in possible worlds only *slightly different* from the actual world, names are still used with the same meaning they have in the actual world; however, speakers in such worlds are not familiar with the actual world; so, the content of names should not be given in terms of the actual world, contrary to rigidified descriptivism. Also, let us add an objection against Bach's solution. Clearly, incomplete uses of descriptions are far less common for metalinguistic descriptions like 'the bearer of the name *N*' than for non-metalinguistic descriptions like 'the kitchen'. It is easy to see why: the contexts in which we could use a metalinguistic description like 'the bearer of the name *N*' as incomplete descriptions are those that contain a unique most salient bearer of the name *N*; but in such contexts, we will normally refer to that name-bearer with the name *itself*, not with a convoluted metalinguistic description. E.g., we would normally say 'Mary is a friend of mine', not 'The bearer of the name 'Mary'/the individual named 'Mary' is a friend of mine'. The same holds for modal sentences: we would normally say 'I could have met Mary today', not 'I could have met the bearer of the name 'Mary'/the person named 'Mary' today'. Given that apparent referential name-uses are common, but incomplete uses of metalinguistic descriptions are not, it is not immediately evident whether the two kinds of uses have the same modal, epistemic, and semantic profiles. Consequently, it is also not immediately evident whether sentences like '*N* is the bearer of the name *N*' (or utterances thereof) are necessary or contingent, a priori or a posteriori, and analytic or synthetic. Further features of both

[155] This view might be ascribed to Bach 2002, 81, 86, 92; and Graff Fara 2015a, 70.

[156] See the extensive arguments in Graff Fara 2015a, 95-108. For the less common case of incomplete descriptions that are *not* rigid designators, see, e.g., ibid., 103-105; Higginbotham 1988, 31; Bach 2008, 23. Higginbotham cites an example he attributes to Irene Heim: 'The spare tire is missing from the car', which might be used to convey that the car does not, and never had, a spare tire. Bach's example will be cited in full: "if Claire says to me, "The decanter is broken," I can't not take her to be talking about the actual decanter of ours. On the other hand, if before we decided on a decanter she said, "The decanter had better not cost more than $100," clearly she would be making a general statement pertaining to whichever decanter we buy".

solutions will be discussed in the next section, where we address the predicativist analysis of apparent referential name-uses in more detail.

3.4.2) Predicativism, Content, and Piggybacking

So far, our reconstruction of predicativism has largely bracketed the question of the semantic content of apparent referential name-uses. As we have seen, predicativists analyze apparent referential uses of a name *N* as phrases of the form '$\text{Ø}_{\text{the/that}}$ *N*' and, in a second step, as incomplete descriptions/complex demonstratives of the form 'the/that bearer of the name *N*'. However, we have not yet encountered a predicativist *semantics* of such phrases: e.g., would predicativists agree with referentialists that the intended referent of an apparent referential name-use is part of the semantic content of that use? Or would they agree with most descriptivists that this is not the case?

Some predicativists, most notably Graff Fara, would argue that such questions are not theirs to answer. E.g., since 'the'-predicativists analyze apparent referential name-uses as incomplete descriptions, their proposal for the semantics of apparent referential name-uses can simply defer to the semantics of incomplete descriptions: the correct semantics for incomplete descriptions, whatever it is, should also be the correct semantics for apparent referential name-uses. Analogously for 'that'-predicativism, where incomplete descriptions would be replaced with complex demonstratives. Graff Fara calls this type of deference 'piggybacking'.[157]

Still, given the central place that the semantics of apparent referential name-uses traditionally occupies in the theory of names, let us have a closer look at the different semantic options that predicativism is compatible with. We suggest that there are three main options for the analysis of incomplete descriptions, and two main options for the analysis of complex demonstratives. In this section, we briefly present each of these options. (Note that unless indicated otherwise, we will use 'content' to mean *semantic* content.)

First, consider incomplete descriptions:

- Let *u* be an utterance of the description 'the NP' as an incomplete description (where NP is a noun phrase). Then, there are three main options for the semantic content of *u*:
  - **A1** the Russellian content of 'the NP';
  - **A2** the Russellian content of 'the NP' under a restricted domain;
  - **A3** the Russellian content of a description 'the NP*', where 'the NP*' is a *completion* of 'the NP'.

Here, we define the *Russellian content* of a definite description 'the NP' as the function that maps any possible world *w* either to the object that in *w* uniquely exemplifies the (actual) content of NP, or to the empty set ∅ if *w* contains no such object.[158]

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[157] See Graff Fara 2015a, 72f., 101.

[158] For our purposes, we gloss over many of the intricacies in the analysis of definite descriptions, including the differences between a Russellian and a Fregean analysis. Note that some predicativists–most notably Elbourne (2005: 98f.)–would favor a Fregean over a Russellian analysis. Roughly, the distinction would be that on the Russellian analysis, the semantic evaluation of a definite description at a particular world is a function, while on the Fregean analysis it is simply the referent (hence, on the Russellian analysis, the property expressed by NP is part of the assertion of sentences that use 'the NP', while on the Fregean analysis, the property is part of the presuppositions of such an assertion). The two versions can be rendered more precise using lambda applications (we use Scott brackets ⟦, ⟧ for semantic evaluation):

- Russellian analysis of 'the NP':
  $\lambda f_{<e,t>}[\lambda g_{<e,t>}[\exists x(\forall y(f(y) = 1 \leftrightarrow x = y) \wedge g(x) = 1)]](\lambda x_e[x \text{ exemplifies } ⟦\text{NP}⟧])$
  $= \lambda g_{<e,t>}[\exists x(\forall y(y \text{ exemplifies } ⟦\text{NP}⟧ \leftrightarrow x = y) \wedge g(x) = 1)].$
- Fregean analysis of 'the NP':

For illustration of options **A1-3**, let 'the NP' be the description 'the president'; and let *u* be an utterance of 'the president' as an incomplete description, made with the intention to refer to the current US president; at the time of writing in 2025, that would be Donald Trump. (The utterance might be part of a longer utterance, say, of the sentence 'The president visited Los Angeles today'.) Then, according to analysis **A1**, the content of *u* will be the Russellian content of 'the president', that is, the function that maps any possible world *w* either to the object that in *w* uniquely exemplifies the property expressed by the noun 'president', or to ∅ if *w* contains no such object. Given that the actual world contains more than one president, the Russellian content of 'the president' will map the actual world to ∅. So, according to **A1**, 'the president' has no referent at the actual world–more specifically, no *semantic* referent as opposed to an *intended* referent.

Analysis **A2** will be analogous to **A1**, except that we restrict the domain of objects that the description is evaluated at. E.g., assume we restrict the domain to persons currently living in the White House. Then, the content of the description 'the president' under **A2** would map the actual world to the unique president currently living in the White House; so, the actual world would be mapped to Trump. Neale calls an analysis along the lines of **A2** the *implicit approach* to incomplete descriptions.[159]

According to analysis **A3**, the content of an incomplete description 'the NP' will be the Russellian content of a description 'the NP*', where 'the NP*' *completes* 'the NP'. Neale speaks of the *explicit approach*.[160] The explicit approach allows for a variety of different options; we focus on two (for brevity, we write the intended referent of *u* as 'r_u'):

A3a 'the NP*' picks out r_u without directly referring to r_u;
A3b 'the NP*' picks out r_u (in part) by directly referring to r_u.

We call the former completion a *descriptivist completion*, and the latter a *referentialist completion*; in the case of referentialist completions, the intended referent will be part of the content of 'the NP*'. For illustration, take again my utterance of 'the president'. Completing descriptions that fall under **A3a** include, e.g., the descriptions 'the current US president', 'the president I intend to refer to right now', 'the president I am currently thinking of', 'the most salient president in the context of this utterance', etc. Take the first description, 'the current US president': the description is uniquely true of Trump (in 2025), so the Russellian content of the description will map the actual world to Trump. To ensure that *all* possible worlds are mapped to Trump (or at least all worlds where Trump exists), the completing descriptions can be rigidified, e.g., by adding an actuality operator: 'the current US president *in the actual world*', 'the president I am *actually* thinking of right now', etc. By contrast, to illustrate **A3b**, let *a* be an expression directly referring to Trump; e.g., *a* might be a demonstrative pronoun, according to the standard Kaplanian semantics for demonstratives. Then, completing descriptions could include, e.g., 'the president identical to *a*' or, more formally, 'the *x* s.t. *x* is a president and $x = a$'. Given that directly referential expressions are typically treated as rigid designators, the Russellian content of such descriptions would pick out Trump at every possible world

$\lambda f_{\langle e,t\rangle}$ s.t. $\exists x \forall y(f(y) = 1 \leftrightarrow x = y)[\iota x{:}f(x) = 1](\lambda x_e[x$ exemplifies $[\![\text{NP}]\!])$
$= [\iota x{:}\ x$ exemplifies $[\![\text{NP}]\!]]$ if $\exists x \forall y(f(y) = 1 \leftrightarrow x = y)$
$\emptyset$ otherwise.

[159] See Neale 1990, 95.
[160] See Neale 1990, 95. Elbourne (2010) distinguishes five main options, focusing on the syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic relations between the completed description and the completing description.

where he is a president. To ensure again that *all* possible worlds are mapped to Trump, we could again add actuality operators, as in 'the *x* s.t. *x* is a president *in the actual world* and *x* = *a*'. Contrary to the previous options, **A3b** attempts to *combine* the descriptivist and the referential treatments of incomplete descriptions: this would save both the intuition that incomplete descriptions are *descriptions*, that they describe their referents and attribute properties to them; and the intuition that the main function of incomplete descriptions is to *refer* to their intended referents.

Since 'the'-predicativists analyze apparent referential uses of a name *N* as incomplete descriptions of the form 'the bearer of the name *N*', we can now apply the previous analyses to apparent referential name-uses. We confine ourselves to three analyses **A4-6** that are analogous to **A1-3**:

- Let *u* be an apparent referential use of a name *N*. Then, there are three main options for the semantic content of *u* under a predicativist analysis:
  - **A4** the Russellian content of the description 'the bearer of the name *N*';
  - **A5** the Russellian content of the description 'the bearer of the name *N*' under a restricted domain;
  - **A6** the Russellian content of some description 'the NP*', where 'the NP*' completes the description 'the bearer of the name *N*'.

A6 can be split into **A6a/b**, in analogy to **A3a/b**. Also, completions of 'the bearer of the name *N*' would include, e.g., 'the bearer of the name *N* that I am thinking of right now', 'the bearer of the name *N* that I am *actually* thinking of right now', 'the bearer of the name *N* that is identical to *a*' (where *a* directly refers to the intended referent of *u*), and so on. In what follows, we mostly focus on **A4** and **A6a/b**, setting **A5** aside.

For comparison, let us briefly turn to complex demonstratives, that is, to phrases of the form 'demonstrative pronoun + NP' (e.g., 'that NP'). Here, philosophers typically agree that the intended referent is part of the content; they disagree, however, whether the property expressed by the noun phrase NP is part of the content as well.[161] This gives us two main options, for any utterance *u* of a complex demonstrative 'that NP'. The first is fully referential and identifies the content of *u* simply with the intended referent of *u*. The second option is analogous to **A6b**. More specifically, the content of *u* would be the function that maps every world w to an object *x* iff $x = r_u$ and in the actual world, *x* exemplifies the property expressed by NP; and to ∅ if there is no such object. For illustration, let *u* be an utterance of the complex demonstrative 'that president', uttered with the intention to refer to Donald Trump. Then, according to the first option, the semantic content of *u* is simply the intended referent, that is, in our example, Trump. By contrast, according to the second option, the semantic content of *u* is the function that maps every world to Trump, under the condition that Trump is indeed a president in the actual world. Again, these analyses can be applied to apparent referential name-uses. So, let *u** be an utterance of an apparent referential use of the name 'Trump'. Then, according to the first option, the semantic content of *u** is simply Trump. According to the second option, the semantic content of *u** is the function that maps every world to Trump, under the condition that Trump is indeed a bearer of the name 'Trump' in the actual world.

Predicativists are rarely explicit about the semantic content of apparent referential name-uses. Bach seems to favor a Russellian analysis along the lines of **A4** as a theory of the

[161] For a fully referentialist analysis of complex demonstratives, see, e.g., Larson/Segal 1995, 211-213. For a partially descriptivist analysis, see, e.g., Richard 1993, 216-222.

semantic content of apparent referential name-uses (though clearly not as theory of their pragmatically conveyed content).[162] Elbourne analyzes incomplete descriptions along the lines of **A6b**.[163] Similarly for Graff Fara who would seem to reject analysis **A4** in favor of either **A5** or **A6**. Graff Fara argues that utterances of sentences that contain apparent referential uses of a name with more than one bearer can still be true: they are true if they are true of the name's intended referent.[164] Take an utterance of the sentence 'Trump is the 47th US President': the utterance of the sentence is true if the intended referent of the utterance of 'Trump' is Donald Trump, but false if the intended referent is, e.g., Melania Trump. Graff Fara seems to suggest that the truth values involved here are *literal/semantic* truth values. In that case, the intended referent of an utterance of an apparent referential name-use should be the *semantic referent* of that utterance. Now, assume we analyze apparent referential name-uses as incomplete descriptions, in line with 'the'-predicativism; in particular, 'Trump' would be analyzed as the incomplete description 'the bearer of the name 'Trump''. Then, this would rule out any Russellian analysis of incomplete descriptions along the lines of analysis **A4**: as we saw, according to such an analysis, incomplete descriptions of the form 'the NP' have no semantic referent if the property expressed by NP is exemplified by more than one object–as in the case of the property of being a bearer of the name 'Trump', which is exemplified, among others, by Donald and Melania.

3.4.3) Predicativism, Descriptivism, and Referentialism

Against this background, let us add a few remarks on how predicativism relates to the major alternatives in the semantics of names: descriptivism and referentialism. We confine ourselves to two exemplary cases: first, the relation between the semantics, metasemantics, and epistemology of names, in particular between their semantic content, reference-determiner, and cognitive significance; second, Frege's puzzle of informative identity statements.

As we saw in 3.2, in the initial versions of descriptivism, the semantic content, reference-determiner, and cognitive significance of a name were treated as identical to one another: roughly, they all consisted in the content of the associated description, or the associated cluster of descriptions. E.g., for speakers who associate the name 'Istanbul' with the description 'the largest Turkish city', the semantic content, reference-determiner, and cognitive significance of 'Istanbul' all consisted in the property of being a largest Turkish city combined with a uniqueness claim. By contrast, in most versions of referentialism, the semantics, metasemantics, and epistemology of names come apart: the semantic content of a name is simply its referent; the reference-determiner of a name in a speaker's idiolect is typically given by the speaker's reference-intentions plus a chain of communication leading back to a reference-fixing; and the cognitive significance of the

[162] See Bach 1981, 372; 2002, 75, 91.
[163] See Elbourne 2005, 173, where Elbourne endorses Burge's *descriptivist* analysis of the logical form of his analysis of apparent referential name-uses as complex *demonstratives* (Elbourne, of course, analyzes apparent referential name-uses as incomplete descriptions, not as complex demonstratives); see Burge 1973, 433.
[164] See Graff Fara 2015a, 98f.

name to a speaker might still consist in descriptions or properties that the speaker associates with the name.[165]

How does the predicativist treatment of apparent referential name-uses fit into this picture? Let us focus on 'the'-predicativism and hence on analyses **A4-6**. Depending on which of these analyses is endorsed, predicativism will either be closer to descriptivism or to referentialism in its account of the relationship between the semantics, metasemantics, and epistemology of apparent referential name-uses. Specifically, it seems that analysis **A6a** allows for a unified account of the semantic content, reference-determiner, and cognitive significance of apparent referential name-uses; analyses **A4** and **A5** both allow for a unified account of semantic content and reference-determiner which, however, will often not capture the cognitive significance; under analysis **A6b**, semantic content, reference-determiner, and cognitive significance come apart. E.g., assume I utter an apparent referential use of 'Trump', and this utterance is analyzed as the incomplete description 'the bearer of the name 'Trump''. Also assume the incomplete description is analyzed in accordance with **A6a**, that is, as a descriptivist completion of 'the bearer of the name 'Trump'': e.g., as 'the bearer of the name 'Trump' who is currently US president in the actual world'. Such a completing description will give the semantic content and semantic reference-determiner of the utterance, and it might also capture the cognitive significance for the speaker. E.g., when I utter 'Trump' with the intention to refer to Donald Trump, the property of being the current US president might be the one I most closely associate with the intended referent. By contrast, according to **A4**, the semantic content of my utterance of 'Trump' is given by a function that maps any world to the object which in that world is the only bearer of the name 'Trump'; so, since the name 'Trump' has *more* than one bearer in the actual world, the semantic content of my utterance will not map the actual world to any object since. This also determines the semantic reference of my utterance–the semantic referent at the actual world is simply the object that the semantic content maps the actual world to; and since the semantic content does not map the actual world to any object, my utterance lacks a semantic referent. At the same time, the intended referent of my utterance is Donald Trump, and I mentally represent Trump in a way that picks him out uniquely, e.g., again as the current US president, or as the bearer of the name 'Trump' who is currently US president, or the like. Similarly for **A5**. Finally, under analysis **A6b**, the content of an apparent referential name-use provides the referent of that use *directly*, without providing any reference-*determiner*, nor any way in which speakers mentally represent the referent.

For a second exemplary case, consider Frege's puzzle of informative identity statements of the form '$N = N^*$'.[166] Historically, solving Frege's puzzles has been a main motivation

[165] To be sure, this does not lead to a complete separation between the semantics and epistemology of names: most referentialists agree that to be competent in using a name, or to be able to fully understand a name-utterance, speakers need to have a *de re* attitude towards the name's referent and thereby (according to referentialism) towards the name's content. Often, this will be formulated in terms of being *familiar* or *acquainted* with the referent, or of being able to *identify* the referent. For two passages representative of the debate, see, e.g., Soames 2002, 92; Recanati 1993, 28.

[166] The puzzles go back at least to Frege 1892. For the puzzle of informative identity statements, see pp. 25f., 50 (with the example of 'a = a' and 'a = b'). On the history of Frege's solutions to this puzzle, see Kremer 2010.

for descriptivism, including for the pre-Kripkean versions of metalinguistic descriptivism. Predicativists have largely abandoned this motivation. Still, for a deeper understanding of predicativism, we might want to assess how predicativism fares against traditional versions of descriptivism when it comes to solving the puzzles. Again, we focus on 'the'-predicativism, setting 'that'-predicativism aside.

How can true identity statements of the form '*N* = *N**' (e.g., 'Cicero = Tully') be informative? Predicativists would analyze the sentence 'Cicero = Tully' as 'The bearer of the name 'Cicero' = the bearer of the name 'Tully''; call the latter sentence *s*. Also, predicativists would treat both definite descriptions in this sentence–'the bearer of the name 'Cicero'' and 'the bearer of the name 'Tully''–as incomplete. Now, take a context in which each of the two incomplete descriptions has a unique referent, and where those two referents are identical: e.g., a context where both descriptions refer to the Roman orator. Then, according to predicativists, *s* is true. Since the descriptions are taken to be incomplete, the claim that *s* is true is not refuted by the fact that 'Cicero' and 'Tully' each have more than one bearer: several towns are named 'Cicero' (e.g., Cicero, Illinois), 'Tully' is a common Irish surname, etc. At the same time, predicativists will maintain that *s* is informative. To see how this claim might be defended, recall the previous section 3.4.2: there we encountered several options for the analysis of incomplete descriptions that predicativists might apply to apparent referential name-uses. We will set analysis **A5** aside and focus on **A4** and **A6**. Under analysis **A4**, identity statements of the form 'The bearer of the name *N* = the bearer of the name *N**' will come out as false whenever *N* or *N** have more than one bearer, even when we would intuitively judge the sentence '*N* = *N**' (or an utterance thereof) to be true. This also holds for the sentence 'The bearer of the name 'Cicero' = the bearer of the name 'Tully'', given that the names 'Cicero' and 'Tully' have multiple bearers. So, analysis **A4** would not only fail to explain why 'Cicero = Tully' is informative–it would not even preserve the intuition that the sentence is true (given a suitable disambiguation of the two names). Then again, predicativists who favor **A4** might argue that this intuition belongs to the pragmatics, not the semantics of names and descriptions. So, both the sentence 'Cicero = Tully' and the sentence 'The bearer of the name 'Cicero' = the bearer of the name 'Tully'' would be semantically false, but pragmatically true, at least if the names/descriptions are all uttered with the intention to refer to the Roman orator. The question of whether the sentences are informative will then be a matter of pragmatics: specifically, the sentence 'The bearer of the name 'Cicero' = the bearer of the name 'Tully'' will be informative iff the two descriptions pragmatically convey different contents (in a particular context of utterance). This will be the case, e.g., if the pragmatically conveyed content of the descriptions involves the two different properties of being a bearer of 'Cicero' and of being a bearer of 'Tully'.

By contrast, **A6** can be spelled out in ways that *s* comes out as true. Also, it seems that **A6a** and **A6b** both entail that *s* is informative. We start with **A6a**. According to **A6a**, an apparent referential use of a name *N* should be analyzed as a *descriptivist* completion of the incomplete description 'the bearer of *N*'. In the case of 'the bearer of the name 'Cicero'', descriptivist completions include 'the *most famous* bearer of the name 'Cicero'', 'the bearer of the name 'Cicero' *that I'm thinking of right now*', 'the bearer of the name 'Cicero' *who was a Roman orator*', etc. Now, given that the two incomplete descriptions

'the bearer of the name 'Cicero'' and 'the bearer of the name 'Tully'' use different predicates, we can use different descriptions to complete each of them.[167] E.g., we can complete 'the bearer of the name 'Cicero'' as 'the most famous bearer of the name 'Cicero'', and 'the bearer of the name 'Tully'' as 'the most famous bearer of the name 'Tully''. Under such an analysis, *s* would clearly be informative: the uses of 'Cicero' and 'Tully' in *s* would be analyzed as having different semantic contents.

The results are similar for analysis **A6b** where an apparent referential use of a name *N* is analyzed as a *referentialist* completion of the incomplete description 'the bearer of *N*'. E.g., let *a* and *a** be two different directly referential expressions whose content is simply the person Marcus Tullius Cicero; then, 'the bearer of the name 'Cicero'' could be completed as 'the bearer of the name 'Cicero' that is identical to *a*', and 'the bearer of the name 'Tully'' as 'the bearer of the name 'Tully' that is identical to *a**'. Again, the uses of 'Cicero' and 'Tully' in *s* would be analyzed as having different semantic contents: the former involves the property of being a bearer of the name 'Cicero', the latter the property of being a bearer of the name 'Tully'. So, again, *s* would be informative. Looking back at the three analyses we discussed, 'the'-predicativism seems to be a promising strategy to solve the puzzle of informative identity statements: each analysis can be spelled out in a way that explains why identity statements of the form '*N* = *N**', or utterances thereof, can be informative.

3.4.4) 'The'-Predicativism or 'That'-Predicativism?

For the most part, the focus of this section was on 'the'-predicativism rather than 'that'-predicativism. Against this background, let us now reconstruct why contemporary predicativists generally prefer 'the'-predicativism over 'that'-predicativism. We first offer a more detailed reconstruction of the motivation behind 'that'-predicativism (which can to some extent also be applied to 'the'-predicativism). In a second step, we discuss several objections.

Let us work with the following statement of 'that'-predicativism:

- 'That'-Predicativism:
  The content of apparent referential uses of any name *N* consists of two elements: the property of being a bearer of the name *N*, plus an element contributed by an unpronounced demonstrative.

As we said in 2.4, 'that'-predicativism is mainly associated with Burge's 1973 paper "Reference and Proper Names". Burge's argument for 'that'-predicativism can be reconstructed as relying on seven assumptions; we translate them into contemporary terminology. 1) All name-uses should be given a *uniform* analysis, that is, an analysis that applies to apparent predicative and apparent referential name-uses alike.[168] Let us reason under the stronger assumption that 1*) all name-uses indeed *have* a uniform analysis. 2) The *only* plausible analysis of apparent predicative name-uses is predicative: in particular, it analyzes apparent predicative uses of a name *N* as expressing the property of being a bearer of *N*.[169] Together, (1*) and (2) give us a first result: like apparent predicative uses of *N*, also apparent referential uses of *N* express the property of being a bearer of *N*.

[167] We do not *have* to: we could also complete both descriptions, e.g., as 'the *x* s.t. *x* is a bearer of the name 'Cicero' and also a bearer of the name 'Tully''.
[168] See, e.g., Burge 1973, 439.
[169] See Burge 1973, 429.

However, 3) apparent referential uses of a name *N* clearly have a referential function: they are always used to speak about some *specific* bearer of *N*. More importantly, this referential function is part of the *semantics*, not just the *pragmatics*, of apparent referential name-uses.[170] And 4) many names have multiple bearers, so for those names the property of being a bearer of *N* is not uniquely exemplified and will hence not suffice to pick out any specific bearer of *N*.[171] Together with the first result, (3) and (4) give us a second result: apparent referential name-uses will express *more* than just the property of being a bearer of *N*. That is, the content of such name-uses will be complex rather than simple–it will consist of two elements: the property of being a bearer of *N*, plus some additional element that (roughly speaking) restricts the set of bearers of *N* to some unique bearer of *N*. 5) Burge identifies two ways how this additional element can be contributed: either by an unpronounced definite article, or by an unpronounced demonstrative.[172] 6) Burge suggests that sentences containing apparent referential name-uses are "incompletely interpreted" or "lack truth value" unless they are supplemented with a specific context or a specific "speaker-reference".[173] E.g., 'Saul wrote Naming and Necessity' is true when interpreted relative to a speaker who intends to refer with 'Saul' to Saul Kripke, but false when interpreted relative to a speaker who intends to refer with 'Saul' to Saul Bellow. And 7) Burge adopts a Russellian analysis of definite descriptions. That is, phrases of the form 'definite article + noun phrase NP' will be completely interpreted (given that NP is completely interpreted). And they will refer to the unique object exemplifying NP if there is such an object; otherwise, they will fail to refer.[174] (5-7) give us a third result: the additional element of the content of apparent referential name-uses is not contributed by an unpronounced definite article. Together with the second result, this entails that the additional element is contributed by an unpronounced demonstrative. So, the content of apparent referential name-uses consists of two elements: the property of being a bearer of *N*, plus an element contributed by an unpronounced demonstrative. This way, we have arrived at the above statement of 'that'-predicativism.

'The'-predicativists typically subscribe to most of Burge's assumptions, but reject (3) and/or (7). So, either the referential function of apparent referential name-uses is not part of the semantics of such uses (but only part of their pragmatics); or definite descriptions do not require a Russellian analysis: specifically, a definite description can *semantically* express the content that it has if interpreted as an *incomplete* description. We already discussed these options in the previous two sections. In this section, we focus on the main objection that 'the'-predicativists raise against 'that'-predicativism *itself* rather than the argument in favor of it.

A major concern of predicativists is to explain when and why the determiner that supposedly combines with apparent referential name-uses remains unpronounced. So, 'the'-predicativists should explain why the definite article is pronounced in some contexts, but unpronounced in others (in particular, in front of bare singular name-uses); and

[170] See Burge 1973, 431f.
[171] See Burge 1973, 431.
[172] See Burge 1973, 431f.
[173] See Burge 1973, 432.
[174] See Burge 1973, 431.

analogously for 'that'-predicativists. Let us go through the main explanations proposed in the literature; in 3.4.4.1, we discuss 'the'-predicativist explanations, in 3.4.4.2 'that'-predicativist explanations; against this background, 3.4.4.3 argues that 'the'-predicativism holds an advantage over 'that'-predicativism.

For the purposes of this section, we will focus on names that do not standardly combine with a pronounced definite article on apparent referential uses–that is, names like 'Mary' as opposed to names like 'Thames'. We will call those names 'NNs'. Also, we will reserve the term 'NNP' for English noun phrases that are headed by *singular* NNs, and that are *not* determiner phrases (or, more cautiously, that do not have the form 'DET + noun phrase'). Like any other noun phrase, an NNP might, but does not have to, contain modifiers. Then, NNPs include:

- [$_{NNP}$ [$_{NN}$ Mary]]: I met (a/that/*the/…) Mary.
- [$_{NNP}$ [$_{AP}$ beautiful] [$_{NN}$ Mary]]: I met (a/that/the/…) beautiful Mary.
- [$_{NNP}$ [$_{NN}$ Mary](,) [$_{RC}$ whom I like]]: I met a/that/the/… Mary whom I like./ I met Mary, whom I like.
- [$_{NNP}$ [$_{NN}$ Mary] [$_{PP}$ from London]]: I met (a/that/the/…) Mary from London.

Also, we abbreviate definite articles as DA and demonstrative pronouns as DEM. Finally, in line with the literature, we will refer to (pronounced or unpronounced) determiners that combine with names as *preproprial*.[175]

3.4.4.1) 'The'-Predicativism and the Unpronounced Definite Article

Starting with Sloat (1969), there have been several attempts to explain when the preproprial definite article remains unpronounced; we will briefly reconstruct and challenge three such proposals, due to Sloat (1969), Matushansky (2006b), and Graff Fara (2015a). Note that we set three cases aside: first, as we said, the case of names that are standardly combined with a pronounced definite article on apparent referential uses ('the Thames', 'the Alps'). Second, the case of plural name-uses ('the clever Marys'): here, the rules for the combination with determiners seem to be the same as for common count nouns. And third, the case where the definite article is stressed ('*the* Mary'): as Graff Fara (2015a: 92) rightly points out, an expression can be stressed only if pronounced it (the same will hold below for stressed demonstrative pronouns). Hence, we confine ourselves to phrases of the form 'unstressed DA + NNP'.

Then, the first proposal is due to Sloat (1969: 28) and can be stated as follows:

(1) In English phrases of the form 'unstressed DA + NNP', DA is unpronounced iff NN combines neither with a restrictive AP nor with a restrictive RC.[176]

The righthand side of the equivalence in (1) excludes cases like 'I met the [$_{AP}$ clever] Mary, not the dull one' (restrictive AP) and 'The Mary [$_{RC}$ I met] is clever' (restrictive RC). Sloat's approach suffers from a number of shortcomings. First, Graff Fara (2015a: 84-86, 87f.) objects that phrases of the form 'pronounced DA + AP + NN' do not have to be restrictive: e.g., in a sentence like 'I met the clever Mary', the adjective 'clever' can be read both restrictively and non-restrictively. In fact, several APs do not allow for bare phrases of the form 'AP + NN', but can still be used non-restrictively: e.g., in 'I met the ever-popular Mary', omitting the pronounced DA would lead to ungrammaticality, but

[175] See, e.g., Delsing 1993, 54.

[176] Or equivalently: In English phrases of the form 'unstressed DA + NNP', DA is pronounced iff NN combines with a restrictive AP or a restrictive RC.

'ever-popular' can still be used non-restrictively. Second, Sloat does not address PP, AdvP, NP, or VP modifiers that combine with a pronounced DA, as in:

- The Mary [$_{PP}$ in this house] is smarter than the Mary [$_{NP}$ next door].
- The Mary [$_{AdvP}$ downstairs] is smarter than the Mary [$_{AdvP}$ upstairs].
- The Mary [$_{VP}$ sleeping downstairs] is smarter than the Mary [$_{VP}$ sleeping upstairs].

Note that in each case, the modifiers are used restrictively. A first solution might simply refine Sloat's account by adding restrictive PP/AdvP/NP/VP modifiers to the righthand side of (1): so, DA is unpronounced iff NN does not combine with a restrictive AP, RC, PP, AdvP, NP, or VP; or equivalently: DA is pronounced iff NN combines with a restrictive AP, RC, PP, AdvP, NP, or VP. However, this strategy fails for PP modifiers, as shown by sentences like:

a) Mary [$_{PP}$ from London] is smarter than Mary [$_{PP}$ from Paris].
b) Mary [$_{PP}$ from Accounting] is smarter than Mary [$_{PP}$ from HR].
c) Paris [$_{PP}$ in France] is prettier than Paris [$_{PP}$ in Texas].

Here, the PP modifiers are restrictive, but the names are bare and do not combine with a pronounced DA (to be sure, DA *can* also be pronounced, but Sloat's account (1) is not formulated in modal terms). Sloat might counter that PP, AdvP, NP, and VP modifiers are in fact reduced relative clauses: 'The Mary ~~who's~~ in this house/~~who's~~ downstairs/~~who's~~ sleeping downstairs is smarter…', 'Mary ~~who's~~ from London is smarter than Mary ~~who's~~ from Paris'. But our objection still stands: if such modifiers are relative clauses, then *some* restrictive relative clauses–e.g., the ones in sentences (a-c)–combine with an unpronounced definite article, contrary to (1).

According to Matushansky's (2006b) proposal, definite articles that precede names can be subject to 'm-merging', a procedure where two consecutive syntactic heads morphologically merge.[177] The syntactic heads in question would be the definite article as head of a DP, and the name as head of an NP. M-merging either leads to DA being unpronounced or being pronounced in a distinct way–as, e.g., in Catalan, where the preproprial definite articles *en*/*na* combine only with names, not with common nouns.[178] Since English does not have any special preproprial articles, we can state Matushansky's proposal in simpler terms:

(2) In English phrases of the form 'unstressed DA + NNP', DA is unpronounced iff DA and NN m-merge.

Note that while Sloat's proposal relies on the semantic/pragmatic notion of restricted/unrestricted interpretations, Matushansky's is given in fully morphosyntactic terms. Also, Matushansky (2006b: 294, 299) suggests that not all languages and not all kinds of names allow for m-merging: e.g., in English, personal proper nouns do, but proper nouns for ships do not ('the/*$Ø_{the}$ *Titanic*').[179] Graff Fara (2015a: 93, n. 40) points to a problem for Matushansky's approach: in phrases where a name is *succeeded* by a modifier ('The Mary sleeping downstairs is clever', with 'Mary' succeeded by the modifier 'sleeping downstairs'), it should be possible for the definite article and the name to merge and for the definite article to remain unpronounced–but often, this is not the case (*'Mary sleeping downstairs is clever'). For a second problem, the definite article should not be able to merge with a name if the two are not consecutive and are instead separated by additional

[177] On m-merging, see Matushansky 2006a, 80-98, especially 80f., 86-89.
[178] See Matushansky 2006b, 297; Hinzen 2016, 605-607.
[179] See Matushansky 2006b, 294, 299.

expressions. However, predicativists would analyze bare phrases of the form 'AP + NN' (as in 'I met [clever Mary]') as being combined with an unpronounced DA ('I met $Ø_{the}$ [clever Mary]'), even though DA and NN are separated by an AP.

Finally, Graff Fara's (2015a: 92f.) proposal is given in purely syntactic terms and can be reconstructed as follows:

(3) In English phrases of the form 'unstressed DA + NNP',
   a) DA must be unpronounced iff DA and NN are sisters (that is, NN is not modified);
   b) DA can both be pronounced and unpronounced iff NN combines with a 'null-permissive' modifier.[180]

The 'must'- and 'can'-sentences are here meant as statements about grammaticality: e.g., 'DA must be unpronounced' means 'only an unpronounced DA is grammatical'. As to (3b), Graff Fara (2015a: 86-90) introduces the notion of *null-permissive modifiers* for modifiers that permit both a pronounced and an unpronounced DA. This includes, e.g., unreduced relative clauses ('I met the Mary who is clever' and 'I met $Ø_{the}$ Mary who is clever') and various adjectives ('I met $Ø_{the}$/the clever Mary'). To illustrate (3a), take again sentences like 'Mary is clever' or 'I met Mary', which 'the'-predicativists analyze as '$Ø_{the}$ Mary is clever' or 'I met $Ø_{the}$ Mary': in both cases, $Ø_{the}$ and 'Mary' are sisters, and pronouncing the article would be ungrammatical (*'The Mary is clever', *'I met the Mary'). (3) implies that in phrases of the form 'unstressed DA + NNP', DA must be pronounced iff NN combines with a modifier that is *not* null-permissive. This includes, e.g., reduced relative clauses ('The Mary ~~whom~~ I met is clever' vs. *'Mary ~~whom~~ I met is clever') and again various adjectives ('I met the ever-popular Mary' vs. *'I met ever-popular Mary').

For a potential objection against Graff Fara's proposal, consider close appositions, as in:

- [Mary the philosopher] is clever.

Arguably, in 'Mary the philosopher', the phrase 'the philosopher' occurs as a modifier,[181] in which case it will be a null-permissive modifier since 'Mary' is not preceded by a pronounced DA. So, by (3b), 'Mary' in 'Mary the philosopher' *can* be preceded by a pronounced DA. But it cannot: *'the Mary the philosopher' is ungrammatical. One possible solution would be to restrict null-permissive modifiers to modifiers that *allow*, but do not *require*, DA to be unpronounced. Another solution would argue that 'the philosopher' in 'Mary the philosopher' is not a modifier of 'Mary', but of '$Ø_{the}$ Mary' (as in '[[$Ø_{the}$ Mary] [the philosopher]]'); the solution would then restrict null-permissive modifiers to modifiers of *names*, which excludes modifiers of phrases of the form 'pronounced/unpronounced determiner + name'. The second solution is more intricate. Consider that according to predicativists, an utterance of '$Ø_{the}$ Mary' refers to the contextually most salient Mary (the most salient bearer of the name 'Mary' in the context of utterance). However, an utterance of 'Mary the philosopher' refers to the contextually most salient *philosopher* Mary (that is, the most salient person in the context of utterance who is both a bearer of the name 'Mary' and a philosopher)–even if that person is not the contextually most salient Mary'. There are two ways out for predicativists. Either they revise the reference-conditions for '$Ø_{the}$ Mary' by stipulating that in close appositions like 'Mary the

[180] Instead of 'the definite article must be unpronounced', Graff Fara writes 'the definite article must appear as $Ø_{the}$'. We reconstruct Graff Fara's 'when' as 'iff'.
[181] For discussion, see Keizer 2007: 22-60, on 'Burns the poet'.

philosopher', '$Ø_{the}$ Mary' does not refer to the contextually most salient Mary but simply contributes the set of Marys (the set of bearers of the name 'Mary'), which is then restricted by modifiers such as 'the philosopher'. Or predicativists will have to argue that the function of the modifier 'the philosopher' is not restrictive (restricting the set of Marys to the contextually most salient philosopher Mary), but to shift the reference from the contextually most salient Mary to the contextually most salient philosopher Mary (the reference-shift will be harmless only if the contextually most salient Mary happens to be the contextually most salient philosopher Mary).

3.4.4.2) 'That'-Predicativism and Unpronounced Demonstratives

As we saw in the previous section, 'the'-predicativism has to account for the fact that combining a bare singular NN with a pronounced definite article is not always grammatical. 'That'-predicativism does not face this problem–it is always *grammatical* to combine a bare singular NN with a pronounced demonstrative pronoun: e.g., 'Mary is clever'/'I met Mary' can be replaced with 'That Mary is clever'/'I met that Mary'. On the other hand, as noted by Higginbotham (1988: 36), Segal (2001: 561), and Rami (2014: 850f.), bare names can differ in their *pragmatic effect* from phrases that combine a name with a pronounced demonstrative. Just compare 'I met Mary' and 'I met that Mary'. Assume Mary is my cousin, and I want to tell her father, my uncle, that I met her: in that case, the first sentence is appropriate, the second is not. By contrast, if someone shows me photos of two Marys and asks 'Which Mary did you meet?', it would be natural for me to reply 'I met *that* Mary' (pointing at one of the photos), while just replying 'I met Mary' would be odd (even if pointing at one of the photos). So, to return to our initial question: can 'that'-predicativists explain when the preproprial demonstrative remains unpronounced?

The only proposal in the literature is due to Sawyer (2010: 217) and can be stated as follows:

4) In English utterances *u* of the form 'unstressed DEM + NNP',
   a) DEM should be unpronounced iff the referent of *u* is evident without demonstration;
   b) DEM may both be pronounced and unpronounced iff the referent of *u* is not evident without demonstration (in which case the utterance should be accompanied by *some* kind of demonstration).

Note that proposal (4) is relativized to utterances, making it pragmatic rather than morphosyntactic or semantic. Also, the 'should'- and 'may'-sentences are here best understood (in Gricean terms) as maxim for how to make an utterance as perspicuous as possible.[182] They should *not* be understood as verdicts about grammaticality: whether DEM is pronounced or unpronounced makes no difference for grammaticality. As to (4b), Sawyer (ibid.) suggests that DEM may still be left unpronounced if some *non-linguistic* demonstration–e.g., an exophoric gesture–suffices to make the referent evident.

For an objection against Sawyer, it seems that she underestimates the pragmatic range of demonstrative pronouns. We suggest that pronounced demonstratives in English can have a variety of pragmatic effects/can perform a variety of pragmatic functions. Let us focus on the pragmatic functions of demonstratives as used in *complex* demonstratives, that is, in phrases where the demonstrative is *adnominal* (phrases of the form 'DEM NP'). We distinguish four non-intersecting functions that are relevant in the context of names; largely in line with the literature, we call them exophoric, anaphoric, introductory, and

[182] Cf. Grice 1975, 46.

recognitional.[183] For some of these functions, we will additionally point to *subfunctions*. Let us begin with the exophoric function. Exophoric complex demonstratives are typically accompanied by an ostensive gesture towards their referent (or an image of the referent, or the like): 'That philosopher/that Mary [pointing at a particular Mary] is clever'. Exophoric complex demonstratives whose NP is a name often have a more specific subfunction, namely to *make a disambiguation of the name explicit*; we will speak of the *disambiguation function*. For illustration, recall one of the above examples: someone shows me photos of two Marys and asks 'Which Mary did you meet?', and I answer 'I met that Mary', pointing at one of the photos. Second, anaphoric complex demonstratives depend on, and co-refer with, an anaphoric antecedent: 'I met *a philosopher/a girl named 'Mary'* today, and when I talked to my brother, that philosopher/that Mary turned out to be a friend of his' (the anaphor is underlined, the antecedent is in italics).[184] Third, introductory complex demonstratives (typically 'this' rather than 'that') introduce a hearer-new referent: 'I met this philosopher/this Mary today–I don't think you know her, but she's quite the character'.[185] Fourth and finally, recognitional complex demonstratives refer to some salient object that is hearer-old and typically discourse-new. Demonstratives of this type usually have one of two 'subfunctions': first, they might convey that the speaker is *unfamiliar*–or at best *vaguely* familiar–with the referent (or that the speaker believes the same is true for the hearer). E.g.: 'Today, I ran into that philosopher/that Mary–the one we once met in college, you remember her?'. We will simply speak of the *unfamiliarity function*. Second, they might convey a (typically pejorative) *value judgment*: 'Did you hear what that Trump did today?'; this second subfunction has been called *expressive*, *affective*, or *emotional deixis*.[186] We will speak of the *value judgment function*.

We argue that apparent referential name-uses can usually perform the first two functions, though adding the pronounced demonstrative might *emphasize* the function:

- (pointing at a particular Mary:) Mary/that Mary is clever.
- I met *a girl named 'Mary'* today, and when I talked to my brother, Mary/that Mary turned out to be a friend of his.

In exophoric contexts, an exception would be the subfunction of disambiguation. Assume again someone shows me photos of two Marys and asks 'Which Mary did you meet?'. Also assume that I point at one of the photos and merely answer 'I met Mary', instead of 'I met that Mary'. To be sure, the ostensive gesture might suffice to disambiguate 'Mary'; but since the very *purpose* of the utterance is the disambiguation of the name 'Mary' (rather than an act of reference to some Mary), it would be odd not to render the disambiguation *explicit* on the phonetic level and to convey it only with a gesture while using the name 'Mary' referentially. Similarly, the introductory function is rarely performed by

[183] See, e.g., Diessel 1999, 93-114; Himmelmann 1996. Rami (2014: 850f.) focuses on what we call the exophoric and anaphoric functions.
[184] Burge (1973: 435f.) cites anaphoric name-uses in contexts of *introducing* the name, e.g.: "*The shortest spy in the 21st century* will be Caucasian. Call him 'Bertrand'. (That) Bertrand will also be bald." Or: "*Someone* cast the first stone. Whoever he was, call him 'Alfred'. (That) Alfred was a hyprocrite [sic]." (Italics and underlines added.)
[185] See the discussion of *new-this* in Wald 1983, 94f.
[186] See Diessel 1999, 106f. Hinzen (2016: 603, n. 2) gives the example of 'That Thatcher was a pain for Britain'

apparent referential name-uses as they are almost always hearer-old.[187] Arguably, most apparent referential name-uses perform the recognitional function, but they usually have neither of the two subfunctions of unfamiliarity or value judgment. For illustration, assume again that Mary is my cousin and I talk to her father, my uncle, on the phone. It would be natural for me to start a friendly conversation about Mary by asking, 'How's Mary?', but it would be unnatural for me to ask, 'How's that Mary?' or 'How's this Mary?'. It is easy to see why: first, since the conversation is taking place over the phone, my utterance will not be supported by any gesture, so the demonstrative cannot perform the exophoric function. Second, given that my question starts the conversation, there is no anaphoric antecedent that the phrase 'that/this Mary' could refer back to, so the demonstrative will not serve the anaphoric function. Third, I am aware that Mary is hearer-old– Mary's father knows his own daughter; hence, I would not use the demonstrative with the introductory function. Instead, the demonstrative should serve the recognitional function: Mary is hearer-old, but discourse-new. However, adding a pronounced demonstrative to the name will perform either of the two subfunctions described above: it will convey a (most likely pejorative) value judgment about Mary, which I do not intend in a friendly conversation; or it will falsely convey that I am unfamiliar with my own cousin. So, the only pragmatic functions the pronounced demonstrative *could* serve here are not intended and would be misleading.[188]

Is there a replacement for proposal (4) that captures the more complex pragmatics of complex demonstratives? It seems there is:

(5) In English utterances of the form 'unstressed DEM + NNP',
   a) DEM should be unpronounced iff pronouncing DEM would have an unintended pragmatic effect;[189]
   b) DEM should be pronounced iff leaving DEM unpronounced would obfuscate an intended pragmatic effect;
   c) DEM may both be pronounced and unpronounced iff pronouncing DEM or leaving DEM unpronounced makes no (major) difference for the pragmatic effect.

(5) is more general than (4) but also less informative. To make (5) more informative, we should explicate the righthand sides of (5a-c). Based on the brief account of demonstratives just presented, it seems that in anaphoric contexts, combining a name with a pronounced demonstrative has roughly the same pragmatic effect as leaving the name bare (or, according to 'that'-predicativists, leaving the demonstrative unpronounced). Same for exophoric contexts, at least when the demonstrative is not meant to perform the subfunction of disambiguation. This covers (5c). By contrast, the introductory, disambiguation, unfamiliarity, and value judgment functions are only (or at least much more clearly) performed by a pronounced demonstrative, not by a bare name. E.g., assume an apparent referential name-use is uttered in a standard recognitional context where the speaker is familiar with the name's bearer and does not render a value judgment about them; then, pronouncing DEM would have the unintended pragmatic effect of conveying unfamiliarity or a value judgment. Conversely, if an apparent referential name-use is uttered in a

[187] An exception might be introductory constructions like 'This is Mary'. But here, adding a demonstrative to 'Mary' would sound odd ('This is that Mary'), and would likely be admissible only if 'Mary' was hearer-old, as in 'This is that Mary–you know, the Mary I was telling you about'.
[188] I might still use the demonstrative *ironically*, as in 'How's that Mary of yours?'/'How's that daughter of yours?'.
[189] Or, more cautiously: 'is *likely* to have an unintended pragmatic effect'; analogously in the remaining lines of (5).

recognitional context with the intention to convey unfamiliarity or a value judgment, then leaving DEM unpronounced would obfuscate the intended pragmatic effect.

3.4.4.3) An Advantage of 'The'- over 'That'-Predicativism

In the last two sections, we argued that both 'the'- and 'that'-predicativism can explain when the determiner that supposedly combines with apparent referential name-uses remains unpronounced. However, the account of demonstrative pronouns we sketched can be used to confront 'that'-predicativism with yet another objection. As we saw, there is a clear divide between pronounced and unpronounced demonstratives: pronounced demonstratives, if occurring in complex demonstratives, never *only* have the function of converting a predicate into a referring expression–rather, they always have one of the three effects we outlined: the exophoric, anaphoric, or recognitional functions; and when performing the recognitional function, they also have one of the two additional subeffects, namely of unfamiliarity or value judgment. By contrast, most apparent referential name-uses have neither the exophoric nor the anaphoric effects, and neither the subeffects of unfamiliarity nor of value judgment. This seems to undermine the very motivation for the analysis of apparent referential name-uses as complex demonstratives, namely that there is a functional correspondence between pronounced and unpronounced demonstratives. 'The'-predicativism evades this objection: after all, there is clearly a functional correspondence between the pronounced and unpronounced definite article–or at least for one version of the definite article, namely the one used in *incomplete* descriptions.

Can 'that'-predicativism nonetheless be defended against 'the'-predicativism? We take it that there is one possible strategy which, however, will ultimately remain unsatisfying. 'That'-predicativists might argue that the effects/subeffects of pronounced demonstratives are merely part of the *pragmatics* of demonstratives, and that their theory gives at least the *semantically* correct account of apparent referential name-uses, while 'the'-predicativism does not. In particular, 'that'-predicativists might endorse the following three claims about semantics: the semantics of phrases of the form '$Ø_{DET}$ + apparent referential name-use' is partially referentialist; the same holds for the semantics of complex demonstratives; but the semantics of incomplete descriptions is fully descriptivist (e.g., in the sense of options **A1**, **A2**, or **A3a** from section 3.4.2). In that case, the 'that'-predicativist account of apparent referential name-uses would be pragmatically incorrect but semantically correct, while the 'the'-predicativist account would at best be *pragmatically* correct. For a proper defense of their theory, 'that'-predicativists then face four tasks: they would have to defend the three claims about semantics; and they would have to say why an account of apparent referential name-uses that is semantically correct and pragmatically incorrect is superior to an account that is at best *pragmatically* correct.

We will set aside whether this strategy ultimately works out for 'that'-predicativism. At the same time, we propose a more modest defense of 'the'-predicativism. Note that 'the'- and 'that'-predicativists already agree on the *pragmatic* side: 'the'-predicativism gets the pragmatics of '$Ø_{DET}$ + apparent referential name-use' right while 'that'-predicativism does not. Then, to refute 'that'-predicativism, 'the'-predicativists face only *one* instead of *four* tasks: they would have to show that phrases of the form '$Ø_{DET}$ + apparent referential name-use' and incomplete descriptions have the same semantics (be they descriptivist or referentialist); in that case, 'the'-predicativism would be both semantically

and pragmatically correct while ‘that’-predicativism is at best *semantically* correct. Given that a defense of ‘that’-predicativism faces four tasks and a defense of ‘the’-predicativism only one, ‘the’-predicativism holds a discursive advantage over ‘that’-predicativism.

4) The Limits of Predicativism

The two previous chapters introduced predicativism from two angles: chapter 2 introduced predicativism against the background of different ways to classify names, especially in relation to the standard classification of names as singular terms; chapter 3 introduced predicativism against the background of a descriptivist analysis of names and its critique by Kripke. In this and the next two chapters, we turn to a critique of predicativism, combined with a new account of predicative name-uses.

4.1) Objections against Predicativism: An Overview

Let us start with an overview of potential objections against predicativism. Roughly, a critique of predicativism can target four different components:

1) the *classification* of names by predicativism, that is, the classification of names as predicates (predicate view) and as count nouns (count noun view);

2) the *syntactic analysis* of names by predicativism, especially the analysis of apparent referential name-uses as denuded determiner phrases ('$Ø_{\text{the/that}}$ *N*');

3) the *paraphrase* of names by predicativism, that is, the view that any use of a name *N* can be paraphrased as '(the/that) bearer of the name *N*', '(the/that) object named *N*', or the like;

4) the *semantic analysis/interpretation* of names by predicativism, that is, the view that any name *N* expresses the property of being a bearer of the name *N*.

Note that **(2-4)** all fall under what we have so far called the 'analysis' of names; for the most part, we will continue to do so.

Critics of predicativism challenge each of **(1-4)**. Let us briefly list a number of objections that we will discuss in more detail over the course of chapters 4 and 5:

- Against **(1)**:
  - against the predicate view: names have predicative, but also referential uses–they are not predicates, they can merely be *used as* predicates (recall the arguments for the type-ambiguity view from 2.6);
  - against the count noun view: there are crucial morphosyntactic and semantic differences between names and common count nouns; and while names *can* be used as count nouns, they can *also* be used as mass nouns, as adjectives, etc.
- Against **(2)**:
  - in English, some names can or even must be combined with a pronounced (and unstressed) definite article on apparent referential uses ('(the) Sudan', 'the Thames', etc.);
  - in some languages other than English, apparent referential name-uses can or even must be combined with a pronounced (and unstressed) definite article: e.g., they can in Italian and must in Catalan;
  - some languages (e.g., Latin, Mandarin, and most Slavic languages) do not have a definite article;
  - the analysis of apparent referential name-uses as denuded determiner phrases is implausible for uses of names as noun adjuncts.
- Against **(3)**:
  - for some names (e.g., plural-only names) and some name-uses (e.g., in close appositions), replacing a name with its predicativist paraphrase can lead to ungrammaticality or a change in meaning.
- Against **(4)**:
  - most names have predicative uses with a metalinguistic content, but they also have predicative uses whose intended interpretation is *not* metalinguistic;
  - for some names or name-uses, metalinguistic interpretations are inadmissible or at least highly uncommon;

Some of these objections are original while others have appeared in the literature (which we will indicate when discussing them). In the remainder of chapter 4, we will address most of the objections: section 4.2 deals with point **(1)**, 4.3 with **(2)**, 4.4 with **(3)**, and 4.5 with **(4)**. Chapter 5 will then look at some of the objections in more detail, against the background of a comprehensive account of predicative name-uses. Note that we do not

take each of the objections listed to be equally strong, as we will point out over the course of this chapter and the next; in addition, we will consider potential rebuttals by the predicativist.

4.2) Predicativism and the Classification of Names

As we saw in sections 2.4 and 2.5, the predicativist classification of names has two components: the more general predicate view (names are predicates) and the more specific count noun view (names are count nouns). In this section, we set the predicate view aside and focus on the count noun view. We level three objections against the count noun view: first, some names do not have count-noun-uses, or at least not all the paradigm count-noun-uses listed in the Sloat chart (4.2.1); second, names and common count nouns differ in ways that go beyond the few differences conceded by predicativists (4.2.2); third, names can have uses that are not count-noun-uses (4.2.3).

4.2.1) Names with Limited Count-Noun-Uses

We begin with the first objection: some names have only limited count-noun-uses, or none at all. Let us consider two potential sets of examples: titles of artifacts/texts, and proper nouns where a pluralization is uncommon.

Titles often consist of a capitalized phrase homophonous with a lowercased phrase that is *not* a title. E.g., the title '*War and Peace*' is homophonous with the lowercased conjunctive phrase 'war and peace', the title '*To Kill a Mockingbird*' with the lowercased verb phrase 'to kill a mockingbird', and so on. In many cases, such homophonous lowercased phrases do not allow for a treatment as count nouns/count noun phrases. E.g., they cannot be pluralized or combined with determiners that are specific to count nouns:

- *'a [to kill a mockingbird]', *'the famous [to kill a mockingbird]', *'the [to kill a mockingbird] written by Harper Lee', *'two [to kill a Mockingbird]', *'two [to kill a Mockingbird]s', etc.
- *'a [war and peace]' (as opposed to '[a war] and peace'), *'the famous [war and peace]', *'two [war and peace]', *'the famous [war and peace]', *'the [war and peace] written by Tolstoy', *'two [war and peace]s', *'two [wars and peace]' (as opposed to '[two wars] and peace'), etc.

The corresponding capitalized versions might not be ungrammatical, but many of them are still highly uncommon:

- ?'a [*To Kill a Mockingbird*]', ?'the famous [*To Kill a Mockingbird*]', ?'the [*To Kill a Mockingbird*] written by Harper Lee', ?'two [*To Kill a Mockingbird*]', ?'two [*To Kill a Mockingbird*]s', etc.
- ?'a [*War and Peace*]', ?'the famous [*War and Peace*]', ?'the [*War and Peace*] written by Tolstoy', ?'two [*War and Peace*]', ?'two [*War and Peace*]s', *'two *War*s *and Peace*', etc.

These uses correspond to lines 1 and 6 to 8 of the Sloat chart (see 2.5). These phrases are uncommon holds despite the fact that titles often have more than one bearer, just like personal or place names–which is one major reason to use names as count nouns to quantify over the name's bearers. E.g., the bearers of the title '*War and Peace*' include the novel by Tolstoy, but also its various film versions. Still, using the title as a count noun sounds unnatural:

- I recently read a novel titled '*War and Peace*'.
  But: I recently read a ?*War and Peace*.
- There are two works titled '*War and Peace*'.
  But: There are two ?*War and Peace*/?*War and Peace*s/…

Same for '*To Kill a Mockingbird*'.

The point is even clearer in languages with morphological gender-marking. E.g., in German, the indefinite article has morphological gender-marking, but no gender combines with the phrase '*Krieg und Frieden*' ('*War and Peace*'):

- Ich habe kürzlich einen Roman mit dem Titel '*Krieg und Frieden*' gelesen. (I recently read a novel with the title '*War and Peace*'.)
  But: *Ich habe kürzlich einen/eine/ein *Krieg und Frieden* gelesen. (I recently read a$_{masc/fem/neut}$ *War and Peace*.)

Some count-noun-uses of '*War and Peace*' might be admissible in English, but are inadmissible in German. Take uses that combine the title with a definite article and an adjectival modifier. The English version might be admissible:

- the famous novel titled '*War and Peace*': the famous ?*War and Peace*.

But any potential German translation is inadmissible (in German, the definite article has again morphological gender-marking):

- der berühmte Roman mit dem Titel '*Krieg und Frieden*' (the famous novel with the title '*War and Peace*');
  but: *der/die/das berühmte *Krieg und Frieden* (the$_{masc/fem/neut}$ famous *War and Peace*).

For a side note: while most count-noun-uses seem inadmissible for titles like '*War and Peace*' or '*To Kill a Mockingbird*', they are admissible for various other titles, especially ones that consist of proper nouns. E.g., a title like '*Macbeth*' is easily pluralized:

- There are two works titled '*Macbeth*' (e.g., the play by Shakespeare and the opera by Verdi).
  ⇒ There are two *Macbeths*.

A second set of examples includes proper nouns where a pluralization is uncommon. Take the following uses of the names 'Thames' and 'Ramesses':

- There are two Rivers Thames/two rivers named 'Thames': one in England, the other in Canada.
  But: ?There are two Thameses: one in England, the other in Canada.
- Many Egyptian kings were named 'Ramesses'.
  But: ?Many Egyptian kings were Ramesseses.

It is not entirely clear *why* such pluralizations are uncommon. One potential explanation would be phonological: the forms 'Thameses' and 'Ramesseses' might simply sound *too unwieldy*, and part of the motivation to use names as metalinguistic count nouns is to *reduce* unwieldiness–e.g., replacing a phrase like 'a person named 'Mary'' with the shorter 'a Mary' reduces unwieldiness.[190] This explanation is further supported by the fact that the less unwieldy singular forms of 'Thames' and 'Ramesses' have perfectly natural count-noun-uses:

- I've long known the Thames in England, but now I learned there is also a Thames in Canada.
- Was Cleopatra married to a Ramesses?

4.2.2) Differences Between Names and Common Count Nouns

For a second objection, let us consider further differences between names and common count nouns. We begin with four differences acknowledged by Sloat (1969). The first and most prominent difference is syntactic and concerns the last two lines of the Sloat chart: as we already saw, singular proper nouns typically have bare uses in argument position,

[190] Alternative explanations are less promising. E.g., the failure of 'Ramesses' to pluralize is *not* due to the fact that 'Ramesses' is not an English name: compare the admissible 'Many Egyptian queens were named 'Cleopatra'/were Cleopatras'. Also, the problem is not simply that 'Ramesses' ends in the suffix *-s*: compare the admissible 'The Joneses are coming for dinner'.

while singular common count nouns do not; and singular common count nouns can be combined with a pronounced and unstressed definite article, while singular proper nouns cannot (see 2.5).[191] For a second set of syntactic differences, singular proper nouns can typically be combined with a modifier without adding a determiner, while common count nouns cannot.[192] This holds for adjectival modifiers, prepositional modifiers, relative clauses, and modifiers in close appositions. E.g.:

- 'I met young Martin' vs. *'I met young man';
- 'I met Martin from the US' vs. *'I met man from the US';
- 'I met Martin, whom I like' vs. *'I met man, whom I like';
- 'I met Wittgenstein the philosopher' vs. *'I met man the philosopher'.

For a third syntactic difference, in close appositions of the form 'determiner + common count noun phrase + proper noun', the proper noun cannot be substituted with a common count noun:[193]

- 'I met the/that philosopher Wittgenstein' vs. ?'I met the/that philosopher man';
- 'I met my friend Martin' vs. *'I met my friend man'.

A fourth difference is semantic/pragmatic and concerns the distinction between restrictive and non-restrictive uses.[194] E.g., according to 'the'-predicativism, phrases like 'young Martin' in fact combine with an unpronounced definite article: '$\emptyset_{\text{the}}$ young Martin'. And if the proper noun is replaced with a common count noun, the definite article would have to be *pronounced*. E.g.:

- 'I met $\emptyset_{\text{the}}$ young Martin': 'I met the young man'.

However, while 'the young man' is grammatical, the two phrases differ in their range of admissible interpretations: '$\emptyset_{\text{the}}$ young Martin' only allows for a non-restrictive interpretation. By contrast, 'the young man' also allows for a restrictive interpretation (as in 'I met the young man, but the old man was nowhere to be seen'). We return to the restrictive/non-restrictive distinction in more detail in section 4.4.2.

Going beyond the differences acknowledged by Sloat, let us mention one further difference between names and common count nouns (more subtle differences will be added in section 5.4). We begin with some broader context. So far, we have focused on apparent predicative name-uses whose intended interpretation is *metalinguistic*: recall the use of 'Mary' in sentences like 'There is a Mary in my class' or 'Marys tend to be smart'. However, as often observed, there are also apparent predicative name-uses whose intended interpretation is *not* metalinguistic. E.g., consider the following uses:

- My son is a bit of a Mozart.
- The Leonardos are in the east wing.[195]
- The National Portrait Gallery has only one Churchill on display.

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[191] Note again that there are exceptions: e.g., proper nouns that are names, but need to be combined with a definite article in argument position ('the Thames'); or proper nouns that are not names (e.g., 'Spaniard' as in 'I met the Spaniard yesterday', referring to a salient Spaniard).
[192] See Sloat 1969, 28.
[193] Or at least the resulting phrase could no longer be analyzed as close apposition: e.g., 'the philosopher man' might be grammatical, but only if 'philosopher man' is syntactically analyzed as noun-noun compound, not as close apposition; compare 'philosopher king'.
[194] See Sloat 1969, 28f.
[195] For a similar example, see Jeshion 2014, 371.

Here, ‘Mozart’, ‘Leonardo’, and ‘Churchill’ are used predicatively, and more specifically as count nouns, but their intended interpretation is non-metalinguistic. The sentences can be used to convey, e.g., that my son is a bit Mozart-like/that he resembles Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart; that the paintings by Leonardo da Vinci are in the east wing; and that the National Portrait Gallery has only one portrait of Winston Churchill on display. Typically, the first use would be classified as metaphoric, the second and third as metonymic (more on metaphors/metonymies in 5.4.1). As is clear from these interpretations, the non-metalinguistic count-noun-uses of the respective name are derived from *referential* uses of the name: e.g., the non-metalinguistic count-noun-use of ‘Leonardo’ in the sense of ‘painting by Leonardo da Vinci’ is derived from the use of ‘Leonardo’ to refer to Leonardo da Vinci–that is, from uses of ‘Leonardo’ that would typically occur as bare singulars and that predicativists would analyze as ‘$\text{Ø}_{\text{the/that}}$ Leonardo’.

Now, common count nouns or common count noun phrases also allow for referential uses if combined with a (pronounced) determiner. E.g.:

- Mozart/The prodigy soon became more famous than his father.
- Leonardo/The Italian painter died 500 years ago.
- Churchill/The prime minister visited the king today.

Here, ‘the prodigy’, ‘the Italian painter’, and ‘the prime minister’ are used as incomplete descriptions to refer to Mozart, Leonardo, and Churchill. However, common count nouns do *not* allow for count-noun-uses derived from their referential uses. Consider the following sentences:

- My son is a bit of a prodigy: My son is a bit prodigy-like (resembles prodigies).
- The Italian painters are in the east wing: e.g., the paintings by Italian painters are in the east wing.
- The National Portrait Gallery has only one prime minister on display: e.g., the National Portrait Gallery has only one portrait of a prime minister on display.

The sentences have admissible interpretations where the common count nouns/common count noun phrases ‘prodigy’, ‘Italian painter’, and ‘prime minister’ are used metaphorically or metonymically, just as the names in the previous examples. However, their metaphoric/metonymic meanings are derived only from their standard predicative meanings, not from any of their referential meanings. E.g., ‘My son is a bit of a prodigy’ can be used to convey the proposition that my son resembles prodigies, but not the more specific proposition that he resembles Mozart, even in a context where Mozart is the salient prodigy. Similarly, ‘The Italian painters are in the east wing’ cannot be used to convey that the paintings by Leonardo da Vinci are in the east wing, even in a context where Leonardo da Vinci is the salient Italian painter. And so on. For a side note, the same holds for proper nouns that are not used as names, such as demonyms (‘Italian’):

- The Italians are in the east wing: e.g., the paintings by Italian painters are in the east wing.

‘The Italians are in the east wing’ cannot be used to convey that the paintings by Leonardo da Vinci are in the east wing, even in a context where Leonardo da Vinci is the salient Italian.

4.2.3) Predicative Name-Uses that Are Not Count-Noun-Uses

For a third objection against the count noun view, let us turn to predicative name-uses that are not count-noun-uses. We have already encountered some such uses in 2.7.2, and we will present a comprehensive overview of them in section 5.3; in the present section, we merely point to a few examples. As we will see, a large variety of names can be used not

only as count nouns, but also as mass nouns, verbs, adjectives, etc. Consider mass-noun-uses:[196]

- I like listening to Bach: I like listening to music by Bach.
- Let's listen to some Bach: Let's listen to some music by Bach.
- She reads too much Heidegger and not enough Frege: She reads too much philosophy by Heidegger and not enough philosophy by Frege.

In each case, the name can be replaced with a mass noun phrase. Also, in the second and third sentences, the names 'Bach', 'Heidegger', and 'Frege' are combined with determiners that typically combine with mass nouns: the existential determiner 'some', the degree determiner 'too much', and the sufficiency determiner 'not enough'. Such mass-noun-uses are generated by a productive process that allows us to use the name of a person for the person's oeuvre (or parts thereof).

Predicativists might counter that many common nouns that are standardly classified as count nouns have mass-noun-uses as well. Think of the *universal grinder* which allows count nouns that range over objects to be used as mass nouns, ranging over the physical substance that those objects consist of.[197] E.g., the count noun 'chicken' can be used for chicken meat ('I like eating chicken'), the count noun 'oak' (that ranges over oak trees) for oak wood ('This table is made of oak'), the count noun 'mink' for the fur of minks ('My grandmother wore mink'), the count noun 'apple' for the substance that apples consist of ('I put some apple into the salad'), etc.[198] The universal grinder is somewhat analogous to the 'person for oeuvre'-principle that allows names to be used as mass nouns. We will return to this issue in 5.4. For the remainder of this chapter, we will focus on count-noun-uses of names and set other uses, including mass-noun-uses, aside.

4.3) Predicativism and the Syntactic Analysis of Names

Let us turn to a second component of predicativism: the syntactic analysis of names. We list five objections, all of them directed against the predicativist analysis of apparent referential name-uses as denuded determiner phrases. The first four objections concern 'the'-predicativism (4.3.1), the fifth concerns both 'the'- and 'that'-predicativism (4.3.2).

4.3.1) Apparent Referential Name-Uses and the Definite Article

For a first objection, there are names whose apparent referential uses in English require a pronounced definite article, such as 'the Thames', 'the Alps', or 'the *Iliad*' (see 2.7.2). To be sure, such names are sometimes taken as evidence *for* the 'the'-predicativist analysis of apparent referential name-uses: after all, they show that apparent referential name-uses *can* be combined with pronounced definite articles, so a uniform treatment of names can postulate unpronounced articles for any apparent referential name-uses that do *not* combine with a pronounced article.[199] Then again, predicativists fail to explain why the definite article has to remain unpronounced with some names when it obviously can be pronounced with others.

The second and third objections will be crosslinguistic. The second objection points out that the definite article is absent from a large variety of languages, including Latin,

[196] For similar examples, see Nunberg 1995, 115f.; Jeshion 2015c, 384.
[197] See, e.g., Pelletier 1975, 456.
[198] For similar examples, see Nunberg 1995, 117.
[199] See, e.g., Matushansky 2008, 597.

Mandarin, and most Slavic languages.[200] As we saw, the main motivation for 'the'-predicativists to analyze apparent referential name-uses as containing an (unpronounced) definite article is that apparent referential name-uses resemble incomplete descriptions in their semantics/pragmatics, and English incomplete descriptions, of course, contain a (pronounced) definite article. But clearly, this motivation does not work for languages that do not have a pronounced definite article to begin with.[201] At the very least, this shows that for a variety of languages, 'the'-predicativism does not provide a natural analysis. In fact, most such languages still contain demonstrative pronouns, so for them, 'that'-predicativism might be preferable to 'the'-predicativism.[202]

Third, there are languages where apparent referential name-uses can or even must be combined with a pronounced definite article: e.g., they can in Italian and must in Catalan (at least in the case of personal proper nouns).[203] This gives us a crosslinguistic variation of the first objection: predicativism fails to explain why the definite article in front of a name has to remain unpronounced (for many names) in English while it can or even must be pronounced in other languages. Also, Catalan has different definite articles for names and common nouns–or, more precisely, for apparent referential name-uses on one side and common nouns *and* apparent predicative name-uses on the other.[204] As pointed out by Wolfram Hinzen (2016), this suggests that some languages distinguish on a morpho-syntactic level between referential and predicative name-uses, contrary to the predicativist claim that there is no systematic distinction between the two kinds of uses, and that apparent referential name-uses are simply predicative.[205] Going one step further, the second and third objections might be construed as crosslinguistic evidence against a 'the'-predicativist analysis of apparent referential name-uses even in English.

Let us turn to a fourth objection. Here, we argue that also in English, names can be used in singular phrases of the form 'the *N*' ('the Mary'), that is, in combination with a pronounced and unstressed definite article–even if apparent referential uses of *N* are usually bare singulars (e.g., 'Mary' as opposed to 'the Thames'). We look at two examples, the first by Jeshion, the second by us. In Jeshion's example, *N* receives a metalinguistic interpretation; in ours, *N* receives a non-metalinguistic interpretation. In both examples, 'the *N*' functions as an incomplete description.

We reproduce Jeshion's example in a slightly modified way.[206] Assume a young man, Colin, is exclusively attracted to women named 'Mary'. His best friend, Hassan, knows this and only introduces Colin to women that fit his type–he only introduces Colin to

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[200] Hinzen (2016: 598) makes the point for Polish. For Mandarin, see Cheng/Sybesma (1999: 522). For Russian, see Šimík/Demian (2020: 312).
[201] We sidestep the question whether such languages still allow for definite (and in particular incomplete) descriptions, defined in some broader way.
[202] For Mandarin, see Zhu/Huang (2023: 93-97). For Russian, see Dunn/Khairov (2009: 157-159). The fact that some languages have demonstratives, but lack definite articles, coheres with the widely held view that definite articles are historically derived from adnominal demonstrative pronouns–in some languages, that derivation will not take place. See Diessel (1999: 128) for a list of references.
[203] For a list of languages, see Ghomeshi/Massam (2009: 68). For Italian, see Longobardi (1994: 649-653, 656f.). For Catalan, see Hinzen (2016: 598f., 605-608).
[204] See Hinzen 2016, 605-608.
[205] See Hinzen 2016, 598f.
[206] See Jeshion 2017, 227f.; 2018, 485f. (where the story uses the name 'Katherine').

Marys. Colin and Hassan are attending a party, and Hassan points to a group of women, saying 'Over there's a lady who's perfect for you'. Colin anticipates that the lady will be a Mary and replies, 'So, which of them is the Mary?' Here, 'Mary' combines with a pronounced and unstressed definite article; the resulting definite description acts as an incomplete description, referring to the salient Mary in the context of utterance (namely the one Hassan is alluding to). Consequently, 'the Mary' can be replaced with descriptions like 'the person named 'Mary'': 'So, which of them is the person named 'Mary'?' We do not decide whether the example is admissible; to us, it seems overly artificial.

Consider a second, less artificial set of examples. In 4.2, we already encountered apparent predicative name-uses whose intended interpretation is *not* metalinguistic. Consider two such uses: the predicative use of the name 'Leonardo' for paintings by Leonardo da Vinci, and the predicative use of the name 'Ford' for cars manufactured by the Ford Motor Company. This use is evident in sentences like 'The Louvre owns six Leonardos and the Vatican Museums only one' or 'My mother drives a Ford'. Now, such predicative name-uses can clearly be combined in the singular with a pronounced and unstressed definite article, as in: 'In the Vatican Museums, I especially liked the Leonardo' or 'The Ford is parked in the driveway' (speaking about my mother's Ford). Again, 'the Leonardo' and 'the Ford' function as incomplete descriptions, referring to the Leonardo in the Vatican Museums and to my mother's Ford respectively. Note that predicativists might reject this objection based on the view that apparent predicative name-uses that are *not* metalinguistic are not, in fact, uses of names, but only of predicates *derived* from names (where the derived expressions happen to be homophonous with the names they are derived from). We will return to this issue in 5.4.

4.3.2) Names as Noun Adjuncts

Finally, consider a fifth objection. Here, we draw on the use of names as noun adjuncts in noun-noun compounds: the use of 'Leonardo' in 'Leonardo painting' ('the most famous Leonardo painting'), the use of 'Obama' in 'Obama impersonator' ('my favorite Obama impersonator'), etc. For brevity, such compounds will be called *name-noun compounds*, and the occurrences of names as noun adjuncts *name-adjuncts*.

If predicativism is applied to name-adjuncts, it would seem that name-adjuncts need to be combined with an unpronounced determiner, just like apparent referential name-uses in argument position. E.g., the phrase 'an Obama impersonator' would have to be analyzed as 'an [[$Ø_{the/that}$ Obama] impersonator]'. As is easily seen, this analysis is problematic: analyzing apparent referential name-uses in argument position as the pronounced part of a denuded determiner phrase was defensible because such name-uses could grammatically be replaced with *overt* determiner phrases.[207] E.g., 'Mary is asleep' or 'I like Mary' can grammatically be replaced with 'The lady next door is asleep', 'That lady is asleep', 'I like the lady next door', etc. But this defense does not carry over to name-noun compounds: replacing name-adjuncts with overt determiner phrases is ungrammatical. E.g., 'an Obama impersonator' cannot be replaced with *'a [[the/that 44th US president] impersonator]' or *'a [[the/that president] impersonator]'. Same if the determiners are left

[207] We use the term *determiner phrase* for phrases that combine a noun phrase with a determiner. Using the term is not meant as endorsement of the view that such phrases are *not* noun phrases.

unpronounced: *‘a [[$\emptyset_{\text{the/that}}$ 44th US president] impersonator]’, *‘a [[$\emptyset_{\text{the/that}}$ president] impersonator]’.[208] Given that the analogy between apparent referential name-uses and overt determiner phrases breaks down for name-adjuncts, the most plausible option would be to analyze name-adjuncts as genuinely referential, not as predicative in disguise. But then, there would be referential name-uses after all, contrary to predicativism. So, no matter if apparent referential name-uses in argument position are analyzed as predicative or not, there would no longer be a uniform analysis for *all* name-uses–some name-uses would be predicative (e.g., metalinguistic count-noun-uses), others would be referential (e.g., name-adjuncts). This would further undermine the predicative analysis of apparent referential name-uses in argument position. Consider: the main motivation behind such an analysis is to have a uniform treatment of all name-uses. But if name-adjuncts are genuinely referential, then such a uniform treatment is no longer available, so the main motivation behind analyzing apparent referential name-uses as predicative cannot be met. So, we might just as well give apparent referential name-uses the more intuitive analysis as referential expressions.

4.4) Predicativism and the Paraphrase of Names

We turn to objections against the predicativist paraphrase of names. In this section, we discuss types of names and name-occurrences for which the predicativist paraphrase fails to work. 4.4.1 considers one particular type of name: plural-only names (*plurale tantum* names).[209] 4.4.2 considers occurrences of names in combination with modifiers. 4.4.3 adds some more general remarks about the relationship between paraphrasing and synonymy. The problems posed by such names and name-occurrences can be addressed by refining the predicativist analysis, but only at the price of a significant loss in simplicity.

4.4.1) Plural-Only Names

Consider plural-only names that are syntactically treated as plurals, e.g., by being combined with plural verbs.[210] This will include paradigm names of mountain ranges (‘Alps’) and archipelagoes (‘Antilles’), but also some names of historical events (e.g., ‘Troubles’ for the conflict in Northern Ireland). Such nouns are typically combined with a pronounced definite article in apparent referential uses. It seems that simple versions of ‘the’-predicativism would analyze ‘the Alps’ either as ‘the bearer of the name ‘Alps’’ or as ‘the bearers of the name ‘Alps’’. Since the latter phrase is plural and the former is not, only the latter coheres with the syntax of sentences that use ‘the Alps’. E.g.:

- The Alps *are* in Europe.
- The bearers of the name ‘Alps’ *are* in Europe.
- *The bearer of the name ‘Alps’ *are* in Europe.

At the same time, on a semantic level, ‘the bearer of the name ‘Alps’’ seems to be the correct analysis: the noun ‘Alps’ has a unique bearer, namely a unique mountain range.

[208] Some might hold that ‘a president impersonator’ is grammatical, similar to ‘a cat impersonator’ for someone imitating cats; still, ‘a president impersonator’ would not use ‘president’ with an apparent referential meaning, different from ‘Obama’ in ‘an Obama impersonator’.
[209] The objection from plural-only names is in part due to Van Langendonck 2007, 48 (on ‘the Pyrenees’).
[210] Some plural names are syntactically treated as *singulars*. This especially holds for titles: ‘*The Birds* is a film’, ‘*The Brothers Karamazov*/*Buddenbrooks*/*The Betrothed*/*Great Expectations*/… is a novel’, ‘*Women of Algiers* is a painting’, etc.

The individual mountains of that mountain range are not individually bearers of the name 'Alps', but rather have names of their own.

In response to plural-only names, predicativists might further refine their paraphrase. We sketch one proposal:

- For all names *N* that are not plural-only:
  - all occurrences of *N* that are bare singulars can be replaced with the phrase 'the bearer of the name *N*';
  - all singular/plural occurrences of *N* that are not bare singulars can be replaced with the phrase 'bearer/bearers of the name *N*'.
- For all names *N* that are plural-only:
  - all occurrences of *N* can be replaced with 'bearer of the name *N*', in which case all other expressions whose grammatical number depends on *N* (that is, determiners, modifiers of *N*, verbs that take *N* as subject argument, etc.) need to be converted to singular.

E.g., in the sentence 'The Alps are in Europe', the predicativist analysis would now read 'The bearer of the name 'Alps' *is* in Europe', converting the verb to singular. The occurrence of 'Alps' in 'the beautiful Alps' can be replaced with 'bearer of the name 'Alps'', resulting in 'the beautiful bearer of the name 'Alps''. Also, in German, determiners and adjectives have different singular and plural forms; so, the German phrase 'die schönen Alpen' ('the$_{pl}$ beautiful$_{pl}$ Alps') will be analyzed as 'der schöne Träger des Namens 'Alpen'' ('the$_{sg}$ beautiful$_{sg}$ bearer of the name 'Alps'').

Note that plural-only proper nouns cannot be quantified over with numerals: e.g., the sentence 'There are two Antilles' cannot be used to convey the true proposition that there are two bearers of the name 'Antilles' (the Greater Antilles and the Lesser Antilles). However, this phenomenon is not restricted to proper nouns, but extends to most plural-only *common* nouns, such as 'trousers' or 'scissors': *'I own two trousers/scissors' (vs. 'I own two pairs of trousers/scissors').

4.4.2) Modified Name-Phrases

For a second objection against the predicativist paraphrase of names, let us focus on occurrences of names in combination with modifiers. We will speak of *modified name-phrases*. As we shall see, predicativism provides a satisfactory analysis of some, but not all such phrases. The modifiers we will consider include noun phrases, adjective phrases, relative clauses, and prepositional phrases.

Here are a few examples of modified name-phrases where the predicativist analysis works (we again confine ourselves to 'the'-predicativism):

- Relative clause as modifier:
  - I know two Marys who study physics: I know two bearers of the name 'Mary' who study physics.
  - (about two particular Marys): The Mary who studies physics is older than the Mary who studies art history: The bearer of the name 'Mary' who studies physics is older than the bearer of the name 'Mary' who studies art history.
- Prepositional phrase as modifier:
  - I know two Marys from Britain: I know two bearers of the name 'Mary' from Britain.
- Adjective phrase as modifier:
  - I know two very smart Marys: I know two very smart bearers of the name 'Mary'.
- Combined modifiers:
  - e.g., adjective and relative clause: The British Mary whom we met yesterday is coming for dinner: The British bearer of the name 'Mary' whom we met yesterday is coming for dinner.

To be sure, the predicativist paraphrases often sound less natural than the original name-phrases, but they do seem to capture the intended content of those phrases.

In the remainder of this section, we focus on two types of modified name-phrases where the predicativist analysis–at least in its simple version presented in 2.4–does not seem to work. The first type includes close appositions (4.4.2.1), the second includes modified name-phrases that we will call *internally restrictive* (4.4.2.2).

4.4.2.1) Close Appositions and the Restrictive/Non-Restrictive Distinction

Roughly, *close appositions* are binomial phrases whose constituents are not separated: in writing (at least by standard English orthography), they are not separated by a comma; and in speech, they are not separated by a pause (a 'comma intonation').[211] Typically, close appositions will have either the form 'NP_1 Det/P NP_2' or 'Det/P NP_2 NP_1', where NP_1/NP_2 are noun phrases, Det is a determiner, and P a possessive.[212] NP_1 will often be a name–this is the case we focus on. Consider a few examples:

1) the philosopher Wittgenstein (Det NP_2 NP_1);
2) Wittgenstein the philosopher (NP_1 Det NP_2);
3) Wittgenstein the author of the *Tractatus* (NP_1 Det NP_2);
4) that philosopher Wittgenstein (Det NP_2 NP_1);
5) my friend Wittgenstein (P NP_2 NP_1).[213]

In what follows, we focus on (1-3). In each of (1-3), NP_1 is the name 'Wittgenstein' and Det is the definite article. In (1/2), NP_2 is the noun 'philosopher', in (3) the noun phrase 'author of the *Tractatus*'. Obviously, replacing the non-bare singular occurrence of 'Wittgenstein' in (1) with a phrase like 'bearer of the name 'Wittgenstein'' leads to ungrammaticality:[214]

1a) *the philosopher bearer of the name 'Wittgenstein'.

Predicativists might respond by replacing the noun phrase 'bearer of the name 'Wittgenstein'' in (1/1a) with a participle phrase like 'named 'Wittgenstein'' or 'bearing the name 'Wittgenstein'', as in:

1b) the philosopher named 'Wittgenstein'.

While (1b) is grammatical, it leads to new problems, this time pertaining to the distinction between restrictive and non-restrictive readings. Specifically, the phrase 'the philosopher Wittgenstein' has both a restrictive and a non-restrictive reading,[215] while phrases like 'the philosopher named 'Wittgenstein'' only have a restrictive reading. Under a restrictive reading of 'the philosopher Wittgenstein', the modifier 'philosopher' is relevant to determine the reference of the phrase 'the philosopher Wittgenstein': roughly, the purpose of 'philosopher' would be to help narrow down *which* Wittgenstein is being referred to, namely by restricting the set of all Wittgensteins to the set of all Wittgensteins who are philosophers. Then, 'the philosopher Wittgenstein' refers to the unique object that is both

[211] See, e.g., Keizer 2007, 25, 27.
[212] Some would also include phrases of the form 'P NP_1 Det NP_2' ('my friend the actor') among close appositions; see Keizer 2007, 22.
[213] For a more comprehensive list of possible combinations, see Keizer 2005, 448.
[214] See already Sloat 1969, 28f.
[215] Note that close appositions are often defined as being restrictive; in that case, 'the philosopher Wittgenstein' would not come out as close apposition under a non-restrictive reading. More importantly, it seems clear that 'the philosopher Wittgenstein' has both a restrictive and a non-restrictive reading. See Keizer 2007, 34 (for 'the poet Burns').

a bearer of the name ‘Wittgenstein’ and a philosopher (or, for a weaker formulation, to the *most salient* such object). This reading can be made explicit by reformulating (1) as:

1R) the Wittgenstein who is a philosopher.

Here, ‘R’ stands for ‘restrictive’. By contrast, under a non-restrictive reading of (1), the name ‘Wittgenstein’ is used referentially to refer to a specific Wittgenstein, probably the most salient Wittgenstein in the context of utterance (e.g., Ludwig Wittgenstein). Then, the purpose of the modifier ‘philosopher’ is simply to ascribe a property to that Wittgenstein–the property of being a philosopher (not the property of being the philosopher). This reading can be made explicit by reformulating (1) as:

1N) Wittgenstein (a philosopher).

‘N’ stands for ‘non-restrictive’. We put the additional information provided by NP_2 in parentheses to convey that NP_2 does not serve to restrict the reference of ‘Wittgenstein’.

Now, compare (1b). It seems that (1b) only has a restrictive reading, namely a reading by which the phrase ‘named ‘Wittgenstein’’ restricts the set of philosophers to those that bear the name ‘Wittgenstein’. This can be made explicit by reformulating (1b) as:

1bR) the philosopher who is named ‘Wittgenstein’ (a formalization brings out the restrictive reading even better: the *x* s.t. *x* is a philosopher and *x* is named ‘Wittgenstein’).

(1R) and (1bR) are equivalent, in the sense that they have the same referent (if any). But (1b) has no reading under which it is equivalent to (1N). E.g., take a context where some person P other than Ludwig Wittgenstein is the most salient bearer of the name ‘Wittgenstein’, and where P is not a philosopher. In such a context, (1b) still refers to Ludwig Wittgenstein, since Ludwig Wittgenstein is the only object that is both a philosopher and bears the name ‘Wittgenstein’. But (1N) does not: (1N) refers to P and misdescribes P as a philosopher.

In the case of (2) and (3), the differences between the original phrase and the predicativist analysis are more subtle. Take (2):

2) Wittgenstein the philosopher.

Assume we replace the bare singular of ‘Wittgenstein’ in (2) with ‘the bearer of the name ‘Wittgenstein’’:

2a) the bearer of the name ‘Wittgenstein’ the philosopher.

The phrase might not be outright ungrammatical, but at least violates standard orthography (and pronouncing it without a comma intonation between ‘Wittgenstein’ and ‘the philosopher’ would sound unnatural). For an orthographically correct version, we would have to add a comma after ‘Wittgenstein’:

2b) the bearer of the name ‘Wittgenstein’, the philosopher.

However, (2b) faces new problems, again pertaining to the restrictive/non-restrictive distinction. It seems that (2) has a restrictive reading, while (2b) only has a non-restrictive reading. Specifically, (2) has again the readings (1R). By contrast, in the case of (2b), *neither* (1R) nor (1N) are available. Rather, (2b) only allows for alternative non-restrictive analyses under which ‘the bearer of the name ‘Wittgenstein’’ and ‘the philosopher’ are each definite descriptions, be they complete or incomplete. E.g., if we treat the descriptions as incomplete, then the phrase ‘the bearer of the name ‘Wittgenstein’, the philosopher’ refers to whoever is both the most salient bearer of the name ‘Wittgenstein’ and also the most salient philosopher. (2b) can thus be reformulated as:

2bN) the bearer of the name ‘Wittgenstein’ (the [not: a] philosopher).

By contrast, in (2), the phrase ‘the philosopher’ does not have any of the standard functions of (complete or incomplete) definite descriptions, but works more like an *indefinite* description: it merely contributes the indefinite property of being a (not: the) philosopher.

Things are similar for (3):

3) Wittgenstein the author of the *Tractatus*.

Again, we can replace the bare singulars of ‘Wittgenstein’ with ‘the bearer of the name ‘Wittgenstein’’:

3a) the bearer of the name ‘Wittgenstein’ the author of the *Tractatus*.

As in the case of (2a), for an orthographically correct version, we would have to add a comma after ‘Wittgenstein’:

3b) the bearer of the name ‘Wittgenstein’, the author of the *Tractatus*.

But again, (3b) only allows for a non-restrictive analysis, while (3) definitely allows for a restrictive analysis. The main difference between (3) and (2) is that the extension of ‘author of the *Tractatus*’ contains only one object (Ludwig Wittgenstein), while the extension of ‘philosopher’ contains several. We suggest the following analysis. In (3), ‘the author of the *Tractatus*’ can be used restrictively to determine the referent of the entire phrase ‘Wittgenstein the author of the *Tractatus*’, namely as the Wittgenstein who is an author of the *Tractatus*. This analysis replaces the definite description ‘the author of the *Tractatus*’ with the indefinite description ‘an author of the *Tractatus*’. The analysis is supported by the fact that we can speak of ‘Russell the author of *Principia Mathematica*’ even though Russell was not the *only* author of *Principia Mathematica*–he was just the only *Russell* who was an author of *Principia Mathematica*. So, (3) can be reformulated as:

3R) the Wittgenstein who is an author of the *Tractatus*.

By contrast, (3b) only allows for a non-restrictive reading. Under this reading, ‘the author of the *Tractatus*’ will be a definite description (which again allows for both complete and incomplete readings). So, (3b) can be reformulated as:

3bN) the bearer of the name ‘Wittgenstein’ (the author of the *Tractatus*).

Whether (3) also allows for a non-restrictive analysis is debatable: perhaps, for a non-restrictive reading, we would have to add a comma (or, in speech, a comma intonation) between ‘Wittgenstein’ and ‘the author of the *Tractatus*’:

3*) Wittgenstein, the author of the *Tractatus*.

In that case, ‘the author of the *Tractatus*’ would merely be used to further describe an already salient bearer of ‘Wittgenstein’. (3*) can be reformulated as:

3N) Wittgenstein (the author of the *Tractatus*).

In response to the problems posed by close appositions like (1-3), predicativists might refine their account. We sketch two potential refinements, focusing on appositions that use either a definite article or a possessive. We will use ‘WH’ for relative pronouns. First, we suggest that predicativists could adopt the following paraphrase for close appositions that contain a definite article:

- All phrases of the form ‘the NP *N*’ or ‘*N* the NP’ should be paraphrased as:
  - ‘the *N* WH is an NP’ (without comma between *N* and WH) if NP is used restrictively;
  - ‘$Ø_{the}$ *N* (an NP)’ if NP is used non-restrictively.

E.g., the phrase ‘the philosopher Wittgenstein’ would then be analyzed either as ‘the Wittgenstein who is a philosopher’ or as ‘$Ø_{the}$ Wittgenstein (a philosopher)’. Same for

'Wittgenstein the philosopher'. The phrase 'the famous opera *Don Giovanni*' would be analyzed either as 'the *Don Giovanni* which is a famous opera' or as '$Ø_{the}$ *Don Giovanni* (a famous opera)'. And so on. In a second step, the standard predicativist analysis can then be applied to these reformulations: that is, the name *N* can be replaced with the phrase 'bearer of the name *N*', and the unpronounced definite article with its pronounced counterpart. So, 'the Wittgenstein who is a philosopher' becomes 'the bearer of the name 'Wittgenstein' who is a philosopher'; and '$Ø_{the}$ Wittgenstein (a philosopher)' becomes 'the bearer of the name 'Wittgenstein' (a philosopher)'. Regarding 'the bearer of the name 'Wittgenstein' who is a philosopher', we assume that the lack of a comma after 'Wittgenstein' indicates that the relative clause is restrictive. Should this orthographic criterion not suffice, the analysis could stipulate that the relative clause is used restrictively; or we could replace 'the *N* WH is an NP' with 'the *same N* WH is an NP', which again would be analyzed as 'the same bearer of the name *N* WH is an NP'–the two latter phrases would clearly use the relative clause restrictively.

So far, we have mainly addressed close appositions that use a definite article. But similar remarks apply to the use of possessives. E.g., predicativists might propose the following paraphrase for close appositions that contain a possessive instead of a determiner:

- All phrases of the form 'P NP *N*' or '*N* P NP' should be paraphrased as:
  - 'the *N* WH is an NP of P*' if 'P NP' is used restrictively;
  - '$Ø_{the}$ *N* (an NP of/by P*)' if 'P NP' is used non-restrictively,

  where P* is the variant of P that combines with 'of'/'by'.

Consider two examples. 'My friend Mary' would be analyzed as 'the Mary who is a friend of mine' if 'my friend' is used restrictively (e.g., if I contrast my *friend* Mary with my *sister* who is also named 'Mary'); and as 'Mary (a friend of mine)' if 'my friend' is used non-restrictively. Here, 'mine' is the variant of 'my' that combines with 'of'. Similarly, 'Verdi's opera *Macbeth*' would be analyzed as 'the *Macbeth* which is an opera by Verdi' if 'Verdi's opera' is used restrictively (e.g., to contrast Verdi's opera with Shakespeare's play of the same name); and as '*Macbeth* (an opera by Verdi)' if 'Verdi's opera' is used non-restrictively. Here, 'Verdi' is the variant of the genitive 'Verdi's' that combines with 'by'.

4.4.2.2) Internally Restrictive Phrases

In the previous section, we argued that the predicativist analysis fails to work for occurrences of names in close appositions. In this section, we add a second type of modified name-phrases that we call *internally restrictive*, containing an *internally restrictive modifier*. We set such modifiers apart from *externally restrictive* modifiers, the more standard examples of restrictive modifiers. To introduce the distinction, compare the following two sentences:

1) I prefer Wittgenstein the philosopher to Wittgenstein the pianist.
2) I prefer Wittgenstein the philosopher to Wittgenstein the schoolteacher.

(For simplicity, we will treat appositive phrases like 'the philosopher' as modifiers.) Sentence (1) can be used to contrast Ludwig Wittgenstein with his brother Paul Wittgenstein, a pianist. By contrast, sentence (2) can be used to contrast Ludwig Wittgenstein with *himself*: or more precisely, to contrast Ludwig Wittgenstein *as a philosopher* with Ludwig Wittgenstein *as a schoolteacher*, a profession he took up after finishing the *Tractatus*. In both sentences, the underlined modifiers are restrictive. However, in (1), the modifier 'the

philosopher' restricts the set of bearers of the name 'Wittgenstein' to one of its members, while in (2), the same modifier restricts one bearer of the name, e.g., Ludwig Wittgenstein, to one particular *property* or *aspect* of his: to Ludwig Wittgenstein *as exemplifying a particular property*–here the property of being a philosopher. Analogously for the modifiers 'the pianist' and 'the schoolteacher'. We then call the modified 'Wittgenstein'-phrases in (1) externally restrictive and the ones in (2) internally restrictive–the motivation behind the terminology is that in (2), the restriction is 'internal' to one bearer of the name. Similarly, consider a sentence with adjectival modifiers:

3) I prefer the young Wittgenstein to the middle-aged Wittgenstein.

The sentence has two admissible interpretations: the modifiers 'young' and 'middle-aged' can be used as externally restrictive, distinguishing two bearers of the name 'Wittgenstein', one of whom is young while the other is middle-aged. But the two modifiers can also be used as internally restrictive, contrasting two *time periods* in the existence of one particular bearer of the name 'Wittgenstein': the time when he is young and the time when he is middle-aged. In the linguistic literature, name-uses in internally restrictive phrases have been discussed ever since Paul Christophersen's *The Article* (1939).[216] They are often subsumed under one common label, e.g., as 'generic' or 'emphatic' uses.[217] Sometimes, name-uses that can be explicated in terms of properties or aspects of a name-bearer (as in sentence (2)) are distinguished from name-uses that can be explicated in terms of times in the existence of the (as in sentence (3)); e.g., the former have been called 'modalizing uses' or 'manifestation uses', the latter 'exemplary uses' or 'stage uses'.[218]

A detailed account of internally restrictive phrases goes beyond the scope of this study. Instead, we confine ourselves to a few general remarks. To that end, consider a few further examples, where the modifiers are adjective phrases, prepositional phrases, and relative clauses:

4) I prefer the early Wittgenstein to the later Wittgenstein.
5) I prefer the Wittgenstein of the 1920s to the Wittgenstein of the 1940s.
6) I prefer the Wittgenstein who wrote the *Tractatus* to the Wittgenstein who wrote the *Philosophical Investigations*.

In each of these sentences, the modified name-phrases can be interpreted as internally restrictive–in (4) and (5), the internally restrictive reading is the *only* plausible reading. Here are rough paraphrases of the internally restrictive readings:

3*) I prefer Wittgenstein as he was when he was young to Wittgenstein as he was when he was middle-aged.
4*) I prefer Wittgenstein as he was in the early phase of his life to Wittgenstein as he was in the later phase of his life.
5*) I prefer Wittgenstein as he was in the 1920s to Wittgenstein as he was in the 1940s.
6*) I prefer Wittgenstein as he was when he wrote the *Tractatus* to Wittgenstein as he was when he wrote the *Philosophical Investigations*.

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[216] See Christophersen 1939, 168: name-uses in internally restrictive phrases refer to "the same individual at different periods or under different aspects".
[217] 'Generic'/'generisch' in Leys 1989; 'emphatic'/'emphatisch' in Kalverkämper 1978 (see pp. 326-362).
[218] 'Modalizing'/'modalisierend' and 'exemplary'/'exemplarisch' in Kolde 1995, 405; 'manifestation uses' and 'stage uses' in von Heusinger 2010, 105. On stage-level predicates, see also Carlson 1977 and Krifka et al. 1995.

As is easily seen, the predicativist paraphrase fails to account for internally restrictive readings. Consider sentence (3), where the predicativist analysis would give us:

3*) I prefer the young bearer of the name 'Wittgenstein' to the middle-aged bearer of the name 'Wittgenstein'.

Here, the underlined phrases do not allow for an internally, but only for an externally restrictive reading: the phrases cannot be interpreted as coreferential, or as referring to different periods in the life of the *same* person. So, the predicativist paraphrase (3*) fails to reflect one of the readings of (3).

The same holds for the remaining examples. In particular, it holds for internally restrictive close appositions as in (2), even if we assume the *refined* version of predicativism from the previous section. E.g., under that refined version, (2) has two permissible readings:

2a) I prefer the Wittgenstein who was a philosopher to the Wittgenstein who was a schoolteacher.

2b) I prefer $Ø_{the}$ Wittgenstein (a philosopher) to $Ø_{the}$ Wittgenstein (a schoolteacher).

Under further predicativist analysis, this gives us:

2a*) I prefer the bearer of the name 'Wittgenstein' who was a philosopher to the bearer of the name 'Wittgenstein' who was a schoolteacher.

2b*) I prefer the bearer of the name 'Wittgenstein' (a philosopher) to the bearer of the name 'Wittgenstein' (a schoolteacher).

(2a/a*) only have an externally restrictive, not an internally restrictive reading. By contrast, (2b/b*) sound unnatural: e.g., (2b), under its most natural interpretation, they would use both occurrences of 'Wittgenstein' coreferentially, in which case the sentence commits me to the contradictory statement that I prefer Wittgenstein to Wittgenstein. The only non-contradictory way to utter (2b) would be to supplement the two utterances of 'Wittgenstein' with ostensive gestures towards different Wittgensteins–which would again give us an externally rather than internally restrictive reading.

Finally, for some sentences where an internally restrictive reading is more natural than an externally restrictive one, the predicativist analysis is highly unnatural. Take again sentence (4), where the predicativist analysis would give us:

4*) I prefer the early bearer of the name 'Wittgenstein' to the later bearer of the name 'Wittgenstein'.

It is dubious what the phrase 'the early bearer of the name 'Wittgenstein'' could be used to convey. At the very least, the phrase cannot be used to convey the same content as 'the early Wittgenstein', so (4*) cannot be used to convey the same content as (4).

In response to the challenge from internally restrictive phrases, the predicativist paraphrase might be further refined. For some types of modifiers, such a refinement is easily accomplished, especially for close appositions and relative clauses. In the case of close appositions, predicativists might suggest:

- Internally restrictive phrases that are close appositions (where the modifier has the form 'the NP') can be analyzed as '$Ø_{the}$ *N* as an NP' and further as 'the bearer of the name *N* as an NP'.

E.g., under an internally restrictive reading, 'Wittgenstein the philosopher' can be analyzed as '$Ø_{the}$ Wittgenstein as a philosopher' and further as 'the bearer of the name 'Wittgenstein' as a philosopher'. Similarly, take relative clauses. Let 'WH' stand for relative pronouns and 'VP' for verb phrases; we will use the masculine and the present tense generically. Then:

- Internally restrictive phrases of the form 'the *N* WH VP' can be analyzed as '$Ø_{the}$ *N* as he is when he VP' and further as 'the bearer of the name *N* as he is when he VP'.

E.g., 'the Wittgenstein who wrote the *Tractatus*' can be analyzed as '$Ø_{the}$ Wittgenstein as he was when he wrote the *Tractatus*' and further as 'the bearer of the name 'Wittgenstein' as he was when he wrote the *Tractatus*'.

Critics of predicativism might object that other types of modifiers do not allow for a uniform predicativist paraphrase. E.g., in the case of adjectival modifiers, the closest we get would be the following:

- Internally restrictive phrases that are adjective phrases AP can be analyzed as '$Ø_{the}$ *N* as he is when he is AP' and further as 'the bearer of the name *N* as he is when he is AP'.

This proposal works for some, but not all, adjectival modifiers. E.g., it works for 'the young Wittgenstein', which can be analyzed as '$Ø_{the}$ Wittgenstein as he was when he was young'/'the bearer of the name 'Wittgenstein' as he was when he was young'. But it fails to work for 'the early Wittgenstein', which cannot be analyzed as '$Ø_{the}$ Wittgenstein as he was when he was early'–the sentence should rather be analyzed as '$Ø_{the}$ Wittgenstein as he was in the early phase of his life'. Similarly, prepositional modifiers do not allow for a uniform analysis. E.g., compare the phrases 'the Wittgenstein of the 1920s' and 'the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus*': the former phrase is best analyzed as '$Ø_{the}$ Wittgenstein as he was in the 1920s', the latter phrase as '$Ø_{the}$ Wittgenstein as author of the *Tractatus*'.

There are several ways out for the predicativist, even if it is conceded that internally restrictive phrases cannot receive a uniform predicativist analysis. First, predicativists might counter that predicativist analyses are available for all internally restrictive phrases, even if those analyses lack uniformity. E.g., as we saw, internally restrictive phrases with adjectival modifiers do not allow for a *uniform* predicativist analysis, but they can nonetheless be given a *predicativist* analysis. Second, predicativists might argue that the challenge posed by internally restrictive phrases is not specific to predicativism, but extends to *any* theory of names. E.g., we saw that under an internally restrictive reading, 'the young Wittgenstein' and 'the early Wittgenstein' cannot be given a uniform predicativist analysis; however, this is not due to the predicativist analysis of 'Wittgenstein', but rather due to the fact that 'young' conveys a property of Wittgenstein, while 'early' conveys a property of a phase in Wittgenstein's life. Third, predicativists might simply deny that the analysis of names needs to capture any internally restrictive readings. In particular, predicativists might argue that internally restrictive phrases (different from non-restrictive or externally restrictive phrases) do not contain *literal* name-uses: instead, the name-uses in internally restrictive phrases would be *metonymic*. E.g., we paraphrased the sentence 'I prefer the young Wittgenstein to the middle-aged Wittgenstein' as 'I prefer Wittgenstein as he was when he was young to Wittgenstein as he was when he was middle-aged'; alternatively, however, the sentence (or a typical utterance thereof) might be a metonymy conveying that I prefer the *way* that Wittgenstein was when he was young to the *way* that Wittgenstein was when he was middle-aged. Very roughly, the 'way' an object *x* is at a time *t* can here be explicated as the set of properties exemplified by *x* at *t*: the way that Wittgenstein was when he was young is the set of properties that Wittgenstein exemplified in his youth. In some cases, the metonymic meaning might deviate even further from any literal meaning: e.g., the sentence 'I prefer the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus* to the Wittgenstein of the *Philosophical Investigations*' (or a typical utterance thereof) might simply be a metonymic way of conveying that I prefer Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* to Wittgenstein's

Philosophical Investigations. We side with the first and second responses and remain undecided about the third.

4.4.3) Paraphrasing and Synonymy

Looking back at sections 4.4.2.1 and 4.4.2.2, let us see how predicativists might respond to the objections against the predicativist paraphrase of names. Since the predicativist paraphrase is meant to be *synonymous* with the paraphrased name, we are in this context especially concerned with the relationship between paraphrasing and synonymy.

In a first step, predicativists might argue that the failure of expressions to be universally substitutable with their standard paraphrases is a phenomenon that extends from names to various other types of expressions, e.g., to common nouns. Consider the paradigm example of 'bachelor' which can be paraphrased as 'unmarried adult male human being'.[219] But clearly, not *all* uses of 'bachelor' are grammatically substitutable with the phrase 'unmarried adult male human being'. Think of noun-noun compounds: 'bachelor flat' is grammatical, *'unmarried adult male human being flat' is not. Here, a change in syntax is required, e.g., into a noun phrase modified by a prepositional phrase: 'flat of an unmarried adult male human being'. So, the problem of the intersubstitution of paraphrases is not limited to the predicativist paraphrase of names.

Critics of predicativism might object that the problem is more profound: there are name-uses that can be grammatically substituted with their predicativist paraphrase, but where the substitution is still not admissible since it leads to a shift in meaning. As a case in point, consider the kind of non-metalinguistic name-uses that we encountered in 4.2 and 4.3, e.g., the use of the name 'Leonardo' as a predicate ranging over paintings by Leonardo da Vinci, as in 'The National Gallery owns two Leonardos'. According to predicativists, 'Leonardo' is synonymous with the phrase 'bearer of the name 'Leonardo''; critics of predicativism will point out that while the sentence 'The National Gallery owns two Leonardos' can be used to convey that the National Gallery owns two paintings by Leonardo, the sentence 'The National Gallery owns two bearers of the name 'Leonardo'' cannot. (Nor can the latter sentence be used to convey that the National Gallery owns two paintings by *some* bearer of the name 'Leonardo', or paintings by *two* bearers of the name 'Leonardo', or the like.) Predicativists might counter that substitution-failure for synonyms extends to at least some uses where a substitution would be grammatical. Prominent examples include expressions that are synonyms (or 'near-synonyms'), but differ in connotation or in collocation. E.g., the common nouns 'father'/'dad', the adjectives 'skinny'/'slim'/'thin', the verbs 'destroy'/'ruin', or the verbs 'cry'/'weep' have the same literal meaning (if suitably disambiguated), but they differ in connotation: 'father' is formal, 'dad' informal. 'Skinny' is pejorative, 'slim' favorable, 'thin' neutral. 'Destroy' is more forceful than 'ruin'. 'Cry' and 'weep' highlight different aspects of the same type of event: 'cry' puts the focus on the sound, 'weep' on the flow of tears.[220] Similarly, there are expressions that do not differ in literal meaning, but have different collocations, that is, they do not occur in combination with the same words. E.g., 'strong' and 'powerful' have roughly the same meaning, but while both adjectives can be combined with the noun

[219] However, on the difficulty of analyzing 'bachelor', see Harman 1999, 151; Williamson 2022, 120.
[220] See DiMarco/Hirst/Stede 1993, 123; Inkpen/Hirst 2006, 224.

'argument' ('strong/powerful argument'), only 'strong' can be combined with 'tea' ('strong tea' vs. *'powerful tea'), and only 'powerful' can be combined with 'car' ('powerful car' vs. *'strong car').[221] Often, examples of collocation will involve a metaphoric or metonymic meaning. E.g., 'baggage' and 'luggage' are synonyms, but only 'baggage' has the metaphoric sense of 'burden' in combination with 'emotional' or 'historical': 'emotional/historical baggage' vs. *'emotional/historical luggage'.[222] Similarly, 'gun' and 'firearm' are synonyms, but only 'gun' has the metonymic sense of 'assassin' in combination with 'hired': 'hired gun' vs. *'hired firearm'. Predicativists might then argue that the same holds for a name *N* and phrases like 'bearer of the name *N*': they are synonymous, but not universally intersubstitutable. At the same time, the case of names differs crucially from our examples of connotations and collocations. First, differences in collocation among synonyms are typically arbitrary: see the examples of 'baggage' and 'luggage', 'strong' and 'powerful', etc. By contrast, the different uses of a name *N* and the phrase 'bearer of the name *N*' are not arbitrary, but systematic: they depend on what content is intended to be conveyed–if we intend to convey non-metalinguistic properties, we choose *N*, not a phrase like 'bearer of the name *N*'. Also, a name *N* and the phrase 'bearer of the name *N*' lack most differences in connotation that would usually block substitution: e.g., both *N* and 'bearer of the name *N*' are formal rather than informal; neutral rather than pejorative or favorable; are not associated with different degrees of force; and if we assume (with the predicativist) that *N* and 'bearer of the name *N*' have the *same* meaning, they do not seem to highlight *different* aspects of that meaning. Still, predicativists might argue that the difference between *N* and 'bearer of the name *N*' is connotational after all, and in fact similar to the case of highlighting different aspects of meaning: phrases like 'bearer of the name *N*' *explicate* the meaning that is only *implicit* in the name *N*.

We take this defense of the predicativist paraphrase to be promising, but do not decide whether it ultimately succeeds. Below, in 5.4.7, we will encounter an alternative explanation for the different behavior of a name *N* and the phrase 'bearer of the name *N*': namely that non-metalinguistic count-noun-uses of names are in fact noun adjuncts as part of noun-noun compounds, where the second noun has been phonetically deleted. E.g., 'a Leonardo' in the sense of 'a Leonardo painting' would be analyzed as 'a Leonardo ~~painting~~', using the name-noun compound 'Leonardo ~~painting~~', where 'painting' has been phonetically deleted. In that case, phrases like 'bearer of the name *N*' cannot be replaced for names to convey non-metalinguistic properties simply because they cannot be used in noun-noun compounds: *'two bearer(s) of the name 'Leonardo' paintings' is not grammatical. See 5.4.7 for an assessment of this second explanation.

4.5) Predicativism and the Interpretation of Names

In a last step, we turn to objections against the predicativist interpretation/semantic analysis of names: that is, against the view that names express metalinguistic properties. We will also speak of the *metalinguistic interpretation* of names. To be sure, a metalinguistic interpretation is plausible for a variety of names and name-uses, including the use of

[221] See Halliday 1966, 150.
[222] The example is due to Lin 1998.

personal proper nouns in the Sloat chart. Still, in this section we argue that a metalinguistic interpretation of names is not as universally available as suggested by predicativists.

In the previous sections, we already encountered name-uses where a metalinguistic interpretation is not intended or not even admissible. In 4.2.2, we encountered non-metalinguistic count-noun-uses of names, such as the use of 'Leonardo' for paintings by Leonardo da Vinci ('The Leonardos are in the east wing'): here, a metalinguistic interpretation is admissible, but typically not intended. In 4.3, we encountered uses of 'the Leonardo' for a salient Leonardo painting, or uses of 'the Ford' for a salient car manufactured by Ford: here, a metalinguistic interpretation is not even admissible. E.g., the sentence 'In the Vatican Museums, I especially liked the Leonardo' cannot be used to convey that in the Vatican Museums, I especially liked the bearer of the name 'Leonardo' (e.g., a particular person named 'Leonardo'). Similarly, 'The Ford is in the driveway' cannot be used to convey that the bearer of the name 'Ford' (e.g., a particular person named 'Ford') is in the driveway. (Importantly, the fact that metalinguistic interpretations are not available in these cases is *not* explained by the sentence predicates: predicates like 'especially liked' or 'is in the driveway' select both inanimate objects (e.g., paintings or cars) and persons (e.g., persons named 'Leonardo' or 'Ford').)

In this section, we add two further sets of counterexamples against the metalinguistic interpretation. The first concerns names where metalinguistic uses (uses with an intended metalinguistic interpretation) are inadmissible (4.5.1). The second concerns names where metalinguistic uses might be admissible, but are still uncommon (4.5.2).

4.5.1) Names Where Metalinguistic Uses Are Inadmissible

First, as an example of names where metalinguistic uses are inadmissible, take names of companies and brands. Predicative uses are often admissible for company or brand names, but not with a metalinguistic interpretation. E.g., there are two companies named 'Apple', the American tech company and a British records label founded by The Beatles. Still, using such names predicatively with a metalinguistic interpretation would be uncommon:

- There are two companies named 'Apple'. But: ?There are two Apples.
- The American company named 'Apple' is more famous than the British company named 'Apple'. But: ?The American Apple is more famous than the British Apple.
- The company named 'Apple' that was founded in the US is more famous than the other company named 'Apple' that was founded in the UK. But: ?The Apple that was founded in the US is more famous than the other Apple that was founded in the UK.

The count-noun-uses listed here for 'Apple' correspond to lines 6 to 8 of the Sloat chart. Similarly, there are two brands named 'Dove', the American chocolate brand produced by Mars and the British personal care brand produced by Unilever. Again, using such names as metalinguistic count nouns would be highly uncommon:

- There are two brands named 'Dove'. But: ?There are two Doves.
- The British brand named 'Dove' is more famous than the American brand named 'Dove'. But: ?The British Dove is more famous than the American Dove.

The same holds if company names are combined with an indefinite article, corresponding to line 1 of the Sloat chart: e.g., to convey that there is a company named 'Apple'/'Samsung'/'Microsoft', we would not use a sentence like ?'There is an Apple/a Samsung/a Microsoft'. Same for brand names.

The problems surrounding company names are even more evident in languages with morphological gender-marking, such as German. There, any combination of proper nouns referring to companies with modifiers will be ungrammatical unless further combined with a common noun. Take a construction where the modifier is an adjective:

- *Der/die/das berühmte Samsung hat einen neuen CEO.
  (The$_{masc/fem/neut}$ famous Samsung has a new CEO.)

Such constructions are invariably ungrammatical. To attain a grammatical construction, we would have to add a noun like 'Unternehmen' ('company') or 'Elektronikhersteller' ('electronics maker'), as in:

- Das berühmte Unternehmen Samsung hat einen CEO.
  (The$_{neut}$ famous company$_{neut}$ Samsung has a CEO.)
- Der berühmte Elektronikhersteller Samsung hat einen CEO.
  (The$_{masc}$ famous [electronics maker]$_{masc}$ Samsung has a CEO.)

Here, the gender of the determiner follows the gender of the common noun: 'Unternehmen' is neuter, 'Elektronikhersteller' is masculine. Note that in German, the noun 'Samsung' *can* be combined with determiners and modifiers, but only when used to convey a *non-metalinguistic* property, as in the following two sentences:

- Manche Samsungs verkaufen sich gut.
  (Some Samsungs sell well. Intended interpretation: Some Samsung products sell well.)
- Siemens ist das deutsche Samsung.
  (Siemens is the German Samsung/the Samsung of Germany.)

In the first sentence, 'Samsung' is pluralized and metonymically conveys the non-metalinguistic property of being a product manufactured by Samsung. In the second sentence, 'Samsung' is combined with the neuter definite article 'das' and is used metaphorically–roughly, to convey the non-metalinguistic property of resembling Samsung (in some relevant way). At least the second use would also be common in English. (See also 5.2.1.)

It is not clear *why* metalinguistic count-noun-uses are not readily available for company/brand names, different, e.g., from personal names. One possible explanation would go as follows: it is common for personal names, but not for company/brand names, to have more than one bearer. Also, predicate terms are usually only introduced to express properties that are exemplified by more than one object: e.g., there are no predicate terms in natural languages for haecceities or for tropes.[223] Accordingly, there are no predicate terms to express the property of bearing a particular company/brand name.[224] The explanation might have to be further refined. E.g., as we saw, company/brand names with more than one bearer (such as 'Apple' or 'Dove') seem to have no metalinguistic count-noun-uses. And personal names with only one bearer might still have metalinguistic count-noun-uses: e.g., the sentence 'Yesterday, I met a Mary Miller-Jones' contains a metalinguistic count-noun-use of 'Mary Miller-Jones' (combined with an indefinite article), but the sentence is admissible irrespective of the question whether the name 'Mary Miller-

[223] Roughly, the haecceity of an object is the property of the object to be *that very object*. Tropes are properties relativized to objects; trope theorists would typically suggest that for all objects *x* and all properties *P* of *x*, there is a trope that consists of the instance of *P* possessed by *x* and only by *x*.

[224] By 'predicate terms', we mean *non-compositional* predicates. Of course, natural languages have *compositional* predicates expressing properties that are exemplified by only one object: e.g., the uniquely exemplified property of having invented the lightning bulb is expressed by the compositional English predicate 'having invented the lightning bulb'. The same holds for the property of being a company named *N*, as expressed by the compositional English predicate 'being a company named *N*'.

Jones' has more than one bearer–it may well have just one. To account for this, the principle that predicate terms are introduced only for names with more than one bearer would have to be applied in a more coarse-grained manner. For one proposal, let us classify names based on the *object categories* that their bearers belong to–categories such as *person*, *place*, *company*, or *brand*; call the resulting classes of names *category-classes*. Then, the proposal would say that metalinguistic count-noun-uses are admissible for all names belonging to a category-class in which *many* names have more than one bearer (such as the class of personal names); and they are inadmissible for all names belonging to a category-class in which *only few* names have more than one bearer (such as the classes of company or brand names). We leave it as an open question whether there are alternative, more promising explanations.

4.5.2) Names Where Metalinguistic Uses Are Uncommon

Next, let us turn to names where metalinguistic uses might be admissible, but are still uncommon. As a case in point, take names that consist of capitalized common count noun phrases: 'Museum of Modern Art', 'French Revolution', 'Siege of Vienna', 'German Democratic Republic', 'Red Square', 'Oval Office', etc. All these names have the form of common count noun phrases, with the common count nouns 'museum', 'revolution', 'siege', 'republic', 'square', and 'office' as phrasal heads; but different from ordinary uses of common noun phrases, they capitalize common nouns and adjectives ('modern', 'democratic', etc.). Such names show the same syntactic behavior as common count nouns, including the last two lines of the Sloat chart (e.g., the name 'Museum of Modern Art' cannot be used as a bare singular: *'Museum of Modern Art is in Manhattan', but has to be combined with the definite article: 'The Museum of Modern Art is in Manhattan'). However, consider the content of such names in the remaining lines of the Sloat chart, that is, when they do not occur as unmodified singulars. E.g., take variations of the plural occurrences in lines 4 and 8:

- Some **museums of modern art** own Picasso paintings.
- **Museums of modern art** typically own Picasso paintings.

We use boldface to indicate that we leave it open whether the common nouns in these phrases are capitalized or not. Upon hearing these sentences, the most natural interpretation of the phrase '**museums of modern art**' would be non-metalinguistic: that is, as conveying the non-metalinguistic property of being a museum of modern art (a museum exhibiting modern art), not the metalinguistic property of being a bearer of the name 'Museum of Modern Art'. Similarly, the sentence 'The **museum of modern art** in London is not called 'Museum of Modern Art', but 'Tate Gallery of Modern Art'' does not 'sound' contradictory–different from analogous sentences that use proper nouns, such as 'The Steve in my class is not called 'Steve''.

To be sure, in *some* contexts there are ways of indicating that we use a common noun phrase NP to convey the property of bearing NP as a name. Consider two types of contexts. First, there are contexts where the remainder of a sentence/utterance suggests that a phrase is used to convey a name-bearing property. Assume someone says, 'Many **museums of modern art** actually do not exhibit modern art, but contemporary art': here, the content of the remaining sentence suggests that '**museums of modern art**' is used to convey the property of being a bearer of the name 'Museum of Modern Art', not the

property of being a museum exhibiting modern art. For a second type of context, English orthography allows us to indicate in writing that we intend to convey a metalinguistic property with a common noun phrase, namely by capitalizing the phrase (resp. the common nouns and adjectives used by the phrase). When we write 'Museums of Modern Art typically own Picasso paintings', the capitalization of 'Museums of Modern Art' indicates that the phrase is, again, used to convey the property of being a bearer of the name 'Museum of Modern Art', not the property of being a museum exhibiting modern art. Still, the capitalized/uncapitalized distinction does not apply to *spoken* English, where we do not have a compatibly safe way of indicating that an expression is used to convey a metalinguistic content. The closest we get is the use of air quotes, but the analogy between capitalization and air quotes has its limits. E.g., air quotes are typically not used when uttering a name *referentially* (which distinguishes air quotes from capitalization). E.g., when we say, 'The **museum of modern art** owns many Picasso paintings', we use the phrase '**museum of modern art**' as a name of the Museum of Modern Art, New York, and we will usually not add air quotes to my utterance of the phrase. So, if spoken uses of common noun phrases were metalinguistic only if supplemented by air quotes, then spoken *referential* uses of common noun phrases would not be metalinguistic, including cases where the phrase is used as a name; which contradicts the metalinguistic analysis of apparent referential name-uses by predicativists.

In the overview of predicative name-uses presented in the next chapter (in 5.2), we will encounter further examples of names used as count nouns where a non-metalinguistic interpretation is more natural than a metalinguistic one.

Looking back at chapter 4, we add a disclaimer. Our objections against predicativism were largely based on specific counterexamples–from English, but also from languages like Italian, Catalan, and German. Even if those objections are successful, they do not rule out that the different components of predicativism–the predicativist classification, syntactic analysis, paraphrase, and interpretation of names–work at least for *some* occurrences of *some* names in *some* languages. In particular, they *do* work for a wide range of name-occurrences in English: e.g., they typically work for English personal names that consist of proper nouns or proper nouns phrases, at least on standard occurrences including apparent referential uses in argument position ('Mary is a friend of mine') and apparent predicative uses as metalinguistic count nouns (I know two Marys'). Still, our counterexamples show that the predicativist account of names is not as simple and uniform as advertised. The next chapter–over the course of sketching a comprehensive account of predicative name-uses–will add further counterexamples against predicativism, but will also develop more general objections, suggesting that the differences between names and common count nouns outweigh their similarities.

5) Using Names as Predicates

The previous chapter presented the first part of our critique of predicativism. In this chapter, we turn to an account of apparent predicative uses of names. Here, we in part extend the critique, and in part look at predicative name-uses as a subject in its own right.

Let us briefly take stock. As we saw in section 2.4, predicativism is motivated by the observation that names can be used predicatively to convey metalinguistic properties: the use of the name 'Mary' in 'There is a Mary in my class' conveys the metalinguistic property of being a bearer of the name 'Mary'.[225] Also, predicativists would typically go one step further and argue that metalinguistic properties constitute the *literal* content (or at least *a* literal content) of names, and that names express this content also on apparent *referential* uses: the name 'Mary', e.g., would literally express the property of being a bearer of the name 'Mary' even when 'Mary' is used as subject argument ('Mary is smart') or as object argument ('I like Mary').

Critics of predicativism in part agree and in part disagree. They typically agree that *some* predicative name-uses literally express metalinguistic properties, but they argue that not *all* do, and they argue that this phenomenon sets names apart from other kinds of nouns or noun phrases. To substantiate these claims, they would point to apparent predicative name-uses that convey *non-metalinguistic* properties. E.g., take the sentence 'Maria Shriver is a Kennedy': the sentence can be used to convey that Maria Shriver is a bearer of the name 'Kennedy', but it can also be used to convey that Maria Shriver is a member of the Kennedy family. Under the second interpretation, the name 'Kennedy' conveys a non-metalinguistic property: the property of being a member of the Kennedy family. In fact, the sentence is true only under the second interpretation: Maria Shriver is part of the Kennedy family via her mother, a sister of JFK; but she is not a bearer of the name 'Kennedy', as she bears the surname of her father, Sargent Shriver.[226] Or take the sentence 'Both of my *Anna Kareninas* are pretty torn'. Typically, this sentence would not be used to convey that both of my bearers of the name '*Anna Karenina*' are pretty torn, but rather that both of my *copies* of the novel *Anna Karenina* are pretty torn.[227]

In what follows, we will look at the variety of apparent predicative name-uses and ultimately side with the critics of predicativism. In this context, we will often focus on predicative name-uses that express *non-metalinguistic* properties, or 'non-metalinguistic predicative name-uses', as we will say for short. Also, special attention will be given to names that are proper nouns or proper noun phrases. Here is an overview of the chapter. 5.1 introduces some conceptual and terminologies preliminaries. 5.2 has a closer look at uses of names as count nouns, or *count-noun-uses* for short. 5.3 lists additional types of predicative name-uses, focusing on uses of names as mass nouns, verbs, and adjectives. Finally, 5.4 discusses different proposals for the *analysis* of predicative name-uses, among them predicativism and the type-ambiguity view.

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[225] Let us formalize the predicative use of '(being a) Mary' in the sense of '(being a) bearer of the name 'Mary'' as 'M', and the predicate '(being) in my class' as 'C'. Then, the sentence 'There is a Mary in my class' becomes '$\exists x(\mathrm{M}x \wedge \mathrm{C}x)$'. So, 'M' ('Mary') is predicated of x and thereby ascribes to x the property conveyed by 'M', that is, the property of being a bearer of the name 'Mary'.

[226] For the example, see Jeshion 2015a, 238. For the difference between metalinguistic name-uses and name-uses to convey membership in a family, see already Polle 1898, 101 (on 'Schulzes').

[227] For a similar example, see Jeshion 2015a, 247f.

One caveat: for simplicity, this chapter often speaks of *name*-uses when it should speak of *apparent* name-uses or, even more cautiously, of uses of expressions that are *homophonous* with names. It might well turn out that some–or all–predicative 'name-uses' are not in fact uses of names, but uses of predicates that are merely *derived* from homophonous names. (See 5.4.)

5.1) Conceptual and Terminological Preliminaries

Before we begin, let us insert a few notes on terminology. First, we frequently speak of *derivations*: specifically, we say that one use of an expression is derived from a different use of the same or some other expression. Consider the example of 'Champagne' that we will encounter below: originally, 'Champagne' is used as a name for a region in France; from that use, we derive the use of 'champagne' as a mass noun, referring to a type of sparkling wine from the Champagne region (as in 'I've never drunk champagne'); and from that use, we derive the use of 'champagne' as a count noun, ranging over different sorts of the wine (as in 'All champagnes I've tried were dry', meaning that all sorts of champagne I've tried were dry).[228]

The example illustrates two ways to partition the set of derivations: first, we distinguish between *direct* and *indirect* derivations, second between *synchronic* and *diachronic* derivations. Direct and indirect derivations will be defined as follows:

- For all expressions e and e^*, all uses u of e^*, and all uses u^* of e^*:
  - u is directly derived from u^* iff u is derived from u^*, and there is no use u^{**} s.t. u is derived from u^{**}, and u^{**} is derived from u^*.
  - u is indirectly derived from u^* iff u is derived from u^*, but not directly.

E.g., from the name-use of 'Champagne', we directly derive the mass-noun-use of 'champagne'; and from the mass-noun-use, we directly derive the count-noun-use of 'champagne'; thereby, the count-noun-use of 'champagne' is indirectly derived from the name-use of 'Champagne'.

Second, let us define synchronic and diachronic derivations:

- For all expressions e and e^*, all uses u of e^*, and all uses u^* of e^*:
  - for all times t: u is at t synchronically derived from u^* iff $u \neq u^*$, and at t, the existence of u is grounded in the existence of u^*;
  - u is diachronically derived from u^* iff $u \neq u^*$, and at the time when u came into existence, u was either synchronically derived from u^* or part of the motivation to introduce u was that u^* already existed.

Importantly, diachronic derivation does not entail synchronic derivation, nor vice versa. Consider again the champagne-example: the mass-noun-use of 'champagne' for the wine is diachronically, but not synchronically, derived from the name-use of 'Champagne' for the region. Specifically, the wine is *named after* the region–so, part of the motivation to introduce the mass-noun-use of 'champagne' for the type of wine was that the wine originated from a region that was already called 'Champagne'. Today, however, the mass-noun-use of 'champagne' for the wine is arguably no longer grounded in the name-use of 'Champagne' for the region: even if we renamed the region and no longer called it 'Champagne', we might still continue to call the wine 'champagne'. By contrast, the count-noun-use of 'champagne' for sorts of champagne is synchronically, but not diachronically,

[228] On the shift from mass nouns to count nouns (citing the example of 'wines' in the sense of 'sorts of wine'), see Chierchia 2010, 106.

derived from the mass-noun-use of ‘champagne’ for champagne. To see why, consider that English seems to contain the following rule **R**:[229]

R A mass noun that refers to a type of beverage can generally also be used as a count noun for sorts (or subtypes) of that type.

Rule **R** is illustrated by nouns like ‘champagne’ or ‘Chardonnay’, but also by common mass nouns like ‘wine’, ‘brandy’, or ‘milk’ (‘The supermarket sells only two milks: cow milk and goat milk’). So, the mere existence of the mass-noun-use of ‘champagne’, together with **R**, grounds the existence of the count-noun-use of ‘champagne’. Or more naturally: the mere fact that we use ‘champagne’ as a mass noun for a type of beverage allows us to use ‘champagne’ also as a count noun for different sorts of that beverage. By contrast, the mass-noun-use of ‘champagne’ does not historically precede the count-noun-use, so the count-noun-use is not diachronically derived from the mass-noun-use; rather, by introducing ‘champagne’ as a mass noun for champagne, English speakers already implicitly introduced ‘champagne’ as a count noun for *sorts* of champagne, simply because English contains rule **R**.

Finally, throughout this chapter, we will use the notion of *designated name-bearers*, to be relativized to predicative name-uses. Roughly, the designated bearer of a predicative use of a name *N* is the bearer of *N* that is ‘closest’ in the derivational history of the predicative use. E.g., the designated name-bearer of the mass noun use of ‘champagne’ for a particular type of wine is the French region of Champagne. More precisely, we define the notion as follows:

- For all *x*, all names *N*, and all predicative uses *u* of *N*:
  - *x* is a designated bearer of *u* iff there is a use *u** of *N* s.t. *x* is a bearer of *N*; *u** refers to *x*; *u* is derived from *u**; and there is no $y \neq x$ s.t. for some use *u*** of *N*: *y* is a bearer of *N*; *u*** refers to *y*; *u* is derived from *u***; and *u*** is derived from *u**.

For illustration, take again the three uses of ‘Champagne’/‘champagne’ (for simplicity, we set aside that the first use is distinguished from the other two by capitalization). It would seem that the count-noun-use of ‘champagne’ is directly derived *only* from the mass-noun-use of ‘champagne’, which in turn is directly derived *only* from the use of ‘Champagne’ for the region. Now, assume the region in France is a bearer of the name ‘Champagne’ while the type of wine is not; in that case, the only designated bearer of the count-noun-use of ‘champagne’ will be the region. By contrast, assume the wine is a bearer of the name ‘champagne’ as well; in that case, the only designated bearer of the count-noun-use of ‘champagne’ will be the wine.

5.2) Uses of Names as Count Nouns

In this section, we provide a detailed list of different types of count-noun-uses of names, numbered **(1-30)**. We call types **(1-20)** *primary* count-noun-uses, and types **(21-30)** *secondary* count-noun-uses: the main differences between the two is that primary count-noun-uses are more *productive* than secondary count-noun-uses.

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[229] In fact, rule **R** is an instance of the even more general principle called ‘universal sorter’ in linguistics. (See Bunt 1985, 11. ‘Universal packager’ and ‘universal packer’ can also be found.) Analogous examples include the count-noun-use of paradigm mass nouns, such as ‘milk’, ‘meat’, ‘art’, or ‘virtue’. E.g., ‘a milk’ (with an indefinite article) and ‘milks’ (in the plural) range over different types of milk: cow milk, goat milk, etc. ‘A meat’ and ‘meats’ range over different types of meat: beef, pork, etc. ‘An art’ and ‘arts’ range over different types of art, specifically different art *forms*: music, sculpture, film, etc. ‘A virtue’ and ‘virtues’ range over different types of virtue: prudence, fortitude, etc.

Less extensive lists are found in the literature: e.g., Payne/Huddleston (2002) mention our types **(1)**, **(3)**, **(4)**, and **(14)**.[230] Further lists and attempts at a systematization are found, e.g., in Jespersen (1914: 80-83; 1924: 69), Gardiner (1957 [1954]: 11-15), and Kalverkämper (1978: 326-362).

Here is an overview of this section. 5.2.1 begins with types **(1-4)** that are perhaps most prominent in the literature on count-noun-uses. 5.2.2 then turns to types **(5-20)** that we subsume under three broader categories. 5.2.3 offers a more general evaluation of types **(1-20)**. 5.2.4 discusses types **(21-30)** that are less relevant to our discussion, and where a general classification is harder to attain. Finally, 5.2.5 adds some crosslinguistic evidence for count-noun-uses.

For the most part, we focus on names that are proper nouns or proper noun phrases, and on their *non-metalinguistic* count-noun-uses. Note that our classification of count-noun-uses as *name*-uses is merely preliminary: some (perhaps all) of the uses we present might have ceased to be names and taken on an existence as independent lexical items: as count nouns in their own right. We return to this question in section 5.4.

Finally, note that in the context of count-noun-uses, we set the name-uses discussed in 4.4.2.2 aside: that is, name-uses that have been interpreted as ranging over spatiotemporal stages or manifestations of a particular name-bearer (we spoke of name-uses in *internally restrictive phrases*). Take the following sentences:

a) In Cambridge, we met a Wittgenstein whose health had severely deteriorated.
b) The *Philosophical Investigations* were written by an even more radical Wittgenstein than the *Tractatus*.
c) I like both Wittgensteins: the early Wittgenstein and the later Wittgenstein.

As we saw, some linguists analyze the name 'Wittgenstein' here as a count noun, ranging over stages or aspects of a particular bearer of the name, say, Ludwig Wittgenstein. The count noun analysis is supported by the morphosyntax of 'Wittgenstein' in (a-c): in (a/b), a phrase headed by the name 'Wittgenstein' combines with an indefinite article, and in (c), 'Wittgenstein' is pluralized. Still, we are hesitant to endorse the analysis, mainly because we take it to be dubious whether stage- or manifestation-uses can be interpreted as expressing a property (such as the property of being a spatiotemporal stage of Wittgenstein). Here are two reasons to doubt such an interpretation. First, the interpretation often amounts to a violation of semantic selection restrictions set by verbs. E.g., the verb 'meet' in (a) semantically selects for a theme that is a person, not a spatiotemporal stage of a person: that is, we do not meet *spatiotemporal stages* of Wittgenstein, we meet *Wittgenstein* (at a particular spatiotemporal stage of his existence). Similarly, the verb 'write' in (b) semantically selects for an agent that is a person, not a manifestation of a person: the *Philosophical Investigations* were not written by a *manifestation* of Wittgenstein, but by *Wittgenstein* (while exhibiting certain properties, e.g., the property of being radical). Second, count-noun-uses of names can typically be reformulated as phrases headed by a non-name count noun that clearly expresses a property: 'two Maries' as 'two bearers of the name 'Mary''; 'two Leonardos' as 'two paintings by Leonardo'; 'two little Mozarts' as 'two little prodigies'; etc. By contrast, in the case of the uses of 'Wittgenstein' in (a-c), such reformulations are highly unnatural: e.g., ?'In Cambridge, we met a (spatiotemporal)

[230] See Payne/Huddleston 2002, 520-522. Count-noun-uses of names are there called *secondary uses of proper names*.

stage of Wittgenstein whose health had severely deteriorated'; ?'The *Philosophical Investigations* were written by an even more radical manifestation of Wittgenstein than the *Tractatus*'. In fact, a more natural reformulations of (a-c) would replace the underlined phrase, headed by an apparent *count-noun-use* of 'Wittgenstein', with a phrase headed by an apparent *referential* use of 'Wittgenstein', e.g.:

- In Cambridge, we met Wittgenstein whose health had severely deteriorated/at a time when his health had severely deteriorated.
- The *Philosophical Investigations* were written by Wittgenstein in an even more radical way than the *Tractatus*.
- I like both Wittgensteins: I like Wittgenstein in both phases of his life/philosophy/…

Instead, let us turn to the less dubious count-noun-uses under types **(1-30)**.

5.2.1) Primary Count-Noun-Uses I: Name-Bearing, Family, Creation, Resemblance

We begin with *metalinguistic* count-noun-uses, that is, uses that can be explicated in terms of name-bearing:

1) **Metalinguistic Count-Noun-Uses/Name-Bearing**:
   N is a name, and *N* can convey the property of being a bearer of the name *N*.
   - 'There is a Mary in my class': There is a bearer of the name 'Mary' in my class.
   - 'There are two Maries in my class': There are two bearers of the name 'Mary' in my class.
   - 'Maries tend to be smart': Bearers of the name 'Mary' tend to be smart.
   - 'The Mary in my class is smart': The bearer of the name 'Mary' in my class is smart.
   - 'So far, two George Bushs have been US presidents': So far, two bearers of the name 'George Bush' have been US presidents.
   - 'There is a Venice in Italy and a Venice in California': There is a bearer of the name 'Venice' in Italy and a bearer of the name 'Venice' in California. Or more naturally: There is a city named 'Venice' in Italy and a city named 'Venice' in California.

Here, the conjunction '*N* is a name, and *N* can convey the property of being a bearer of the name *N*' captures the *more abstract form* of metalinguistic count-noun-uses. Note that this form is *not* meant as universally applicable schema. Also, we have offered example sentences and for each sentence an interpretation; the name in the original sentence and the expression replacing the name in the interpretation will both be underlined. The interpretation is meant to capture the *intended* content of typical utterances of each sentence, not necessarily the *semantic* content of the sentence. We will proceed analogously with the remaining types of count-noun-uses.

Let us add three types of *non-metalinguistic* count-noun-uses often highlighted in the literature.[231] We call them *family-uses*, *creation-uses*, and *resemblance-uses*. Resemblance-uses have been discussed in the literature since Frege's paper "Über Begriff und Gegenstand",[232] family-uses since Steven Boer's critique of predicativism,[233] and creation-uses since Geoffrey Nunberg's work on polysemy and meaning transfer.[234] Resemblance-uses resurfaced at the beginning of the debate about direct reference in the 1960s,[235] and again at the beginning of the debate about predicativism in the 1970s.[236]

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[231] See, e.g., Rami 2022, 160-165.
[232] See Frege 1892a, 200 ('Es gibt nur ein Wien', 'Triest ist kein Wien': 'There is only one Vienna', 'Trieste is no Vienna').
[233] See Boer 1975, 390.
[234] See Nunberg 1995, 117 ('a Picasso'); Kolde 1995, 404 ('einen Picasso kaufen'/'to buy a Picasso').
[235] See Barcan Marcus 1961, 309 ('Mao Tse-tung is the Stalin of China').
[236] See Burge 1973, 429 ('George Wallace is a Napoleon').

2) **Family-Uses**:
x is a family/house/dynasty named *N*, and *N* can convey the property of being a member of *x*.
- 'Maria Shriver is a Kennedy': Maria Shriver is a member of the Kennedy family.
- 'Charles III is a Windsor': Charles III is a member of the House of Windsor.
- 'My barber, Joe Romanov, is not a Romanov': My barber, Joe Romanov, is not a member of the House of Romanov.[237]
- But: 'Charles III is a House of Windsor' is not used to convey that Charles III is a member of the House of Windsor.

Family-uses are typically admissible for any name that can also be used as the surname of a person.[238] By contrast, they are typically *not* admissible for names that contain descriptive expressions, such as 'Kennedy family' or 'House of Windsor', where 'House' conveys the property of being a noble house/aristocratic family.

Next, in the case of creation-uses, the name of a person/company is applied to their works/products:

3) **Creation-Uses:**
a) work (artwork, film, book, etc.):[239]
x is a person named *N*, and *N* can convey the property of being a work by *x*.
- 'The National Gallery owns two Leonardos': The National Gallery owns two paintings by Leonardo da Vinci.
- 'Have you watched any Scorseses recently?': Have you watched any films by Martin Scorsese recently?
- 'The Seagram Building in New York is a Mies van der Rohe': The Seagram Building in New York is a building by Mies van der Rohe.
- 'Have you read the last two Chomskys?': Have you read the last two books by Noam Chomsky?
- A borderline case is 'a Stradivarius' in the sense of 'a Stradivari violin' (after luthier Antonio Stradivari, latinized 'Stradivarius').

b) product manufactured by a company:
x is a company named *N*, and *N* can convey the property of being made/manufactured by *x*.
- 'My phone is a Samsung': My phone is a phone made by Samsung.
- 'There is a Ford parked in the driveway': There is a car made by the Ford Motor Company parked in the driveway.
- 'Film noir detectives wear Borsalinos and shoot Barettas': Film noir detectives wear hats made by the company Borsalino and shoot guns made by the company Baretta.
- 'I bought a new Hoover': I bought a new vacuum cleaner made by the company Hoover.
- 'I own two Baedekers': I own two travel guides made by the Baedeker publishing house.
- 'I've never had a Heineken': I've never had a beer made by Heineken.
- Note: 'There is a Ford Motor Company parked in the driveway' is not used to convey that there is a car made by the Ford Motor Company parked in the driveway. 'I'm eating a McDonald's' is not used to convey that I'm eating a burger made by the company McDonald's.

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[237] For a similar Romanov example, see Boer 1975, 390.
[238] Note that we adopt a terminological distinction between *surnames* and *family names* (or *names of families*): surnames are part of personal names and can be used referentially to refer to the persons who bear them (the surname 'Kennedy' can be used to refer to any of its bearers, e.g., to John F. Kennedy). By contrast, family names are names whose bearers are families, not persons. Typically, surnames are also family names, and vice versa. But there are exceptions: e.g., the phrase 'House of Windsor' is a family name (the Windsors), but not a surname (no member of the Windsor family has as their surname the phrase 'House of Windsor'). Also, a person can belong to a family without bearing any name of that family: Maria Shriver belongs to the Kennedy family, but does not bear the name 'Kennedy' (nor any other name of the Kennedy family).
[239] Some of the creation-uses listed here might be less natural in English than their analogues in other languages. E.g., Nunberg (2004: 352) suggests that the only type of fictional books/films that creation-uses can be applied to in English are works of *genre* fiction.

We subsume all these uses under the notion of creation: a painting is created by its painter, and at least to some extent, a film by its director, a building by its designer, and a manufactured product by the company manufacturing it. Note that in the case of works that are not industrially manufactured, the creator whose name is used predicatively is typically the artist or the person who controls the artistic process: e.g., in the case of a film the director, not the producer or production company; and in the case of a building the architect, not the builder or construction company. By contrast, in the case of industrially manufactured products, the creator whose name is used predicatively is typically the company manufacturing the product and not, e.g., an engineer responsible for the product's development. Also, creation-uses of personal names are most common for surnames (see the slight oddity of 'Have you watched any Martin Scorsese recently?'); exceptions include person standardly referred to by their first names ('a Leonardo'). Creation-uses of company names are typically only admissible for names that do not contain descriptive expressions. This excludes names like 'Ford Motor Company', where the phrase 'Motor Company' conveys the property of being a motor company/car manufacturer; creation-uses of company names share this feature with family-uses. For a side note on terminology, the uses of names for artworks ('The National Gallery owns two Leonardos') will henceforth be called *artwork-uses*, and the uses of names for manufactured products ('My phone is a Samsung') will be called *manufacturing-uses*.

Finally, in the case of resemblance-uses, the name of an object *x* is applied to objects that resemble *x*. Or more precisely:

4) Resemblance-Uses:
x is named *N*, and *N* can convey the property of resembling *x*, or a property whose exemplification constitutes (or is believed to constitute) resemblance to *x*. Often, resemblance is restricted to contextually relevant properties; for brevity, we will speak of '(contextually) relevant resemblance'.[240]

a) conventionalized uses, e.g.:

- 'bible' (typically lowercased) in the senses of 'sacred scripture' ('The Quran is the bible of Islam') or, more generally, 'authoritative book' ('*Das Kapital* is the bible of communism');
- 'mecca' (typically lowercased) in the sense of 'center' ('Paris and Milan are the meccas of fashion');
- 'adonis'/'apollo' (typically lowercased) in the sense of 'beautiful young man';
- 'Judas' in the sense of 'traitor';
- 'Croesus' in the sense of 'rich man';
- 'Romeo'/'Don Juan'/'Lothario' in the sense of 'womanizer'/'male seducer': derived from the referential uses of the names for Shakespeare's Romeo; the character Don Juan in Tirso de Molina's *El burlador de Sevilla*; and the character Lothario in Nicholas Rowe's *The Fair Penitent*;
- 'Rome' in the sense of 'center of Christianity' ('Moscow is the third Rome');
- 'Venice' in the sense of 'city built into the sea, characterized by canals,…' ('St. Petersburg is the Venice of the north');[241]
- 'Einstein' in the sense of '(scientific) genius' ('My son is a little Einstein');
- 'Mozart' in the senses of 'gifted composer' or 'prodigy' ('My son is a real Mozart').
- Arguably also 'moon' in the sense of 'natural satellite' ('Jupiter's moons'), derived from the referential use of 'Moon' for Earth's natural satellite; 'sun' in the sense of 'star', derived from the referential use of 'Sun' for the star of the Solar System.
- In German: 'Xanthippe' in the sense of 'shrew'.

[240] For the notion of relevant resemblance/relevant similarity, see Boer 1975, 399. See also Graff Fara 2015b, 262.
[241] For a similar Venice example, see von Heusinger 2010, 108.

b) non-conventionalized uses can be generated for any name, e.g.:

- (Your friend Lena has a daughter, Mary, who looks just like her mother. You say:) 'Mary is a little Lena': Mary is a child that relevantly resembles Lena. Or: that looks like Lena.[242]
- 'Berlusconi was an Italian Trump': Berlusconi was an Italian who relevantly resembled Donald Trump. Or: who was a right-wing populist politician/real estate billionaire/TV personality/…
- (You see a man with messy curly hair and say:) 'He's a real Einstein': He's someone who relevantly resembles Albert Einstein. Or: someone who has messy curly hair.

Resemblance-uses seem to be admissible for almost any name. The example about Einstein's hair shows that even names with a conventionalized resemblance-use can in some contexts adopt different, non-conventionalized resemblance-uses. Also, the dichotomy between conventionalized and non-conventionalized uses is a simplification–more realistically, we would have to distinguish different *degrees* of conventionalization. Arguably, the uses of 'bible' in the sense of 'sacred scripture' or of 'mecca' or in the sense of 'center' are *more* conventionalized than the uses of 'Einstein' in the sense of 'genius' or of 'Mozart' in the sense of 'prodigy': consequently, the two former uses are included in a dictionary like *Merriam-Webster's*, while the two latter are not.

Note that resemblance-uses are often part of idiomatic constructions, e.g.:

- article + numeral + name: Mendelssohn was a second Mozart; Moscow is the third Rome;
- article + adjective phrase + name: Berlusconi was the Italian Trump; Einstein was a modern Newton; My son is a real/little Einstein; OpenAI is the new Apple; OpenAI will be the next Apple;
- definite article + name + 'of'-phrase: Einstein was the Newton of the 20th century; Bolsonaro is the Trump of the tropics; St. Petersburg is the Venice of the north.
- possessive + name: Every detective needs his Doctor Watson.

Closely related to resemblance-uses are conventionalized count-noun-uses like the following:

- 'odyssey' (lowercased) in the sense of 'long, difficult journey' ('Today's journey was an odyssey'):
  The resemblance is not to the designated bearer of the name '*Odyssey*' (that is, the Homeric epic), but to the story it narrates.
- 'Waterloo' in the sense of 'decisive defeat' ('Stalingrad was a second Waterloo', 'Stalingrad was Hitler's Waterloo'):
  The resemblance is not to the designated bearer of the name 'Waterloo' (that is, the Belgian hamlet of Waterloo), but to the Battle of Waterloo (which can be metonymically referred to as 'Waterloo', as in 'Waterloo was Napoleon's last battle').
- 'Watergate' in the sense of 'grave political scandal' ('The Lewinsky scandal was a second Watergate'):[243]
  The resemblance is to the Watergate scandal, not to the Watergate Hotel in DC after which the scandal is named. It is unclear whether either the scandal or the hotel are *bearers* of the name 'Watergate', though both can be *referred* to with the name ('Watergate was the scandal that brought down Nixon'; in the case of the hotel, we have to add a definite article: 'The Watergate is a hotel in DC').
- 'Machiavelli' in the sense of 'cunning power politician' ('Nixon was a real Machiavelli'):
  The resemblance is not to the designated bearer of the name 'Machiavelli' (that is, Niccolò Machiavelli), but to the type of politician advertised in Machiavelli's *Il Principe*.[244]

5.2.2) Primary Count-Noun-Uses: Instantiation, Representation, Versions

More recent work, especially by Delia Graff Fara and Robin Jeshion,[245] has pointed to further non-metalinguistic count-noun-uses. In the remainder of this section, we provide an extensive list of such types, numbered **(5-30)**. They will range from very common to

[242] The example is based on Jeshion 2015a, 238.
[243] For a similar Watergate example, see Jeshion 2015a, 247f.
[244] This speaks against Graff Fara's classification of the Machiavelli-example with other resemblance-uses (Graff Fara 2015b, 265).
[245] See Graff Fara 2015b; Jeshion 2015a.

more obscure and isolated uses. Types **(5-20)** will be grouped under three broader categories that we call **Instantiation**, **Representation**, and, for lack of a better term, **Versions** (of a text or a work of art). These categories are somewhat artificial, and there is some overlap between them, but they are nonetheless suited to providing a rough structure. The remaining count-noun-uses **(21-30)** are not easily subsumed under any more general categories and will be addressed in 5.2.4. Note that types **(6)**, **(8)**, **(9)**, **(14)**, **(17)**, **(20)**, **(22)**, and **(27)** can be found in Graff Fara and Jeshion (see the footnotes below).

First, in the case of **Instantiation**, the name of some *x* is applied to instances of *x*. The two most obvious cases of **Instantiation** are names of time periods ('April', 'Monday', 'Christmas') and of brands ('Kleenex', 'Marlboro'). Arguably, the month of April is a type of time period instantiated by the Aprils of each year: April 2025, April 2024, etc.; the brand Kleenex is instantiated by the individual Kleenex tissues. With some lenience, we can also count retail chains, restaurant chains, etc., as being instantiated by their individual stores/branches. This gives us:

Instantiation:

5) Time period:
x is a type of time period named *N*, and *N* can convey the property of being a time period instantiating *x*. Typically, *x* is a month, day of the week, or holiday.

- 'The last two Mondays/Aprils were especially cold'.
- 'We had a wonderful Christmas this year, but the two Christmases before that were awful'.

6) Product of a brand:
x is a brand named *N*, and *N* can convey the property of being a product instantiating the brand *x*.

- 'My grandma smoked Marlboros': My grandma smoked cigarettes of the brand Marlboro (by the company Philip Morris International).
- 'Can you give me a Kleenex?': Can you give me a tissue of the brand Kleenex (by Kimberly-Clark)?
- 'She's carrying a Birkin': She's carrying a bag of the brand Birkin (by Hermès).
- 'He plays a Les Paul': He plays a guitar of the brand Les Paul (by Gibson).[246]
- Common also with car models and branded drugs in pill form:
  - 'O. J. Simpson fled in a white Bronco': O. J. Simpson fled in a white car of the model (Ford) Bronco.
  - 'I took a Xanax/Valium/an Adderall/Ambien': I took a pill of the brand Xanax/Valium/Adderall/Ambien.

7) Branch/store of a chain:
x is a retail/restaurant chain named *N*, and *N* can convey the property of being a branch/store belonging to *x*.

- 'I went to a Subway, a McDonald's, two Home Depots, and one Walmart': I went to a Subway branch, a McDonald's branch, two Home Depot branches, and one Walmart branch.

In what follows, the count-noun-uses of temporal names under **(5)** will be called *time-uses*.

Next, in the case of **Representation**, the name of an object is applied to persons/objects representing the object. With a nod to Goodman,[247] we conceive a representation of *x* as an act that refers to *x* and ascribes properties to *x*, representing *x as* having certain properties. By extension, a representation of *x* may also be the *product* of such an act: a text

[246] See Graff Fara 2015b, 271f.
[247] See Goodman 1968, 27f.

about *x*, a painting depicting *x*, etc. E.g., a portrait of a person is a non-linguistic way of referring to the person and (at least in non-abstract art) ascribing properties to her. Here is a more detailed list:

Representation (typically of a person or physical object):

8) Visual depiction:

x is a bearer of *N*, and *N* can convey the property of being a depiction/portrait/… of *x*.

- 'There are two Churchills in the National Portrait Gallery': There are two depictions/portraits of Churchill in the National Portrait Gallery.[248]
- 'Donatello made two Davids': Donatello made two depictions of David/sculptures depicting David.

9) Performer/impersonator/costume wearer:

x is a bearer of *N*, and *N* can convey the property of performing the role of *x*, impersonating *x*, or wearing a costume that represents *x*.

- 'Ben Kingsley was a great Ghandi': Ben Kingsley was a great performer of the role of Ghandi/was great at portraying Ghandi.
- 'Laurence Olivier was a great Hamlet': Laurence Olivier was a great performer of the role of Hamlet.
- 'Jamie Foxx is one of the best Trumps': Jamie Foxx is one of the best impersonators of Trump.
- (You are at a costume party where people dress as US presidents. The host says:) 'There are three Obamas in the kitchen': There are three people disguised as Obama in the kitchen.[249]

10) Portrayal/impersonation:

x is a bearer of *N*, and *N* can convey the property of being a portrayal/performance or impersonation of *x*.

- 'Ben Kingsley's Ghandi won him an Oscar': Ben Kingsley's portrayal of Ghandi won him an Oscar.
- 'Laurence Olivier's Hamlet was one of the greatest Hamlets ever': Laurence Olivier's portrayal of Hamlet was one of the greatest portrayals of Hamlet ever.
- 'Jamie Foxx does a hilarious Trump': Jamie Foxx does a hilarious impersonation of Trump.

11) Costume/disguise:

x is a bearer of *N*, and *N* can convey the property of being a costume/disguise that represents *x*.

- (At a costume party, you say to two people dressed as Obama:) 'My Biden is better than your Obamas': My Biden costume is better than your Obama costumes.

12) Literary depiction:

x is a bearer of *N*, and *N* can convey the property of being a literary depiction of *x*.

- 'Shakespeare's Caesar is one of the most complex Caesars in literature': Shakespeare's depiction of Caesar is one of the most complex depictions of Caesar in literature.

13) Interpretation:

x is a bearer of *N*, and *N* can convey the property of being an interpretation of *x* (or the works/actions/… of *x*).

- 'Kripke's Wittgenstein sparked a lot of controversy': Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein sparked a lot of controversy.

Finally, under the category **Versions**, the name of an object is applied to (very roughly speaking) versions of the object; typically, the object will be a text or a work of art. As in the case of **Representation**, the notion of a version is meant to cover a range of phenomena: e.g., in the case of texts, it is meant to cover their prints, translations, screen adaptations, etc.; in the case of musical pieces, their renditions and recordings; and so on. Let us distinguish three main cases. In the first case, the object in question is abstract and is

[248] For a similar example (about busts of composers), see Jeshion 2015a, 240.
[249] For a similar example (about Bin Laden), see Jeshion 2015a, 240.

'manifested'[250] by concrete objects: e.g., books or newspaper issues can be conceived as abstract sequences of linguistic expressions that are manifested by concrete prints; similarly for stage plays that are manifested by concrete performances; musical pieces can be conceived as abstract sequences of sound types that are manifested by concrete renditions/performances; etc. In a second case, the object is abstract, and its versions are abstract as well: think of translations of a text, settings of a text to music, productions of stage plays (manifested by the individual performances of the production), arguably also screen adaptations of books/plays/etc. In a third case, the object is concrete, and its versions are concrete as well: here, we mainly think of works of the visual arts and their replicas. Again, let us provide a more detailed list:

Versions (typically of a text or artifact):

14) Copy/print:
x is a text/musical score/film/newspaper issue/etc. titled *N*, and *N* can convey the property of being a copy/print of *x*.

- 'I own two *Anna Kareninas*, one Bible, and three Qurans': I own two copies/prints of *Anna Karenina*, one copy/print of the Bible, and three copies/prints of the Quran.
- (You walk into a shop selling musical scores and say:) 'I need two *Don Giovannis*': I need two musical scores of *Don Giovanni* (more precisely: two prints of the musical score of *Don Giovanni*).
- (A cinema owner says:) 'We lost one of our *Citizen Kanes*': We lost one of our prints/film reels of *Citizen Kane*.
- (The owner of a DVD shop says:) 'I sold two *Citizen Kanes* today': I sold two *Citizen Kane* DVDs today.
- 'There were two *Vogues*/*Guardians* in the letterbox today': There were two prints of (an issue of) *Vogue*/*The Guardian* in the letterbox today.

15) Production/performance of a work of the dramatic arts:
x is a work of the dramatic arts titled *N*, and *N* can convey the property of being a production/performance of *x*.

- 'I've seen two *Hamlets*/*Fidelios*': I've seen two productions/performances of *Hamlet*/*Fidelio*.

16) Rendition/recording of a musical piece:
x is a musical piece titled *N*, and *N* can convey the property of being a rendition/recording of *x*.

- 'Karajan's *Norma* is better than both his *Fidelios*': Karajan's rendition/recording of *Norma* is better than both his renditions/recordings of *Fidelio*.

17) Translation:
x is a text titled *N*, and *N* can convey the property of being a translation of *x*.

- 'Lattimore's *Iliad* is one of the best *Iliads* in English': Lattimore's translation of the *Iliad* is one of the best translations of the *Iliad* in English.[251]

18) Screen adaptation:
x is a text titled *N*, and *N* can convey the property of being a screen adaptation of *x*.

- 'Two *Anna Kareninas* have been produced in Hollywood, one in 1948, the other in 2012': Two screen adaptations of *Anna Karenina* have been produced in Hollywood, one in 1948, the other in 2012.

19) Setting of a text to music:
x is a text titled *N*, and *N* can convey the property of being a setting of *x* to music.

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[250] Our use of 'manifestation' in this context should not lead to a confusion of the count-noun-uses under **Versions** with von Heusinger's 'manifestation-uses' that we mentioned in 2.7.2, 4.4.2.2, and at the beginning of 5.2 (and where manifestations of an object roughly consist of the object *under a particular guise* or *as exhibiting a particular property*).
[251] For a similar example (about *Anna Karenina*), see Jeshion 2015a, 247f.

- ‘Gounod and Busoni each composed a *Faust*’: Gounod and Busoni each composed a setting of Goethe’s *Faust*.
- ‘Bach and Mozart each composed a Gloria’: Bach and Mozart each composed a setting of the Gloria.

20) Replica/forgery:
x is a bearer of *N* (typically a work of the visual arts titled *N*), and *N* can convey the property of being a replica/forgery of *x*.

- (A shop sells copies of famous paintings and sculptures. The vendor says:) ‘We still have two *Mona Lisas*, but the *Davids* are all sold out’: We still have two replicas of the *Mona Lisa*, but the replicas of the *David* are all sold out.
- (The police arrest an art forger and say:) ‘We found several *Mona Lisas* in his studio’: We found several forgeries of the *Mona Lisa* in his studio.

The categories we distinguished are not always neatly separated. Especially, there is some overlap between **Representation** and **Versions**: e.g., we subsumed the performance of stage roles under **Representation**, but they would also fit under **Versions** where we classified the performance of stage plays. Also, some of the uses under **Representation** and **Versions** could be grouped together under a new category, **Imitation**: e.g., impersonations, costumes, and portraits that we classified under **Representation** typically imitate the object/person they represent, and similarly for replicas and forgeries of artworks that we classified under **Versions**.

As we said at the beginning of this section, our list of count-noun-uses of names is not meant to be exhaustive. Let us briefly mention one type of count-noun-uses that we omitted: the use of country names in phrases like ‘the two Koreas’ or ‘the two Germanys’. At first glance, such uses are analogous to the stage-uses we encountered in 2.7.2 and 4.4.2.2. Still, it is not entirely evident what the semantic contribution of such count-noun-uses is: e.g., do they range over ‘spatiotemporal parts’ of the respective country or, alternatively, over states (‘state’ in the political sense) that represent the country (or part thereof)? Take ‘the two Germanys’, which is typically used as an incomplete description for, roughly speaking, the two Germanys during the German division. Does the count-noun-use of ‘Germany’ here range over spatiotemporal parts of Germany, including East and West Germany during the German division–two temporally coextensive, but spatially distinct parts of Germany? Or does it range over states that represent Germany, including the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany–two states that are neither temporally nor spatially coextensive (the former has been dissolved, the latter continues to exist)? We leave this question open.[252]

[252] For a more difficult case, consider the phrase ‘the two Sicilies’ (Italian ‘le due Sicilie’). Originally, the phrase was used to refer to two medieval/early modern kingdoms each of which was called ‘Kingdom of Sicily’ (‘Regno di Sicilia’). However, only one of them was located on the island of Sicily. The other one–unofficially called ‘Kingdom of Naples’–covered the south of mainland Italy and was the remnant of a kingdom that had originally spanned both the island after which it was named, and the rest of southern Italy. Sometimes, the mainland kingdom was called ‘Sicily on this side of the lighthouse’ and the island kingdom ‘Sicily on the other side of the lighthouse’ (Latin ‘Sicilia citra et ultra Farum’), referring to the lighthouse of Messina at the strait between Sicily and mainland Italy. In the 19th century, the two kingdoms were united under the name ‘Kingdom of the Two Sicilies’ (‘Regno delle Due Sicilie’). This allows for several interpretations of the count-noun-use of ‘Sicily’ in ‘the two Sicilies’. Let us consider four such interpretations. First, the count-noun-use might range over *parts* of the designated bearer of the name ‘Sicily’, where that bearer is not the island of Sicily, but rather southern Italy in its entirety, divided into the island part and the mainland part. Second, the count-noun-use might range over *states* representing the designated bearer of the name ‘Sicily’ or part thereof, which again allows for two options: either the

5.2.3) An Evaluation of Primary Count-Noun-Uses

In what follows, the count-noun-uses presented so far under **(1-20)** will be called *primary uses*. Let us add some observations about their main features. We list the following six features:

- **i)** Derivation: most primary count-noun-uses of a name are derived from a referential use of the name for one of its bearers (the designated name-bearer). Exception: **(1)**.
- **ii)** Contribution to content: for most primary count-noun-uses, the designated name-bearer is part of the intended content. Exceptions: some (perhaps all) of the uses under **(4)**.
- **iii)** Productivity: most types of primary count-noun-uses are highly productive, especially for names that consist of proper nouns or proper noun phrases.
- **iv)** Explication: most primary count-noun-uses can be explicated by replacing the name with a longer expression (often a name-noun compound) that uses or mentions the name. Exceptions: some of the uses under **(4)** and **(5)**.
- **v)** Ontological shift: the objects in the extension of a primary count-noun-use typically belong to a different ontological category than the designated name-bearer. Exceptions: **(17)** and **(20)**; **(9)** sometimes, but not always, involves ontological shifts.
- **vi)** Semantic type: primary count-noun-uses are typically of type <e,t>. Exceptions: depending on the complexity of the constructions in which count-noun-uses occur, e.g., some uses under **(4)**.

Ad **(i)**: most primary count-noun-uses of a name are derived from a referential use of the name for one of its bearers. E.g., the use of 'Leonardo' to convey the property of being a painting by Leonardo da Vinci is derived from the referential use of 'Leonardo' for Leonardo da Vinci; the use of the name 'Einstein' to convey the property of being a genius is derived from the referential use of 'Einstein' for Albert Einstein. Most types of count-noun-uses allow for only *one* designated name-bearer per utterance. E.g., a typical utterance of 'The National Gallery owns two Leonardos' (containing an artwork-use of the name 'Leonardo') will imply that there is *one* bearer *x* of the name 'Leonardo' s.t. the National Gallery owns two artworks/paintings by *x*. The utterance will be false, e.g., if the National Gallery owns exactly two paintings by bearers of the name 'Leonardo', but the two bearers are not identical. The exception is **(1)**. Take a sentence like 'I'm not familiar with any Maries'. Clearly, the use of 'Mary' in this sentence is not derived from any referential uses of 'Mary': if the speaker is truthful, then she will not even be aware of any bearers of the name. All she needs to know is that 'Mary' is a personal name, and that personal names can be used to quantify over their bearers.

Ad **(ii)**: for most primary count-noun-uses, the designated name-bearer is part of the intended content. E.g., an artwork-use of the name 'Leonardo' can convey the property of being an artwork/painting by Leonardo da Vinci, in which case the designated bearer (Leonardo da Vinci) is part of the intended content. A family-use of the name 'Windsor' can convey the property of being a member of the House of Windsor, in which case the designated bearer (the House of Windsor) is part of the intended content.

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designated bearer is southern Italy, and the two kingdoms each represent part of that territory (one the island part, the other the mainland part); or the designated bearer is the island of Sicily, and both kingdoms claimed to represent that island, even though only one actually controlled it. Third, the count-noun-use might be *metalinguistic* and range over different bearers of the name 'Sicily': under this interpretation, both the island part and the mainland part were bearers of the name 'Sicily'–the mainland part might have adopted that name by virtue of a reference shift. Under a fourth interpretation, the count-noun-use would metonymically not over different territories/states named *after* the island of Sicily: the island kingdom and the mainland kingdom are each named after the island. We leave it as an open question which of these four options best captures the historical facts. (See also Sakellariou 2012, 63 and ibid., n. 1.)

Exceptions include some (perhaps all) of the uses under **(4)**. First, some resemblance-uses have become conventionalized to an extent that the designated bearer is no longer part of the intended content: this might hold for the resemblance-uses of 'Romeo' in the sense of 'womanizer', of 'adonis' in the sense of 'beautiful young man', etc. The view that the designated bearer of such uses is not part of their intended content is supported by two epistemic observations. First, users of conventionalized resemblance-uses might fail to be aware of the designated bearer: users of 'Romeo' in the sense of 'womanizer' might fail to be aware of Shakespeare's play and its protagonist, users of 'adonis' in the sense of 'beautiful young man' might fail to be aware of the figure from Greek mythology, and so on. Second, users of conventionalized resemblance-uses who are aware of the designated bearer might still believe that the designated bearer does *not* exemplify the property conveyed by the resemblance-use: e.g., I use 'Romeo' in the sense of 'womanizer' despite believing that 'womanizer' has a connotation of insincerity alien to the tragic love of Shakespeare's Romeo.

Still, in some resemblance-uses, the designated name-bearer might well be part of the intended content. Say, you and I agree that both St. Petersburg and Amsterdam are northern cities resembling Venice: like Venice, they are built into the sea, characterized by their canals, etc. However, we disagree about which of the two cities resembles Venice *more*: e.g., according to you, St. Petersburg; according to me, Amsterdam. You convey your view by saying, 'St. Petersburg is the Venice of the north', while I object: 'Amsterdam is the Venice of the north'. Clearly, the intended content of 'Venice' in these utterances is not just the property of being a city built into the sea, characterized by its canals, etc.: you and I agree that this property is exemplified both by St. Petersburg and by Amsterdam, and hence that neither of the two cities is the *only* northern city exemplifying that property. Instead, a plausible way to account for this case would be in terms of the designated bearer of 'Venice': the intended content of 'Venice of the north' might simply be the property of being a northern city that is *most like Venice*. Or a bit more precisely: the property of being an x s.t. x is a northern city and for all y: if y is a northern city, then x resembles Venice at least as much as y does. So, the definite description 'the Venice of the north' would refer to the unique x s.t. x is a northern city and for all y: if y is a northern city, then x resembles Venice at least as much as y does. Analogously for constructions like 'Venice of the east'.

For a more precise statement of the intended content of such resemblance-uses, we will use lambda functions. Also, let us use the following predicates:

- $R(x, y, z)$: x resembles y at least as much as z does;
- Nx: x is in the north/is a northern city;
- Ex: x is in the east/is an eastern city.

Then, the content of 'Venice of the north/of the east' can be stated as follows:

- $\lambda x_e[Nx \wedge \forall y(Ny \wedge \rightarrow R(x, \text{the city of Venice}, y))]$.
- $\lambda x_e[Ex \wedge \forall y(Ey \wedge \rightarrow R(x, \text{the city of Venice}, y))]$.

Also, let us assume that the prepositional phrases 'of the north/east' contribute only the property of being in the north/east, that is, $\lambda x_e[Nx]/\lambda x_e[Ex]$. Then, if we stick to compositional semantics, the content of 'Venice' as occurring in phrases like 'Venice of the north/east' will be:

- $\lambda f_{<e,t>}[\lambda x_e[f(x) = 1 \wedge \forall y(f(y) = 1 \rightarrow R(x, \text{the city of Venice}, y))]]$.[253]

E.g., the content of 'Venice of the north/east' can then be derived by applying the content of 'Venice' to the content of 'north'/'east'. E.g., for 'Venice of the north':

- $\lambda f_{<e,t>}[\lambda x_e[f(x) = 1 \wedge \forall y(f(y) = 1 \rightarrow R(x, \text{the city of Venice}, y))]](\lambda z_e[Nz])$.[254]

By β-reduction, this would give us:

- $\lambda x_e[Nx \wedge \forall y(Ny \wedge \rightarrow R(x, \text{the city of Venice}, y))]$.

A similar analysis can be applied to scenarios where we disagree whether Einstein or Max Planck was the Newton of the 20th century; whether Silvio Berlusconi or Giorgia Meloni is the Italian Trump; or the like. E.g., if we disagree whether Berlusconi or Meloni is the Italian Trump, 'Italian Trump' conveys the property of being an *x* s.t. *x* is Italian and for all *y*: if *y* is Italian, then *x* resembles Trump at least as much as *y* does. So, the intended content of the resemblance-use of 'Trump' as occurring in phrases like 'Italian Trump' could be reconstructed as the function:

- $\lambda f_{<e,t>}[\lambda x_e[f(x) = 1 \wedge \forall y(f(y) = 1 \rightarrow R(x, \text{the person Trump}, x))]]$.

And the content of 'Italian Trump' would be:

- $\lambda f_{<e,t>}[\lambda x_e[f(x) = 1 \wedge \forall y(f(y) = 1 \rightarrow R(x, \text{the person Trump}, y))]](\lambda z_e[Iz])$, where 'I' stands for 'being Italian'.

By β-reduction, this would give us:

- $\lambda x_e[Ix \wedge \forall y(Iy \rightarrow R(x, \text{the person Trump}, y))]$.

Again, resemblance might have to be replaced with contextually relevant resemblance. E.g., we might agree that on balance, Berlusconi resemblances Trump more than Meloni does: Meloni and Trump mainly have in common that they are rightwing populist politicians, while Berlusconi and Trump have in common that they are male, are real estate billionaires, are TV personalities, etc. However, in a context where we are just concerned with politics, the relevant resemblance might consist just in properties that are politics-related; then, we might well disagree whether Berlusconi or Meloni is *politically* more like Trump, and hence whether Berlusconi or Meloni is the Italian Trump.

Ad **(iii)**: most types of primary count-noun-uses are highly productive. For illustration, let us focus on **(1-4)**. First, the vast majority of names allow for uses of type **(4)**, and at least personal and place names allow for uses of type **(1)**. A few exceptions were listed above in section 4.2: think of names that cannot be pluralized, such as the title '*War and Peace*'. Also, the resemblance-uses under **(4)** are more common for *widely known* name-bearers (famous cities, famous persons, etc.), whereas uses as in our 'Lena'-example (involving a *non-famous* name-bearer) seem to be compatibly rare. Types **(2)**, **(3a)**, and **(3b)** are productive at least for family names, personal names, and company names respectively.

(2) and **(3b)** come with further restrictions. Especially, names that contain *descriptive expressions* (or, more cautiously, expressions *derived* from descriptive expressions) typically do not allow for family- or manufacturing-uses. E.g., compare the proper noun 'Windsor' to the phrase 'House of Windsor' which contains the descriptive expression

[253] The notation follows Heim/Kratzer 1998, e.g., 15. Here, '1' stands for the truth value True.

[254] In the notation we use, $\lambda v[A](t)$ is the application of the function $\lambda v[A]$ to the argument *t*. So, e.g., $\lambda v \lambda v[\lambda v^*[A](t^*)](t)$ will involve an application of $\lambda v^*[A]$ to t^*, giving us $\lambda v[A[t^*\backslash v^*]]$ by β-reduction; and an application of $\lambda v[A[t^*\backslash v^*]]$ to *t*. For a similar notation, see Alama/Korbmacher 2024 in sections 1 and 4 (where our '$\lambda v[A](t)$' would be written as '$(\lambda v[A])t$').

'House', here conveying the property of being an aristocratic family. Arguably, both 'Windsor' and 'House of Windsor' are names of the House of Windsor, but while 'Charles III is a Windsor' is admissible, 'Charles III is a House of Windsor' is not. Similarly for 'Ford' and 'Ford Motor Company', containing the descriptive expression 'motor company': both are names of the Ford Motor Company, but while 'There is a Ford parked in the driveway' is admissible, 'There is a Ford Motor Company parked in the driveway' is not. In this respect, family- and manufacturing-uses differ from metalinguistic and resemblance-uses: as a case in point, consider the admissible uses of the name 'Professor Einstein' (with the descriptive expression 'professor') in 'There is a Professor Einstein on the phone' (metalinguistic use) and 'My six-year-old son is a little Professor Einstein' (resemblance-use). For one possible explanation of this difference, family- or manufacturing-uses that contain descriptive expressions 'sound like' or 'evoke' category mistakes: the sentence 'Charles III is a House of Windsor' sounds as if ascribing to a person the category *aristocratic family* or, more generally, the category *family*; 'There is a Ford Motor Company parked in the driveway' sounds as if ascribing to a manufactured product the category *company*. By contrast, calling a person a professor even if they are not does not amount to a category mistake: professors and persons who are not professors share the category *person*. Analogous remarks seem to hold for most other resemblance-uses (e.g., the ones listed under **(4)** above). Still, this explanation is ultimately unsatisfactory. In particular, manufacturing-uses can be classified as metonymic, and metonymies often allow for category mistakes. E.g., we can metonymically use the name of a country's capital to refer to the country's government ('Moscow decided to enter peace talks'), which evokes the category mistake of ascribing the category *place* to a public institution. We will leave it open why family- and manufacturing have this kind of restriction.

Finally, note that in the case of **(3b)**, there are further restrictions. E.g., company names are mostly applied to factory-made products, and only rarely to products made in branches of the company: an individual burger made in a McDonald's branch would not be called 'a McDonald's'.

Ad **(iv)**: most primary count-noun-uses can be explicated by replacing the name with a longer expression (often a name-noun compound) that uses or mentions the name. E.g., metalinguistic count-noun-uses of 'Kennedy(s)' can be replaced with 'bearer(s) of the name 'Kennedy''; family-uses of the name 'Kennedy(s)' can be replaced with 'member(s) of the Kennedy family'; depiction-uses of 'Kennedy(s)' that have John F. Kennedy as their designated bearer can be replaced with 'depiction(s) of (John F.) Kennedy'; etc. Artwork-uses can often be replaced with name-noun compounds where the name is combined with nouns like 'painting': 'a Leonardo' becomes 'a Leonardo painting', etc.

Exceptions include some of the uses under **(4)** and **(5)**. As to **(5)**, think of days of the week: it would sound highly unnatural to explicate 'The last two Mondays were cold' as 'The last two instances of the day Monday were cold'. As to **(4)**, observe that resemblance-uses of a name *N* can often be reformulated as 'analogue to *N*': 'Berlusconi was the Italian Trump' and 'Einstein was a modern Newton' are easily reformulated as 'Berlusconi was the Italian analogue to Trump' and 'Einstein was a modern analogue to Newton'. 'Every detective needs his Doctor Watson' is easily reformulated as 'Every detective needs his analogue to Doctor Watson'. Other constructions do not have an equally natural

reformulation. E.g., 'St. Petersburg is the Venice *of* the north' would have to be reformulated as 'St. Petersburg is the *northern* analogue to Venice' or 'St. Petersburg is the analogue to Venice *in* the north'. Or take more idiomatic constructions, e.g., with 'second': 'My son is a second Mozart'. Resemblance-uses of 'Mozart' might convey properties like being a gifted composer, being a prodigy, etc., or simply the property of resembling Mozart in relevant respects. But we cannot replace 'My son is a second Mozart' with 'My son is a second gifted composer/a second prodigy/…'. Similarly, 'My son is a second person resembling Mozart in relevant respects' sounds unnatural; the same holds for 'My son is a second analogue to Mozart'. More plausibly, the 'second' in 'a second Mozart' would simply have to be omitted in a reformulation: so, 'My son is a second Mozart' becomes, e.g., 'My son resembles Mozart in relevant respects'.

Ad **(v)**: most primary count-noun-uses involve an ontological shift, or more specifically: the objects in the extension of a primary count-noun-use typically belong to a different ontological category than the designated name-bearer. E.g., in family-uses, the category shifts from *family* to *person* (the family members). In artwork- and depiction-uses, the category typically shifts from *person* to *inanimate object* (more specifically, *work of the visual arts*). In manufacturing-uses, the category shifts from *company* to *physical object* (the products manufactured by the company). In performance-uses ('I saw two Hamlets, one in London, the other in New York'), the category shifts from *abstract object* (more specifically, *work of the dramatic arts*) to *event* (more specifically, *performance of a work of the dramatic arts*). In time-uses, the category shifts from *types* of time periods (a category of *abstract* objects) to *instances* of those types, that is, particular time periods (a category of *concrete* objects). And so on.

Exceptions include **(17)** and **(20)**: a text and its translations each belong to the category *text*; and an artwork and its replicas or forgeries each belong to the category *artifact*. The role-uses under **(9)** sometimes, but not always involves ontological shifts: here, the category typically can shift from *fictitious person* (the role) to *real person* (the actor), but in some cases, both the actor and the role are real persons (as in 'Ben Kingsley was a great Ghandi').

Ad **(vi)**: most primary count-noun-uses are of the semantic type <e,t>. E.g., the artwork-use of 'Leonardo' in the sense of 'Leonardo painting' simply expresses the one-place property of being a painting by Leonardo da Vinci:

- $\lambda x_e[x \text{ is a painting by Leonardo da Vinci}]$.

So, the artwork-use of 'Leonardo' is of type <e,t>.

However, in more complex constructions, count-noun-uses will express more complex properties/relations and hence belong to more complex semantic types, provided we stick to compositionality.[255] This will hold, e.g., for some uses under **(4)**. Recall how we analyzed the resemblance-use of 'Venice' as occurring in constructions like 'the Venice of the north':

- $\lambda f_{<e,t>}[\lambda x_e[f(x) = 1 \wedge \forall y(f(y) = 1 \rightarrow R(x, \text{Venice}, y))]]$.

[255] Many thanks to Hannes Leitgeb for this observation.

So, the use of 'Venice' would here be of type <<e,t>,<e,t>>. Going further, consider resemblance-uses of 'Venice' in even more complex constructions:

- Amsterdam was the Venice of the north of the 17th century, but St. Petersburg was the Venice of the north of the 18th century.

The sentence contains resemblance-uses of 'Venice' in phrases of the form '[Venice of NP_1] of NP_2', where NP_1 refers to a location and NP_2 to a point or period of time. E.g., take 'Venice of the north of the 17th century', and abbreviate 'the 17th century' as '17'. Then, the phrase 'Venice of the north of the 17th century' could be given either of the two following analyses:

a) λx_e[it is true in the 17th century that: $Nx \wedge \forall y(Ny \rightarrow R(x$, the city of Venice, $y))$].

b) $\lambda x_e[N_{17}x \wedge \forall y(N_{17}y \rightarrow R_{17}(x$, the city of Venice, $y))]$.

According to option (a), the phrase 'of the 17th century' contributes the one-place propositional operator 'it is true in the 17th century that'; according to (b), 'of the 17th century' contributes an index that relativizes predicates to the 17th century: e.g., '$N_{17}x$' will mean that x is a northern-city-of-the-17th-century. For simplicity, we will work with option (a); also, we will gloss over the fact that the functions expressed by NP_1/NP_2 concern locations and times respectively. The more general form of (a) would then be:

a*) $\lambda x_e[o(f(x) = 1 \wedge \forall y(f(y) = 1 \rightarrow R(x$, the city of Venice, $y)))]$, where 'o' is a one-place propositional operator.

One-place propositional operators are of type <t,t>. So, the content of the resemblance-use of 'Venice' in '[Venice of NP_1] of NP_2' can be stated as:

- $\lambda o_{<t,t>}[\lambda f_{<e,t>}[\lambda x_e[o(f(x) = 1 \wedge \forall y(f(y) = 1 \rightarrow R(x$, the city of Venice, $y)))]]]$.

The type of this function, and hence of 'Venice' in '[Venice of NP_1] of NP_2', would be <<t,t>,<<e,t>,<e,t>>>.

5.2.4) Secondary Count-Noun-Uses

Against this background, let us turn to the remaining count-noun-uses **(21-30)** that we call *secondary uses*. We will argue that they differ from the primary uses under **(1-20)** in several important respects. Here is a list:

21) Genericized trademark:
x is a company/brand named N; T is an object category exemplified i.a. by (some) products of x; and N can convey the property of instantiating T.

- 'I bought a new hoover': I bought a new vacuum cleaner (not necessarily by the company Hoover).[256]
- 'Can you give me a Kleenex?': Can you give me a tissue (not necessarily of the brand Kleenex)?
- Related names include 'a davenport' (for a type of couch; company name); 'a Xerox' (company name); 'rollerblades' (plural only; company name); 'a taser' (company name); 'a Jet Ski' (brand name); 'a band-aid' (brand name); 'a Sellotape' (brand name).
- Compare: there are no names of car manufacturers/brands that are used as genericized trademarks. E.g., 'I bought a new Ford' never just conveys that I bought a new car, but always that the car is made by the Ford Motor Company.

22) Alcoholic beverage:
x is a place named N; T is a type of alcoholic beverage (typically a wine or brandy) allegedly originating from x; and N can convey the property of being a subtype/sort of T.

- 'All the Chardonnays I've tried were dry': All the sorts of Chardonnay I've tried were dry.
- 'Marsalas are from Sicily and Malagas are from Spain': Marsala wines (that is, sorts of Marsala wine) are from Sicily and Malaga wines are from Spain.

[256] For similar Kleenex and hoover examples, see Graff Fara 2015b, 268.

23) Gymnastics/figure skating element:
x is a person named *N*; *T* is a type of gymnastics/figure skating element allegedly first completed by *x*; and *N* can convey the property of instantiating type *T*.

- 'The gymnast did a Produnova/Roche': The gymnast did a Produnova vault/Roche vault (after Yelena Produnova/Jorge Roche).
- 'The figure skater did an Axel/a Lutz': The figure skater did an Axel jump/a Lutz jump (after Axel Paulsen/Alois Lutz).

24) Necktie knot:
x is a person named *N*; *T* is a type of necktie knot allegedly invented by *x*; and *N* can convey the property of instantiating type *T*.

- 'a Windsor (knot)' (after Edward VIII, the Duke of Windsor); 'a Pratt (knot)' (after its inventor Jerry Pratt); 'a Balthus (knot)' (after the artist Balthus); etc.

25) Garment/accessory:
x is a person/place named *N*; *T* is a type of garment/accessory allegedly worn by/at *x*; and *N* can convey the property of instantiating type *T*.

- Garments named after persons: 'a cardigan' (after James Brudenell, 7th Earl of Cardigan); 'a Prince Albert' (a type of coat, after Prince Albert of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha); 'a Chesterfield (coat)' (after George Stanhope, 6th Earl of Chesterfield); 'a spencer' (a short jacket/vest, after George Spencer, 2nd Earl Spencer); 'a leotard' (a type of one-piece garment, after acrobat Jules Léotard).
- Garments named after places: 'a jersey' (after the island of Jersey); 'a tuxedo' (after the town of Tuxedo, New York); 'an ascot' (a type of cravat, after the racecourse in Ascot); 'capris' (capri pants, after the island of Capri).
- Footwear: 'Wellingtons' (a type of boots, after the Duke of Wellington).
- Headdress: 'a Panama (hat)'; 'a homburg' (after the city of Bad Homburg).
- Bags: 'a Birkin (bag)' (after Jane Birkin); 'a Kelly (bag)' (after Grace Kelly).

26) Hairstyle/beard:
x is a person/place named *N*; *T* is a type of hairstyle/beard allegedly worn by/at *x*; and *N* can convey the property of instantiating type *T*.

- 'a pompadour' (a hairstyle, after Madame de Pompadour); 'a Rachel (cut)' (after the character Rachel in *Friends*); 'a Princeton (cut)'; 'a Van Dyke (beard)' (after Anthony van Dyck); 'a Ned Kelly (beard)' (after outlaw Ned Kelly); 'a Garibaldi (beard)' (after Giuseppe Garibaldi); etc.

27) Stereotype:
F is a property stereotypically associated with the name *N* or its bearers, and *N* can convey *F*.

- 'She's a real Karen': She's a real privileged and discriminatory woman (see *Merriam-Webster's*).
- 'She's such a Priscilla': She's such a prissy woman.[257]
- Arguably, stereotype-uses also include phrases like 'chatty Cathy', 'nosy Nelly', 'negative Nancy', and the like; or the more general 'Joe' in the sense of 'person'/'man', as in 'a regular Joe'.

28) Isolated uses where the designated name-bearer is part of the intended content, e.g.:

- 'a TikTok' in the sense of 'a TikTok video'/'a video uploaded on the platform TikTok' ('I made a TikTok'). The use does not extend to other online platforms: e.g., a YouTube video is not called 'a YouTube'.
- 'an Uber' in the sense of 'a car ride provided by the company Uber' ('I'll get an Uber'). Similarly for the ride share company Lyft or the moving truck company U-Haul. However, the use does not extend to almost all other service companies: e.g., a delivery by Amazon is not called 'an Amazon'.

29) Isolated uses where the designated name-bearer is not part of the intended content, e.g.:

- 'a moon' in the sense of 'a lunar month', derived from the use of 'Moon' for Earth's moon.

[257] For the Priscilla example, see Jeshion 2015a, 246. For similar examples, see Matushansky 2008, 608f. ('Jeremiah'); and Jeshion 2015a, 239 ('Orville').

- ‘a Benjamin’ in the sense of ‘a 100-dollar bill’, after Benjamin Franklin who is featured on the 100-dollar bill. Compare: Abraham Lincoln is featured on the 5-dollar bill, but ‘an Abraham’ is not used in the sense of ‘a 5-dollar bill’.
- ‘a marathon’ in the sense of ‘a marathon race’ (after the city of Marathon where the race originated, according to legend).
- ‘a spa’ in the senses of ‘a therapeutic bath’ and ‘a spa town’ (after the Belgian town of Spa).
- ‘a genoa’ in the sense of ‘a genoa sail’ (after the city of Genoa where this type of sail was allegedly first used).
- ‘a sandwich’: a dish popularized by John Montagu, 4th Earl of Sandwich.
- ‘a Chateaubriand’: a steak allegedly invented for French writer François-René de Chateaubriand.
- ‘a pavlova’: a light meringue cake (after Russian ballerina Anna Pavlova, allegedly for her exceptional lightness).[258]
- ‘a carpaccio’: a beef dish (after painter Vittore Carpaccio).
- ‘a Colt’ in the sense of ‘a revolver’ (after its inventor, Samuel Colt).
- ‘a Dobermann’: a dog breed (after its first breeder, Louis Dobermann).
- ‘a Chihuahua’: a dog breed (after its supposed place of origin, the Mexican state of Chihuahua).
- ‘a Windsor’ in the sense of ‘a Windsor chair’, a type of wooden chair with spindle back (see *Merriam-Webster’s*; after a former production site of Windsor chairs in the town of Windsor).
- ‘a chesterfield’ in the sense of ‘a couch’, or for a particular type of couch with upright armrests (see *Merriam-Webster’s*; after Philip Stanhope, 4th Earl of Chesterfield, who allegedly commissioned the first couch of this type).
- ‘a John Hancock’ in the sense of ‘a signature’ (after Founding Father John Hancock, famous for his signature under the Declaration of Independence).
- Potentially ‘an Oscar’ in the sense of ‘an Academy Award’, most likely after an actual person named ‘Oscar’, allegedly due to a physical resemblance to the Oscar statuette.[259]

30) Isolated uses without a designated name-bearer, e.g.:

- ‘a jack’ in the sense of ‘a lifting jack’.
- ‘a john’ in the sense of ‘a toilet’.
- ‘a James’ in the sense of ‘a tailor’s dummy for men’s clothing’; ‘a Judy’ in the sense of ‘a tailor’s dummy for women’s clothing’.
- in German: ‘ein Dietrich’ (‘a Dietrich’) in the sense of ‘a picklock’.

For the remainder of this section, we first have a closer look at some of these uses, focusing on three exemplary types: **(21)** (genericized trademarks), **(23)** (gymnastics/figure skating elements), and **(27)** (stereotype). Then, we draw a few comparisons between primary and secondary count-noun-uses.

In evaluating **(21)**, **(23)**, and **(27)**, we confine ourselves to features **(i-iii)** from the previous section, regarding the derivation, intended content, and productivity of count-noun-uses. First, take feature **(i)**, according to which a count-noun-use of a name *N* is derived from a unique referential use of *N* for a bearer of *N*. We argue that **(i)** is exhibited by **(21)** and **(23)**, but not by **(27)**; we will also see, however, that there is more than one plausible derivation in the case of **(23)**. Take the genericized trademarks under **(21)**: any name that can be used as a genericized trademark first has a referential use, referring to a company or brand; from that use, we derive a count noun that applies to the products of the company/brand; in a third step, we apply the count noun to anything belonging to the same object category as those products. The step from the second to the third meaning illustrates a more general phenomenon of meaning derivation, namely the ‘species for genus’ synecdoche by which a species can stand for the genus that the members of the species

[258] See Leach 2010, 24f.
[259] See Davis 2022, 217-221.

belong to: think of the use of 'bread' in the more general sense of 'food', as in 'our daily bread'. In the case of **(21)**, the species is constituted by the products of the company/brand, while the genus is the object category that those products belong to. By contrast, feature **(i)** is not exhibited by **(27)**: the uses under **(27)** are not derived from a unique referential use of the name for one of its bearers. E.g., the reason why 'Karen' is used in the sense of 'privileged and discriminatory woman' might be the behavior of *several* women named 'Karen' rather than just one. Or the name 'Karen' and the property of being a privileged and discriminatory woman might simply be especially common among the same set of people, say, white American women. Also, some stereotype-uses might not be related to any stereotypes about the *bearers* of the name, but rather to the name's *phonology*: 'Priscilla' might evoke the property of being prissy simply because 'Priscilla' and 'prissy' are phonologically similar–in this case, the latter word is phonologically part of the former. For a more intricate case, consider type **(23)**, where a personal name is used as a count noun for gymnastics or figure skating elements. E.g., take the count-noun-use of 'Axel' for Axel jumps. For brevity, let AXEL be the *type* of figure skating jump instantiated by the individual Axel jumps. At first glance, the count-noun-use seems to be derived from the referential use of 'Axel' for figure skater Axel Paulsen, the inventor of the Axel jump. However, if combined with the generic definite article, 'Axel' can also be used to refer to the type AXEL, as in 'The Axel is one of the most difficult figure skating jumps'. This gives us two potential derivations of the count-noun-use of 'Axel'. According to the first option, 'Axel' is first a name for Axel Paulsen; in a second step, that name comes to be used as a count noun for Axel jumps; and in a third step, that count noun is used generically to refer to the type AXEL. According to a second option, the name 'Axel' is first used to refer to Axel Paulsen; in a second step, the type AXEL is named 'Axel' after Axel Paulsen–thereby, the name 'Axel' adopts a second referential use; and in a third step, the use of 'Axel' for the type AXEL, not for Axel Paulsen, comes to be used as a count noun ranging over instances of that type, that is, over Axel jumps. So, according to the first option, the count-noun-use of 'Axel' is directly derived from the use of 'Axel' for Axel Paulsen, and according to the second, from the use of 'Axel' for the type AXEL; so, the designated bearer of 'Axel' is Axel Paulsen in the first case, and the type AXEL in the second. We do not decide which of the two options is preferable. Either way, however, the count-noun-use has a unique designated bearer: in the first case Axel Paulsen, in the second case the type AXEL.

Next, consider feature **(ii)**, according to which the designated bearer of a count-noun-use is part of the intended content of that use. We argue that **(ii)** is exhibited neither by **(21)** nor by **(27)**. For **(27)**, this is trivial: the uses under **(27)** do not have a unique designated name-bearer to begin with. For **(21)**, consider an example: if we use 'hoover' as a genericized trademark in the sense of 'vacuum cleaner', the company Hoover is not part of what we intend to convey–in fact, competent users of 'hoover' in the sense of 'vacuum cleaner' might be unaware that the name 'Hoover' originally referred to a vacuum manufacturer. Whether **(23)** exhibits feature **(ii)** depends on the derivation of **(23)**. Take again the count-noun-use of 'Axel' in the sense of 'Axel jump'. Here, the type AXEL is part of the intended content of the count-noun-use of 'Axel', while Axel Paulsen is not: competent users of 'Axel' in the sense of 'Axel jump' need not be aware of Axel Paulsen, or of

his relation to the Axel jump–rather, they only need to be aware that Axel jumps are the instances of a particular type of jump, namely the type AXEL. So, if Axel Paulsen is the designated bearer of the count-noun-use of 'Axel', then the designated bearer of that use is *not* part of the intended content of that use; by contrast, if the type AXEL is the designated bearer, then the designated bearer *is* part of the intended content.

Finally, consider feature **(iii)** about productivity. **(27)** seems to be productive: any name that is stereotypically associated with a property can be used to convey that property. By contrast, **(21)** is not productive: to be sure, several company or brand names can be used in a genericized sense for the object category that the products of that company/brand belong to. But there is no 'automatism' to that effect, that is, those uses are not generated by a more general principle: not just *any* name or proper noun that refers to a company can be used to range over anything belonging to the same object category as the company's products; and same for brands. E.g., there is no car company/brand whose name can be used to range over cars in general. This distinguishes **(21)** from primary count-noun-uses: e.g., under type **(3)**, a proper noun referring to a company/brand can automatically be used for the products of the company/brand. For a more intricate case, take again **(23)**: whether the uses under **(23)** are productive depends again on how they are derived. E.g., if the count-noun-use of 'Axel' for Axel jumps is derived from the use of 'Axel' for Axel Paulsen, then the use is not productive: after all, several figure skating jumps are not referred to with the name of their inventors (the toe loop jump was invented by figure skater Bruce Mapes, but is not named after him–it is simply called 'toe loop jump'); and the Axel and the Lutz are both named after their inventors, Axel Paulsen and Alois Lutz, but we use the inventor's first name in the case of the Axel, and the inventor's surname in the case of the Lutz. By contrast, if the count-noun-use of 'Axel' for Axel jumps is derived from the use of 'Axel' for the type AXEL, then the use is productive: if *N* is a name used to refer to a type of gymnastics/figure skating element, then *N* can be used as a count noun for instances of that type. In that case, type **(23)** could be subsumed under the category **Instantiation** in section 5.2.2. Note that analogous principles would hold for the names under **(24-26)**. E.g., if *N* is a name of a type of necktie knot/garment/accessory/hairstyle, then *N* can be used as a count noun for instances of that type. Compare: 'The Windsor is a type of necktie knot' and 'I'm wearing a tie with a Windsor'; 'The Chesterfield is a type of coat' and 'I'm wearing a Chesterfield'; 'The Birkin is a type of bag' and 'I'm carrying a Birkin'; 'The pompadour is a type of hairstyle' and 'I'm wearing a pompadour'; 'The Van Dyke is a type of beard' and 'I'm wearing a Van Dyke'; etc. in fact, we might suggest an even more general principle: if *N* is a name of an object type, then *N* can be used as a count noun for instances of that type. This principle would cover not only **(23-26)**, but also many of the isolated uses under **(29)**: e.g., 'The marathon is a type of race' and 'I'm running a marathon'; 'The Windsor is a type of chair' and 'I'm sitting on a Windsor'; 'The pavlova is a type of cake' and 'I'm eating a pavlova'; etc.

In a next step, let us draw some comparisons between primary and secondary count-noun-uses. We focus on the relation between types like **(3)** on one side and types like **(23-26)** on the other.

E.g., compare the use of 'Leonardo' in the sense of 'Leonardo painting'/'painting by Leonardo da Vinci', belonging to type **(3)**; and the use of 'Axel' in the sense of 'Axel

jump', belonging to type **(23)**. On one side, both name-uses seem to be derived from the corresponding name-noun compounds, and those derivations rely on more general conventions. Specifically, there is a convention allowing us to abbreviate compounds of the form '*N* painting' (in the sense of 'painting by *N*') to their constituent name *N*: e.g., 'Leonardo painting' can be abbreviated as 'Leonardo'. The same holds for compounds of the form '*N* jump': 'Axel jump' can be abbreviated as 'Axel'. On the other side, the conventions that generate the compounds 'Leonardo painting' and 'Axel jump' crucially differ: if a painting is painted by a bearer of the name 'Leonardo', then fully in virtue of that, the painting can be called 'Leonardo painting'. By contrast, the same does not hold for figure skating jumps and their inventors: types of jumps invented by a bearer of the name 'Axel' are not automatically called 'Axel jump', nor are the particular jumps that instantiate such jump types. Rather, the compound 'Axel jump' applies only to *one* jump type and to the instances of that type; same for the use of 'Axel' derived from 'Axel jump'. This indicates that the name-noun compound 'Axel jump' is itself a *name* for the Axel jump that had to be specifically *introduced* to refer to that jump. To be sure, in generating the compound 'Axel jump', there is still a convention at play: the convention to name figure skating jumps after their inventors. This way, the Axel jump is named after its inventor Axel Paulsen, the Lutz jump after its inventor Alois Lutz, etc. Similar naming conventions exist for gymnastics elements and necktie knots. At the same time, such naming conventions are less 'strict' than the conventions that produce compounds like 'Leonardo painting'; let us point to four features that illustrate this claim. First, naming conventions allow for exceptions: as we saw, the toe loop jump was invented by figure skater Bruce Mapes, but is not named after him. Second, naming conventions often allow for some lenience about *how* one thing is named after another: as we saw, the Axel and the Lutz are both named after their inventors, but we use the inventor's first name in the case of the Axel, and the inventor's surname in the case of the Lutz. Third, a name-noun compound generated in accordance with a naming convention might continue to be used even if it turned out that the referent of the compound was *misnamed*. E.g., if it turned out that the Axel jump had been invented by someone other than Axel Paulsen, we might nonetheless continue to call the jump 'Axel jump'–the convention to refer to this jump by the name 'Axel jump' might overrule the initial motivation to introduce the name based on the belief that the jump was invented by Axel Paulsen. Fourth, the count-noun-use of 'Axel' has become *independent* of the use of 'Axel' for Axel Paulsen: e.g., if we stopped referring to Axel Paulsen, or if we stopped referring to him as 'Axel (Paulsen)', we might still continue to call the Axel jump 'Axel jump' and 'Axel'. None of these four features is shared by primary count-noun-uses, such as the use of 'Leonardo' for paintings by Leonardo da Vinci.

Also note that there are several cases 'in between' the two just sketched. E.g., take the use of 'TikTok' in the sense of 'TikTok video' under **(28)**. On one side, the name-noun compound 'TikTok video' has been generated by a more general convention that is not a naming convention: if a video is uploaded on an online platform named *N*, then fully in virtue of that, the video can be called '*N* video': 'TikTok video', 'YouTube video', etc. In fact, this is just a subtype of the more general convention to designate objects *x* with compounds where a common noun expressing the category of *x* is combined with a name or a common noun referring to the place where *x* is located: 'London subway' (subway in

London), ‘Louvre painting’ (paintings in the Louvre), ‘window seat’, ‘nose hair’, etc.[260] (In the context of online platforms, the notion of a location will be somewhat metaphoric.) On the other side, there is no general convention for compounds of the form ‘*N* video’ to be abbreviated to *N*: so, while a TikTok video can be called ‘a TikTok’ (‘I made a TikTok’), a YouTube video is not called ‘a YouTube’.

5.2.5) Crosslinguistic Evidence for Count-Noun-Uses

Finally, let us add a few notes on the crosslinguistic evidence for count-noun-uses. It seems that English count-noun-uses typically have analogues in other languages and vice versa. To argue for this in detail would go beyond the scope of this study. Let us merely point to German where almost all of the types **(1-30)** are instantiated as well. Sometimes, the concrete instances of the types deviate: e.g., as predicate for tissues, German does not use ‘Kleenex’, but ‘Tempo’, the name of a German tissue brand. Similarly for hairstyles/beards: the pompadour is not called ‘pompadour’ in German, but the goatee is called ‘Henriquatre’ in German after French king Henry IV. German might not have any common analogues, e.g., to the stereotype-uses under **(27)** or to some of the isolated uses under **(29/30)**.

Let us point to a few exceptions. It seems that count-noun-uses can vary between different languages especially when it comes to the kinds of objects that a count-noun-use can be applied to. E.g., in German, names for types of wine can be used predicatively for glasses and bottles of wine: a glass/bottle of Chardonnay will be called ‘ein Chardonnay’ (‘a Chardonnay’), two glasses/bottles ‘zwei Chardonnays’ (‘two Chardonnays’), etc. This differs from English where such count-noun-uses are only applicable to *subtypes* of the respective type of wine. Also, in the case of name-noun compounds that refer to tea sorts (e.g., ‘Darjeeling tea’), German allows the name to be used as a count noun for subtypes of the tea sort, as well as for cups and packages of the tea sort: e.g., both a sort of Darjeeling tea and a cup/package of Darjeeling tea will be called ‘ein Darjeeling’ (‘a Darjeeling’). Again, English does not allow for any of these uses.

5.3) Additional Predicative Name-Uses

The previous section 5.2 provided a detailed overview of how names can be used as count nouns. In this section, we add some less prominent types of predicative name-uses, focusing on uses of names as mass nouns (5.3.1), as verbs (5.3.2), and as adjectives (5.3.3). In 5.3.4, we list a few borderline cases where a classification as predicative name-uses seems more controversial. Note that for the most part, the syntactic and semantic observations made in this chapter will remain informal.

Also note that like in the previous section, we distinguish between uses that have been conventionalized and uses that are generated by a productive process. E.g., the mass-noun-uses we looked at in 4.2.3 (e.g., ‘Let’s listen to some Bach’) were generated by a productive process that allows us to use a personal name for parts of the person’s oeuvre. By contrast, the mass-noun-use of the country name ‘china’ in the sense of ‘porcelain’ (‘I bought some china’) is conventionalized and has not been generated by any productive process.

[260] See Jackendoff 2010, 438.

5.3.1) Names Used as Mass Nouns

Let us begin with a number of productive uses of names as mass nouns. Consider again the sentences from 4.2.3:

1) She reads too much Heidegger and not enough Frege.
2) Let's listen to some Bach.

The names are here not used referentially for their bearers Martin Heidegger, Gottlob Frege, or Johann Sebastian Bach; rather, they convey *something by* these bearers, namely their oeuvre, or, more specifically, their philosophy (in the Heidegger/Frege sentence) and their music (in the Bach sentence). This gives us three options for how to reformulate (1/2):

1a) She reads too much by Heidegger and not enough by Frege.
2a) Let's listen to something by Bach.
1b) She reads too much from Heidegger's oeuvre and not enough from Frege's oeuvre.
2b) Let's listen to something from Bach's oeuvre.
1c) She reads too much philosophy by Heidegger and not enough philosophy by Frege.
2c) Let's listen to some music by Bach.

The (c)-versions get closest to the syntax of the original sentences: here, the mass-noun-uses of 'Heidegger', 'Frege', and 'Bach' are replaced with mass noun phrases (headed by the mass nouns 'philosophy' and 'music'). Also, in sentences (1/2), the phrases 'determiner + name' (e.g., 'too much Heidegger') were headed by the name; analogously, in the (c)-versions, the corresponding phrases 'determiner + mass noun phrase' are headed by the mass noun phrases that replace the names. By contrast, in the (a/b)-versions, the names are replaced with prepositional phrases, and in (2a/b), the determiner 'some' is replaced with the pronoun 'something'; the phrases 'determiner/pronoun + prepositional phrase' are now headed by the determiner/pronoun. On the other hand, the (a/b)-versions might get closer to the *intended content* of (1/2): e.g., it seems that speakers are able to understand a sentence like 'She reads too much Heidegger' even if they do not know that Heidegger wrote *philosophy*.

As we saw in 2.7.3, uses of names as mass nouns can also take the form of *bare singulars*. Consider the following sentence:

- I have read Frege, and I love to listen to Bach.

As in the previous example, 'Frege' and 'Bach' can be replaced with the unquantified mass noun phrases 'philosophy by Frege' and 'music by Bach':

- I have read philosophy by Frege, and I love to listen to music by Bach.

Note that there are some closely related bare name-uses where the reformulation in terms of a mass noun does not seem to work. Compare the following two sentences:

- I have read too much Dante.
- I know Dante by heart.

In the first sentence, 'Dante' is analogous to 'Frege' and 'Bach' in the previous example and can be replaced with 'poetry/literature by Dante', using the mass nouns 'poetry' or 'literature'. But consider the second sentence: if we replace 'Dante' with 'poetry by Dante', then it seems that the phrase is (in a tacit way) existentially quantified: 'I know poetry by Dante by heart' means that I know *some* poetry by Dante by heart. By contrast, the sentence 'I know Dante by heart' would usually be used to convey that I know *all* (or at least a significant portion) of Dante's poetry by heart. A suitable reformulation of this sentence would use a quantified rather than an unquantified mass noun phrase,

specifically a definite description with a mass noun as its head: e.g., ‘the poetry of Dante’ or ‘Dante’s poetry’. Interestingly, in the previous example, an analogous reformulation would make no difference in content: ‘I have read Frege, and I love to listen to Bach’ can also be reformulated as ‘I have read Frege’s philosophy, and I love to listen to Bach’s music’, and the content is the same as in ‘I have read philosophy by Frege, and I love to listen to music by Bach’.

Note that productive mass-noun-sues are not restricted to personal names. Perhaps most prominently, any proper noun referring to a drug brand can be used for quantities of the drug, as in ‘I took some Adderall/Xanax/Ambien/Tylenol/…’. Or consider the mass-noun-use of food company names for quantities of their food. E.g.:

- I eat McDonald’s/Burger King/… almost every day.
- I eat too much McDonald’s/Burger King/…

Here, the first sentence uses the company names as bare singulars, while the second adds the determiner ‘too much’. In both sentences, the name *N* can be replaced with a mass noun phrase like ‘food made by *N*’.

For examples of a different kind, observe that names can also become mass nouns in a more *conventionalized* way. Often, the names in these contexts are place names denoting cities, geographic regions, or countries; and they become mass nouns for products originating from the respective place. First, for a few isolated cases, e.g., take the mass-noun-use of ‘china’ in the sense of ‘porcelain’ and the use of ‘Gouda’ in the sense of ‘Gouda cheese’: in both cases, the name for the place of origin becomes a mass noun denoting a type of product originating from that place.

For a more productive case, think of place names that become mass nouns denoting types of wine or brandy. As we saw, the name ‘Champagne’ first refers to a region in France and then becomes a mass noun (spelled with lowercase initial), denoting a type of sparkling wine from that region. Similar for ‘Chardonnay’, referring to a Burgundian village and denoting a wine made from a wine grape originating from the surroundings of that village (allegedly); ‘Madeira’, referring to a Portuguese island and denoting a dessert wine from that island; ‘Marsala’, referring to a Sicilian city and denoting a dessert wine from the surroundings of that city; ‘Malaga’, referring to an Andalusian city (the referential use usually has the Spanish spelling ‘Málaga’) and denoting a dessert wine from the surroundings of that city; ‘Cognac’, referring to a French city and denoting a brandy from that city; ‘Armagnac’, referring to a French region and denoting a brandy from that region; etc. In the context of alcoholic beverages, the mass-noun-uses of names of cities/villages typically remain capitalized. These mass nouns often allow for further derivations. First, as we saw, they can be used as count nouns, denoting *subtypes* of the type of wine denoted by the mass-noun-use: ‘a champagne’, ‘a Madeira’, ‘a Chardonnay’, etc. Second, they occasionally allow for further mass noun derivations: e.g., the name ‘Burgundy’ initially refers to a region in France, is then used as a (typically capitalized) mass noun denoting the wine from that region, and in a third step becomes a (typically lowercased) mass noun denoting the color of that wine.

For another productive case where names come to be used as mass nouns, think of names of Japanese regions like ‘Kobe’, ‘Matsusaka’, ‘Ōmi’, or ‘Yonezawa’ that have become mass nouns denoting different types of beef originating from those regions. Here,

the mass-noun-use might be understood as being derived from name-noun compounds: e.g., the mass-noun-use of 'Kobe' abbreviates the compound 'Kobe beef'. In this respect, mass nouns for types of beef resemble the use of 'Madeira' to abbreviate 'Madeira wine', or the use of 'Chardonnay' to abbreviate 'Chardonnay wine', but differ from 'champagne' which does not abbreviate any compound like *'champagne wine'.

Let us add a few conventionalized mass-noun-uses that are not derived from place names. In particular, consider mass-noun-uses of brand and company names that have been further generalized and become genericized trademarks.[261] The name will then range over objects of the same *type* as the products of the brand, or over quantities of the *material* of those products. E.g., the name 'Mace' originally referred to a brand of pepper spray by the company Mace Security International and then became a mass noun (typically lowercased) for pepper spray in general: in 'She sprayed him with mace/some mace', 'mace' is used as a mass noun ranging over quantities of pepper spray. Similarly, the name 'Styrofoam' originally referred to a brand of polystyrene foam by the company DuPont and then became a mass noun (often still capitalized) for polystyrene foam in general ('I wrapped the vase in Styrofoam/some Styrofoam'). The name 'Tupperware' originally referred to a manufacturer of plastic food containers for household use and then became a mass noun (still capitalized) for such containers in general: as in 'I bought some Tupperware', where 'Tupperware' ranges over quantities of plastic food containers.[262]

For one difference between conventionalized and non-conventionalized mass-noun-uses, recall the notion of a *designated name-bearer* introduced in 5.1. In the case of non-conventionalized mass-noun-uses, the designated name-bearer is part of the intended content; in the case of conventionalized mass-noun-uses, it is typically not. E.g., the designated bearer of the mass-noun-use of 'Heidegger' (given a suitable disambiguation) is Martin Heidegger, and the intended content of that use can be construed as the property of being part of Heidegger's oeuvre, of being philosophy written by Heidegger, or the like; the designated bearer of the mass-noun-use of 'McDonald's' (given a suitable disambiguation) is the company McDonald's, and the intended content of that use is the property of being food made by McDonald's; and so on. By contrast, in the case of the mass-noun-use of 'champagne', the designated bearer is the region Champagne, but that region is not always part of the intended content–many competent users of 'champagne' will not know where champagne originates from, or that there even is a region of the same name as the beverage. Similarly for 'Chardonnay', 'Kobe', etc.

5.3.2) Names Used as Verbs

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[261] On genericized/generic trademarks from a legal perspective, see, e.g., Folsom/Teply 1980. The trademarks discussed by the authors go beyond brand and company names and include patented terms such as 'escalator' or 'linoleum'; see ibid., 1324.

[262] The main difference between the mass-noun-use of 'Tupperware' and the previously listed mass-noun-uses (such as 'mace', 'Styrofoam', or 'champagne'). 'Tupperware', like 'tableware', 'cutlery', 'luggage', etc., is syntactically a mass noun, but cognitively a count noun (see Chierchia 2010, 110). That is, the objects in the extension of 'Tupperware' can be counted just as the objects in the extensions of count nouns: we can count pieces of Tupperware (or of tableware, cutlery, luggage, etc.) just as we can count apples or cats. To borrow a term from Krifka (1989: 83f.), 'Tupperware' is associated with a 'natural unit', constituted by the individual Tupperware food containers.

For a fourth type of predicative name-uses, consider uses of names as verbs. Similar to the case of mass-noun-uses, we can distinguish between verb-uses that have been conventionalized and ones that have not. Let us look at a few examples.

In the case of conventionalized verb-uses, we begin with a compatibly large group of verb-uses that comprises names of companies, brands, and digital products/services. Think of:

1) 'to FedEx sth.': to send sth. using the services of FedEx.
2) 'to hoover (sth.)': to vacuum-clean (not necessarily with a vacuum manufactured by the company Hoover); 'to sellotape sth.': to stick/tape sth. with sellotape (not necessarily of the brand Sellotape); 'to rollerblade': to skate with in-line skates (not necessarily manufactured by the company Rollerblade); 'to xerox sth.': to photocopy sth. (not necessarily with a copier manufactured by the company Xerox); 'to mace sb.': to spray sb. with pepper spray (not necessarily of the brand Mace); 'to taser sb.': to attack sb. with a stun gun (not necessarily manufactured by TASER International); 'to jet-ski': to ride on a water scooter (not necessarily of the brand Jet Ski); 'to Uber': to drive with a ridesharing service (not necessarily with the one provided by the company Uber).
3) 'to WhatsApp sb./with sb.': to message sb./with sb. via WhatsApp; 'to Venmo/PayPal sth.': to send (sb.) sth. via Venmo/PayPal; 'to Skype/FaceTime sb./with sb.': to call sb./talk with sb. via Skype/FaceTime; 'to Instagram sth.': to post sth. on Instagram.
4) 'to google sth.': to search for sth. on the internet (not necessarily with Google Search); 'to photoshop sth.': to graphically edit sth. with digital means (not necessarily with Adobe Photoshop).

The verb-use of any name *N* under (1-4) is derived from a referential use of *N* for a particular bearer of *N*: e.g., the verb-use of 'FedEx' is derived from the referential use of 'FedEx' for the FedEx Corporation; so, the FedEx Corporation is the designated bearer of the verb-use of 'FedEx'.

Let us have a closer look at (1-4). We divided the verb-uses under (1-4) by two criteria: first, the activities conveyed by the verb-uses under (1) and (2) are non-digital, the ones under (3) and (4) are digital. The list reflects that verb-uses have become especially common since the early 21st century for names of digital products, or of companies producing digital products. Second, the designated bearer of the name is part of the content of the verb-uses under (1) and (3), but not under (2) or (4): that is, the verb-uses under (2) or (4) have become genericized. E.g., the FedEx Corporation is part of the content conveyed by 'to FedEx sth.', that is, the activity of sending sth. using the services of the FedEx Corporation. By contrast, the company Rollerblade is not part of the content conveyed by 'to rollerblade', that is, the activity of skating with in-line skates. In some cases, it is not entirely clear what referential use the verb-use is derived from. E.g., 'to google' might be derived from the name of the company Google, or from the abbreviated, colloquial name for the search engine Google Search. The verb-uses under (1-4) could be distinguished by other criteria as well, e.g., by their valency and semantic type: e.g., some verb-uses ('to jet-ski' as in 'I often jet-ski') are intransitive and hence of type <e,t>; others ('to google sth.' as in 'I'll google it') are transitive and hence of type <e,<e,t>>; still others ('to PayPal sb. sth.' as in 'I'll PayPal you the money') are ditransitive and hence of type <e,<e,<e,t>>>.

More importantly, let us see what the verb-uses under (1-4) have in common. It seems that their intended contents can be determined by the following rule:

- The verb-use of a name *N* under (1-4) conveys an activity that the designated bearer of *N*, or a product of/service by that bearer, is meant to be used for.

E.g., take the verb-use of 'WhatsApp': the designated bearer of 'WhatsApp' is the messenger service WhatsApp; an activity that WhatsApp is meant to be used for is messaging via WhatsApp; and this activity is the content of the verb-use of 'WhatsApp'. Or take the verb-use of 'xerox': the designated bearer of 'Xerox' is the Xerox Corporation; a product of Xerox are photocopiers; an activity that photocopiers are meant to be used for is photocopying; and this activity is the content of the verb-use of 'xerox'. With a nod to Millikan and Jackendoff, we could here make use of the notion of *proper functions*: the proper function of an object (product, service,…) is the function that the object is generally supposed to fulfill.[263] E.g., the proper function of photocopiers is to be used for photocopying; the proper function of WhatsApp is to be used for messaging. More generally, all the uses under (1-4) can be classified as *metonymic*: that is, roughly, there is some 'contiguity'–or, more generally speaking, some *close relation*–between the contents of the verb-uses and their designated bearers. Take 'WhatsApp': the name of a messenger service becomes a verb conveying the activity of sending messages on that messenger service. Here, the close relation between the content *c* of the verb-use (the activity of sending messages via WhatsApp) and the designated bearer *x* of the name (the messenger service WhatsApp) consists in *c* being the proper function of *x*. Or in the case of 'xerox', the name of a photocopier manufacturer becomes a verb conveying the activity of photocopying. Here, the close relation between the content *c* of the verb-use (the activity of photocopying) and the designated bearer *x* of the name (the company Xerox) consists in *c* being the proper function of products manufactured by *x* (though not *only* of those products: photocopiers by other companies have the same proper function).

Let us add three conventionalized verb-uses that are not derived from company, brand, or product names. First, take 'to meander' in the sense of 'to wriggle/wind': 'Meander' is first a name of a river in Turkey (today mostly referred to as the Büyük Menderes River), then a verb denoting a movement resembling the winding course of the Meander River. Second, take the verb 'to champagne': 'Champagne' is first a name for a region in France, then a mass noun denoting a type of sparkling wine. In a third step, 'champagne' is used as a verb: both in the intransitive sense of drinking champagne, and in the transitive sense of treating sb. lavishly by serving them champagne (see *OED*). For a third example, take 'to gaslight sb.' in the sense of manipulating sb. by psychological means into questioning his or her own sanity (see *OED*). The verb-use of 'gaslight' is derived from the referential use of the name '*Gaslight*' for the 1944 psychological thriller whose protagonist performs this type of manipulation towards his wife.

For comparison, let us turn to verb-uses that are not conventionalized. However, different from the non-conventionalized count-noun-uses or mass-noun-uses, such non-conventionalized verb-uses typically are not generated by any productive process–rather, they seem more 'creative'. Take the following examples by Eve and Herbert Clark:[264]

- My sister Houdini'd her way out of the locked closet.
- Nixon was John Deaned right out of the White House.

[263] See Millikan 1984, 17-19; Jackendoff 2016, 23.
[264] See Cark/Clark 1979, 784f. (the Nixon-sentence is slightly modified).

The first sentence can be paraphrased as 'My sister escaped the locked closet by trickery'.[265] The verb-use 'to Houdini' is here derived from the referential use of the name for escapologist Harry Houdini, and it conveys the act of escaping by trickery as famously performed by Houdini. It seems that Harry Houdini is not part of the intended content of the sentence–rather, his name is merely used metaphorically to evoke an act associated with him. In the second sentence, the syntactic form is based on formulations like the colloquial 'Nixon was kicked right out of the White House', conveying that Nixon was made to leave the White House, used here metonymically for the American presidency. What is more, the verb-use of the name 'John Dean' indicates the agent that made Nixon leave the White House: attorney John Dean who provided damning evidence against the president during the Watergate scandal. So, the verb phrase 'to John Dean sb. right out of the White House' here conveys two things: a) the act of making sb. leave the White House/resign the presidency, and b) the agent of that act, namely John Dean. So, John Dean would seem to be part of the sentence's intended content, different from Houdini in the previous sentence.

For a final example, consider another type of non-conventionalized verb-uses that is frequently encountered in colloquial speech. Picture the following scenario: after a fight, John tries to sweet-talk his girlfriend Katherine, calling her by her nickname 'Katie'. Katherine snaps at him: 'Don't Katie me, I won't forgive you that easily!' Here, the verb-use 'to *N* sb.' conveys, roughly, the property of addressing sb. with *N*. Apart from metalinguistic count-noun-uses, verb-uses of this sort are one of the rare examples of metalinguistic predicative name-uses. Also note that this type of verb-use is not restricted to names–analogous examples can be generated for any expression used as appellation: assume John called Katherine 'sweetheart' and she responds with 'Don't sweetheart me!'

5.3.3) Names Used as Adjectives

Finally, let us briefly look at a fifth–and much rarer–type of predicative name-uses: the use of names as *adjectives*. The examples we look at are not conventionalized, but have been generated by a productive process. Consider the following examples:

1) 'Trump is becoming a bit too Mussolini for my taste': Trump is becoming a bit too Mussolini-like/similar to Mussolini for my taste.
2) 'Murder mysteries today are still very Agatha Christie': Murder mysteries today are still very Agatha Christie-like/similar to Agatha Christie novels.
3) 'My grandma is extremely 1950s': My grandma is extremely 1950s-like/similar to what people were like in the 1950s.
4) 'The priest at our church is so Old Testament': The priest at our church is so Old Testament-like/similar to the protagonists of the Old Testament.
5) 'Archeology is not as *Indiana Jones* as Spielberg made us believe': Archeology is not as *Indiana Jones*-like/similar to *Indiana Jones*/the *Indiana Jones* franchise as Spielberg made us believe.

The underlined names here seem to be used as adjectives, and more specifically, as adjectives in *predicative* position (as in 'He is old'), not in *attributive* position ('the old man'). The main motivation for this classification is syntactic: in sentences (1-4), the underlined names combine with the intensifiers 'too', 'extremely', 'very', and 'so', which

[265] See Cark/Clark 1979, 784.

usually combine with adjectives/adjectives phrases.[266] Similarly, in sentence (5), the underlined name takes the place of an adjective in an 'as … as' comparison phrase. To further strengthen the point, replace the underlined names with adjectives, e.g.:

1*) Trump has become a bit too authoritarian for my taste.
3*) My grandma is extremely old-fashioned.
5*) Archeology is not as adventurous as Spielberg made us believe.

Typically, adjective-uses of names seem to be colloquial abbreviations of expressions that transform names also *morphologically* into adjectives, e.g., by adding '-like', as in 'Mussolini-like'. (In some cases, one might alternatively add suffixes like '-esque', as in 'Kafkaesque', or '-ian', as in 'Orwellian'.)

Adjective-uses of names typically have a *resemblance* meaning. More specifically, adjective-uses of a name *N* can convey:

a) resemblance to *x*, where *x* is the designated bearer of *N*; or
b) resemblance to *S*, where *S* is a set of objects closely connected to the designated bearer of *N*.

To illustrate (a), the adjective-use of 'Mussolini' in sentence (1) conveys the property of resembling Benito Mussolini (the designated bearer of 'Mussolini'). Similarly in (5) where, arguably, the *Indiana Jones* franchise is the designated bearer of '*Indiana Jones*'. (It might be debatable if the franchise is indeed a *bearer* of the name '*Indiana Jones*'; at the very least, the proper noun phrase '*Indiana Jones*' is commonly used to refer to the franchise.) To illustrate (b), the adjective-use of 'Agatha Christie' in sentence (2) conveys the property of resembling Agatha Christie novels, something closely connected to Agatha Christie herself, who in turn is the designated bearer of 'Agatha Christie'. Similarly for the decade of the 1950s (the designated bearer of '1950s' in (3)) and the people of that decade; or the biblical book of the Old Testament (the designated bearer of 'Old Testament' in (4)) and its protagonists. The notions of 'resemblance' and 'close connection' in (a/b) suggest that adjective-uses of names are, roughly speaking, cases of metaphor and metonymy. E.g., the adjective-use of 'Mussolini' in the sense of 'being like Mussolini' would be fully metaphoric: it conveys resemblance to the referent of another use of 'Mussolini' (the referential use for Benito Mussolini). By contrast, the adjective-use of 'Agatha Christie' in the sense of 'being like the crime mysteries by Agatha Christie' is partly metaphoric, partly metonymic: the metaphoric part is the resemblance to the crime mysteries by Agatha Christie, the metonymic part is the close connection of those crime mysteries to the referent of another use of 'Agatha Christie' (the referential use for writer Agatha Christie). (For a more precise statement of metaphor and metonymy, see section 5.4.1.)

5.3.4) Borderline Cases

Beginning with section 2.2, we have classified name-uses as either apparent referential or apparent predicative name-uses. In this section, we add three borderline cases that do not neatly fit into this classification. Since these cases are of minor relevance to our critique of predicativism, we will mostly omit a thorough discussion. (One further candidate for predicative name-uses will be addressed in chapter 6, where we challenge the predicativist analysis of names in labelling constructions.)

[266] Or with adverbs, but the underlined name-uses are clearly not used as adverbs: adverbs are used as modifiers (e.g., to modify verbs or adjectives), and the name-uses in sentences (1-5) do not modify any other expression.

The first and perhaps most common borderline case involves apparent referential name-uses (often as bare singulars) that are metonymic or metaphorical and can be replaced with phrases containing a predicate, such as definite/indefinite descriptions or complex demonstratives. Consider five cases. First, take metonymies where the government of a country is referred to with a name of the country, or of its capital, or of its government buildings:

- Russia/Moscow/the Kremlin decided to enter peace talks: The government of Russia decided to enter peace talks.

Second, take metonymies where the title of a book is applied to the film rights for that book:

- Spielberg bought *Jurassic Park* for $1.5 million: Spielberg bought the film rights for (the novel) *Jurassic Park* for $1.5 million.[267]

Third, take metonymic uses of place names for events that happened at that place:

- Waterloo was one of the worst defeats in history: The defeat in the Battle of Waterloo was one of the worst defeats in history.[268]

Fourth, take metonymies where the name of a person/object is applied to depictions of that person/object:

- Lincoln is on every penny:[269] A depiction of Lincoln is on every penny.
- The Colosseum is on the Italian 5 cent coin: A depiction of the Colosseum is on the Italian 5 cent coin.

Finally, take metaphoric uses of personal names, applied to objects/persons resembling a bearer of the name:

- (At a party, you see someone who looks like Napoleon, and say to your friends:) Look at Napoleon over there: Look at the/that person resembling Napoleon over there.[270]

In each sentence, the name can be replaced with a common noun phrase: the head nouns would be 'government', 'rights', 'defeat', 'depiction', and 'person'. In the first three examples, the phrase is a definite description. In the fourth example, the phrase is an indefinite description. In the fifth example, the phrase is either a definite description or a complex demonstrative. The metonymic/metaphoric uses listed here have in common that they are productive: they do not require any specific introduction, but are licensed by more general metonymic/metaphoric principles. E.g., the use of 'Russia' for the Russian government does not have to be introduced by stipulating that 'Russia' can refer not only to the country, but also to the country's government; instead, the use of 'Russia' for the Russian government is licensed by the more general metonymic principle that *any* country name can be used to refer to the government of the respective country.

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[267] See also Nunberg 2004, 346 (on 'Spielberg bought the novel for $1 million').

[268] We set the example apart from 'Waterloo was one of the worst battles in history' in the sense of 'The Battle of Waterloo was one of the worst battles in history'. Here, again, the place name 'Waterloo' metonymically stands for an event that happened at that place. But since 'Battle of Waterloo' seems to be a name consisting of a capitalized common noun phrase (see 2.7.3), it will be contentious whether the replacing phrase 'the Battle of Waterloo' is strictly speaking descriptive/whether the capitalized 'Battle' as occurring in this phrase is used as a predicate.

[269] See Bach 2015, 780.

[270] See also Van Langendonck/Van de Velde 2016, 19 (on 'Hitler is coming tonight' where 'Hitler' is used to refer to an unpopular guest).

For a second borderline case, consider apparent anaphoric name-uses with predicative meanings. Rami (2022) distinguishes five types of anaphoric name-uses.[271] We will consider two of them: names used as donkey anaphora (Rami's second type[272]), and name-uses bound by a quantifier that does *not* use or mention the name (Rami's fourth type[273]).

For the use of names as donkey anaphora, consider two (slightly modified) examples by Geurts and Elbourne:

1) If a child is named 'Bambi', then Disney will sue the parents of Bambi.[274]

2) Every woman who has a husband named 'John' and a lover named 'Gerontius' takes only Gerontius to the Rare Names Convention.[275]

The anaphoric uses of the names 'Bambi' and 'Gerontius' are underlined. One possible analysis of donkey anaphora, championed by Neale,[276] treats them as D-type anaphora, that is, as anaphora that can be analyzed as definite descriptions.[277] This analysis is easily applied to uses of *names* as donkey anaphora. For **(1)** and **(2)**, we provide two versions of the analysis each: the first analyzes the name-use the same way in which 'the'-predicativists analyze apparent referential name-uses; the second enriches that analysis with further predicates provided by the anaphoric antecedents.

1a) If a child is named 'Bambi', then Disney will sue the parents of the bearer of the name 'Bambi'.

1b) If a child is named 'Bambi', then Disney will sue the parents of the child named 'Bambi'.

2a) Every woman who has a husband named 'John' and a lover named 'Gerontius' takes only the bearer of the name 'Gerontius' to the Rare Names Convention.

2b) Every woman who has a husband named 'John' and a lover named 'Gerontius' takes only the lover of hers who is named 'Gerontius' to the Rare Names Convention.

For a more precise version, let us formalize these sentences. We will use the following notation:

- Cx: x is a child.
- Wx: x is a woman.
- N(x, e): x is named e.
- P(x, y): x is a parent of y.
- S(x, y): x sues y.
- H(x, y): x is a husband of y.
- L(x, y): x is a lover of y.
- T(x, y, z): x takes y to z.
- RNC: Rare Names Convention.

Also, clauses of the form 'the F is G' will be formalized using the iota-operator: [ιx: Fx](Gx). Then, **(1a/b)** and **(2a/b)** can be formalized as follows:

1a*) $\exists x(\mathrm{C}x \wedge \mathrm{N}(x, \text{'Bambi'})) \rightarrow [\iota y\colon \mathrm{N}(y, \text{'Bambi'})](\forall z(\mathrm{P}(z, y) \rightarrow \mathrm{S}(\text{Disney}, z)))$.

1b*) $\exists x(\mathrm{C}x \wedge \mathrm{N}(x, \text{'Bambi'})) \rightarrow [\iota y\colon \mathrm{C}y \wedge \mathrm{N}(y, \text{'Bambi'})](\forall z(\mathrm{P}(z, y) \rightarrow \mathrm{S}(\text{Disney}, z)))$.

2a*) $\forall x(\mathrm{W}x \wedge \exists y(\mathrm{H}(y, x) \wedge \mathrm{N}(y, \text{'John'})) \wedge \exists z(\mathrm{L}(z, x) \wedge \mathrm{N}(z, \text{'Gerontius'})) \rightarrow [\iota r\colon \mathrm{N}(r, \text{'Gerontius'})](\mathrm{T}(x, r, \mathrm{RNC}) \wedge \forall t(\mathrm{T}(x, t, \mathrm{RNC}) \rightarrow t = r)))$.

2b*) $\forall x(\mathrm{W}x \wedge \exists y(\mathrm{H}(y, x) \wedge \mathrm{N}(y, \text{'John'})) \wedge \exists z(\mathrm{L}(z, x) \wedge \mathrm{N}(z, \text{'Gerontius'})) \rightarrow [\iota r\colon \mathrm{L}(r, x) \wedge \mathrm{N}(r, \text{'Gerontius'})](\mathrm{T}(x, r, \mathrm{RNC}) \wedge \forall t(\mathrm{T}(x, t, \mathrm{RNC}) \rightarrow t = r)))$.[278]

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[271] See Rami 2022, 173-178.
[272] See Rami 2022, 174f.
[273] See Rami 2022, 176. Rami speaks of apparent anaphoric name-uses bound by nominal quantifiers.
[274] After Geurts 1997, 321.
[275] After Elbourne 2005, 181.
[276] See, e.g., Neale 1990, 226f., 235f. (especially the discussion of analyses 1_7 and 34).
[277] For the term 'D-type anaphora', see Sommers 1982, xvii. See also Elbourne 2005, 6-11.
[278] There are alternative ways of interpreting 'only' in this context. E.g., we might replace 'only Gerontius' with 'Gerontius and not John'. So, **(2b*)** could be replaced with: $\forall x(\mathrm{W}x \wedge \exists y(\mathrm{H}(y, x) \wedge \mathrm{N}(y, \text{'John'}))$

Note that the definite descriptions in **(1a*)**, **(1b*)**, and **(2a*)** are closed formulas, while the definite description in **(2b*)** is an open formula, containing a free occurrence of '*x*'. Also note that there are further descriptive options for how to analyze **(1)** and **(2)**. E.g., following Neale,[279] we could analyze the anaphoric use of 'Bambi' in **(1)** as *numberless* description, e.g.:

1c) If a child is named 'Bambi', then Disney will sue the parents of the bearer(s) of the name 'Bambi'.

A formalization could use Neale's 'whe'-operator:[280]

1c*) $\exists x(\mathrm{C}x \wedge \mathrm{N}(x, \text{'Bambi'})) \rightarrow [\text{whe } y\text{: } \mathrm{N}(y, \text{'Bambi'})](\forall z(\mathrm{P}(z, y) \rightarrow \mathrm{S}(\text{Disney}, z))$.

Such an analysis would leave it open how many bearers the name 'Bambi' has/how many children have been named 'Bambi'. Still, the numberless description analysis often seems too weak to capture uses of names as donkey anaphora: e.g., **(2)** seems to imply that any woman with a lover called 'Gerontius' takes *exactly one* Gerontius to the Rare Names Convention. We will set this issue aside.

Apart from uses of names as donkey anaphora, there are anaphoric name-uses that are bound by a quantifier that do not use or mention the name. Consider the following example (after Rami):

3) In every ancient Roman family, Quintus was the fifth son.[281]

Here, the use of 'Quintus' is bound by the quantifier 'in every ancient Roman family': a quantifier that does not use or mention the name 'Quintus'. (Contrast this with the quantificational type of donkey anaphora, as in the Gerontius-sentence: there, the quantifier 'every woman who has a husband named 'John' and a lover named 'Gerontius'' mentioned the name 'Gerontius'.) Again, the anaphorically used name can be treated as D-type anaphora and can be replaced with a definite description, e.g.:

3a) In every ancient Roman family, the bearer of the name 'Quintus' was the fifth son.

3b) In every ancient Roman family, the bearer of the name 'Quintus' in that family was the fifth son (of that family).

For a more precise formulation, let us use the following abbreviations:

- R*x*: *x* is an ancient Roman family.
- B(*x*, *N*): *x* is a bearer of the name *N*.
- $\mathrm{B}_f(x, N)$: *x* is a bearer of the name *N* in family *f*.
- M(*x*, *f*): *x* is a member of family *f*.
- FS(*x*, *f*): *x* is the fifth son of family *f*.

Then, consider one possible formalization of **(3a)** and two of **(3b)**:

3a*) $\forall x(\mathrm{R}x \rightarrow [y\text{: } \mathrm{B}(y, \text{'Quintus'})](\mathrm{FS}(y, x)))$.

3b*) $\forall x(\mathrm{R}x \rightarrow [y\text{: } \mathrm{B}_x(y, \text{'Quintus'})](\mathrm{FS}(y, x)))$.

3b)** $\forall x(\mathrm{R}x \rightarrow [y\text{: } \mathrm{B}(y, \text{'Quintus'}) \wedge \mathrm{M}(y, x)](\mathrm{FS}(y, x)))$.

The definite description in **(3a*)** is a closed formula; the definite descriptions in **(3b*)** and **(3b**)** are open formulas, containing free occurrences of '*x*'. Also, in **(3b*)**, the

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$\wedge\ \exists z(\mathrm{L}(z, x) \wedge \mathrm{N}(z, \text{'Gerontius'})) \rightarrow [\iota r\text{: } \mathrm{L}(r, x) \wedge \mathrm{N}(r, \text{'Gerontius'})](\mathrm{T}(x, r, \mathrm{RNC})) \wedge [\iota s\text{: } \mathrm{H}(s, x) \wedge \mathrm{N}(s, \text{'John'})](\neg \mathrm{T}(x, s, \mathrm{RNC})))$.

[279] See again Neale 1990, 235f.

[280] 'whe' can be defined by the following equivalence: [whe *x*: *Fx*](*Gx*) iff there is one or more *F*, and all *F*s are *G*s.

[281] See Rami 2022, 176. For a slightly more precise formulation, replace 'ancient Roman family' with 'ancient Roman family with at least five sons'. A related example is found in Elbourne 2005, 181f.; if we follow the testimony by Elbourne (2005: 218, n. 17), examples of this type go back to an example by Kamp where the Latin names are, however, used referentially ('Even if this man [gesture at Secundus] had been born first, Primus would still have inherited everything').

predicate ‘being a bearer of’ is relativized to the quantifier: specifically, it is indexed with the variable bound by the quantifier. In **(3b**)**, the phrase ‘the bearer of the name ‘Quintus’ (in that family)’ from **(3b)** is analyzed as a conjunction of the two predicate phrases ‘B(*y*, ‘Quintus’)’ and ‘M(*y*, *x*)’. Either way, ‘Quintus’ in **(3)** will not merely convey the property of being a bearer of the name ‘Quintus’–so, it conveys more than a use of ‘the bearer of name ‘Quintus’’ as *complete* description. Also, if we stick to the definition of incomplete descriptions given in 2.4, then ‘Quintus’ cannot be analyzed as a use of ‘the bearer of name ‘Quintus’’ as *incomplete* description: after all, we defined incomplete descriptions as uses of definite descriptions with a referential intention, and ‘Quintus’ in **(3)** is not used to refer to any specific bearer of the name. Rather, ‘Quintus’ ranges over *several* bearers of the name ‘Quintus’–one for each ancient Roman family. Alternatively, in light of anaphorically used definite descriptions, we might revise our definition of incomplete descriptions: they might now be defined as uses of definite descriptions that are referential *or* anaphoric. Referential and anaphoric uses of definite descriptions of the form ‘the *F*’ have in common that they are used without the presupposition that there is *only* one *F*; so, it would be natural to subsume the two uses under a common heading.[282]

Note that at least in some contexts, anaphoric name-uses of either of the two types presented here can also be given a *non-descriptivist* analysis–an analysis under which they are not classified as D-type anaphora. Famously, at least some sentences involving donkey anaphora can be analyzed as universal statements.[283] This also holds for **(1)**:

1)** $\forall x(\mathrm{C}x \wedge \mathrm{N}(x, \text{‘Bambi’}) \rightarrow \forall y(\mathrm{P}(y, \underline{x}) \rightarrow \mathrm{S}(\text{Disney}, y)))$.

In this analysis, the anaphoric use of ‘Bambi’ in **(1)** corresponds to a variable–to the underlined occurrence of ‘*x*’ in **(1**)**, bound by the initial quantifier ‘$\forall x$’. Similarly for **(3)**:

3)** $\forall x \forall y(\mathrm{R}x \wedge \mathrm{B}(y, \text{‘Quintus’}) \wedge \mathrm{M}(y, x) \rightarrow \mathrm{FS}(\underline{y}, x))$.

Here, the anaphoric use of ‘Quintus’ in **(3)** corresponds to the underlined occurrence of ‘*y*’ in **(3**)**. Deciding which of the two types of analysis is better suited for anaphoric name-uses goes beyond the scope of this study.

Let us briefly mention a third borderline case: the adoption of personal names as terms for units of measurement, as in:

- 10 newtons/amperes/pascals/joules/coulombs/volts/ohms/watts/kelvins/…

For brevity, we will speak of *unit names*.[284] They crucially differ from the two previous borderline cases: unit names do not inherit their meaning by more general metonymic or metaphoric principles, nor from an anaphoric antecedent. Rather, the adoption of a personal name as a unit name requires a *specific introduction*: e.g., the use of ‘newton’ for the standard unit of force was introduced in 1948 by the General Conference on Wights and Measures. Orthographically, unit names are distinguished from the personal names they are derived from by being lowercased.

Unit names are not easily classified as either apparent referential or apparent predicative name-uses. In fact, more so than in the two previous borderline cases, it is questionable whether unit names should still be classified as uses of *names*: rather, they are uses

[282] This would be in line with Bach’s claim that there are non-referential incomplete descriptions, though to be sure, the example he provides is not of an *anaphorically* used definite description. See again Bach 2008, 23; and section 3.4.1 above.
[283] For possible exceptions, see Neale 1990, 225.
[284] See Sassoon 2010.

of expressions *derived* from (homophonous) names. Also, by our orthographic criterion for proper nouns in terms of capitalization (see 2.7.3), unit names would not be classified as proper nouns, but as common nouns. At the same time, unit names are not easily classified under any of the standard categories of common nouns, that is, count nouns and mass nouns. On one side, unit names bear some resemblance to count nouns: first, they are pluralizable and can be combined with numerals (‘10 newtons’). Second, they can typically be combined with articles: ‘a newton’ is equivalent to ‘one newton’, and ‘the newton’ would refer to the unit itself (as in ‘The newton is a unit of force used by physicists’). Then again, different from count nouns, unit names cannot be combined with demonstrative or possessive pronouns, nor with adjectives: e.g., *‘that newton’ cannot be used to refer to a particular force/quantity of force; *‘my newton’ cannot be used to refer to my force; *‘large newtons’ cannot be used to quantify over large forces/quantities of force.

Still, if we adopt a more formal analysis, unit names can be analyzed as predicates that express relations. E.g., consider constructions like ‘10 newtons are not a lot of force’ or ‘The golf club hit the ball with 5000 newtons’. In both cases, it is plausible to analyze ‘newton’ as expressing a two-place relation that we can formalize as the following lambda term:

- $\lambda n_e[\lambda x_e[x$ is a force n times as large as the force needed to accelerate a body weighing one kilogram by one meter per second squared$]]$.[285]

The two arguments of ‘newton’ would here be denoted by the variables ‘x’ and ‘n’: ‘x’ ranges over objects in general, including abstract objects like forces; ‘n’ ranges over real numbers.[286] For the remainder of our discussion, we will set unit names aside.

5.4) Predicative Name-Uses: Classification and Analysis

The two previous sections offered a detailed, albeit still largely informal account of predicative name-uses. In this section, we attempt a more general evaluation of predicative name-uses. We will largely focus on uses of names as count nouns.

5.4.1 and 5.4.2 offer two more general classifications of predicative name-uses: first as cases of metaphor and metonymy, then as cases of what Nunberg calls *deferred interpretation*. 5.4.3 and 5.4.4 return to predicativism: here, we reconstruct and challenge the predicativist analysis of predicative name-uses, focusing on *non-metalinguistic* uses. In 5.4.5, we argue that a similar challenge applies to the existing versions of the type-ambiguity view. 5.4.6 sketches an alternative analysis of predicative name-uses that amounts to a modified version of the type-ambiguity view. 5.4.7 develops a crosslinguistic argument against the view that count-noun-uses of names are cases of PF-deletion (phonetic/phonological-form-deletion), that is, of the phenomenon that syntactic components of an expression can remain unpronounced; the argument will be crosslinguistic, focusing on gender- and plural-marking in German. Finally, in 5.4.8, we have a closer look at two borderline cases of predicative name-uses, namely at family-uses and time-uses.

5.4.1) Metaphor and Metonymy

[285] In this study, the body terms that are part of lambda terms will be written in square brackets.
[286] For a similar analysis, see Sassoon 2010, 156f. Note, however, that Sassoon analyzes phrases that combine phrases of the form ‘numeral + unit name’ with adjectives, as in ‘two meters high’.

Let us attempt to get a clearer understanding of the notions of metaphor and metonymy. Standardly, metaphors are conceived in terms of resemblance, and metonymies in terms of contiguity–of a close and salient connection. For a more precise formulation, take an expression *e* and a use *u* of *e*; c_u will be the intended content of *u*. Also, $[c_u]$ will be the extension of *u*, given that the intended content *c* is assigned to *u*; for simplicity, the extension of a singular term will be construed as the singleton of the term's referent. So, e.g., if c_u is a property, then $[c_u]$ is the set of objects exemplifying that property; if c_u is an object, then $[c_u]$ is the singleton of that object. Then:

- *u* is a metaphor iff there is a content $c \neq c_u$ that *e* can be used to convey, and the intention to convey c_u with *u* is grounded in the belief that the objects in $[c]$ and $[c_u]$ resemble one another.
- *u* is a metonymy iff there is a content $c \neq c_u$ that *e* can be used to convey, and the intention to convey c_u with *u* is grounded in the belief that there is a close connection between the objects in $[c]$ and $[c_u]$.

(If resemblance is classified as a type of close connection, then the two definitions imply that metaphors are a type of metonymy. Alternatively, a clause could be added to the righthand side of the definition of metonymy that excludes that the connection between the objects in $[c]$ and $[c_u]$ consists in resemblance. When we speak of metonymies in this study, we tacitly exclude metaphors.)

Here are some examples to illustrate the definitions. To start with a paradigm example of metaphor, take the noun 'shepherd', and let *c* be one of the properties that 'shepherd' can convey: the property of being a shepherd (that is, someone who guides sheep). Now, some uses *u* of 'shepherd' convey a different content c_u, namely the property of being someone who provides guidance, as in 'The Lord is my shepherd'. And the intention to convey c_u with *u* is partially grounded in the belief that the objects in $[c]$ and $[c_u]$ resemble one another: persons who provide guidance resemble shepherds, simply because shepherds *themselves* provide guidance (to sheep). So, *u* is a metaphor.[287] To add a paradigm example of metonymy, take the noun 'crown', and let *c* be one of the properties that 'crown' can convey: the property of being a crown (a type of headgear). Now, some uses *u* of 'crown' convey a different content c_u, namely the property of being a monarch, as in 'The crown is a part of the political system of the UK'. And the intention to convey c_u with *u* is partially grounded in the belief that there is a close connection between $[c]$ and $[c_u]$: the connection that typically, the objects in $[c]$ are made only for the objects in $[c_u]$, that is, crowns are made only for monarchs. So, *u* is a metonymy.

Let us return to predicative name-uses. Given our definitions of metaphors and metonymies, resemblance-uses come out as metaphors: for all resemblance-uses *u* of a name *N*, there is a content $c \neq c_u$ that *N* can be used to convey, and the intention to convey c_u with

[287] In the metaphors cited here and below, the objects in $[c]$ and $[c_u]$ resemble one another for the simple reason that $[c]$ is necessarily a subset of $[c_u]$. E.g., necessarily, all persons who provide guidance to sheep are persons who provide guidance (to sb./sth.). Note, however, that there also are metaphors where this is not the case. E.g., take again the noun 'shepherd', and let *c* again be the property of being someone who guides sheep; but let c_u be the property of being someone who provides guidance to *humans*. In that case, $[c]$ and $[c_u]$ are possibly disjoint: possibly, no one who provides guidance to humans also guides sheep. Still, the objects in $[c]$ and $[c_u]$ will resemble one another: they all provide guidance to *sb./sth*. For a second example, take synesthetic metaphors, as when we use the adjective 'dark' with the literal meaning 'devoid of light' (*c*) which is applied to physical objects or spatial locations, and the metaphoric meaning 'sad' which is applied to emotional states (c_u, as in 'I'm in a dark mood'). Here, $[c]$ and $[c_u]$ are necessarily disjoint: necessarily, physical objects or spatial locations are not emotional states.

u is partially grounded in the belief that the objects in [c_u] and [c] resemble one another. E.g., take the name 'Einstein', and let c be the person Albert Einstein, that is, one of the contents (here: referents) that 'Einstein' can be used to convey. Also, take a resemblance-use u of 'Einstein', where the intended content c_u is the property of being a scientific genius. Here, the intention to convey c_u with u is partially grounded in the belief that the objects in [c_u] resemble the object in [c]: that is, scientific geniuses resemble Albert Einstein, simply because he is a scientific genius himself. By contrast, artwork-uses are metonymies. Take the name 'Leonardo', and let c be the person Leonardo da Vinci. Also, take an artwork-use u of 'Leonardo', where the intended content c_u is the property of being a painting by Leonardo da Vinci. The intention to convey c_u with u is partially grounded in the belief that there is a close connection between [c] and [c_u], namely the connection that the object in [c] created the objects in [c_u]: that is, Leonardo created his own paintings. A similar analysis applies to manufacturing-uses. Also time-uses can be construed as metonymic: take the name 'April', and let c be the month of April. Also, take a time-use u of 'April', where the intended content c_u is the property of being an April, that is, a time period instantiating the month of April in a particular year. The intention to convey c_u with u is partially grounded in the belief that there is a close connection between [c] and [c_u]: the connection that the object in [c] (the month of April) is instantiated by the objects in [c_u] (the particular Aprils of each year).

Some, including Van Langendonck (1997), have suggested to classify also *metalinguistic* count-noun-uses as metonymic.[288] Take a metalinguistic count-noun-use u of the name 'Mary', where the intended content c_u is the property of being a bearer of the name 'Mary'. Another content c that the name 'Mary' can be used to convey (specifically on mentioned occurrences[289]) is the name 'Mary' itself. And the intention to convey c_u with u is partially grounded in the belief that there is a close connection between [c] and [c_u]: namely the connection that the object in [c] (that is, the name 'Mary') is a name for the objects in [c_u] (that is, for the bearers of the name 'Mary').

We add three observations. First, some predicative name-uses will *combine* metaphor and metonymy. Recall the remarks from the previous section about 'Waterloo': 'Waterloo' is first used to refer to the hamlet in Belgium; then to the Battle of Waterloo ('Waterloo was Napoleon's last battle'); and then to convey the property of being a decisive defeat ('Stalingrad was Hitler's Waterloo'). Here, the use of 'Waterloo' for the battle is a metonymy where a place (the hamlet) stands for an event (the battle) that occurred at that place; and the resemblance-use of 'Waterloo' in the sense of 'decisive defeat' is a metaphor where an event (the battle) stands for a property of that event (the property of being a decisive defeat).[290]

Second, in a similar way, a metonymic predicative name-use can consist of *more than one* metonymy. Take the newspaper example from **(14)**, involving names of newspapers, such as '*The Guardian*'. By a first metonymy, the name of a newspaper (perhaps slightly modified, here by dropping the definite article) becomes a predicate applied to issues of

[288] E.g., Van Langendonck 1997, 44.
[289] For simplicity, we here subsume mentions under uses, in the sense that an occurrence of an expression e that mentions e is a use of e that refers to e.
[290] For similar remarks about the combination of metaphor and irony, see famously Grice 1975, 53.

the newspaper, as in 'Have you read today's *Guardian*?', where '*Guardian*' means 'issue of *The Guardian*'. By a second metonymy, this predicate is applied to prints of newspaper issues, as in 'My *Guardian* wasn't delivered today', where '*Guardian*' means (roughly) 'print of an issue of *The Guardian*'.

Third, note that there are prominent metonymies that are *not* represented by any count-noun-uses of names. To cite just one example, recall the metonymy by which a country's government can be referred to using the name of the country's capital, as in 'Moscow decided to enter peace talks' to convey that the Russian government decided to enter peace talks. However, the name of a country's capital cannot be used as a count noun to range over the different governments of that country. E.g., the sentence 'Many Moscows sold oil to the West' cannot be used to convey that many Russian governments sold oil to the West.

5.4.2) Deferred Interpretation

In the previous section, we reduced predicative name-uses to two basic types: metaphors and metonymies. Some philosophers have attempted an even simpler and more general classification. In particular, Graff Fara (2015b) and Rami (2022) draw on Nunberg's notion of meaning transfer or deferred interpretation and apply that notion to count-noun-uses.[291] We will argue, contra Graff Fara, that *all* count-noun-uses can be analyzed as cases of deferred interpretation, or at least of a phenomenon *closely related* to deferred interpretation.

Let us begin by reconstructing the notion of deferred interpretation. First, Nunberg would distinguish between two types of linguistic uses: we will call them *standard* and *non-standard*.[292] Roughly, the standard uses of an expression are the ones that are not synchronically derived from any other uses of the same expression (or a homophonous expression). Analogously, we can distinguish between standard/non-standard contents or extensions: e.g., a standard content is a content that a standard use is intended to convey; a standard extension of an expression is an extension that the expression has if being assigned a standard content. Note that the distinction between standard and non-standard uses is *not* identical to the one between semantic and pragmatic uses, or literal and non-literal uses: e.g., a use might be synchronically derived from a literal use, but still be literal itself. (Recall the count-noun-use of 'champagne' for sorts of champagne, which is synchronically derived from the literal mass-noun-use of champagne, but would seem to be a literal use as well.) By Nunberg's conception, a deferred interpretation is an interpretation that assigns a non-standard content to an expression *e*, where that non-standard content is derived from a standard content of *e* by a salient function.[293]

We will address two distinctions relevant to the notion of deferred interpretation: the distinctions between reference-shift and content-shift, and between the content-shift of noun phrases and the content-shift of verb phrases. We omit Nunberg's distinction

[291] In what follows, we mostly rely on Nunberg 1993 and 2004; the notion of deferred reference (rather than deferred interpretation) as well as the ham sandwich example first appear in Nunberg 1979. See Graff Fara 2015b, 257-261, 264-267; Rami 2022, 161-172.

[292] Our terminology follows Graff Fara 2015b, 260. Nunberg (2004: 344) would speak of *conventional* contents/uses, Jeshion (2015b: 281) of *normal* or *canonical* contents/uses.

[293] See, e.g., Nunberg 1995, 112f. For related work on meaning transfer, see Ostler/Atkins 1991 and Wilensky 1991.

between metaphoric and metonymic types of deferred interpretation; rather, we will focus on the *metonymic* type.[294] In the case of metonymic deferred interpretation, Nunberg suggests that the salient function associated with a predicate maps objects exemplifying a property to objects exemplifying another property.[295] For illustration, we will consider two of Nunberg's examples that we call the *sandwich example* and the *parking example*. The sandwich example is set in a restaurant: a customer has ordered a sandwich which has not yet been prepared; the waiter who took the order is going off duty and tells his replacement:

- The sandwich is sitting at table 20.[296]

Clearly, what the waiter intends to convey is that the *person who ordered a sandwich* is sitting at table 20, not that any actual *sandwich*–two slices of bread with a filling–is sitting at table 20.[297] The sandwich example allows us to illustrate the distinction between reference-shift and content-shift. Importantly, Nunberg suggests that the example does not involve a reference-shift, but a content-shift: that is, it is not the singular term 'the sandwich' that shifts its reference from one referent to another (from a particular sandwich to a particular person who ordered a sandwich); rather, the predicate 'sandwich' shifts its content from its standard content–the property of being a sandwich–to a non-standard content, namely the property of having ordered a sandwich. To motivate this assessment, recall that according to the example, the restaurant has not yet prepared the sandwich that was ordered. In that case, the utterance context does not contain any sandwich, and hence no unique or most salient sandwich that the description 'the sandwich' could be used to refer to: so, the description 'the sandwich' does not shift its reference from a standard referent (a particular sandwich) to a non-standard or derived referent (a particular person who ordered a sandwich), simply because the description does not have a standard referent to begin with (in the context of utterance).[298] Instead, it will be the predicate 'sandwich' that shifts its content. Also, Nunberg would suggest that this content-shift follows a salient function: here, the function maps orders to the customers placing them.

Let us turn to a second set of examples, the parking examples. Each of the parking examples exploits the *grammatical number* of noun phrases and verb phrases.[299] We start with two examples of reference-shift, both involving demonstrative reference. Assume you arrive at a party and hand the valet the keys to your car. You say, 'This is parked out back', pointing at the keys while uttering the demonstrative 'this'; and you intend to convey that your car is parked out back. Then, it would seem that with the singular 'this', you are not referring to your car keys (plural), but to your car (singular). So, the reference of 'this' shifts from the objects you are pointing at (the keys) to your car. For a variation of the example, assume you hand the valet one key that fits several cars, all of which are parked out back, and you say, 'These are parked out back', pointing at the key. Here, it would seem that with the plural demonstrative 'these', you are not referring to the car key

[294] See Nunberg 2004, 348.
[295] See Nunberg 1995, 112f.
[296] Our wording of the example is close to Nunberg 1979, 149. For brevity, we replace Nunberg's 'ham sandwich' with 'sandwich'.
[297] See Nunberg 1979, 149; Nunberg 1993, 42.
[298] For versions of the argument, see Nunberg 2004, 360, n. 6; Graff Fara 2015b, 259. For further evidence, see Nunberg 1995, 115f.; Fauconnier 1994, 5-7.
[299] See Nunberg 1993, 38-40; 1995, 110.

(singular), but to your cars (plural). So, the reference of 'these' shifts from the object you are pointing at (the key) to your cars. Compare these cases of reference-shift with two examples of content-shift. You are going to a party with your spouse, travelling in the *same* car. When you arrive, you say to the valet, 'We are parked out back'. Here, the referential expression 'we' and the accompanying verb 'are' are plural, so their grammatical number does not agree with the number of cars. Nunberg takes this to suggest that 'we' does not shift its reference from you and your spouse to your car–rather, the predicate 'being parked out back' shifts its content. On its standard uses, the predicate 'parked' applies only to vehicles, but by deferred interpretation, the predicate can be applied to the vehicle owners (or drivers, or the like). When applied to vehicles, 'parked' conveys, roughly, the property of standing without being driven; when applied to vehicle *owners*, 'parked' conveys the property of being the owner of a parked vehicle. For a variation of the example, assume you are a contractor and have gone to a construction site with several vehicles, all of which are parked out back; you say to your employer, 'I am parked out back'. Here, the utterance can convey, by deferred interpretation, that your cars (plural) are parked out back. This time, the referential expression 'I' and the verb 'am' are singular, so again, their grammatical number does not agree with the number of cars. Rather, the predicate 'parked' has again shifted its content (in the same way as before). In the latter two examples, the predicate 'parked' is associated with the salient function that maps every car to its owner. Different from the sandwich-example, the predicate shifting its content in the parking examples is not a noun ('sandwich'), but the sentence-predicate, that is, the verb phrase 'am/are parked out back'.

Let us state the metonymic type of deferred interpretation more formally, again following Nunberg.[300] Let A and B be two sets of objects. Also, let g be the salient function from A to B. Then, for any predicate F that is true of an object x in A, there is a derived predicate F* homophonous with F that is true of an object in B, namely of the image of x under g. If property P is the content of F, then the content of F* is given by the following lambda term:

- $\lambda y_{\in B}[\exists x_{\in A}(g(x) = y \wedge Px)]$.[301]

(We here use 'P' as a predicate constant and hence do not bind it with a lambda operator.) E.g., take the sandwich example. Relative to a particular restaurant at a particular time, let A be the set of ordered dishes and B the set of customers; and let g be the function that maps every order in A to a customer in B, namely the customer placing that order. Also, let F be the predicate 'sandwich'. Then, F* is a predicate also spelled and pronounced 'sandwich'; let us write this predicate as 'sandwich*'; and the content of 'sandwich*' is:

- $\lambda y_{\in B}[\exists x_{\in A}(g(x) = y \wedge \text{sandwich}(x))]$.

So, the content of F* is a function from objects to truth values that maps any customer y to the truth value True iff there is an order x s.t. the salient function g from orders to customers maps x to y (that is, y placed the order x) and x is a sandwich. Again a bit less formally: someone is a sandwich* iff they have ordered a sandwich. Or consider the

[300] See, e.g., Nunberg 1995, 112f.

[301] See Nunberg 1995, 112f. For some cases of metonymic content transfer, Nunberg suggests a variant of the above function that replaces the existential with the universal quantifier and the conjunction with an implication; we will set this additional feature aside.

parking example. Here, A is the set of cars, B is the set of car owners, and F is the predicate 'parked out back'. Then, the content of F* ('parked out back*') is:

- $\lambda y_{\in B}[\exists x_{\in A}(g(x) = y \wedge \text{parked-out-back}(x))]$.

This term denotes a function from objects to truth values that maps any car owner *y* to the truth iff there is a car *x* s.t. the salient function *g* from cars to car owners maps *x* to *y* (that is, *y* is the owner of *x*) and *x* is parked out back. So, someone is parked out back* iff they own a car that is parked out back.

Graff Fara (2015b) suggests applying the notion of deferred interpretation to predicative name-uses, in particular to count-noun-uses. She argues that for *most* non-metalinguistic predicative name-uses, there is a salient function from the standard extension of the name (that is, in her predicativist view, the set of the name's bearers) to a non-standard extension of the name, namely the set of objects exemplifying the property that the predicative use of the name is intended to convey.[302] E.g., Graff Fara would apply this analysis to artwork-uses, such as the use of 'Leonardo' in 'The National Gallery owns two Leonardos'. Just as in Nunberg's examples, the content-shifting predicates are associated with a salient function, which in this case maps artworks to their artists: e.g., every painting by Leonardo da Vinci would be mapped to Leonardo da Vinci.

By contrast, Graff Fara distinguishes three types of count-noun-uses that she does *not* classify as cases of deferred interpretation: metalinguistic count-noun-uses, family-uses, and resemblance-uses. As a predicativist, Graff Fara takes metalinguistic count-noun-uses to be the only standard uses of names, so they are not derived from any other standard uses by deferred interpretation.[303] In the case of family-uses, Graff Fara argues they are not uses of names to begin with, but instead uses of proper nouns that happen to be homophonous with names: this would hold, e.g., for the use of 'Kennedy' in 'Maria Shriver is a Kennedy'.[304] In the case of resemblance-uses, Graff Fara argues that there is no *unique* function from the standard extension of the name to the extension of the name's resemblance-use; or, in other words, there is no unique relation in which an object has to stand to a name-bearer in order to fall in the extension of the resemblance-use.[305] Take the name 'Einstein': an object *x* can be *an Einstein* in the resemblance-sense if *x* is a brilliant physicist, or if *x* is a genius, or if *x* has messy curly hair like Einstein, and so on. And different of these resemblance-properties might be relevant in different contexts, depending, e.g., on the topic of the conversation. According to Graff Fara, this sets resemblance-uses apart from cases of deferred interpretation. E.g., in the sandwich example, there is a unique relation between the dishes in the standard extension and the customers in the non-standard extension, namely the relation '*x* ordered *y*': an object *x* will be *a sandwich* in the non-standard sense iff *x* ordered a sandwich. Similarly for artwork-uses, where the relevant relation is the relation '*x* was created by *y*': e.g., an object *x* will be *a Leonardo* in the non-standard sense iff *x* was created by Leonardo.

[302] See Graff Fara 2015b, 262, 264.
[303] See Graff Fara 2015b, 257-260.
[304] See Graff Fara 2015b, 267-272 (Graff Fara calls family-uses 'Romanov examples').
[305] See Graff Fara 2015b, 261f., 264f.

Following the critique of Graff Fara's approach by Jeshion (2015a/b) and Rami (2022), we argue that the mechanism of deferred interpretation–or something close to it–can be extended to the two count-noun-uses that she excludes from deferred interpretation: family-uses and resemblance-uses. At the same time, we argue that deferred interpretation works differently for *any* predicative name-uses than for common count nouns.

Let us begin with two main differences between count-noun-uses of names and Nunberg's paradigm examples of deferred interpretation. First, Nunberg's examples are cases of content-shift, where a predicate shifts its content from one property to another. Also, these examples are associated with a salient function that maps properties to properties–e.g., via a function from objects exemplifying the former property to objects exemplifying the latter property (that is, from objects in the predicate's standard extension to objects in the predicate's non-standard extension). By contrast, when names are used as count nouns, this typically involves a shift from a specific reference to a specific predicative content, that is, a shift from objects to properties. E.g., the artwork-use of 'Leonardo' in the sense of 'painting by Leonardo da Vinci' involves a shift from a referent (the person Leonardo da Vinci) to a predicative content (the property of being a painting by Leonardo da Vinci). The resemblance-use of 'Einstein' in the sense of 'genius' involves a shift from a referent (the person Albert Einstein) to a predicative content (the property of being a genius). And so on. To further highlight this difference, consider *plural* count-noun-uses, such as the plural artwork-use 'Leonardos' in the sentence 'The National Gallery owns two Leonardos'. Assume the artwork-use 'Leonardo' involved a shift from one property to another, e.g., from the property of being a bearer of the name 'Leonardo' to the property of being a painting by a bearer of the name 'Leonardo'–or formally: $\lambda y[\exists x(x$ is a bearer of the name 'Leonardo' $\wedge\ y$ is a painting by $x)]$. In that case, the sentence would say that the National Gallery owns two paintings by a bearer of the name 'Leonardo'. This would be true even if the National Gallery owned two paintings by two *different* bearers of the name 'Leonardo' and not more than one painting by any *particular* bearer of the name 'Leonardo'. But clearly, this is not an admissible interpretation of the sentence: the sentence requires 'Leonardo' to be disambiguated. So, the sentence is true only if for *some* artist named 'Leonardo', the National Gallery owns two paintings by *that* artist.

For a second difference between Nunberg's examples and count-noun-uses of names, consider that the salient function in Nunberg's examples maps objects in the standard extension to objects in a non-standard extension. This option will be implausible for count-noun-uses of names. Take artwork-uses, where the name of an artist is applied to his artworks: there is no salient function from the set of artists to the set of artworks, given that most artists have created more than one artwork. Rather, the salient function associated with artwork-uses maps every artist to the *set* of his artworks.[306] More generally, count-noun-uses of names are associated with a function from objects to *sets* of objects.

In light of these two differences, let us state the reference-to-content shift of names more formally. Let A and B be two sets of objects; h will be a salient function from A to

[306] Alternatively, we might consider the function that maps every artwork to its artist (for simplicity, we might ignore cases where an artwork is created by more than one artist). This is the strategy pursued by Graff Fara who also applies it to Nunberg's cases (2015b: 260). In that case, let A and B be two sets of objects, and let h^* be a salient function from B to A. The content of a predicative meaning of a name N could then be stated as $\lambda y_{\in A}[\exists x_{\in B}(h^*(y) = x \wedge x = N_u)]$.

the powerset of B (mapping the objects in A to sets of objects in B). Then, the content of count-noun-uses of a name *N* can be stated as follows:

- $\lambda y_{\in B}[\exists x_{\in A}(y \in h(x) \wedge x = N_u)]$.[307]

(The index 'u' under *N* is meant to indicate that *N* is used, not mentioned.) E.g., let *h* be the function from artists to sets of artworks that maps every artist to the set of artworks created by that artist. Also, let *N* be the name 'Leonardo', and assume 'Leonardo' refers to Leonardo da Vinci (in a particular context, or given a particular disambiguation). Then, the artwork-use of 'Leonardo' (in the sense of 'painting by Leonardo da Vinci') would have the following content:

- $\lambda y_{\in B}[\exists x_{\in A}(y \in h(x) \wedge x = \text{Leonardo da Vinci})]$.

Contra Graff Fara, we argue that the analysis, or at least something close to it, can also be applied to family-uses and resemblance-uses. In the case of family-uses, the salient function maps every family to the set of the family's members.[308] E.g., take the name 'Kennedy' for the Kennedy family. The family-use of 'Kennedy' (in the sense of 'member of the Kennedy family') will then have the following content:

- $\lambda y_{\in B}[\exists x_{\in A}(y \in h(x) \wedge x = \text{the Kennedy family})]$.

In the case of resemblance-uses, we slightly modify the analysis. Here, it seems that the notion of resemblance has to be relativized to contexts of utterance (as we did in 5.2.1 with the notion of 'contextually relevant resemblance'). E.g., in some contexts, the resemblance-use of 'Einstein' might apply to physicists, in others to geniuses, in still others to persons with messy curly hair, etc. We hence replace function *h* (a function from objects to sets of objects) with a function *h** from object-context pairs to sets of objects. So, the above content of count-noun-uses of names will have to be slightly modified:

- $\lambda c[\lambda y_{\in B}[\exists x_{\in A}(y \in h^*(\langle x, c\rangle) \wedge x = N_u)]]$.

E.g., in the case of resemblance-uses, *h** will map any pair of an object *x* and a context *c* to the set of objects that resemble *x* in a way relevant to the context *c*. So, the content of a resemblance-use of the name 'Einstein' for anyone resembling Albert Einstein can be stated as:

- $\lambda c[\lambda y_{\in B}[\exists x_{\in A}(y \in h^*(\langle x, c\rangle) \wedge x = \text{Albert Einstein})]]$.

Note that context-sensitivity might not be a discerning feature of resemblance-uses. Jeshion points to disguise-uses:[309] whether I am *an Obama* in the sense of 'being disguised as Barack Obama' might depend on the context, say, on the kind of costume party I attend– on some costume parties, it might suffice if I wear a name tag saying 'Barack Obama', on others I might have to dress like Obama, on still others I might have to imitate his rhetoric, etc. In fact, we could add a contextual variable for all cases of deferred interpretation: in some cases, adding a contextual variable will not make any difference (e.g., for

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[307] Given that a function will map each object in its domain to exactly one object in its codomain, the existential statement can be reformulated in terms of unique existence or a definite description; e.g., $\lambda y_{\in A}[[\iota x_{\in B}\colon h(y) = x](x = N_u)]$. Analogously for $\lambda y_{\in B}[\exists x_{\in A}(y \in h^*(x) \wedge x = N_u)]$.

[308] Here, Graff Fara's alternative analysis of salient functions would have implausible consequences. According to Graff Fara, a count-noun-use of a name should be associated with a salient function that maps objects in the non-standard extension to objects in the standard extension: so, in the case of family-uses, the salient function would map every person to the family she belongs to. This function will be undefined for most (if not all) persons, given that persons can belong to more than one family (and normally do: e.g., to the family of their mother and the family of their father).

[309] See Jeshion 2015b, 292.

artwork-uses: whether an artist created a particular artwork is not true in some contexts and false in others); but adding a contextual variable would ensure a uniform analysis of count-noun-uses.

Also, consider metalinguistic count-noun-uses, as in 'There is a Mary in my class': can such uses be interpreted as cases of deferred interpretation? In the previous section 5.4.1, we pointed to Van Langendonk's analysis of metalinguistic count-noun-uses of names as metonymies; according to that analysis, metalinguistic count-noun-uses of names are metonymically derived from *mentioned* occurrences of names. If we combine this approach with deferred interpretation, then metalinguistic count-noun-uses are associated with a salient function h that maps every name to the set of its bearers. And the content of metalinguistic count-noun-uses of a name can be represented as follows:

- $\lambda c[\lambda y_{\in \mathrm{B}}[\exists x_{\in \mathrm{A}}(y \in h(x) \wedge x = N_{\mathrm{m}})]]$.

Here, the index 'u' under N is replaced with 'm', indicating that N is mentioned, not used. So, e.g., the content of count-noun-uses of the name 'Mary' could be stated as:

- $\lambda c[\lambda y_{\in \mathrm{B}}[\exists x_{\in \mathrm{A}}(y \in h(x) \wedge x =$ 'Mary'$)]]$.

Finally, recall a distinction we drew at the beginning of this section: the distinction between deferred interpretation for noun phrases and for verb phrases/sentence-predicates. We argue that count-noun-uses of names can be combined with *both* these types of deferred interpretation (though not at the same time). That is, in some cases, the count-noun-use of a name receives deferred interpretation, in others the accompanying sentence-predicate.

To illustrate this difference, consider the following sentence: 'There are two Churchills in the National Gallery'. Note that this sentence can be used to convey at least two propositions that are both about portraits. First, the sentence can be used to convey that there are two portraits of (some particular) Churchill in the National Gallery; and second, that there are (one or more) portraits of two Churchills in the National Gallery. (To illustrate the second option, consider the following scenario: I ask you, 'Is there a portrait of Churchill in the National Gallery?' And you respond with, 'Which Churchill? There are actually *two* Churchills in the National Gallery: Winston Churchill and his ancestor John Churchill, the Duke of Marlborough'.) Clearly, the sentence 'There are two Churchills in the National Gallery' might have different truth values under the two interpretations. E.g., assume the National Gallery owns two portraits of Winston Churchill, but no portraits of any other Churchills; then, the sentence is true under the first interpretation, but false under the second. Or assume the National Gallery owns exactly one portrait of Winston Churchill and exactly one of his ancestor John Churchill, the Duke of Marlborough, and no portraits of any other Churchills; then, the sentence is false under the first interpretation, but true under the second. Nunberg would argue that under the first interpretation, the name 'Churchill' receives deferred interpretation and is used in sense of 'portrait of Churchill', conveying the property of being a portrait of Churchill. By contrast, under the second interpretation, it is the verb phrase 'to be in the National Gallery' that receives deferred interpretation and that conveys something like 'to be *represented by a portrait* in the National Gallery'. (A side note: the second interpretation still leaves several options for how to analyze the name 'Churchill': e.g., 'Churchill' might mean 'bearer of the name 'Churchill'', as in 'Two bearers of the name 'Churchill' are represented with portraits in

the National Gallery'; but just as well 'member of the Churchill family', as in 'Two members of the Churchill family are represented with a portrait in the National Gallery'.)

To sum up, in the case of depiction-uses, the name and the sentence-predicate can each receive deferred interpretation. Interestingly, not all count-noun-uses behave this way. E.g., take the sentence 'The National Gallery owns two Leonardos'. This sentence can be used to convey, e.g., that the National Gallery owns two paintings by Leonardo da Vinci; but it cannot be used to convey that the National Gallery owns (one or more) paintings by two Leonardos–say, one by Leonardo da Vinci and one by some other artist named 'Leonardo'. So, here only the name ('Leonardo') and not the sentence-predicate ('own') can receive deferred interpretation. In other words, the Leonardo- and Churchill-examples do not allow for the same types of deferred interpretations. It is not immediately evident why. Let us briefly look at two explanations that remain unsatisfactory and a third one that is more promising. The first explanation would point to the types of count-noun-uses: perhaps, depiction-uses allow for both types of deferred interpretation, and artwork-uses only for one. Against this first explanation, consider a sentence like 'There are two Leonardos in the National Gallery'. To be sure, under its most natural interpretation, the sentence conveys that there are two paintings by Leonardo da Vinci in the National Gallery. But the sentence might also be used to convey that two Leonardos (two artists named 'Leonardo') are represented with some of their works in the National Gallery; in that case, not only the name, but also the sentence-predicate would receive deferred interpretation. A second explanation would point to the standard meaning of the sentence-predicate: e.g., the predicate 'own'–in its standard content of ownership–applies to artworks, not to persons, while the predicate 'being in' (as in 'There are two Leonardos in the National Gallery') applies to artworks and persons alike; hence, 'own' can be applied by deferred interpretation to uses of 'Leonardo' that range over artworks by Leonardo da Vinci, but not to uses of 'Leonardo' that range over persons bearing the name 'Leonardo'. Against this second explanation, recall one of the above examples of deferred interpretation, adopted from Nunberg: you say 'We are parked out back' in a situation where you and your spouse came in the same car. Here, we followed Nunberg and argued that the sentence-predicate 'parked out back' (not the subject 'we') receives deferred interpretation and is hence applied to persons (to you and your spouse), even though the predicate's standard uses apply to vehicles, not to persons.

A more promising third explanation could point out that in some cases, using the sentence-predicate with a deferred interpretation would simply be *misleading*. Assume a speaker utters the sentence 'The National Gallery owns two Leonardos' with the intention to convey that the National Gallery owns paintings by two bearers of the name 'Leonardo'/by two artists named 'Leonardo'; here, the speaker would use the sentence-predicate 'own' with a deferred interpretation where 'to own *x*' is intended to convey 'to own paintings by *x*'. Now, clearly, this use of 'own' is not conventionalized; by contrast, the name 'Leonardo' has a highly conventionalized count-noun-use on which it means 'painting by Leonardo da Vinci'. And it seems that hearers are more likely to understand the phrase 'owns two Leonardos' as conveying a *conventionalized* meaning, and hence as conveying the property of owning two paintings by Leonardo da Vinci than as conveying the property of owning paintings by two artists named 'Leonardo'. Also, compare the two

propositions that the National Gallery owns paintings by two artists named 'Leonardo', and that the National Gallery owns two paintings by Leonardo da Vinci: it seems that both propositions would be relevant in roughly the same contexts–that is, in contexts of discussing the paintings owned by the National Gallery. So, the utterance-context does not give hearers any reason to interpret the sentence as conveying the non-conventionalized content as opposed to the more easily comprehensible conventionalized content. And speakers will be able to anticipate that their hearers will react this way. Hence, speakers should realize that uttering the sentence to convey the non-conventionalized content will be misleading–they will be unlikely to get the intended content across. For a caveat, note that this explanation does not yet tell us *why* there is a conventionalized use of 'Leonardo' in the sense of 'painting by Leonardo da Vinci', but no conventionalized use of 'own *x*' in the sense of 'own paintings by *x*'. One possible explanation would be that facts about creation (e.g., who painted a particular painting) generally take precedence over facts about ownership (e.g., what museum owns a particular painting). Also, there are several potential explanations of this precedence: e.g., facts about creation might take precedence because they are generally regarded as more significant/noteworthy than facts about ownership,[310] or because they concern intrinsic rather than extrinsic properties, or the like.

5.4.3) Predicative Name-Uses: The Debate between Predicativists and Anti-Predicativists
Against this background, let us see what role that predicative name-uses play in the debate between predicativists and anti-predicativists. In the previous sections, we encountered various kinds of predicative name-uses: among them metalinguistic count-noun-uses, but also a) count-noun-uses that are not metalinguistic and b) predicative name-uses where names are not used as count nouns, but, e.g., as mass nouns or adjectives. Critics of predicativism like Jeshion (2015a) use predicative name-uses that are not metalinguistic count-noun-uses to challenge the predicativist *uniformity argument*: according to the uniformity argument, predicativism is superior since its metalinguistic analysis of names uniformly applies to *all* name-uses–to apparent referential and apparent predicative uses alike. According to Jeshion, predicativism in fact fails to apply to a large variety of name-uses, namely to predicative name-uses that are not metalinguistic count-noun-uses.[311] A bit more specifically, non-metalinguistic predicative name-uses will be counterexamples against the metalinguistic interpretation of names; and predicative name-use that are not count-noun-uses will be counterexamples against the count noun view.

In the remainder of this section, we will look at the predicativist response to this challenge and potential counterarguments by the anti-predicativist. Graff Fara (2015b) responds to Jeshion's challenge that the apparent name-uses cited by critics of predicativism are not *standard* name-uses: they are either non-standard, derived name-uses, or they are not even uses of names, but of expressions merely *homophonous* with names; by contrast, the only standard name-uses would be uses of names as metalinguistic count nouns. Thereby, the

[310] This explanation comes close to Nunberg's criterion that a property derived deferred interpretation should be contextually 'noteworthy' (see Nunberg 1995, 114; 2004, 349f.). The difference is that there might be contexts in which facts about ownership *are* more noteworthy than facts about creation; our explanation, by contrast, is non-contextual and rather relies on the claim that facts about creation are *generally* more noteworthy than facts about ownership.
[311] See Jeshion 2915a, 247-249.

existence of apparent non-metalinguistic predicative name-uses, and apparent name-uses that are not count-noun-uses, does not jeopardize the treatment of names as metalinguistic count nouns.[312]

To strengthen this point, Graff Fara argues that there are four options for how to analyze cases of non-standard content/of content-derivation:[313]

- A content derived from a standard content of an expression *e* can be:
  - **a)** a non-literal content of *e*;
  - **b)** an additional literal content of *e* (next to the standard content of *e*, which is also literal);
  - **c)** a literal content of a longer expression that contains *e* as part, and the rest of which is deleted/elided;
  - **d)** a literal content of a new expression homophonous with *e*.

Let us consider some potential examples, focusing on count-noun-uses of names. First, for an example that might fit under **(b)** or **(d)**, recall genericized trademarks like 'hoover' in the more general sense of 'vacuum': here, the predicative content of being a vacuum, derived from the use of 'hoover' for the company, has been conventionalized.[314] There is ample evidence that the property of being a vacuum has become a *literal* content of 'hoover'. Consider four indicators: first, 'vacuum' is typically listed in dictionaries as one meaning of 'hoover'. Second, speakers can (and presumably many do) use 'hoover' in the sense of 'vacuum' without being aware that 'hoover' initially referred only to one *manufacturer* of vacuums–that is, the designated bearer of 'Hoover' (the company) is not part of the content conveyed by the count-noun-use of 'hoover'. Third, for a counterfactual argument, we would continue to use 'hoover' in the sense of 'vacuum' even if we no longer used 'Hoover' as a name for the company, or if the company was dissolved. And fourth, the count-noun-use has a different orthography than the referential use: the latter is capitalized, the former is not. All four points distinguish the count-noun-use of 'hoover' from count-noun-uses like 'Leonardo' in the sense of 'painting by Leonardo da Vinci'. To be sure, this does not yet settle whether the predicative use of 'hoover' in the sense of 'vacuum' is an example of **(b)** or **(d)**: 'hoover'/'Hoover' might be two uses of the same expression, in which the expression would have more than one literal content–the company as referential content, and the property of being a vacuum as predicative content. Just as well, 'hoover' in the sense of 'vacuum' might be a new expression that is merely *homophonous* with the name 'Hoover' for the company, and whose *only* literal content is the property of being a vacuum. For our purposes, we will not decide between the two options.

Let us turn to a second example. As we saw in 5.2.3, count-noun-uses of names can often be replaced with a name-noun compound: e.g., 'a Leonardo' with 'a Leonardo painting'. Here, option **(c)** is fairly plausible, that is, an analysis in terms of deletion/elision: 'a Leonardo' could then be analyzed as 'a Leonardo ~~painting~~', where 'painting' is deleted/elided (here indicated by striking 'painting' out). In that case, the name 'Leonardo' in 'a Leonardo' would not convey the property of being a painting by Leonardo da Vinci–rather, it would convey the same content it also contributes to phrases like 'a Leonardo

[312] See especially Graff Fara 2015b, 259-261.

[313] See Graff Fara 2015b, 259-261. On p. 260f., our point **(a)** is listed as '**Pragmatic**', **(b)** as '**Semantic shift**', **(c)** as '**Predicate ellipsis**', and **(d)** as '**Predicate replacement**'.

[314] Note that we sidestep the question whether the use of 'Hoover' as name for the company is a literal content or not; we merely assume, for the sake of the argument, that the use of 'hoover' in the sense of 'tissue' is derived from the use of 'Hoover' for the company.

painting' where the name occurs as a noun adjunct. Section 5.4.7 will be devoted to a critique of this analysis.

Uncontentious examples of **(a)** are not easy to come by. To be sure, we classified most count-noun-uses of names as metaphors or metonymies; so, *if* metaphors and metonymies are non-literal, then the same will be true for most count-noun-uses. E.g., the property of being a prodigy, as metaphorically conveyed by the name 'Mozart' ('My son is a second Mozart'), will then be a non-literal content of 'Mozart'. And the property of being a painting by Leonardo da Vinci, as metonymically conveyed by the name 'Leonardo', will be a non-literal content of 'Leonardo'. Then again, it has become increasingly controversial in contemporary philosophy and linguistics whether metaphors and metonymies are indeed non-literal.[315] For our purposes, we will leave the question of the literal content of metaphors/metonymies open.

Graff Fara argues that regardless of which of the analyses **(a-d)** is correct, examples of count-noun-uses that can be classified as cases of content-derivation will not threaten predicativism.[316] If **(a)** is correct, then the derived content of count-noun-uses is not their literal content–but the predicativist analysis is only meant to capture literal content. If **(c)** or **(d)** are correct, then the expression that gets its content by derivation is not a name: in the case of **(c)**, the expression is a longer expression, consisting of a name and some other expression that is deleted; in the case of **(d)**, the expression is a predicate *derived* from a name. But the predicativist analysis is only meant to apply to names, not to expressions that merely contain names as constituents or that are merely derived from names.

Option **(b)** might seem more challenging to predicativists: if **(b)** is correct, then predicativism will not apply to *all* name-uses–some uses of a name *N* will *not* literally express the property of being a bearer of *N*. However, Graff Fara argues that an analogous analysis can be applied to other predicates, in particular to common count nouns. E.g., option **(b)** would also be available for common count nouns like 'sandwich' and their deferred-interpretation uses: e.g., the literal contents of 'sandwich' might include *both* the property of being a sandwich (a type of dish) and the property of having ordered a sandwich (a property that 'sandwich' conveys under deferred interpretation); but still, only the former property would be a *standard* content of 'sandwich'. In that case, **(b)** contradicts neither the predicativist claim that the *standard* literal content of a name *N* is the property of being a bearer of *N*.

In a third step, let us see how critics of predicativism can respond to Graff Fara. Jeshion (2015b) agrees with Graff Fara that common count nouns have standard as well as non-standard contents/uses, and that their non-standard uses include resemblance- and deferred-interpretation-uses. So, *if* names are count nouns, and *if* the standard content of a name *N* is the metalinguistic property of being a bearer of name *N*, then non-metalinguistic count-noun-uses of names can be treated as resemblance- or deferred-interpretation-uses.[317] Jeshion objects that Graff Fara's response just *assumes* the antecedent of this conditional rather than *establishing* it. That is, Graff Fara's response would work if it

[315] See, e.g., Recanati 1995; Carston 2002, 349-359; Carston 2012.
[316] See Graff Fara 2015b, 260f.
[317] See again Graff Fara 2015b, 260f.

already was established that names are count nouns whose standard content is metalinguistic–but this is precisely what predicativists and their critics disagree on.[318]

Is there a way out for the predicativist? The most natural response to the updated anti-predicativist challenge in Jeshion (2015b) would be an updated version of the uniformity argument: the view that the standard content of a name *N* is the metalinguistic property of being a bearer of *N* is still the *closest* we get to a uniform treatment of apparent name-uses–this view allows for a uniform treatment of apparent referential name-uses and metalinguistic count-noun-uses. The remaining, non-metalinguistic uses can then be analyzed according to one of the options **(a-d)** from the previous section–e.g., they could be analyzed as name-uses with a *non-standard* content. Also, it seems that there are two main alternatives to predicativism. Both analyses would analyze apparent referential name-uses as referential/non-predicative. Beyond that, the first analysis would treat only apparent referential name-uses as standard name-uses; roughly, this is the singular term view introduced in 2.1. The second analysis would additionally treat at least some apparent predicative name-uses (e.g., metalinguistic count-noun-uses) as standard name-uses; this is the *type-ambiguity view* introduced in 2.6. The singular term view is equally uniform as predicativism (it analyzes all standard name-uses as singular terms/as referential), but it accounts for less apparent name-uses than predicativism (it does not account for apparent predicative name-uses). The *type-ambiguity view* is less uniform than predicativism (it analyzes some name-uses as referential, others as predicative). So, against the type-ambiguity view, predicativists could again invoke the uniformity argument; and against the singular term view, predicativists could additionally invoke another criterion by which to evaluate theories, namely the criterion of *scope*: predicativism accounts for considerably *more* cases than other equally uniform theories of names, including the singular term view.

To evaluate the predicativist response, let us take a step back. We argue that predicativism confronts us with more general questions about linguistic expressions: in particular, which uses/contents of expressions are *standard* and which are *non-standard*? Predicativists analyze only apparent referential name-uses and apparent metalinguistic count-noun-uses as standard name-uses; the argument for this analysis is mainly based on the uniformity argument, that is, on the argument that the predicativist analysis is uniform and hence theoretically superior. In our updated version, the argument would invoke not just the theory's uniformity, but also its scope. However, if we follow this reasoning, other theoretical virtues will favor other analyses: e.g., the virtue of coherence with pre-theoretic intuition will favor both the singular term view and the type-ambiguity view–intuitively, names are referential on at least some, if not all, their uses. In addition, one might argue that an account of standard uses should satisfy not only general theoretical virtues (such as uniformity, scope, etc.), but also criteria that are *genuinely linguistic*. E.g., one might demand that a theory of the standard uses of an expression should give precedence to the *most common* or *most important* uses of the expression. And clearly, apparent referential name-uses are more common, and more important to our overall use of language, than apparent predicative name-uses–we mostly use names referentially, and their

[318] See Jeshion 2015b, 286f.

referential use is the primary reason to introduce names in the first place. This criterion would favor the singular term view over predicativism and the type-ambiguity view. So, the burden of proof is on predicativism: the predicativist needs to explain why the advantages of predicativism outweigh the advantages of theories like the singular term view or the type-ambiguity view.

5.4.4) Further Evidence Against the Count Noun View

Going beyond the more general critique of predicativism outlined in the previous section, let us raise at least a more specific objection against the predicativist view that names are count nouns. In particular, we argue that *content-derivation* is crucially different for names than for count nouns. We consider two types of count nouns: first, common count nouns; second, proper nouns that cannot be used as names–think of demonyms such as 'Italian' or 'Spaniard'.

To be sure, names as well as common count nouns have metaphoric and metonymic uses that are derived from the respective standard uses (or, more cautiously, names and common count nouns allow us to derive *homophonous* expressions by metaphor or metonymy). First, however, the same holds for various other kinds of expressions, including mass nouns, verbs, or adjectives. For mass nouns, think of the metaphoric use of 'baggage' in 'emotional baggage', or the metonymic use of 'milk' in 'oat milk', etc.; for verbs: the metaphoric use of 'explode' in the sense of 'burst with anger', or the metonymic use of 'breathe' in the sense of 'live' ('For as long as I breathe…');[319] for adjectives: the metaphoric use of 'cold' in 'emotionally cold', or the metonymic use of 'green' in the sense of 'unripe'.[320] Second, the process by which metaphoric/metonymic uses are derived is crucially different for names than for common count nouns. Most importantly, as we saw in 4.2.2 and 5.4.2, it seems that (non-metalinguistic) metaphoric and metonymic name-uses are derived from *referential* uses, whereas metaphoric and metonymic uses of common count nouns are derived from *non-referential* uses.

Let us add a second, more intricate difference between the content-derivation of names and count nouns. As a case in point, consider deferred interpretation. As we said in 5.4.2, count-noun-uses of names can be combined with *two different kinds* of deferred interpretation: e.g., in the case of depiction-uses, both the name and the sentence-predicate can receive deferred interpretation (though not at the same time); by contrast, in the case of artwork-uses, the name receives deferred interpretation, while the sentence-predicate does not. Now, interestingly, count nouns seem to behave in a less systematic way than names–in some cases, count nouns even behave in the *opposite* way to names. Take two examples similar to the ones from 4.2.2, one involving an artwork-use, the other a depiction-use: 'There are two Leonardos in the National Gallery' and 'There are two Churchills in the National Gallery'. Replace 'Churchill' with the common count noun (or common count noun phrase) 'prime minister'; also, replace 'Leonardo' with the proper noun 'Italian'–a demonym that functions like a count noun and cannot be used as name. This gives us: 'There are two Italians in the National Gallery' and 'There are two prime ministers in the National Gallery'. So, roughly, 'Italian' is interpreted as 'painting by an Italian', and

[319] See Halliday 1994, 340 (for 'breathe').
[320] See Warren 2006, 10 (for 'green').

'prime minister' as 'depiction of a prime minister'. Now, 'There are two Italians in the National Gallery' can convey that two paintings by (one or more) Italians are in the National Gallery; and also that paintings by two Italians are in the National Gallery; in the first case, the noun 'Italians' would receive deferred interpretation, in the second case the sentence-predicate 'are in the National Gallery'. By contrast, in the case of names ('There are two Leonardos in the National Gallery'), only the name can receive deferred interpretation. Also, it seems that 'There are two prime ministers in the National Gallery' can convey that depictions of two prime ministers are in the National Gallery; but not that two depictions of (one or more) prime ministers are in the National Gallery. The latter proposition would be true even if all depictions of prime ministers depicted the same prime minister, which does not seem to be an admissible interpretation of the sentence. So, here, the sentence-predicate can shift its meaning, but the common count noun cannot, while in the case of names, both the name and the sentence-predicate can shift their meaning.

As these observations show, the analogy between the content-derivation of names and common count nouns–an analogy supposed to warrant their joint classification as count nouns–is merely superficial. On the contrary, phenomena of content-derivation illustrate the significant *differences* between names and common count nouns.

5.4.5) Challenging the Type-Ambiguity View

What are the main alternatives to predicativism in analyzing predicative name-uses? As we saw in section 2.6, the type-ambiguity view positions itself as an alternative to predicativism, in particular to two signature claims of predicativism: to the predicate view that names are predicates on all their uses, and to the count noun view that names are count nouns on all their uses. In this section, we argue that the type-ambiguity view indeed evades some of the problems of predicativism. Still, we take it that the existing versions of the type-ambiguity view can be challenged with some of the same arguments as predicativism and hence provide no viable alternative to predicativism. In the next section, we will suggest that those challenges can be met by modifying the type-ambiguity view.

We begin with two main advantages of the type-ambiguity view over predicativism. First, recall that the type-ambiguity view treats apparent referential name-uses as singular terms, not as denuded definite descriptions or denuded complex demonstratives. Thereby, the type-ambiguity view evades especially the problems of the syntactic analysis of names by predicativism (see 4.3), and the problems of the predicativist paraphrase of names (see 4.4). Second, according to the type-ambiguity view, referential name-uses are not derived from predicative name-uses, but rather vice versa; this agrees better with crosslinguistic evidence from less liberal languages than English that contain referential name-uses, but no or only limited predicative name-uses (recall the remarks on Danish in 2.6).

On the other hand, the existing versions of the type-ambiguity view–that is, the two versions by Leckie and Schoubye introduced in 2.6–face some of the same challenges as predicativism. First, recall the challenge formulated in 4.2: just like predicativists, the proponents of the type-ambiguity view overgeneralize the Sloat chart by suggesting that in English, *all* referentially used names correspond to a name that is used as a

metalinguistic predicate and, more specifically, as a metalinguistic count noun.[321] As we saw, this is *not* the case: think again of proper nouns referring to companies/brands, of capitalized descriptions, or of titles of texts/artifacts–such names often do not allow for uses as metalinguistic predicates/count nouns. We suggest that the claim that *all* referentially used names correspond to a predicatively used name is not essential to the type-ambiguity view and should hence be abandoned by a revision of the view. Such a revision would be in line with Schoubye's observation that different languages allow for different derivations of predicative from referential name-uses, depending on how liberal the respective language is. It would then not be surprising that even in a compatibly liberal language like English, not *all* names allow for *all* types of predicative uses.

For a second challenge, the existing versions of the type-ambiguity view focus on *metalinguistic* predicative name-uses and largely neglect *non*-metalinguistic ones. E.g., according to Schoubye, names are like pronouns in that they are associated with φ-features: roughly, the φ-feature of a name *N* is the metalinguistic property of being a bearer of *N*. This way, Schoubye gives precedence to *metalinguistic* predicative name-uses. However, consider the following challenge: when pronouns are used predicatively (as in 'My best friend is a she'), then the *only* properties such uses can convey are properties that constitute φ-features. By contrast, even assuming that names have φ-features, and that those φ-features consist in metalinguistic properties, those φ-features are not the only properties that predicative name-uses can convey–as we saw, they can convey a wide range of non-metalinguistic properties as well. Also, expressions other than names can also have metalinguistic predicative uses–think of homonymous common nouns like 'bank': 'I went to two banks today: the Bank of America branch on Wall Street and the bank of the East River'.[322] To be sure, such metalinguistic predicative uses of common nouns are less frequent than the metalinguistic predicative uses of names, but they exist; and they are certainly not derived from any φ-features of common nouns.

Leckie's version of the type-ambiguity view, like Schoubye's, neglects non-metalinguistic predicative name-uses. Still, Leckie's *metonymic* account of predicative name-uses is more easily extended to non-metalinguistic uses. As we saw in 2.6, according to Leckie, English contains a lexicalized metonymic rule that allows for names to have metalinguistic predicative uses on which they express metalinguistic properties; due to their lexicalization, such uses will *literally/semantically* express metalinguistic properties. By contrast, Leckie explicitly argues that such uses are not merely a *pragmatic* phenomenon.[323] Her argument goes roughly as follows: if the metalinguistic content of predicative

[321] See Leckie 2014, 1143; Schoubye 2017, 724.
[322] For a similar example, see Rami 2022, 167. Consider an even more plausible example. Assume I tell you, 'I went to a bank today'. If it is unclear from the context which property I intend to express with 'bank', it would be natural for you to ask, 'Which kind of bank? A financial institute or a riverside?'. Here, you use 'bank' to convey the metalinguistic property of being called 'bank': your question can be reformulated as 'Which kind of entity called 'bank'?'. That the use of 'bank' here is metalinguistic is supported by the following reasoning: if we use 'bank' non-metalinguistically, then 'bank' will either express the property of being a financial institute or the property of being a riverside. In the former case, riversides are not a kind of bank, as riversides are not a kind of financial institute–rather, the different kinds of banks will then include commercial banks, cooperative banks, etc. Analogously if 'bank' expresses the property of being a riverside–financial institutes are not a kind of riverside. For a similar example, see Leckie 2013, 1157.
[323] See Leckie 2013, 1158f.

name-uses was merely pragmatically conveyed (not semantically expressed), then in cases where a non-metalinguistic reading of a predicative name-use is more plausible, the metalinguistic reading should not be admissible; but metalinguistic readings are admissible for *all* predicative name-uses, including for those uses where the intended content is not metalinguistic (Leckie cites resemblance- and family-uses).[324] Let us list three objections. First, the assumption that metalinguistic readings are admissible for all predicative name-uses contradicts the evidence provided in 4.5. There we argued that on some uses, non-metalinguistic readings are the *only* admissible readings: recall the example of company/brand names that seem to have manufacturing- and resemblance-uses, but no metalinguistic uses. To be sure, a metalinguistic interpretation seems to be available for *most* predicative name-uses, even where it is not the intended interpretation. However, second, this holds also for (at least some) non-metalinguistic uses: e.g., the sentence 'There are two Leonardos in the National Gallery' can always be interpreted as conveying that there are two paintings by Leonardo da Vinci in the National Gallery, even in contexts where the intended content is that there are two bearers of 'Leonardo' in the National Gallery–e.g., two visitors whose first name is 'Leonardo'. Third, Leckie considers only one possible reason why predicative name-uses often allow for unintended (e.g., metalinguistic) interpretations: namely that those interpretations are lexicalized. However, the following alternative explanation would be equally plausible: predicative name-uses typically allow for unintended (metalinguistic or non-metalinguistic) interpretations simply because those interpretations are *often* intended, which is why hearers generally take them into account as candidates for intended interpretation–even in cases where they ultimately turn out *not* to be intended. This alternative explanation is perfectly compatible with the view that the intended content of predicative name-uses is just pragmatically conveyed, not semantically expressed. Compare the case of generalized conversational implicatures.[325] E.g., the implicature from 'some' to 'not all': the literal content of 'Some guests already left' is the proposition that at least one guest has already left; but utterances of the sentence will often be intended to convey the proposition that at least one, but not all guests already left.[326] And since an implicature of this kind are *usually* part of the intended content of utterances of 'some', hearers might take the implicature into account as a candidate for the intended interpretation of 'some' even in cases where it turns out *not* to be intended. On the other hand, if metalinguistic predicative interpretations *are* lexicalized for names, then the same should hold for at least some *non-metalinguistic* predicative interpretations, namely for those that are generally admissible even when they are not intended.

5.4.6) Sketching an Alternative Analysis

Against this background, we turn to an alternative analysis of count-noun-uses of names. Most importantly, we will argue that *most* predicative name-uses–be they metalinguistic or not–have the *same semantic status*. More specifically, we will suggest that most predicative name-uses, including all that are *metalinguistic*, are non-standard uses that are

[324] See Leckie 2013, 1158f.
[325] On generalized conversational implicatures, see, e.g., Grice 1975, 56f.; Levison 2000, 11-72.
[326] On generalized conversational implicatures in general, see, e.g., Grice 1975, 56f.; Levison 2000, 11-72. On the generalized conversational implicature from 'some' to 'not all', see Davis 1998, 10f., 21f.; Levinson 2000, 16f. (with the guests-example).

derived from referential name-uses. The resulting view will be a version of the type-ambiguity view that deviates from the versions proposed so far in the literature.

We proceed in three steps. First, we argue that all apparent metalinguistic predicative name-uses and at least some apparent non-metalinguistic predicative name-uses are indeed uses *of* names (the remaining apparent non-metalinguistic predicative name-uses will *not* be uses of names, but instead of expressions merely *homophonous* with names). Second, we argue that no apparent predicative name-uses are used *as* names–rather, they are used as predicates, and more specifically as count nouns, as mass nouns, etc. Hence, they are *non-standard* uses of names. Third, we discuss whether all predicative name-uses are *derived* from referential name-uses.

Let us begin with the question: are apparent predicative name-uses uses *of* names? In response to this question, we suggest an approach that individuates expressions and their uses in terms of synchronic derivation. We formulate merely a *sufficient* condition:

D If an expression *e* has a use *u*, and an expression *e** homophonous with *e* has a use *u**, and *u** is synchronically derived from *u*, then *u** is also a use of *e*.

E.g., there is an expression spelled and pronounced 'Leonardo' that is a name of Leonardo da Vinci; also, there is a second, homophonous expression that can be used as a count noun, ranging over paintings by Leonardo da Vinci. And the latter use is synchronically derived from the former, namely by a more general rule stating that if PN is a proper noun referring to a person *x*, then a noun homophonous with PN can be used to range over the paintings by *x*. So, by **D**, the count-noun-use of the second expression is also a use of the first expression, and hence a use *of* the name 'Leonardo'. By contrast, take a genericized trademark like 'Kleenex'. There is an expression spelled and pronounced 'Kleenex' that is a name of the brand Kleenex; also, there is a second, homophonous expression that can be used as a count noun, ranging over tissues (not necessarily of the brand Kleenex). Here, as we argued above, the latter use is not synchronically, but only diachronically derived from the former. So, **D** leaves it open whether the count-noun-use of the second expression is also a use of the first expression. The same will hold for most predicative name-uses that we classified as *conventionalized* in 5.2 and 5.3.

Note that our answer to the first question does not decide whether the names in questions are individuated only by their phonology or also by their bearers: 'Leonardo' might be a disambiguated name only for Leonardo da Vinci, or a non-disambiguated name for Leonardo da Vinci, Leonardo DiCapriori, etc. Also note that the approach is rather coarse-grained: e.g., uses of verbs that are synchronically derived from nouns (such as, arguably, the verb 'bottle', derived from the count noun 'bottle') will be classified as uses of nouns; to avoid this potentially counterintuitive consequence, we might add in the antecedent of **D** that *e* and *e** belong to the same *class* of expressions, e.g., to the same word class. Classes of expressions would then have to be individuated in a way that verbs and nouns do not belong to the same class, but all nouns/noun phrases (e.g., names and count nouns) do.

Let us turn to the second question: are apparent predicative name-uses used *as* names? Our answer will be given in terms of the *primary function* that a particular class of expressions is meant to fulfill. Roughly, we suggest that a use *u* of an expression *e*, is used *as* an expression of class C iff on *u*, *e* is used to fulfill the primary function of the expressions belonging to C. E.g., let C be the class *name*: then, on *u*, *e* is used as a name iff on

u, *e* is used to fulfill the primary function of names. Also, we take it that the primary function of a name is to be used to refer to its bearers. So, a use *u* of an expression *e* is a use of *e* as a name iff on *u*, *e* is used to refer to a bearer of *e*. (More cautiously, we might say that the primary function of a name is to be used on occurrences that refer to the name's bearers; so, a use *u* of an expression *e* is a use of *e* as a name iff on *u*, *e* is used as part of a phrase that refers to a bearer of *e*. This would account for the predicativist view that names are not used to refer, but can occur as parts of denuded referring phrases.) By this conception, names are not *always* used as names: on some occurrences, names are not used referentially (or as part of a referring phrase), but exclusively predicatively. Now, count-noun-uses of a name are not referential, and hence do not refer to the name's bearers; so, when names are used as count nouns, they are not used *as names*. This will hold regardless of whether such count-noun-uses are metalinguistic or not: so, even if predicativists are right in their verdict that *non-metalinguistic* count-noun-uses are not used as names, the same will hold for *metalinguistic* count-noun-uses, contrary to predicativism. Taking the two previous results together gives us a version of the type-ambiguity view: names can typically be used both referentially and predicatively (even though on their predicative uses, they are not used *as* names).

Finally, consider the third question: are all predicative name-uses *derived* from referential name-uses? As we saw on several occasions over the course of this study, most *non-metalinguistic* predicative name-uses seem to be derived from referential name-uses. E.g., the non-metalinguistic predicative use of 'Leonardo' in the sense of 'painting by Leonardo da Vinci' would seem to be derived from the referential use of 'Leonardo' for Leonardo da Vinci. More importantly, does this also hold for *metalinguistic* predicative name-uses? In 5.4.1 and 5.4.2, we suggested that metalinguistic *predicative* name-uses can be derived from metalinguistic *referential* name-uses on which a name is used to refer to itself (that is, from *mentioned* occurrences of the name). We briefly considered two approaches: the first (in 5.4.1) was metonymic and followed a proposal by Van Langendonck; the second (in 5.4.2) was based on Nunberg's notion of deferred interpretation and postulated a salient function from names to sets of name-bearers. So, we could summarize:

- Non-metalinguistic predicative uses of a name *N* are derived from non-metalinguistic referential uses of *N*, specifically uses of *N* that refer to bearers of *N*.
- Metalinguistic predicative uses of a name *N* are derived from metalinguistic referential uses of *N*, specifically uses of *N* that refer to the name *N* itself (that is, mentioned occurrences of *N*).

On closer inspection, the second claim–about *metalinguistic* predicative name-uses–turns out to be problematic. Recall that in 5.1, we defined synchronic derivation in terms of grounding. It is not clear, however, whether metalinguistic predicative name-uses are indeed grounded in the function of names to refer to themselves: in particular, if we decided to abandon that function, we might still continue to use names as metalinguistic count nouns. E.g., if we decided that the name 'Mary' can no longer be used to refer to itself (as in ''Mary' is a name'), we might still continue to use 'Mary' as a metalinguistic count noun (as in 'I know a Mary'). For a promising alternative, we might suggest that an expression *e* can be associated with *two* metalinguistic functions neither of which is grounded in the other: the first is referential and refers to *e* itself (for most types of expressions, this function will be the more common one); the second is predicative and

ranges over entities called *e*. Importantly, this approach neither quantifies over *all* names nor *only* over names: as we saw, some names (e.g., proper nouns for companies) do not have metalinguistic predicative uses, while expressions *other* than names (e.g., pronouns like 'she' or common nouns like 'bank') often *do* have metalinguistic predicative uses.

Predicativists might reply to this alternative picture that apart from names, expressions are rarely used with a *predicative* metalinguistic meaning. E.g., common nouns CN are rarely if ever used to convey the property of being called CN. Take again the common count noun 'bank', which is hardly ever used to convey the property of being an entity called 'bank'. As we saw, the noun *can* be used this way, as when I say, 'I went to two banks today: the Bank of America branch on Wall Street and the bank of the East River'. But such uses are rare, and certainly much rarer than, e.g., metalinguistic uses of 'Mary' as in 'I know a Mary'. We sketch two objections against this reply. First, in the case of names, the bearers usually share their ontological categories: e.g., they are persons in the case of personal names, places in the case of place names, etc. (Exceptions include 'Washington' as both personal and place name.) And objects belonging to the same ontological categories are more easily grouped together and quantified over. This explains at least the frequent *plural* use of names ('There are two Maries in my class'). By contrast, the same rarely holds for common nouns. Take again 'bank': financial institutes and riversides belong to disparate ontological categories. For a second objection, metalinguistic uses of names are not easily *mistaken* for the most common name-uses, that is, for referential name-uses–simply because referential name-uses are typically neither combined with indefinite articles nor with numerals, nor are they pluralized, etc. So, sentences like 'There are two Marys in my class' or 'Which Washington do you like better? The city or the state?' are not ambiguous between the metalinguistic and referential reading of 'Mary(s)' or 'Washington'. By contrast, the opposite is true for common nouns: e.g., even if we allow that a sentence like 'I went to two banks today' can be used to convey the metalinguistic content that I went to two entities called 'bank' today (e.g., a bank branch and a riverside), the sentence will be ambiguous between the metalinguistic reading and the two more common non-metalinguistic readings under which 'bank' conveys either the property of being a financial institute or the property of being a riverside. And clearly, each non-metalinguistic reading will be far more natural than the metalinguistic reading. This seems to sufficiently explain why predicative metalinguistic uses are more common for names than for expressions like common nouns.

5.4.7) Against PF-Deletion: An Argument from German Gender- and Plural-Marking

In section 5.4.3, we introduced four different options for how to analyze count-noun-uses of names. According to option **(c)**, such uses can be analyzed as the pronounced part of a longer expression the rest of which is deleted, that is, remains unpronounced. This phenomenon is commonly known as PF-deletion: as deletion from the final phonetic form (PF) of an expression.[327] The proposal that at least some count-noun-uses of names can be analyzed as cases of PF-deletion is defended, e.g., in Karen De Clerq (2008).

[327] On PF-deletion more generally, see, e.g., Kennedy 2002; Merchant 2004; 2013; Fox/Lasnik 2003; Baltin 2012; Colley/Bassi 2022.

In the case of count-noun-uses of names, the longer expression would most likely be a name-noun compound, where the name acts as name-adjunct and is combined with a common count noun that remains unpronounced; so, the uses that we classified as count-noun-uses would not be count-noun-uses after all, but rather name-adjuncts in disguise. Typically, the unpronounced common count noun will express an object category that the objects in the extension of the compound belong to. E.g., the sentence 'There is a Leonardo in the National Gallery' might be analyzable as 'There is a Leonardo ~~painting~~ in the National Gallery'. Here, the count-noun-use of the name 'Leonardo' would be part of the name-noun compound 'Leonardo painting', where the common count noun 'painting' expresses an object category that the objects in the extension of 'Leonardo painting' belong to: Leonardo paintings belong to the object category *painting*. At the same time, the noun 'painting' remains unpronounced. Similarly, 'There are two Leonardos in the National Gallery', with the plural 'Leonardos', might be analyzable as 'There are two Leonardo ~~painting~~s in the National Gallery', where 'painting' is deleted, but the plural *-s* from 'paintings' is retained and contracted with 'Leonardo'. Still, also in English, there are important exceptions. If we focus on the count-noun-uses that we classified as *primary*, then the exceptions include especially the following:

- metalinguistic uses: 'Maria Shriver is a Maria' vs. *'Maria Shriver is a Maria woman/person/…', *'Maria Shriver is a 'Maria' bearer', or the like;
- family-uses: 'Maria Shriver is a Kennedy' vs. *'Maria Shriver is a Kennedy woman';
- resemblance-uses: 'Einstein is the Newton of the 20th century' vs. *'Einstein is the Newton person of the 20th century', ?'Einstein is the Newton analogue of the 20th century', ?'Einstein is the Newton-like person of the 20th century';
- time-uses: 'The last two Aprils were cold' vs. *'The last two April months/instances/… were cold';
- some more isolated cases: e.g., it sounds unnatural to combine a predicatively used name for a car model like '(Ford) Bronco' with a noun like 'car': ?'He drove a (Ford) Bronco car'.

If we go beyond an analysis in terms of name-noun compounds, then some of these examples might be avoided, e.g.:

- metalinguistic uses: 'Maria Shriver is a Maria' ≈ 'Maria Shriver is a ~~bearer of the name~~ 'Maria'';[328]
- car model uses: 'He drove a Bronco' ≈ 'He drove a ~~car of the model~~ Bronco'.

However, we would want a uniform analysis of *singular* and *plural* apparent predicative name-uses, and for plural uses, this type of analysis breaks down: e.g., 'He drove two Broncos' cannot be analyzed as 'He drove two ~~cars of the model~~ Bronco'/'He drove two ~~car~~s ~~of the model~~ Bronco'. Instead, the plural *-s* would have to be positioned *after* 'Bronco' (as in the unnatural 'He drove two Bronco~~-car~~s').

In this section, we argue that the analysis of count-noun-uses as cases of PF-deletion is even less plausible for languages that are morphologically richer than English. In particular, our focus will be on German, and there on the *morphological gender- and plural-marking* of count-noun-uses. As we will show, in German, different count-noun-uses are morphologically derived by different principles and accordingly require different analyses. Importantly, this also holds for *non-metalinguistic* count-noun-uses: as we will see, several non-metalinguistic count-noun-uses in German cannot be analyzed as cases of PF-deletion. The evidence from morphologically richer languages can be construed as a

[328] Such an analysis might urge us to analyze the apparent metalinguistic predicative use of 'Maria' in 'Maria Shriver is a Maria' as a mention; for the time being, we will not pursue this option further.

crosslinguistic argument against a deletion analysis of count-noun-uses in *any* language, including English.

Before we begin, let us insert two notes on terminology. First, we will call the extension of a predicative use of a (disambiguated) name the name's *predicative extension*. E.g., the predicative extension of a family-use of 'Kennedy' (disambiguated to refer to the Kennedy family) will be the set of members of the Kennedy family. The predicative extension of an artwork-use of 'Leonardo' (disambiguated to refer to Leonardo da Vinci) will be the set of artworks by Leonardo da Vinci. Second, we will speak of a *correspondence* between grammatical and non-grammatical genders: the grammatical genders *masculine* and *feminine* correspond to the non-grammatical genders of male and female, while the grammatical gender *neuter* corresponds to a non-grammatical lack of gender.

Now, let *e* be a German phrase headed by a count-noun-use of a name *N*. We suggest that there are at least three more general principles for determining the gender of *e*:

- The grammatical gender of *e*
  - **P1** corresponds to the gender of the objects in the extension of *e*, or
  - **P2** is the grammatical gender of *N* as referring to the designated bearer of *N*, or
  - **P3** is the grammatical gender of a salient expression describing the objects in the extension of *e*.

Also, as we will see below, there are German phrases headed by a predicatively used name whose gender is not determined by *any* more general principle. For now, let us elaborate on each of the principles **P1-3** in detail. First, **P1** is best illustrated by metalinguistic uses and by family-uses. Consider the following uses of the name 'Kennedy':

- Onassis hat eine Kennedy geheiratet.
  Onassis married a$_{fem}$ Kennedy.
- Onassis hat die berühmteste Kennedy geheiratet.
  Onassis married the$_{fem}$ most famous Kennedy.

Both sentences use phrases headed by a count-noun-use of the name 'Kennedy' which can here be interpreted both as a metalinguistic use ('bearer of the name 'Kennedy'') and as a family-use ('member of the Kennedy family'). As indicated by the feminine articles 'eine' and 'die', the phrases are feminine. Also, by German grammar, the extension of feminine metalinguistic uses or feminine family-use contains only female objects (female bearers of the respective name/female members of the respective family). So, e.g., if we interpret 'Kennedy' as family-use, the extension of the indefinite description 'eine Kennedy' is the set of all female members of the Kennedy family.

Second, consider principle **P2**. E.g., consider two sentences involving resemblance- and recording-uses:

- Javier Milei ist eine zweite Margaret Thatcher.
  Javier Milei is a second$_{fem}$ Margaret Thatcher.
- Die *Norma* von Karajan ist besser als sein *Fidelio*.
  The$_{fem}$ *Norma* by Karajan is better than his$_{masc}$ *Fidelio*. In the sense of: The recording of *Norma* by Karajan is better than his recording of *Fidelio*.

The first sentence contains a resemblance-use of the name 'Margaret Thatcher', the second contains recording-uses of the names/opera titles '*Norma*' and '*Fidelio*'. Let us assume these names are disambiguated such that their designated bearers are former British PM Margaret Thatcher, Bellini's opera *Norma*, and Beethoven's opera *Fidelio*. The name 'Margaret Thatcher' as used for the former PM and the name '*Norma*' as used for the opera are both feminine; and the name '*Fidelio*' as used for the opera is masculine. This is evident from referential uses of these names that are combined with

determiners/possessives and modifiers: e.g., 'die umstrittene Margaret Thatcher' ('the$_{fem}$ controversial Margaret Thatcher'), 'Bellini's bewegende *Norma*' ('Bellini's moving$_{fem}$ *Norma*'), or 'Beethoven's berühmter *Fidelio*' ('Beethoven's famous$_{masc}$ *Fidelio*'). This coheres with the gender of the count-noun-uses in our two example sentences: 'eine zweite Margaret Thatcher' ('a second$_{fem}$ Margaret Thatcher') is feminine; 'die *Norma* von Karajan' ('the$_{fem}$ *Norma* by Karajan') is feminine as well; and 'sein *Fidelio*' ('his$_{masc}$ *Fidelio*') is masculine.

We add three observations. First, the 'Thatcher'-example refutes De Clerq's claim that German count-noun-uses whose extension contains *persons* always have the grammatical gender corresponding to the gender of those persons: that is, feminine for female persons and masculine for male persons.[329] Instead, the resemblance-use of 'Margaret Thatcher' is feminine, despite the fact that its extension contains also male persons like Argentine president Javier Milei (where Milei would relevantly resemble Thatcher, e.g., by being a market-liberal politician). Second, in the 'Thatcher'-example, some might object that the feminine gender of the count-noun-use of 'Margaret Thatcher' does not follow the feminine gender of the name 'Margaret Thatcher' as referring to the name's designated bearer, but simply follows the female gender of the designated bearer, that is, of the person Margaret Thatcher. Note, however, that this proposal fails to work for the '*Norma*'-sentence. Here, the designated bearer of the name '*Norma*' is the opera *Norma* (not its title character, the priestess Norma). Operas are inanimate and hence genderless. So, if the gender of the count-noun-use of '*Norma*' followed the gender of the name's designated bearer, it should be neuter, not feminine. Analogously for the masculine count-noun-use of '*Fidelio*'. The same holds for resemblance-uses of opera titles, as in 'Verdis *Troubadour* ist keine *Norma*' ('Verdi's *Troubadour* is no$_{fem}$ *Norma*'). Third, some might propose that **P2** can be simplified by omitting the reference to designated name-bearers. So, **P2** would become:

P2* The grammatical gender of a German phrase headed by a count-noun-use of a name *N* is the grammatical gender of *N*.

Here, the reference to the designated bearer of *N* is omitted. Against this proposal, note that names in German typically do not have a gender *per se*, but can have different genders for different bearers. E.g., take the name 'Hillary' which can refer to Hillary Clinton and to mountaineer Edmund Hillary. In German, when referring to a female person like Hillary Clinton, the name is feminine; when referring to a male person like Edmund Hillary, the name is masculine: 'die berühmte Hillary' ('the$_{fem}$ famous Hillary') for Hillary Clinton, but 'der berühmte Hillary' ('the$_{masc}$ famous Hillary') for Edmund Hillary.

Let us add a few more examples illustrating **P2**. The next sentences contain depiction-uses, role-uses, and disguise-uses:

- Die National Portrait Gallery besitzt einen Winston Churchill und eine Queen Victoria.
  The National Portrait Gallery owns one$_{masc}$ Winston Churchill and one$_{fem}$ Queen Victoria. In the sense of: one portrait of Winston Churchill and one portrait of Queen Victoria.
- Cecilia Bartoli war eine großartige Rosina und ein noch besserer Cherubino.
  Cecilia Bartoli was [a great Rosina]$_{fem}$ and [an even better Cherubino]$_{masc}$.
- Meine Mutter war ein köstlicher Donald Trump auf der Kostümparty.
  My mother was [a hilarious Donald Trump]$_{masc}$ at the costume party.

[329] See De Clerq 2008, 67f.

In the first sentence, the depiction-use of 'Winston Churchill' has the gender of referential uses of the name for the name's designated bearer, that is, Winston Churchill; same for Queen Victoria. In the second sentence, singer Cecilia Bartoli is female, Rosina (from Rossini's *Barber of Seville*) is a female role, and Cherubino (from Mozart's *Marriage of Figaro*) is a male role–a trouser role, to be portrayed by a female singer. As the examples show, the gender of role-uses of 'Rosina' is feminine, while the gender of role-uses of 'Cherubino' is masculine even when the role-use is predicated of a female singer. Similarly for the third sentence. So, role- and disguise-uses are further examples against De Clerq's claim that German count-noun-uses whose extension contains persons always have the grammatical gender corresponding to the gender of those persons.

Next, consider principle **P3**. According to **P3**, the grammatical gender of a phrase *e* headed by a count-noun-use of a name is the grammatical gender of a salient expression describing the objects in the extension of *e*. We will simply speak of *salient expressions*. Typically, the salient expression can be added to the name to form a name-noun compound in which the name is the adjunct. **P3** is best illustrated by manufacturing-uses. E.g.:

- Ich habe einen Samsung gekauft. In the sense of: Ich habe einen Samsung-Computer gekauft.
  I bought a$_{masc}$ Samsung. In the sense of: I bought a Samsung computer$_{masc}$.
- Ich habe ein Samsung gekauft. In the sense of: Ich habe ein Samsung-Smartphone gekauft.
  I bought a$_{neut}$ Samsung. In the sense of: I bought a Samsung smartphone$_{neut}$.
- Ich habe eine Underwood gekauft: Ich habe eine Underwood-Schreibmaschine gekauft.
  I bought an$_{fem}$ Underwood: I bought an Underwood typewriter$_{fem}$.

In the first sentence, the salient expression is 'Computer' which in German is masculine; in the second, it is 'Smartphone' which in German is neuter; in the third, it is the feminine 'Schreibmaschine' ('typewriter'). The predicative uses of 'Samsung' and 'Underwood' agree with that: they are masculine in the first sentence, neuter in the second, and feminine in the third. The three examples might suggest that all instances of principle **P3** are cases of PF-deletion where the salient expression is phonetically deleted, as argued by De Clerq.[330] However, there seem to be counterexamples to De Clerq's thesis. E.g., consider manufacturing-uses of names for car manufacturers, as in:

- Meine Mutter fährt einen Ford.
  My mother drives a$_{masc}$ Ford.

Here, the count-noun-use of 'Ford' is masculine, just as the salient expression: the noun 'Wagen' ('carriage', 'car'). However, the sentence that results from adding the noun 'Wagen' to 'Ford' ('Meine Mutter fährt einen Ford-Wagen': 'My mother drives a Ford car') sounds unnatural in German. Also, contemporary German has largely replaced the noun 'Wagen' with the neuter noun 'Auto' ('car'), and while most competent German speakers will know that count-noun-uses of names of car manufacturers like 'Ford' are masculine, they may be unaware why–they may be unaware that the masculine of such uses historically derives from the masculine of 'Wagen'. So, from a perspective of linguistic competence, it is implausible to assume that manufacturing-uses that are applied to cars simply abbreviate phrases where the name is supplemented with the noun 'Wagen'.

For a second argument against De Clerq's claim, consider the *pluralization* of German count-noun-uses. Here, the plural is typically formed by adding an 's' to the name, even

[330] See De Clerq 2008, 66.

when the plural of the salient expression is formed in a different way. E.g., take the following sentences:

- Ich habe zwei Samsungs gekauft. In the sense of: Ich habe zwei Samsung-Computer gekauft.
  Ich bought two Samsungs. In the sense of: I bought two Samsung computers.
- Ich habe zwei Underwoods gekauft: Ich habe zwei Underwood-Schreibmaschinen gekauft.
  I bought two Underwoods: I bought two Underwood typewriters.
- Ich habe zwei Borsalinos gekauft: Ich habe zwei Borsalino-Hüte gekauft.
  I bought two Borsalinos: I bought two Borsalino hats.

Here, the plurals 'Samsungs', 'Underwoods', and 'Borsalinos' are marked by the suffix *-s*. By contrast, the plural of 'Computer' is not morphologically marked; the plural of 'Schreibmaschine' is marked by the suffix *-n*; and the plural of 'Hut' ('hat') is marked by the suffix *-e* (plus by converting 'u' to 'ü'). So, in all three cases, the count-noun-use cannot simply be a result of PF-deletion, but would at least require further phonetic modifications, e.g., adding the suffix *-s*, deleting the suffix *-n* in the case of 'Schreibmaschinen', etc. A far simpler alternative analysis would depart from PF-deletion and suggest that in German, names for manufacturers can simply be used as count nouns, and these uses have a morphology of their own, e.g., they always take the suffix *-s* in the plural (contrary to the more complex morphology of German common count nouns). This does not contradict the view that such count-noun-uses still inherit their grammatical gender from salient expressions like 'Computer' or 'Smartphone'; but as the example of 'Wagen'/'car' suggests, this is a diachronic rather than a synchronic phenomenon–it belongs to the *historical origin* of count-noun-uses rather than to their current meaning.

So far, we have illustrated principles **P1-3** using a number of examples. At this point, let us briefly show for some of the examples why they instantiate only *one* of those principles each: this indicates that principles **P1-3** are not redundant, but need to be stated separately. Take the 'Kennedy'-examples, an instance of **P1**; and assume a metalinguistic reading of 'Kennedy' (as 'bearer of the name 'Kennedy''). Metalinguistic count-noun-uses of names do not have any designated bearers. So, the 'Kennedy'-examples do not instantiate **P2**. Also, just as in English, there are no natural ways in German to supplement metalinguistic count-noun-uses with a salient expression: e.g., 'eine Kennedy-Frau' ('a Kennedy woman') or 'eine 'Kennedy'-Namensträgerin' ('a 'Kennedy' name-bearer$_{fem}$') sound unnatural. So, the 'Kennedy'-examples do not instantiate **P3**. Next, take the 'Thatcher'-example, an instance of **P2**. The extension of resemblance-uses of 'Margaret Thatcher' contains also male objects (such as Milei), but the predicative use of 'Margaret Thatcher' is feminine; so, the example does not instantiate **P1**. Also, it seems that in the case of resemblance-uses, there are no clear examples of salient expressions (neither in English nor in German). At best, we might in some cases use 'analogue' (or in German 'Analogon', 'Entsprechung', or the like) as explicating expression, as in 'Bolsonaro is the Brazilian Trump' ≈ 'Bolsonaro is the Brazilian analogue to Trump' (see 5.2.3). Then again, German translations of 'analogue' have the same gender on *all* their uses ('Analogon' is always neuter, 'Entsprechung' always feminine) and none of them are masculine–while resemblance-uses are masculine for masculine names and feminine for feminine names. More generally, it seems implausible that resemblance-uses for male and female objects should be associated with two *different* salient expressions–one masculine, the other feminine. So, the example does not instantiate **P3**. Finally, take the first 'Samsung'-

example (‘I bought a Samsung [computer]’), an instance of **P3**. The extension of manufacturing-uses of ‘Samsung’ contains only devices like computers, smartphones, etc., and hence inanimate, genderless objects, but the use of ‘Samsung’ in the sense of ‘Samsung computer’ is masculine, not neuter. So, the example does not instantiate **P1**. Also, the designated bearer of ‘Samsung’ is the company Samsung; but apparent referential uses of company names like ‘Samsung’ are not gendered in German (see 4.5.1) and hence do not have the same gender as predicative uses of ‘Samsung’. So, the example does not instantiate **P2**.

In a next step, let us look at three German examples of gender-marking that do not seem to be explained by **P1-3**, nor by any other general principles. First, consider manufacturing-uses of names for aircraft manufacturers:

- Ich habe heute eine Boeing und einen Airbus gesehen.
  I saw a$_{fem}$ Boeing and an$_{masc}$ Airbus today.

Here, the predicative use of ‘Boeing’ instantiates **P3**: the salient expression would be the feminine noun ‘Maschine’ (‘machine’) which in German is commonly used for planes. E.g., one would speak of ‘Boeing-Maschine’ (‘Boeing machine’), ‘Lufthansa-Maschine’ (‘Lufthansa machine’), etc. By contrast, the predicative use of ‘Airbus’ is masculine, not feminine. This coheres with none of the principles **P1-3**: as to **P1**, the predicative extension of manufacturing-uses of ‘Airbus’ contains only planes and hence genderless objects, but manufacturing-uses of ‘Airbus’ are not neuter; as to **P2**, uses of ‘Airbus’ that refer to the name’s designated bearer are genderless as well (as typically for company names); as to **P3**, there are no salient expressions for ‘plane’ in German that are masculine (‘Flugzeug’ is neuter, ‘Maschine’ is feminine). Instead, the masculine of ‘Airbus’ is best explained by the fact that ‘Airbus’ ends in the common noun ‘-bus’ (‘bus’) which is masculine in German. However, this convention does not seem to follow any more general principle, but is isolated: many German proper nouns end in a common noun, but the gender of their count-noun-use does not normally follow the gender of that common noun. E.g., German city names often end in the feminine common nouns ‘-stadt’ (‘city’) or ‘-burg’ (‘fortress’), as in ‘Darmstadt’ or ‘Hamburg’. Yet, any German uses of city names are neuter: e.g., ‘das schöne Hamburg’ (‘the$_{neut}$ beautiful Hamburg’); for a count-noun-use, see the resemblance-use in ‘Rotterdam ist das Hamburg der Niederlande’/‘Rotterdam is the$_{neut}$ Hamburg of the Netherlands’.

For a second case, consider the use of names of chains (retail chains, restaurant chains, etc.) for their branches. In German, such uses are always masculine. E.g.:

- In meiner Straße gibt es einen neuen Walmart/Nordstrom//McDonald’s/Starbucks/…
  On my street, there is a$_{masc}$ new$_{masc}$ Walmart/Nordstrom/McDonald’s/Starbucks/…

A first attempt at an explanation might analyze the masculine of these name-uses as the masculine of German ‘Laden’ (‘shop’). However, ‘Laden’ is more naturally applied to small shops than to supermarkets like Walmart, department stores like Norstrom, fast-food restaurants like McDonald’s, or coffeehouses like Starbucks. In the case of ‘Walmart’, a candidate for a salient expression would be ‘supermarket’ which is masculine in German (‘Supermarkt’). However, the same does not hold for the other examples, where the salient expression would be neuter: e.g., ‘Kaufhaus’ (‘[department store]$_{neut}$’) in the case of department store chains like Nordstrom; ‘Restaurant’ (‘restaurant$_{neut}$’) in the

case of restaurant chains like McDonald's; and 'Café' ('café$_{neut}$') or the more old-fashioned 'Kaffeehaus' ('coffeehouse$_{neut}$') in the case of coffeehouse chains like Starbucks. Also, German predicative uses of chain names for their branches seem to be masculine regardless of the *kind* of business that the chain operates: that is, regardless of whether the chain operates supermarkets, department stores, restaurants, etc. A more natural candidate for a salient expression applying to all the examples listed here would be 'branch', all of whose German translations are feminine ('Filiale'/'Niederlassung'/'Dependance').

For a potential third case, consider the use of personal names for objects created by bearers of those name–e.g., the use of names of painters for their paintings, the use of names of authors for their books, etc. Again, in German, such uses *always* seem to be masculine. Consider artwork-uses:

- Dieses Gemälde ist entweder ein früher Dalí oder ein später Kahlo.[331]
  This painting is either an early$_{masc}$ Dalí or a late$_{masc}$ Kahlo.

Here, the designated bearers of the names 'Dalí' and 'Kahlo' are Salvador Dalí (male) and Frida Kahlo (female). But the artwork-uses of 'Dalí' and 'Kahlo' are both masculine. Again, this coheres with none of the principles **P1-3**. First, the predicative extension of artwork-uses of 'Dalí' and 'Kahlo' contains only artworks and hence genderless objects, but the artwork-uses of 'Dalí' and 'Kahlo' are masculine, not neuter. Second, the use of 'Kahlo' for its designated bearer is feminine, which does not cohere with the masculine of the count-noun-use of 'Kahlo'. And third, the most natural choices for salient expressions are not masculine either: 'Gemälde' ('painting') or 'Bild' ('image') are neuter; the same holds for the nouns standardly used in German to refer to artworks in general, like 'Kunstwerk' ('artwork'), 'Werk' ('work'), or 'Artefakt' ('artifact'). De Clerq suggests that the masculine is here derived from the masculine of the German noun 'Kunstgegenstand' (which would be 'art object' rather than 'artwork').[332] But this seems forced: the noun 'Kunstgegenstand' is (and has always been) rare and uncommon.

For a brief side note, note that not all languages with morphological gender-marking behave the same way as German when it comes to count-noun-uses. E.g., in Flemish (Belgian Dutch), a language closely related to German, all count-noun-uses that are applied to inanimate objects (such as artworks, manufactured products, etc.) are masculine.[333]

5.4.8) Two Borderline Cases: Family-Uses and Time-Uses

For a final case study, we have a closer look at two controversial cases that we classified as count-noun-uses: family-uses and time-uses. We will discuss whether these types of uses are counterexamples to predicativism–a view challenged not only by predicativists, but also by critics of predicativism.[334]

Recall that family-uses range over members of families: e.g., the use of 'Kennedy' in 'Maria Shriver is a Kennedy' ranges over the members of the Kennedy family–the

[331] For a caveat, we are not entirely certain if names for female artists (like 'Kahlo') allow for artwork-uses. Still, if they do, those uses are definitely *not* feminine or neuter.
[332] See De Clerq 2008, 65, 67. De Clerq suggests that in German, count-noun-uses that are painting-examples are always masculine, though apparently some German speakers prefer the *neuter* for painting-examples (see De Clerq 2008, 74, n. 3). My own native speaker intuitions strongly favor the masculine.
[333] See De Clerq 2008, 64f.
[334] E.g., Jeshion 2015b, 289f.

sentence conveys that Maria Shriver is a member of the Kennedy family. Time-uses range over concrete time periods: 'The last two Aprils were cold' conveys that the last two time periods instantiating the month of April (say, April 2025 and April 2024) were cold. Clearly, the intended content of such uses is *not* metalinguistic.[335] In this context, we call nouns like 'Kennedy' *proper family nouns* and nouns like 'April' *proper temporal nouns*.

As we saw, predicativists allege that apparent non-metalinguistic predicative name-uses are either not uses *of* names, or at least not uses of names *as* names. In the case of family- and time-uses, predicativists might go one step further and argue that family- and time-uses are not even *derived* from names. The argument would go as follows. First, proper temporal nouns are *never* names–neither on apparent predicative nor on apparent referential uses; instead, they are simply count nouns that can be used referentially, and that happen to be capitalized. Second, proper family nouns are *sometimes* names, e.g., when used to refer to persons who bear the noun as a surname (as in 'Kennedy was the 35th US President'); but they are never names *of families*, while family-uses of proper family nouns (like 'Kennedy') are clearly derived from their use in expressions referring to families (e.g., in the expression 'Kennedy family'). In what follows, we look at these claims in more detail, first for family-uses, then for time-uses.

As to proper family nouns, observe that apparent non-metalinguistic predicative name-uses are typically derived from apparent referential name-uses: e.g., the use of 'Leonardo' in the sense of 'painting by Leonardo da Vinci' from the apparent referential use of 'Leonardo' for Leonardo da Vinci. By contrast, the family-use of 'Kennedy' in the sense of 'member of the Kennedy family' is not derived from an apparent referential use of 'Kennedy'. In particular, the proper noun 'Kennedy' has no apparent referential uses that refer to the Kennedy family: '(The) Kennedy is a family' is not admissible, contrary to 'The Kennedys are a family' (where 'Kennedys' might already be used in the sense of 'member of the Kennedy family').[336] The only apparent referential uses of 'Kennedy' refer to bearers of the name 'Kennedy' ('Kennedy was the 35th US President'); and the expressions referring to the Kennedy family use 'Kennedy' at best as proper part, as in 'Kennedy family'. Same for dynasty names like 'Romanov': *'(The) Romanov is a Russian dynasty' vs. 'The Romanovs are a Russian dynasty'; again, the expressions referring to the Romanov family use 'Romanov' at best as proper part, as in 'House of Romanov'.

For a counterargument, as we saw in 2.7.2, there are a number of proper nouns that we pre-theoretically classify as names, and that cannot be used as bare singulars in argument position. Consider two types of such nouns. First, some singular proper nouns have to be combined with a definite article in argument position: 'Thames', 'Bible', 'Renaissance', '*Mayflower*', etc. And yet, it seems strange to deny that the respective proper nouns are names: 'Thames' seems to be a name for the river, 'Bible' a name for the scripture,

[335] This is perfectly compatible with the view that the same expressions, or at least expressions with the same spelling/pronunciation) can *also* be used to convey metalinguistic properties: the noun 'Kennedy' can also be used to convey the property of being named 'Kennedy', as in 'There is a Kennedy in New York and another one in California', meaning that there is a place named 'Kennedy' in New York and another one in California. Similarly, 'April' is a fairly common girl's name, and a sentence like 'There are two Aprils in my class' can convey that there are two girls named 'April' in my class.

[336] In fact, the point is made both by predicativists like Graff Fara (2015b: 267-272) and by critics of predicativism like Jeshion (2015b: 289f.).

'Renaissance' a name for the historical era, etc.[337] Second, some proper nouns cannot be used for referential purposes unless combined with other proper nouns into a 'full' name. E.g., consider some middle names or some constituent nouns of double or hyphenated names: such nouns can normally not be used on their own as names, but arguably, they are still names of the person bearing the full name. E.g., the proper noun 'Leonard' is the middle name of Churchill, but there is no convention to refer to Churchill as 'Leonard', unless 'Leonard' is used as part of Churchill's full name, 'Winston Leonard Spencer-Churchill'. Analogously for the noun 'Spencer' as part of Churchill's hyphenated surname. Both types of names suggest that not *all* names can be used referentially for their bearers. So, the same might hold for proper nouns that are part of family names, e.g., 'Romanov' as part of 'House of Romanov', or 'Kennedy' as part of 'Kennedy family'. That such nouns are indeed names is further supported by the fact that conversations like the following sound perfectly natural: someone asks you, 'What's the name of the famous family that Maria Shriver belongs to?', and you reply 'Kennedy'. Or someone asks you, 'What's the name of the family that ruled Russia?', and you reply 'Romanov'.[338]

Next, consider time-uses. First, note that proper temporal nouns like 'April', 'Monday', or 'Christmas' crucially differ from proper family nouns like 'Kennedy': proper family nouns cannot be used as bare singulars to refer to families; by contrast, proper temporal nouns can be used as bare singulars to refer both to types of time periods and to concrete instances of those types. E.g., the bare singular of 'April' can refer to the month of April, that is, to a type of month, as in 'April is a month in the Gregorian calendar' or 'April is the cruelest month'. But the bare singular of 'April' can also refer to concrete *instances* of the month of April, that is, to April 2025, April 1990, etc.: think of sentences like 'We last met in April', where 'April' would usually refer to the *most recent* April.

Predicativists might raise another objection against the example of time-uses: they might suggest that proper temporal nouns are *never* names–different from proper family nouns which can be used as surnames.[339] Instead, proper temporal nouns might simply be *count nouns*, and like several other count nouns, they allow for referential uses or bare singulars: consider nouns like 'war', 'religion', or 'film' which can be used both in quantified form (e.g., 'I saw a film/two films tonight') and as bare singulars (e.g., 'Film is an art form'). Of special significance in this context are *non-proper* nouns that refer to time periods, e.g., nouns for seasons: 'summer', 'winter', etc. Similarly to proper temporal nouns like 'April', non-proper temporal nouns can be used both in quantified form ('We had a lovely summer this year', 'The last two summers were lovely') and as bare singulars ('Summer is a season', 'We last met in summer'). Let us call this specific type of count nouns *flexible count nouns*–they are flexible between quantified uses and bare singular uses.

To respond to the argument, let us compare proper temporal nouns in some more detail to other noun classes. First, compare proper temporal nouns and count nouns. For one

[337] For similar remarks about '*Missa Solemnis*' (not 'the *Missa Solemnis*') as the name of the Beethoven mass, see Geurts 1997, 326.
[338] It is not quite clear how this assessment can be reconciled with name-feature **(2)** from 2.7.3, where the function to refer was identified as the main function of names; we leave this question open.
[339] For a related discussion, see Graff Fara 2015b, 277.

main difference, consider bare singulars and definite descriptions. First, paradigm count nouns can be combined with a definite article to form either generic or incomplete/referential descriptions, as in 'The tiger is an animal' (generic) and 'Have you seen the tiger?' (referring, e.g., to the tiger in a particular zoo). By contrast, typical count nouns cannot be used as bare singulars, or at least not in a generic or a referential sense: see *'Tiger is an animal' and *'Have you seen tiger?' In the case of proper temporal nouns like 'April', things are reversed. Here, the bare singular would be used both in the generic and in the referential sense: e.g., 'April is a month' (generic), 'Where did you go in April?' (referring, e.g., to last April). By contrast, the corresponding definite descriptions are ungrammatical: *'The April is a month', *'Where did you go in the April?'.

Second, compare proper temporal nouns and mass nouns; again, let us highlight one main difference. If a proper temporal noun refers to a type of time periods, then the noun's quantified uses range over concrete *instances* of that type. E.g., the noun 'April' refers to a type of month–the month of April–, and its quantified uses range over concrete *instances* of that type, that is, over the particular Aprils of different years. Think of sentences like 'We had an especially cold April this year' or 'The last two Aprils were cold'. By contrast, as we saw in 5.1, if a mass noun refers to a type T and allows for quantification, the noun's quantified uses typically do not range over concrete *instances* of T, but over *subtypes* of T. Take the mass noun 'milk': quantified uses of 'milk' do not range over concrete instances of milk (e.g., the glass of milk I am drinking right now), but rather over subtypes of milk (cow milk, goat milk, etc.). Think of sentences like 'Cows produce a particularly nutritious milk' or again 'The supermarket sells only two milks: cow milk and goat milk'.

Third, consider again flexible count nouns like 'summer', 'film', or 'war'. Despite their overall similarity to proper temporal nouns, there are a number of crucial differences. E.g., as we already saw, a proper temporal noun PN cannot be combined with a definite article to form phrases of the form 'the PN'. E.g., we can say 'We met in April/on Monday/during Christmas', but not *'We met in the April/on the Monday/during the Christmas'. By contrast, most flexible count nouns *can* be combined with definite articles: e.g., 'The film was thrilling', 'We met during the summer', where 'the film' and 'the summer' act as incomplete descriptions, referring to a particular film/summer.[340] In fact, most flexible count nouns *have* to be combined with the definite article to refer to particulars: e.g., 'Film was thrilling' cannot be used to convey that a particular film was thrilling.[341]

Fourth, compare proper temporal nouns to the remaining proper nouns. Syntactically, there is a strong similarity: like most proper nouns, proper temporal nouns can be used referentially as bare singulars; they can be pluralized and combined with several determiners; and they cannot be combined with a (pronounced) definite article, unless the article is stressed. However, proper temporal nouns differ from most other proper nouns in that the former can be used to refer to object *types*–specifically, types of time periods. Compare proper nouns for persons or places, like 'Steve' or 'London': they can be used

[340] The same holds for mass nouns like 'milk': when talking about a particular quantity of milk, we say 'The milk went bad', not 'Milk went bad'.

[341] A possible exception are some nouns referring to time periods, such as nouns for seasons: 'We met during the summer' and 'We met during summer' are both grammatical. It is not clear, however, if the second sentence uses 'summer' referentially, or rather in an indefinite sense, as in 'We met while it was summer'.

to refer to particular objects, but not to types of objects. E.g., ‘London’ can be used to refer to London, England, and to London, Ohio, but not to the type of cities called ‘London’: a sentence like ‘London is a type of cities’ is infelicitous, if not ungrammatical, and a sentence like ‘London has several million inhabitants’ refers with ‘London’ to one concrete London, while a sentence like ‘April has 30 days’ typically refers to the month of April *instantiated* by concrete Aprils.

To sum up, it seems that proper temporal nouns are syntactically most similar to the remaining proper nouns, but semantically most similar to what we called *flexible count nouns*: they refer both to *types* and to their *instances*. So, if nouns are classified based on syntactic criteria, proper temporal nouns should be classified together with the remaining proper nouns; if nouns are classified based on semantic criteria, proper temporal nouns should be classified together with flexible count nouns rather than with any other proper nouns. More importantly, should proper temporal names still be classified as *names*? Among the three name-features that we listed in 2.7.3, one feature was that the bearers of names are typically individuals. Whether expressions like proper temporal nouns or flexible count nouns exhibit this feature then depends on whether types (e.g., types of time periods) fall under the ontological category of individuals. (Note that the types involved here greatly vary: they are types of time periods in the case of temporal nouns; types of artifacts in the case of ‘film’; types of events in the case of ‘war’; types of sociocultural systems in the case of ‘religion’; and so on.) In what follows, we leave these questions open. Instead, we will assume, for the sake of the argument, that proper temporal nouns are names, at least on occurrences where they are used to refer to types of time periods.

6) Names in Labelling Constructions: Referential Mentions or Predicative Uses?

We turn to the third and last part of our critique of predicativism. Here, we are concerned with occurrences of names in what we will call *labelling constructions*: think of the occurrences of the name 'Saul' in constructions like 'Kripke is called **Saul**', 'Kripke is named **Saul**', or 'Kripke's parents called him **Saul**'. Philosophers and linguists agree almost unanimously that the occurrences of the name 'Saul' in these constructions are mentions: they refer to the name 'Saul' itself. Call this the *orthodox view*.[342] A few predicativists, among them Delia Graff Fara and Ora Matushansky, reject the orthodox view: they would argue that names in labelling constructions are predicative rather than referential, and uses rather than mentions. Call this the *renegade view*. In this chapter, we argue against the renegade view and attempt to defend the orthodox view.

Here is an overview of what is to come. 6.1 briefly introduces some conceptual and terminological preliminaries. 6.2 has a more detailed look at morphosyntactic and semantic features of labelling constructions. 6.3 turns to the analysis of labels and presents arguments for the orthodox and the renegade views. 6.4 introduces the predicative analysis of name-labels in greater detail, focusing on the versions by Matushansky and Graff Fara. 6.5 challenges the renegade view. 6.6 compares name-labels to predicative adjuncts and standard types of predicative complements. Finally, 6.7 sketches different ways to account for the data that motivate the renegade view, thereby attempting to defend the orthodox view.

Note that we will often write an expression boldface when we want to leave it open (if only for the sake of the argument) whether the expression is used or mentioned. E.g., in 'Kripke is named **Saul**', the boldface of 'Saul' is meant to indicate that we leave it open whether the name 'Saul' is used or mentioned in this sentence, and hence whether the occurrence of the name should be surrounded by quotes or not.

6.1) Labels, Labelling Verbs, and Labelling Constructions

Roughly, labelling constructions tell us what *label* has been applied to an object–in other words, they tell us what the object is *called*. E.g., the sentences 'Kripke's parents named him **Saul**' or 'Kripke is often called a genius' are labelling constructions telling us what Kripke is called, namely **Saul** and a genius respectively.

We will use the following terminology for labelling constructions:

- label: an expression used to label an individual.
- labelling verb:[343] a verb expressing how an individual is given a label.
- label-receiver: a phrase referring to the individual(s) that a label is given to.
- label-giver: a phrase referring to one or more individuals giving a label to an individual.

E.g., in 'Kripke's parents named him **Saul**', the name 'Saul' is the label, 'named' is the labelling verb, the pronoun 'him' is the label-receiver, and the phrase 'Kripke's parents' is the label-giver. In 'Kripke is often called a genius', the phrase 'a genius' is the label, 'called' is the labelling verb, and the name 'Kripke' is the label-receiver; the sentence does not contain a label-giver. Also, when the label is a name, we will speak of a *name-*

[342] The orthodox view is almost unanimously endorsed, including most descriptivists and most anti-descriptivists. See, e.g., Kripke 1980, 62, n. 25; Bach 2002, 80.
[343] We adopt the term 'labelling verb' from D'hoedt/Cuyckens 2017, 19.

label. 'Kripke's parents named him **Saul**' contains the name-label 'Saul', while 'Kripke is often called a genius' does not contain a name-label. Also, we will call the *referent* of a label-giver *semantic label-giver*; analogously for label-receivers.

6.2) Labelling Constructions: Morphosyntactic and Semantic Observations

Labelling constructions as we understand them can use labelling verbs like the following:

- *call*, *name*, *nickname*, *rename*, *code-name*, *baptize*, *christen*, *refer*, *address*, *dub*, *term*, *label*, *title*, *designate*, *introduce, know as*, *go by*, *answer to*,…

The four last verbs might be least expected; consider example sentences:

- I introduced him as **Professor Kripke**.
- I knew him as **Professor Kripke**, not as **Saul**. Intended interpretation: I knew him under the name 'Professor Kripke', not under the name 'Saul'.
- My friend Charles goes by (the name) **Charly** these days.
- My dog answers to (the name) **Daisy**.

In what follows, we list a number of morphosyntactic and semantic features of labelling constructions. Most of these features hold for labels in general and for name-labels in particular. We will list eleven features (**Feature 1**, **Feature 2**,…). Some of them go back to work by Ora Matushansky.[344] We begin with two basic syntactic features, then add two basic semantic features, and finally add seven more specific morphosyntactic features.

Feature 1: Direct and Indirect Labels. Let us begin with a basic syntactic observation about labelling constructions. Some labelling verbs combine with the preposition *as* followed by the label, others combine with the label directly, and yet others allow for both options. We will speak of 'direct' and 'indirect' labels. E.g., verbs like *call*, *nickname*, *rename*, *code-name*, *baptize*, *christen*, *dub*, *term*, and *title* combine with direct labels:

- He is called **Saul**.
  We nicknamed him **Billy**.
  In 1924, Saint Petersburg was renamed **Leningrad**.
  The Normandy landings were code-named **Operation Overlord**.
  The priest baptized/christened him **Saul**.
  The simultaneous release of the movies *Barbie* and *Oppenheimer* was dubbed **Barbenheimer**.
  The Chernobyl meltdown has been termed **one of the worst disasters in history**.
  Beethoven's only opera is titled ***Fidelio***.

Also, in English, most indirect labels combine with the preposition *as*. This holds, e.g., for the verbs *refer*, *address*, *know*, and *introduce*:

- I refer to him as **Professor Kripke**.
  I address him as **Professor Kripke**.
  I know him as **Professor Kripke**.
  I introduced him as **Professor Kripke**.

The verb *answer* can function as an indirect labelling verb in combination with the preposition *to*, which is especially common for animal names:

- My dog answers to (the name) **Daisy**.
- One of the elephants in the London zoo answers to (the name) **Otto**.

Analogous constructions exist in languages other than English; e.g., in German, *answer to* translates as *hören auf* + accusative (literally *listen onto*). Similarly, *go* can function as

[344] See Matushansky 2005, 2008.

an indirect labelling verb in combination with *by*, which is especially common for nicknames:

- My friend Charles goes by (the name) **Charly** these days.

Finally, *call*, *name*, *label*, and *designate* allow for both direct labels and indirect labels:

- I called him by the name 'Saul'.
- His parents named him **Saul**.
  The police named the suspect in the Unabomber case as **Ted Kaczynski**.
- The Chernobyl meltdown has been labelled (as) **one of the worst disasters in history**.
  Frege's philosophy of mathematics is labelled (as) **logicism**.
  The late Renaissance is often labelled (as) **Mannerism**.
  The style of Monet's paintings is labelled (as) **Impressionism**.
- The 26th of December is designated **Saint Stephen's Day**.
  In 1872, Yellowstone was designated as **a national park**.

Some, but not all labelling verbs change their meaning if combined with *as*. E.g., the verb *label* does not change its meaning while the verb *name* does: 'His parents named him **Saul**' means that his parents gave him the name 'Saul', while 'The police named the suspect as **Ted Kaczynski**' means, roughly, that the police identified the suspect by the name 'Ted Kaczynski'.[345]

Feature 2: Labelling Verbs and Licensing. For a first syntactic feature of labels, note that labels can belong to at least four phrasal categories:

- adjective phrases:
  - She called him stupid.
  - She called him stupid beyond belief.
- noun phrases:
  - She called him a genius/the greatest genius she knew/her best friend/**Saul**/**moron**.
  - arguably the pronoun 'that' in: That's what she called him.
- participle phrases:
  - She called him beloved by everyone.
- prepositional phrases:
  - She called him out of his mind.

Our focus will be on cases where the label is a name (e.g., 'Saul' in 'She called him **Saul**') or a common noun that is in the singular and *not* combined with a determiner (e.g., 'moron' in 'She called him **moron**').

In this context, let us see which labelling verbs combine with name-labels and which do not. While almost all labelling verbs can combine with name-labels, there are a few exceptions, most notably the verb *term*. The verbs *label* and *title* rarely combine with names for persons, places, etc. Rather, when *label* combines with names, then most naturally with names for more 'abstract' entities, such as scientific theories ('logicism'), historical eras ('Mannerism'), artistic styles ('Impressionism'), and the like. The verb *title* mostly combines with titles of artifacts or publications and occasionally with honorifics (e.g., 'Professor' in 'They titled him **Professor**'). Some labelling verbs combine *only* with names and no other labels: this holds for *nickname*, *rename*, *code-name*, *baptize*, and *christen*.

[345] See also Hampe 2014, 220.

Feature 3: Verbs of Naming, Referring, and Describing. Given these syntactic distinctions, we make a first attempt at analyzing labelling verbs. We divide labelling verbs into three main categories: verbs of naming (or name-giving), verbs of referring, and verbs of describing (or attributing/ascribing a property). Accordingly, we will speak of constructions of naming, referring, and describing. Verbs of naming include *name* (not in combination with *as*), *baptize*, *nickname*, *rename*, *code-name*, *title*, and more rarely *dub*, *label*, and *designate*. Verbs of referring include *refer* and *address*. Verbs of describing include *term*, *dub*, *label*, and *designate* (in combination with *as*). The verb *call* fits into all three of these categories: *call* can express an act of naming in 'His parents called him **Saul**', but it expresses an act of referring in 'She once called him **my love**' and an act of describing in 'She called him a genius'. A few labelling verbs might not fit into any of the three categories, such as *name* in combination with *as* ('The police named the suspect as **Ted Kaczynski**') or *know* ('I knew him as **Professor Kripke**, not as **Saul**'). Possibly, these verbs form a fourth category and mean, roughly, 'to identify by name'.

Constructions of naming and referring are, in a sense, *about* the label. When we say, 'Kripke is called **Saul**', we mean ''Saul' is a name for Kripke' or, equivalently, 'Kripke is a bearer of the name 'Saul'': these latter sentences are clearly about the name 'Saul', they *mention* the name rather than using it. When we say, 'She called him **moron**', we mean 'She referred to him/addressed him with the word 'moron'': again, this latter sentence is clearly about the noun 'moron', it mentions the noun rather than using it. By contrast, constructions of describing are not about the label itself, but about the *content* of the label, in particular about the *property* expressed by the label. Take constructions like 'Mary called Kripke a genius', which means neither that Mary gave Kripke the name 'genius', nor that she referred to/addressed him with the noun 'genius' or the phrase 'a genius'; rather, it means that she ascribed to him the property of being a genius. Mary might have expressed this property with the noun 'genius' or the phrase 'a genius', but also with expressions that have (roughly) the same content, say, with the adjective 'ingenious' or the German noun 'Genie'. To paraphrase verbs of describing, we will also use the verb *assert*: 'She called him a genius' can then be paraphrased as 'She asserted that he is/was a genius' or, more cautiously, 'She made an assertion implying that he is/was a genius'.

Feature 4: Optional vs. Obligatory Labels. For another semantic observation,[346] we should note that labels are obligatory with some labelling verbs, but optional with others. To render this more precise, take a labelling construction of the form '*s L*', where *L* is the label (plus a preposition if the label is indirect), and *s* is the string of signs preceding the label. We will call *s* the *core* of the labelling construction. E.g., in 'He is called **Saul**', the core is 'He is called'; in 'His parents called him **Saul**', the core is 'His parents called him'. Then, observe that some labelling constructions entail their core, while others do not. E.g., labelling constructions with verbs like *name*, *rename*, *refer*, *address*, or *know* seem to entail their core:

- His parents named him **Saul**.
  ⇒ His parents named him. (That is, they gave him a name.)

[346] For the verbs *call*, *baptize*, and *nickname*, the observation is made in Matushansky 2008, 622.

- In 1924, Saint Petersburg was renamed **Leningrad**.
  ⇒ In 1924, Saint Petersburg was renamed.
- I referred to/addressed/knew him as **Professor Kripke**.
  ⇒ I referred to him./I addressed him./I knew him.

With these verbs, the label is optional. By contrast, labelling constructions with the verbs *call* or *term* do not entail their core:

- She called him **Saul**.
  ⇏ She called him.
- The Chernobyl meltdown has been termed **one of the worst disasters in history**.
  ⇏ *The Chernobyl meltdown has been termed.

With these verbs, the label is obligatory. Note that if we omit the name 'Saul' from 'She called him **Saul**', the resulting sentence is grammatical, but involves a shift in meaning: 'She called him' would not mean that she gave him a name, or referred to him with some name, but rather that she called him on the phone. By contrast, the sentence 'The Chernobyl meltdown has been termed' is not even grammatical.

Feature 5: Grammatical Case. Let us add further morphosyntactic features. First, labels can occur in different *grammatical cases*: most importantly, they can occur in the nominative, but they can also be inflected. This is best observed in languages with morphological case-marking. E.g., German allows for the sentence 'Sie nannte ihn einen Verbrecher' ('She called him$_{acc}$ [a criminal]$_{acc}$'); but also for the sentence 'Sie nannte ihren Vater **lieber Vater**' ('She called her$_{acc}$ father$_{acc}$ **dear**$_{nom}$ **father**$_{nom}$'). In the first sentence, the label 'einen Verbrecher'/'a criminal' is in the accusative; in the second sentence, the label 'lieber Vater'/'dear father' is in the nominative.

As Matushansky has emphasized, the possibility of inflection also holds for name-labels. First, in languages such as Latin, German, modern Greek, and Icelandic, labels usually have to agree with the case of the label-receiver, and in active labelling constructions, the label-receiver will be inflected.[347] Take the following active labelling construction:

- They called him **Peter the Great**.

Here, 'Peter the Great' is the label and 'him' is the label-receiver. The German translation would be:

- Sie nannten ihn **Peter den Großen**.
  They called him$_{acc}$ [**Peter the Great**]$_{acc}$.

Both the label-receiver ihn ('him') and the name-label 'Peter der Große' ('Peter the Great') are in the accusative. (The German nominative translation of 'Peter the Great' would be 'Peter der Große'.) Second, in some languages, a particular case functions as predicate case: this holds, e.g., for Russian, Arabic, Hungarian, and Finnish.[348] E.g., in

[347] See Matushansky 2005, 230f.; 2008, 586-588. In German labelling constructions, the label-receiver is usually in the accusative (when the construction is active: 'Kripkes Eltern nannten ihn **Saul**'/'Kripke's parents called him$_{acc}$ **Saul**') or in the nominative (when the construction is passive: 'Mein Vater wird **Jan** genannt'/'My father$_{nom}$ is called **Jan**'). However, in German, proper nouns are not (or no longer) standardly used with different nominative and accusative forms; see also Penzl 1982. (Dated examples to the contrary can be found in Goethe: 'Helena'$_{nom}$/'Helenen'$_{acc}$, 'Iphigenie'$_{nom}$/'Iphigenien'$_{acc}$, 'Ottilie'$_{nom}$/'Ottilien'$_{acc}$.) So, the inflection of names in labelling constructions is hardly recognizable in German. Hence our example of 'Peter der Große'/'Peter the Great', a name that combines a proper noun with a common noun phrase in apposition.

[348] See Matushansky 2008, 583-585.

Syrian Arabic, the predicate case is the accusative.[349] Consequently, the Syrian Arabic translation of the passive sentence 'He is called **Saul**' would have the label-receiver 'he' in the nominative and the name-label 'Saul' in the accusative.

Note that there are exceptions. E.g., in a few languages with morphological case-marking, such as Georgian, names in labelling constructions occur in the nominative.[350] Also, in some languages with morphological case-marking, such as Russian or German, name-labels are typically in the nominative if they are titles (of artifacts, publications, etc.).[351] Consider an example from German. In German, e.g., titles are often inflected outside of labelling constructions, but they are in the nominative when occurring as labels. Take Thomas Mann's novel *Der Zauberberg* (*The Magic Mountain*). When the title occurs as label, the nominative is the most natural option:

- Thomas Mann called his third novel ***The Magic Mountain***. (in the sense of: Thomas Mann gave his third novel the title '*The Magic Mountain*'.)
  German: Thomas Mann nannte seinen dritten Roman [***Der Zauberberg***]$_{nom}$.
  vs. ?Thomas Mann nannte seinen dritten Roman [**den/*Den Zauberberg***]$_{acc}$.

Different from what Matushansky suggests, the reason for this is not simply that titles are names of *inanimate* objects.[352] To see why, consider first that also for titles, inflection is natural on occurrences outside of labelling constructions that normally require inflection, e.g., as object argument in the accusative:

- Ich habe den *Zauberberg* gelesen.
  (I have read [the *Magic Mountain*]$_{acc}$.)

Second, consider that apart from titles, names of inanimate objects are typically inflected in labelling constructions. Here are two examples from German, involving the names 'Zweiter Weltkrieg' ('Second World War') and 'Pazifischer Ozean' ('Pacific Ocean'):

- Wir nennen den Krieg von 1939 bis 1945 **(den) Zweiten Weltkrieg**.
  We call [the war from 1939 to 1945]$_{acc}$ [**(the) Second World War**]$_{acc}$.
- Wir nennen den Ozean zwischen Asien und Amerika **(den) Pazifischen Ozean**.
  We call [the ocean between Asia and America]$_{acc}$ [**(the) Pacific Ocean**]$_{acc}$.

Feature 6: Grammatical Number. We add an observation about the grammatical number of labels. Observe that in some labelling constructions where the label is a common noun phrase that is ascribed to a plurality of objects, the noun phrase expressing that property can (or must) be plural. By contrast, in all labelling constructions that ascribe the same name to a plurality of objects, the name-label must be singular. E.g.:

1) Milton and Keats are both called great poets.
*Milton and Keats are both called a great poet.

2) Milton and Keats are both called the greatest poets of their generations.
*Milton and Keats are both called the greatest poet of his generation.
?Milton and Keats are both called the greatest poet of their respective generation(s).

3) *Milton and Keats are both called **Johns**.
Milton and Keats are both called **John**.

4) *All Johns are called **Johns**.
All Johns are called **John**.

[349] See Matushansky 2005, 229f.
[350] See Matushansky 2008, 620, 623.
[351] For Russian, see Matushansky 2008, 585 (on '*Anna Karenina*').
[352] See Matushansky 2008, 585.

In **(1/2)**, there is plural agreement between the label-receiver (the phrase 'Milton and Keats') and the label ('great poets', 'the greatest poets of their generations'). In **(3/4)**, there is no such agreement: the label-receiver is still plural, but the label ('John') is singular. This shows that names in at least one important respect function differently from other labels, including labels that are definite noun phrases as in **(2)**.

The same holds for names that do not consist of proper nouns, but contain common noun phrases as components, such as 'Leo the Great':

- Pope Leo I and Roman emperor Leo I were both called important historical figures.
- Pope Leo I and Roman emperor Leo I were both called **Leo the Great**.
  *Pope Leo I and Roman emperor Leo I were both called **Leo the Greats**/**Leos the Great**/**Leos the Greats**.

Also note that the behavior of name-labels in this context is more similar to constructions of referring. E.g.:

- Mary calls both her sisters **beloved sister**.
  Mary calls both her sisters **beloved sisters**.

Normally, what we convey with the first sentence is that Mary refers to both her sisters with the phrase 'beloved sister' (e.g., by starting her letters to either of them with the salutation 'Beloved sister!'); by contrast, what we express with the second sentence is that Mary describes both her sisters as beloved sisters. The standard assumption would be that in the first sentence, 'beloved sister' is mentioned, while in the second, 'beloved sisters' is used.

Feature 7: Passivization. The remaining five features concern possible *reformulations* of labelling constructions. First, label-receivers *passivize*, while labels do *not*: that is, labelling constructions can be reformulated as passive sentences in which the label-receiver is the subject, but not as passive sentences in which the label is the subject.[353] E.g.:

- His parents called him **Saul**.
  He was called **Saul** by his parents.
  ***Saul** (Saul/'Saul') was called he/him/to him/of him/for him/… by his parents.
- His parents call him a genius.
  He is called a genius by his parents.
  *A genius is called he/him/to him/of him/for him/… by his parents.

Here, the label-receiver 'him' passivizes (becoming 'he'), but the labels '**Saul**'/'a genius' do not. Contrast this with standard examples of ditransitive constructions, that is, constructions where the verb takes two object arguments:

- Steve gave Mary a book.
  Mary was given a book by Steve.
  A book was given to Mary by Steve.

Here, both 'Mary' and 'a book' passivize.

Feature 8: Clefting. Labelling constructions cannot be reformulated as cleft sentences where the label is clefted–or at least this holds if the label is a name.[354] E.g.:

- He is called **Saul**.
  *It is **Saul** that he is called.
- His parents called him **Saul**.

[353] For names, the observation is made in Matushansky 2005, 227f.; 2008, 617-619.
[354] For names, the observation is made in Matushansky 2008, 578f.

*It was **Saul** that his parents called him.

- We called him a brilliant physicist.
  ?It was a brilliant physicist that we called him.

Here, the original sentences are admissible, but the corresponding cleft-sentences (that cleft the label) are not, or are at least dubious. Contrast this with the following examples where clefting is clearly admissible:

- The butler committed the murder.
  It was the butler that/who committed the murder.
- Steve gave Mary a book.
  It was Mary that/whom Steve gave a book.
- Steve gave Mary a book.
  It was a book that Steve gave Mary.

In the first example, the clefting is applied to the grammatical subject ('the butler') of the original sentence; in the second and third examples, the clefting is applied to an object argument ('Mary', 'a book') of the original sentences. Further contrast these examples with the following inadmissible clefts:

- The butler was the murderer.
  *It was the murderer that/who the butler was.
- The butler was a murderer.
  *It was a murderer that/who the butler was.

Here, the clefting is applied to a predicative complement ('a murderer') of the original sentences.

Feature 9: Order of Label and Label-Receiver. Labelling constructions typically cannot be reformulated by *reversing the order* of the label and the label-receiver.[355] Let us focus on constructions that contain a label-giver. E.g.:

- His parents named him **Saul**.
  *His parents named **Saul** (to/for/…) him.
- We called Einstein a brilliant physicist. (In the sense: We said that Einstein was a brilliant physicist.)
  *We called a brilliant physicist (to) Einstein.
  ⇏ We called a brilliant physicist for Einstein. (Which means, roughly, that we ordered some brilliant physicist to go to Einstein.)

Note that this again contrasts with standard examples of ditransitive constructions:

- Steve gave her a book.
  Steve gave a book to her.
- We reserved him a seat.
  We reserved a seat for him.

But again, standard examples of predicative complements behave more like labels:

- I made/consider/… the butler a murderer.
  *I made/consider/… a murderer (to/for/…) the butler.

Here, 'the butler' is the object and 'a murderer' the predicative complement.

Feature 10: Labelling Constructions and Copulas. Most labelling constructions cannot be reformulated as a sentence where the label is combined with a copula. Take the following sentence:

- Mary called him a genius.

[355] See also Matushansky 2008, 620.

This cannot be reformulated as *'Mary called him that he *is*/*was*/*be* a genius', 'Mary called that he *is*/*was*/*be* a genius', or the like. Similarly for the following sentences (we restrict ourselves to two inadmissible reformulations each):

- His parents named him **Saul**.
  *His parents named that he is Saul/'Saul'.
  *His parents named him to be Saul/'Saul'.
- Mary once called him **moron**.
  *Mary once called that he is (a) moron/'moron'.
  *Mary once called him to be (a) moron/'moron'.
- I addressed him as **Professor Kripke**.
  *I addressed that he is Professor Kripke/'Professor Kripke'.
  *I addressed him to be Professor Kripke/'Professor Kripke'.

In constructions of *describing*, we can obtain a related reformulation if we replace the main verb, e.g., with *say*:

- Mary *called* him a genius.
  ≈ Mary *said* that he is/was a genius.

For verbs of naming or referring, this strategy is not available. E.g.:

- Mary *called* Kripke **Saul**.
  ≉ Mary *said* that Kripke is 'Saul'/Saul/a Saul.
- Mary *called* him **moron**.
  ≉ Mary *said* that he is 'moron'/a moron.

Roughly, 'Kripke is Saul' means that Kripke is identical with *a*, where *a* is the referent of 'Saul' (given some disambiguation); 'Kripke is 'Saul'' means that Kripke is identical with the name 'Saul'; 'Kripke is a Saul' means that Kripke is a bearer of the name 'Saul'. Clearly, 'Mary called Kripke **Saul**' has none of these three meanings–rather it means that Mary *gave* Kripke the name 'Saul' or that she *referred* to him with that name.

Note that some labelling verbs might be exceptions to this behavior and might allow for a combination with copulas. E.g., take the verb *refer*: perhaps, 'She referred to him as a genius' can be reformulated as 'She referred to him as being a genius'. Also, as Matushansky points out, some languages other than English–such as Korean–typically combine name-labels with copulas.[356]

Feature 11: Labels and Category Terms. Labelling constructions can typically not be reformulated by combining the label with a category term.[357] Let us illustrate what we mean by way of example:

1) Kripke is called **Saul**.
   ⇏ Kripke is called **the word/name Saul**.
2) Kripke is named **Saul**.
   ⇏ Kripke is named **the word/name Saul**.
3) Kripke's parents named him **Saul**.
   ⇏ Kripke's parents named him **the word/name Saul**.
4) I refer to Kripke as **Professor Kripke**.
   ⇏ I refer to Kripke as **the words/phrase/name Professor Kripke**.
5) I address Kripke as **Professor Kripke**.
   ⇏ I address Kripke as **the words/phrase/name Professor Kripke**.
6) She called Kripke a genius.

[356] See Matushansky 2008, 582.
[357] For the verb *name*, this observation is made in Matushansky 2008, 590.

⇏ She called Kripke the property of being a genius.

The reformulations of (1-5) feature category terms that express *linguistic* categories: the categories *name*, *word*, *phrase*, etc. The reformulation of (6) features a category term that expresses a *non*-linguistic category: the category *property*. The reformulations of (1-5) might be outright ungrammatical; if not, they still differ in truth value from the original sentences. E.g., the sentence 'Kripke is named **the name Saul**' would at best express the false proposition that the phrase 'the name 'Saul'' is a name for Kripke. Also, in (6), the 'She called Kripke the property of being a genius' would express the proposition that she said about Kripke that he is (identical to) the property of being a genius, which is clearly not an admissible interpretation of the original sentence 'She called Kripke a genius'.

Analogous remarks hold for languages other than English. Take the German translations of sentences (1-6):

1/2*)Kripke heißt **Saul**.
⇏ Kripke heißt **das Wort/der Name/den Namen Saul**.

3*) Kripkes Eltern nannten ihn **Saul**.
⇏ Kripkes Eltern nannten ihn **das Wort/den Namen Saul**.

4*) Ich bezeichne Kripke als **Professor Kripke**.
⇏ Ich bezeichne Kripke als **die Worte/die Phrase/den Namen Professor Kripke**.

5*) Ich rede Kripke als **Professor Kripke** an.
⇏ Ich rede Kripke als **die Worte/die Phrase/den Namen Professor Kripke** an.

6*) Sie nannte Kripke ein Genie.
⇏ Sie nannte Kripke die Eigenschaft, ein Genie zu sein.

To be sure, reformulations often succeed if the labelling verb or the preposition *as* are replaced. E.g.:

1) His parents *named* him **Saul**.
≈ His parents *gave* him the name 'Saul'.

2) I refer to him *as* **Professor Kripke**.
≈ I refer to him *with* the name 'Professor Kripke'.

3) I address him *as* **Professor Kripke**.
≈ I address him *with* the name 'Professor Kripke'.

4) She *called* him **moron**.
≈ She *referred* to him with the word 'moron'.

Feature 11 distinguishes labels from many standard examples of mentions, e.g.:

- He wrote 'Saul' on a piece of paper.
  He wrote *the word/name/noun/expression/...* 'Saul' on a piece of paper.
- He said 'dear friends'.
  He said *the words* 'dear friends'.

In both cases, a linguistic category term is used to make *explicit* that the respective expression (the name 'Saul', the phrase 'dear friends') is mentioned, not used.

An exception to **Feature 11** would be constructions like *call by*, *answer to*, or *go by*: here, the category term *name* is admissible: it is obligatory in the case of *call by* ('I called him by the name **Saul**' vs. *'I called him by **Saul**') and optional in the case of *answer to* and *go by* ('My dog listens to (the name) **Daisy**', 'My friend Charles goes by (the name) **Charly** these days').

6.3) The Analysis of Labels: Orthodox vs. Renegade View

The previous section listed some important morphosyntactic and semantic features of labelling constructions. Against this background, let us now turn to the analysis of labels.

We will be concerned both with a *semantic* and a *syntactic* analysis. On the semantic side, there are four main options for how to analyze labels: labels are mentions or uses, and they are referential expressions/singular terms (referring to an object) or predicates (expressing a property/relation). We call these options *mention analysis*, *use analysis*, *referential analysis*, and *predicative analysis*. On the syntactic side, there are three main options: labels are (object) arguments, predicative complements, or predicates of a clause. We call these options *argument analysis*, *complement analysis*, and *clause-predicate analysis*. In what follows, we will not always keep the *complement analysis* and *clause-predicate analysis* apart: predicative complements are often analyzed as predicates of a clause that lack a verb. (E.g., the adjective 'yellow' in 'I painted the wall yellow' would typically be analyzed as a predicative complement; alternatively, 'the wall yellow' can be analyzed as a clause with the non-verbal predicate 'yellow').

Let us illustrate some of these options with two examples that are uncontentious among philosophers and linguists. First, take two constructions of describing:

1) Mary called Kripke smart.

2) Mary called Kripke a genius.

Here, the labels are the adjective 'smart' and the indefinite description 'a genius'. The two sentences are roughly synonymous with:

1*) Mary said/asserted that Kripke is smart.

2*) Mary said/asserted that Kripke is a genius.

In both cases, it would be uncontentious to opt for a combination of the use analysis and the predicative analysis. E.g., in **(1)**, the label 'smart' is used, not mentioned, and it is a predicate, not a referential expression. It seems that 'smart' semantically contributes to **(1/1*)** the property of being smart; so, if we define predicates as expressing properties/relations, the occurrence of 'smart' is a predicate. Also, if an occurrence of an expression *e* is a mention, then that occurrence is, in a sense, 'about' the expression *e* itself. By contrast, the occurrence of 'smart' in **(1)** is not about the adjective 'smart' (something linguistic), but about the property of being smart (something non-linguistic). This is evident from the fact that **(1)** would still be true if Mary did not use the adjective 'smart' to describe Kripke, but instead a synonym, say, 'intelligent'. So, the occurrence of 'smart' in **(1)** is not a mention; assuming that all occurrences of expressions are mentions or uses, the occurrence of 'smart' will be a use. Analogously for **(2)**. E.g., 'a genius' in **(2)** is used, not mentioned, which is again evident from the fact that **(2)** would be true even if Mary did not use the phrase 'a genius' to describe Kripke, but, e.g., the German translation 'ein Genie'. On the syntactic side, the salient option for **(1)** and **(2)** is the complement analysis: that is, the labels 'smart' and 'a genius' would typically be analyzed as predicative complements that combine with the verb 'called' to form a verb phrase. Clearly, 'a genius' is not an *object argument* of 'called', different from its role in a sentence like 'I met a genius today': if 'a genius' was an object argument in **(2)**, then the sentence would say that a three-place relation supposedly expressed by 'call' holds between three persons, namely Mary, Kripke, and some genius. Clearly, this is not the case: the sentence simply says that Mary ascribes to Kripke the property of being ingenious.

Now, compare constructions of describing like **(1)** and **(2)** to a construction of referring:

3) Mary called Kripke 'my darling'.

In **(3)**, the label is the common noun phrase ‘my darling’. **(3)** is roughly synonymous with:

3*) Mary referred to/addressed Kripke with ‘my darling’.

Here, it would be uncontentious to opt for the combination of the mention analysis and the referential analysis: the label ‘my darling’ is mentioned, not used, and it is a referential expression, not a predicate. All that the phrase ‘my darling’ contributes to the semantics of the sentence is the phrase itself: the sentence expresses that the three-place relation of referring/addressing (with some expression) holds between the persons Mary and Kripke and the phrase ‘my darling’. Also, if the phrase was used, then the first-person possessive pronoun ‘my’ would refer to the speaker of the sentence, while it in fact refers to Mary, the referent of the sentence subject. On the syntactic side, one option would now be to analyze the phrase ‘my darling’ as an object argument: that is, the sentence says that the three-place relation of referring/addressing (with some expression) holds between the two persons Mary and Kripke and the phrase ‘my darling’. Specifically, ‘my darling’ would be the direct object argument and ‘Kripke’ the indirect object argument. Alternatively, some might still analyze ‘my darling’ as a predicative complement, simply by analogy to ‘call’-constructions of describing.

What about name-labels? As we said at the beginning of this chapter, most would agree that if a name *N* occurs as a label, that occurrence is a mention of *N*, referring to the name *N* itself. We called this the orthodox view; in the terminology just introduced, the orthodox view combines the mention analysis and the referential analysis. Predicativists like Graff Fara and Matushansky, by contrast, defend the renegade view, a combination of the use analysis and the predicative analysis. That is:

- Orthodox View:
  - Mention Analysis: Name-labels are mentions.
  - Referential Analysis: Name-labels are referential expressions.
- Renegade View:
  - Use Analysis: Name-labels are uses.
  - Predicative Analysis: Name-labels are predicates.

In the remainder of this section, we motivate both views. For illustration, we will use the following two constructions of naming:

4) Kripke is named ‘Saul’.

5) Kripke is named Saul.

First, here is how the orthodox view would analyze **(4)** and **(5)**. **(4)** is true under at least some admissible disambiguations of ‘Kripke’, including those that disambiguate the name to refer to Saul Kripke. By contrast, **(5)** is false, presumably under all admissible disambiguations of ‘Kripke’ and ‘Saul’. In **(4)**, the name ‘Saul’ is *mentioned*, indicated in writing by single quotes around the name’s occurrence. Also, mentioned occurrences of any expression refer to the expression itself; so, the occurrence of the name ‘Saul’ in **(4)** refers to the name itself, and the sentence says that the name ‘Saul’ is a name of Kripke. By contrast, in **(5)**, the name ‘Saul’ is *used*, indicated in writing by omitting the quotes around ‘Saul’. Also, used occurrences of names–at least if they are bare singulars–refer to bearers of the name. So, the occurrence of the name ‘Saul’ in **(5)** refers to a bearer of the name ‘Saul’. So, the sentence says that this bearer of the name ‘Saul’ is a name for Kripke. The latter sentence is false for all admissible disambiguations of ‘Saul’, simply

because no bearer of the name 'Saul' is a name for anything: the only bearers of the name 'Saul' are non-linguistic entities, including persons like Saul Kripke or novelist Saul Bellow, perhaps films or books titled 'Saul', perhaps pets named 'Saul', and the like. In other words, the use of 'Saul' in **(5)** amounts to a category mistake, subsuming a non-linguistic entity under the category *linguistic entity*.

Semantically, **(4)** and **(5)** can then be analyzed as having three constituents each: the occurrence of the phrase 'is named' expresses the name-relation ('is a name for'). The used occurrence of the name 'Kripke' refers to one of the bearers of the name 'Kripke', e.g., Saul Kripke. And in **(4)**, the mentioned occurrence of 'Saul' refers to the name 'Saul' itself, while in **(5)**, the used occurrence of 'Saul' refers to a bearer of the name 'Saul'. Syntactically, this neatly corresponds to an analysis by which 'is named' is the predicate of **(4/5)**, 'Kripke' is the predicate's subject argument, and the occurrence of 'Saul' (a mention in **(4)** and a use in **(5)**) is the predicate's object argument.[358]

For a slightly different syntactic analysis, the occurrence of 'Saul' might again be treated as a predicative complement. First, if name-labels are arguments, they should clearly be *object* arguments: the *subject* argument of a labelling construction would either be the label-giver (in active labelling constructions like 'Mary called Kripke **Saul**') or the label-receiver (in passive labelling constructions like 'Kripke is called **Saul**'). However, the morphosyntactic features of name-labels are more similar to those of predicative complements than to those of object arguments. Consider, e.g., **Features 5** and **7-9** from the previous section. As to **Feature 5**, there is usually case agreement between predicative complements and their predicands, but not between direct and indirect object arguments. Consider examples from German:

- Predicative complement with subject argument as predicand ⇒ nominative agreement:
  Er ist ein Mann (He$_{nom}$ is [a man]$_{nom}$).
- Predicative complement with object argument as predicand ⇒ accusative agreement:
  Sie hält ihn für einen Mann (She considers him$_{acc}$ [a man]$_{acc}$).
- Double object construction ⇒ no case agreement:
  Sie gibt ihm ein Buch (She gives him$_{dat}$ [a book]$_{acc}$).

In the case of labelling constructions with name-labels, there is case agreement between the label-receiver and the name-label, suggesting that name-labels are predicative complements rather than (direct) object arguments. Also, as to **Feature 7-9**, object arguments can be passivized and clefted, and the order of different object arguments (e.g., direct and indirect objects) can be reversed; while these features usually do not apply to predicative complements. Again, name-labels (and any other label) are more similar to predicative complements: they can neither be passivized nor clefted, and the order of label and label-receiver cannot be reversed.[359] Given that labels in constructions of describing can *only* be analyzed as predicative complements, while labels in constructions of naming and referring can at least *also* be analyzed as predicative complements, analyzing name-labels as predicative complements has the benefit of allowing for a *uniform* analysis of all labels.[360] Note, however, that the match between name-labels and predicative complements

[358] The view that name-labels are grammatical objects is rejected in Graff Fara 2015, 63-65; she implicitly ascribes the view to Kent Bach (see, e.g., Bach 2002, 75).
[359] See Matushansky 2008, 578f., 617-620.
[360] For this approach, see, e.g., Huddleston 2002, 264f.; Hampe 2011, 219.

is not perfect. Most importantly, there is usually number agreement between predicative complements and their predicands:

- Singular agreement: He$_{sg}$ is [a man]$_{sg}$. She considers him$_{sg}$ [a man]$_{sg}$.
- Plural agreement: They$_{pl}$ are [men]$_{pl}$. She considers them$_{pl}$ [men]$_{pl}$.

But as we saw under **Feature 6**, *plural* label-receivers correspond to *singular* name-labels: '[All Johns]$_{pl}$ are called **John**$_{sg}$'.

As we saw in the introduction to this chapter (6.1), some predicativists disagree with the orthodox assessment of sentences **(4)** and **(5)** and instead defend the renegade view: according to the renegade view, **(5)** is true while **(4)** is false. Specifically, the true proposition that the name 'Saul' is a name for Kripke would be expressed by **(5)**, not by **(4)**. How do predicativists motivate this assessment?

As we said in the beginning of this section, the renegade view combines the use analysis with the predicative analysis. First, the predicative analysis is more easily motivated: as we already saw, name-labels largely behave like predicative complements. Of course, this does not yet tell us what property/relation name-labels would express; more on that in the next section. Second, to motivate the use analysis, Matushansky observes that mentions *typically* have the following two morphosyntactic features that we already encountered in passing in the previous section:[361]

M1 First, a syntactic feature: a mentioned occurrence of an expression *e* can be combined (without a shift in meaning) with a term referring to a linguistic category that *e* belongs to.

M2 Second, a morphological feature: in languages with morphological case-marking, a mentioned occurrence of an expression *e as such* (and not of a particular *grammatical form* of *e*) is in the lexical form, even on sentence positions that otherwise require an inflected form.

As to **M2**, note that the lexical form of noun phrases would be a nominative (typically the nominative singular, unless the noun is a *plurale tantum*). **M1** and **M2** extend from expressions in general to names in particular. For illustration, consider an example from German:

6) Wir schreiben über Peter den Großen.
   We are writing about [Peter the Great]$_{acc}$.
7) Wir schreiben über 'Peter der Große'.
   We are writing about '[Peter the Great]$_{nom}$'.

In (1), the name 'Peter der Große' ('Peter the Great') occurs in the accusative, as usually required by 'schreiben über' ('write about'). This indicates that (6) is about the name's *referent*, that is, the Russian emperor. By contrast, in (7), the phrase occurs in the nominative. This indicates that the occurrence is a mention rather than a use, and hence that (7) is not about the name's referent, but about the name *itself*. So, (7) says that we are writing about the *name* 'Peter der Große'.

However, as we have seen under **Features 5** and **11** in the previous section, name-labels exhibit neither **M1** nor **M2**. Contrary to **M1**, name-labels cannot be combined with linguistic category terms (except after the labelling verbs *go by* and *listen to*). And contrary to **M2**, name-labels are typically inflected in languages with morphological case-marking, even though labelling constructions that contain name-labels (such as 'Kripke is called **Saul**' or 'Kripke's parents called him **Saul**') are clearly about the name *as such*, not about

[361] See again Matushansky 2005, 230f.; 2008, 586-588.

a particular *grammatical form* of the name. Philosophers and linguists often tacitly assume a definition of mentions in purely semantic terms, e.g.:

- **Semantic conception of mentions**: An occurrence *o* of an expression *e* is a mention of *e* iff *o* refers to *e* itself; otherwise, *o* is a use of *e*.

But given the additional features **M1** and **M2**, we might define mentions in a narrower way, e.g.:

- **Narrow conception of mentions**: An occurrence *o* of an expression *e* is a mention of *e* iff *o* refers to *e* itself and exhibits features **M1** and **M2**; otherwise, *o* is a use of *e*.

By the narrow conception of mentions, name-labels are not mentions, but uses.

6.4) The Renegade View: Analyzing Name-Labels as Predicates

Against this background, let us have a closer look at how defenders of the renegade view semantically analyze name-labels. After a few preliminaries (6.4.1), we reconstruct two proposals, the first by Matushansky (6.4.2), the second by Graff Fara (6.4.3).[362]

6.4.1) Preliminaries: Small Clauses and Naming

We lack space to provide a detailed account of small clauses (SCs). SCs are standardly defined as clauses of the form 'NP XP', where NP is the subject and XP an untensed predicate; some conceptions exclude *verbal* predicates altogether.[363] Take a few examples of constructions that have been analyzed as SCs:[364]

1) Mary considers [$_{SC}$ Steve <u>happy/a genius/her best friend</u>].
2) Steve$_i$ is considered [$_{SC}$ t$_i$ <u>happy/a genius</u>].
3) Mary wanted [$_{SC}$ Steve <u>out of her life/gone</u>].
4) Mary made [$_{SC}$ Steve <u>happy/laugh/president/her successor</u>].

The SCs are in brackets, and the SC predicates are underlined. As (1-4) show, SC predicates can be NPs ('president'), DPs ('a genius', 'her best friend'), APs ('happy'), PPs ('out of her life'), and VPs ('laugh', 'gone'). The SC subject can be pronounced, as in (1/3/4), or a trace, as in the passive construction (2). SCs involve a wide range of syntactic phenomena, e.g., raising-to-object as in (3) and resultatives as in (4).

Defenders of the nonstandard view typically argue that labelling constructions can be analyzed as involving SCs. We will speak of *labelling* (*naming*, *referring*,…) SCs for short. In labelling SCs, the label-receiver (or its trace) can function as SC subjects and the label as SC predicate. E.g.:

5) Mary called [$_{SC}$ Steve <u>charismatic/a friend/her best friend</u>]. ('call' as verb of describing)
6) Mary used to call [$_{SC}$ Steve **<u>my best friend/John</u>**]. ('call' as verb of referring)
7) Kripke$_i$ was once mistakenly called [$_{SC}$ t$_i$ **<u>Steve</u>**]. ('call' as verb of referring)

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[362] There is at least one further predicativist analysis of name-labels in the literature: Sánchez Sánchez 2023. The account gives a *resultative* analysis of name-labels, motivated by the observation that in some languages other than English (including Spanish), name-labels are optional rather than obligatory; see pp. 11-13. (In English, as we saw under **Feature 4**, some labelling verbs (such as *name*) combine with optional labels while others (such as *nickname*) combine with obligatory labels.) Also, the account does not analyze constructions of naming in terms of naming *conventions*, but in terms of *acts* of naming (pp. 28f.). For one objection, it seems the account is unsuitable for passive constructions of naming: such constructions are about name-bearing rather than name-giving, and name-bearing does not presuppose that any act of naming took place (e.g., places often bear their names in virtue of unintended morphological changes, rather than given their names in an act of naming).

[363] As, e.g., in Matushansky (2008: 576).

[364] For *want*, *consider*, and *make* as verbs that take SC complements, see, e.g., Chomsky 1988 [1981], 106-112; Stowell 1983, 297f.; Aarts 1992, 21f.

8) Kripke's parents named [$_{SC}$ him **Saul**].
9) Bill Clinton$_i$ is nicknamed [$_{SC}$ t$_i$ **Bill**].
10) Leningrad$_i$ was renamed [$_{SC}$ t$_i$ **St. Petersburg**].

(5/6/8) are active labelling constructions, (7/9/10) are passive labelling constructions. (5) is a construction of describing, (6/7) are constructions of referring, (8-10) are constructions of naming. In naming constructions, the label and hence the supposed SC predicate is typically a determiner-less NP, comparable to the SC predicate 'president' in 'Mary made Steve president'.

For another set of preliminaries, let us introduce the following three notions: naming relations, naming conventions, and naming functions. First, as to naming relations, we distinguish between two- and three-place relations. Two-place naming relations concern name-*bearing* and include, e.g., the relations of *x* being a name of *y*; of *x* being a nickname of *y*; of *x* being a personal name of *x* (where *x* is a personal name of *y* iff *x* is a name of *y* and *y* is a person); and so on. Each two-place naming relation corresponds to a three-place relation that concerns name-*giving*: e.g., *x* being a name of *y* corresponds to *z* giving *y* the name *x*; *x* being a nickname of *y* corresponds to *z* giving *y* the nickname *x*; etc. We will also speak of the two- and three-place versions of the *basic naming relation*, the *nickname relation*, etc. Note that passive naming verbs express two-place naming relations, while active naming verbs express three-place naming relations. For any naming verb NV, we abbreviate the two-place relation expressed by it as NV_{R2} and the three-place relation as NV_{R3}.

Second, naming conventions will be conventions to use a particular expression as a name (of some type) for a particular individual. We individuate naming conventions in a fine-grained way s.t. every naming convention holds between *only* one individual and *only* one name. E.g., the naming convention to use 'Bill' as nickname for Bill Clinton will hold only between the name 'Bill' and the person Bill Clinton. The different naming relations correspond to different types of naming conventions: we can distinguish *basic naming conventions* (conventions to use *x* as a name for *y*), *nickname conventions* (conventions to use *x* as a nickname for *y*), etc.

Third, we introduce naming functions. Here, a naming function NV_F will evaluate which naming conventions establish the relation NV_{R2} (that is, the two-place relation corresponding to the naming verb NV). E.g., the function 'nickname'$_F$ evaluates which naming conventions establish the relation 'nickname'$_{R2}$. 'Saul' is a birth name, not a nickname of Kripke, so 'nickname'$_F$ maps the convention to use 'Saul' as name for Kripke to 0 (the truth value False); 'Bill' is a nickname of Bill Clinton, so 'nickname'$_F$ maps the convention to use 'Bill' as name for Bill Clinton to 1 (the truth value True); and so on. More generally, for any naming convention *C* holding between a name *N* and an individual *x*: $NV_F(C) = 1$ iff *C* establishes NV_{R2} between *N* and *x*.

6.4.2) Matushansky's Analysis of Name-Labels

At first glance, constructions of naming and referring might be analyzed as atomic formulas, with the labelling verb expressing a two- or three-place relation. E.g.:

- Kripke is named **Saul**: 'name'$_{R2}$(Kripke, 'Saul').
- Kripke's parents named him **Saul**: 'name'$_{R3}$(Kripke's parents, Kripke, 'Saul').
- I refer to Kripke as **Professor Kripke**: 'refer'$_{R3}$(I, Kripke, 'Professor Kripke').

However, alternative analyses are available. E.g., Matushansky analyzes naming constructions not as atomic formulas, but as existential statements that quantify over naming conventions. For simplicity, let us confine ourselves to *passive* naming constructions: e.g., 'Kripke is named Saul' can be analyzed, roughly, as saying that *there is a convention* to use 'Saul' as a *name* for Kripke; 'Bill Clinton is nicknamed Bill' can be analyzed as saying that *there is a convention* to use 'Bill' as a *nickname* for Bill Clinton. Also, recall the connection we drew in the previous section between naming conventions and naming relations. Then, e.g., 'there is a convention to use 'Bill' as a nickname for Bill Clinton' can be analyzed further as:

- There is a naming convention C s.t. '$\text{nickname}'_{F}(C) = 1$ (i.e., C establishes the two-place nicknaming relation '$\text{nickname}'_{R2}$) and C holds between the name 'Bill' and Bill Clinton.[365]

Or formally:

- $\exists C(\text{'nickname'}_{F}(C) = 1 \wedge C(\text{'Bill'}, \text{Bill Clinton}))$.[366]

Let us extend this analysis to passive naming constructions in general. To that end, we index passive verbs with 'p'; and we index names with 'u' and 'm' for 'use' and 'mention'. According to the standard view, passive naming constructions have the form '$\text{NP}_1\ \text{NV}_p\ t_1\ N_u$', with the name N being used. Then, the content of '$\text{NP}_1\ \text{NV}_p\ t_1\ N_u$' can be stated as follows:

- $[\![\text{'NP}_1\ \text{NV}_p\ t_1\ N_u\text{'}]\!] = \exists C(\text{NV}_F(C) = 1 \wedge C(N_m, [\![t_1]\!]))$.

In a next step, let us see what the constituents of the construction '$\text{NP}_1\ \text{NV}_p\ t_1\ N_u$' contribute to the content of the construction. We will ignore the label-receiver NP_1 whose semantic contribution is already covered by its trace t_1. Then, let us begin with the supposed SC '$t_1\ N_u$'. Matushansky argues that the contribution of '$t_1\ N_u$' is simply the open atomic formula '$C(N_m, [\![t_1]\!])$' (containing a free occurrence of the predicate variable 'C'). More formally:

- $[\![\text{'}t_1\ N_u\text{'}]\!] = \lambda C^*_{<e,<e,t>>}[C^*(N_m, [\![t_1]\!])]$.

Here, the semantic contribution of the label-receiver (or its trace) is simply its referent: e.g., in 'Bill Clinton$_1$ is nicknamed t_1 Bill' (suitably disambiguated), the contribution of 'Bill Clinton' or its trace is the person Bill Clinton. Then, if we stick to compositional semantics, the content of the name-label 'N_u' will be:

- $[\![\text{'}N_u\text{'}]\!] = \lambda x_e[\lambda C^*_{<e,<e,t>>}[C^*(N_m, x)]]$
  $\Rightarrow [\![\text{'}t_1\ N_u\text{'}]\!] = \lambda x_e[\lambda C^*_{<e,<e,t>>}[C^*(N_m, x)]]([\![t_1]\!])$
  $= \lambda C^*_{<e,<e,t>>}[C^*(N_m, [\![t_1]\!])]$.

So, the type of name-labels would be <e,<<e,<e,t>>,t>>, and the content of a naming SC will be an application of the content of a name-label.[367] For illustration, take again 'Bill Clinton$_1$ is nicknamed t_1 Bill'. Here, the use of 'Bill' and the SC 't_1 Bill' would be analyzed as follows:

- $[\![\text{'Bill'}]\!] = \lambda x_e[\lambda C^*_{<e,<e,t>>}[C^*(\text{'Bill'}, x)]]$
  $\Rightarrow [\![\text{'}t_1\ \text{Bill'}]\!] = \lambda x_e[\lambda C^*_{<e,<e,t>>}[C^*(\text{'Bill'}, x)]]([\![t_1]\!])$
  $= \lambda C^*_{<e,<e,t>>}[C^*(\text{'Bill'}, [\![t_1]\!])]$
  $= \lambda C^*_{<e,<e,t>>}[C^*(\text{'Bill'}, \text{Bill Clinton})]$.

[365] Matushansky (2008) uses 'R', not 'C'.
[366] Note that Matushansky (2008) would write the name-bearer as the first argument and the name as the second; we choose the opposite presentation for a more intuitive presentation.
[367] See Matushansky 2008, 610-612.

For the naming SC to become a closed formula, the variable 'C*' needs to be bound; Matushansky argues that in naming constructions, this is accomplished by the naming verb.[368] As before, we will distinguish between passive naming verbs. Then:

- $[\![\text{NV}_\text{p}]\!] = \lambda f_{<<e,<e,t>>,t>}[\exists C_{<e,<e,t>>}(\text{NV}_\text{F}(C) = 1 \wedge f(C) = 1)]$.

E.g.:

- $[\![\text{'name'}_\text{p}]\!] = \lambda f_{<<e,<e,t>>,t>}[\exists C_{<e,<e,t>>}(\text{'name'}_\text{F}(C) = 1 \wedge f(C) = 1)]$.
- $[\![\text{'nickname'}_\text{p}]\!] = \lambda f_{<<e,<e,t>>,t>}[\exists C_{<e,<e,t>>}(\text{'nickname'}_\text{F}(C) = 1 \wedge f(C) = 1)]$.

Let us see how the naming verb then combines with the naming SC:

- $[\![\text{'NV}_\text{p}\ t_1\ N_\text{u}\text{'}]\!] = \lambda f_{<<e,<e,t>>,t>}[\exists C_{<e,<e,t>>}(\text{NV}_\text{F}(C) = 1 \wedge f(C) = 1)]([\![\text{'}t_1\ N_\text{u}\text{'}]\!])$
  $= \exists C_{<e,<e,t>>}(\text{NV}_\text{F}(C) = 1 \wedge [\![\text{'}t_1\ N_\text{u}\text{'}]\!](C) = 1)$
  $= \exists C_{<e,<e,t>>}(\text{NV}_\text{F}(C) = 1 \wedge \lambda C^*_{<e,<e,t>>}[C^*(N_\text{m}, [\![t_1]\!])](C))$
  $= \exists C_{<e,<e,t>>}(\text{NV}_\text{F}(C) = 1 \wedge C(N_\text{m}, [\![t_1]\!]))$.

So, the content of '$\text{NV}_\text{p}\ t_1\ N_\text{u}$' will be an application of the content of the naming SC '$t_1\ N_\text{u}$'.[369] (Note that in our derivation, the last step relies on the principle that for all functions f, variables v, terms t, and formulae A: if $f = \lambda v[\text{A}]$, then $f(t) = 1$ iff $\lambda v[\text{A}](t)$.[370]) For illustration, take again 'Bill Clinton$_1$ is nicknamed t_1 Bill'. The string 'nicknamed t_1 Bill' will now be analyzed as:

- $[\![\text{'nicknamed } t_1 \text{ Bill'}]\!] = \lambda f_{<<e,<e,t>>,t>}[\exists C_{<e,<e,t>>}(\text{'nickname'}_\text{F}(C) = 1 \wedge f(C) = 1)]([\![\text{'}t_1 \text{ Bill'}]\!])$
  $= \exists C_{<e,<e,t>>}(\text{'nickname'}_\text{F}(C) = 1 \wedge [\![\text{'}t_1 \text{ Bill'}]\!](C) = 1)$
  $= \exists C_{<e,<e,t>>}(\text{'nickname'}_\text{F}(C) = 1 \wedge \lambda C^*_{<e,<e,t>>}[C^*(\text{'Bill'}, [\![t_1]\!])](C) = 1)$
  $= \exists C_{<e,<e,t>>}(\text{'nickname'}_\text{F}(C) = 1 \wedge C(\text{'Bill'}, [\![t_1]\!]))$
  $= \exists C_{<e,<e,t>>}(\text{'nickname'}_\text{F}(C) = 1 \wedge C(\text{'Bill'}, \text{Bill Clinton}))$.

For our purposes, we omit active labelling constructions which, in Matushansky's analysis, will additionally involve a causal operator (CAUSE) and a change of state operator (BECOME).[371] E.g., 'Kripke's parents named him Saul' would be analyzed, roughly, as 'Kripke's parents *caused* it that the name 'Saul' *became* a name for Kripke'.[372]

Also note that according to Matushansky, the content of name-labels is the content of names on *all* their uses–including, e.g., apparent referential uses.[373] Here, Matushansky endorses the 'the'-predicativist analysis of apparent referential uses of a name N as

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[368] See Matushansky 2008, 613f.

[369] Note that defenders of the orthodox view might endorse Matushansky's analysis of naming constructions in terms of existential statements that range over naming-conventions: e.g., the analysis of passive naming constructions '$\text{NP}_1\ \text{NV}_\text{p}\ t_1\ \boldsymbol{N}$' as '$\exists C(\text{NV}_\text{F}(C) = 1 \wedge C([\![t_1]\!], N_\text{m}))$' ('Kripke is named **Saul**' as 'There is a convention to use the name 'Saul' as a name for Kripke'). However, they would provide a different analysis of the name-label $\boldsymbol{N}$ and the passive naming verb NV_p. In particular, $\boldsymbol{N}$ would simply refer to the name N itself. Then, if we stick to compositionality, NV_p would have to be analyzed as:

- $[\![\text{NV}_\text{p}]\!] = \lambda x_e[\lambda y_e[\exists C(\text{NV}_\text{F}(C) = 1 \wedge C(x, y))]]$.

So, the content of '$\text{NP}_1\ \text{NV}_\text{p}\ t_1\ \boldsymbol{N}$' would be an application of the content of NV_p to the (referential) contents of the label-receiver t_1 and the name-label $\boldsymbol{N}$:

- $[\![\text{'NP}_1\ \text{NV}_\text{p}\ \boldsymbol{N}\text{'}]\!] = \lambda x_e[\lambda y_e[\exists C(\text{NV}_\text{F}(C) = 1 \wedge C(x, y))](N_\text{m})]([\![t_1]\!])$
  $= \exists C(\text{NV}_\text{F}(C) = 1 \wedge C([\![t_1]\!], N_\text{m}))$.

[370] See also Heim/Kratzer 1998, 37f.

[371] See Matushansky 2008, 584, 610f. For a precise definition of the CAUSE component, see von Stechow 1995, 83.

[372] Also note that for our purposes, we can gloss over several intricacies of Matushansky's account. E.g., in the semantics of a name-label, Matushansky (2008, 592) would replace the mentioned occurrence of the name with the phonetic string that the name instantiates. So, the lexical entry [['Bill']] would not read '$\lambda x_e[\lambda C^*_{<e,<e,t>>}[C^*(\text{'Bill'}, x)]]$', but '$\lambda x_e[\lambda C^*_{<e,<e,t>>}[C^*(/\text{bɪl}/, x)]]$', where '/bɪl/' is the phonetic transcription of 'Bill'.

[373] See Matushansky 2008, 599f.

combining with an unpronounced definite article; and she argues that the content of such a use can be given by the following formalized definite description:

- $[\iota x{:}C_0(N_m, x)]$, where C_0 is the naming convention in force between speak and hearer.

6.4.3) Graff Fara's Analysis of 'Call'-Constructions

Let us turn to Graff Fara's analysis of 'call'-constructions, laid out mostly in Graff Fara (2011). We reconstruct her analysis in three steps. First, Graff Fara analyzes *all* labels as small clause predicates–including cases that she and Matushansky would analyze as mentions, such as the label 'my darling' in 'Mary called Kripke 'my darling''. Also, when expressions occur as predicates, they will have predicate-like extensions–or predicative extensions, as we will say for short. Graff Fara makes several provocative claims about predicative extensions, most importantly:

- Mentions (not only uses) have predicative extensions.[374]

Following Graff Fara, we will use schematic letters to range over types of expressions. The letter '*e*' will be instantiated by any type of expression: names ('Saul'), adjectives ('smart'), common nouns ('genius'), phrases headed by common nouns ('a genius'), and so on. '*e*' is also instantiated by expressions that are themselves in quotes, e.g., ''Saul'' (written here with two single quotes on each side). The letter '*N*' will be instantiated by names and the letter '*P*' by predicates: by adjectives, common nouns, phrases headed by common nouns, and the like. Note that we use strings of quotes only as strings of *single* quotes–we will not use *double* quotes. Then, Graff Fara would subscribe to the three following schemas:[375]

1) *x* is in the predicative extension of '*N*' iff *x* is a bearer of '*N*'.
2) *x* is in the predicative extension of '*P*' iff *x* exemplifies the property expressed by '*P*'.
3) *x* is in the predicative extension of ''*e*'' iff *x* has been referred to with '*e*'.

Consider a few instances of these schemas:

1a) Kripke is in the predicative extension of 'Saul' iff Kripke is a bearer of 'Saul'.
2a) Kripke is in the predicative extension of 'smart' iff Kripke exemplifies the property expressed by 'smart' (that is, the property of being intelligent).
3a) Kripke is in the predicative extension of ''Saul'' iff Kripke has been referred to with 'Saul'.
3b) Kripke is in the predicative extension of '''Saul''' iff Kripke has been referred to with ''Saul''.
3c) Kripke is in the predicative extension of ''smart'' iff Kripke has been referred to with 'smart'.

With these conditions, we get the following results:

- ad **(1a)**: Kripke is a bearer of the name 'Saul' (since 'Saul' is Kripke's first name). So, Kripke is in the predicative extension of 'Saul'.
- ad **(2a)**: Kripke is smart. So, Kripke is in the predicative extension of 'smart'.
- ad **(3a)**: Kripke has been referred to with the name 'Saul' (by people who were on a first-name basis with him). So, Kripke is in the predicative extension of ''Saul''.
- ad **(3b)**: Kripke has (probably) not been referred to with the expression ''Saul''. So, Kripke is not in the predicative extension of '''Saul'''.
- ad **(3c)**: Kripke has (probably) not been referred to with the adjective 'smart'. So, Kripke is not in the predicative extension of ''smart''.

Let us add a few remarks on **(3b)** and **(3c)**. For **(3b)**, consider that in order to refer to Kripke with the expression ''Saul'', the name 'Saul' would have to be *mentioned* in reference to Kripke, as in the sentence '*Naming and Necessity* was written by 'Saul''. This

[374] See Graff Fara 2011, 497f.
[375] See Graff Fara 2011, 493-495, 497-499.

hardly makes sense: we would expect a *use* of the name, as in '*Naming and Necessity* was written by Saul'. For **(3c)**, consider that the adjective 'smart' cannot be used as referential term, different from other adjectives such as 'handsome' ('Hey, handsome, how are you?'). This does not contradict the fact that Kripke has been *described* with the adjective 'smart'.[376]

In a second step, let us see how Graff Fara applies her conception of predicative extensions to 'call'-constructions. We confine ourselves to *passive* 'call'-constructions. Here, the following schemas might be proposed:

4) *x* is called *N* iff *x* is in the predicative extension of '*N*'.
5) *x* is called *P*/a *P* iff *x* is in the predicative extension of '*P*'.
6) *x* is called '*e*' iff *x* is in the predicative extension of "*e*".

(4-6) are analogous to the above schemas **(1-3)**. Graff Fara accepts **(4)** and **(6)**, but rejects **(5)**. To see why, consider three instances:

4a) *x* is called Saul iff *x* is in the predicative extension of 'Saul'.
5a) *x* is called smart iff *x* is in the predicative extension of 'smart'.
6a) *x* is called 'Saul' iff *x* is in the predicative extension of "Saul".

Graff Fara would maintain that a person is called Saul iff being a bearer of the name 'Saul', and hence iff being in the predicative extension of the name 'Saul'. And she would maintain that a person is called 'Saul' iff having been referred to with the name 'Saul', and hence iff being in the predicative extension of "Saul". By contrast, she would deny **(5a)**: clearly, a person can falsely be described as smart–she can be *called* smart without *being* smart, and hence without being in the predicative extension of 'smart'; conversely, a person can be smart without ever being recognized as such, and hence without ever being called smart.[377]

In a third step, we turn to the *motivation* behind Graff Fara's analysis of 'call'-constructions. The analysis seems to be motivated by two independent arguments. The first morphosyntactic and tries to establish that labels in constructions of naming are uses, not mentions. Here, Graff Fara–like Matushansky–simply draws on the fact that name-labels typically lack **Features 5** and **11** that we would expect from mentions (see 6.3). By contrast, the second argument is semantic and tries to establish that labels in constructions of referring are mentions, not uses. Consider the sentence:

7) Mary called Kripke **stupid**.

In **(7)**, the adjective 'stupid' is the label. **(7)** has two admissible interpretations. According to the first, **(7)** is a construction of describing and means that Mary ascribed to Kripke the property of being stupid. Under this first interpretation, **(7)** is not about the adjective

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[376] Note that we do *not* assume the following schema (and expect that Graff Fara would not subscribe to it either):

- *x* is in the predicative extension of '*e*' iff *x* has been referred to with *e*.

This would be instantiated by the following schema (where the variable '*e*' for expressions is substituted with the variable '*N*' for names):

- *x* is in the predicative extension of '*N*' iff *x* has been referred to with *N*.

Which again would be instantiated by conditions like:

- Kripke is in the predicative extension of 'Saul' iff Kripke has been referred to with Saul.

But while the lefthand side of this condition is true (as we have seen in **(1a)**), the righthand side is false: it says (roughly) that Kripke has been referred to not with the name 'Saul', but with some *bearer* of the name 'Saul'.

[377] See Graff Fara 2011, 499f.

'stupid', but about the content of that adjective: the property of being stupid; and **(7)** would have the same content as any sentence that replaces 'stupid' with a synonym, say, 'unintelligent'. This suggests that 'stupid' is *used* under this first interpretation. But **(7)** can also be interpreted as a construction of referring: in that case, **(7)** means that Mary referred to Kripke with the adjective 'stupid', as when she addressed him with 'You forgot the keys again, stupid!'. And she might do so *without* thereby ascribing any property to Kripke–e.g., she might use the adjective 'stupid' jokingly. Under this second interpretation, **(7)** is not about the content of the adjective 'stupid', but about the phrase itself. This suggests that 'stupid' is *mentioned* under the second interpretation. If we follow Graff Fara, then the analysis of labels in constructions of referring can be extended from expressions like 'stupid' to any other expression that can be used referentially, including names. This would give us an argument in favor of treating names as mentions when they occur as labels in constructions of referring.[378]

6.5) Challenging the Renegade View

In the previous section, we have reconstructed two proposals of how to analyze name-labels as predicates–first the proposal by Matushansky, then the one by Graff Fara. This completed our exposition of the renegade view: the view that name-labels are predicative uses, not referential mentions. Let us now turn to a critique of this view.

In this section, we will defend three main theses that contradict the versions of the renegade view sketched in the previous sections. These theses are:

- **T1** In English, most labels syntactically behave like predicates/predicative complements rather than object arguments.
- **T2** In English, most labels syntactically behave like uses rather than mentions. In particular, they cannot be combined with linguistic category terms.
- **T3** In languages with morphological case-marking, name-labels typically behave the same way in constructions of naming and in constructions of referring. In most cases, they morphosyntactically behave like predicates and like uses.

Importantly, **T1** and **T2** also hold for labels that defenders of the renegade view classify as *mentions*, not as uses.

First, let us argue for thesis **T1**. Consider the following sentences:

1) Mary called Kripke **professor**. (E.g., she might have addressed him with 'professor': 'Professor, I forgot my homework'.)

2) Mary called Kripke **my best friend**. In the sense of: Mary referred to Kripke with the phrase 'my best friend'.

3) Mary once mistakenly called Kripke **Steve**.

(1-3) are 'call'-constructions of referring. According to both Matushansky's and Graff Fara's versions of the predicative analysis, the labels 'professor' and 'my best friend' in **(1/2)** are mentions. For the noun 'professor' to be used, it would have to be combined with the indefinite article: 'Mary called Kripke a professor'; and if 'my best friend' was used, 'my' would refer to the speaker of the sentence, not to Mary. By contrast, the label 'Steve' in **(3)** is a use according to Matushansky, and a mention according to Graff Fara. Now, it would seem that the labels in **(1-3)** syntactically behave like predicates rather than object arguments. In particular, they cannot be passivized, clefted, or reordered:

[378] See Graff Fara 2011, 493f.

- Passivization:
  - ***Professor** was called to/for/… Kripke by Mary.
  - ***My best friend** was called to/for/… Kripke by Mary.
  - ***Steve** was once mistakenly called to/for/… Kripke by Mary.
- Clefting:
  - *It was **professor** that Mary called Kripke.
  - *It was **my best friend** that Mary called Kripke.
  - *It was **Steve** that Mary once mistakenly called Kripke.
- Reordering:
  - *Mary called **professor** to/for/… Kripke.
  - Mary called **my best friend** to/for/… Kripke. (shift in meaning)
  - Mary once mistakenly called **Steve** to/for/… Kripke. (shift in meaning)

Each reformulation of **(1-3)** leads to ungrammaticality or a shift in meaning. (E.g., 'Mary once called **Steve** to Kripke' is grammatical if the name '**Steve**' is a use, not a mention; but then, the meaning of 'called' shifts from 'refer' to something like 'summon': the sentence would no longer mean that Mary once referred to Kripke with the name 'Steve', but that Mary once summoned the person Steve to Kripke.)

Next, let us argue for thesis **T2**. For one syntactic feature of uses, recall that they cannot be combined with linguistic category terms, or only at the price of a shift in meaning; that is, they do not exhibit feature **M1** of mentions. Assume we apply linguistic category terms to the labels in **(1-3)**:

- Mary called Kripke **the word/noun/expression/… 'professor'**.
- Mary called Kripke **the phrase 'my best friend'**.
- Mary once mistakenly called Kripke **the name 'Steve'**.

Again, each of the resulting sentences is either ungrammatical or involves a shift in meaning. E.g., 'Mary called Kripke the word 'professor'' would mean that Mary said about Kripke that he *is* the word 'professor'; and 'Mary called Kripke 'the word 'professor'' would mean that Mary referred to Kripke with the phrase 'the word 'professor'', rather than with the word 'professor' itself. The same also holds for most labelling verbs other than *call*. E.g.:

- Mary referred to Kripke as **Saul**.
  vs. Mary referred to Kripke as **the name 'Saul'**.

Finally, in support of thesis **T3**, consider again the German sentence:

- Sie nannten ihn **Peter den Großen**.

This sentence can be translated as a construction of naming (as we did in 6.2), but just as well as a construction of referring, in the sense of: They referred to him with the name 'Peter the Great'. In both cases, the name-label 'Peter den Großen' is an inflected form (the nominative would be 'Peter der Große'); and there is case-agreement between the label-receiver 'ihn' and the label 'Peter den Großen' (both are in the accusative). Or consider constructions that can *only* be interpreted as constructions of referring, not as constructions of naming. E.g., assume Mary mistakenly uses the German name 'Atlantischer Ozean' ('Atlantic Ocean') to refer to the Pacific:

- Mary nannte den Pazifik einmal versehentlich **Atlantischen Ozean**.
  Mary once mistakenly called [the Pacific]$_{acc}$ [**Atlantic Ocean**]$_{acc}$.

Clearly, this is a construction of referring: when we say that Mary once mistakenly called the Pacific **Atlantic Ocean**, we mean that she once mistakenly *referred* to the Pacific with the name 'Atlantic Ocean', not that she once mistakenly *introduced* 'Atlantic Ocean' as a

name for the Pacific. Similarly for labelling verbs other than 'nennen' ('call'). E.g., take German constructions that use 'bezeichnen als', which comes close to a translation of 'denote as':[379]

- Sie bezeichneten ihn als **Peter den Großen**.
  They denoted him$_{acc}$ as [**Peter the Great**]$_{acc}$.

Again, the label is inflected, and there is case-agreement between label and label-receiver. Note that the point can be made for several other languages as well, e.g., for Finnish and Korean.[380] Also note that the point applies not only to name-labels. E.g., consider incomplete/referentially used definite descriptions. Assume Mary uttered the sentence 'The leader of the free world arrived in Germany today', using the definite description 'the leader of the free world' referentially to refer to the US president. This scenario would be correctly described as follows:

- Mary called the president **the leader of the free world**. In the sense of: Mary referred to the president with the phrase 'the leader of the free world'.
  German: Mary nannte [den Präsidenten]$_{acc}$ [**den Anführer der freien Welt**]$_{acc}$.
  vs. *Mary nannte [den Präsidenten]$_{acc}$ [**der Anführer der freien Welt**]$_{nom}$.

Again, in the German translation, the label is inflected, and there is case-agreement between label and label-receiver. Going one step further, the examples from German show that in languages with morphological case-marking, labels typically have the morphological features of uses (rather than mentions) and of predicates/predicative complements (rather than direct object arguments): in particular, labels share with uses the morphological feature of inflection, and with predicative complements the morphological feature of case-agreement with an object argument (if the label was a second object argument, then it should be in a *different* case than the first object argument). Again, this also holds for labels that defenders of the renegade view classify as mentions.

The examples we cited lend support to our three theses **T1-3**. Now, let us see what impact these theses have on the renegade view. Most importantly, all three theses suggest that name-labels receive the *same* treatment in constructions of referring as in constructions of naming: more specifically, they should either be predicates in both types of constructions, or referential expressions in both types of constructions; and they should either be uses in both types of constructions, or mentions in both types of constructions. More specifically, by Matushansky's criteria for predicates and uses, name-labels should be treated as predicative uses, not referential mentions, in both types of constructions. What is more, the same holds for various *other* kinds of labels in constructions of referring.

For some more specific remarks, let us consider first the versions of the renegade view by Graff Fara, then the version by Matushansky. First, as we saw in 6.4.3, Graff Fara analyzes labels differently in constructions of referring and constructions of naming: the former as mentions, the latter as uses. Her motivation seemed to be that constructions of referring (different from constructions of describing) are about the label itself, not about the content of the label; and that labels in constructions of naming morphosyntactically behave like uses–they cannot be combined with linguistic category terms, and they can

[379] The German translation of *refer to* would be *sich beziehen auf* which is less commonly used in labelling constructions.
[380] See the examples in Matushansky 2008, 582 (the Elvis example in Korean), 584 (the Bill Gates example in Finnish).

be inflected. Now, clearly, also constructions of naming–just like constructions of referring–are about the expression that occurs as label: the sentence 'Kripke is named **Saul**' is about the name 'Saul'. So, Graff Fara's reasoning seems to presuppose that the morphosyntax is what distinguishes constructions of naming from constructions of referring: that is, labels in constructions of referring do *not* have the morphosyntactic behavior of uses. But as we just showed in our defense of theses **T2** and **T3**, this is not the case. So, Graff Fara's proposal to analyze labels differently in constructions of referring than in constructions of naming is unwarranted.

Second, as we saw in 6.4.2, Matushansky analyzes names (or name-uses) as metalinguistic predicates that express specific relations between individuals and names (where those relations consisted in naming conventions). Again, this analysis was mainly motivated by the morphosyntactic behavior of name-labels in constructions of naming. However, as we showed in our defense of **T1-3**, labels in constructions of referring (including *name*-labels) often exhibit the same morphosyntactic behavior. So, if Matushansky's reasoning is applied to labels in constructions of referring, those labels would have to receive a predicative analysis as well. More specifically, their predicative analysis would have to be related, in some way, to the notion of *reference*–just as the analysis of name-labels in constructions of naming is related to the notion of name-bearing (by being formulated in terms of naming conventions). Let us spell out one such analysis, beginning with name-labels. It seems that to account for name-labels in constructions of referring, Matushansky's analysis might simply be modified by replacing the variable that ranges over naming conventions with a variable ranging over acts of reference. For simplicity, we will analyze acts of reference as relations, analogously to how Matushansky analyzes naming conventions (we set aside the possibility that acts of reference might best be analyzed in terms of event semantics). So:

- $\lambda x_e[\lambda y_e[\lambda R_{<e,<e,<e,t>>>}[R(x, y,$ the name $N)]]]$, where '$R(x, y, z)$' is any three-place act of reference obtaining between a speaker x, an object y, and an expression z used by x to refer to y.

Also, recall that Matushansky analyzes naming verbs as contributing a naming *relation*: specifically, the naming-verb expressed whether a particular naming convention establishes the relation of x being a name for y, or of x being a nickname for y, and so on. To formalize the connection between naming verbs, naming relations, and naming conventions, we used the function NV_F. Analogously, we might now introduce *reference* relations: e.g., the more general three relations of *x referring* to *y* with *z*, or the more specific relation of *x addressing y* with *z*; and we might suggest that in constructions of referring, the reference relation is expressed by the verb of referring.[381]

We will not spell the analysis out in detail. The upshot is, however, that name-labels are ambiguous: they have different predicative contents in constructions of naming than in constructions of referring. Also, a similar ambiguity would arise for other kinds of labels. E.g., the occurrence of the common count noun 'professor' as a label in a construction of referring ('Mary called Kripke **professor**') would not express the property of

[381] Note that there will still be major differences between constructions of naming and of referring. Perhaps most importantly, active constructions of referring are not analyzable in causal terms: 'I referred to Kripke as **Professor Kripke**' cannot be analyzed as 'I caused it that there was a reference act obtaining between me, Kripke, and the expression 'Professor Kripke''/'I caused it that Kripke was referred to with the expression 'Professor Kripke''.

being a professor, nor would it refer to the noun 'professor' itself (as it would if it was a mention). Rather, 'professor' would here express the following function:

- $\lambda x_e[\lambda y_e[\lambda R_{<e,<e,<e,t>>>}[R(x, y,$ 'professor')]]], where '$R(x, y, e)$' is again any three-place reference-relation.

This way, a semantics along the lines of Matushansky would multiply the meanings of expressions: it would assign new predicative meanings to expressions of any kind.

Our primary point in this section was that by its own criteria, Matushansky's analysis of labelling constructions needs to be revised–the renegade view needs to be extended beyond constructions of naming. Also, however, we take these necessary revisions to be an argument against Matushansky's version of the renegade view, simply because the resulting analysis is overly counterintuitive and lacks simplicity. E.g., a far more intuitive and far simpler approach would be that name-labels make the same semantic contribution to constructions of referring as to constructions of naming–the semantic difference between 'Kripke is named **Saul**' and 'Kripke is referred to as **Saul**' seems to be fully explained by the semantic difference between the labelling verbs *name* and *refer*.

6.6) Excursion: Name-Labels, Predicative Adjuncts, Predicative Complements

In the previous two sections, we dealt with two predicative analyses of name-labels, one by Matushansky, the other by Graff Fara. To get a fuller understanding of the relation between name-labels and predicates, we add an excursion on predicative adjuncts and predicative complements. In 6.6.1, we show why name-labels are not predicative adjuncts. In 6.6.2, we compare name-labels to different types of predicative complements: first, to predicative complements that combine with raising or control verbs (6.6.2.1); second, to depictives and resultatives (6.6.2.2).

6.6.1) Why Name-Labels Are Not Predicative Adjuncts

Let us begin with the alternative between predicative adjuncts and predicative complements. If we follow the standard conception, then one important difference between adjuncts and complements would be that complements are typically obligatory while adjuncts are always optional. That is, for all expressions *e* and all sentences *s*, if *e* is an adjunct in *s*, then omitting *e* from *s* results in a string *s** that is a grammatical sentence and whose constituents contribute the same meaning to *s** as to *s*. E.g., in the sentence 'Fortunately, I found him smart', 'fortunately' is an adjunct. And indeed, the sentence 'I found him smart' is grammatical, and its constituents contribute the same meaning to this second sentence as to 'Fortunately, I found him smart'. By contrast, for some expressions *e* and some sentences *s*, if *e* is a complement in *s*, then omitting *e* from *s* results in a string *s** that is either not grammatical or some of whose constituents contribute a different meaning to *s** than to *s*. E.g., in 'Fortunately, I found him smart', both 'him' and 'smart' are complements, and in fact, both are obligatory. Omitting 'him' from the sentence results in the ungrammatical 'Fortunately, I found smart'. And omitting 'smart' from the sentence results in 'Fortunately, I found him' which is grammatical, but where the verb *found* shifts its meaning. Obviously, this gives us only a partial distinction between adjuncts and complements: 'adjunct' implies 'optional', but not vice versa; 'obligatory' implies 'complement', but not vice versa. To get a full distinction, we need to distinguish adjuncts from *optional* complements. For one approach, consider licensing. Roughly,

whether an expression can function as complement in a clause depends to some extent on the main verb of the clause–that is, different verbs license different kinds of complements. E.g., the verb *find* licenses constructions of the form 'NP + AP' (among others), but no constructions of the form 'NP + gerund clause': we can say 'I find him insufferable', but not *'I find him being insufferable'. By contrast, adjuncts do not require licensing. So, if a phrase needs to be licensed by a verb to occur in combination with that verb, then the phrase is a complement, not an adjunct.[382]

Now, we saw under **Feature 4** that labels–including name-labels–are obligatory with some labelling verbs, but optional with others. E.g., labels are obligatory with the verbs *call* or *nickname*, but optional with the verb *name*: 'She named him **Saul**' implies 'She named him', but 'She called him **Saul**' does not entail 'She called him' (which would involve a shift in the meaning of 'call', in the sense of 'to call sb. on the phone'), and 'She nicknamed him **Saul**' does not entail 'She nicknamed him' (which does not seem grammatical). So, at first glance, 'Saul' might seem to be a complement in 'She called him **Saul**' and 'She nicknamed him **Saul**', but a mere adjunct in 'She named him **Saul**'. However, as we saw in **Feature 3**, the verb *name* has quite narrow licensing criteria: *name* in the sense of 'giving a name' combines only with names and not with any other phrases. (Same for verbs like *nickname*, *baptize*, or *christen*, and the verb *call* in the naming or referring sense.) This suggests that also in 'She named him **Saul**', 'Saul' is a complement rather than an adjunct.

For one further indicator for English complements, consider the 'do so/did so' test.[383] Typically, complements cannot be replaced in 'did so'-constructions. We will test the verbs *call*, *name*, *address as* and *know as*–as we have seen, labels are obligatory with *call*, but optional with *name*, *address*, and *know*. Compare the following sentence-pairs:

- She called him a genius and I called him a moron.
  ≉ *She called him a genius and I did so a moron.
- The Hebrews named Jerusalem **Yerushalayim** and the Arabs named Jerusalem **Al-Quds**.
  ≉ *The Hebrews named Jerusalem **Yerushalayim** and the Arabs did so **Al-Quds**.
- She addressed him as **Saul** and I addressed him as **Professor Kripke**.
  ?≈ She addressed him as **Saul** and I did so as **Professor Kripke**.
- She knew him as **Saul** and I knew him as **Professor Kripke**.
  ?≈ She knew him as **Saul** and I did so as **Professor Kripke**.

In the scope of the verbs *call* and *name*, labels clearly fail the 'did so' test. In the scope of the verbs *address as* and *know as*, the resulting 'did so'-constructions sound at least highly unnatural. So, the examples suggest that also labelling verbs where the label is optional fail the 'did so' test. This again suggests that labels are complements rather than adjuncts, even in the scope of labelling verbs where the label is optional.

6.6.2) Name-Labels and Predicative Complements

6.6.2.1) Raising and Control

In a next step, we will argue that labelling constructions are neither raising nor control constructions.[384] Compare the following sentences:

- Mary wants him to be a good student/the best student ever. (raising-to-object verb *want*)

[382] See, e.g., Huddleston 2002, 219-222.
[383] See, e.g., Huddleston 2002, 222f.; Carnie 2007, 183.
[384] On raising and control, see, e.g., Carnie 2007, 431-439.

- Mary persuades him to be a good student/the best student ever. (object control verb *persuade*)
- Mary promises him to be a good student/the best student ever. (subject control verb *promise*)
- Mary calls him a good student/(the) best student ever. (labelling verb *call*)
- Mary calls him **Saul**. (labelling verb *call*)

We focus on raising and control constructions that have an object argument (here: 'him'); that excludes all raising-to-subject constructions ('Mary seems to be a good student') and some subject control constructions ('Mary promises to be a good student'). In constructions with raising-to-object or object control verbs, the subject of the non-finite clause is the object of the main clause. In constructions with raising-to-subject or subject control verbs, the subject of the non-finite clause is the subject of the main clause. In labelling constructions, the label is applied to the referent of the object of the main clause–so, if the construction of label-receiver plus label constitutes a clause, then the subject of that clause is the label-receiver and hence the object of the main clause.

Let us add three syntactic and two semantic comparisons between raising, control, and labelling verbs. First, for a syntactic difference, raising and control allow for infinitival clauses (in our examples with 'to be'), while labelling constructions do not (recall **Feature 10**). Second, passivization of the object argument is permissible for labelling constructions: e.g., 'Mary calls him a good student' can be passivized as 'He is called a good student by Mary' (recall **Feature 7**). This feature is shared by object control constructions, but not by subject control constructions, and by some, but not all raising-to-object constructions. E.g., the object control construction 'Mary persuades him to be a good student' can be passivized as 'He is persuaded to be a good student by Mary'; by contrast, the subject control construction 'Mary promises him to be a good student' cannot be passivized as *'He is promised to be a good student by Mary'. And the raising-to-object construction 'Mary wants him to be a good student' cannot be passivized as *'He is wanted to be a good student by Mary'; but the raising-to-object construction 'Mary *expects* him to be a good student' can be passivized as 'He is expected to be a good student by Mary'. Third, labelling constructions are not easily reformulated with *that*-clauses (recall again **Feature 10**): e.g., 'Mary calls him a good student' cannot be reformulated as *'Mary calls (him) that he is a good student', and 'Mary calls him **Saul**' cannot be reformulated as *'Mary calls (him) that he is Saul/'Saul'/a Saul'. This feature is shared by some (not all) control constructions, but not by raising constructions. E.g., 'Mary wants/expects him to be a good student' can be reformulated as 'Mary wants/expects that he is a good student'; 'Mary persuades him to be a good student' can be reformulated (less naturally) as 'Mary persuades him that he be a good student'; but 'Mary tells him to be a good student' cannot be reformulated as 'Mary tells him that he is/be a good student'.

Fourth, in active labelling constructions the label applies to the referent of the object argument of the main verb (that is, the semantic label-receiver), not to the referent of the subject argument of the main verb (that is, the semantic label-giver). E.g., in 'Mary calls him a genius', the label 'a genius' applies to the referent of 'him', not to the referent of 'Mary'. This feature is shared by raising-to-object and object control verbs, but not by subject control verbs, including those that take an object argument ('Mary promises him to be a good student'). Fifth, labelling verbs typically do not semantically select their object argument–anything can be labelled (an exception is the verb *title* which semantically selects artifacts, texts, etc.). This feature is shared by raising-to-object verbs, but not

by control verbs. In the case of object control verbs like *persuade* or subject control verbs like *promise*, the object should refer to a person (in our examples: the referent of 'him'). By contrast, in the case of raising verbs like *want* and labelling verbs like *call*, the object can refer to any kind of object: in our examples, the referent was again a person, but it might well be an inanimate object: 'Mary calls *the dessert* delicious'; 'Mary wants *the dessert* to be delicious'; *'Mary persuades *the dessert* to be delicious'.

6.6.2.2) Depictives and Resultatives

Let us turn to depictives and resultatives. We group them together under the heading *secondary predicates*. Again, we confine ourselves to constructions that contain an object argument, which will enable us to compare such constructions to labelling constructions that contain a label-receiver. Some standard examples include:

- I painted the wall yellow.
- I ate the meat raw.
- I ate the meat hungry.

The secondary predicates here are the adjectives 'yellow', 'raw', and 'hungry'. In the first and second sentences, the subject of the secondary predicate is the *object* argument of the verb: 'the wall' in the first sentence (the wall became yellow) and 'the meat' in the second (the meat was raw). In the third sentence, the subject of the secondary predicate is the *subject* argument of the verb, that is, 'I' (I was hungry). That the secondary predicates in these sentences are optional is evident from the following entailments:

- I painted the wall yellow.
  ⇒ I painted the wall.
- I ate the meat raw/hungry.
  ⇒ I ate the meat.

Secondary predicates are commonly divided into resultatives and depictives.[385] Roughly, resultatives describe a result of the event described by the remainder of the sentence: in 'I painted the wall yellow', 'yellow' is a resultative describing the property the wall has as a result of me painting it–that is, as a result of the event described by 'I painted the wall'. By contrast, depictives describe a state that the referent of one of the arguments of the main predicate is in *during* the event described by the remainder of the sentence: in the sentence 'I ate the meat hungry', 'hungry' is a depictive describing the state that I (the referent of the subject argument) was in while I was eating the meat. In 'I ate the meat raw', 'raw' is a depictive describing the state that the meat (the referent of the object argument) was in while I was eating it.

Let us attempt a somewhat more precise analysis. We begin with depictives. Take any sentence that contains a depictive and has the following form:

1) NP_1 V NP_2 D,

where NP_1/NP_2 are the first/second noun phrases, V is a verb, and D a depictive. Also, the content of any expression *e* will be written as '[*e*]'. And we will use '*x* WHILE *y*' to represent the simultaneity of two states/events *x* and *y*, and '*x* BE *y*' to represent that an object *x* has property *y*. Then, sentences of the form (1) (or utterances of such sentences) can be given either of the following analyses:

1a) [NP_1 V NP_2] WHILE [NP_1 BE D].

[385] See the locus classicus: Halliday 1967, 63f.

1b) [NP_1 V NP_2] WHILE [NP_2 BE D].

The only difference is that (1b) replaces NP_1 with NP_2 in [NP_1 BE D]. E.g., in 'I ate the meat hungry', NP_1 = 'I', NP_2 = 'the meat', V = 'ate', and D = 'hungry'. Say, I utter the sentence and thereby refer to a particular piece of meat M and apply 'hungry' to myself, not to M. Then, [NP_1] = I, [NP_2] = M, [V] = the relation of eating, and [D] = the property of being hungry. So, this utterance says that I ate M while I was hungry. Analogously for 'I ate the meat raw', which would say that I ate meat M while M was raw.

The analysis of resultatives is more intricate. We start with a first proposal that we subsequently refine. Take any sentence that contains a resultative and has the following form:

2) NP_1 V NP_2 R,

where R is the resultative. Also, we use '*x* CAUSE *y* BY MEANS OF *z*' to indicate that an object *x* causes an event/state *y* by means of performing an act *z*; and we use '*x* BECOME *y*' to represent that *x* adopts property *y*. Then, for a first proposal, sentences of the form (2) can be given the following analysis:

2a) [NP_1] CAUSE ([NP_2] BECOME [R]) BY MEANS OF [V NP_2].

That is, the referent of NP_1 causes it that the referent of NP_1 becomes [R], that is, adopts the property expressed by R; and the referent of NP_1 does so by means of performing the act expressed by the clause 'V NP_2'. E.g., in 'I painted the wall yellow', NP_1 = 'I', NP_2 = 'the wall', V = 'painted', and R = 'yellow'. Say, I utter the sentence, referring to a particular wall W. Then, [NP_1] = I, [NP_2] = W, [V] = the relation of painting, and [R] = the property of being yellow. So, my utterance of the sentence can be analyzed as saying that I caused it that W became yellow; and I did so by means of performing the act of painting W.

Things are not quite that simple. To see why, let us add a few more example sentences:

a) I made him president.
b) I drove Mary crazy.
c) I laughed myself sick.

In (a), the verb *made* simply expresses causation, but no *means* of causation: the sentence cannot be reformulated as 'I caused him to be president by making him'. The same holds for (b): again, the sentence cannot be reformulated as 'I caused Mary to be crazy by driving her'. (The difference is that *drive* only *idiomatically* expresses causation and does not express causation in any other context.) In (c), the means of causation are expressed, but those means are just expressed by the verb, not by the phrase consisting of the verb plus the object argument: I caused myself to become sick, and I did so by laughing, not by laughing *myself* (where 'myself' would be understood as object argument of 'laughing'). Then, the analysis of sentences like (a) and (b) would seem to have the form:

2*) [NP_1] CAUSE ([NP_2] BECOME [R]).

And the analysis of sentences like (c) would seem to have the form:

2**) [NP_1] CAUSE ([NP_2] BECOME [R]) BY MEANS OF [V].

In sentences (a-c), NP_2 is a *fake object*: semantically, NP_2 does not combine with NP_1 and V, but with R. E.g., 'myself' in (c) does not combine with 'I laughed' to express that I was

the object (the theme/goal/recipient/beneficiary/…) of my own laughter, but rather with 'sick' to express that I became sick.[386]

To return to our initial question: Can labels in labelling constructions be analyzed as secondary predicates? And if so, are they resultatives or depictives? In the literature, one occasionally encounters a distinction between verbs like *call* or *term* on one side and verbs like *name* or *baptize* on the other, suggesting that the former take depictive complements (not depictive *adjuncts*) and the latter resultative complements.[387] The motivation behind this classification is roughly as follows. First, in resultative clauses, the resultative complement represents a result of the event described by the main verb of the clause. Similarly, in labelling constructions where the main verb is *name* or *baptize*, the label represents the result of the naming/baptizing: as a result of the naming/baptizing event described by the main verb, the label-receiver is a bearer of that label (which in the case of verbs like *name* or *baptize* will be a proper name). Second, in depictive clauses, the depictive complement/adjunct represents a property that the referent of the subject or object of the clause has–and, more specifically, a property that does *not* result from the event described by the main verb of the clause. Similarly, in labelling constructions where the main verb is *call* or *term*, the label represents a property ascribed to the label-receiver–and more specifically, a property that does *not* result from the event described by the main verb, that is, the event of ascribing some property to an object or referring to that object with some expression (at least if *call* is interpreted as verb of describing or referring).

Despite these analogies, there are strong objections against the classification of labelling verbs as resultatives or depictives. We begin with labelling constructions that are analyzed as depictives. The first two objections are fairly obvious. First, the label does not necessarily express a property that the semantic label-receiver *exemplifies*, but rather one that the semantic label-giver (perhaps mistakenly) *claims* to be exemplified to the semantic label-receiver. Second, and more specifically, the label does not necessarily express a property that the semantic label-receiver exemplifies (or is claimed to exemplify) *during* the event described by the main verb: I can call Shakespeare a genius without implying he is *currently* a genius. Third, as Matushansky points out,[388] the standard examples for depictives are optional. By contrast, labelling constructions–even with verbs like *call* or *term*–are often obligatory. Fourth, in constructions of referring with verbs like *refer*, *address*, *know as*, and in some cases *call* ('I once mistakenly called him **Saul**'), the label represents neither a result of the event described by the main verb, nor a property exemplified by, or ascribed to, the semantic label-receiver. Rather, such labelling constructions describe a reference event where the label is the *means* of reference.

The resultative analysis of constructions of naming goes beyond the standard conception of resultatives as well. After all, in standard examples of resultatives, the resultative

[386] See, e.g., Goldberg/Jackendoff 2004, 536f., 550f. Also note that there are further types of resultative constructions. E.g., first, there are so-called 'caused motion constructions', as in 'I rolled the ball down the hill' or 'I ran into the kitchen'. (See Goldberg/Jackendoff 2004, 540.) Second, there are resultative constructions where the result does not represent a change in property/location, but the opposite, as in 'I kept him warm' or 'I didn't let him out of the kitchen'. (See Hampe 2011, 220.) For our purposes, we will set such additional resultatives aside.
[387] E.g., Huddleston 2002, 264f.; Hampe 2011, 219.
[388] See Matushansky 2008, 622.

expresses a property; and on the face it, this is not the case with name-labels. Still, in a sense, constructions of naming contain indeed a *result* of a naming event: sentences like 'Mary named/baptized/nicknamed her son **Steve**' describe not only an event of naming/baptizing/nicknaming, but also a result of that event, namely that Mary's son becomes a bearer of the name/nickname 'Steve'. Hence, we take a resultative analysis of constructions of naming to be more promising than a depictive analysis of the remaining labelling constructions, but the resultative analysis will still have to go beyond the schemata we have sketched above, such as (2a). It seems implausible to simply combine in that schema the component BECOME with a (used or mentioned) name.

Instead, we suggest a more independent analysis of labelling constructions in general, and labelling constructions with name-labels in particular. E.g., English labelling constructions that contain both a name-label and a label-giver will have the following form:

3) NP_1 V NP_2 *N*,

where *N* is a proper name. We suggest that such constructions allow for two semantic analyses, where the first applies to constructions of naming and the second to constructions of referring:

3a) [NP_1] CAUSE ([NP_2] BECOME [BEARER OF *N*]) BY MEANS OF [V NP_2].

3b) [NP_1] REFER [NP_2] BY MEANS OF *N*.

In (3a), V can then be an inflected form of verbs like *name*, *baptize*, *christen*, *nickname*, *call* (in the sense of 'name'), etc. In (3b), V can be an inflected form of verbs like *refer*, *address*, *know as*, etc. '*x* REFER *y*' says that *x* refers to *y*.

6.7) Defending the Orthodox View

Let us return to the dispute between the orthodox view and the renegade view. As we saw in 6.3, the renegade view combines the predicative analysis with the use analysis: name-labels are predicative uses. In section 6.5, we argued that the renegade view leads to an overly complicated and counterintuitive analysis of labels in general and name-labels in particular. In 6.6, we argued against alternative approaches to analyzing name-labels as predicative occurrences.

In the last section of this chapter, let us explore a number of strategies that are meant to avoid the renegade view and to rehabilitate the orthodox view–or at least parts of it (e.g., the mention analysis, but not the referential analysis). Section 6.7.1 and 6.7.2 briefly discuss two strategies that we remain skeptical about. According to the first, name-labels are not occurrences of a name *N*, but merely of a *quote*-name of *N*; even if those occurrences are predicative uses, this will not affect the analysis of *N* itself. According to the second strategy, name-labels are special cases of direct quotation, that is, they mention *utterances* of names. By contrast, 6.7.3 sketches a more straightforward strategy to defend the referential analysis, replacing compositional semantics with construction grammar. And 6.7.4 sketches a strategy to defend the mention analysis based on a more standard, fully semantic conception of the use/mention distinction. Taken together, the third and fourth strategies will amount to a defense of the orthodox view. Finally, 6.7.5 classifies name-labels as a case of what we will call *irregular mentions*: of mentions that in some way behave irregularly.

6.7.1) Quote-Names as Predicative Uses?

The first strategy would argue that even if we analyze name-labels as predicative uses, this still leaves room for the possibility that what is used predicatively is not the name *itself*, but rather the name's *quote*-name: that is, the expression formed by putting the name in quotes. Accordingly, morphological case-marking would then not be applied to the name itself, but rather to the name's quote-name. Call this the *quote-name analysis*.

Outside the context of labelling constructions, a similar suggestion is made by Jeshion (2015c) for pluralized mentions. Consider a sentence like 'This text contains too many **amazings**' in the sense of 'too many occurrences of the adjective 'amazing'; here, '**amazings**' involves morphological plural-marking in the form of a plural *-s*. There are two ways to write '**amazings**' in such a context: either we put the entire expression 'amazings' in quotes, or we put the quotes around the lexical form 'amazing' and add the plural *-s* after the end quotes. In the first case, the plural-marking seems to be applied to the adjective 'amazing' *itself*, while in the second, it is applied to the adjective's *quote*-name. Intuitively, only the second option captures the intended interpretation of '**amazings**' as 'too many occurrences of the adjective 'amazing'': after all, we should put the quotation marks around the expression we are talking about, and when we intend to convey that a text contains too many occurrences of the adjective 'amazing', we talk about the expression 'amazing', not about the expression 'amazings'. Also note that the occurrence of '**amazings**' can be conceived as a predicative use, by an argument analogous to Matushansky's argument why name-labels are predicative uses: in particular, '**amazings**' is predicative because it conveys a property–the property of being an occurrence of the adjective 'amazing'; and '**amazings**' used rather than mentioned because it is not in the lexical form, but pluralized. An analogous proposal might then be made for name-labels: here, the morphological case-marking might be applied not to the name itself, but rather to the name's quote-name.

Here is a crosslinguistic objection against the quote-name analysis. Consider that different from the plural-marking in '**amazings**', case-marking is often not a mere *affix* on the lexical form, but involves *internal* changes to the lexical form. Recall the two German sentences:

- Wir nennen Peter I. **Peter den Großen**.
  We call Peter I **Peter the**$_{acc}$ **Great**$_{acc}$.
- Wir nennen den Ozean zwischen Asien und Amerika **Pazifischen Ozean**.
  We call the ocean between Asia and America **Pacific**$_{acc}$ **Ocean**.

If case-marking was here applied to the quote-names ''Peter der Große'' or ''Pazifischer Ozean'' rather than to the names 'Peter der Große' and 'Pazifischer Ozean', then the morphological modification should only be attached to the *end* of the quote-name, after the quotation mark (here after 'Großen'/'Great' or 'Ozean'/'Ocean'). However, the two sentences also modify the 'inside' of the names: in the first sentence the article 'der' which becomes 'den', in the second sentence the adjective 'Pazifischer' which becomes 'Pazifischen'.[389]

[389] 'Peter' and 'Ozean'/'ocean' are not morphologically modified: as we already saw, German proper nouns usually have no morphological case-marking; and the accusative singular of the common noun 'Ozean' is morphologically identical to its lexical/nominative form.

The objection tacitly presupposes that the quote-name of a lexical item (e.g., a name) always consists of the expression's lexical form put in quotes. Then again, we will argue below that mentions of lexical items do not *have* to be in the lexical form: in some idiomatic constructions, they can be inflected instead. Perhaps, the same holds for quote-names: perhaps, a lexical item has several quotes-names, including ones that are formed from the item's lexical form and others formed from the item's inflected forms; and some constructions might require a quote-name formed from an inflected form. We do not pursue the quote-name analysis further, as the solution we ultimately defend in 6.7.3 is closely related but simpler–in particular, it will not rely on the notion of a quote-name.

6.7.2) Name-Labels as Modified Quotations?

For a second strategy, we might suggest analyzing constructions of naming and referring as cases of *mixed quotation*; in that case, a name-label would be the directly quotational part of a mixed quotation. More specifically, *inflected* name-labels could be analyzed as *morphologically modified* quotations.

Let us introduce these notions by way of example. Assume Mary says:

- My dad's one hell of a guy.

There are at least three different ways to report this utterance. First, we could use direct quotation, as in:

- Mary said: «My dad's one hell of a guy».

(Direct quotation will here be indicated using French quotes '«', '»'.) Second, we could use indirect quotation, e.g.:

- Mary said that her dad was one hell of a guy.
- Mary said that her father was an extraordinary man.
- Mary called her father one hell of a guy.
- Mary called her father an extraordinary man.

The first two indirect quotations follow a 'that'-clause, the latter two follow a 'call'-construction (specifically, a construction of describing). Also, the four quotations deviate in different degrees from the wording of Mary's utterance: e.g., the first uses the informal 'dad', the second replaces it with the more formal 'father'. All indirect quotations have in common, however, that they replace the first-person pronoun 'my' used by Mary with the third-person pronoun 'her'. Different from direct quotations, indirect quotations do not–or not necessarily–reproduce the wording of an utterance and instead express the content of that utterance. Now, compare a third type of quotation:

- Mary said that her father was «one hell of a guy».
- Mary called her father «one hell of a guy».

In spoken language, we might replace the quotation marks '«' and '»' with 'quote' and 'unquote'/'end of quote' respectively. This third type of quotation combines indirect and direct quotation: it starts with the indirect quotation 'her father' which paraphrases Mary's utterance of 'my dad'; and it ends in the direct quotation of 'one hell of a guy'. Quotations of this kind are typically called *mixed (or open) quotation*: they combine direct and indirect quotation, that is, they report in part the content of an utterance, and in part the wording of that utterance.[390]

[390] For a similar conception of mixed quotation, see Cappelen/Lepore 1997, 429. See also Davidson 1979, 28f.; Abbott 2003, 16-20; Cappelen/Lepore 2007, 52-65; and volume 17 (2003) of the *Belgian Journal of*

In a second step, let us look at *modified* direct quotations. In languages with a richer morphology than English, it is common practice to morphologically modify quoted utterances so that they fit the grammatical structure of the sentence containing the quotation.[391] One way of doing so is to modify morphological case-marking. This would typically be indicated in writing, e.g., by putting the modified parts in square brackets. Say, Frege asserts the German sentence:

- Russell ist ein grandioser Philosoph.
  Russell is [a terrific philosopher]$_{nom}$.

We can report this utterance using mixed quotation, as in:

- Frege sagte, dass Russell «ein grandioser Philosoph» sei.
  Frege said that Russell was «[a terrific philosopher]$_{nom}$».
- Frege nannte Russell «ein[en] grandiose[n] Philosoph[en]».
  Frege called Russell «[a terrific philosopher]$_{acc}$».

The second bullet point illustrates that in German, direct quotations (here as part of mixed quotations) can be morphologically modified to fit the grammar of a sentence/clause. E.g., a clause of the form 'that Russell is NP' requires NP to be nominative, while a sentence of the form 'Frege called Russell NP' requires NP to be accusative. Hence, the nominative masculine indefinite article 'ein' is supplemented with the suffix *-en*, becoming the accusative masculine indefinite article 'einen' (analogously for 'Philosoph'/'philosopher'); and the nominative masculine adjective 'grandioser ('terrific') has the suffix *-r* replaced with 'n', becoming the accusative masculine adjective 'grandiosen'.[392]

In the quotations we have considered so far, the labels were common noun phrases ('one hell of a guy', 'an extraordinary man', 'a terrific philosopher'). Let us now turn to name-labels. We might propose that inflected name-labels can be analyzed as modified direct quotations: that is, if a name in the scope of a labelling verb like *call* occurs in some grammatical case other than the nominative, then that occurrence might be a modified direct quotation. Recall the German sentence:

- Sie nannten ihn **Peter den Großen**.
  (They called him$_{acc}$ [**Peter the Great**]$_{acc}$.)

We might now suggest that in this sentence, the phrase 'Peter den Großen' is not used, but rather a modified direct quotation, in which case the sentence could be written more explicitly as:

- Sie nannten ihn «Peter de[n] Große[n]».

To be sure, we normally do not write the sentence with quotation marks to indicate direct quotation, nor with square brackets to indicate where the quote has been modified. But

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Linguistics. We set several intricacies aside: e.g., whether the *content* of the directly quoted part of a mixed quotation is part of the content of the entire mixed quotation or not.

[391] See also Shan 2010, 423f., for an example from Italian about morphological gender-marking; and Maier 2014, 11f., for an example from Dutch about syntactic reordering.

[392] In our example, the quotation changes a nominative into an accusative. Note that in other cases, the quotation might have to change an accusative into a nominative. Assume Frege asserts 'Ich halte Russell für einen grandiosen Denker' ('I consider Russell [a terrific thinker]$_{acc}$'). This can be reported using the following mixed quotations:

- Frege sagte, dass Russell ein «grandiose[r] Denker» sei.
  Frege said that Russell was [a «terrific thinker»]$_{nom}$.
- Frege nannte Russell «einen grandiosen Denker».
  Frege called Russell «[a terrific thinker]$_{acc}$».

this might be out of pure convenience: perhaps, there is simply an orthographic convention by which quotes are not indicated in writing if they are occurrences of names.

Note that Matushansky agrees that labels can be quotations: in particular, she argues that in languages with morphological case-marking, nominative labels in active labelling constructions are often quotations, not uses. The example she cites is from Russian and translates as 'Lisa calls her sister «[my joy]$_{nom}$»'.[393] Matushansky argues that there is further evidence that in such examples, the label is not used: if 'my joy' was used, the indexical 'my' would refer to the speaker of the sentence and not, as intended, to Lisa (compare our remarks on 'Mary called Kripke 'my darling'' in 6.3). Note, however, that not all languages with morphological case-marking behave in this respect like Russian. E.g., in German, labels can (and perhaps even must) be morphologically modified even if they contain indexicals. Assume Frege said, 'Russell ist einer der größten Philosophen unserer Zeit' ('Russell is [one of the greatest philosophers of our time]$_{nom}$'), using the indexical 'our'. We can report this utterance today, over a hundred years later, using the following sentence:

- Frege nannte Russell «eine[n] der größten Philosophen unserer Zeit».
  Frege called Russell$_{acc}$ «[one of the greatest philosophers of our time]$_{acc}$».

Clearly, 'our time' here does not refer to *our* time, that is, the early 21st century. So, by Matushansky's criterion, the reporting sentence does not *use* the phrase 'einen der größten Philosophen unserer Zeit' ('one of the greatest philosophers of our time'). At the same time, the direct quotation is still modified: the nominative from Frege's utterance is replaced in the quotation with an accusative. Now, as we saw in section 6.3, Matushansky cites two main reasons for the use analysis of name-labels: first, name-labels cannot be combined with linguistic category terms; second, in languages with morphological case-marking, name-labels are typically inflected. As we have now shown, at least the second reason does not hold up: there are name-labels that Matushansky would take to be quotations rather than uses, but that are still morphologically modified (by inflection).

We do not decide whether the analysis of name-labels as modified quotations is ultimately viable. One major objection would be that an object can be a bearer of a name even if that name has never been uttered to refer to the object: e.g., as far as I know, my full birth name 'Felix Nicolai Rohls' has never been uttered to refer to me. Also, intuitively, all quotations are quotations *of utterances*. So, when I assert, 'I am named **Felix Nicolai Rohls**', I could not actually 'quote' anyone/any utterance. Still, the assertion seems to be true.

6.7.3) Constructions of Naming and Referring as Idiomatic Constructions

A third and simpler strategy would analyze constructions of naming and referring as *idiomatic* constructions; let us call this the *idiomatic analysis*. Here, we take a construction C to be idiomatic if the meaning of C is not fully predictable from the meaning of the constituent expressions of C and more general syntactic or semantic principles.[394] E.g., more general syntactic principles would suggest that an inflected occurrence of a name *N* is a use, not a mention; and a more general semantic principle would suggest that a use of a name *N* either refers to a bearer of *N*, or conveys a property (as in apparent predicative

[393] See Matushansky 2008, 585.
[394] For a similar conception of 'idiomatic', see Goldberg 1995, 22.

name-uses). By contrast, according to the idiomatic analysis, an inflected occurrence of a name *N* as a label would refer to the name *N* itself–this would be all that a name-label contributes to the meaning of a construction of naming or referring. Meanwhile, the relation between the name and the semantic label-receiver (plus the semantic label-giver in the case of active labelling constructions) would be contributed by the labelling verb, not by the name-label.

Here is one way to spell this strategy out. Take active constructions of naming in English. Their semantics might simply be given by the following rule:

English active constructions of naming:

- Syntax: NP_1 + V + NP_2 + *N*. (E.g., 'Mary named her son **Steve**'.)
- Semantics: X_1 GIVE Y_2 THE NAME *N*. Plus potential additional content (e.g., about the type of name or naming) expressed by the verb V.

The indices are meant to capture correspondences between syntax and semantics: X_1 is the referent of NP_1, etc. V will be a verb of naming. The content of V (or at least part of that content) is represented by the capitalized phrase 'GIVE … THE NAME'; the phrase should be understood as untensed. Among English verbs of naming, the verb *name* expresses merely the naming relation and no further content (as long as not combined with *as*); same for *call* if used as verb of naming. For other verbs of naming, we can list the additional content in a separate line, e.g.:

- V = 'nickname': *N* is a nickname.
- V = 'codename': *N* is a codename.
- V = 'rename': *N* replaces a prior name of Y_2.
- V = 'baptize' (in the narrow sense of bestowing a name at a Christian baptism): the naming takes place at a Christian baptism of Y_2.
- V = 'title': Y_2 is an artifact or text.

The semantics of German might contain similar constructions, but with additional case-marking:

German active constructions of naming:

- Syntax: $NP_{1,nom}$ + V + $NP_{2,acc}$ + $N_{3,nom/acc}$.
- Semantics: X_1 GIVE Y_2 THE NAME *N*. Plus potential additional content expressed by V.

So, both in the English and the German versions, the syntactic occurrence of *N*–that is, the name-label–simply corresponds to the name *N* itself on the semantic level. The semantics for constructions of *referring* would be almost identical, except for the semantic contribution of the labelling verb. Constructions of describing would receive a rather different analysis, e.g.:

English active constructions of describing:

- Syntax: NP_1 + V + NP_2 + NP_3/AP_3. (E.g., 'Mary called her son a genius/smart'.)
- Semantics: X_1 SAY [Y_2 BE Z_3]. Plus potential additional content expressed by V.

Here, Z_3 is the property expressed by NP_3/AP_3. Note that the idiomatic analysis remains silent on whether labels are uses or mentions–the strategy simply bypasses that question. However, it clearly refutes the predicative analysis: all that the name *N* contributes to the semantic level is the name *N* itself, not a property or relation.

6.7.4) A Semantic Conception of the Use/Mention Distinction

A fourth strategy would reject Matushansky's narrow conception of the use/mention distinction. The most plausible alternative would be to define uses and mentions in purely semantic terms, e.g.:

- An occurrence *o* of an expression *e* is a mention of *e* iff *o* refers to *e* itself.
- For all expressions *e* and all occurrences *o* of *e*: *o* is either a use or a mention of *e*, but not both.

In that case, we can easily return to the orthodox view and classify name-labels in labelling constructions as mentions, not as uses. After all, the main argument for classifying name-labels as uses was morphosyntactic: name-labels are typically inflected in languages with a richer morphology than English, and they cannot be combined with linguistic category terms. But this argument will lose its force if we adopt the semantic conception of the use/mention distinction and hence no longer distinguish uses and mentions based on their morphosyntax. If we combine the semantic conception of the use/mention distinction with the idiomatic analysis of constructions of naming and referring, then name-labels in such constructions can indeed be analyzed as mentions: as we saw, according to the idiomatic analysis, an occurrence of a name as label simply refers to the name itself. So, taking the idiomatic analysis and the semantic conception of the use/mention distinction together, we get a defense of the orthodox view: name-labels are referential mentions, not predicative uses.

6.7.5) Name-Labels as Irregular Mentions

Against this background, we suggest that name-labels can be classified as *irregular mentions*: as mentions that in some way behave irregularly. To illustrate irregularities among mentions, consider that normally, mentions *can*, but do not *have to be*, made explicit by being combined with a linguistic category term–and, more specifically, with terms for *any* linguistic category that the mentioned expression belongs to. A bit more precisely:

M3 If an occurrence *o* of an expression *e* is a mention of *e*, then for all linguistic categories *C* that *e* belongs to: *o* can be, but does not have to be, combined with a term referring to *C*.

So, the sentence

- 'Saul' has four letters.

can be reformulated as

- The name/proper noun/noun/word/expression/character sequence/… 'Saul' has four letters.

However, there seem to be counterexamples: cases where an occurrence of an expression seems to be a mention, but where the occurrence does not satisfy the consequent of principle **M3**. We will briefly look at a few examples. All these examples will be *uncontentious* examples that are classified as mentions both by the renegade view and by the orthodox view. In particular, they satisfy **M1** and **M2**, the two features of mentions that we introduced in 6.3: that is, they can be combined with at least some linguistic category terms and they are not inflected.

Consider the following examples:

- His parents gave him the name 'Saul'.
- He bears the name 'Saul'.

In both sentences, the name 'Saul' seems to be a mention, and it is combined with a linguistic category term, here: 'name'. Yet, neither sentence satisfies the consequent of **M3**: first, in both sentences, the combination of the mention with a linguistic category term is not optional, but obligatory:

- *His parents gave him 'Saul'.
- *He bears 'Saul'.

Second, the category term ‘name’ cannot be replaced with terms referring to other linguistic categories that names belong to–category terms such as ‘word’, ‘noun’, ‘proper noun’, or ‘expression’:

- *His parents gave him the word/noun/proper noun/expression/… ‘Saul’.
- *He bears the word/noun/proper noun/expression/… ‘Saul’.

Instead, in contexts of name-giving or name-bearing, a mentioned occurrence of a name *must* combine with the linguistic category term ‘name’. Some mentions of *sentences* exhibit a similar behavior. E.g.:

- He raised/posed the question ‘Is Paris in France?’
  He raised/posed the interesting/trivial/… question ‘Is Paris in France?’
  *He raised/posed ‘Is Paris in France?’
  *He raised/posed the sentence/expression/… ‘Is Paris in France?’

Here, ‘question’ would be a linguistic category term referring to a sentence-type. The verbs *raise* and *pose* combine with a phrase of the form ‘the question *o*’, where *o* is a mentioned occurrence of an interrogative sentence; but they do not combine *directly* with a mentioned occurrence of any interrogative sentence, nor with other linguistic category terms.

Let us look at another group of examples. In particular, consider verbs that can precede direct quotations, such as *say*, *utter*, *whisper*, *mumble*, *tell*, *assure*, *assert*, *believe*, *think*, *claim*, *suggest*, *conclude*, *infer*, *explain*, *announce*, *ask*, *demand*, or *beg*. It seems that for most of these verbs, mentions can be combined with some, but not all linguistic category terms satisfied by the mentions. Take examples with *ask*, *say*, and *assert*:

a) Steve asked, ‘Is Paris in France?’.
   Steve asked the question ‘Is Paris in France?’.
   *Steve asked the sentence/the words/the expression ‘Is Paris in France?’.
b) Steve asserted, ‘Paris is in France’.
   Steve asserted the sentence ‘Paris is in France’.
   ?Steve asserted the words/the expression ‘Paris is in France’.
c) Steve said, ‘Paris is in France’.
   Steve said the sentence/the words ‘Paris is in France’.
   ?Steve said the expression ‘Paris is in France’.
d) Steve said, ‘very good’.
   Steve said the words ‘very good’.
   ?Steve said the adjective phrase ‘very good’.

In each example, the first line contains a direct quotation, while the second and third combine the quoted/mentioned sentence with a linguistic category term. And in each case, some of these combinations are admissible, while others are ungrammatical or at least infelicitous.

To return to labelling constructions, we might now suggest that name-labels are simply another case of irregular mentions: they are mentions that violate principle **M3**. To be sure, they deviate from the examples just cited by not being combinable with *any* linguistic category terms, and by being typically inflected in languages with morphological case-marking. But the proposal would be to overlook these differences: what is relevant is that name-labels, just like several other kinds of mentions, behave irregularly. Instead, all irregular mentions are associated with specific constructions: some mentions of names are associated with constructions where a combination with a specific category term ‘name’ is obligatory: ‘bear the name *N*’, ‘give sb. the name *N*’, ‘raise/pose the question *s*’ (where

s is a sentence), etc. Other mentions are associated with constructions where a combination with specific linguistic category terms is optional: ‘ask (the question) *s*’; ‘say (the sentence/the words) *s*’; ‘say (the words) *e*’ (where *e* can be any string of words); etc. And name-labels are typically associated with labelling constructions where the label cannot be combined with a linguistic category term and is inflected in languages with morphological case-marking.

7) Conclusion

This study dealt with the relationship between names and predicates. As we said in the introduction in chapter 1, we had two main objectives: first, to challenge predicativism–the view that names are metalinguistic predicates. Second, to provide a detailed account of predicative uses of names–a topic largely neglected in the philosophical literature. Let us briefly summarize our main findings.

Chapters 2 and 3 were meant to position predicativism among different approaches at how to classify and analyze names. In chapter 2, we motivated two signature views of predicativism: the predicate view (names are predicates) and the count noun view (names are count nouns). Predicativism reacts to the existence of apparent predicative name-uses, but as we saw, there are other responses as well: a prominent rival of predicativism would be the type-ambiguity view. In three appendices to chapter 2, we showed that different classifications of names–such as the predicate view and the singular term view–often come along with different accounts of how to individuate names; but at least for the classifications of names found in the literature, we argued that different individuations of names should not be a reason to favor one classification over the other. Also, we showed why the distinction between apparent predicative and apparent referential name-uses should not be spelled out in terms of their morphosyntax, but in terms of their intended content. And we defended the view that proper names are not confined to proper nouns or proper noun phrases.

Chapter 3 sketched the development of the theory of names, in particular of the *analysis* of names, from descriptivism to predicativism. We summarized and supported the Kripkean critique of descriptivism (specifically of descriptivism about the *content* of names) and showed how predicativism manages to evade that critique. At the same time, we argued that predicativism is not an overall promising strategy to solve Frege's puzzles, traditionally one of the main motivations for descriptivism. Also, we argued that 'the'-predicativism is superior to 'that'-predicativism, focusing on the problems of the demonstrative element in the 'that'-predicativist analysis of apparent referential name-uses.

Chapter 4 gave an overview of possible objections against predicativism, distinguishing four main components of predicativism: the classification, syntactic analysis, paraphrase, and semantic analysis/interpretation of names. E.g., we argued (drawing in part on the literature) that the predicativist classification of names as count nouns overgeneralizes the Sloat chart; that the syntactic analysis of apparent referential name-uses as incomplete descriptions does not cohere with crosslinguistic evidence; that the paraphrase of a name *N* as the phrase 'bearer(s) of *N*' is not applicable to plural-only names or to close appositions; and that various names *N* cannot be interpreted as expressing the property of being a bearer of *N*, or at least not on all their uses. We did not assign equal importance to each of these objections and in some cases countered them by refining the existing versions of predicativism. Then again, such refinements come at the cost of a loss in simplicity, and simplicity was one of the main appeals of predicativism.

Chapter 5 provided a more detailed account of predicative name-uses. There, we first gave an extensive list of predicative name-uses, distinguished by syntactic criteria: we encountered uses of names as count nouns, but also as mass nouns, verbs, and adjectives; and we discussed a number of borderline cases, including anaphoric name-uses. In a next

step, we had a closer look at uses of names as count nouns (or *count-noun-uses* for short). We provided a detailed list of count-noun-uses, classified by their intended content: as we saw, such uses can convey not only the metalinguistic property of being a bearer of the name *N*, but a large variety of non-metalinguistic properties as well, such as membership in a family named *N*, being an artwork by a person named *N*, and so on. We argued that such uses can typically be understood as cases of deferred interpretation, a specific form of meaning transfer. We challenged the analysis of count-noun-uses both by predicativism and by the existing versions of the type-ambiguity view. And we suggested a modified version of the type-ambiguity view to account for these challenges. Also, we rejected the view that all count-noun-uses are cases of PF-deletion, to be analyzed as the pronounced parts of name-noun compounds; the argument was in part crosslinguistic, drawing on observations about the gender-marking of count-noun-uses in German.

whileChapter 6 confronted an especially provocative version of predicativism: the analysis of names in labelling constructions as predicative uses. We distinguished different kinds of labelling constructions and argued that names in constructions of naming and in constructions of referring behave largely alike. Leaning on crosslinguistic evidence, we argued against two parts of the predicativist analysis: first, against the view that names in labelling constructions are predicates rather than referential expressions, and second, against the view that they are uses rather than mentions. We considered five possible defenses of the orthodox view, ultimately suggesting that name-labels constituted a special case of ‘irregular mentions’.

Appendix: Names in Noun-Noun Compounds

In this appendix, we briefly address the use of names in noun-noun compounds and, more specifically, as noun adjuncts. Above, we called such compounds *name-noun compounds*, and the occurrences of names therein *name-adjuncts*. To be sure, while name-noun compounds are predicative phrases, name-adjuncts themselves are usually not analyzed as predicative; nonetheless, to get a fuller understanding of the relationship between names and predicates, it will be illuminating to discover how name-adjuncts interact with common nouns to form predicative phrases–and how their contribution to compounds differs from that of a common noun. In this section, we first reconstruct one of the leading contemporary theories of noun-noun compounds, the theory by Jackendoff (1). In a second step, we apply that theory to name-noun compounds (2). Lastly, we add some remarks on the distribution of name-adjuncts (3).

1) Noun-Noun Compounds

Noun-noun compounds are phrases of the form 'N_1 N_2': here, N_1 and N_2 are two (common or proper) nouns, or one or both of them are themselves compounds. N_1 and N_2 can be contracted ('cannonball'), or hyphenated ('singer-songwriter'), or remain independent ('union member'). Jackendoff focuses on compounds where N_1 and N_2 each are *common* nouns, and classifies such compounds based on several semantically relevant criteria. We will reproduce one of his classifications, focusing on the semantic contribution made by nouns as parts of a compound.

Here, Jackendoff distinguishes four types of compounds.[395] First, in some compounds, N_2 denotes a function, and N_1 denotes an argument of that function.[396] Take the phrases 'union member', 'bus driver', and 'aircraft carrier'. The functions denoted by N_2 are Member-of(x, y), where y is an institution; Driver-of(x, y), where y is a vehicle; and Carrier-of(x, y), where y is a physical object. This reflects that all members are *members of* (some institution), all drivers are *drivers of* (some vehicle), and all carriers are *carriers of* (some physical object). N_1 then denotes the second argument[397] of those functions: unions in the case of 'union member'; buses in the case of 'bus driver'; aircrafts in the case of 'aircraft carrier'.[398] Second, some compounds are associated with functions that are not denoted by N_1 or N_2; rather, N_1 and N_2 each denote one of the arguments of the function. Take the phrases 'pine tree' and 'window seat'. 'Pine tree' is associated with the function Kind(x, y), where x is an object and y is a kind that x belongs to. N_1 then denotes the first argument of that function and N_2 the second: the first argument is a tree, the second is the kind *Pinus pinea*.[399] Similarly, 'window seat' is associated with the function Situated-next-to(x, y), where both x and y are objects. Again, N_1 denotes the first argument of that

[395] For an overview, see Jackendoff 2016, 33.
[396] In the context of this section, we will represent functions as relations.
[397] Here and in what follows, the order of arguments of the respective function is irrelevant: each of the functions conveyed by noun-noun compounds can be reformulated in a way that reverses the order of arguments (e.g., Driver-of can be reformulated as Driven-by). What is relevant, however, is whether the function is denoted by N_1 or by N_2.
[398] See Jackendoff 2016, 25f.
[399] See in part Jackendoff 2016, 27.

function and N_2 the second: the first argument is a seat, the second a window.[400] Jackendoff distinguishes thirteen types of functions that can be associated with noun-noun compounds.[401] We will return to some of them below.

For the third and fourth types of compounds, Jackendoff makes use of the notion of a *proper function*: that is, roughly, a function that an object is generally *supposed* to fulfill (see 5.3.2).[402] E.g., cups have the proper function to hold certain liquids; medical doctors have the proper function (at least in their role *as doctors*) to treat certain illnesses, body parts, etc. For an alternative formulation, we might say that cups are associated with the function Held-in(x, y), where x is a liquid and y a container. Then, for the third type of compound, take the phrases 'coffee cup' and 'eye doctor'. Here, N_2 denotes a proper function and one of the arguments of that function; and N_1 denotes another argument of the function. In 'coffee cup', N_2 denotes the proper function Held-in(x, y), where x is a liquid and y a container. N_2 also denotes the second argument: the container holding the liquid is a cup. And N_1 denotes the first argument: the liquid held in the cup is coffee. Similarly, in 'eye doctor', N_2 denotes the proper function Treated-by(x, y), where x is the recipient of the treatment and y a person providing the treatment. N_2 also denotes the second argument: the person performing the treatment is a doctor.[403] And N_1 denotes the first argument: the recipient of the treatment is an eye. Finally, in compounds of the fourth type, N_1 denotes a proper function that modifies N_2. Take the word 'cannonball'. The proper function of a cannon is that balls are shot from it. By contrast, it is not generally the proper function of balls to be shot from cannons–the proper function of a *bowling* ball is to be thrown at bowling games. Now, in 'cannonball', N_1 denotes the proper function Shot-from(x, y), where both x and y are physical objects. N_1 also denotes the second argument of that function, while N_2 denotes the first argument: x is a ball and y is a cannon.[404]

2) Names as Noun Adjuncts

Let us see how Jackendoff's classification applies to name-noun compounds, specifically to compounds consisting of a name-adjunct and a common noun. We focus on compounds where N_1 is the name and N_2 a common count noun. The first type of noun-noun compounds corresponds to name-noun compounds like 'Samsung employee' and 'Obama impersonator': all employees are *employees of* something/someone, and all impersonators are *impersonators of* something/someone. So, in 'Samsung employee', N_2 denotes the function Employed-by(x, y), where x is the employee and y the employer; and N_1 denotes the second argument of that function, that is, the employer. In 'Obama impersonator', N_2 denotes the function Impersonating(x, y), where x is the impersonator and y the object/person being impersonated; and N_1 denotes the second argument of that function, that is, the object/person being impersonated. Note that the object denoted by N_1 can fulfill different thematic roles, especially the roles of agent and theme: in 'Samsung employee', N_1

[400] See in part Jackendoff 2016, 28. Here and in what follows, we reformulate some of Jackendoff's functions; e.g., the function we write as Situated-next-to(x, y) is written BE(x, AT y) in Jackendoff.
[401] See Jackendoff 2016, 27-30.
[402] See Jackendoff 2016, 23.
[403] See in part Jackendoff 2016, 32.
[404] See, e.g., Jackendoff 2016, 33.

denotes the agent of the employment relation; in 'Obama impersonator', N_1 denotes the theme of the impersonation relation.

Let us turn to the second type of noun-noun compounds. Here, Jackendoff's analysis requires a more fundamental revision. Take 'Samsung computer', 'Leonardo painting', and 'Louvre painting'. According to Jackendoff's analysis, 'Samsung computer' would be associated with a function that is not denoted by N_1 or N_2, namely the function Made-by(x, y). And N_1 and N_2 each denote one of the arguments of that function: N_2 denotes the first argument (x is a computer), and N_1 denotes the second argument (y is the company Samsung). Similarly for 'Leonardo painting', which is again associated with the function Made-by; again, N_2 denotes the first argument (x is a painting), and N_1 denotes the second argument (y is Leonardo da Vinci). By contrast, 'Louvre painting' is associated with the function Situated-in(x, y), where x is a physical object and y a place/building. N_2 then denotes the first argument (x is a painting) and N_1 the second argument (y is the Louvre). In some cases, more than one of the functions that Jackendoff describes will have to be combined.[405] E.g., take the phrase 'Renaissance painting'. The semantics of this phrase combines the functions Made-by and Be-at (with a temporal interpretation). More specifically, the function associated with the phrase can be analyzed as the following conjunction: Made-by(painting, x) and Be-at(x, Renaissance).

We turn to the third type of noun-noun compounds. It seems that this type does not correspond to any of the previously listed name-noun compounds, and examples are more elusive. However, take the phrase 'Churchill museum' in the sense of 'museum about Churchill'. We might say that the proper function of museums is to contain an exhibition about a certain topic; N_1 then provides that topic, namely the person Winston Churchill. Or take the compound '*Nosferatu* DVD' in the sense of 'DVD with the film *Nosferatu* recorded on it'. '*Nosferatu*' is here clearly not an argument of 'DVD': DVDs do not have to be *DVDs of* anything–blank DVDs are DVDs as well. Instead, '*Nosferatu* DVD' can be analyzed in terms of proper functions: DVDs have the proper function to store image and sound sequences; N_1 then provides one such sequence, namely the film *Nosferatu*.

Finally, we claim that the fourth type of compounds does not correspond to *any* name-noun compounds. Here is one possible explanation: names refer to individuals, and individuals as such have no proper functions. So, in a name-noun compound, the proper function cannot be contributed by N_1.

3) The Distribution of Name-Adjuncts

Finally, we add some remarks on the distribution of name-adjuncts: more specifically, let us see which kinds of names can function as name-adjuncts in combination with which kinds of common nouns. For brevity, we will call the objects in the extension of a compound the *compound satisfiers*. Let us look at a few types of name-noun compounds. First, most common nouns can be combined with the name of a historical era, namely an era where the compound satisfiers existed or originated (we will speak of *eras of existence/origin*): 'Renaissance painting' (era of origin), 'Renaissance computer' (as in 'There are no Renaissance computers', era of origin), 'Renaissance ideas' (era of origin), 'Renaissance painter' (era of existence), 'Renaissance politician' (era of existence), etc.

[405] See Jackendoff 2016, 33-35.

Typically, the name refers to the era of existence if the compound satisfiers are animated, and otherwise to the era of origin. Second, take common nouns referring to manufactured products (‘computer’, ‘car’): they can usually be combined with names of the manufacturer (‘Samsung computer’), but not with personal names, e.g., for the owner (*‘Mary computer’ for computers owned by my friend Mary), or place names, e.g., for a place of origin (*‘Germany computer’ for computers manufactured in Germany). Third, take common nouns referring to types of artworks (e.g., ‘painting’): they can usually be combined with names of the artist (‘Leonardo painting’) or the subject (at least if the subject is a person, as in ‘Jesus painting’). More rarely, they can be combined with names of times or places, e.g., with a name of the era of origin (‘Renaissance painting’, but not *‘Middle Ages painting’), or with a name of the place where they are situated (‘Louvre painting’, ‘Sistine Chapel painting’). Usually, they cannot be combined with names of the places depicted or the place of origin (*‘Venice paintings’ for paintings that depict Venice or were painted in Venice). For a fourth example, take the noun ‘impersonator’ which, apart from names of historical eras, can only be combined with a name of the impersonated person (‘Obama impersonator’), but not, e.g., with the name of the impersonator or a name of a place where the impersonator lived or performed their impersonations.

Also, typically, names can be used as name-adjuncts only if there is no adjective corresponding to the name: e.g., there are no adjectives corresponding to ‘Samsung’, ‘Renaissance’, ‘Leonardo’, or ‘Obama’, but there are adjectives corresponding to ‘Germany’ (‘German’), ‘Middle Ages’ (‘medieval’), ‘Venice’ (‘Venetian’). Sometimes, there *are* corresponding adjectives, but not with the appropriate meaning: e.g., ‘Jesuanic’ means (roughly speaking) ‘*by* Jesus’, not ‘*of* Jesus’: so, a Jesuanic painting would be a painting by Jesus rather than of Jesus. Similarly, ‘Leonardesque’ means ‘*in the style of* Leonardo’, not ‘*by* Leonardo’: Leonardesque paintings are paintings in the style of Leonardo, but not necessarily by Leonardo. Finally, not all name-noun compounds allow for an omission of the common noun: e.g., a Leonardo painting is a Leonardo, a Ford car is a Ford, a Chesterfield coat is a Chesterfield, etc. But a Renaissance painting cannot be called ‘a Renaissance’, a Louvre painting cannot be called ‘a Louvre’, a Netflix film cannot be called ‘a Netflix’, etc.

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