# Political Participation and Representation in Non-Democracies

Empirical Analyses in Political Economy

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POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION IN NON-DEMOCRACIES:
EMPIRICAL ANALYSES IN POLITICAL ECONOMY

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

In most modern societies, governments provide the framework for societal organization. They design institutions and establish a universal set of rules that all members of society are required to abide by. How governance is shaped and what form institutions take has a profound impact on citizens' lives: ultimately, governments delineate the scope of citizens' rights, duties, and limits.

In democracies, governments are accountable to citizens and political rights are distributed equally to aggregate people's preferences and validate policy decisions by a majority. However, the right to participate in the creation of societal rules is not universal and throughout history, only a select few have had this privilege. Even today, less than 20% of the world population lives in democracies, having their interests represented via free, fair and transparent elections (V-Dem Institute, 2023). This leaves the vast majority of people without a say in creating the rules that govern their lives and profoundly shape their everyday experiences.

Even though the chapters of this dissertation are self-contained and can be read independently, they are all connected by the drive to understand an overarching question: What if citizens are excluded from determining the formalities of the social contract?

In particular, chapter 1 provides an answer to the question of who is selected to be part of the political elite when institutions ban the population from electing the decision makers. In chapters 2 and 3, I add to our understanding about how members of society respond when they are excluded from formal political participation. Chapter 2 approaches this question by looking at disenfranchised groups that turn to political activism and I evaluate the effectiveness of such efforts. Chapter 3 looks at exclusion from political participation that occurs through government repression. I provide insights into whether these coercive policies indeed suppress opposition, or whether they spark backlash instead.

All chapters are furthermore united in the significant underlying data collection and digitization efforts that have been undertaken for them. Every chapter uses novel data from historical sources to measure concepts that are difficult to gauge:

interpersonal links and career progressions within an autocratic regime, individual politicians' responsiveness to activists, and state repression. All chapters explore political economy questions by using history as a lens to understand phenomena which are still of relevance today. In the following sections, I provide an overview of each chapter.

Chapter 1 is joint work with Cathrin Mohr and adds to our understanding of how the political elite is selected in autocracies. Unlike in democracies, where citizens collectively appoint their representatives in elections, in autocracies, political leaders are selected and it is unclear how. Among the different potential factors at play, we examine the role of interpersonal links between potential politicians and members of the political elite. To study this question, we turn to the German Democratic Republic and the preceding Soviet Occupation Zone during the founding period of the regime. We compile a novel, comprehensive dataset covering all important German communists during the Weimar Republic and study their career trajectories in the newly established German socialist regime. To do so, we draw on their detailed curriculum vitae and transform them into a dataset. The interpersonal links we consider are quasi-exogenous and predetermined to the episode we study, stemming from having been interned in the same concentration camp during the Nazi regime.

We find that being connected to a party leader comes with a career penalty with respect to high-level careers. Individuals are less likely to hold a powerful position in national politics when someone they are connected to is part of the upper echelon of the ruling party. We posit that preventing competing factions in the state leadership is the driver behind the career patterns that we find — a mechanism that is supported by historical evidence: the aversion to factionalism is deeply characteristic of communist states and a strategy presumably adapted to stabilize the regime. By maintaining unity of leadership, this tactic helps to ensure that the population perceives the government as strong and effective.

Apart from preventing high-level careers, interpersonal links to the party leadership on the other hand make it more likely that an individual holds a low-level political position in county politics. This is in line with patronage taking place for the lower ranks of political appointments.

We confirm that the effect of being linked to the party leadership through concentration camp internment does not pick up having other characteristics in common,

that would plausibly explain career paths.

Overall, the results imply that even though political appointments in autocracies are not subject to popular control, they are not unconstrained. Instead, constraints seem to be taken into account for high-level personnel decisions to stabilize leadership, and in particular to prevent competing factions.

Chapter 2 approaches the subject of political participation and representation in the context of the German Empire, the German state that existed between 1871 and 1918. The Empire had granted universal suffrage to men over 25, but had not extended franchise to women, leaving them without institutionalized access to express their political preferences. However, women resorted to peaceful activism as a means of voicing their demands, over time forming a large-scale social movement. They have advocated primarily for the expansion of public welfare services and the enhancement of women's and girls' educational and occupational opportunities.

Peaceful activism by a disenfranchised group is inherently non-threatening to the political mandate, and does not incentivize politicians through elections or the prospect of a revolution. Thus, the efficacy of such activism remains in question — did politicians respond, or did it fail to exert an impact due to lacking leverage?

I study this question by examining the main legislative body of the German Empire, the *Reichstag*, and evaluate whether elected representatives are receptive to women's activism. To do so, I have compiled a novel dataset that combines parliamentary speeches between 1899 and 1914 with information regarding politicians' (potential) exposure to women's activism.

To address the challenge that exposure to political activism is usually not random, I leverage variation in women's political engagement induced by a reform in association laws. Prior to the reform, women in the German Empire were either prohibited from political engagement or were free to be politically active, depending on where they lived. The law reform I consider has equalized women's opportunities to participate in political activism across the Empire. Thereby, some representatives in parliament experience a change in their exposure to political activism by women, depending on which constituency they represent in parliament.

I compare the content of speeches delivered by representatives of constituencies

where women's rights to engage in political activism are liberalized due to the reform, before and after the legal amendment. I abstract from the change that would have taken place in absence of the law reform by accounting for the difference in speech patterns observed for representatives of locations where women did not experience a change in their political rights.

I find that when elected representatives are less exposed to women's activism, they are also less likely to reference women and the issues important to them, thus leading to a complete exclusion of women and their preferences from the political discourse. Put differently, when women advocate for their causes, this is echoed in parliament by their representative, even though women were not part of the electorate and even though their activism did not pose a threat to the political order of the Empire.

This chapter illustrates the power of social movements, even when they are not threatening the political power structures and shows that when groups are formally excluded from the institution of voting, they can still transport their demands into the political discourse via activism.

In chapter 3, I examine the issue of political exclusion taking the form of state repression of organized opposition. Specifically, I turn to the infamous Socialist Laws in the German Empire and investigate whether repressive policies led to the defeat of organized opposition, or whether they incited backlash instead.

Turning to this setting allows me to examine the contemporaneous responses to state repression in the population. While the Socialist Laws persecuted any form of socialist agitation, the electoral procedures remained unchanged, enabling Social Democratic candidates to run for and hold office in the national parliament. Leveraging this unique circumstance, I utilize the vote shares of Social Democratic candidates to disclose local, contemporaneous support for the repressed movement, which is a rare opportunity.

I quantify local intensity of repression by censorship verdicts against socialist publications issued by local police authorities. These serve as a proxy because of the critical role of written material for agitation. It is also plausible, that in regions where repression of Social Democrats is more intense, more police searches and ultimately confiscation of written material takes place, leading to more censorship. Finally, I support the claim that censorship is a suitable proxy by showing that censorship correlates with a tangible form of repression felt by

individuals: imprisonment.

My analysis uncovers a positive association between repression under the Socialist Laws and the level of support for Social Democratic candidates. I account for time-invariant differences between electoral districts that might explain both support for Social Democracy and intensity of government repression. Furthermore, I control for for initial differences in latent support for Social Democracy, the supply of socialist publications and the effect of population size.

In addition to the empirical evidence presented in this chapter, contemporary accounts from both political opponents and supporters of the socialist movement lend credence to the notion that the coercive policy strengthened the political movement instead of eroding its support base. The shared experience of repression was found to strengthen the identification of supporters, potentially increasing their willingness to engage in agitation and resulting in electoral success. Also, socialists met under innocuous pretenses by joining non-political associations of other social groups and while doing so, presented themselves as moderate reformers. This might further explain how Social Democracy was able to extend its vote base and reach new social groups. Lastly, under the threat of being detected by police, illegal socialist underground organizations promoted individuals from the lower ranks of the party into important positions to avoid attention. The resulting less elitist party leadership might have compelled individuals to join the movement and could have resulted in more representative leaders that would be more appealing to voters, if they prefer a candidate that closely resembles themselves.

In conclusion, this chapter reveals that attempts to silence opposition instead of allowing them to participate in shaping policy can actually backfire and might further erode popular support for the government instead of consolidating power.

All three chapters add to our understanding of political processes in non-democracies. Making progress in this area is particularly critical in light of the current threats to democratic systems posed by war and the fact that the world has just reverted to having more autocracies than liberal democracies (V-Dem Institute, 2023, p. 11). In particular, in this dissertation I shed light on political appointments in autocracies and show the power and resilience of an active civic society, which overcomes exclusion from political processes even in the light of institutional constraints in non-democratic settings.

CHAPTER 1

ELITE SELECTION IN AN AUTOCRACY:
THE CAREER COSTS OF POLITICAL TIES

1.1 INTRODUCTION

In autocracies, a confined group of individuals wields substantial power over political decision-making. Unlike democracies, where leaders are elected through a transparent and participative process, autocracies are characterised by opaque selection mechanisms for the politcal elite. However, the composition of these political elites is of great importance, as has for example been verbalized by Stalin's slogan that "cadres decide everything" (Stalin, 1934, p. 767). Not only do they exert their policy preferences on the population without requiring citizens' consent, but they also play a vital role in the stability and survival of the regime. Internal conflict among the political elite can render the regime vulnerable to overthrow.[1] Unraveling the factors behind the selection of these key actors is thus crucial for understanding the stability of autocracies and the well-being of citizens living in these regimes.

There are of course many potential factors that influence the elite selection in autocratic states. In this paper, we focus on the role of social connections between potential and existing members of the elite. Specifically, we ask how having a link to the political elite affects an individual's probability to be chosen for becoming part of the elite themself.

Personnel decisions in autocracies are subject to a trade-off: on the one hand, members of the elite want to engage in patronage by promoting their allies and friends to appealing positions within the state. On the other hand, the regime wants to prevent the formation of factions within the elite, as these pose a threat

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This chapter is joint work with Cathrin Mohr.

[1]Estimates suggest that as much as two thirds of changes in autocratic governments are driven by internal opposition among the ruling elite (Svolik, 2012).

to the balance of power within the ruling class and in the most extreme case, might threaten the stability of the entire regime.

Studying the role of personal ties to the political elite empirically is associated with two main challenges. First, we usually only observe those individuals that did become part of a regime's elite and not the entire set of potential elites. Second, people who are linked to each other might share characteristics that could affect their (political) careers.

In this paper, we examine the selection of members of the political elite in the context of former Socialist East Germany (German Democratic Republic, GDR) after World War II. Building a rich, novel dataset based on individuals' CVs, we follow the potential pool of talent for the political elite — German communists that had been politically active beforehand — from 1946 until 1962. We analyze the effect of individuals' links to the GDR's political elite on their probability to be selected into the political elite, national politics, or local politics.

The links we consider have been formed in a natural experiment, namely through imprisonment in the same concentration camp during the Nazi era, before the GDR came into existence. These imprisonments did not follow a systematic set of rules within the sample we consider, i.e. important communist figures in the Weimar Republic, and we thus regard the links arising from them as quasi-exogenous. While links between individuals are pre-determined to the foundation of the GDR and are thus fixed over the sample period, we exploit within-individual variation in connectedness to the elite that occurs through turnover in the GDR's central party leadership. These personnel changes generate shocks in whether an individual is connected to the highest levels of government through a common camp history. Using this within-individual variation in connections to the political elite, we hold time-invariant characteristics of individuals constant and estimate how career developments differ in times with and without links to the political elite.

We find that being linked to a member of the GDR elite makes it less likely that an individual is part of the top tiers of the political system. We show that individuals are ranked lower in the political state hierarchy and are less likely to be part of the leading elite or in national politics. At the same time, it is more likely that they hold a position in local politics. We posit that these results can be explained by a policy against inner-party factions, preventing individuals

that could potentially form a faction from holding power at the same time. The aversion to inner-party factions is common to communist and socialist regimes, such as the GDR. As links between the elite and local politicians do not threaten the regime's stability, patronage could take place at this level.

Our work relates to several strands of the literature. First, our work contributes to the literature studying the survival of autocratic regimes (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000; Wintrobe, 2000; De Mesquita et al., 2005; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). Autocracies that are led by parties are more stable than other forms of autocracies (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2014), suggesting that parties offer a potential way for autocracies to increase chances of survival (Boix and Svolik, 2013). By examining a potential mechanism by which the party leadership of the GDR prevented potential instability, that is by averting the formation of factions in the elite, we add to our understanding of how autocratic parties can increase regime stability.

Second, we relate to the literature on selection of politicians in autocratic regimes. Most closely related to our work are papers exploring the determinants of promotions into the national political elite in China (Li and Zhou, 2005; Persson and Zhuravskaya, 2016). Several papers have looked at the effect of connections for promotions in the context of provincial leaders in China: Jia, Kudamatsu, and Seim (2015) find that connected provincial leaders are more likely to be promoted. Fisman et al. (2020) also focus on connections and control for the origin of such connections. Doing so, they find that connected provincial leaders are actually *less* likely to be promoted into the Chinese Politburo. Their findings are in line with the stylized fact that the Chinese central administration allocates members of the same faction to different administrative bodies (Francois, Trebbi, and Xiao, 2023). We contribute to this literature by looking at a broader set of potential politicians, exploring a wider range of positions to which individuals can be promoted, and by studying the rank within the hierarchy of political positions. In addition, we are able to draw on connections that were formed through a natural experiment, alleviating concerns about connections proxying individual characteristics that might affect their career prospects.[2]

Third, our paper is linked to the literature exploring natural experiments that lead to quasi-exogenous variation of connections between individuals. Battiston

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[2]There is also a literature on the role of links between individuals and promotions within bureaucracies, for example Xu (2018) and Colonnelli, Prem, and Teso (2020).

(2018) studies the role of social ties on earnings relying on networks that were formed between 1909 and 1924 on immigrant ships to the US. Becker et al. (2022) study the effect of links with émigrés for the migration decision of Jewish scientists during the Nazi era. Costa and Kahn (2007) look at the effect of networks on survival in prisoner of war camps.

The paper proceeds as follows: Section 1.2 gives an overview of the historical background, spanning all periods in German History that are relevant for our paper, i.e. the Weimar Republic, the Nazi era and the German Democratic Republic. Section 1.3 provides information about the data we use and our definition of links. Section 1.4 examines the effect of ties to the party elite on political careers in the GDR, Section 1.5 addresses potential threats to identification. Section 1.6 looks at the potential mechanisms and Section 1.7 concludes.

1.2   HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1.2.1   COMMUNISTS IN GERMANY BEFORE 1945

The Communist Party of Germany (KPD) was founded post-World War I, in 1918, amidst Germany's transformation into a parliamentary democracy. The KPD, which marked the radical left of the German party spectrum, maintained significant electoral support, usually obtaining more than 10% of votes in national elections. The party was organized with an elaborate hierarchical structure, which encompassed many upper- and lower-level leadership positions at the national and sub-national level. Central party actors were constantly redeployed, sent to different locations and assigned new positions, since the KPD aimed to prevent the emergence of inner-party factions (Weber and Herbst, 2008, p. 31).

After the Nazi party (NSDAP) took over power in Germany, an arson attack on the parliament building in February 1933 initiated a mass persecution of potential regime opponents. Among these opponents, the Nazis especially targeted communists, whom they regarded as a major threat to their power. The Nazis particularly focused on active members of the KPD, irrespective of their position in the party hierarchy (Osterloh and Wünschmann, 2017). Overall, around 60,000 communists were imprisoned in 1933/4 (Weber and Herbst, 2008, p. 16). The intensity and speed of persecution surprised even communist elites.

To manage the sudden masses of prisoners, the Nazis erected improvised concentration camps, for instance in vacant factory buildings and castles. Still, limited camp capacities posed a constraint on the number of inmates that could be interned in a respective camp (Osterloh and Wünschmann, 2017; Duhnke, 2018; Drobisch and Wieland, 2018). Decisions on whom to intern and in which camp were made by local Nazi leaders, who often took the mass persecution as an opportunity for personal retribution against communist individuals with whom they had interacted previously (Orth, 1999, p. 23).

By the end of the 1930s all of the early provisional camps, except for Dachau, were dissolved and replaced by a conceptualised system of concentration camps. Those were strategically placed in areas that are rich in natural resources, so that inmates could be exploited as laborers in the war economy and the construction sector. In the early 1940s death camps were established, forming a distinct and unprecedented type of concentration camp. Those were the centers of the genocide of the European Jews, Romani people and the mass murder of other groups, such as homosexual persons (Orth, 1999).

As a consequence of persecution, the Communist Party's remaining activities were forced to go underground or relocate to foreign countries, while another group, composed primarily of top-tier leaders, emigrated to Moscow. Apart from the mass wave of political persecuting in the early days of Nazi rule, which aimed to manifest power, there were large-scale internments of communists during World War II to avoid subversion by opposition groups. In between these episodes, there were infrequent arrest waves (Osterloh and Wünschmann, 2017; Orth, 1999).

1.2.2   FORMER COMMUNISTS DURING THE BUILD-UP OF THE GDR

After the end of World War II, the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAD) assumed control in the East German occupation zone and initiated the build-up of a socialist East German state. German Communists that had survived the Nazi regime returned from underground, from concentration camps or exile and took leading roles in the new administration (Schneider, 2013). Formerly active German Communists were extensively involved in the state-building process, which culminated in the formal establishment of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1949. This process was characterized by a continuity in political

direction, without significant disruptions.

The GDR was governed by a single party, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), which was founded through a forced merger of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD).[3] Within the SED, former KPD cadres maintained a dominant position, while former SPD members occupied a secondary position in the power hierarchy (Gieseke and Wentker, 2011).

The SED controlled every domain of (political) life in the GDR; it was impossible to distinguish between the state and the party. By acting as gatekeeper of all important positions within the state and by filling them with its cadres, the party governed state and society (Gieseke and Wentker, 2011; Wagner, 1998; Malycha, 2000). Over time, the SED institutionalized its complex personnel system by introducing a cadre nomenklatura, i.e. a set of rules that regulated the authority over the selection of personnel for various positions. The nomenklatura was introduced in a systematic fashion in 1949 and gradually expanded to encompass all lines of administration within the state, such as politicians, people working in the political administration, leading figures in the media sector and at universities, as well as managers of state owned enterprises.

Given that the new East German state and its government represented a complete break from the prior Nazi regime, it was necessary to fill all positions with newly appointed personnel, ideally with reliable and experienced communists. Those German Communists that were politically active before the Nazis took over power formed the natural pool of talent that the socialist regime could draw from, as these individuals were experienced working within communist party structures.

1.2.3   Important Political Positions in the GDR

The SED state was structured according to the highly hierarchical principle of "democratic centralism", which stipulates that all decisions made by the central party leadership are binding and have to be implemented by the lower-level administrative bodies, i.e. the districts and the counties.

The most influential individual within the state was the First Secretary of the

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[3]The KPD and the SPD were the two left-wing parties of the Weimar Republic. The SPD was much more moderate than the KPD and was able to secure the largest share of votes out of all parties in all elections until 1932.

Central Committee. He was in charge of setting the agenda for each meeting of the most important political institution, the Politburo. The Politburo singularly decided on the political course and all key policy questions.[4] In addition, a considerable portion of the Politburo's work consisted of high-stakes personnel decisions within the party and the state: For example in 1950, 23.5 percent of resolutions by the Politburo were concerned with cadre politics (Amos, 2003, p. 50). The size of the Politburo varied over time, ranging between 10 and 21 members and candidates between 1946 and 1962.

The Secretariat of the Central Committee served as a binding organ between the Politburo and specialized departments within the SED. It drafted resolutions for the Politburo and controlled the SED's political work. It was also tasked with cadre politics and oversaw the work of the cadre department, which had to "control and develop the leading cadre" (Amos, 2003, p. 99). The Secretariat consisted of 6 to 13 members.

The third important political organ within the GDR was the Central Committee. It was the leading organ of the SED and officially ratified the decisions of the Politburo. Its membership size varied between 50 and 110 members over the course of the GDR, with 34 to 60 candidates. Only members had an official vote, while candidates had an advisory say.

Note, that technically the Party Congress (*Parteitag*) of the SED elected the Central Committee and the Central Committee in turn elected members and candidates of the Politburo and the Secretariat. However, in reality the Politburo decided a priori who was chosen to become part of the Politburo, the Secretariat, and the Central Committee (Amos, 2003, p. 102).

1.2.4 Remembering Concentration Camps in the GDR

The attitude of the SED leadership towards former concentration camp internees was torn: On the one hand, former inmates and their experiences were heavily instrumentalized to cultivate and reinforce popular support for the newly founded state. The GDR was presented as a counterpoint to Nazi Germany and as being led by "anti-fascist heroes", who actively resisted Nazi rule (Epstein, 1999;

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[4]There is no evidence that (except after the turmoil of the Uprising of 1953) Soviet representatives were present during the weekly meetings of the Politburo, but members of the Politburo had to inform the Soviets about their work (Amos, 2003, p. 48).

Gieseke and Wentker, 2011; Keller, 1998).

On the other hand, former concentration camp internees were also met by suspicion within the political elite: Walter Ulbricht, the leading state figure in the GDR from 1950 to 1971, was very distrustful of former concentration camp inmates, due to the close contacts and relationships between them that could only be partly controlled (Erler, 1998, p. 267).

The official, SED-led commemoration of the lives of communists who were persecuted in concentration camps was carried out within the Union of Persecuted of the Nazi Regime (Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes, VVN).[5] The VVN contained individual camp committees, i.e. groups of former inmates of the respective camp. The Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee viewed the VVN as a gathering place for critical voices, which ultimately led to its ordered dissolution in 1953.

Nevertheless, camp committees continued to exist and were incorporated into the new national remembrance association later on (Committee of antifascist members of the resistance, *Komitee der Antifaschistischen Widerstandskämpfer*) (Reuter and Hansel, 1997, pp. 18, 411).

There was strong solidarity between former camp inmates. The camp committees created an opportunity for individuals that have been interned in the same camp to connect, meet regularly, and exchange views (Reuter and Hansel, 1997, p. 411). When looking at the members of the camp committees, it is evident that important political figures of the GDR did in fact stay in contact with other former inmates of the same camp. For example, Karl Schirdewan, who was member of the Politburo and the Central Committee from 1953 to 1958, was a member of the Sachsenhausen committee. Edith Baumann, a member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee from 1949 to 1953 and a candidate of the Politburo from 1958 to 1961, as well as Erich Mückenberger, a member of the Central Committee from 1950 to 1989, candidate and later member of the Politburo (1950/1958-1989), were both part of the Ravensbrück Committee.

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[5]The experience of other groups that were interned in concentration camps, such as Jews, Romani people or homosexuals, were largely ignored within the public debate of the GDR.

1.3   DATA

1.3.1   BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

We have compiled a novel, extensive dataset using the detailed curriculum vitae of more than 1,000 important communists that were active in the Weimar Republic, i.e. the German state that existed before the Nazis took over power. Our sample consists of the universe of central members of the KPD between 1918 and 1933 that survive until 1946, allowing us to study an ex-ante pool of potential politicians in the GDR, rather than only the ex-post realized political elite.

The CVs were published in the biographical handbook of German Communists (Weber and Herbst, 2008)[6] and were made available online by the *Bundesstiftung Aufarbeitung.*[7] It is worth noting that this handbook was written after the GDR ceased to exist, making it a trustworthy source without an ideological bias. We have web-scraped the CV texts and since they do not follow a consistent structure, have performed extensive data cleaning to conceptualize the individuals' career paths and camp histories. In addition, we have acquired more detailed information about potential careers in the East German state by relying on information published in a handbook on important people in the GDR (Mueller-Enbergs et al., 2010).

The dataset that we have constructed comprises a diverse range of information on the demographics and activities of individuals during the Weimar Republic, as well as their experiences during the Nazi regime, including internment in concentration camps. Furthermore, the curricula vitae include information on the individuals' career paths after World War II, including both, those who pursued careers in the East German government, and those who continued their careers in other countries. For each year, we know which professional and political positions individuals hold.

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[6]The handbook covers all *important* communists in this time. This includes elected communist politicians as well as local and national party leaders. For a detailed discussion of which positions are included in this book please refer to Appendix Section 1.A.1.

[7]For example CVs, see Appendix Section 1.A.2.

1.3.2   POLITICAL POSITIONS WITHIN THE STATE HIERARCHY

Hierarchy Score

To conceptualize the hierarchical structure of the East German government, we use internal records from the GDR's Ministry of Domestic Affairs. These records delineate the hierarchy of national politicians and key representatives of the GDR, ranking them according to their position in the political system of the GDR (Wagner, 1998). In total, 28 positions are listed, ranging from the First Secretary of the Central Committee, the highest office, to the vice chairperson of the district administration (*Räte der Bezirke*).[8] For the complete ranked list of positions, please refer to Appendix Table 1.A.1. We use this internal hierarchy to assess for each individual and each year in our sample, which position they hold within the SED apparatus.

We translate every position in the hierarchy into a score and assign each individual the hierarchy score corresponding to the highest rank they hold in a given year.[9] To make interpretation of the results easier, we rescale the hierarchy score such that it ranges from 1 to 29, with 29 being the score of the most important position within the state hierarchy, 2 being the score of the least important position within the state hierarchy and 1 being the score for all other positions that are not listed in the official hierarchy.

Important Leading Positions

Apart from regarding an individual's position within the official state hierarchy in general, we look at whether individuals hold specific positions at the different levels of state administration.

First, we focus on national-level party leadership positions, defined as the top ten positions within the state hierarchy.[10] The lowest-rank position within this group is the candidates and members of the Central Committee, which held considerable

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[8]Note that the internal hierarchy ranks national and district-level positions, but not county-level positions.

[9]Note that an individual can hold multiple positions in a given year.

[10]The top ten positions are: First Secreatry of the Central Committee/Chairman of the State Council, Chairmen of the Council of Ministers, President of the National Parliament, members and candidates of the Politburo, Secretaries and members of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, President of the National Council of the National Front of the GDR, deputies of the Chairmen of the State Council, deputies of the Chairmen of the Council of Ministers, Chairmen of the block parties, and members and candidates of the Central Committee.

power and influence, being members of one of the three leading organs in GDR politics. Thus, this measure captures the top-tier political elite of the GDR. By focusing on this group, we also capture members and candidates of the two remaining important political organs, that is the Politburo and Secretariat of the Central Committee, as well as individual positions such as the First Secretary of the Central Committee, who was the party leader and held the most powerful position in the state. He was responsible for setting the agenda of the leadership organs and had the right to intervene in their activities. We construct a dummy variable, *Is Leading*, indicating whether an individual is a part of this elite.

Second, we assess whether individuals are involved in national politics more broadly. In addition to members of the leading elite, we consider individuals that are part of the National Parliament, the State Council, Council of Ministers, and the State Planning Commission, as well as Ministers, State Secretaries, and Department Heads at the Central Committee. This variable thus captures a broader measure of participation within national politics and also includes individuals that do not hold any real decision-making power, but are still in prestigious positions within the GDR's political system.

Local Positions

Third, we look at positions at the local level by focusing on county politicians. These were responsible for executing orders locally and crucially, they provided information and reported to the upper-level leadership (Ammer, 1995). Despite not holding powerful or influential positions, these individuals were still part of the official SED apparatus.

1.3.3   LINKS BETWEEN COMMUNISTS AND TREATMENT

To capture links between potential GDR politicians, we draw on the detailed CV information and gather the location of camp internment for all individuals in our sample, that were imprisoned in a concentration camp during the Nazi regime. We assign those individuals, that have been interned in the same concentration camp a link to each other. This is a plausible approach given the ample historical evidence describing that former camp inmates that have been interned in the same camp met regularly after 1945 (see Section 1.2.4). These links are predetermined to the GDR and do not change throughout its existence.

In our analysis, we estimate the effect of being connected to the party leadership on an individual's career path. A person is linked to the SED leadership, if someone that has been interned in the same concentration camp is in one of the top 10 positions according to the government's internal ranking of positions, i.e. being part of the Central Committee or in a higher-ranked position. Turnover in the party leadership creates the variation that we exploit in a panel setting, i.e. whether someone is connected to the party leadership through their camp experience changes over the sample period.

Figure 1.1: Camp Experiences

	Camp	Years
A	Dachau	1934-1937
B	Dachau	1935-1937
C	Buchenwald	1938-1939
D	Buchenwald	1940
E	No Camp	

Figure 1.2: Resulting Camp Links

	A	**B**	**C**	**D**	**E**
A	.	1	0	0	0
B	1	.	0	0	0
C	0	0	.	1	0
D	0	0	1	.	0
E	0	0	0	0	.

Figures 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate the measurement of camp links. Take for instance five individuals, A, B, C, D, and E and two camps, Dachau (green) and Buchenwald (purple). A and B have been in the camp Dachau at the same time. Hence, in our dataset A and B are linked to each other. C and D have both been in Buchenwald, but in different years. So they are, too linked to each other. E is not linked to anyone else, because E has not been interned in a camp at all.

At some point during the sample period, person B gets promoted and becomes member of the leading elite, e.g. by becoming a candidate of the Central Committee. In this case, A has a link to the political elite for as long as B remains part of the elite.

1.3.4 Summary Statistics

Summary statistics about the characteristics of individuals in our sample are presented in Table 1.1. We follow their careers from the year 1946 to 1962. Naturally, we limit our analysis to individuals that are still alive in 1946, the first year of the sample period, leaving us with a total of 1059 individuals.

Around one third of individuals in our sample was interned in a concentration camp during the Nazi regime (341 out of 1059). In 1946, individuals were approximately 50 years old on average. Few individuals in our sample are women (13.6 percent of those individuals that were not in a concentration camp, and 5.9 percent of those that were in a concentration camp). This reflects the fact that most of the important active communists during the Weimar Republic — and beyond — were men. Conditional on having been interned in any camp, individuals were imprisoned for around 3.3 years. Approximately 87 percent of former camp inmates are linked to the SED leadership through camp internment at some point between 1946 and 1962.

The maximum position within the hierarchy, ranging from 1 as not holding a position within the set of important ranks as defined by the GDR's Ministry of Domestic Affairs, to 29 as being the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the SED, that individuals reach until 1962 is 2.3 for non-inmates and 2.8 for former inmates of concentration camps on average. The latter group is also more likely to be a leading politician (7 percent versus 4.9 percent), in national politics (10.6 versus 7.4 percent) and in local politics (24.0 versus 10.0 percent).

Looking at averages across the sample period, former camp inmates have a link to someone in the leading elite 60.5 percent of the time. Former inmates on average hold a rank of 2.0 in the hierarchy, non-inmates of 1.7 and inmates are more likely to be in a leading position (3.8 percent versus 2.6 percent), in national politics (5.6 percent versus 3.8 percent), and in local politics (8.8 percent versus 4.1 percent) in a given year.

Table 1.1: Summary Statistics

	Not in Camp			In Camp			
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Diff
Panel A: All Individuals in Panel							
Age in 1946	49.864	8.648	718	49.490	7.548	341	0.373
Lifetime after 1946	23.288	13.358	673	23.854	12.520	336	-0.566
Female	0.136	0.344	718	0.059	0.235	341	0.078***
Years in Camp	0	0	718	3.296	2.687	341	-3.296***
Ever Link to Leading	0	0	718	0.868	0.339	341	-0.868***
Maximum Hierarchy Position	2.266	4.922	718	2.804	5.523	341	-0.538*
Ever In Leading	0.049	0.215	718	0.070	0.256	341	-0.022
Ever In National Politics	0.074	0.262	718	0.106	0.308	341	-0.032*
Ever In Local Politics	0.100	0.301	718	0.240	0.428	341	0.140***
Panel B: All Observations in Panel							
Link to Leading	0	0	10,610	0.605	0.489	5,056	-0.605***
Hierarchy Position	1.650	3.626	10,610	1.987	4.157	5,056	-0.337***
In Leading	0.026	0.159	10,610	0.038	0.191	5,056	-0.012***
In National Politics	0.038	0.190	10,610	0.056	0.231	5,056	-0.019***
In Local Politics	0.041	0.199	10,610	0.088	0.283	5,056	-0.047***

Note Data sources see text. Mean and standard deviation for individuals without and with camp background, respectively. Sample is limited to individuals that are still alive in 1946. The column Diff reports the difference in means between the two groups. *, **, and *** denote significance on the 10 percent, 5 per cent, and 1 percent level, respectively.

1.4   Links to the Political Elite and Career Paths

The aim of this paper is to evaluate the impact of having a link to the political elite on an individual's probability to be active in politics. Exploiting the panel structure of our dataset, we estimate the following Difference-in-Differences model that compares an individual's position within the GDR's state hierarchy when they are connected to the leading elite to their position when they are not:

$$Y_{ijt} = \beta \cdot LinkedToLeading_{ijt} + \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \sum_j \alpha_j \times Year_t \times Camp_j + \epsilon_{ijt} \quad (1.1)$$

Y_{ijt} is either a dummy that equals 1 if individual i that has been interned in camp j during the Nazi regime is in position Y in year t or individual i's position in the hierarchy in t. Our explanatory variable of interest, $LinkedToLeading_{ijt}$ is a dummy that indicates whether i is liked to a member of the leading elite, i.e. an individual in the Central Committee or a higher rank (see Section 1.2.3). The individual-level variation in $LinkedToLeading_{ijt}$ stems from fluctuations in

the party's leadership. Individuals are linked to the leading elite if they have been interned in the same concentration camp as someone who is currently in the leading elite.

α_i and α_t are individual and year fixed effects, respectively. Individual fixed effects capture individual-level characteristics that are constant over the sample period, such as the career path before 1933 or political talent. Year fixed effects account for all developments over time that apply equally to all individuals, such as a higher turnover in political positions in years with a party congress. The sum of $\alpha_j \times Year_t \times Camp_j$ comprises linear time trends for each camp j. Controlling for camp-specific time trends allows the career trends of former inmates of different camps to differ. They for example capture distinct career paths that would emerge if the Nazis sent communists with certain characteristics to specific camps and these characteristics in turn affecting post-war career paths (in a linear fashion). As many individuals were interned in several camps, their individual camp-specific time trends will be the sum of all relevant time trends.

The coefficient of interest, β, thus captures how the career outcomes of individuals differ when connected to an individual in the leading elite, compared to when they are not connected, accounting for all general differences between individuals and across time as well as potential linear trends that are specific to former inmates of the different camps.

ϵ_{ijt} is the error term and clustered at the camp level. Since individuals could be interned in multiple camps, for clustering, we assign each individual to the concentration camp in which they where interned for the longest time. In Appendix Table 1.C.1 we show that our results are robust to alternative cluster definitions and to implementing bootstrapped standard errors.

We limit our analysis to the years 1946 to 1962, covering the time period from the first to the fifth party congress (and ending before the sixth party congress), which can be interpreted as the GDR's equivalent of legislative sessions. This was the defining period for the build-up of the GDR's political system[11] and communists that had been active during the Weimar Republic played a crucial role in this process.[12]

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[11]At the sixth party congress, the SED program was adopted. Therefore, it can be assumed that the year 1962 marked a caesura, after which the party structure could be considered established.

[12]In Appendix Table 1.C.2 we present estimates extending the sample period to later years,

Table 1.2: Links and Career Trajectories

	Position in Hierarchy (1)	Leading (2)	National Politics (3)	Local Politics (4)
Linked to Leading	-0.797**	-0.041**	-0.051***	0.032*
	(0.342)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Individual FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Linear Year Trends by Camp	✓	✓	✓	✓
Years	1946-1962	1946-1962	1946-1962	1946-1962
Observations	15,666	15,666	15,666	15,666
R^2	0.692	0.669	0.652	0.676

Note Results from estimating equation 1.1. Hierarchy is a score taking values between 1 and 29, linking jobs to their rank within the official state hierarchy. More powerful positions have higher scores. Outcomes in columns (2) to (4) are dummies indicating whether an individual holds the respective position in a given year. Linked to Leading is a dummy indicating whether an individual is linked to a member of the party elite, i.e. a person at least as powerful as someone in the Central Committee, through internment in the same concentration camp in the Nazi era. Standard errors clustered at camp level. Significance levels: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Table 1.2 shows the results of estimating regression model 1.1. We find that an individual holds a lower position in the national state hierarchy when linked to the party leadership. On average, links to important politicians are associated with a decrease in the hierarchy score by 0.797 points, which corresponds to a reduction of around 0.21 of a standard deviation (column 1, significant at 5 percent level).[13] Columns 2 to 4 examine whether individuals hold political positions in the SED leadership themselves, in national politics more generally, and local politics, respectively. We find a negative effect of being connected to the party leadership on an individual's probability to be part of the national leadership themselves; individuals are on average 4.1 percentage points less likely to also be in a leading position when linked to the elite (column 2, significant at 5 percent level). The career penalty of being linked to the party leadership extends to holding a position in national politics in general, as individuals are 5.1 percentage points less likely to be a politician at the national level (column 3, significant at 1 percent level). These results show that individuals hold lower positions in the national political hierarchy when they are linked to a politician in the leading elite.

When examining whether links to the party leadership also have an effect on being active in local-level politics, we find a positive effect; the coefficient estimate in column 4 indicates that individuals are on average 3.2 percentage points more

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up to 1989. Coefficients remain similar, but significance changes in some cases, when the sample is extended too far. As individuals die, the sample gets smaller over time.

[13]SD of hierarchy score ≈ 3.808.

likely to be a county-level politician when they are linked to the party leadership (significant at 10 percent level).

Taken together, the results in Table 1.2 indicate that individuals rank lower in the state hierarchy when linked to the party elite. As we control for individual fixed effects in all regressions, these estimates propose that individuals fare worse in their career when they have a link to the party elite – and not that individuals that ever have such a link have worse career outcomes per se.

To gain a better understanding of the career dynamics at play and the timing of the effects, we proceed by estimating an event-study framework:

$$Y_{ijt} = \sum_{\tau=-4}^{4} \beta_\tau \cdot LinkedToLeading_{ijt} \times D_\tau + \alpha_i + \alpha_t \qquad (1.2)$$
$$+ \sum_j \alpha_j \times Year_t \times Camp_j + \epsilon_{ijt}$$

All variables and parameters are defined as before, except the treatment indicator is interacted with a set of dummies indicating the period relative to treatment. The dummies D_{-4} and D_4 are defined as pooling all periods of at least 4 years before and after an individual got a link to a leading politician, respectively.[14] The period $\tau = 0$ is defined as the first year during which an individual has a link to someone in the leading elite through internment in the same camp during the Nazi era. We omit the coefficient for the year before an individual gets a link, i.e. the period $\tau = -1$.

Figure 1.3 exhibits how career paths are realized over time. In panel (a) we show how the position in the hierarchy evolves for individuals before and after they get a link to the elite: Individuals do not exhibit distinct career patterns before they are linked, but start experiencing career penalties one year after they gain a link to the leading elite. Similar patterns emerge when considering an individual's probability to be in a leading position, or in national politics; there is no pre-trend, and individuals are less likely to be part of the leading circle and national politics starting in the year in which they get a link to the party leadership (panels b and c). The pattern for an individual's probability to be a local politician is a bit indefinite and does not exhibit a clear trend (panel d).

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[14]The timing when individuals get a link varies, and thus the number of available periods before and after getting a link differs across individuals.

Figure 1.3: Event Studies

(a) Position in Hierarchy

(b) Leading

(c) National Politics

(d) Local Politics

Note The graph plots the coefficients and corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals resulting from estimating equation 1.2. Hierarchy is a score taking values between 1 and 29, linking jobs to their rank within the official state hierarchy. More powerful positions have higher scores. The outcomes in panels b-d are dummies indicating whether an individual holds the respective position in a given year. The periods correspond to years since the emergence of a link to the party leadership.

There are two underlying mechanisms potentially explaining why people place lower in the national hierarchy once they have a link to a leading politician: they might be demoted or they might no longer be promoted, but would have been in the counterfactual. To disentangle these explanations, we rerun equation 1.1, but as dependent variables, we consider a dummy indicating whether an individual moves down the hierarchy, i.e. is demoted, and a dummy indicating whether an individual moves up the hierarchy, i.e. is promoted. In each case, we restrict the sample to individuals that are not at the bottom or top of the hierarchy, i.e. individuals that *can* be demoted or promoted, respectively.

The results in Table 1.3 show that an individual's likelihood to be demoted does not increase when linked to the party's leading elite (column 1). Instead, it be-

Table 1.3: Moving up and down the Hierarchy

	Moving Down		Moving Up	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Linked to Leading	0.069	0.048	-0.014**	-0.015**
	(0.096)	(0.155)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Lagged Hierarchy Score		0.004		-0.007***
		(0.002)		(0.000)
Linked to Leading $\times$ Lagged Hierarchy Score		0.001		-0.002
		(0.005)		(0.001)
Individual FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Linear Year Trends by Camp	✓	✓	✓	✓
Years	1946-1962	1946-1962	1946-1962	1946-1962
Observations	681	681	15,643	15,643
R^2	0.311	0.312	0.127	0.160

Note Results from estimating equation 1.1. Moving Down is a dummy indicating whether an individual moved down the hierarchy (column 1 and 2), Moving Up a dummy indicating whether an individual moved up the hierarchy (column 3 and 4). Linked to Leading is a dummy indicating whether an individual is linked to a member of the party elite, i.e. a person at least as powerful as someone in the Central Committee, through internment in the same concentration camp in the Nazi era. Models in columns 2 and 4 add the lagged hierarchy score (score in the year before) and the interaction of the lagged hierarchy score with Linked to Leading as explanatory variables. The samples are restricted to individuals that are not at the bottom of the hierarchy, i.e. at position 1, (column 1 and 2) or at the top of the hierarchy (column 3 and 4), i.e. at position 29, in year $t-1$. Standard errors clustered at the camp level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

comes less likely that an individual is promoted (column 3, significant at 5 percent level). To control for the fact that the potential for demotions and promotions depends on the current position in the hierarchy, we additionally include an individual's hierarchy score in the previous year individually and its interaction with having a link to the leading elite (columns 2 and 4). Again, we do not find a statistically significant relationship between having a link to a leading politician and the probability of being demoted, but we find a negative and significant coefficient in the regression examining the probability to move up the state hierarchy. The likelihood to move up is lower for individuals that are ranked higher in the national hierarchy, which includes individuals that are closer to the leading elite of the GDR.

The finding that links to the party leadership are attached to career penalties, raises the question about the persistence of such career-costs. To shed light on this question, we examine whether an individual continues to rank lower in the state hierarchy once a link disappears. In particular, we add a dummy variable to equation 1.1, that turns 1 if an individual had a link to the party leadership in the past, i.e. is no longer linked.

Table 1.4: Effects once Link is gone

	Position in Hierarchy (1)	Leading (2)	National Politics (3)	Local Politics (4)
Linked to Leading	-2.454*	-0.100*	-0.122*	-0.023
	(1.237)	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.033)
No longer linked to Leading	-1.888	-0.067	-0.080	-0.062
	(1.252)	(0.060)	(0.063)	(0.037)
Individual FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Linear Year Trends by Camp	✓	✓	✓	✓
Years	1946-1962	1946-1962	1946-1962	1946-1962
Observations	15,666	15,666	15,666	15,666
R^2	0.693	0.669	0.653	0.676

Note Results from estimating equation 1.1 with an additional indicator for whether an individual had a link to the party leadership in the past. Hierarchy is a score taking values between 1 and 29, linking jobs to their rank within the official state hierarchy. More powerful positions have higher scores. Outcomes in columns (2) to (4) are dummies indicating whether an individual holds the respective position in a given year. Linked to Leading is a dummy indicating whether an individual is linked to a member of the party elite, i.e. a person at least as powerful as someone in the Central Committee, through internment in the same concentration camp in the Nazi era. Standard errors clustered at camp level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

The results from this exercise are shown in Table 1.4. We only find a significant negative effect on an individual's position in the national hierarchy, the probability to be part of the leading elite, and to be active in national politics for as long as an individual is linked to the leading elite (columns 1 to 3, all significant at the 10 percent level). The respective coefficients on the indicator for links being gone are also negative, but smaller in magnitude and insignificant at conventional levels. The effects considering local-level political careers are now opposite in sign and the coefficient for the post-link period is borderline insignificant with a p-value of 0.104. This is consistent with a mechanism, where individuals with a link to the leadership are able to remain in their local-level political positions while they are linked to the political elite and are removed from these positions once their link is gone (column 4).

1.5 ROBUSTNESS

The causal interpretation of our estimates from regression equation 1.1 relies on parallel career paths of the treatment and the control group in the absence of treatment. In our setting, the treatment group consists of individuals that have a link to the leading elite, while the control group consists of individuals that do not have a link. In this section we explore potential threats to identification, i.e. address concerns that the career paths of the treatment and control group would

not be comparable in absence of treatment.

Note that by including individual fixed effects in all of our regressions, we account for all individual characteristics affecting their career trajectories in a constant manner. For example, occupational backgrounds might have determined both, in which concentration camp individuals were interned and for which political positions they were chosen in the GDR. Such general differences between individuals are accounted for by the inclusion of individual fixed effects. This also applies to all general, time-constant differences between former inmates and non-inmates.[15]

Another set of concerns is addressed by the inclusion of camp-specific linear year trends. These trends capture all (linear) differences in career paths between individuals that have been to different camps, such as the possibility that the importance of placing former internees of certain camps in prominent political positions for propaganda purposes may have decreased over time. In such a case, former inmates of particular camps would be less likely to become part of the leading elite as time progresses. The magnitude of this decrease could vary by camp, depending on their prominence, but will be captured by the camp-specific linear year trends that are included in all regressions.[16]

To explain our results, the effect of an unobserved factor would need to vary over time, i.e. would need to differ between periods in which individuals have or do not have a link to the ruling elite. In particular, an underlying process driving the results would have to explain individuals moving down the hierarchy and becoming less likely to be within the leading elite or in national politics, exactly once they have a link to a leading politician (as shown in the event studies in Figure 1.3).

1.5.1   The Role of Shared Characteristics

We interpret our results as quantifying the effect of being linked to a member of the leading elite on career outcomes. However, if assignment to camps was contingent on individual characteristics, our coefficients might spuriously pick up the effect of having shared characteristics with individuals in the ruling elite,

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[15]Appendix Table 1.B.1 shows which covariates are associated with being linked to someone in the leading elite until 1962.

[16]Note that we can not include camp-specific year fixed effects as our treatment is defined at the camp level.

or they might pick up other, pre-existing links.[17] This would cast doubt on the exogeneity of our explanatory variable and as a consequence, whether being linked to the leading elite drives our results.

We approach this concern by constructing several alternative links based on a number of potential shared characteristics. We include any links that arise from having been exiled in the same country at the same time between 1933 and 1945, last known place of residency before the persecution of communists started in 1933, the profession in 1933, the year of birth, place of birth and the year in which individuals entered the KPD. For instance, when constructing networks based on having had the same profession in 1933, we group every person that has had the same job in early 1933 together and assign them links to each other. We then define for each of these alternative links a dummy that turns 1 if an individual is connected to the party leadership through a link from this specific origin. For example, the dummy for being linked to the party leadership through the 1933-job turns 1 if an individual had the same job in 1933 as someone in the party leadership.

If having a link to the leading elite is orthogonal to shared underlying characteristics with people in the party leadership, we expect that being linked to the leadership through camp internment is for instance uncorrelated with having had the same job in 1933 as someone from the party leadership. This approach allows us to examine whether we estimate the causal effect of having been in the same camp or whether our coefficient of interest for instance picks up the effect of having had the same profession before the Nazis took power.

We one by one additionally control for each of these links to the leadership in our main regression. Each panel in Figure 1.4 shows the baseline coefficients from running regression 1.1 for the four main outcomes we consider and below, how the coefficient of interest changes once we control for links to the party leadership that arise from other sources.[18] We find that our results remain very stable both in terms of magnitude and significance, which indicates that links to the party leaderships through camp internments are uncorrelated with other characteristics. This strengthens our claim that connections formed through concentration camps are exogenous conditional on individual fixed effects, and that our results can be interpreted in a causal fashion.

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[17]See Appendix Figure 1.B.1 for an analysis of selection into camps based on characteristics.

[18]For coefficients on the variables measuring alternative links, see Appendix Table 1.C.3.

Figure 1.4: Controlling for other potential Links

(a) Position in Hierarchy

(b) Leading

(c) National Politics

(d) Local Politics

Note The graph shows the coefficients on the variable *LinkedToLeading* from estimating equation 1.1. We additionally control for links to leading politicians that occur through shared characteristics. "Baseline" displays the coefficient obtained from not controlling for other links, the remaining coefficients stem from models that additionally control for the respective alternative link. 95% and 90% confidence intervals are depicted in grey and green.

1.5.2   Adding Camp Inmate Year Fixed Effects

By construction of our treatment variable, only individuals that were interned in a camp can potentially have a link to the leading elite. Potentially, there could be differences in career paths between former camp inmates and non-inmates that unfold non-linearly over time and would thus bias our results. The presence of general year fixed effects and camp linear year-trends would not account for this possibility. To capture such potential differences, we additionally include a second set of year fixed effects, specific to all former camp inmates, in equation 1.1. Table 1.5 shows that our coefficients do not change in terms of magnitude or significance in any of the specifications. This indicates that the results are not driven by different career trajectories of communists that have been interned in a camp compared to communists that have not been interned in any camp.

Table 1.5: Controlling for Inmate-specific Year Fixed Effects

	Position in Hierarchy (1)	Leading (2)	National Politics (3)	Local Politics (4)
Linked to Leading	-0.806**	-0.041**	-0.051***	0.032*
	(0.345)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Individual FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Camp Inmate × Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Linear Year Trends by Camp	✓	✓	✓	✓
Years	1946-1962	1946-1962	1946-1962	1946-1962
Observations	15,666	15,666	15,666	15,666
R^2	0.691	0.669	0.652	0.676

Note Results from estimating equation 1.1, additionally controlling for camp inmate-specific year fixed effects, i.e. interaction terms between a dummy that turns 1 for all former camp inmates and the respective year dummies. Hierarchy is a score taking values between 1 and 29, linking jobs to their rank within the official state hierarchy. More powerful positions have higher scores. Outcomes in columns (2) to (4) are dummies indicating whether an individual holds the respective position in a given year. Linked to Leading is a dummy indicating whether an individual is linked to a member of the party elite, i.e. a person at least as powerful as someone in the Central Committee, through internment in the same concentration camp in the Nazi era. Standard errors clustered at camp level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

1.5.3   The Role of Potential Outliers

In the most extreme scenario, our results could be driven by outliers and solely apply to former inmates of one specific camp. Consider for instance the concentration camp Buchenwald: former inmates from this camp played a special role in the political sphere of the GDR and were renowned across the country. The experience of communists in Buchenwald was viewed as representative for the resistance of communism in general against the Nazi rule. The SED instru-

mentalized the history of Buchenwald to create a foundation myth, portraying the GDR as an anti-fascist model state. As there were tensions between former inmates from this camp specifically and those communists that emigrated to Moscow during the Nazi reign, it is perceivable that there was only a negative effect for individuals that have been to Buchenwald, and the Moscow elite attempting to keep this group of former inmates out of high-level positions. To check whether results are driven by non-linear trends specific to former inmates of Buchenwald, or any other camp in particular, we rerun our main regression, each time excluding all individuals that have been to one specific camp from our sample.

Results are shown in Figure 1.5 and display the baseline coefficient with a triangle and all other coefficients, stemming from excluding inmates of a different camp at a time, with circles. Coefficients only change marginally in this exercise, and results remain significant, albeit in some instances significance drops from the 5 to the 10 percent level. Overall, these results show that the patterns we uncover arise across camps and are not driven by a single camp in particular.[19]

1.6   MECHANISMS

In the previous sections, we have shown that being linked to the leading elite affects individuals' career paths: individuals with links rank lower in the national state hierarchy, are less likely to be part of the leading elite or active in national politics, but are more likely to hold a position in county-level politics. As shown in the event studies, the timing of the effects is consistent with individuals experiencing career penalties once linked to the party leadership through their camp history. Next, we turn to the potential mechanisms that could explain these findings.

1.6.1   FEAR OF FACTIONS AT ELITE LEVEL

Historical evidence suggests that anti-factionalism explains the negative effect of having connections to the leading elite on an individual's prospects to hold high-level positions within the state hierarchy. A strict stance against factions is

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[19]We perform a similar test by excluding all links that stem from a given camp by setting these links to zero. Naturally, we only perform this analysis for those camps, that are represented in the ruling elite until 1962. Results are shown in Appendix Figure 1.C.1.

Figure 1.5: Excluding all Individuals that have been to certain Camp

(a) Position in Hierarchy

(b) Leading

(c) National Politics

(d) Local Politics

Note The Graph plots the coefficients of estimating equation 1.1, leaving out all individuals from a different concentration camp in each iteration. The baseline coefficient is represented by a triangle and the coefficients from running regressions on the restricted samples are denoted by circles. 95 percent confidence intervals are shown in gray, 90 percent confidence intervals in black.

central to communist ideology: Building factions was considered one of the most severe offenses against party discipline and deemed a threat to the ruling party's unity and power, and by extension, to the stability of the regime (Gieseke and Wentker, 2011). The hostile stance against factionalism is also reflected in the party statute:

> "Every appearance of factions and formation of groups contradicts the nature of our Marxist-Leninist party and is not compatible with party membership."[20]

The fact that this quote was also included in the teaching books used at party schools — which trained potential future leaders of the GDR — demonstrates the

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[20]Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (1976, p. 57)

centrality of this principle to state ideology. Measures against factions among the powerful elite were used to enforce party discipline (Ammer, 1995; Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen, 1965).

Any group within the GDR could be suspected of forming a faction — even people meeting for a seemingly innocuous event such as a birthday party: In 1954, the party control commission investigated former members of the Socialist Worker Party — a left-wing, Marxist party that existed from 1931 to 1945 — because they met every year to celebrate birthdays (Mählert, 1998, pp. 451).

If individuals who have been interned in the same camp were considered a potential faction, anti-factionalism could explain why we find connection penalties for high-level careers. And indeed, people who have been to the same concentration camp were seen as belonging to the same group. This is highlighted by the following summary of the plethora of groups that existed in 1946 within East Germany by a cadre secretary in Saxony:

> "There was the Moscow group, the Spanish group, the Buchenwalders, the Sachsenhauseners, the Mauthauseners, the Waldheimers and the Auschwitzers, [...]"[21]

The listing of specific concentration camps strongly implies that former inmates of the same concentration camp were considered part of a unified group.

A competing theory could propose, that the negative effect of links to the leading elite is driven by having a personal tie to the elite. We perform an empirical plausibility check to distinguish between the two mechanisms. To do so, we exploit that factions would likely extend to all people who have been in the same camp, no matter the timing, since individuals could connect after internment, for example through the camp remembrance committees (see Section 1.2.4). In contrast, any mechanism that is based on personal links would result in links arising by having been in the same camp *at the same time* having a stronger effect than if two individuals are only connected by having been interned in the same camp.

Hence, we add an additional variable to equation 1.1 that captures whether an individual has a link to someone in the leading elite with whom they have been

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[21] As quoted in Mählert (1996, p. 239).

interned in the same camp at the same time. Table 1.6 shows that for national-level positions, our baseline coefficients remain unchanged and personal links do not lead to stronger career penalties for individuals (columns 1 to 3). The coefficient on the variable that captures links to someone who has been in the same camp, irrespective of the timing (our baseline coefficient), is negative and significant. However, the coefficient quantifying the additional effect of personal links, i.e. individuals having been in the same camp at the same time, is close to zero and insignificant. This shows, that the penalty for national-level careers is neither driven by, nor larger for links stemming from having overlapped in a concentration camp. Importantly, these results are in line with our interpretation regarding people interned in the same concentration being considered as part of the same faction. The party leadership thus seems to have prevented the career advancement of additional members of camp groups to thward the existence of a faction within the elite.

Table 1.6: Effect by Overlap in Concentration Camp

	Position in Hierarchy (1)	Leading (2)	National Politics (3)	Local Politics (4)
Linked to Leading	-0.833*	-0.043*	-0.060**	0.017
(Same camp any time)	(0.419)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.017)
Personal Link Leading	0.058	0.004	0.015	0.025
(Same camp, same time)	(0.358)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.018)
Individual FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Linear Year Trends by Camp	✓	✓	✓	✓
Years	1946-1962	1946-1962	1946-1962	1946-1962
Observations	15,666	15,666	15,666	15,666
R^2	0.692	0.669	0.652	0.676

Note Results from estimating equation 1.1, additionally controlling for a dummy indicating that a link stems from having been interned in the same camp at the same time as someone from the party leadership. Hierarchy is a score taking values between 1 and 29, linking jobs to their rank within the official state hierarchy. More powerful positions have higher scores. Outcomes in columns (2) to (4) are dummies indicating whether an individual holds the respective position in a given year. Linked to Leading is a dummy indicating whether an individual is linked to a member of the party elite, i.e. a person at least as powerful as someone in the Central Committee, through internment in the same concentration camp in the Nazi era. Standard errors clustered at camp level. Significance levels: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

To further support this claim, we exploit the fact that if the fear of factions explains the negative impact on career prospects for those linked to the elite, then individuals that were in a better position to build a faction should have been penalized more due to the larger risk they posed. Members of a camp committee, the institution that brought together former inmates of the same camp and allowed them to form links between one another, should therefore bear higher career costs of connections to the party elite.

While we do not know which individuals were members of camp committees, we can identify those that have been to camps for which such a committee exists. We distinguish between individuals that have been to camps with a committee and those that have not and rerun equation 1.1 to determine the differential effects of the presence of a camp remembrance committee on individual career outcomes.

Table 1.7 shows that the effect of being linked to the leading elite is larger in magnitude for individuals that have been to a camp for which a camp remembrance committee existed in the GDR. These individuals rank lower in the hierarchy and are less likely to be part of the SED elite or in national politics, when they are linked to the elite (columns 1 to 3). The effect is no longer statistically distinguishable from zero for individuals that only have been interned in camps for which no remembrance committees existed in the GDR.[22] These results indicate that individuals, that were presumably perceived to have a greater potential for engaging in faction building were penalized more, supporting the notion that fear of faction building explains the negative relationship between being linked to the elite and career outcomes. When focusing only on local-level political positions, only individuals that cannot have been part of a remembrance committee exhibit a higher probability to be active in local politics when they are linked to the political elite (column 4).

Table 1.7: Effect by Potential for Membership in Camp Committee

	Position in Hierarchy (1)	Leading (2)	National Politics (3)	Local Politics (4)
Linked to Leading & Camp Committee	-0.910*	-0.045*	-0.058**	0.017
	(0.478)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.020)
Linked to Leading & No Camp Committee	-0.659	-0.037	-0.043	0.050**
	(0.512)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.025)
Individual FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Linear Year Trends by Camp	✓	✓	✓	✓
Years	1946-1962	1946-1962	1946-1962	1946-1962
Observations	15,666	15,666	15,666	15,666
R^2	0.692	0.669	0.652	0.676

Note Results from estimating equation 1.1, where the main dependent variable, having a link to the elite, is split for individuals that have been to at least one camp for which a camp committee existed in the GDR, and individuals that were only interned in camps for which no camp committees existed. Hierarchy is a score taking values between 1 and 29, linking jobs to their rank within the official state hierarchy. More powerful positions have higher scores. Outcomes in columns (2) to (4) are dummies indicating whether an individual holds the respective position in a given year. Linked to Leading is a dummy indicating whether an individual is linked to a member of the party elite, i.e. a person at least as powerful as someone in the Central Committee, through internment in the same concentration camp in the Nazi era. Standard errors clustered at camp level. Significance levels: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

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[22]Note that coefficients are insignificant because standard errors are large and not because of small coefficients.

1.6.2   Patronage at the Local Level

Easter (1996) examines the role of personal networks for political appointments during the build-up of Soviet Russia. In his qualitative analysis, he finds that the central state administration appointed people whom they had personal ties with to local-level posts to strengthen the reach of the central party leadership into the regional administration. A strategy like this plausibly explains the positive effect of ties to the party leadership on individuals' county-level careers. As local-level politicians were not powerful enough to destabilize the regime, ties between the top levels of the national, political hierarchy and local politicians were not considered a faction that needed to be prevented.

The coefficient estimates in column 4 of Table 1.6 speak to patronage explaining the positive effects on local-level careers, as links emerging from joint internment at the same time have a stronger positive effect on being a local politician, than links emerging from having been to the same camp at different times. The coefficients are no longer individually significant, but the p-value for testing joint significance is 0.03.

1.6.3   Exploring other Potential Mechanisms

Next, we evaluate the role of other plausible mechanisms for driving the negative effects of being linked to the party leadership on the likelihood that individuals are part of the leadership themselves. We discuss mental costs of being exposed to fellow inmates, a quota for politicians from camps, or the existence of *kompromat*.

Mental Costs of Exposure to Fellow Inmate(s)

Concentration camp internment was a highly traumatic experience. Leading politicians might have used their power to avoid having regular contact to people that remind them of their camp internment. This would explain why individuals are less likely to be a member of the party leadership when linked to leading politicians through their shared camp internment.

This hypothesis, however, fails to adequately explain the observed effects. Despite their experiences of persecution, former communist internees took pride in their resistance to the Nazi regime and maintained a rich culture of remembrance of their internment. In fact, some of these individuals, such as Ernst Thälmann,

achieved iconic status by leveraging their camp internment. The SED leadership, too utilized the history of communist persecution in Nazi concentration camps as a means of advancing state ideology and compensating for the regime's lack of democratic legitimacy. This is evidenced by the extensive coverage of the topic by party-controlled media, which published about 20 related reports per year on average.[23]

Additionally, official organizations such as the "Victims of Fascism" and designated remembrance days played an influential role in GDR culture. Overall, no historical evidence suggests that communists sought to hide or erase their experiences in concentration camps. In contrast, they were idealized for their camp experiences and actively leveraged their persecution to legitimize their hold on power.

Quota

A general quota for people with a camp background in the party leadership would be an obvious candidate explaining the negative effects of being linked to the party leadership on high-level careers. In this case, the promotion of an individual with a camp background into the political elite would require another individual to be demoted and/or no additional individual with a camp background could be promoted, so that the overall number of former camp inmates remained constant. It could even be the case, that politicians with camp backgrounds pushed for such a quota, aiming to protect their "unique selling point", since as discussed above, communists used their camp experience as political capital.

We test empirically, whether a quota limiting the share of people with a camp background in the party leadership can explain the effects we find. Initially, we examine the evolution of the share of individuals with camp background in party leadership positions over time. Figure 1.6 plots the share and number of people in the leading elite that have been in a concentration camp over time. We observe that neither the share nor the number of former camp inmates in the political elite are constant over time. Furthermore, the share of leaders with a camp background does not suggest quotas changing over time, as the shares are not regularly close to sharp cutoff values.

As a second empirical test, we exploit the fact that a "camp-quota" would affect

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[23]Based on the count of articles in the party-controlled newspaper "Neues Deutschland" about the subject of communists in concentration camps during the Nazi Era.

Figure 1.6: Former Camp Inmates in Leadership Positions

(a) Share Camp Inmates   (b) Number Camp Inmates

Note The graph plots the share and number of former camp inmates in the party leadership, i.e. the group captured by our outcome "Leading", over the sample period.

all people with camp background equally. We thus examine whether the number of people with a camp background in different leadership positions has a differential effect on the probability to be promoted to that particular position for *all* former camp internees. Hence, for each year we calculate how many people that were interned in a concentration camp are in certain leadership positions. The explanatory variable of interest is the number of former camp inmates in the respective position (excluding individuals themselves, if applicable) interacted with a dummy that equals one for former camp inmates.

Table 1.8 presents the results from this analysis. The coefficient estimates for the quota interactions are statistically indistinguishable from zero for leading and national political positions (columns 1 and 2), and positive for the local-level positions (significant at 10 percent level, column 3). Importantly, the coefficient of interest (baseline) does not change in magnitude or significance after the inclusion of the quota interactions. This indicates, that the negative impact of having a link to someone from the central committee is not driven by an (implicit) quota, specifying that only a certain number of people with a camp background can be in each of the positions under consideration.

Kompromat

Another potential mechanism explaining the connection-penalties for high-level careers is the existence of *kompromat*; leading politicians that have been interned in the same camp might have private, damaging information about potential

Table 1.8: Quota for Camp Internees

	Leading (1)	National Politics (2)	Local Politics (3)
Linked to Leading	-0.038**	-0.052***	0.020*
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.011)
Num other Leading Politicians from Camp $\times$ Camp$_i$	-0.005 (0.003)		
Num other National Politicians from Camp $\times$ Camp$_i$		-0.002 (0.002)	
Number other Local Politicians from Camp $\times$ Camp$_i$			0.002* (0.001)
Individual FE	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓
Linear Year Trends by Camp	✓	✓	✓
Years	1946-1962	1946-1962	1946-1962
Observations	15,666	15,666	15,666
R^2	0.669	0.652	0.677

Note Results from estimating equation 1.1, additionally controlling for interaction terms between the number of *other* former camp inmates in a respective position in a given year and a dummy that turns 1 for all former camp inmates. Linked to Leading is a dummy indicating whether an individual is linked to a member of the party elite, i.e. a person at least as powerful as someone in the Central Committee, through internment in the same concentration camp in the Nazi era. The outcomes are dummies indicating whether an individual holds the respective position in a given year. Standard errors clustered at camp level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

politicians, obtained through the camp committee network, and had the power to use it to inhibit their careers. Specifically, the behaviour of communists within the camps might have been held against them after 1945. Many inmates collaborated with the Nazis during internment to enhance their chances of survival, and there have been instances were this behavior was brought forward causing the exclusion of individuals from the party or the demotion from their positions.[24]

If leaders possessed damaging information about other communists and used it to prevent their careers, the probability of a party reprimand, exclusion or dismissal from political positions might increase once a person has a link to an important person with the power to remove them. Table 1.9 presents results from running regression 1.1 with either a dummy for getting a party reprimand, a dummy for being excluded from the party, a dummy for being laid-off, or a dummy that pools all of these three events as outcomes. It appears, that having a link to the

[24]The behavior of former inmates in concentration camps was deemed important by the party. For example, when Walter Bartel — a former Buchenwald inmate — became the center of a party inspection in 1953, he was interviewed several times about his behavior in the camp (Niethammer, 1995, pp. 414). He was removed from all political positions in 1953.

party leadership does not increase the probability to be penalized in any of these ways, as none of the specifications returns significant effects.

Table 1.9: Penalties

	Party Reprimand (1)	Party Exclusion (2)	Layoff (3)	Reprimand, Exclusion or Layoff (4)
Linked to Leading	-0.000	-0.002	-0.003	-0.004
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.007)
Individual FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Linear Year Trends by Camp	✓	✓	✓	✓
Years	1946-1962	1946-1962	1946-1962	1946-1962
Observations	15,666	15,666	15,666	15,666
R^2	0.073	0.075	0.231	0.167

Note Results from estimating equation 1.1. The outcomes are dummies indicating whether an individual experiences the respective event in a given year. Linked to Leading is a dummy indicating whether an individual is linked to a member of the party elite, i.e. a person at least as powerful as someone in the Central Committee, through internment in the same concentration camp in the Nazi era. Standard errors clustered at camp level. Significance levels: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

In addition, we also posit that the likelihood of having damaging information should be higher if two individuals were at the same camp at the same time, but as the results in Table 1.6 show, career costs of connections to the leading elite are not higher when individuals were interned jointly with a member of the GDR's political elite. Taken together, the evidence does not support the idea of leading politicians impeding people's careers by using their private information about past misdemeanors to remove corrupted people from the party leadership or preventing them from joining the elite.

1.6.4   WHO ARE THE DECISION MAKERS?

Lastly, we want to confirm that members of the GDR leadership, rather than other groups in the GDR or Soviet leaders, are the decision makers that produce the pattern of elite selection we uncover. First of all, historical evidence speaks against Soviet leaders having more than a controlling function in individual personnel decisions. While indeed, substantial influence was initially granted to the Soviet Military Administration (SMAD), and after 1949 the Soviet Control Commission (SCC) (known as High Commission of the USSR in Germany after 1953) on matters of economic and foreign policy, the Soviets relied heavily on the cooperation with German communists.

Importantly, decisions regarding whom to assign to political posts were made by German communists in the political elite, mostly the Politburo – in agreement with the Soviets (Benser and Krusch, 1994; Kaiser, 1999). This implies that individuals outside of the elite, as for example the former camp inmates themselves, could not influence who would become a member of the elite. It was therefore not possible for former inmates to coordinate and push a single member of their camp network into the elite.

While the Soviet Military Administration had to agree to all personnel decisions made by the GDR elite, they did not seem to have been actively involved in the discussion of these issues. There is no evidence indicating that members of the Soviet Military Administration were present at the meetings of the Politburo, the organ that made all important cadre decisions within the GDR (Amos, 2003, p.48).[25]

Second, we can exploit the decay of Soviet influence over GDR policy over time to test empirically, whether our results also hold in periods without major Soviet control. In 1955, the USSR and the GDR signed a treaty guaranteeing the full sovereignty of the GDR. We rerun equation 1.1, additionally controlling for an interaction term between having a link to the party leadership and a dummy $PostSC_t$ that equals 1 for all years from 1955 onward, thus capturing the years in which the GDR was officially an independent state. As Table 1.10 shows, we do not uncover differential effects of being linked to the party leadership after the GDR was given full sovereignty. Coefficients on the interaction term $LinkedtoLeading_{it} \times PostSC_t$ are small and statistically insignificant, while the baseline coefficients remain unaffected (columns 1 to 4). This result speaks against the claim that the Soviet leadership is responsible for the career trajectories we uncover.

Last, we argue that if decisions were made jointly by the GDR elite and the Soviet elite, this does not invalidate the interpretation of our results: both elites were interested in ensuring the stability of the GDR regime and the functioning of government processes, and therefore in preventing factions to form.

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[25]The only exceptions took place in June and July 1953 after the large uprising in the GDR.

Table 1.10: Potential for German Control

	Position in Hierarchy (1)	Leading (2)	National Politics (3)	Local Politics (4)
Linked to Leading	-0.738**	-0.039**	-0.050***	0.030
	(0.320)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.018)
Linked to Leading × Post SC	-0.319	-0.009	-0.007	0.008
	(0.214)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.020)
Individual FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Linear Year Trends by Camp	✓	✓	✓	✓
Years	1946-1962	1946-1962	1946-1962	1946-1962
Observations	15,666	15,666	15,666	15,666
R^2	0.692	0.669	0.652	0.676

Note Results from estimating equation 1.1, additionally controlling for an interaction between being linked to leading politicians and a dummy indicating all periods after 1955, in which Soviet control ceased and the GDR gained full sovereignty. Hierarchy is a score taking values between 1 and 29, linking jobs to their rank within the official state hierarchy. More powerful positions have higher scores. Outcomes in columns (2) to (4) are dummies indicating whether an individual holds the respective position in a given year. Linked to Leading is a dummy indicating whether an individual is linked to a member of the party elite, i.e. a person at least as powerful as someone in the Central Committee, through internment in the same concentration camp in the Nazi era. Standard errors clustered at camp level. Significance levels: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

1.7   Conclusion

In autocratic states, the selection of political decision makers follows an opaque set of rules. In this paper, we shed light on the role of one potential determinant for elite selection in autocracies, that is links to the state's political leadership. In particular, we examine how being linked to the political elite affects an individual's prospects to hold political power within the state. We study this subject in the context of the socialist GDR regime during its early phase, from 1946 to 1962.

Our analysis is based on a novel, comprehensive dataset consisting entirely of leading communist figures that were active during the Weimar Republic, before the foundation of the GDR was foreseeable. Every individual in our sample that survived World War II was part of the natural pool of talent the GDR could draw from when it set up its state system.

We build our panel dataset by drawing on their detailed CVs and tracking their careers until 1933, their experiences during the Nazi period from 1933 to 1945 and throughout the founding period of the GDR. We ask how links to the GDR party leadership, defined as the top positions including the Central Committee according to an internal hierarchy, affect individuals' probability to be selected for political leadership themselves. As links are usually correlated with individual

characteristics that explain career paths, we exploit quasi-exogenous, predetermined links that were formed through concentration camp internment in the same camp during the Nazi regime.

Links to the leadership affect individuals' careers in two ways: First, when individuals are connected to the political elite of the GDR, they hold lower positions within the state hierarchy, are less likely to be part of the party leadership, and to be active in national politics more broadly. Second, individuals are more likely to be active in county-level politics when they are connected to the party leadership. We intensively investigate possible mechanisms and find that the career patterns uncovered are most consistent with the state party's leadership implementing a policy against factionalism, which is a central feature of communist regimes. Importantly, results are stronger for individuals that have a higher potential for forming factions because they have been to concentration camps for which remembrance committees existed, which allowed former inmates to get together regularly. We rule out that alternative mechanisms play a role for explaining the career pattern we observe: Evidence speaks against general quotas for people with a camp background in the party leadership, or preventing corrupted people to hold powerful positions. Controlling for individual fixed effects and robustness checks showing that camp networks do not pick up shared characteristics that are relevant for political careers assures us that we can interpret our estimates causally.

The results of our paper contribute to the growing literature on the role of networks for political careers. In particular, we establish that the main results by Fisman et al. (2020), who find that connections play a negative role for promotions into the Chinese Politburo, also hold in other settings. They, too find evidence for a connection-penalty and propose prevention of infra-party factions as main mechanism. We contribute to this literature by exploiting a novel natural experiment and by showing that links can have different effects on careers for high and low ranking positions. Thus, to the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to aim at understanding the selection of politicians throughout the entire hierarchy of a new autocratic state exploiting links that are arguably formed exogenously.

Appendices

1.A Data Description

1.A.1 Who is included in the Dataset?

- 1918 Founding Congress participants

- Leading members of the KPD, i.e. members of the Politbureau and the Secretary

- Members of the KPD headquarters

- Members of the district organization

- Members and candidates of the central committee

- German members of international leading communist committees in the Komintern, communist youth international and the union international

- Head of departments in the central committees

- Editors of party organs

- Elected representatives of the KPD on Reichs and Landtags level

- Heads of the mass organisations that belonged to the KPD, such as members of the central committee of the Communist Youth etc.

- Leaders of the illegal KPD after 1933

- Participants of the "Brussels Conference" in October 1935 in Moscow

- Participants of the "Bern Conference" in January and February 1939 close to Paris

- Leading figures of the secret organization

- Some additional well-known German communists that did not hold any official roles, well-known authors etc.

- Socialists that were important in the foundation of the KPD

1.A.2 EXAMPLE CVS

Barthel, Karl:

Born on March 20th 1907 in Lohmen (near Cobitz/county of Prina in Saxony), son of a working class family. Labourer and agricultural worker, then vertical and horizontal lathe operator in Dresden. There, in 1922 he became member of the DMV and the KJVD also in Saxony, between November 1927 and March 1931 administrator of the KJVD in Thuringia, since December 1929 until March 1931 deputy of the state parliament Thuringia. Beginning in June of 1931 Head of the Hesse-Waldeck district party organization, where he replaced Ernst Lohagen as head of office (Polleiter) in November 1931. In July of 1932 he became the youngest member of the German Reichstag (Constituency Hessia-Nassau). Beginning in February of 1933 he became Central Committee Instructor in Halle and Berlin, from August 1933 in lower Silesia. He was arrested on October 28th 1933 in Breslau, sentenced to two and a half years in jail after an eleven months long detention. Between October 1934 and October 1936 imprisoned in Wohlau/Silesia. 1936 transfer to the concentration camp Buchenwald, where he was imprisoned until April 11th in 1945. Starting in July 1945 until the beginning of April 1946, Barthel was the mayor of the city of Jena and afterwards he managed the public utility company (VEB) in Jena until the end of December 1964. After 1945, he was accused of misconduct in prison, and of mistakes in his position as mayor. Nevertheless he led the VVN district executive committee and the VdN district commission Gera as secretary until February 1953. From 1957 to 1962 he was chairman of the district committee of the National Front in Jena, in 1967 he received the VVO in gold. With the help of his wife, he had managed to smuggle out sketches and messages about life in the concentration camp. This resulted in one of the most impressive concentration camp reports in 1946: "Die Welt ohne Erbarmen, Greifenverlag Rudolstadt". Karl Barthel died in Jena on February 21, 1974.

Warnke, Hans:

Born August 15th, 1896 in Hamburg, son of a saddler and roofer. He also learned roofing from 1911 to 1914. In 1914 he became member of the SPD. Between 1914 and 1918 front-line soldier, then member of the Volkswehr in Hamburg. He joined the USPD in 1919 and fled from the troops of General von Lettow-Vorbeck to Güstrow in June 1919, where he worked as a roofer until 1923. There,

he co-founded the local USPD and entered the KPD together with the USPD's left wing at the end of 1920. From 1920 to 1924 and from 1928 to 1931 he was city councilor in Güstrow, since 1923 full-time functionary and actively involved in the preparation of the October uprising in 1923. In January 1924 Warnke was elected to the state parliament of Mecklenburg-Schwerin. He was arrested in August 1924 because of the actions in 1923, and was sentenced to two and a half years in prison in 1925. As a result, he lost his mandate in the state parliament. However, he was elected again in 1926 and released from the Hamburg prison in July 1926. Initially, he worked as an instructor, then from November first, 1926, as head of the district leadership of Mecklenburg. Having been seriously ill since November 1931, he went to the Soviet Union for treatment in April 1932. He was replaced first by Arthur Vogt and then, after his arrest, by Hans Sawadzki. From the summer of 1932, Warnke was the head of the district leadership. From April 13th, 1933 to 1935 in protective custody, then again roofer in Güstrow. Arrested again at the outbreak of the war as a former KPD functionary, he was interned in the concentration camp Sachsenhausen until the end of 1939 and again in July/August 1944. In May 1945 he became mayor of Güstrow. From July 1945 to the end of 1946 he was the first vice President of the Mecklenburg State Administration, then until October 1949 Minister of the Interior of the Mecklenburg State Government and from 1949 to 1952 State Secretary in the GDR Ministry of the Interior. Warnke was a member of the PV and the Central Committee of the SED from 1946 to 1981. In August 1952 he became chairman of the Rostock district council, was criticized several times for deviations from the party line, then dismissed as chairman of the council in May 1959, allegedly due to his state of health and demoted to director of the Rostock port authority. Since 1965 he was emplyed by the Directorate of Maritime Transport and Port Management in Rostock. On the occasion of his 65th birthday he was awarded the Karl Marx Order. Hans Warnke died on January 9th in 1984.

1.A.3   OFFICIAL STATE HIERARCHY

Table 1.A.1: Positions in Official State Hierarchy

Hierarchy Level	Positions
1	First Secretary of the Central Committee and Chairman of the State Council
2	Chairmen of the Council of Ministers of the GDR
3	President of the National Parliament
4	Members and candidates of the Politburo
5	Secretaries and Members of the Secretariat of the Central Committee
6	the President of the National Council of the National Front of the GDR
7	the deputies of the chairmen of the State Council
8	the deputies of the chairmen of the Council of Ministers
9	the chairmen of the block parties (CDU, LDPD, NDPD, DBD)
10	Members and candidates of the Central Committee
11	Members of the Council of Ministers
12	President of the Supreme Court
13	Attorney General
14	Chairmen and deputies of the Presidium of the national Parliament
15	Members of the State Council
16	First Secretaries of the district leaderships of the SED
17	Chairmen of the district councils
18	Vice President of the National Council
19	Chairmen of the mass organizations of the GDR
20	Deputies of the chairmen of the block parties
21	State secretaries with their own competence areas
22	Generals of the armed bodies
23	Heads of central state offices and administrations
24	Secretaries of State
25	Deputy Ministers
26	Chairmen of the Friendship Societies
27	Secretaries of the district leaderships of the SED
28	Deputy chairmen of the district councils
29	everyone else

1.B   Selection into Camps

In this section, we explore potential covariates that are associated with being interned in each of the camps in our dataset. We also show which covariates are related to having a link to the political elite during the sample period.

To estimate which covariates predict in which concentration camp is interned, we run the following regression:

$$Camp_{ij} = \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 X_{i,1933} + \beta_3 Distance_{ij,1933} + \epsilon_{ij}, \qquad (1.3)$$

where $Camp_{ij}$ is a dummy for whether individual i has been to concentration camp j between 1933 and 1945, X_i are individual characteristics, such as gender, age in 1945, whether the place of birth was within the borders of the future GDR, and the year in which i became part of the communist party (KPD). $X_{i,1933}$ are individual characteristics in the beginning of 1933 before the Reichtag fire in February 1933[26], such as whether i was an elected politican, worker, unemployed, in prison, working in the media sector, member of a communist organization or the SPD in 1933. In addition, we add controls that capture where i lived in 1933: a dummy whether i was living in Berlin, a dummy whether i was abroad and latitude and longitude of i's location in 1933. We also add the distance to the closest concentration camp that existed between 1933 and 1945 based on i's location in 1933.

Results are presented in Figure 1.B.1.

We rerun equation 1.3 using a dummy whether an individual ever has a link to someone in the leading elite between 1946 and 1962 as the dependent variable. Results are shown in Table 1.B.1.

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[26]If we did not find any information for January or February 1933, we use the latest available information before.

Figure 1.B.1: Selection Into Camps

(a) Abroad 1933

(b) Age in 1945

(c) In Berlin 1933

(d) Born in Area of GDR

(e) In Communist Organization 1933

(f) In Media, 1933

(g) Unemployed, 1933

(h) Elected Politician, 1933

Selection Into Camps, continued

(i) In Prison, 1933

(j) In SPD, 1933

(k) Worker, 1933

(l) Distance to Camp, 1933

(m) Female

(n) Year KPD Entry

The graphs plot the coefficients of estimating equation 1.3 (Appendix). Each point represents the result for a specific concentration camp with 95 percent confidence intervals.

Table 1.B.1: Individual Characteristics and Treatment

| | Ever Linked to Leading | | | |
| | All Individuals | | Former Inmates | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Age 1945	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Female	-0.137	-0.137	-0.015	-0.020
	(0.122)	(0.123)	(0.085)	(0.084)
Born in Area of GDR	0.037	0.038	0.007	0.015
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.036)
KPD Entry Year	0.000*	0.000*	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Elected Politican 1933	0.323***	0.321***	0.084	0.097*
	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.055)	(0.054)
Worker 1933	0.059	0.060	0.011	0.009
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Unemployed 1933	-0.034	-0.036	-0.098	-0.091
	(0.125)	(0.123)	(0.297)	(0.289)
In Prison 1933	0.173	0.172	-0.193	-0.195
	(0.182)	(0.182)	(0.233)	(0.238)
In Media 1933	0.007	0.005	-0.043	-0.035
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.058)	(0.056)
In Communist Organization 1933	0.105*	0.106*	0.042	0.047
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.044)	(0.044)
In SPD 1933	0.195	0.195	0.216**	0.213**
	(0.167)	(0.167)	(0.090)	(0.089)
In Berlin 1933	-0.055	-0.053	0.028	0.087
	(0.055)	(0.053)	(0.047)	(0.057)
Abroad 1933	-0.140	-0.105	-0.125	-0.306
	(0.089)	(0.083)	(0.262)	(0.271)
Latitude 1933	-0.001	-0.005	0.011	0.007
	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Longitude 1933	0.000	0.001	0.005	-0.010
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.009)
Distance to closest Camp 1933		-0.000		0.001*
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Observations	1,027	1,027	341	341
R^2	0.127	0.127	0.050	0.071

Note Results from estimating equation 1.3. The dependent variable is a dummy that indicates whether an individual has been to the same camp as someone that is part of the leading elite between 1946 and 1962. Standard errors clustered at camp level. Significance levels: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

1.C   ROBUSTNESS

1.C.1   DIFFERENT STANDARD ERRORS

Table 1.C.1: Robustness: Different Standard Errors

	Position in Hierarchy (1)	Leading (2)	National Politics (3)	Local Politics (4)
Linked to Leading	-0.797	-0.041	-0.051	0.032
Longest Camp Cluster	(0.342)**	(0.017)**	(0.016)***	(0.017)*
Individual Cluster	(0.313)**	(0.016)**	(0.017)***	(0.017)*
Place 1933 Cluster	(0.246)***	(0.014)***	(0.015)***	(0.014)**
Bootstrap	(0.171)***	(0.008)***	(0.009)***	(0.013)**
Individual FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Linear Year Trends by Camp	✓	✓	✓	✓
Years	1946-1960	1946-1960	1946-1960	1946-1960
Observations	14,526	14,526	14,526	14,526

Note Results from estimating equation 1.1. Hierarchy is a score taking values between 1 and 29, linking jobs to their rank within the official state hierarchy. More powerful positions have higher scores. Outcomes in columns (2) to (4) are dummies indicating whether an individual holds the respective position in a given year. Linked to Leading is a dummy indicating whether an individual is linked to a member of the party elite, i.e. a person at least as powerful as someone in the Central Committee, through internment in the same concentration camp in the Nazi era. Standard errors clustered at camp-level (longest internment), inmate-level, and place 1933-level. Bootstrap results are from sampling individuals with replacement, performing 1000 repetitions. Significance levels: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

1.C.2   DIFFERENT SAMPLE PERIODS

Table 1.C.2: Links and Career Trajectories, Sample Years

	Position in Hierarchy (1)	Leading (2)	National Politics (3)	Local Politics (4)
Panel A: 1946-1965				
Linked to Leading	-0.595**	-0.024*	-0.031**	0.035***
	(0.265)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.011)
Observations	17,785	17,785	17,785	17,785
R^2	0.694	0.673	0.655	0.677
Panel B: 1946-1970				
Linked to Leading	-0.431**	-0.014	-0.018*	0.039***
	(0.203)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Observations	20,799	20,799	20,799	20,799
R^2	0.699	0.681	0.657	0.679
Panel C: 1946-1980				
Linked to Leading	-0.437**	-0.014	-0.017*	0.039***
	(0.173)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Observations	24,704	24,704	24,704	24,704
R^2	0.720	0.708	0.669	0.684
Panel D: 1946-1989				
Linked to Leading	-0.419**	-0.013	-0.016*	0.036***
	(0.172)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Observations	26,479	26,479	26,479	26,479
R^2	0.724	0.707	0.679	0.694
Individual FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Linear Year Trends by Camp	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note Results from estimating equation 1.1 with different sample years. Hierarchy is a score taking values between 1 and 29, linking jobs to their rank within the official state hierarchy. More powerful positions have higher scores. Outcomes in columns (2) to (4) are dummies indicating whether an individual holds the respective position in a given year. Linked to Leading is a dummy indicating whether an individual is linked to a member of the party elite, i.e. a person at least as powerful as someone in the Central Committee, through internment in the same concentration camp in the Nazi era. Standard errors clustered at camp level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

1.C.3   Discarding Camp Networks

Figure 1.C.1: Discarding Links from individual Camps

(a) Position in Hierarchy

(b) Leading

(c) National Politics

(d) Local Politics

Note: Results from running equation 1.1, iteratively setting all links stemming from a specific camp to zero. Baseline results are shown as a triangle, the results from the regressions where links are set to zero with dots. 95 percent confidence intervals in light gray, 10 percent confidence intervals in dark gray.

1.C.4   OTHER LINKS

Table 1.C.3: Camp Links and Other Links

	Position in Hierarchy (1)	Leading (2)	National Politics (3)	Local Politics (4)
Panel A: Baseline Results				
Camp Link to Leading	-0.797**	-0.041**	-0.051***	0.032*
	(0.342)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)
R^2	0.692	0.669	0.652	0.676
Panel B: Exile 1933-1945				
Camp Link to Leading	-0.796**	-0.041**	-0.051***	0.032*
	(0.341)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Exile Link to Leading	0.183	0.008	0.009	-0.011
	(0.217)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.010)
R^2	0.692	0.669	0.652	0.676
Panel C: Location 1933				
Camp Link to Leading	-0.759**	-0.039**	-0.049***	0.031*
	(0.328)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.017)
Location 1933 Link to Leading	-0.407	-0.017	-0.023	0.009
	(0.276)	(0.010)	(0.017)	(0.011)
R^2	0.692	0.669	0.653	0.676
Panel D: Position 1933				
Camp Link to Leading	-0.809**	-0.041**	-0.051***	0.032*
	(0.342)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Position 1933 Link to Leading	-0.397*	-0.009	-0.013	-0.004
	(0.216)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.013)
R^2	0.692	0.669	0.652	0.676
Panel E: Year of Birth				
Camp Link to Leading	-0.794**	-0.041**	-0.051***	0.032*
	(0.342)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Year of Birth Link to Leading	0.063	0.004	-0.006	0.003
	(0.101)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.007)
R^2	0.692	0.669	0.652	0.676
Panel F: Place of Birth				
Camp Link to Leading	-0.797**	-0.041**	-0.051***	0.032*
	(0.343)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Place of Birth Link to Leading	-0.252***	-0.011***	-0.012	-0.008
	(0.063)	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.006)
R^2	0.692	0.669	0.652	0.676
Panel G: KPD Entry Year				
Camp Link to Leading	-0.803**	-0.041**	-0.051***	0.032*
	(0.343)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)
KPD Entry Link to Leading	-0.580**	-0.016	-0.029*	0.024*
	(0.267)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.014)
R^2	0.693	0.669	0.653	0.676
Individual FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Linear Year Trends by Camp	✓	✓	✓	✓
Years	1946-1962	1946-1962	1946-1962	1946-1962
Observations	15,666	15,666	15,666	15,666

Note Results from estimating equation 1.1. Each panel includes one additional link to the party leadership, stemming from shared characteristics. Hierarchy is a score taking values between 1 and 29, linking jobs to their rank within the official state hierarchy. More powerful positions have higher scores. Outcomes in columns (2) to (4) are dummies indicating whether an individual holds the respective position in a given year. Linked to Leading is a dummy indicating whether an individual is linked to a member of the party elite, i.e. a person at least as powerful as someone in the Central Committee, through internment in the same concentration camp in the Nazi era. Standard errors clustered at camp level. Significance levels: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Chapter 2

I Advocate, Therefore I Am?
Politicians' Response to Activism by Disenfranchised Groups

2.1 Introduction

Politicians make concessions to secure their electoral support. This notion is at the heart of Downs's (1957) seminal model of electoral competition, that has been foundational for modern political economy.[1] As laid out in both theoretical work and empirical studies, politicians also yield to demands when they face the threat of a revolution.[2] However, do politicians react to citizens' demands even when there are no direct incentives to do so, that is, when demands are neither backed by votes nor convey a revolutionary threat? In this paper, I investigate this question by turning to a historical sample case for activism that does not pose a threat – neither through the ballot box, nor the possibility of a revolution.

The women's movement in the German Empire (1871-1918) constitutes an ideal testing ground to study this subject: In this time, women became politically engaged actors, advocating for the improvement of welfare provisions and the enhancement of women's educational and occupational opportunities. By the conclusion of the German Empire, a substantial social movement had formed, comprising approximately 600,000 mobilized women. At the same time, women were excluded from franchise and were not anticipated to gain suffrage in the near future. Notably, unlike British suffragettes German women did not employ violent tactics to further their causes.

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[1]See Ansolabehere (2008) for a discussion of the contributions, limitations, and advancements of Downs (1957).

[2]For instance, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) have conceptualized how, when faced with the threat of a revolution, franchise extensions can help the elite to credibly commit to concessions. This model has been put to an empirical test by Aidt and Jensen (2014), who find evidence supporting this theory.

In this context, I present micro-level evidence on the responsiveness of elected representatives to women's activism via an analysis of parliamentary debates. I find that politicians are receptive to women's advocacy which implies that they do respond to civic activism, even when such activism does not pose a direct threat to their power.

Variation in politicians' exposure to women's activism stems from a reform of the association laws of the German Empire. The Imperial Association Law (IAL) came into effect in May 1908 and granted women across the entire Empire the right to organize in political associations and to take part in the political discourse. Prior to the reform, female political activism was subject to different legal regulations in the various territories of the Empire: while women could freely engage in political activities in some of the German federal states, they were prohibited from engaging in the political sphere in others. The IAL eliminated these disparities and opened up the political arena for women in previously restrictive states. Depending on which constituency a politician represents in parliament, the law induced a shift in their exposure to women's political activism, which creates an opportunity to study their response via parliamentary speech.

I employ a Difference-in-Differences in reverse framework to compare the content of parliamentary speeches delivered by representatives from districts where women's political organizational rights underwent changes, i.e. were liberalized, to those from districts where such rights remained unchanged, both before and after the legal reform. Note that since disparate legal regulations on women's activism exist *prior* to the IAL, any differences in speech content between representatives are expected to arise *before* the reform and should vanish once the IAL levels the political playing field for women across states.

I find that women's activism translates into the political discourse: elected representatives from constituencies that impose restrictions on female advocacy mention women and their concerns less in their parliamentary speeches, compared to both their speeches after the restrictions have been lifted and the trajectory of those representatives from constituencies without such restrictions throughout.

In the national parliament each electoral district was represented by a single elected official, who held speeches to address current issues, draft legislation, and decide on government expenditures. I track the attention given to women and the issues they advocate for at the representative-level through an analysis of

their parliamentary speeches. To do so, I compile a novel dataset that combines information from several historical sources. I construct a speech corpus, i.e. a dataset of text transcriptions, of all speeches delivered by representatives in the national parliament of the German Empire between 1899 and 1914. Using information from biographical handbooks, I link each speaker to the electoral district they represent and thus assess their potential exposure to female political activism.

While bans on female political activism are in place, representatives of affected electoral districts are on average 4.8 percentage points less likely to mention women in their speeches and 4.1 percentage points less likely to address issues central to women's activism, as identified through contemporary documents, compared to after the lifting of restrictions and relative to representatives from districts where women are always free to express their political demands.

I uncover heterogeneities in politicians' responses to changes in women's activism that point towards underlying political economy mechanisms. The results show that politicians, who in their careers are not only members of the national parliament, but hold a mandate in a state (local) parliament at some point, are more receptive to changes in women's activism. This is possibly explained by their increased involvement, better understanding, and interest in local politics and their resulting knowledge of the activities of local organizations. Additionally, representatives with a more secure electoral majority are more receptive to women's activism, which speaks to their greater willingness or ability to take political risks by addressing the demands of non-voters, as opposed to exclusively catering to their electorate. Interestingly, the results do not indicate any heterogeneity based on partisan affiliation.

To strengthen the claim that the relationship detected is indeed driven by women's political activism, I present several pieces of evidence. First, numerous historical accounts convey that when subject to bans, women were less outspoken about their demands to avoid legal repercussions. Second, I hand-collect and digitize novel micro-data on the spread of the women's movement throughout the German Empire. Exploiting the same law reform, I show that bans are associated with fewer women's associations being founded, fewer women organizing in associations and fewer women members of the Social Democratic Party. A final test reveals a significant negative association between restrictions on fe-

male activism and the likelihood of representatives mentioning both women and the word "petition" in the same speech, the term "women's association", and the term "Frauenfrage" (*issue of women's rights*). Taken together, this evidence lends support to the claim that the relationship between changes in association laws and representatives' speeches is driven by IAL-induced variation in female activism.

I estimate the relationship of interest by comparing the change in speech content of representatives from districts that have bans on women's political activism in place and have them lifted due to the IAL, to the change in speech content of representatives of districts where women could freely express their political point of view throughout the study period. The panel structure of my data allows me to control for numerous sources of omitted variable bias that are captured by speaker and time fixed effects, respectively. Since representatives can change the district they represent, I am additionally able to control for electoral district fixed effects. I confirm that my results are not spuriously driven by representatives strategically changing districts to avoid (or encounter) women's activism.

A challenge to identifying the causal effect of activism in this setting is the additional possibility that, independent of differences in exposure to activism, speakers representing districts in restrictive states are on different (political) trends. For example, locations that have initially imposed restrictions on women and lift them due to the IAL could be expected to experience a stronger liberalization trajectory compared to locations that have always had liberal laws for women. First, such an underlying process would result in finding a positive relationship, as the "catch-up" of formerly more restrictive locations would be reflected in representatives discussing the topics women are concerned with *more* than representatives of locations that are more progressive throughout. Second, my model accounts for different trends depending on the level of conservatism of the constituency speakers represent, the district's religious denomination, the share of workers employed in the industrial sector, and the size of the workforce. Hence, I abstract from the potential effect of these pre-determined characteristics that might result in different trends of representatives' speech content, even absent of different association laws. Third, I do not find that the relationship uncovered also holds when considering topics of public welfare in general, not specific to women, which speaks against latent trends in discussing social matters driving the results. Fourth, the results still hold when controlling for linear trends

based on those speaker characteristics that are found to differ between treated and control regions.

I conduct sensitivity analyses and confirm that my results are stable with regard to dropping speakers or electoral districts from my sample. My results also do not depend on an exact specification of words used to capture speech related to women or the topics they are invested in.

My work is related to several strands of the literature. First, I aim to contribute to our understanding of the factors driving politicians' actions while in office. Related literature has for instance shown that politicians react to the extension of the electorate by allocating resources to the newly enfranchised (Moehling and Thomasson, 2012; Sabet and Winter, 2019). Politicians' effort exerted in office is partly explained by their pay (Ferraz and Finan, 2011; Gagliarducci and Nannicini, 2013), as well as term limits (Dal Bó and Rossi, 2011; Titiunik, 2016; Fouirnaies and Hall, 2022). Term limits also seem to have a positive effect on the alignment of the policies implemented by politicians with their individual preferences (Smart and Sturm, 2013). Perhaps most related to my work are papers examining the role of constituents' preferences for politicians' voting behavior on bills (Aidt and Franck, 2019; Aidt, Grey, and Savu, 2021). I add to this literature by providing evidence in line with activism shaping how politicians exercise their mandate, not only in high-stakes decisions but continuously in their day-to-day work.

Second, I add to existing literature on the impact of social movements in general (Campbell, 2023; Levy and Mattsson, 2023) and in particular, to our understanding of how social movements alter political outcomes (Madestam et al., 2013; Mazumder, 2018; Casanueva, 2023). Several studies have thereby focused on the role of violence for success in attaining concessions (Huet-Vaughn, 2020; Wasow, 2020). A large share of research in this area has focused on how social movements affect voting decisions of the population, whereas I look at the decisions made by politicians.

My paper also contributes to the literature that seeks to understand the achievements made in women's pursuit to equality and autonomy over the past centuries. Medical advancements such as access to birth control and maternal care (Goldin and Katz, 2002; Albanesi and Olivetti, 2016), as well as technological improvements in household appliances (Coen-Pirani, León, and Lugauer, 2010)

have enabled women to pursue education and professional careers. The rise of the service sector, since women have a comparative advantage in mental over physical labor, has further enhanced women's participation in the labor market (Ngai and Petrongolo, 2017; Rendall, 2017). Similar to my work, papers have looked at women's advancement from a different perspective than their labor market participation. Bühler, Vollmer, and Wimmer (2023) attribute women's access to education to their probability to be acknowledged as influential and Bargain, Boutin, and Champeaux (2019) establish the empowering effect of women's political participation on their agency and decision-making power. My research indicates that women's involvement in political activism has played a role in extending their influence in public affairs.

Lastly, this paper is related to the literature exploring parliamentary speech as a rich source to study historical political processes (Spirling, 2016; Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Taddy, 2019; Gennaro and Ash, 2022; Hanlon, 2022). I contribute to this strand of literature by proposing speech as a measure of politicians' receptiveness to the demands of their constituents.

The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 provides the historical background about the national parliament in the German Empire, the German women's movement and the law reform I exploit. Section 2.3 presents the various historical data sources that have been used for compiling the dataset. Section 2.4 outlines the empirical strategy for examining the association between the law reform and changes in the political discourse and presents the results. Sections 2.5 and 2.6 explore the heterogeneity and robustness of the results. Section 2.7 presents historical and quantitative evidence for the impeding effect of bans on women's political engagement, thus lending support for the proposed channel. Section 2.8 concludes.

2.2   HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

2.2.1   REICHSTAG IN THE GERMAN EMPIRE

The German Empire, established in 1871, was a federation of the 25 individual German states and the Imperial Territory of Alsace-Lorraine. The Empire was a constitutional monarchy with three constitutional bodies: the government of the German Empire (*Reichsleitung*), the national parliament (*Reichstag*), and the

Federal Assembly (*Bundesrat*).

The German Emperor was head of government and appointed senior government personnel. Most crucially, he appointed the chancellor of the Empire, whom he delegated the Empire's executive affairs to.

The national parliament was the only imperial institution that consisted of elected representatives. Every electoral district was represented by a single member of parliament, that was elected directly by universal suffrage for male citizens over the age of 25.[3] The national parliament held two significant powers, namely, setting the budget and sharing legislative authority with the Federal Assembly.[4]

Although the national parliament could not directly determine the overall political direction, it held substantial power in the Empire. The budget debate in the national parliament frequently served as a platform for discussions on all government actions, making it a powerful tool for representatives. Also, as government action required legislative reform and thus relied on parliamentary majority, the Reichstag had significant political influence by threatening to withdraw support for policies. The Reichstag was as a central player in imperial politics alongside the chancellor, particularly in the post-Bismarck era, and was widely recognized as such. Members of parliament were targeted by various interest groups that hoped to influence decisions (Nipperdey, 2013).

The duration of legislative periods ranged from 3 to 5 years and they were divided into two sessions and several session segments, respectively. The length of session segments varied between 5 and 7 months and they were followed by a recess of several months. Usually, discussions about a particular issue spanned multiple plenary sittings within the same session segment and during a given session segment, the Reichstag aimed to enact a specific set of laws.[5]

The content of parliamentary debates provides valuable insights into whether women's ideas are echoed in the political debate and the potential for improving

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[3]Passive voting rights were also exclusively granted to men, which is why all representatives in parliament are male.

[4]The Federal Assembly, comprised of envoys from state governments, was the representative body of the Empire's member states. Its consent was necessary to pass laws and it could draft legislation. In practice, it was primarily concerned with issues of administrative federalism and played a decreasing role over time, especially after Chancellor von Bismarck's dismissal.

[5]For instance in the beginning of the parliamentary sitting on November 29, 1904, the parliament's president lists all laws that are supposed to be enacted in the coming session-segment (Reichstag des Deutschen Reichs, 1898-1918).

their status in society. During the 19th and early 20th century, gender inequality was deeply embedded in legislation. For instance, women were not allowed to study at universities, girls had no right to formal secondary education, women did not have independent control over property and were not allowed to vote.[6] The national parliament was the primary institution responsible for enacting legislation and the degree of debate on particular issues within it arguably is an indicator of potential legislative changes. Consistent with this reasoning, Hanlon (2022) analyses UK parliamentary records from 1810 to 2005 and finds that when topics are discussed more extensively, it is more likely that laws are passed in the corresponding areas. Moreover, government spending was discussed in the Reichstag's budget debates. Since women placed emphasis on the importance of public spending for welfare projects,[7] budgetary debates shed light on the extend to which women's preferences are considered in the political discourse, too.

2.2.2   Women's Activism

Throughout the existence of the German Empire, women did not have the right to vote and were thus excluded from institutionalized political participation. However, the year 1865 and the founding of the German Women's Association (*Allgemeiner Deutscher Frauenverein*) marked the starting point of the German women's movement.

Women activists articulated and publicized their propositions and demands by hosting events and rallies. Members of women's associations also sought to transport their ideas to the parliament by drafting petitions. "Many of the debates on women's rights that took place in the state parliaments and the Reichstag were based on petitions from the ranks of the women's associations" (Wischermann, 2003, p. 211). Over time, the movement fragmented into a working-class and a middle-class branch, because the interests of organized women differed along these lines. Proletarian women considered the social problems associated with their class as first order concern. Therefore, they integrated into the workers' movement and the Social Democratic Party and pressed for female-specific interests like maternity protection or fighting against wage discrimination (Pauls,

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[6]A sobering overview of areas where women lacked rights can be found in Lange (1912).

[7]Not only do historical accounts about women's organizations in the German Empire clearly reflect this (see Section 2.2.2) but this is also a well-established fact in the literature. See for instance Abrams and Settle (1999), Aidt and Dallal (2008), Miller (2008), and Moehling and Thomasson (2012).

1966).

The middle-class women's movement, which was non-partisan, advocated for expanding social services and social security systems and sought greater influence of the female sex in the public sphere, particularly in the matters of public welfare, family, and education. The vast majority of active women in the movement believed that women had particular maternal instincts. Therefore, they argued, society would benefit from female involvement in these "natural" areas of women's work (Lange, 1912). Another core concern of middle-class women was expanding educational and occupational opportunities of girls and women through gaining the right to study at universities or girls' access to secondary schooling.

Only a select group of women in the movement, namely the "radicals" or "emancipated" women, believed in the idea that women deserve equal rights and influence in society as a matter of justice. The majority of organized women distanced themselves from the so-called "emancipated" women (Pauls, 1966). This hesitance towards more progressive ideas is also reflected in the circumstance that for a long time, the demand for female suffrage was only a fringe topic within the women's movement (Kaplan, 1979). The fight for women's suffrage began only in 1902 in the radical branch of the movement and gained popularity among organized women slowly, with the national umbrella organization of women's suffrage associations having around 10,000 members by 1918. Around that time, the umbrella association of German women's associations (*Bund Deutscher Frauenvereine*) counted more than 600.000 members (Wischermann, 2003; Bund Deutscher Frauenvereine, 1917).

The women's movement rested on two pillars. Firstly, famous pioneers like Anita Augspurg, Minna Cauer, or Clara Zetkin formulated ideas on how to improve society more broadly and women's lives in particular. They spread their views throughout the Empire by holding speeches and by publishing articles in the women's press, i.e. newspapers edited by them. These pioneers became icons within the movement and their work was important for mobilizing women to join. Secondly, local women's associations formed in numerous municipalities and spread the movement across the German Empire. Agnes Zahn-Harnack, a protagonist of the movement, highlighted the importance of the local associations when she noted that the movement came to life in its local associations (cited after Wischermann, 2003, p. 117). Local women's associations were engaged and

present in their respective communities. For instance, they organized educational courses for women, ran alcohol-free taverns to fight alcoholism, they operated information offices for female job-seekers, provided legal assistance to women, or awarded scholarships to female students (Bund Deutscher Frauenvereine, 1913; Bund Deutscher Frauenvereine, 1917).

The movement continued to grow until the Nazis came to power in 1933. The regime put a halt on its activities, since Nazi ideology forced women into domesticity rather than allowing them to play a significant role in the public sphere. Thereby, many of the movement's accomplishments were reversed (Wiggershaus, 1984).

2.2.3   The Imperial Association Law

Since the 1850s, the individual states that in 1871 formed the German Empire had different laws regulating associations and public assemblies, which originated from the reaction era following the German Revolution of 1848. The revolution had brought to light popular politicisation for the first time and in response, rulers regulated public gatherings and people's ability to connect in associations.

The state laws differed in various dimensions, one of them being whether women were allowed to participate in political associations, join parties, and to publicly discuss political matters. Hence, in some states women were barred from political activities, and the term "political" was narrowly interpreted as encompassing all endeavors that aimed towards changes in the societal status quo (Schultze, 1973). For women in these states it was therefore effectively impossible to campaign for change without risking penalties, such as the dissolution of associations, fines, or even imprisonment (Ball, [1907] 2020; Gerhard and Wischermann, 1990).

This is exemplified by the case of a Berlin-based association of working-class women, which was dissolved because its members had protested against the sewing thread tariff. The incident was sufficient to label the organization as political (Hinsberg, 1898). A similar case can be found in Cologne in 1902, where the Women's Craft Association was dissolved as a consequence of the chairwoman's advocacy for a reduction in women's working hours (Schultze, 1973). Another example for women's associations being prosecuted for their "political" behavior is the women's association *Sonntagsruhe* (Sunday Rest), whose chairwoman was legally charged owing to an invited speaker's address on the issues of prostitution

and the rights of illegitimate children (Gerhard and Wischermann, 1990). Although the impact of prohibitive association laws was felt much more severely by working-class women, the possibility of dissolution always loomed over middle-class women's associations as well (Hinsberg, 1898; Huber-Sperl, 2004).

At the same time, women in other states were permitted to engage in political activism through joining parties or by forming and participating in associations that discussed political issues. Aiming to avoid such unequal legal treatment of citizens across states, the Empire's constitution had actually stipulated uniformity in association laws. Uncertainty about the Empire's jurisdiction over public assemblies however caused disagreement and prevented progress in the pursuit towards an Imperial Association Law. It wasn't until the "Bülow-Block", a coalition of conservatives and liberals around chancellor von Bülow, finally addressed the law reform in 1908 (Delius, 1908).

The Imperial Association Law (IAL) took effect in May 1908 and shifted political activism by women. By granting women across the German Empire the right to participate in political parties and form associations with political objectives, the IAL effectively lifted restrictions on women's political involvement in those states that had previously prohibited such activities. However, women in other states did not experience changes in their rights to initiate or participate in political agitation. For the list of German states and information on the IAL's respective impact on women's political rights, refer to Appendix Table 2.A.1. It is noteworthy, that not restricting women's ability to organize politically in the new Imperial Association Law was not subject to controversy among representatives in parliament. The aspects that did cause controversy were restrictions imposed on other groups, i.e. minors and ethnic minorities.

2.3   DATA AND MEASUREMENT

My aim is to understand whether a representative's exposure to activism influences the execution of their political mandate. Variation in exposure to advocacy stems from whether or not a member of parliament represents a constituency where women undergo a change in their political organizational rights due to the IAL. Each representative is linked to his electoral district by using information on speakers' characteristics and careers. To assess the influence of female advocacy on individual politicians, I consider speeches delivered by representatives in

parliament.

Summary statistics for the measures used in my analyses are presented in Appendix Table 2.B.1 and report the means and standard deviations grouped by treatment status along with the differences in means and their significance levels. The level differences pointed out are taken into account in the main specification and are further addressed in robustness checks (Section 2.6).

2.3.1   PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES IN THE REICHSTAG

I draw on the transcribed parliamentary protocols of the German Reichstag (Reichstag des Deutschen Reichs, 1898-1918) and transform them into a speaker-level panel dataset covering all plenary sittings during legislative periods 10 to 13.[8] The transcribed protocols have been made accessible online by the Bavarian State Library and an excerpt is provided in Appendix Figure 2.B.3.

I have extracted the individual speeches of each plenary sitting from the protocols and matched them to the respective speaker, while the date of the speech, i.e. the plenary sitting, was mapped into its corresponding session segment and the legislative period's session. This provides the temporal structure to the dataset; for more information see Appendix Table 2.A.3. Session segments are between 5 and 7 months long and are followed by a recess period of several months. Discussions on a particular topic were usually spread across several plenary sittings within the same session segment, and related proposals were voted upon within the same session segment as well. Each legislative period was divided into two sessions, that comprised multiple session segments, respectively.

I exclude speeches by the President and the Vice-Presidents of the parliament to discard procedural speeches. I furthermore exclude speeches by envoys of the Federal Assembly, who sometimes appear in the national parliament to make reports, as they are not elected representatives of any electoral district.

In order to gauge representatives' receptiveness to women's activism, I begin by employing a simple strategy of categorizing their speeches based on whether or not they reference women or girls. This approach aims to capture whether a representative takes into account the impact of policies on female citizens or

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[8]Legislative period 10 starts in December 1898 and legislative period 13 concludes in 1918. I exclude the war years from my analysis, as during WW I, the parliament held very few and irregular sessions.

discusses their perspectives. To do so, I specify words that capture the mentioning of women and girls, like woman/women (*Frau(en)*) or girl(s) (*Mädchen*) and determine whether one of these words was used in a given speech. The dictionary of terms used for classification is presented in Appendix Table 2.A.2. In Section 2.6.1, I confirm that my results are not sensitive to my exact choice of dictionary words.

With the intention to more systematically capture speakers' receptiveness to women's political activism, I rely on the yearbooks of the women's movement that contain association statues and articles about their activities (see Section 2.3.4 for details). I identify the core areas of their activism, namely charity/public welfare, education and female employment and the terms commonly used in these contexts. To capture references to women's political advocacy in speeches, I create dictionaries containing these terms. Again, Appendix Table 2.A.2 presents the dictionaries and in Section 2.6.1, I present evidence confirming that my results are not sensitive to the exact choice of terms.

2.3.2   MP's and Electoral District's Characteristics

I link speakers in parliament to the electoral district they represent using biographical handbooks about the members of the German Empire's parliament. These have been published in Best and Schröder (1992) and made accessible online as a database via *ParlamentarierPortal*. Having web-scraped this database, I obtain information about the political career of each member of parliament and crucially, which electoral district they represent in a given legislative period. By linking each representative to his electoral district, I assess whether he is potentially exposed to female political activism prior to the enactment of the IAL. The database further contains details on whether representatives hold a mandate in a regional parliament at any point, which faction they are affiliated with and the vote share they have obtained in the elections. I use these speaker characteristics in heterogeneity analyses.

In addition, I use data on electoral district attributes from Schmädeke (2001). Specifically, I obtain population size in 1895, the share of Catholics within the population in 1890, and the share of workers employed in the industry in 1895. I augment this information by producing a shapefile of the Confederation of the

Rhine with borders of 1812[9] to determine for each electoral district whether it has been part of the confederation. The Rhine Confederation was a coalition of German states that existed between 1806 and 1813. The member states implemented a series of reforms to modernize their institutions, taking inspiration from the French model. Having been member of the Confederation of the Rhine serves as a proxy for liberalism. The underlying map to create the shapefile is taken from Stier (1969).

2.3.3   Association Laws

The empirical strategy of this paper relies on state-level changes in the laws regulating women's political activism. Therefore, I assess for each of the 26 German states whether the association and assembly laws that were in place prior to the IAL have restricted women's political engagement or not and thus, whether the IAL has liberalized women's ability to be politically active. To do so, I draw on the state's legislative texts regarding assemblies and associations, that are compiled in Ball ([1907] 2020). Appendix Table 2.A.1 lists the German states and provides information on whether the IAL caused a change for women's ability to engage in political activism, or not.

2.3.4   Women's Activism

I argue that the IAL has shifted women's political activism in regions with previously restrictive regulations, which in turn changed representatives' exposure to female advocacy. To support this claim, I draw on various data sources and measure the regional extent of the middle-class women's movement as well as of working-class women over time.

To quantify middle-class women's activism, I hand-collect data on women's organizations from association registers published in different yearbooks of the middle-class women's movement.[10] Crucially, these list local women's associations with their names and locations. See Appendix Figure 2.B.2 for an example entry. I map these into their respective electoral district, which results in an electoral district level panel dataset spanning the years 1901, 1908, 1912 and 1916. The

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[9]1812 is the year closest to the start of my sample period for which a map on the Confederation of the Rhine was readily available.

[10]Günther (1901), Wegner (1908), Bund Deutscher Frauenvereine (1913), and Bund Deutscher Frauenvereine (1917).

regional dissemination of the middle-class women's movement throughout the German Empire is depicted in Figure 2.1. While by 1901, associations have been established only in some electoral districts (panel a), by 1916 the movement has permeated almost every electoral district in the Empire (panel b).

Figure 2.1: Spatial Distribution of the Middle-Class Women's Movement

(a) 1901   (b) 1916

Note The maps show the German Empire with electoral district borders. The map on the left plots the number of middle-class women's associations in 1901, i.e. the first year for which data is available, and the map on the right plots the number of middle-class women's associations in 1916, i.e. the latest year for which I have data available.

The association registers I rely on may not accurately represent women's actual level of political organization. Potentially, women organized secretly in areas where political activism by women was banned before the enactment of the IAL. This however does not introduce measurement problems in my setting, as the focus of this paper lies on the degree of women's political activism that was observable to the representative in parliament. It is unlikely, that confidential women-led political organizations would have made themselves known to their representatives. As long as my measurement of female political activism aligns with the knowledge of parliament representatives, the data I use are a suitable indicator.

I complement data from the yearbooks of the middle-class women's movement with official government statistics (Meyer, 1909; Reichsarbeitsministerium, 1910), as they contain information on the number of female members organized in women's associations. These data are available for the beginning of 1908, i.e.

just before the enactment of the IAL, and 1910 and they are reported on the state level, except for Prussia that reports data on the province level.

For information on the regional extent of political participation by working-class women, i.e. the second branch of the women's movement, I draw on membership records of the Social Democratic Party for the years 1907 to 1914. The number of female party members per year and party-district are published in Fricke (1962). I have digitized these records and determined whether a particular party-district lies within a state that has restrictive laws on women's political activism in place before the IAL, or not.

2.4   POLITICIAN'S RESPONSE TO WOMEN'S AC-TIVISM

To evaluate whether politicians are receptive to women's political activism, I quantify the association between a representative's exposure to women's political activism and the content of their parliamentary speeches. The treatment group comprises speakers representing electoral districts where bans on women's political activism were previously imposed and lifted in May 1908 by the IAL. The control group comprises speakers representing districts where women were permitted to organize politically throughout the entire period of investigation, i.e. where women's right to do so was not changed by the IAL.

In my regression analysis, I compare the change in speech content before and after the IAL between speakers of the treatment group and speakers of the control group. The identifying assumption is that their speeches would have developed in parallel in the absence of differences in the association laws, conditional on my set of control variables. Formally, I estimate the following Difference-in-Differences in reverse regression equation:[11]

$$Y_{idst} = \beta \cdot BanArea_d \times BansInPlace_s + \alpha_i + \gamma_d + \delta_t$$
$$+ \sum_t \boldsymbol{\theta'_t} \cdot \boldsymbol{X_d} \times \delta_t + \boldsymbol{\nu'} \cdot \boldsymbol{X_{it}} + \epsilon_{idst} \quad (2.1)$$

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[11]This set-up is a DiD in reverse, as differences in women's legal ability to organize politically exist before the IAL reform and are abolished after the reform, as opposed to a classical DiD set-up, where a treatment differs after a given point in time.

Y_{idst} is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if speaker i, who represents electoral district d in parliament, covers women or girls in speech s that he delivers in session segment t and 0 otherwise. Alternatively, Y_{idst} is a dummy indicating whether he covers women in the domains of charity, education, or professional work — the areas women were particularly concerned with. In the latter case, I interact a dummy indicating that women or girls are mentioned with a dummy that is 1 if charity, education, or female professions[12] are mentioned in the speech and 0 if none of these topics are mentioned.

$BanArea_d$ is a dummy variable indicating that a speaker represents an electoral district that has bans on female political engagement in place before the IAL: If the electoral district lies in a state with bans on women's political activism before the law reform, $BanArea_d$ equals 1 and 0 otherwise. $BansInPlace_s$ is a dummy that equals 1 if at the time speech s is delivered potential bans are in place, which applies to all speeches held in plenary sittings before the IAL becomes effective on May 15, 1908.

α_i are speaker fixed effects, δ_t are fixed effects for the session segment and γ_d are electoral district fixed effects.

By including speaker fixed effects, I hold constant all factors that influence the content of a representative's speech and remain constant for a speaker over time, like general expertise on topics or personal preferences. The session segment fixed effects account for events that affect all speakers and their speeches equally and for overall time trends. Including electoral district fixed effects controls for all unobserved characteristics of an electoral district that affect the speeches of the corresponding representative and are constant over time. Note that it is possible to include both, speaker and electoral district fixed effects as it is common for speakers to represent different electoral districts in different legislative periods.

$\boldsymbol{X_d}$ is a vector of co-variates on the electoral district level, that are pre-determined to the sample period. It contains the share of Catholics as of 1890 and a dummy indicating whether an electoral district lies in a region that was a member of the Rhine Confederation, which proxies liberalism. These variables thus capture important cultural characteristics of the electoral district that a speaker represents. Furthermore, I include measures for the economic structure of an electoral

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[12]If one was interested only in capturing whether women are mentioned in context of professional work, it would suffice to evaluate whether female professions are mentioned, as these are gendered distinctly. This however is not the case for the topics of charity and education.

district, i.e. the size of the working population as of 1895 and the share of workers employed in the industry as of 1895. I allow those co-variates to have varying effects over time by interacting them with session segment fixed effects, i.e. by including the sum of $\boldsymbol{\theta'_t} \cdot \boldsymbol{X_d} \times \delta_t$ in the regression, where $\boldsymbol{\theta_t}$ is a vector of coefficients.

In the vector $\boldsymbol{X_{it}}$, I furthermore include control variables on the speaker level, i.e. their election result in the current legislative period and a set of dummies indicating their affiliation to a faction, as these can change over time.

The coefficient of interest, β, captures how, conditional on control variables, a speaker's probability to mention women (in context of their fields of activism) differs when women in his electoral district are not allowed to engage politically as opposed to when they are, relative to the change exhibited in the speeches of representatives of electoral districts where women are granted these rights throughout. If representatives respond to women's activism, the coefficient estimate will be negative. This then indicates that the lack of exposure to female political engagement, resulting from bans, translates into a decrease in the discussion of women and their issues by representatives of affected districts. The estimate is zero if politicians do not react to changes in women's degree of political organization. Obtaining a positive coefficient estimate would indicate that representatives mention women's issues more when women cannot organize politically.

Standard errors are clustered at the state level, i.e. the level on which it is determined whether a speaker is affected by an IAL-induced change in association laws regrading women's political activism.

The results from estimating regression 2.1 are displayed in Table 2.1 and indicate that representatives are receptive to female activism. While bans are in place, representatives of districts that are affected by bans are less likely to mention women in their speeches, as implied by the negative and statistically significant coefficients presented in columns 1 to 3 (all significant at the 5 % level). The specification in column 1 solely controls for speaker and session segment fixed effects. In column 2, I additionally include electoral district fixed effects and flexibly control for pre-determined district characteristics. The model presented in column 3 contains the richest set of control variables, additionally incorporating the speaker's faction and vote share, and is thus the preferred specification. According to the coefficient estimate, bans are associated with a 4.8 percentage

Table 2.1: Potential Exposure to Activism and Parliamentary Debates

	Mention Women			Mention Women: Context Education, Charity, or Work		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Ban Area × Bans in Place	-0.030** (0.014)	-0.046** (0.017)	-0.048** (0.018)	-0.025* (0.014)	-0.039** (0.017)	-0.041** (0.018)
Speaker FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Session Segment FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Electoral District FE & Flexible Controls	-	✓	✓	-	✓	✓
Speaker Controls	-	-	✓	-	-	✓
R²	0.113	0.119	0.120	0.116	0.122	0.122
Observations	19,477	19,477	19,477	19,477	19,477	19,477

Note Results from estimating equation 2.1 on the sample of parliamentary speeches delivered 1898-1914. Mention Women is a dummy indicating that at least one term that refers to women or girls is used in a speech. Mention Women: Context Education, Charity, or Work is an interaction between the former and a dummy indicating that at least one term referring to charity, education or female professional work is used in a speech. Ban Area is a dummy indicating that a speaker represents an electoral district in a state that bans women's political activism before May 1908. Bans in Place is a dummy indicating that a speech was held before bans were lifted by the IAL (May 1908). All regressions include speaker and session-segment fixed effects. Flexible, pre-determined electoral district co-variates include membership in the Rhine-Confederation as of 1812, the share of Catholics as of 1890, the share of workers occupied in the industry and workforce size as of 1895. Speaker controls include the vote share in the previous election and party affiliation dummies. Standard errors clustered at state level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

points lower likelihood that a speech covers women (or girls). This corresponds to a sizable reduction of approximately 20% relative to the control group's mean dependent variable.

Columns 4 to 6 present the results for the probability that a speech specifically covers women in the context of female activism, i.e. charity, education, or women's professional work.[13] Again, I start by only including speaker and session segment fixed effects, which produces the negative and statistically significant coefficient presented in column 4 (significant at the 10 % level). The models shown in columns 5 and 6 additionally contain electoral district fixed effects and flexible controls (column 5) and speaker controls (column 6). These estimates are negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. As before, the model presented in column 6 includes the richest set of control variables and is therefore the preferred specification. The coefficient suggests that bans are associated with a 4.1 percentage points lower probability that a speech covers women in the contexts that mirror the areas of their activism. The size of the coefficient corresponds to a reduction of 19.34% relative to the mean in the control group.

Taken together, the results suggest that female political activism is echoed in the parliamentary discourse, making it an effective tool to draw attention to demands. At the same time they imply that bans on female political engagement are effective in excluding women from the political discourse. Note that the association is not driven by debates about the IAL-reform itself, as evidenced by Appendix Table 2.C.1, showing that the results are similar when excluding speeches about the IAL.[14]

Next, I analyse how the association between bans on women's political activism and a representative's speeches evolves over time. Thereby, I can also evaluate whether speech content evolves in a similar fashion, once the association laws are equal across districts. I modify regression 2.1 by allowing the coefficient of interest to vary over time, and in particular I estimate:

$$Y_{idst} = \sum_{\tau} \beta_{\tau} \cdot BanArea_d \times \mu_{\tau} + \alpha_i + \gamma_d + \delta_t$$
$$+ \sum_t \boldsymbol{\theta'_t} \cdot \boldsymbol{X_d} \times \delta_t + \boldsymbol{\nu'} \cdot \boldsymbol{X_{it}} + \epsilon_{idst} \qquad (2.2)$$

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[13]For unpooled results, see Appendix Table 2.C.2.

[14]I identify speeches about the IAL by searching for the terms "association law", "association culture" (*Vereinswesen*), and "assembly law".

All variables and parameters are defined as before, except for the set of β_τs that are now period-specific effects of bans. In order to reduce noise, I aggregate the coefficients of interest on the level of the legislative period's session, that is represented by τ.[15] I follow this approach for all legislative period's sessions, except for the session in which the IAL is enacted, because the IAL's enactment occurs around the midpoint of the session. Dividing this particular session into two parts, pre-IAL and post-IAL, allows me to clearly interpret the obtained coefficients as differences before and after the enactment of the IAL. See Appendix Table 2.A.3 for an overview of the temporal structure of the speech corpus. The omitted period is the post-IAL part of session 1, legislative period 12, corresponding to the first period in which the legal opportunities for women's political engagement are equalized across regions. All coefficients are interpreted relative to this reference period.

Figure 2.2 presents the results. When comparing the results for the probability to cover women or girls in a speech (panel a) with the probability to cover them specifically in context of the areas they advocated for (panel b), similar patterns emerge: in periods when bans are in place, representatives of electoral districts that ban women's political activities mention women and the topics they advocate for less, compared to when bans are lifted, relative to speakers of districts unaffected by the law reform and conditional on the full set of control variables. Once women across electoral districts face equal opportunities to engage in political activism, there is no significant difference in the probability to reference women or their areas of activism across speakers. It is noteworthy that already before the enactment of the IAL, beginning in 1907, the treatment effect is close to zero and insignificant (LP 12, 1/1).

This can at least in part be explained by women in restrictive states anticipating the law and expanding their political advocacy, as evidenced by an article published in December 1907 in the central organ of the Federal Association of German Women's Associations. The article informs women that the draft for an Imperial association law is pending for deliberation before the Reichstag and it points out that the draft does not contain restrictions on women's political engagement. The article concludes by highlighting that "new and serious duties arise for women: the joint participation with men in the social and cultural tasks

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[15]Each legislative period is divided into two sessions that lasts around 2 years, with a break of recess in between two sessions.

Figure 2.2: Dynamic Association between Bans and Speeches

(a) Probability to Mention Women

(b) Probability to Mention Women
in Context Charity, Education, or Professions

Note Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from estimating equation 2.2 on a dummy for mentioning women or girls in a speech (a), and on a dummy for mentioning them in context of education, charity or professional work (b). The red vertical line illustrates the timing when the IAL takes effect. The omitted period is defined as the first period after the IAL comes into effect on May 15, 1908 and there are no legal differences across locations anymore. Part 1 of session 1, legislative period (LP) 12 (denoted as LP 12 1/1) encompasses the plenary sittings taking place between February 1907 and May 7, 1908, i.e. the part of LP 12, session 1 that takes place before the IAL is in effect. Part 2 of the first session of LP 12 (denoted as LP 12 1/2) encompasses the plenary sittings taking place between November 1908 and July 1909, i.e. the part of LP 12, session 1 that takes place after the IAL becomes effective.

of the present" (Welczeck, 1907, p. 188).

The vanishing of the treatment effect in 1907, prior to the enactment of the IAL, could alternatively be explained by me falsely attributing the patterns uncovered to the IAL, when in fact a separate reform is responsible for driving the results. This alternative reform would have needed to be implemented in 1907 in states that prohibited women's participation in activism before the IAL. I posit that this scenario is an unlikely candidate to explain the speech patterns I find. Having researched laws enacted in 1907 in the by far largest state with bans on women's political activism, namely Prussia, I could not identify a reform that would reasonably cause speakers to persistently reference women and the areas of their activism at lower rates before its implementation. Appendix Table 2.A.5 lists laws enacted in Prussia in 1907 and shows that the only reform related to women or their causes is a law regarding the transformation of the Women's Merit Cross into a medal. It is highly unlikely that this reform played a significant role in producing the speech patterns observed.

Thus far, the findings indicate that women and their associated causes are less likely to receive mention from parliamentary representatives, when they are less exposed to female activism. It is still unclear whether this is due to speakers' decreased likelihood to devote entire speeches to women's concerns or whether representatives give less attention towards women and their preferences in overall debates. To shed light on this, I employ a Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) model that classifies the parliamentary speeches into topics.[16] Among the obtained topics, I identify the one topic that potentially pertains to women and their causes based on searching for the term "woman" (*Frau*) among its top 10 most frequent words. This topic additionally features words like "child", "school", "teacher", and "church", leading me to consider it a likely candidate for covering the areas of female activism. For the list of topics and the corresponding 10 most frequent words, please refer to Appendix Table 2.A.4.

For each speech, the LDA algorithm calculates the proportions devoted to the

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[16]I follow the standard practice of pre-processing the text corpus by eliminating punctuation, numbers, and stop words, i.e. words that lack topical relevance. Additionally, I exclude parliamentary procedure-related terms such as "session" (*Sitzung*) and "agenda" (*Tagesordnung*), keep nouns only and stem them. Some speeches are dropped due to not containing any words after pre-processing. This results in the lower number of observations in column 1 of Table 2.2. To extract the underlying topics, I configure the algorithm to produce 22 topics, since this specification produces a classification which I deem as adequately representing the defining themes of the era.

respective topics uncovered. I construct a dummy variable that equals 1 if the "women's topic" is addressed with the highest intensity in a given speech and run regression equation 2.1 on this outcome variable. The result is presented in column 1 of Table 2.2 and reveals that there is no significant relationship between bans on women's political activism and the probability that a representative dedicates a speech mostly to the "women's topic". The coefficient in not statistically significant at conventional levels and close to zero, indicating that exposure to women's political activism (or the lack thereof) does not influence speakers' tendency to devote entire speeches to areas of female advocacy. Instead, it seems that speakers are generally less likely to consider the perspectives of women when debating any topic while they are not exposed to women's activism. Appendix Figure 2.C.1 demonstrates that the coefficient of interest remains statistically insignificant across 15 distinct realizations of the LDA model.

As a next step, I investigate whether representatives speak negatively about women and their advocacy when they do mention women. I estimate equation 2.1 on a dummy variable indicating whether the speaker uses the term "emancipated" in their speech. This term was considered derogatory at the time and was avoided by most women involved in the movement (see Section 2.2). If mentioning women is tied to negative connotations, then I should not only find that bans are associated with speakers referring to women less, but also that they use derogatory terms for women with a lower probability. Hence, in case of speakers speaking negatively about women, I would expect to find a significant and negative coefficient estimate. Column 2 of Table 2.2 shows that this is not the case: the coefficient estimate is close to zero and not statistically significant.

To understand whether bans have influenced the length of speeches delivered, I run regression 2.1 on the count of nouns contained in a given speech. The coefficient estimate presented in column 3 of Table 2.2 implies that bans have not altered the length of parliamentary speeches, as it is statistically insignificant.

2.5 Heterogeneity

The results presented thus far indicate that politicians are responsive to women's political activism (or the lack thereof). To investigate the interplay between women activist groups and their representatives in parliament further, I draw on biographical handbooks for the members of the national parliament and analyse

Table 2.2: Potential Exposure to Activism and Parliamentary Debates

	Women Topic (LDA) (1)	Emancipated (2)	Speech Length (3)
Ban Area × Bans in Place	-0.0009	0.0006	-52.5
	(0.005)	(0.0004)	(57.8)
Speaker FE	✓	✓	✓
Session Segment FE	✓	✓	✓
Electoral District FE & Flexible Controls	✓	✓	✓
Speaker Controls	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.114	0.092	0.171
Observations	19,397	19,477	19,477

Note Results from estimating equation 2.1 on the sample of parliamentary speeches delivered 1898-1914. Women Topic (LDA) is a dummy indicating that the women's topic detected by the LDA model is most prevalent in a given speech. Emancipated is a dummy indicating whether the term "emancipated" is used in a speech. Speech Length is the count of nouns used in a speech. Ban Area is a dummy indicating that a speaker represents an electoral district in a state that bans women's political activism before May 1908. Bans in Place is a dummy indicating that a speech was held before bans were lifted by the IAL (May 1908). All regressions include speaker and session-segment fixed effects. Flexible, pre-determined electoral district co-variates include membership in the Rhine-Confederation as of 1812, the share of Catholics as of 1890, the share of workers occupied in the industry and workforce size as of 1895. Speaker controls include the vote share in the previous election and party affiliation dummies. Standard errors clustered at state level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

whether bans on women's political activism are associated with heterogeneous responses regarding speakers' characteristics. I consider a speaker's ideological position within the political spectrum, having a mandate in a state parliament at any point, and the vote share gained in the previous election.

First, I ask whether a politician's position on the left-right political spectrum is associated with a differential response to women's activism. Given that the liberal faction and the Social Democrats claimed to embody the progressive end of the spectrum, one could expect that their members react more strongly to the information updates they receive via female advocacy. On the other hand, one could also assume that their reaction is less pronounced, in line with a scenario where they gather information about women's preferences independent of women's associations being active or not.

To test these hypotheses, I rerun equation 2.1 on the dummy indicating that women (or girls) are mentioned in a speech and the dummy indicating that they are mentioned in the context of charity, education, or professional work. I add a triple interaction term, interacting $BanArea_d \times BansInPlace_s$, i.e. the term capturing the treatment effect, and a dummy, $SD/Liberal_{it}$, that equals 1 for all members of the Social Democratic or the liberal faction and 0 otherwise. The coefficient on this triple interaction term quantifies the *additional* treatment

effect for the members of the Social Democratic and the liberal faction compared to speakers of other factions. A positive and significant coefficient on the triple interaction term would indicate that representatives of the Social Democratic or the liberal faction are less sensitive to the lack of female activism in their speeches, i.e. a ban on women's political activism is associated with a smaller reduction in the probability to consider women in a speech compared to members of other factions. A negative and significant coefficient would imply that members of this group react more strongly to the lack of female activism in their speeches. If the coefficient is insignificant, no differential response can be detected.

Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.3 present the results and show that for both outcomes considered, the coefficient on the triple interaction term is close to zero and insignificant. Thus, there is no evidence for a distinctive association between bans on women's political activism and the likelihood that a representative accommodates women's preferences in their speeches along partisan lines.[17]

A second question to ask when aiming to understand the interaction between women activists and representatives is whether politicians that are more involved in the local affairs within their electoral district are more receptive to activist groups. To approach this question, I exploit the fact that some representatives in the national parliament hold a mandate in a local (state) parliament at some point in their political careers, i.e. either before, during, or after they hold a mandate in the Reichstag. I proxy local involvement by defining a dummy variable that indicates whether a speaker holds a mandate in a state parliament at some point and construct the triple interaction term with this variable and $BanArea_d \times BansInPlace_s$.

Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.3 show that for both outcomes, the coefficient on the triple interaction term is negative, statistically significant at the 1% level and close to the magnitude of the main results (Table 2.1). While the effect for representatives that never hold a mandate in a state parliament is still negative, it is insignificant, indicating that the main results shown in Table 2.1 are driven by members of the Reichstag that hold a mandate in a state parliament during their careers. This finding is in line with those politicians being plausibly more

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[17]Note however, that there are level differences in the probability to mention women (in the context of their advocacy) in a speech, contingent on faction affiliation: Members of the Social Democratic or the liberal faction mention women (in context of their advocacy) with a probability of approx. 0.25 (0.22), which is considerably higher than for members of other factions, who do so with a probability of 0.2 (0.17).

Table 2.3: Heterogeneity

Heterogeneity:	Party		State Parliament		Vote Share	
	Women (1)	Context (2)	Women (3)	Context (4)	Women (5)	Context (6)
Ban Area × Bans in Place	-0.050*** (0.018)	-0.041** (0.018)	-0.022 (0.019)	-0.011 (0.019)	-0.057*** (0.018)	-0.048** (0.018)
Ban Area × Bans in Place × SD/Liberal	0.005 (0.011)	0.0005 (0.010)				
Ban Area × Bans in Place × State Parliament			-0.039*** (0.006)	-0.044*** (0.005)		
Ban Area × Bans in Place × Vote Share Below Median					0.021*** (0.003)	0.016*** (0.004)
Speaker FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Session Segment FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Electoral District FE & Flexible Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Speaker Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.1196	0.1220	0.1197	0.1222	0.1196	0.1221
Observations	19,477	19,477	19,477	19,477	19,477	19,477

Note Results from estimating equation 2.1, additionally including several triple interaction terms between Ban Area × Bans in Place and different dummies. The first dummy (columns 1 and 2) equals 1 for speakers of the liberal and the Social Democratic factions. The second dummy (columns 3 and 4) equals 1 if a speaker ever has a mandate in a state parliament, the third dummy (columns 5 and 6) equals 1 if a speaker gained a below median vote share in the previous election. The sample period spans the years 1898-1914. Women is a dummy indicating that at least one term that refers to women or girls is used in a speech. Context is an interaction between the former and a dummy indicating that at least one term referring to charity, education or female professional work is used in a speech. Ban Area is a dummy indicating that a speaker represents an electoral district in a state that bans women's political activism before May 1908. Bans in Place is a dummy indicating that a speech was held before bans were lifted by the IAL (May 1908). All regressions include speaker and session-segment fixed effects. Flexible, pre-determined electoral district co-variates include membership in the Rhine-Confederation as of 1812, the share of Catholics as of 1890, the share of workers occupied in the industry and workforce size as of 1895. Speaker controls include the vote share in the previous election and party affiliation dummies. Standard errors clustered at state level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

involved in local politics and more aware of local activism and thus more receptive to changes in women's political activism.

Lastly, one might expect that a representative's vote share in the previous election affects their interaction with their constituents, both their electorate and the non-voters they represent. The vote share a politician received signals whether they have a secure majority, or if they need to work towards consolidating their support among the electorate. This, in turn, might influence whether a politician focuses on catering to their electorate, or also considers issues that may not be of direct relevance to voters. To examine whether the vote share of a representative affects their receptiveness to women's political activism, I construct a dummy indicating whether the speaker has gained a vote share below the median in the election for the current legislative period. Similar to before, I additionally incorporate the triple interaction term between $BanArea_d \times BansInPlace_s$ and $VoteShareBelowMedian_{it}$ into regression equation 2.1 and report the results in columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.3.

The association between bans and speech content is weaker among speakers who received a below-median vote share compared to those with an above-median vote share, since the coefficients on the triple interaction terms are positive and highly significant (both at the 1% level). Thus, the association between bans on women's activism and speech content is stronger for representatives with more comfortable majorities, that is they are more receptive to female activism and change their speech patterns more strongly. This finding speaks to representatives with secure electoral support being able to take more political risks by targeting the interests of non-voters. Representatives with less comfortable majorities might feel a stronger need to please their local electorate and to focus on their demands.

2.6   Robustness

2.6.1   Stability with Respect to Dictionary Terms

The dictionaries used to classify speeches are based on my word choices, making it crucial to examine whether the results are contingent on particular word combinations of dictionary terms. However, it is worth noting that the yearbooks of the women's movement and the texts published therein serve as the foundation for my choices regarding whether a speech contains content related to education,

charity, or female professions. Therefore, I am optimistic that the dictionaries mirror the words representatives would use if they referred to issues related to women's activism well. Nevertheless, in what follows my aim is to inspect the robustness of my results with respect to my choice of words underlying the dictionaries used for speech classification. To inspect the dictionary terms, see Appendix Table 2.A.2.

I first examine whether results for the outcome indicating that women (or girls) are mentioned in a given speech are robust to the specified words. The underlying dictionary contains nine terms, hence I define nine new dummy outcomes indicating that a speech mentions women, based on the different dictionaries that result from sequentially dropping one of the terms from the original dictionary. I estimate equation 2.1 on the set of outcome variables and compare the coefficients of interest across models. Figure 2.3a plots the results of this exercise and shows that the obtained estimates are all negative and lie within the 95% confidence interval of the baseline estimate (depicted in green).

In a similar fashion, I inspect the robustness of results for the outcome variable indicating that women are mentioned in the context of charity, education or professional work. Figure 2.3b depicts the coefficient estimates that I obtain when dropping one term at a time from the underlying dictionaries for speech classification, then redefine the outcome and estimate equation 2.1. Again, all resulting coefficient estimates are negative and lie within the 95% confidence interval of the baseline estimate obtained for the outcome variable defined using my original dictionaries (presented in green). All in all, there is no evidence suggesting that my main results depend on my exact choice of words for speech classification.

2.6.2 Stability with Respect to Dropping Speakers or Electoral Districts

To further investigate the robustness of my main results, I explore whether the coefficients of my main specifications are stable with respect to dropping speakers or electoral districts from my sample, respectively. Excluding one speaker (electoral district) at a time, I reestimate equation 2.1 as many times as there are speakers (electoral districts).

In Figure 2.4, I plot the distribution of the obtained coefficients. The black

Figure 2.3: Sensitivity of Estimates to Dictionary Terms

(a) Probability to Mention Women

(b) Probability to Mention Women
in Context Charity, Education, or Professions

Note Coefficients as well as 90% and 95% confidence intervals from estimating equation 2.1 on a dummy for mentioning women or girls in a speech (a), and on a dummy for mentioning them in context of charity, education, or professional work (b). The results in green display the baseline estimates. The estimates in black stem from a series of models where I drop one term at a time from the dictionaries defining whether women or girls (a) are mentioned and from the dictionary that defines whether a speaker addresses charity, education, or female work (b).

dashed line displays the baseline coefficients from using the full sample. The grey dotted lines indicate the upper and lower bound of the baseline results' 95% confidence intervals. The set of estimates obtained from iteratively dropping speakers (electoral districts) are centered around their corresponding baseline estimate and all of them lie within its 95% confidence interval, which demonstrates the stability of my coefficient estimates.

2.6.3 Confounding Factors

The results presented thus far indicate that representatives in parliament react to women's activism (or the lack thereof). However, to what extent do these correlations pick up confounding factors instead of a causal effect of women's activism? A number of concerns about the causal interpretation of these coefficients are addressed by the fixed effects and control variables I include.

All regression models contain speaker fixed effects. These capture speaker characteristics that affect their parliamentary speeches, as long as their impact remains constant over time. For example, a representative's preferences, their fundamental position on the spectrum between conservatism and liberalism, or their expertise might determine the topics they address and the focus they put. If such characteristics are correlated with potential exposure to women's activism, coefficients would be biased and therefore, it is important to account for such factors by incorporating speaker fixed effects.

In my richest specification, I also control for electoral district fixed effects, which absorb the time-invariant characteristics of the electoral district represented by the speaker. This addresses potential concerns about unobserved district characteristics that may shape speech patterns in a constant way. Note that speakers commonly change electoral districts, which allows me to include both speaker fixed effects and electoral district fixed effects. For instance, issues related to social welfare might be more pressing in urban districts due to the precarious situation of workers. For speeches, it might also play a role which federal state an electoral district is located in, due to cultural differences between states, that might be reflected in the topics a district's representative addresses or the perspective taken. By controlling for electoral district fixed effects, factors like these are accounted for as long as their impact on speeches remains constant throughout.

(a) Mention Women, exclude Districts

(b) Mention Women in Context, exclude Districts

(c) Mention Women, exclude Speakers

(d) Mention Women in Context, exclude Speakers

Figure 2.4: Stability of Estimates when dropping Speakers or Electoral Districts

Note Results from estimating equation 2.1 on a dummy for mentioning women or girls in a speech (a) and (c), and on a dummy for mentioning them in the context of education, charity, or professional work (b) and (d). The figure plots the distribution of the estimates obtained from a series of regressions that use restricted samples resulting from iteratively dropping one electoral district (panels a and b) or one speaker (panels c and d) from the sample. The black vertical dashed line marks the corresponding baseline estimate from the full sample, the grey vertical lines mark the lower and upper bounds of the 95% confidence interval from the baseline estimate.

All regressions include session segment fixed effects. A session segment includes all plenary sittings that take place within a time-window of several months when the Reichstag is in session and is followed by a recess of several months. Usually, a specific set of laws was discussed and enacted within a session segment. Session segment fixed effects on the one hand capture shocks to the speech agenda that are common to all representatives, like the Chancellor's political course, or events such as the "Black Friday" violent police attacks against British suffragettes on November 18, 1910 in London. Events like those might have had an impact on the parliamentary discourse in Imperial Germany and are accounted for in session segment fixed effects. On the other hand, session segment fixed effects absorb the time trend in the probability to consider women and their advocacy in parliamentary speeches that is common across representatives, for instance a general trend towards more female liberties.

However, period fixed effects assume that all representatives are affected uniformly by events and trends. A natural concern is that speeches by more reactionary representatives evolve in a different fashion than speeches of more liberally-minded representatives. This introduces endogeneity problems, as conservatism is likely to be correlated with IAL-induced changes in women's political activity: the existence of restrictions on female political activism in certain locations before the IAL might be explained by the fact that these places had been more conservative in the past. Supposedly, these places experience a catch-up in liberalism, i.e. a faster liberalization, which leads to the IAL allowing women in the entire Empire to form political associations.[18]

Note however, that in such a scenario the coefficients would be biased towards finding positive effects, i.e. representatives from districts with restrictive laws would focus more on advancing the status of women over time, compared to their counterparts in states with initially more liberal laws.

To address the concern that representatives from places with more conservative laws before the IAL might be on different trajectories when it comes to discussing women and the social issues they advocate for, the vector of electoral district controls that is included in my regression models, X_d, contains a dummy variable indicating that a location has been a member of the Rhine Confederation

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[18]Table 2.B.1 for instance shows that representatives from electoral districts that previously had limitations on female activism are more likely to vote in favor of the IAL and the paragraph of the law that explicitly prohibits gender-based restrictions.

in 1812, proxying liberalism. The confederation states implemented social and institutional reforms following the French example. In addition, I allow the representatives of electoral districts to be on different trajectories depending on the religious denomination of the constituents in 1890, the level of industrialization, and the size of the workforce, both in 1895. Possibly, more industrialized locations experience a greater emergence of discourse around topics of public welfare, as they are linked to urbanization and the social conditions of workers. X_d thus contains these variables as well and is interacted with the sum of session segment dummies.

Underlying Trends in Welfare Topics

After allowing for different trends of representatives with respect to these predetermined district attributes, one might still be concerned about different underlying trends in considering issues of public welfare as important. Therefore, I test for the existence of underlying trends in addressing social topics, that are specific to regions that initially banned female political activism. Such underlying trends would be picked up by my coefficient of interest, as they would not only be correlated with my treatment variable, but also have an effect on the probability to mention the issues that the women's movement advocated for, i.e. issues of social welfare.

To examine this possibility, I classify speeches using the same keywords to determine whether the context of a speech is coherent with women's activism, i.e. charity/public welfare, education and professions, except I do not require that these are used in connection with women. Then, I run regression 2.1 on this set of dummy outcomes. This exercise sheds light on whether the speech patterns I uncover are connected specifically to women's agitation, or whether they spuriously pick up a broad societal trend that is concentrated in regions where the IAL changes women's ability to agitate.

The results are presented in Table 2.4 and indicate that the main results are indeed the product of exposure to women's activism (or the lack thereof). When not requiring women to be mentioned as well, there is neither a significant association between bans and the probability that education is addressed in a speech (column 1), nor that charity (column 2) or male professionals and workers (column 3) are mentioned. Even though the estimates are negative, they are all statistically insignificant. Also, when I pool these outcomes in one indicator,

Table 2.4: Underlying Trends in Welfare Topics and Women's Rights

	Mention			Pooled	Women's Suffrage
	Education	Charity	Male Workers		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Ban Area × Bans in Place	-0.005	-0.029	-0.031	-0.019	-0.002
	(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.002)
Speaker FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Session Segment FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Electoral District FE & Flexible Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Speaker Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.103	0.099	0.176	0.125	0.078
Observations	19,477	19,477	19,477	19,477	19,477

Note Results from estimating equation 2.1 on the sample of parliamentary speeches delivered 1898-1914. The outcomes in columns 1-3 are dummies indicating that at least one term that refers to education (1), charity (2) or male workers (3) is used in a speech. The dummy outcome in column 4 is 1 if at least one term referring to any one of the former topics is used. Women's Suffrage is a dummy indicating that this term was used in a given speech. Ban Area is a dummy indicating that a speaker represents an electoral district in a state that bans women's political activism before May 1908. Bans in Place is a dummy indicating that a speech was held before bans were lifted by the IAL (May 1908). All regressions include speaker and session-segment fixed effects. Flexible, pre-determined electoral district co-variates include membership in the Rhine-Confederation as of 1812, the share of Catholics as of 1890, the share of workers occupied in the industry and workforce size as of 1895. Speaker controls include the vote share in the previous election and party affiliation dummies. Standard errors clustered at state level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

there is no significant relationship (column 4).

Underlying Trends in Support for Women's Rights

Next, I explore the possibility that my main results are driven by a trend in advocating for women's rights that is unrelated to the activities of the women's movement and concentrated in areas with bans on women's political engagement. Therefore, I consider the probability that a speech contains the term "Frauenwahlrecht", i.e. women's suffrage as an outcome. This is illuminating, as if one supports gender equality, it may be a topic of discussion, but women's suffrage was a peripheral issue within the women's rights movement for a long time (as discussed in Section 2.2). The coefficient estimate in column 5 of Table 2.4 is close to zero and insignificant, which serves as some evidence that my main results do not spuriously pick up greater benevolence towards women, or support for women's rights, that is unrelated to their activism.

Strategic Switchers

Another scenario that might raise concern for the causal interpretation of my estimates is the possibility for representatives to strategically select into or out of exposure to women's activism by switching electoral districts. Recall that the control group comprises speakers for whom the potential to be exposed to women's activism does not change, while the treatment group consists of speakers that experience a change in their potential exposure to women's political activism. Representatives can not only experience such a change through the IAL, but also by switching from representing a district in a state with bans on women's activism to representing a district in a state without such bans, before enactment of the IAL (or vice versa). This creates the possibility of speakers selecting into exposure to women's activism.

I identify those representatives who, by representing another district, experience a change in their potential exposure to female advocacy, drop their speeches and reestimate equation 2.1. Doing so, I only use variation in potential exposure to female activism that arises from the IAL. The results are shown in Table 2.5 and are qualitatively unchanged, which indicates that my main results do not reflect selection of speakers into exposure to political activism by women through changing electoral districts between states.

Table 2.5: Selection into Women's Activism

	Mention Women (1)	Mention Women: Education, Charity, or Work (2)
Ban Area × Bans in Place	-0.047** (0.018)	-0.042** (0.018)
Speaker FE	✓	✓
Session Segment FE	✓	✓
Electoral District FE & Flexible Controls	✓	✓
Speaker Controls	✓	✓
R^2	0.118	0.121
Observations	18,872	18,872

Note Results from estimating equation 2.1 on the sample of parliamentary speeches delivered 1898-1914. I exclude speakers that experience a change in whether women in their district can organize politically, not because of the IAL, but because they represent an electoral district in another state with differing laws pre IAL. Mention Women is a dummy indicating that at least one term that refers to women or girls is used in a speech. Mention Women: Education, Charity, or Work is an interaction between the former and a dummy indicating that at least one term referring to charity, education or female professional work is used in a speech. Ban Area is a dummy indicating that a speaker represents an electoral district in a state that bans women's political activism before May 1908. Bans in Place is a dummy indicating that a speech was held before bans were lifted by the IAL (May 1908). All regressions include speaker and session-segment fixed effects. Flexible, pre-determined electoral district co-variates include membership in the Rhine-Confederation as of 1812, the share of Catholics as of 1890, the share of workers occupied in the industry and workforce size as of 1895. Speaker controls include the vote share in the previous election and party affiliation dummies. Standard errors clustered at state level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Underlying Trends Related to Speaker Attributes

Speakers possessing certain attributes may exhibit distinct trends in their speech patterns compared to speakers without these attributes. If these characteristics are correlated with the electoral district's association laws that were valid prior to the IAL, the coefficients would be biased.

To address this concern, I incorporate linear year trends that are specific to speakers' attributes by interacting each dummy variable capturing the respective characteristic with a linear trend. This is done for all speaker characteristics that exhibit significant differences between the treatment and the control group (see summary statistics in Table 2.B.1). Accordingly, the set of speaker attributes that I allow to create differential speech trends includes an indicator for religious affiliation (i.e. Catholic), a dummy indicating the year of birth being below median, a dummy for having a university degree, faction dummies and a binary indicator for whether a speaker's vote share is below the median.

The results are presented in columns 1 and 3 of Table 2.6 and are very similar to the baseline estimates. Columns 2 and 4 of Table 2.6 display the results

for running regression 2.1, additionally controlling for linear state trends. The coefficient estimates are slightly smaller in magnitude and the standard errors increase, resulting in a drop in significance to the 10% level.

Table 2.6: Linear Trends

	Mention Women		Mention Women: Education, Charity, Work	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Ban Area × Bans in Place	-0.046**	-0.037*	-0.038**	-0.032*
	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.019)
Linear Trends (Speaker Characteristics)	✓	-	✓	-
Linear Trends (States)	-	✓	-	✓
Speaker FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Session Segment FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Electoral District FE & Flexible Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Speaker Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.121	0.125	0.123	0.129
Observations	19,477	19,477	19,477	19,477

Note Results from estimating equation 2.1, additionally controlling for linear trends. The linear trends, capturing the year relative to the enactment of the IAL, are interacted with dummies capturing speaker characteristics, or with dummies for the German states. The sample period spans the years 1898-1914. Mention Women is a dummy indicating that at least one term that refers to women or girls is used in a speech. Mention Women: Education, Charity, Work is an interaction between the former and a dummy indicating that at least one term referring to charity, education or female professional work is used in a speech. Ban Area is a dummy indicating that a speaker represents an electoral district in a state that bans women's political activism before May 1908. Bans in Place is a dummy indicating that a speech was held before bans were lifted by the IAL (May 1908). All regressions include speaker and session-segment fixed effects. Flexible, pre-determined electoral district co-variates include membership in the Rhine-Confederation as of 1812, the share of Catholics as of 1890, the share of workers occupied in the industry and workforce size as of 1895. Speaker controls include the vote share in the previous election and party affiliation dummies. Standard errors clustered at state level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

2.7   MECHANISM

So far, I have argued that the relationships detected are driven by changes in politicians' exposure to women's political agitation. In this section, I lend support to this proposition by providing several pieces of evidence. First, I present historical accounts illustrating that existing women's associations were deterred from political activism when they faced bans. However, once bans were lifted they became more outspoken about their political demands.

Second, by using data on the existence of women's associations, I can exploit the same source of variation as in my speech analyses, i.e. the IAL-induced changes in women's ability to be politically engaged, and show that bans on women's

activism are associated with a slower spread of the women's movement. These two pieces of evidence demonstrate that changes in exposure to political activism can be considered a credible mechanism: Bans are associated with women organizing less and if they do, their activities are less political. Third, I examine politicians' use of specific words, that point towards changes in exposure to women's political activism driving the results.

2.7.1   Bans Making Women Apolitical

Historical records indicate that existing women's associations were indeed less politically vocal in regions where restrictions on their political activism were in place prior to the IAL.

Anita Augspurg, a pioneer of the women's movement, illustrated in her memoirs how before the IAL, rather radical and overtly political associations were only founded in states that allowed women to form associations with political goals, but not in states with restrictive laws (Heymann and Augspurg, 1972, p. 97). This highlights that women refrained from forming political associations when subjected to restrictions. However, not only openly political women adjusted their activities in response to bans: according to Wischermann (2003, p. 83), moderate women's organizations responded to restrictive association laws by "imposing political abstinence on thesmselves" out of fear of legal repercussions. Furthermore, Huber-Sperl (2004, pp. 206) illustrates how organized women navigated the boundaries set by association laws and avoided conflict with authorities by carefully evaluating whether their actions would be in compliance with the regulations.

That this was common knowledge at the time becomes apparent when considering an encyclopedia entry from 1900 about women's membership in associations:

> "It makes a truly pitiful impression when a female or mixed association does not dare to discuss these [social] and other matters because political issues cannot be discussed for fear of dissolution, and then debates at length about whether the respective topic is political or not."[19]

An interesting example of such behavior stems from the statutes of the Jew-

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[19] *Illustriertes Konversations-Lexikon der Frau* ([1900] 1993, p. 641)

ish Women's Organization (*Jüdischer Frauenbund*) that had its headquarters in Frankfurt, a region with restrictive association laws before the enactment of the IAL in 1908. The 1904 founding statutes describe the purpose of the association as follows:

> "The association's purpose is to work together for the public interest. The areas of work include charity work, public education, promotion of the professional lives of Jewish women and girls, improving morality, fighting girl trafficking, etc. **Political subjects are not discussed**."[20]

While in 1904, the Jewish women's organization stressed clearly that it refrains from engaging politically, the association's entry in the 1913 yearbook of the women's movement almost exactly reproduces this wording, except the last sentence has been removed. That is, the Jewish Women's Organization no longer publicly ruled out to touch political issues (Bund Deutscher Frauenvereine, 1913, p. 35).

All in all, historical evidence supports the view that existing associations that were located in regions with restrictions prior to the IAL avoided being perceived as engaged in political topics for as long as bans were in place. Once bans were lifted, they ceased to practice political abstinence (Wischermann, 2003, p. 83).

2.7.2   Bans Hampering the Spread of the Movement

To obtain quantitative evidence about the underlying forces, I estimate the association between restrictions on women's political engagement and politicians' potential exposure to female political activism. Therefore, I hand-collect and digitize historical data on the spread of the women's movement and utilize the same source of variation as previously to estimate the relationship between restrictions and the regional spread of the women's movement. In particular, I estimate the following Difference-in-Differences in reverse equation:

$$Y_{dt} = \beta \cdot BanArea_d \times BansInPlace_t + \gamma_d + \delta_t + \epsilon_{dt} \qquad (2.3)$$

where Y_{dt} is either the number of women's associations, the number of women

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[20]Pappenheim (3. März 1905, p. 101)

organized in women's associations, or the number of female members of the Social Democratic Party in region d and period t. Regions are either electoral districts, states and provinces, or party agitation districts, depending on the level of reporting of the outcome considered.[21] $BanArea_d$ is a dummy variable indicating that in a given region, bans were placed on women's political engagement before the IAL. Hence, if a region is located in a state with bans on female political activism before the law reform, $BanArea_d$ equals 1 and 0 otherwise. $BansInPlace_t$ is a dummy variable that equals 1 in periods before the IAL lifted potential bans, i.e. for observations before May 1908. The coefficient of interest, β, captures the effect of active bans on the quantity of women's activism. γ_d and δ_t are region and year fixed effects, respectively. Region fixed effects capture factors that are constant over the sample period for a given region, such as the geographical features that make connecting people more or less difficult, or inherent cultural traits. Year fixed effects account for all incidences that affect all regions equally and the universal trend in association activities. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Table 2.7 reveals a negative association between the presence of restrictions on female political activism and the formation of women's associations and the number of women organized in the movement. On average, electoral districts where women's political organization is restricted experience 0.847 fewer associations being founded before the IAL, compared to districts where no such bans are in place (column 1, significant at the 10% level). In column 2, associations that are primarily concerned with charitable work are excluded, as it is less clear how the formation of these association responds to restrictions on political activism, which in turn might add noise to the analysis. The coefficient indicates on average 0.769 fewer associations being formed per electoral district due to bans (significant at the 5% level). When looking specifically at associations that are mainly concerned with promoting female education (column 3), or associations that are mainly concerned with promoting women's professional careers (column 4), I also find negative and significant effects of bans (significant at the 5% level). All effects are sizable, ranging between a reduction of about 21% relative to the

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[21]I aggregate the data on women's associations published in the association registers to the electoral district level. The membership data published in the official statistics is reported on the state level for all states except Prussia, for which data is reported on the province level. Since Prussia was by far the largest German state, its provinces are more comparable in size to the other German states. Membership data for the Social Democrats are reported on the level of party agitation districts.

Table 2.7: Foundation of Women's Associations and Female Members

	Yearbooks of Middle-Class Women's Movement				Official Statistics		SD Records
	Associations	Association ex. Charity	Associations Female Education	Associations Professional	Associations	Female Members in Associations	Female Members in SD Party
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Ban Area × Bans in Place	-0.8468*	-0.7685**	-0.0576**	-0.4785**	-50.45**	-10,023.9***	-1,188.0**
	(0.4589)	(0.3261)	(0.0268)	(0.1762)	(21.80)	(3,165.2)	(482.5)
Mean Dep. Var. in Control	3.98	3.13	0.15	0.88	77.58	11,990	1,915.8
Electoral District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.79	0.79	0.76	0.74	0.97	0.97	0.8
Observations	1,568	1,568	1,568	1,568	75	75	222

Note Results from estimating equation 2.3. Ban Area is a dummy indicating that a given region is located in a state that has bans on women's political activism in place before the IAL. Bans in Place is a dummy indicating observations before the lifting of any bans. The sample used in columns 1–4 spans the years 1901, 1908, 1912, and 1916. The unit of observation is the electoral district and 1901 is the observation before the lifting of any bans. The outcomes are the number of associations of the given type. Data in columns 5 and 6 stem from official statistics of the German Empire. The sample contains 2 surveys, one in early 1908, before the IAL and another early in 1910. The unit of observation is the state, except for Prussia that reports data on the province level. The outcome is either the number of women's associations (5), or the count of female members organized in women's associations (6). Data in column 7 stem from SPD membership records and span the years 1907 plus 1909-1913. The unit of observation is the party agitation district, where I only use those districts that do not overlap different states with differing association laws pre IAL. The outcome is the count of female party members. Standard errors clustered at state level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

control group's mean in column 1 and 54% in column 4.

Appendix Table 2.C.3 shows that the results presented in columns 1-4 of Table 2.7 are robust to excluding electoral districts in cities that comprise multiple electoral districts. For those cities, the mapping of associations into electoral districts was complicated by the lack of precise information about electoral district borders, which can lead to inaccuracies.

Using data collected by imperial authorities, I am able to not only measure the number of associations founded, but also the number of female members active in women's associations. To also quantify how working-class women were affected by the bans, I rely on data on the female members of the Social Democratic Party. Columns 5-7 of Table 2.7 present the results. Column 5 confirms the previous findings: Bans are associated with fewer women's associations being founded. Territories, i.e. states or provinces, where bans were placed on women's political activism have on average 50.45 fewer women's associations when the ban is in effect. Note that the difference in effect size compared to columns 1-4 is due to differing regional units of observation. The coefficient is significant at the 5 percent level and amounts to a reduction of about 65% relative to the control group's mean. Column 6 shows that bans also resulted in fewer women joining women's associations. This effect, too is very sizable, as it shows that bans on women's political activism are associated with around 10,024 fewer women being active in the women's movement (significant at the 1% level, reduction of 84% compared to control group mean). Finally, I look at the number of female members of the Social Democratic Party to quantify political engagement of working-class women. Column 7 shows that while bans are in place, 1.188 fewer women join the Social Democratic Party on average per party agitation district. This coefficient is significant at the 5% level and amounts to a reduction of 62% relative to the control group mean. Taking the evidence presented in Table 2.7 together, regions with bans on women's political engagement indeed experience far less activism by women while these bans were in place. This in turn indicates that the representatives of these regions were exposed to women's activism to a substantially lower degree while restrictions were in place.

Next, I turn to investigating how the association between bans and women's political participation evolves over time, exploiting all available time periods sep-

arately.[22] I proceed to estimate the following dynamic Difference-in-Differences in reverse set-up:

$$Y_{dt} = \sum_t \beta_t \cdot BanArea_d \times \delta_t + \gamma_d + \delta_t + \epsilon_{dt} \qquad (2.4)$$

All parameters and variables are defined as before, except the parameters of interest, i.e. the set of β_ts, are now period-specific. The omitted period is always the first observation after the IAL is in effect, that is after all women across the Empire have legal opportunities to politicize. This exercise sheds light on whether the women's movement evolved in a similar fashion after the IAL in regions that had bans in place before the IAL, compared to regions where no bans were placed on women's political participation. Note that if bans placed constraints on women, it is to be expected that trends are not immediately similar after association laws are equalized across states. Instead, regions where bans were lifted might experience some take-up growth in the first years after the lifting of the ban.[23] For the assumption that in absence of bans, women's political activism would have spread in a similar fashion across the Empire to be reasonable, there should be no difference in the expansion of the movement in the medium to long term following the implementation of the IAL.

The results are presented in Figure 2.5 and show that for all outcomes considered, the coefficient of interest is negative and statistically significant in the period before the alignment of women's opportunities to be politically active, which is in line with bans resulting in less female activism. After bans are lifted, coefficients are positive, which indicates a more intense expansion of the movement in regions that previously banned female political engagement. Note however, that except for the 1910 coefficient on female members of the Social Democratic Party, the coefficients are not statistically significant at the 5 percent level. This pattern is in line with a take-up expansion of activism by women, that is triggered by the liberalization experienced in regions where women previously faced restrictions. However, the effect fades over time and in the longer run, the movement seems to spread in a similar fashion across regions.

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[22]Note that the data from the official statistics used in columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.7 only contain 2 periods and can therefore not be used for the estimation of dynamic effects.

[23]This is comparable to anticipation of the treatment in the canonical Difference-in-Differences setting.

Figure 2.5: Women's Activism over Time

Note Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from estimating equation 2.4. The red vertical line represents the enactment of the IAL. The reference period is always the first observation after the IAL was enacted and laws are equal in the entire Empire. Data on associations stem from the yearbooks of the middle-class women's movement and are available for 1901, 1908, 1912 and 1916 and aggregated to the electoral district. Data on female members of the Social Democratic Party are available on the party agitation district level and reported in 1907 and 1909-1913. I drop a party agitation district if it contains territories of multiple states that have different regulations pre IAL.

2.7.3   Evidence from Speeches

I perform a final empirical test to examine the claim that speakers' lower exposure to women's advocacy drives their reduced propensity to mention women and the topics important to them when bans are in place. In particular, I look at speakers' use of specific words that shed light on their receptiveness to female activism. I run regression equation 2.1 on three different dummy outcomes and present results in Table 2.8.

Table 2.8: Mentioning Keywords

	Women's Associations (1)	Women and Petitions (2)	"Frauenfrage" (3)
Ban Area × Bans in Place	-0.006*	-0.021**	-0.006**
	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.002)
Speaker FE	✓	✓	✓
Session Segment FE	✓	✓	✓
Electoral District FE & Flexible Controls	✓	✓	✓
Speaker Controls	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.065	0.086	0.048
Observations	19,477	19,477	19,477

Note Results from estimating equation 2.1 on the sample of parliamentary speeches delivered 1898-1914. Women's Associations is a dummy indicating that this term is used in a given speech. Women and Petitions is a dummy indicating that a speech contains both, at least one word referring to women and girls, and the term petition or submission (used as synonyms). Frauenfrage is a dummy indicating that the term "issue of women's rights" was used in a speech. Ban Area is a dummy indicating that a speaker represents an electoral district in a state that bans women's political activism before May 1908. Bans in Place is a dummy indicating that a speech was held before bans were lifted by the IAL (May 1908). All regressions include speaker and session-segment fixed effects. Flexible, pre-determined electoral district co-variates include membership in the Rhine-Confederation as of 1812, the share of Catholics as of 1890, the share of workers occupied in the industry and workforce size as of 1895. Speaker controls include the vote share in the previous election and party affiliation dummies. Standard errors clustered at state level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

When looking at whether the word "women's association" is mentioned in a speech, I find a negative and significant relationship with bans (column 1, significant at the 10% level). As a second outcome, I consider whether the word "petition" or "submission" — both words were used interchangeably — is mentioned together in a speech with one of the dictionary terms referring to women (or girls). The coefficient in column 2 is negative and significant at the 5% level, suggesting that women and petitions are less frequently mentioned jointly for as long as bans are in place in the electoral district represented by the speaker.

Lastly, I consider the term *Frauenfrage* which translates as "issue of women's rights". This term refers to the cultural discussion about women's rights and their status in society. Column 3 presents the results for running regression 2.1 on a dummy that equals 1 if a speech contains this particular term and shows that bans are associated with a lower probability that a speaker mentions this word.

Taken together, the pieces of evidence presented in Table 2.8 additionally speak to the interpretation that bans on women's political activism are associated with women voicing fewer political demands and their ideas being transported to a lesser extend to parliament via their representative.

2.8   CONCLUSION

In this paper, I investigate the receptiveness of politicians to activist groups when they do not pose a threat to their mandate. Specifically, I ask whether the areas of activists' advocacy are echoed by representatives and thereby reflected in the parliamentary discourse.

The setting of the women's movement in Imperial Germany presents a unique opportunity to examine activism by a disenfranchised group that has never resorted to violence or posed a threat to political stability. Besides providing a sample case for studying non-threatening activism by disenfranchised groups, this setting allows me to exploit a law-induced shift in activism. The Imperial Association Law equalized women's opportunities to participate in political activism, while prior to this reform, women in the German Empire were either barred from political activism or free to engage in activism, depending on where they lived.

By utilizing a newly constructed dataset that integrates various historical sources, I demonstrate that a lower level of potential exposure to women's political activism is associated with fewer references to women and their areas of activism in parliamentary speeches delivered by their representatives. The panel structure of my dataset allows me to analyze the relationship between changes in potential exposure to women's activism and changes in speech content within speakers. I am able to additionally include an array of fixed effects and control variables, as well as to rule out several concerns that would render causal interpretation impossible.

When political activism by women is banned, they are less likely to form associations and participate in political activism, and they hesitate to voice their political positions. The lack of female activism is associated with how representatives in parliament exercise their political mandate: women and the topics important to them are mentioned less in the parliamentary speeches delivered by representatives. These results imply that politicians are responsive to the demands of the population they represent, even when they are not facing a threat at the ballot box or the prospect of a coup d'etat.

Assessing whether activists sway politicians in their favor by looking closer at the sentiments activists are met with remains an avenue for further research. However, I posit that the success or failure of activism does not only hinge on whether individuals comply with activists' demands, but is rather determined by activists' ability to prompt political discourse. By that standard, one can conclude that women activists have advocated successfully.

Appendices

2.A   Supplementary Information

Table 2.A.1: States and Bans on Women's Political Activism pre IAL

State	Number of Electoral Districts
States in which IAL does not cause change for women's ability to engage politically:	
Duchy of Anhalt	2
Duchy of Saxe-Altenburg	1
Duchy of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha	2
Duchy of Saxe-Meiningen	2
Free and Hanseatic City of Bremen	1
Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg	3
Free and Hanseatic City of Lübeck	1
Grand Duchy of Baden	14
Grand Duchy of Hesse	9
Grand Duchy of Oldenburg	3
Grand Duchy of Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach	3
Imperial Territory of Alsace–Lorraine	15
Principality of the Reuss Junior Line	1
Principality of Schaumburg-Lippe	1
Principality of Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt	1
Principality of Schwarzburg-Sondershausen	1
Principality of Waldeck	1
Kingdom of Bavaria	48
Kingdom of Saxony	23
Kingdom of Württemberg	17
	149
States in which IAL liberalizes women's ability to engage politically:	
Duchy of Brunswick	3
Grand Duchy of Mecklenburg-Schwerin	6
Grand Duchy of Mecklenburg-Strelitz	1
Kingdom of Prussia	236
Principality of Lippe	1
Principality of the Reuss Elder Line	1
	248

Table 2.A.2: Dictionaries for Speech Classification, Words with the Stem:

Women Mentioned	
Frau	Woman
Maedchen	Girl
Weib/weiblich	Woman/female
Witwe	Widow
Mutter/Mütter	Mother/s
Dame	Woman, Lady
Bürgerin	Female Citizen

Context Education	
Bildung	Education
Schule	School
Unterricht	Class/Schooling
Lehrer	Teacher
Erziehung	Schooling
Schüler	Pupil
Studium	Studies
Universitaet	University

Context Charity	
Armen	Poor
Pflege	Care
Waise	Orphan
Wohlfahrt	Welfare
Fürsorge	(Social) Support
Bedürftig	In need

Context Women's Professional Work	
Arbeiterin	Female Worker
Lehrerin	Teacher
Ärtztin	Female Doctor
Gehilfin	Female Assistant
Beamtin	Female Civil Servant
Stenotypistin	Female Stenotypist
Pensionsbesitzerin	Female Pension Owner
Dienstmädchen	Maid
Krankenschwester	Nurse
Gouvernante	Governess
Wäscherin	Washerwoman
Dienstbotin	Female Servant
Telefonistin	Female Telephone Operator
Näherin	Seamstress
Weibliche Angestellte	Female Employee

Table 2.A.3: Timing of Session Segments, Sessions, and Legislative Periods

Plenary Sittings	Session Segment	Session	Legislative Period
06.12.1898-22.06.1899	1	1	10
14.11.1899-12.06.1900	2	1	10
14.11.1900-15.05.1901	3	2	10
26.11.1901-11.06.1902	4	2	10
14.10.1902-30.04.1903	5	2	10
03.12.1903-16.06.1904	6	1	11
29.11.1904-30.05.1905	7	1	11
28.11.1905-28.05.1906	8	2	11
13.11.1906-13.12.1906	9	2	11
19.02.1907-14.05.1907	10	1	12
22.11.1907-07.05.1908	11	1	12
15.05.1908	Imperial Association Law comes into Effect		
04.11.1908-13.07.1909	12	1	12
30.11.1909-10.05.1910	13	2	12
22.11.1910-31.05.1911	14	2	12
17.10.1911-05.12.1911	15	2	12
07.02.1912-22.05.1912	16	1	13
26.11.1912-30.06.1913	17	1	13
25.11.1913-20.05.1914	18	1	13

Table 2.A.4: LDA Topic Terms

Aussenpolitik	Kolonialpolitik	Landwirtschaft	"Frauenthema"	Steuern	Wahlen, Parteien
deutschland	koloni	preis	kind	steu	sozialdemokrati
regier	land	landwirtschaft	schul	mark	sozialdemokrat
polit	suedwestafrika	mark	kirch	million	zentrum
england	schutzgebiet	landwirt	frau	prozent	regier
volk	eingebor	fleisch	lehr	gesetz	partei
deutsch	leut	land	jugend	vorlag	recht
staat	gesellschaft	getreid	staat	einzelstaat	wahl
frankreich	deutsch	bevoelker	standpunkt	gemeind	volk
land	gouverneur	vieh	kunst	besitz	wort
russland	kolonialpolit	bau	anschau	belast	wahlrecht
Arbeiterorg.	Rechtsprechung	Beamtentum	Armee	Vereinsrecht	Oefftl. Verwaltung
arbeit	gericht	beamt	kriegsminist	preuss	gemeind
arbeitgeb	faell	verwalt	offizi	versamml	berlin
organisation	urteil	mark	soldat	verein	stadt
gewerkschaft	reichsgericht	post	arme	recht	staedt
streik	straf	stell	leut	deutsch	wohnung
leut	recht	unterbeamt	mann	staat	arzt
verein	prozess	dien	militaerverwalt	pol	krankheit
recht	mann	postverwalt	heer	sprach	leut
unternehm	verfahr	eisenbahn	milita	bevoelker	jahr
koalitionsrecht	zeug	verkehr	unteroffizi	bundesstaat	mittel
Mittelstand	Aussenhandel	Sozialversicherung	Finanzen	Schifffahrt	Gesetz
handwerk	industri	arbeit	reichsbank	schiff	gesetz
petition	mark	rent	million	hamburg	bestimm
angestellt	preis	mark	geld	marin	vorlag
mittelstand	deutschland	versicher	prozent	leut	regier
forder	ausland	beitraeg	bank	marineverwalt	recht
gewerb	regier	krankenkass	boers	werft	gesetzentwurf
geschaeft	handelsvertraeg	berufsgenossenschaft	mark	seeleut	entwurf
handlungsgehilf	zoll	gesetz	geschaeft	firma	bedenk
betrieb	staat	kass	verkehr	kapita	paragraph
regel	zolltarif	arzt	kapital	erfind	grund
Krieg	Etat	Elsass	Arbeitsregulierung		
krieg	mark	elsasslothring	arbeit		
volk	etat	wein	betrieb		
fried	million	elsass	stund		
stell	ausgab	verleg	mark		
zukunft	budgetkommission	lothring	arbeitszeit		
massnahm	summ	kontroll	loehn		
vaterland	jahr	wuerttemberg	jahr		
not	einnahm	werk	unternehm		
feind	tit	regier	lohn		
dov	forder	rhein	leut		

Table 2.A.5: Prussian Laws in 1907

Date	Law
February 4, 1907	Ordinance concerning the jurisdiction of administrative courts for disputes which are to be decided in administrative proceedings
March 15, 1907	Treaty between Prussia and Saxe-Weimar concerning the construction of railways between 1. Niederpöllnitz and München-bernsdorf, 2. Geisa and Tann
March 28, 1907	Law concerning the dissolution of the deposit fund of the main administration of state debt
April 22, 1907	Treaty between Prussia and Saxe-Coburg and Gotha concerning the transfer of the management of property consolidations in the Duchy of Coburg to the Royal Prussian settlement authority
April 22, 1907	Treaty between Prussia and Waldeck concerning the regulation of lottery affairs
May 13, 1907	Law concerning the determination of the state budget estimate for the budget year 1907
May 29, 1907	Railway loan law
May 29, 1907	Judges' salary law
June 11/15, 1907	Agreement concerning the relationship of the Prussian church community of Altenwalde to the Hamburg state
June 22, 1907	Law concerning the determination of an supplementary budget for the state budget for the budget year 1907
June 29, 1907	Migrant work place law
July 15, 1907	Hunting regulation
July 15, 1907	Law against the disfigurement of towns and areas of outstanding natural beauty
July 17, 1907	Law concerning expanded real estate acquisition on the Rhine-Weser canal and the Berlin-Stettin main shipping route
August 12, 1907	Law concerning the approval of additional state funds for the improvement of housing conditions for workers employed in state-owned enterprises and for low-paid state officials
August 16, 1907	Treaty between Prussia and Württemberg concerning the change of the state border along the Prussian municipality Steinhofen, Oberamt Hechingen, and the Württemberg municipality Engstatt, Oberamt Balingen
October 22, 1907	Document concerning the transformation of the Women's Merit Cross into a medal
November 6, 1907	Regulation regarding the convocation of the two houses of the Landtag
November 15, 1907	Treaty between the German Empire and Sweden regarding the establishment of a railway steam ferry connection between Sassnitz and Trelleborg
November 17, 1907	Law concerning the expansion of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal

Note List of major Prussian Laws in 1907. Source: *Wichtige Gesetze und andere Rechtsakte in der Zeit der Verfassung von 1850 (1850–1918)* (2015).

2.B DATA

Figure 2.B.2: Association Data for Middle-Class Women's Movement

Angeschlossene Pfadfinderinnenabteilungen ohne kompletten Vorstand.

Ort	Namen der Leiter und Wandereltern
Altenburg, S.=A.	Frl. G. Blasius, Lehrerin, Ziegelstr. 24
Arolsen, Pfadfinder=gruppe Jung-Arolsen	Frau Elisabeth von Schmeling, Wetterburgstr. 26
Bodenbach a. d. Elbe	Alois Barsch
Diedenhofen i.Lothr.	z. Zt. frei
Duisburg	Frl. J. Leuchtenberg, Am Buchenbaum 29
Duisburg-Meiderich	Frl. F. Striepling, Auf dem Damm 103
Frankenberg i. S.	Frl. Emmy Fischer, Reich=str. 10
Jena	Frl. Helene Payer, Anger 20
Klotzsche Bez. Dres=den	Frau Dr. Böttcher, Querallee 20
Mannheim	Frl. Marie Geber, Rheinan=str. 26
Metz	Frl. Aggi v. d. Heyde, Theobaldplatz 31
Oldenburg (Groß=herzogtum)	Hauptfeldmeister Horrmeyer
Reichenbach i. Vogtl.	Bürgerschullehrer Kurt Kitzing, Bahnhofstr. 48
Reichenberg i.Böhm.	Hortleiter Karl Weide
Teplitz	C. Bohaczek, Postgasse 1
Ulm a. D	Assistent Aug. Wirsching, Vorsitzender d. Guttemplerordens, Stauffenring 2

Deutscher Bund abstinenter Frauen

E.V.: Vors.: Frl. Gustel v. Blücher, Dresden=A. 24, Liebigstr. 22. Ehrenvorsitzende: Frl. Ottilie Hoffmann, Bremen, Dobben 28a. Gegr. 1900. 56 Ortsgruppen und 2 korporative Mitgliedsvereine. Ca. 2500 Mitglieder. Dazu 6 Jugend= u. 6 Kindergruppen mit ca. 450 Mitgliedern. Postscheckkonto Nr. 13 470, Postscheckamt Leipzig.

Zweck: Der Verband hat den Zweck, dem Alkoholismus, welcher Familienglück und Volkswohlfahrt untergräbt, mit allen den Frauen zu Gebot stehenden Mitteln entgegenzuwirken. Dies soll erreicht werden: 1. durch Alkoholenthaltsamkeit, 2. durch Aufklärung, 3. durch Belehrung der Jugend, 4. durch Bekämpfung der Trinksitten, 5. durch Errichtung alkoholfreier Wirt=schaften, 6. durch Trinkerfürsorge, 7. durch Beeinflussung der Gesetzgebung.

Organ: „Die Abstinenz." Schriftleitung und Verlag: Dr. med. Karl Strecker, Berlin N 28. Erscheint monatlich. Preis vierteljährlich 75 Pf.

Ort	Vorsitzende
Berlin	Frau Hedwig Kauptsch, Berlin W 57, Bülowstr. 5
Braunschweig	Frau Sölter, Sidonienstr. 2
°Celle	Frl. Marie Greiling, Harburgerstr. 1
°Danzig	Frl. Clara Loche, Lastadie 40
Frankfurt a. M.	Frau Baronin von Stosch, Soden i. Taunus
Freiburg i. Br.	Frau Jula Hoffmann, Holbeinstr. 7
Halle a. S.	Frau Marie von Oertzen, Advokatenweg 48
°Hannover	Frl. von Bock und Polach, Podbielskistr. 13
Hildesheim	Frau Martha Wachhausen, Hameln, Reichsbank
Heidelberg	Frau Morgenthal, Gaisberg=str. 27
Kassel	Frau Elsa Bauer, Wilhelmshöhe, Kunoldstr. 46
°Königsberg i. Pr.	Frau Ida Wittschell, Unter Laak 21
Magdeburg	Frl. M. R. Schwarzlose, Albrechtstr. 6
Mannheim	Vors. i. Vertr. Frl. Luise Oettinger, Lehrerin, Bachstr. 3
Stettin	Frl. Agathe Heinlé, Augusta=str. 61

Norddeutscher Verband:

Vors. Frl. Ottilie Hoffmann, Bremen.

Ort	Vorsitzende
°Bremen	Frl. Ottilie Hoffmann, Dobben 28a
Bremerhaven und Umgegend	Frl. Mahlich, Geestemünde, Ludwigstr. 9
Curhaven	Frl. Ingeborg Meier, Dohrmannstr. 5.
Delmenhorst	Ehrenvors. Frau Kommerzienrat Lahusen. Vors. Frl. Dahle, Kinderheim I, Bremerstr.
°Ellen, Post Heme=lingen	Frau Oberin Brauns
°Hamburg	Frau Louise Vidal, Magdalenenstr. 68a
Kiel	Frl. Anna Dannmeyer, Irenestr. 45

Figure 2.B.3: Transcribed Parliamentary Protocol

Reichstag. — 16. Sitzung. Freitag den 14. Januar 1910. 537

(Dr. **Müller** [*Meiningen*].)

(A) der Gerichte zu untergraben und den Ernst der Rechtsprechung zu gefährden. Mit der Aussetzung der Strafvollstreckung und der Einführung der bedingten Verurteilung muß aber bei den jugendlichen Verurteilten zu gleicher Zeit die Stellung unter die Schutzaufsicht nach amerikanischem und englischem Muster erfolgen. Ich halte von der Tätigkeit der Polizei in dieser Beziehung natürlich sehr wenig

(Zustimmung links);

aber ich bin auf der anderen Seite der Anschauung, daß die rein private Tätigkeit auch nicht genügen wird, sondern wir müssen zu einer Regelung dieser hochwichtigen Frage gelangen durch eine ähnliche Einrichtung, wie sie in den Vereinigten Staaten und England mit den probation offices besteht; wir müssen öffentliche Fürsorgeämter haben, die den Jugendlichen, die einmal gestrauchelt sind, kräftige Stützen in ihrem weiteren Fortkommen geben. Wenn nicht diese sozialpolitischen Momente zu gleicher Zeit berücksichtigt werden, dann, befürchte ich, werden diese gutgemeinten Bestimmungen dieses Abschnitts großenteils nur auf dem Papier stehen bleiben. Meine Herren, solange wir nicht, wie in der englischen children bill, die Kinder während der Untersuchungshaft unbedingt nur in besonderen Anstalten, niemals aber in den Gefängnissen mit all den Verbrechern zusammenschließen, wird es meiner Überzeugung nach auf diesem Gebiete nicht besser werden, — was Sie auch für schöne papierne Bestimmungen treffen.

(Sehr richtig!)

Die Gefängnisstrafe ist z. B. in England für Personen unter 16 Jahren vollkommen abgeschafft, und solange Sie in Deutschland Jugendliche mit Dirnen und Zuhältern in eine Haft bringen, wenn auch nur vorübergehend, ist alles umsonst.

(Lebhafte Zustimmung links. — Zuruf rechts: Das geschieht ja gar nicht!)

(B) — Doch, das geschieht, meine Herren! Sie brauchen nur das Gesetz anzusehen, in dem die Möglichkeit gegeben ist, daß auch in Zukunft noch Jugendliche in Untersuchungshaft zusammen mit alten Verbrechern, wenn auch vorübergehend, aufgenommen werden. Solange eine solche Möglichkeit auch nur im entferntesten besteht, bleibt alles schönes Papier, was Sie hier beschließen!

(Zuruf rechts.)

Ich möchte davor warnen, hier eine falsche Sparsamkeitspolitik zu treiben. In England schützt der Staat das Kind und sich selbst, seine Zukunft im Kinde, dadurch, daß er jede Berührung des Kindes, des Jugendlichen, mit dem alten Verbrecher unbedingt vermeidet. Deswegen sage ich auch: wir haben eine vollständige Kinderstrafgesetzgebung notwendig in materieller Beziehung wie in formaler Beziehung. Ich glaube auch, daß zu den Untersuchungen und Vernehmungen weiblicher jugendlicher Angeklagter in weitem Umfange Frauen herangezogen werden müßten.

(Lebhafte Zustimmung links.)

Wir haben also vor allen Dingen ein vollständiges kriminalpolitisches Kinderschutzgesetz notwendig, bei dem wir die Hilfe der Frau brauchen, sowie ferner ein Strafvollzugsgesetz.

Der Strafvollzug ist die Wurzel alles kriminalpolitischen Übels. Statt den sittlichen Keim zu schützen, vernichtet die jetzige Strafvollstreckung ihn geradezu. Deshalb legen wir das größte Gewicht einerseits auf eine Präventivpolitik, d. h. auf eine Hebung des ganzen kulturellen Niveaus unseres Volkes, vor allen Dingen auch bezüglich der körperlichen Erziehung unserer Jugend; wenn aber Repression eintreten muß, dann muß ein Strafvollzug eingerichtet werden, der eine möglichste Individualisierung von Tat und Mensch zuläßt.

(Zustimmung links.)

Sonst sind und bleiben unsere Gefängnisse, nach dem Aus-

(C) spruch einer der bedeutendsten Autoritäten dieses Gebietes, Brutstätten des Lasters und der moralischen Vergiftung. Wir werden auch in dieser Beziehung das Gebotene nur als eine Abschlagszahlung nehmen; wir verlangen aber, wie bisher, die baldigste Vorlegung eines Reichsstrafvollzugsgesetzes.

Meine Herren, ich resümiere mich dahin. Es werden noch große Änderungen notwendig sein, wenn der Zweck dieser gesetzgeberischen Vorlagen, einerseits die Kriminalität herabzudrücken und andererseits dem Angeklagten genügende Rechtsgarantien zu geben, in Erfüllung gehen soll. Aber ich stimme mit den Herren Vorrednern völlig darin überein, daß auch die besten Gesetzesparagraphen nichts helfen, sondern daß allein der Geist der Anwendung der Gesetze entscheidend ist. Zu einer solchen richtigen Anwendung der Gesetze brauchen wir ein erstklassiges Richtertum, ein Richtertum, das nach oben und unten vollkommen unparteiisch ist, und dessen Bildung zu einer richtigen Menschenbehandlung und Menschenerkenntnis führen muß. Die Frage der Vorbildung unseres deutschen Richtertums ist eine der allerwichtigsten; ich kann hier natürlich nicht näher darauf eingehen. Zu einem erstklassigen Richtertum gehört endlich auch die lebendige Fühlungnahme des deutschen Richterstandes mit dem Denken und Fühlen der breitesten Schichten des deutschen Volkes und die Weckung des Interesses dieser Volkskreise für die Fortentwicklung unserer Rechtszustände. Nur ein solches Zusammenwirken von Volk und Richtertum wird einen Erfolg verbürgen bei der großen Aufgabe der Bekämpfung der Kriminalität und der Hebung des rechtlichen und sittlichen Niveaus unseres Volkes. Wir hoffen und wünschen, daß in der Kommission ein Gesetz zustande kommt, dem auch meine politischen Freunde mit Freuden zustimmen können.

(Lebhaftes Bravo links.)

Vizepräsident Dr. **Spahn:** Das Wort hat der Herr (D) Abgeordnete Dr. Barenhorst.

Dr. **Barenhorst,** Abgeordneter: Meine Herren, den Reigen der Redner des heutigen Tages haben eröffnet zwei Herren aus dem Königreich Sachsen. Danach hat ein Herr aus Württemburg gesprochen, Herr Gröber, und soeben haben wir die helle Stimme des Herrn Müller (Meiningen), eines Halbbayern und eines Halbmeiningers

(Heiterkeit),

hier vernommen. Morgen wird ein Sachsen-Weimarer, Herr Graef, hier das Wort ergreifen. Deshalb werden Sie es nicht unbescheiden finden, wenn auch nun ein Preuße endlich einmal zu dieser Vorlage hier Stellung nimmt.

(Heiterkeit.)

Ich nehme zunächst gern Veranlassung, gleichermaßen wie der Herr Kollege Wagner dem geschiedenen Herrn Staatssekretär Dr. Nieberding den Dank meiner Fraktion für seine Verdienste um die deutsche Rechtsentwicklung auszusprechen. Seine hervorragenden Verdienste sind mit goldenen Lettern dauernd in die Rechtsgeschichte unseres deutschen Volkes eingetragen.

(Bravo! rechts.)

So empfinden wir auch an diesem uns heute vorliegenden Entwurf der Strafprozeßordnung und des Gerichtsverfassungsgesetzes die Spuren der Tätigkeit des Herrn Dr. Nieberding.

Jeder, der sich mit dem Entwurf näher beschäftigt hat, wird zugeben, daß derselbe eine sorgfältige und durchaus gründliche und vollständige Arbeit enthält. In erster Linie beruht er ja bekanntlich auf den Vorarbeiten der Justizkommission, und diese Justizkommission hatte eine sehr günstige Zusammensetzung; denn sie bestand gleichermaßen aus einer Anzahl Praktiker und Theoretiker. So hat denn der Entwurf auch ganze Arbeit gemacht,

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(Dr. **Barenhorst.**)

(A) und hat den vielen Wünschen und den mannigfachen Kritiken Rechnung getragen, welche an unserer Straf=prozeßordnung im Laufe der 30 Jahre, die sie nun be=standen hat, geübt worden sind. Tatsächlich war die Strafprozeßordnung besser als ihr Ruf. Sie ist viel schlechter gemacht — der Herr Kollege Gröber als Richter nicht mir zu und wird das bestätigen —, als sie sich in der Praxis bewährt hat. Man kann jetzt, nachdem lange Jahre die Justizkommission an dem Entwurf gearbeitet hat, von ihm tatsächlich sagen: was lange währt, wird endlich gut.

Es sind besonders drei Beschwerden, die in der Öffentlichkeit wiederholt zum Ausdruck gekommen waren und jetzt ihre Regelung im Entwurf gefunden haben. Zunächst ist es die Beseitigung der Mängel des Vor=verfahrens, welche darin bestanden, daß dem Angeklagten keine hinreichende Einwirkung auf das Vorverfahren und keine hinreichende Rechtssicherheit gegeben war. Es ist weiter die Einführung der Berufung gegen die Urteile der Strafkammern, und es ist drittens die Einführung der Laienrichter bei Strafkammern. Der Schwerpunkt liegt hiernach, wenn man sich diese drei Punkte vergegenwärtigt, nicht sowohl in der Strafprozeßordnung, sondern in erster Linie in der Gerichtsverfassung; denn die Gerichts=organisation ist für eine Strafrechtspflege von besonderer Bedeutung, mehr, als dies bei einem Zivilprozeßverfahren der Fall ist.

Wenn wir uns kritisch die Novelle vor Augen führen und uns fragen, ob sie das Richtige getroffen hat, so kommen wir, glaube ich, zu dem Resultat, daß dieser Entwurf gerade den richtigen Mittelweg eingeschlagen hat, wenn wir uns vergegenwärtigen, wie zwei große Organi=sationen kürzlich zu diesem Entwurf Stellung genommen haben. Der Deutsche Anwaltstag wie der Deutsche Richter=tag haben am Ende des vorigen Jahres am Schluß der (B) Gerichtsferien getagt und haben beide die näheren über den vorliegenden Entwurf beraten. Der Anwaltstag hat seinen Standpunkt dahin zum Ausdruck gebracht, daß er noch weitere Zugeständnisse verlangt, besonders für den Angeklagten, auch zur Hebung der Stellung des Ver=teidigers. Er erblickt in dem ganzen Entwurf nur Schein=konzessionen. Auf einen entgegengesetzten Standpunkt hat sich der Deutsche Richtertag gestellt. Ihm geht der Entwurf in vieler Hinsicht zu weit, namentlich auch in der Zusammensetzung der Gerichte. Der Deutsche Richter=tag will überhaupt nicht die Zuziehung des Laienelements und hat das Laienelement, worauf ich noch später im Gegensatz zu Herrn Dr. Müller (Meiningen) zurückkommen werde, für die Berufungsinstanz ganz abgelehnt. Wenn der Entwurf nun zwischen diesen beiden verschiedenen An=sichten, der Ansicht des Anwaltstags und der des Richter=tags, gerade die Mitte gewählt hat, so können wir mit Fug und Recht sagen, daß er im allgemeinen das Richtige getroffen, die mittlere Linie innegehalten hat.

(Sehr richtig! rechts.)

Der Schwerpunkt liegt nicht in der Strafprozeß=ordnung, sondern im besonderen Maße im Gerichts=verfassungsgesetz. Hier ist in erster Linie vorgesehen eine alte Forderung, die seit langem das Volk beherrscht und auch in Juristenkreisen Anwendung gefunden hat, nämlich die Zuziehung der Laienrichter bei den Strafkammern. Es war inkonsequent, daß man bei den Schöffengerichten, die nur kleinere Sachen zu verhandeln haben, Laien zuzieht, aber bei den Strafkammern bislang auf die Laien ver=zichtet hat. Ich will weiter anführen, daß man z. B. in Hamburg gerade durch die Zuziehung des Laienelements zur Strafrechtspflege vor Einführung unserer Justizgesetze im Jahre 1879 ganz hervorragende Erfolge erzielt hat. Ich will weiter hervorheben, daß der frühere hannöversche Justizminister Leonhardt, der nachher den preußischen

Ministersessel eingenommen hat, in seinem Vorentwurf im (C) Jahre 1873 die Zuziehung der Laienrichter für die Straf=kammern in Gestalt der großen Schöffengerichte beabsichtigt hat. Eine andere Frage ist allerdings, ob man die Laienrichter für die Berufungskammern einführen will. Es ist das hier von den Herren Vorrednern vielfach be=fürwortet worden, und manche Herren sind dafür ein=getreten. Ich glaube, daß das verfrüht ist. Wir haben bislang bei der Strafkammer nicht die Mitwirkung der Laien gehabt. Wenn wir jetzt die Laien in die Straf=kammerinstanz einführen, ist das ein erster Versuch, ist das eine große Erweiterung des Laienelements, die viele An=forderungen an die Laien stellt, die allerdings etwas dadurch erleichtert werden, daß ihnen nunmehr Reisekosten und Diäten bewilligt werden sollen. Aber es ist andererseits auch die Frage, zu prüfen — und der preußische Herr Justizminister hat in dieser Beziehung Material in Aus=sicht gestellt —, ob tatsächlich in allen Landesteilen, be=sonders im Osten, in den gemischtsprachigen Landesteilen, in Posen und Schlesien, eine genügende Anzahl von Schöffen vorhanden ist. Daher müssen wir doch tat=sächlich mit der Zuziehung von Laien bei den Straf=kammern erst Erfahrungen machen, und dann können wir erst dazu übergehen, die Laien in die Berufungsinstanz einzuführen.

Was den zweiten Teil, die Berufung gegen die Urteile der Strafkammer betrifft, so kann ich auch hier namens meiner Partei unbedingt meine Zustimmung erklären. Es ist dies gleichfalls eine Forderung, die wiederholt in Volks= wie in Juristenkreisen laut geworden ist, und die all=mählich eine derartig greifbare Gestalt angenommen hat, daß man sagen kann, daß der allgemeine Wille darauf hinausgeht, die Strafkammern mit einer Berufungsinstanz zu versehen. Auch hier war es inkonsequent, daß man die Schöffengerichte, welchen die Aburteilung der geringeren Straftaten obliegt, mit einer Berufungsinstanz ausstattete, (D) dagegen den Strafkammern, die wichtigere und schwerere Materien zu verhandeln haben, auch gewöhnlich auf höhere Strafen erkennen, die Berufung versagt. Gerade ein Beispiel aus der letzten Zeit hat ergeben, daß tatsächlich die Strafkammern häufig zu drakonische Strafen ver=hängen, daß die Aburteilung häufig zu beschleunigt vor sich geht, und infolgedessen tatsächlich dem Angeklagten in dem einen oder anderen Falle Unrecht geschehen ist. Ich will nur an den berühmten Fall des „Hauptmanns von Köpenick" erinnern, der sich durch seine letzte Straftat geradezu berühmt gemacht hat. Er ist verhältnismäßig gelinde bestraft worden, weil, wie all=gemein feststeht und wohl von niemandem bestritten werden wird, die Strafkammer, die den Fall abzuurteilen hatte, unter dem Eindruck stand, daß dem Angeklagten bei der früheren Verhandlung vielfach unrecht geschehen sei. Der „Hauptmann von Köpenick" hob hervor, daß er bei seiner vorletzten Verurteilung, die ihm 15 Jahre Zuchthaus eingebracht hatte, einer Verhandlung unterstellt worden wäre, die im ganzen nur 20 Minuten dauerte.

(Hört! hört! bei der Reichspartei.)

Deshalb glaube ich — und ich muß dies auch als Richter aussprechen, denn wir sind berechtigt, offene Kritik zu üben, und müssen es tun als Volksvertreter —, daß wir es als eine große Errungenschaft ansehen müssen, wenn wir die Strafkammern mit einer Berufungsinstanz ausgestalten.

Was im allgemeinen die Gerichtsorganisation an=betrifft, so ist sie mir in einer Hinsicht viel zu kom=pliziert; sie ist mir auch etwas zu schwerfällig. Alles in allem haben wir in Zukunft nicht weniger als neun Instanzen.

Erfreulich ist es für mich — ich glaube, ich kann das auch namens eines großen Teils meiner Fraktions=freunde sagen —, daß das Schwurgericht beibehalten ist.

Table 2.B.1: Summary Statistics

	N	Unaffected by IAL		Liberalization due to IAL		Difference
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
Panel A: MP Characteristics						
Male	1,024	1	0	1	0	0
Ever Mandate in State Parliament	1,024	0.518	0.500	0.525	0.500	0.007
Year of Birth	1,024	1857.138	11.656	1854.149	12.353	-2.989***
Vote Share	1,024	58.662	8.659	61.023	11.967	2.361***
Catholic	1,024	0.401	0.491	0.275	0.447	-0.125***
University Degree	1,024	0.485	0.500	0.600	0.490	0.115***
Liberal	1,024	0.246	0.428	0.216	0.408	-0.029
SPD	1,024	0.250	0.434	0.134	0.341	-0.116***
Centrum	1,024	0.258	0.436	0.191	0.394	-0.067**
Conservatives	1,024	0.051	0.217	0.232	0.421	0.181***
Panel B: Voting on IAL						
For Women	358	0.468	0.501	0.589	0.493	0.121**
For Overall Bill	361	0.446	0.499	0.593	0.492	0.147***
Panel C: District Characteristics						
Member of Rhine Confederation	397	0.861	0.347	0.458	0.499	-0.403***
Share Catholics 1890	397	43.123	37.383	33.285	35.192	-9.838**
Population 1895	397	128,071.926	45,566.705	133,952.842	63,449.896	5,880.916
Employed Population 1895	397	59,123.980	19,162.939	54,251.000	24,198.835	-4,872.980**
Share Employed in Industry 1895	397	35.408	14.631	32.742	15.663	-2.666*
Electorate 1898	397	28,198.872	11,632.940	29,228.672	16,158.008	1,029.800
Panel D: Speeches						
Length (nouns)	19,477	529.680	615.023	446.769	529.501	-82.911***
Women Mentioned	19,477	0.240	0.427	0.211	0.408	-0.030***
Women Mentioned; Charity, Education, or Professional Work	19,477	0.212	0.409	0.182	0.386	-0.030***
Women Topic (LDA)	19,397	0.041	0.198	0.032	0.177	-0.009**
Female Suffrage Mentioned	19,477	0.003	0.056	0.002	0.040	-0.002*
Women and Petitions Mentioned	19,477	0.064	0.245	0.052	0.222	-0.012***
Women's Associations Mentioned	19,477	0.005	0.07	0.002	0.043	-0.003***
Frauenfrage Mentioned	19,477	0.004	0.061	0.002	0.041	-0.002**
Emanzipated Mentioned	19,477	0.000	0.018	0.001	0.028	0.000
Panel E: Women's Associations						
Associations	392	3.975	6.680	4.472	9.355	0.498
Associations, Charity	392	0.846	1.650	0.880	1.833	0.034
Associations, Education	392	0.150	0.423	0.174	0.618	0.024
Associations, Professional	392	0.882	2.107	1.282	3.378	0.400**
Female Members in Associations	75	11,989.52	22,788.441	39,187.029	35,721.385	27,197.504***
Female Members of the SD Party	222	1,915.792	2,188.018	2,108.173	3,189.950	192.382

Note Mean and standard deviation for observations with and without changes in association laws for women due to the IAL. The difference between the group means is reported in the last column and significance of the difference is denoted by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

2.C   Robustness

Figure 2.C.1: Results for Different Realisations of LDA Topic Models

Note Results from estimating equation 2.1 on a dummy indicating that the "Women's Topic" is assigned the highest topic probability out of the LDA topics. The figure plots the distribution of the estimates obtained from a series of estimations that use different LDA topic models for speech classification. The green coefficient marks the corresponding baseline estimate, the grey vertical lines illustrate the 90% confidence interval.

Table 2.C.1: Exposure to Activism and Parliamentary Debates, ex. IAL Debates

	Mention Women			Mention Women: Context Education, Charity, or Work		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Ban Area × Bans in Place	-0.030** (0.014)	-0.051*** (0.017)	-0.052*** (0.017)	-0.025* (0.014)	-0.041** (0.017)	-0.043** (0.018)
Speaker FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Session Segment FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Electoral District FE & District Controls	-	✓	✓	-	✓	✓
Speaker Controls	-	-	✓	-	-	✓
R^2	0.107	0.114	0.114	0.107	0.114	0.114
Observations	17,069	17,069	17,069	17,069	17,069	17,069

Note Results from estimating equation 2.1 on the sample of parliamentary speeches delivered 1898-1914, excluding speeches covering association laws. Mention Women is a dummy indicating that at least one term that refers to women or girls is used in a speech. Mention Women: Context Education, Charity, or Work is an interaction between the former and a dummy indicating that at least one term referring to charity, education or female professional work is used in a speech. Ban Area is a dummy indicating that a speaker represents an electoral district in a state that bans women's political activism before May 1908. Bans in Place is a dummy indicating that a speech was held before bans were lifted by the IAL (May 1908). All regressions include speaker and session-segment fixed effects. Flexible, pre-determined electoral district co-variates include membership in the Rhine-Confederation as of 1812, the share of Catholics as of 1890, the share of workers occupied in the industry and workforce size as of 1895. Speaker controls include the vote share in the previous election and party affiliation dummies. Standard errors clustered at state level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 2.C.2: Activism and Parliamentary Debates: Unpooled

	Women Mentioned in Context		
	Education (1)	Charity (2)	Professions (3)
Ban Area × Bans in Place	-0.038** (0.018)	-0.037* (0.019)	-0.011 (0.008)
Speaker FE	✓	✓	✓
Session Segment FE	✓	✓	✓
Electoral District FE & Flexible Controls	✓	✓	✓
Speaker Controls	✓	✓	✓
R²	0.120	0.109	0.107
Observations	19,477	19,477	19,477

Note Results from estimating equation 2.1 on the sample of parliamentary speeches delivered 1898-1914. The outcomes are dummies indicating whether women or girls were mentioned in the same speech as at least one term referring to education (1), or charity (2), or professional work (3). Ban Area is a dummy indicating that a speaker represents an electoral district in a state that bans women's political activism before May 1908. Bans in Place is a dummy indicating that a speech was held before bans were lifted by the IAL (May 1908). All regressions include speaker and session-segment fixed effects. Flexible, pre-determined electoral district co-variates include membership in the Rhine-Confederation as of 1812, the share of Catholics as of 1890, the share of workers occupied in the industry and workforce size as of 1895. Speaker controls include the vote share in the previous election and party affiliation dummies. Standard errors clustered at state level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 2.C.3: Bans & Associations, w/o Cities with Multiple Electoral Districts

	Associations (1)	Association ex. Charity (2)	Associations Female Education (3)	Associations Professional (4)
Ban Area × Bans in Place	-0.9289* (0.4528)	-0.8393** (0.3097)	-0.0648** (0.0288)	-0.5078*** (0.1657)
Mean Dependent Variable	3.89	3.09	0.15	0.99
Electoral District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
R²	0.78	0.77	0.75	0.73
Observations	1,532	1,532	1,532	1,532

Note Results from estimating equation 2.3 on the sample of electoral districts that do not lie within cities with several districts. The sample years are 1901, 1908, 1912, and 1916. Ban Area is a dummy indicating that a given electoral district is located in a state that has bans on women's political activism in place before the IAL. Bans in Place is a dummy indicating observations before any bans were lifted by the IAL, i.e. observations in 1901. Standard errors clustered at state level. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

CHAPTER 3

STATE REPRESSION AND BACKLASH UNDER THE SOCIALIST LAWS

3.1 INTRODUCTION

When governments face organized opposition that is potentially threatening to the stability of the political system, repressing opposition is often their means of choice to restore social and political order. Such tactics are common in autocracies, but they have also been employed in democratic systems.[1]

It is unclear, how state repression affects organized opposition. On the one hand, these policies can deter citizens from supporting the opposition by raising the expected costs of doing so (Tullock, 1971).[2] On the other hand, the external threat posed against group members may strengthen in-group solidarity. As government repression intensifies, so does group identification among sympathisers, achieving the opposite of the intended objective (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Giles and Evans, 1985; Fouka, 2020; Gehring, 2022). This raises the question whether coercive government policies are effective in accomplishing their intended goals. In other words, does repression of organized opposition ultimately help governments to safeguard their power or do such policies instead erode their support further?

Opportunities to examine this question empirically are rare. Governments that engage in repression usually do not disclose where they do so, making it difficult to measure suppression on the local level. In addition, citizens do not readily disclose their support for a repressed organization. As a result, the failure of state repression may not become apparent until the regime collapses, which is an infrequent event that only manifests at the national level (Kuran, 1989). Given these

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[1]This is illustrated for instance by the U.S. government's campaign to root out supposed communist sympathizers, or the bans placed on left- and right-wing parties in Germany, both during the 1950s.

[2]This argument, although originally formulated for an individual's decision to participate in a protest, is applicable to this context as well.

difficulties, researchers have little room to study the effects of state repression, beyond conducting case studies.

The infamous Socialist Laws in the German Empire present an exceptional opportunity to empirically investigate government repression against a well-organized opposition movement. The laws, in place between 1878 and 1890, aimed towards containing the Socialist and Social Democratic Movement,[3] which was perceived as a threat to the stability of the political system. The policy outlawed any form of socialist organization and imposed censorship on related publications. As a result, social democratic organizations were forced to operate secretly. At the same time however, election regulations were left unchanged, enabling Social Democrats to run as candidates in elections and citizens to vote for Social Democrats.[4]

Exploiting this setting, I overcome significant obstacles that typically impede research on state repression: I obtain a measure for the level of support for a repressed movement locally and repeatedly throughout the period of the validity of the repressive policies, proxied by election outcomes of Social Democrats. Furthermore, I use censorship verdicts in connection to the Socialist Laws issued by local police authorities to gauge local repression of Social Democrats. Thus, I combine previously unused records of censored publications under the Socialist Laws, that contain information about the date and place of the verdict, with the results for national elections. The resulting panel dataset covers all electoral districts of the German Empire and spans the legislative periods and elections during the validity of the coercive policy.

Censorship is a suitable proxy for local state repression of Social Democracy, as there is a positive and significant correlation between the censorship intensity and the prison sentences imposed by police authorities in connection to the Socialist Laws. This association also holds when controlling for the level of support for the Social Democratic Party prior to the enactment of the laws. However, censorship verdicts could not only capture the intensity with which local police authorities repress socialists, but also reflect the local supply of publications with socialist content and thereby proxy for the dispersion of the socialist movement.

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[3]At that time, the terms Socialist and Social Democrat were interchangeable. I follow this denotation and use the terms Socialist and Social Democrat as synonyms in this paper.

[4]This however only applies to men, as women neither had active nor passive voting rights in the German Empire.

To address this confounder, I take advantage of the circumstance that any police department could ban publications, independent of where these were produced. Thus, I hold constant the supply of publications eligible for censorship by controlling for the number of socialist publications produced in the area of a given police directorate.

In my main specifications I furthermore control for electoral success of Social Democratic candidates in the elections prior to the Socialist Laws. This measure serves as a proxy for latent support for Social Democracy that is pre-determined to the enactment of the Socialist Laws. This approach helps to account for factors that may be correlated with both state repression and popular endorsement of Social Democracy. As a robustness check, I show that my results are stable with respect to the choice of proxy for latent, pre-determined socialist support.

My results suggest that state repression does not have the intended impact on opposition. I find a positive association between state repression, as proxied by censorship activity an electoral district is subject to in a given legislative period, and the vote share obtained by Social Democratic candidates in the subsequent election. I show that the existence of repression is associated with a 1.2 percentage points higher vote share of Social Democratic candidates. Furthermore, when repression intensifies by 10% the vote share attained by Social Democratic candidates increases by 0.082 percentage points on average. Heterogeneity analyses reveal that my findings are not driven by large cities or electoral districts that host the head quarters of a police directorate.

I identify these estimates exploiting variation in repression within electoral districts over time and conditional on controls for the supply of socialist publications, pre-determined support for Social Democracy, and population size. The identifying assumption is, as per usual in a standard panel setting, that conditional on control variables and fixed effects, there must not be any other factor explaining electoral success of Social Democrats that is correlated with repression in any period, i.e. censorship in the past, present or future. The election result of the Social Democrats in the preceding election is a candidate factor violating this assumption: police directorates might adapt their strategies to electoral support and electoral support for Social Democracy presumably is correlated over time. Therefore, electoral success of Social Democrats in election $t-1$ would be correlated with both electoral success and repression in period t. To address this

concern, I follow Angrist and Pischke (2009) and bound the effect of interest from above and below, estimating the standard fixed effect model and a model with the lagged electoral outcome as control variable. The upper and lower bounds obtained in this manner are positive.

Exploring the timing of the association furthermore reveals a pattern fully consistent with effects being driven by repression under the Socialist Laws: while vote shares of Social Democratic candidates do not exhibit a differential trend in areas where repression, proxied by censorship, takes place during the Socialist Laws, electoral success increases differentially in these areas while the Socialist Laws are in effect. These differences fade away once the Socialist Laws are lifted.

Historical evidence further speaks to the Socialist Laws having had positive effects on support for Social Democracy and hints towards several possible mechanisms at play. First, the common experience of repression was observed to increase identification with the political movement among supporters. Stronger identification could in turn explain a higher willingness to engage in illegal agitation and thereby drive success in elections. Second, to avoid repression Social Democrats commonly maintained the image of moderate reformers when appearing in public. They also participated in gatherings of non-political, unrelated associations, using this cover to meet in groups. In combination, these two strategies could have led to socialist ideas being spread more widely and becoming more socially acceptable. Third, in areas with more intense repression new leaders emerged from within the lower ranks of the movement to replace prominent socialist figures, who were more likely to draw the police's attention to illegal party organizations. The opportunity to play an active role in shaping the Social Democratic organization could have motivated individuals to join the movement. Alternatively, voters being more likely to vote for a candidate that more closely resembles themselves would be an explanation for such a mechanism as well.

My work is related to the literature studying state repression. Scholars have for instance examined the determinants of state repression and the trade-offs involved when rulers decide on how to employ coercive policies (Wintrobe, 1990; Davenport, 2007a; Davenport, 2007b; Gregory, Schröder, and Sonin, 2011; Mohr, 2023). Other work evaluates the unintended consequences of coercive policies and state repression (Sullivan and Davenport, 2017; Fouka, 2020; Hager and Krakowski, 2022; Bautista et al., 2023; Bühler and Madestam, 2023). Closely related to my

paper, Kersting (2022) examines the effect of the Socialist Laws on support for Social Democracy in Prussia, the largest state of the German Empire. He measures repression under the Socialist Laws using information on the location of Socialist associations that were dissolved when the laws came into effect and in particular focuses on the interaction between the repressive policy and welfare reforms targeting the Social Democrats' support base. Thomson (2022) studies the association between repression under the Socialist Laws and electoral outcomes for Socialists by exploiting the circumstance that six cities of the German Empire have expelled Socialists under the Socialist Laws. I contribute to the literature by providing a novel time-varying measure for repression, using censorship of socialist publications as a proxy for repression by state authorities.

My work also adds to our understanding about the drivers of voting behavior. Papers have for instance evaluated the contemporaneous as well as the long-run effect of immigration (Giuliano and Tabellini, 2020; Tabellini, 2020; Calderon, Fouka, and Tabellini, 2023). Other research has focused on the effect of exposure to social movements and protests on voting (Madestam et al., 2013; Aidt and Franck, 2015; Wasow, 2020; Casanueva, 2023). Jones, Troesken, and Walsh (2017) and Rodon and Guinjoan (2022) study the role of exposure to violence to explain voting behavior.

My paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 provides historical background about the Social Democratic Party in the German Empire, specifically during the period of repression under the Socialist Laws. Section 3.3 introduces the data sources used, motivates my choice of proxy and presents summary statistics. Section 3.4 explains the empirical model and Section 3.5 presents the results. In Section 3.6, I explore the possibility that my results are driven only by distinct locations and conclude that this is not the case. Section 3.7 discusses concerns for identification and addresses some core concerns. Potential mechanisms driving the results are discussed in Section 3.8 and Section 3.9 concludes.

3.2   Historical Background

3.2.1   Socialist Laws

In 1875, the General German Workers' Association ($ADAV$) and the Social Democratic Workers' Party ($SDAP$) merged to found the Socialist Workers' Party of

Germany (*SAP*). Representing the interests of the working-class movement, the government perceived the SAP as a threat as it feared a socialist revolution. Consequently, the government implemented repressive measures, which culminated in the enactment of the Socialist Laws.

The German Emperor Wilhelm I endured two assassination attempts in 1878 with the second attempt resulting in severe injuries. Seizing upon these events as an opportunity to ban the Social Democratic Movement, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck connected the attacks to Social Democracy,[5] dissolved the national parliament and leveraged the resulting new parliamentary majority to pass the Socialist Laws that were enacted on October 22, 1878.[6]

Essentially, the laws prohibited any form of public agitation for Social Democracy. This included outlawing workers' unions as well as the Social Democratic Party (SAP). In addition, socialist associations and meetings were prohibited and written publications related to Social Democracy were banned. Censorship of publications was enforced by local police authorities confiscating publications and passing them on to the respective regional police directorate, that then decided on whether or not a publication should be censored due to socialist content. Once a censorship verdict was made, it was announced in the *Reichsanzeiger*, the official government gazette publishing regulations and official announcements. Importantly, any regional police authority could confiscate and censor publications, regardless of where the material was printed or published. Censorship verdicts by the regional police directorates were applied to the *entire* territory of the German Empire. Following a censorship verdict, all existing copies and printing plates were to be destroyed and the distribution or printing of prohibited written material was punishable by a hefty fine of up to 1,000 marks or up to 6 months of imprisonment.[7] A wide variety of socialist publications were censored. The list includes works such as the Communist Manifesto, SAP party protocols, printed speeches by social democrats, campaign pamphlets, and the newspapers of the workers' movement. Furthermore, publications of entertainment value were subject to censorship as well, including political fiction, novels about the working-class, as well as workers' songs, and images of Social Democratic representatives

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[5]The allegations about a connection between the the assassinations and Social Democracy to this day, however could not be proven.

[6]Actually, the term Socialist Laws refers to one law. However, as it was renewed several times, it is common to refer to the policy in the plural form.

[7]Reichsministerium des Innern (1878)

(Birett, 1987).

If government authorities deemed socialists a potential threat to public safety in given locations, they could impose "small states of siege" on those places. As a consequence, any form of assembly required prior authorization and the dissemination of any printed materials was prohibited entirely. Additionally, authorities were able to expel individuals from these areas.

3.2.2   Social Democracy under the Socialist Laws

After the implementation of the Socialist Laws, all Social Democratic organizations, including the party, were swiftly dissolved, either by themselves or by government authorities. Banned from legal existence, the Socialist Workers' Party nevertheless persisted in conducting illegal underground activities. Thereby the party refrained from implementing a coherent and centralized national structure but instead built an extensive network of local illegal organizations. The objective of this strategy was to diversify risk and minimize the impact of potential infiltration, a tactic frequently utilized by state executives (Höhn, 1964; Nipperdey, 2013).

In general, the movement did not turn to violent or militant tactics. This approach was taken to avoid inciting revolutionary scares in the population and to prevent more severe repression. To further keep political sensation low, less prominent individuals were chosen as leaders of local underground structures to avoid detection by the police (Höhn, 1964; Fricke and Knaack, 1983).

The party's establishment of informal and local organizations was disguised as recreational clubs, such as card game evenings and singing associations, or took the form of secret meetings in private residences. A further tactic commonly employed to maintain local informal party structures was to join meetings of established, non-political associations and gather in this fashion. Outdoor trips, e.g. to the forest, were also used as opportunities for regular meetings under innocuous pre-texts, whereas funerals of socialists served as large-scale events for party members to assemble, with as many as 20,000 people gathering at a funeral on one occasion. These strategies allowed the party to maintain its structure locally and continue its activities in a covert manner (Fricke and Knaack, 1983).

To strengthen the party's internal cohesion, irregular party congresses were organized and held abroad. These were announced at the last minute to prevent police

interference. Additionally, the party relied heavily on the weekly newspaper *Der Sozialdemokrat* to maintain cohesiveness. The paper, produced from 1879 to 1890, initially in Switzerland and later in London, was smuggled to and within the German Empire via a distribution network. The extensive police efforts to disrupt the newspaper's dissemination failed.

The Socialist Laws imposed severe restrictions on members of the Socialist Movement, including surveillance, imprisonment, search warrants, and smear campaigns (Höhn, 1964; Belli, 1978). In one known instance, a worker was killed by police when the dispersion of an illegal gathering escalated (Fricke and Knaack, 1983). Another severe form of repression under the Socialist Laws was the expulsion of Social Democrats and their families, resulting in their loss of livelihood. However, some members of the movement still chose to emigrate in order to avoid repression (Fricke and Knaack, 1983; Nipperdey, 2013).

Members that joined the Socialist Movement during this period were expected to show loyalty, be willing to make sacrifices, and to actively fight for the party's causes. It was considered a duty for each member to not only agitate within their communities but also to assist in the distribution of *Der Sozialdemokrat* (Der Sozialdemokrat, 19. September 1880). Members were expected to bear the considerable risk of prosecution and imprisonment if caught by police. Those that were punished by police were hailed as martyrs for the cause (Höhn, 1964).

3.2.3   Elections in the German Empire

In the elections for the national parliament suffrage was extended to all male citizens above the age of 25, with one representative per electoral district being directly elected via an absolute majority voting system. In the event that no candidate secured over 50% of votes in the initial ballot, a runoff election was held between the two leading candidates. The results of these elections were documented and published by government statistical offices. Since neither the regulations surrounding parliamentary mandates nor the electoral procedures were directly affected by the Socialist Laws, (male) Social Democrats retained the ability to contest parliamentary seats as individual candidates (Nipperdey, 2013, pp. 355, 399).

By securing parliamentary mandates in national elections Social Democrats could legally pursue their political objectives in the face of repression under the Social-

ist Laws. They delivered speeches in the national parliament, enabling them to propagate their views to a broad audience as parliamentary speeches were commonly covered in newspapers. In these speeches, Social Democrats sought to mobilize liberal-minded citizens by emphasizing the threat posed to the principles and values that liberals had fought to establish (Höhn, 1964, p. 40). As parliamentarians, Social Democrats furthermore enjoyed privileges that allowed them to effectively coordinate illegal party organizations, substituting for the official party machinery when necessary. This included immunity from prosecution and entitlement to free train travel, which greatly facilitated their mobility and their ability to coordinate with party members throughout the Empire (Höhn, 1964; Fricke and Knaack, 1983; Nipperdey, 2013).

In the lead up to elections, Social Democrats undertook intense agitation efforts to mobilize support for their cause: they organized recreational events through seemingly innocuous associations, distributed pamphlets, and plastered public spaces with campaign slogans. These agitation efforts were well organized, precise, and supported financially (Höhn, 1964; Fricke and Knaack, 1983). It was a common tactic to nominate a candidate in several electoral districts. This implies that while information to confirm the presence of Social Democratic contenders in all electoral districts is unavailable for elections prior to 1890, it is reasonable to assume that such candidates were always nominated.

Figure 3.1 displays the percentage of votes won by Social Democratic candidates in national elections both prior to and during the period of the Socialist Laws, with the dashed line marking the introduction of the Socialist Laws in October 1878. The data indicate that Social Democrats were able to maintain a significant level of electoral support in spite of the repressive measures and that the laws seem to have failed in weakening Social Democracy as a whole. Although there was a slight setback in the 1881 election, following the enactment of the Socialist Laws, the growth in vote shares continued unabated after the laws were introduced.

Figure 3.1: Vote Share for Social Democrats

Note The graph plots the overall vote share of Social Democratic candidates in national elections prior to and during the Socialist Laws. The grey dashed line marks the enactment of the Socialist Laws. Accordingly, the data points depicted by dots represent elections prior to the enactment of the Socialist Laws and the data points depicted by triangles depict elections during the Socialist Laws.

3.3   DATA

In this paper, I investigate the relationship between state repression towards an opposition group and their support in the population using the historical example of Social Democrats under the Socialist Laws. Exploiting this historical setting, I measure local popular endorsement for the suppressed movement, i.e. Social Democracy, through the vote share attained by Social Democratic candidates. Despite the intense repression faced by Social Democrats during the Socialist Laws, electoral procedures were not altered, maintaining passive voting rights for socialists and access to a low-cost means of expressing support for Social Democracy.[8]

I use censorship verdicts issued by police directorates to quantify local intensity of state repression. Censorship was a significant tool against Social Democracy as information was provided mainly in written form and agitation was carried out mostly through distributing pamphlets during this period. I support the claim that censorship is a suitable proxy for state repression of Social Democrats by showing that censorship and prison sentences imposed on Social Democrats under the Socialist Laws are positively and significantly correlated.

3.3.1   DATA SOURCES

Censorship verdicts of publications under the Socialist Laws are published in Birett (1987), listing censored publications and providing crucial information such as the title, author, publisher, date of censorship, and issuing police directorate. See Appendix Figure 3.B.1 for an extract of this data source. Having digitized these records, I obtain the number of publications that were censored by a given police directorate in a given legislative period. I also retrieve the number of publications that were censored in a given legislative period and *produced* in a given police directorate, irrespective of the place of censorship.

Birett (1987) mainly draws on official gazettes of the German Empire and its member states, where administrative decrees were officially announced, to compile the list of censorship verdicts.[9] This source is particularly reliable since the

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[8]Note that women were excluded from the franchise in the German Empire, which is why I can only measure popular support for Social Democracy among men.

[9]These are mainly published in the German Reichsanzeiger, but the data are occasionally supplemented by the official gazettes of the individual states.

Socialist Laws mandated that all bans be announced in the *Reichsanzeiger* (Reichsministerium des Innern, 1878), implying that there is no selective reporting and that Birett (1987) provides a comprehensive representation of all censorship verdicts in connection to the Socialist Laws.

To link the place of censorship, i.e. the police directorates that issued the verdicts, to the electoral district(s) they govern, I draw on information outlining the area of jurisdiction of police directorates in the different states of the German Empire (Königliches Staatsministerium des Innern, 1878, pp. 377–381). I locate these areas of jurisdiction using information on the Empire's administrative boundaries from Kashin and Ziblatt (2012). Finally, I link electoral districts to these using a shapefile of electoral districts in the German Empire (Blossom and Ziblatt, 2011).

The outcome of interest is Social Democrats' electoral success in national elections, i.e. elections for the German Reichstag. For election results before 1890, I draw on official statistics of the German Empire and digitize the election records.[10] Election results from 1890 onward, along with population figures for the electoral districts and information on absolute and sector-specific employment, are made available online by Schmädeke (2001).

Combining these data sources, I compile a novel panel dataset on electoral support for Social Democratic candidates and local repression of Social Democracy spanning all electoral districts of the Empire. I consider all elections and legislative periods during the validity of the Socialist Laws, that is the elections of 1881, 1884, 1887, and 1890. In addition, I include the election of 1893 since repression under the Socialist Laws occurred in its preceding legislative period as the laws were abolished *after* the 1890 election. This dataset is the basis for my main analysis.

To enrich the data with information on pre-determined local Social Democratic support, I incorporate information from additional sources. First, I draw on the number of members of the ADAV and the SDAP represented at the 1875 founding congress of the Socialist Workers' Party, published in Fricke (1964).[11] Second, I

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[10] *Vierteljahreshefte zur Statistik des Deutschen Reichs* and *Monatshefte zur Statistik des Deutschen Reichs* (Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, 1875; Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, 1879; Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, 1882; Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, 1885; Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, 1887).

[11] Even though this source was published in the Socialist GDR, there is no reason to believe that these data were fabricated for propaganda purposes. First, these data pertain to history and second, I have cross-checked the correctness of the data using female membership records

add data on Social Democratic associations that were dissolved when the Socialist Laws were enacted in 1878 (Auer, 1913). I digitize these data sources and link the information to the respective electoral district, excluding districts that encompass multiple cities, as the information is reported on the city level.

Lastly, I obtain information on the regional distribution of subscribers to the banned party organ *Der Sozialdemokrat* from Fricke (1964), which I digitize and link to the respective police directorate.

3.3.2   Censorship as Proxy for Repression

In my analysis, I exploit censorship of written publications by local police directorates as a measure for gauging repression of social democrats. Several reasons speak for the validity of this approach.

First, circulation of written material was considered the most significant means of agitation and a vital tool for connecting members of the movement, making censorship effective in suppressing the organization (Fricke and Knaack, 1983, pp. 23, 48, 138). Government authorities recognized the critical role of written material for socialist agitation and imposed harsher penalties on violations of censorship verdicts than on participation in illegal socialist meetings.[12]

Second, it is plausible that regions with stricter suppression of social democrats were subject to more police searches, leading to the confiscation of written materials and ultimately censorship. Moreover, in regions with stricter execution of the Socialist Laws the same publication was arguably more likely to be considered censurable. Thus, censorship is likely to be a reliable indicator of the repression that Social Democrats faced at the local level.

To investigate the validity of this claim empirically, I draw on information on the total length of prison sentences imposed against Social Democrats under the Socialist Laws, published in Fricke (1964). These records provide information on the cumulative duration of prison terms specifically handed down to individuals who had violated the Socialist Laws. Digitizing these data and mapping the information to the police directorates, I correlate the total number of censorship

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for the Social Democratic Party, that are also published in Fricke (1964), with a historical party protocol (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, 1910).

[12]The punishment for distributing or printing banned written material was a fine of up to 1,000 marks or imprisonment for up to 6 months, while participation in illegal clubs or assemblies was punishable by a fine of up to 500 marks or imprisonment for up to 3 months.

verdicts issued by a given police directorate in connection to the Socialist Laws with the total length of prison sentences due to violations of the Socialist Laws.

Table 3.1: Censorship and Imprisonment under the Socialist Laws

	Criminal Detention		Investigative Custody	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Number Publications Censored	73.4**	65.5**	32.8***	30.7***
	(32.6)	(27.3)	(6.47)	(5.65)
SD Vote Share Before S.L.	-	✓	-	✓
Observations	125	125	125	125
R^2	0.26	0.27	0.44	0.45

Note Results from estimating an OLS-regression on the cross-section of police directorates. The outcomes are the total days of prison sentences imposed in connection to violations against the Socialist Laws, either for criminal detention, or investigative custody. The explanatory variable of interest is the total number of censored publications under the Socialist Laws. SD Vote Share Before S.L. controls for the average vote share Social Democrats gained in the national elections preceding the Socialist Laws, i.e. in the elections of 1871, 1874, 1877 and 1878. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard-errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

The results suggest that censorship is indeed a good indicator for repression of social democrats by police directorates. Specifically, Table 3.1 indicates a positive and significant correlation between censorship and imprisonment in connection to the Socialist Laws both for preventive custody (significant at the 5 percent level) and criminal detention (significant at the 1 percent level). Columns 2 and 4 of Table 3.1 show that the correlations persist when accounting for Social Democratic support prior to the enactment of the Socialist Laws. This indicates that the positive association between censorship and imprisonment does not spuriously pick up that locations with more censorship and imprisonment exhibit stronger ex-ante diffusion of the Social Democratic movement. Thus, censorship is a meaningful measure, correlating with a tangible form of repression felt by individuals: imprisonment.

3.3.3   Summary Statistics

Table 3.2 reports summary statistics for the measures used in my analyses. Across the 397 electoral districts and the five elections affected by the Socialist Laws, Social Democratic candidates receive an average of 10.83% of the votes, with a 10% probability of advancing to a runoff election and a 6% probability of winning

a mandate, on average. The average turnout per electoral district and election is 67.44%.

Censorship occurs in 57% of electoral districts and legislative periods, with an average of 4.94 publications being censored per electoral district and legislative period. An average of 2.57 socialist publications prohibited in a given legislative period was published per electoral district.

In the elections prior to the enactment of the Socialist Laws, Social Democratic candidates receive on average 5.82% of the votes. This share is slightly higher in the last election before the laws were enacted, the 1878 election, averaging 6.03%. In the elections leading up to the Socialist Laws, the Social Democratic vote share increased by an average of 0.99 percentage points. For the sample of electoral districts that do not lie in large cities with multiple electoral districts,[13] the average number of members represented in the founding congress of the Socialist Worker's Party of Germany is 74.24, and an average of 0.44 Socialist associations were dissolved (or dissolved themselves) in compliance with the Socialist Laws in 1878.

In 1875, the average population of electoral districts is approximately 107,611. By 1895, the average number of employed citizens per electoral district is 56,041, with 33.7% of them employed in the industry sector. 22% of electoral districts housed the headquarters of a police directorate.

During the 12 years in which the Socialist Laws were valid, police directorates impose an average of 639 days of investigative custody and 1,731 days of criminal detention in connection with violations of the laws. On average, 42% of police directorates contain at least one location where the illegal party newspaper *Der Sozialidemokrat* is distributed in 1888, and 0.79 places are subscribed per police directorate in 1888. Between 1887 and 1890, *Der Sozialidemokrat* has an average of 43.11 subscribers per police directorate.

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[13]Membership figures for the founding congress of the SAP and information on socialist associations are only available at the city level. Consequently, it is not possible to map the data into electoral districts in cases where cities contain multiple districts.

Table 3.2: Summary Statistics

	N	Mean	SD
Electoral Districts			
Election Outcomes			
Vote Share Social Democrats (%)	1985	10.83	15.29
Runoff with Social Democrat	1985	0.10	0.30
Mandate Social Democrat	1985	0.06	0.24
Turnout (%)	1985	67.44	12.74
Censorship and Publications			
Dummy Censorship	1985	0.57	0.5
Number Censored Publications	1985	4.94	15.70
Number Publications Produced	1985	2.57	10.69
Measures Support for SD Pre Laws			
Average Vote Share for SD Before (%)	397	5.82	10.42
Vote Share for SD 1878 (%)	397	6.03	12.06
Average Growth in Vote Share for SD Pre (%-pt.)	397	0.99	3.24
Members represented in Party Congress 1875	381	74.24	178.96
Number Dissolved Associations 1878	381	0.44	1.33
Other			
Population 1875	397	107,610.76	23,282.71
Number Employed 1895	397	56,040.9	22,501.56
Share Employed in Industry 1895	397	33.7	15.31
Houses the Headquarters of Police Directorate	397	0.22	0.42
Police Directorates			
Imprisonment in Connection with the Socialist Laws			
Days Investigative Custoday	125	639.34	2,111.91
Days Criminal Detention	125	1,731.18	6,135.42
Distribution of Der Sozialdemokrat			
Dummy Place Subscribed 1888	125	0.42	0.5
Number Places Subscribed 1888	125	0.79	1.32
Average Subscribers 1887-1890	125	43.11	175.83

Note Data sources see text. The German Empire was divided into 125 police directorates and had 397 electoral districts. In cases where the number of electoral districts is smaller, this is because the data were reported on the city level and cities are excluded, when they are divided into multiple electoral districts, i.e. Berlin, Breslau, Dresden, Hamburg and Munich. The Socialist Laws impacted 5 electoral periods.

3.4 REGRESSION SET-UP

In this paper, I investigate the relationship between government repression of opposition groups and popular endorsement of these groups. To do so, I estimate the association between censorship by local police authorities and electoral success of Social Democrats in a given electoral district and election. Formally, I estimate the following regression model:

$$Y_{dpt} = \beta \cdot Censorship_{pt} + \alpha_d + \delta_t$$
$$+ \gamma \cdot Publications_{pt} + \sum_t \boldsymbol{v'_t} \cdot \boldsymbol{X_d} \times \delta_t + \epsilon_{dpt} \quad (3.1)$$

Y_{dpt} denotes outcome Y in election t and electoral district d, that is under the jurisdiction of police directorate p. Specifically, Y is either the vote share of the Social Democratic candidate, a dummy indicating whether the Social Democratic candidate advances to a runoff election, a dummy indicating whether a Social Democrat wins the mandate for the electoral district, or voter turnout.

$Censorship_{pt}$ serves as proxy for repression and quantifies censorship verdicts under the Socialist Laws between election t and the previous election, $t - 1$, i.e. in the legislative period preceding election t. It represents either a dummy indicator that turns 1 if the police directorate governing the electoral district has censored any publication in connection to the Socialist Laws in the preceding legislative period and 0 otherwise, or the natural logarithm of 1+ the number of publications that have been censored by the police directorate responsible for the electoral district.

α_d and δ_t are electoral district and election fixed effects, respectively. Electoral district fixed effects account for differences between electoral districts that affect Social Democratic electoral success in a constant manner across elections. Thus, α_d captures constant factors that are correlated with repression and with electoral success of Social Democrats and would otherwise bias the results, like underlying economic conditions of electoral districts. The election fixed effect δ_t absorbs shocks and developments in success for Social Democrats that are common to all electoral districts within a legislative period.

One concern is that more censorship by police authorities may simply reflect a higher local supply of socialist publications in a given police directorate. I address

this concern by accounting for the supply of written publications with socialist content: $Publications_{pt}$ controls for the number of publications that are censored in the preceding legislative period by any of the police directorates in the Empire, but were published within the police directorate governing the respective electoral district. Note that publications could be censored by police directorates independent of where they were published, enabling me to hold constant the supply of publications in a given police directorate. However, the data on publications only pertains to those that are censored. As such, the number of publications published in a district is conditional on their censorship by any police directorate in the Empire.[14]

In this standard panel model, β captures the causal effect of repression if no third factor exists, that has an effect on Social Democratic vote shares in period t and is correlated with repression in *any* of the periods. Initial support for Social Democrats is presumably an important determinant of Social Democratic vote shares and is also likely to be correlated with repression. As it cannot be reasonably assumed that the effect of initial support for Social Democracy on election outcomes is constant over the sample period, this factor is presumably not absorbed by the electoral district fixed effects. Therefore, I allow initial support for Social Democracy, prior to the enactment of the Socialist Laws, to have differential effects across elections and thereby capture period specific effects of latent socialist support. The vector X_d, which is interacted with a set of election dummies δ_t, contains the average vote share of the Social Democrats in the elections before the enactment of the Socialist Law.

Similarly, population size might be an important time-varying factor explaining Social Democratic electoral success. Initially, the support base for Social Democracy was concentrated in the working-class milieus of large, industrial cities and with time social democrats began to agitate rural workers as well. Since police repression might be correlated with urbanization, I flexibly control for population in 1875, i.e. the last census prior to the enactment of the Socialist Laws, by including this measure in X_d as well.

In conclusion, the coefficient of interest, β, captures the association between local

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[14]The number of publications produced in a given location could be considered a potential outcome of repression. Thus, for all analyses conducted, I present results for alternatively using the number of publications produced in a police directorate in the first legislative period after the enactment of the Socialist Laws, interacted with election fixed effects, instead of using $Publications_{pt}$ as a control variable. The results are shown in Appendix Section 3.A.

repression and electoral success of Social Democrats. I estimate β by exploiting variation in censorship within an electoral district, holding constant the effect of supply of socialist publications, initial support for Social Democracy and initial population size.[15] ϵ_{dpt} is clustered at the level of the police directorate, i.e. the level of treatment.

3.5 RESULTS

Repression and Election Outcomes

To begin with, I focus on the vote share for Social Democratic candidates in elections. Panel A of Table 3.3 shows the association between repression and electoral success on the extensive margin, obtained from estimating equation 3.1 and gradually including the control variables. The explanatory variable is a dummy indicating whether a given electoral district was subject to any censorship between election t and election $t-1$, that is in the legislative period preceding election t.

The results point to a positive association between the vote share of the Social Democrats and repression. The estimate in column 1 shows the result from the model that includes electoral district and election fixed effects and indicates that censorship in the previous legislative period is associated with a 1.13 percentage points higher vote share for the Social Democratic candidate (significant at the 10 percent level). In column 2, I add the number of publications that were produced in the area of jurisdiction of police directorate p, responsible for electoral district d, and censored in the previous legislative period. The model presented in column 3 additionally includes a set of interaction terms between the average vote share for the Social Democrats before the Socialist Laws came into effect and election fixed effects. The obtained coefficients in columns 2 and 3 are slightly larger than the coefficient in column 1 and both significant at the 5 percent level.

My preferred specification includes all control variables and is presented in column 4. The obtained coefficient indicates that censorship in the preceding legislative period is associated with a 1.2 percentage points higher vote share for the Social Democrats in a given election (significant at the 5 percent level). This amounts to an increase of approximately 11.1 percent relative to the mean vote share of

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[15]Note that I do not include contemporaneous population size, as selective migration in response to repression might make this a potential outcome.

Table 3.3: Repression and Electoral Success for the Social Democrats

	SD Vote Share (%)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Extensive Margin				
Censored	1.13*	1.19**	1.16**	1.20**
	(0.586)	(0.576)	(0.552)	(0.544)
R^2	0.855	0.858	0.875	0.875
Panel B: Intensive Margin				
Ln(Number Publications Censored)	0.176	0.606*	0.842***	0.856***
	(0.379)	(0.316)	(0.266)	(0.269)
R^2	0.854	0.858	0.875	0.876
Electoral District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Election FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Number Publications	-	✓	✓	✓
SD Vote Share Before	-	-	✓	✓
Population Before	-	-	-	✓
Observations	1,985	1,985	1,985	1,985
Elections	5	5	5	5
Electoral Districts	397	397	397	397

Note Results from estimating equation 3.1. The outcome is the vote share of the Social Democratic candidate. Censored is a dummy that equals 1 if censorship took place, Ln(Number Publications Censored) is the natural logarithm of 1+ the number of publications that were censored, in the legislative period preceding the election by the police directorate responsible for the electoral district. All regressions include electoral district and election fixed effects. Number Publications controls for the number of publications censored in the preceding legislative period that were published in the police directorate. SD Vote Share Before controls for the average vote share for Social Democrats in the elections prior to the enactment of the Socialist Laws, Population Before controls for the electoral district's population in 1875, both by being interacted with a set of election fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the police directorate. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Social Democrats over the sample period.

Panel B of Table 3.3 sheds light on the effect of repression intensity, presenting the results of estimating equation 3.1 with the explanatory variable being the natural logarithm of 1+ the number of censored publications in the legislative period preceding the given election. The coefficient estimates are all positive and except for the coefficient that stems from solely including electoral district and election fixed effects (column 1) statistically significant at conventional levels. Controlling for the number of publications produced in a given police directorate, the coefficient estimate increases to 0.606 and is statistically significant at the 10% level. In columns 3 and 4, I add average support for the Social Democrats before

the enactment of the Socialist Laws and population size in 1875 as flexible control variables, respectively. The coefficients increase further and are statistically significant at the 1% level. The richest and preferred specification suggests that with every increase in censorship verdicts by 10% Social Democratic candidates on average achieve a higher vote share of approximately 0.082 percentage points $(ln(1.1) \times 0.856 \approx 0.082)$. Put differently, moving from the 25th percentile of censorship verdicts to the 75th percentile is associated with an increase in Social Democratic vote shares of 1.38 percentage points on average.[16]

Taking the evidence presented in Table 3.3 together, I find a positive association between government repression and support for Social Democracy after controlling for electoral district and election fixed effects, latent support for Social Democracy, population size, and the number of publications produced in the respective police directorate. The relationship holds both at the extensive and intensive margin of repression. Moving forward, in the interest of parsimony I will only display regression results with the full set of control variables as this specification accounts for the largest set of potential confounders.

The finding that repression of the Social Democratic movement is associated with increased electoral support raises the question whether repression also correlates with the composition of the parliament. To shed light on this, I examine the probability that a Social Democrat advances to compete in a runoff election[17] and the probability of an electoral district ultimately being represented by a Social Democrat, via the first or a runoff election. To do so, I construct the corresponding dummy variables, i.e. a dummy that equals 1 if a Social Democratic candidate takes part in a run-off election in electoral district d and election t and 0 otherwise, and a dummy that equals 1 if a Social Democrat gains the mandate and 0 otherwise. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.4 present the results from estimating equation 3.1 on the respective outcome. There is no statistically significant correlation between the outcomes considered and repression, neither at the extensive nor at the intensive margin, as the coefficients of interest are close to zero and insignificant.

I additionally explore the impact of repression on voter turnout. Column 3 of

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[16]The 25th percentile of censorship verdicts is 0, the 75th percentile of censorship verdicts is 4 (unreported).

[17]Elections for the national parliament were held according to absolute majority rule, i.e. if no candidate gained more than 50% of votes in the first ballot, the two candidates with the most votes would participate in a runoff election.

Table 3.4 shows that voter turnout does not seem to be affected by repression, as evidenced by the insignificant coefficient estimates. I provide the results from gradually adding control variables in Appendix Table 3.A.2, that also consistently point towards repression being not significantly related to the composition of the parliament or voter turnout.

Table 3.4: Repression and Election Outcomes

	Runoff with SD (1)	Mandate for SD (2)	Voter Turnout (%) (3)
Panel A: Extensive Margin			
Censored	0.008	0.0005	-0.031
	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.817)
R^2	0.338	0.567	0.736
Panel B: Intensive Margin			
Ln(Number Publications Censored)	-0.002	-0.000	0.281
	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.446)
R^2	0.338	0.567	0.737
Electoral District FE	✓	✓	✓
Election FE	✓	✓	✓
All Controls	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,985	1,985	1,985
Elections	5	5	5
Electoral Districts	397	397	397

Note Results from estimating equation 3.1. The outcome is either a dummy indicating whether the Social Democratic candidate advanced to a runoff election (1), a dummy indicating whether the Social Democrat gained the mandate (2), or voter turnout (3). Censored is a dummy that equals 1 if censorship took place, Ln(Number Publications Censored) is the natural logarithm of 1+ the number of publications that were censored, in the legislative period preceding the election by the police directorate responsible for the electoral district. All regressions include electoral district and election fixed effects. Number Publications controls for the number of publications censored in the preceding legislative period that were published in the police directorate. SD Vote Share Before controls for the average vote share of Social Democrats in the elections prior to the enactment of the Socialist Laws, Population Before controls for the electoral district's population in 1875, both by being interacted with a set of election fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the police directorate. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Further Evidence for increased Support for Social Democracy

The observed positive association between state repression and vote shares for Social Democratic candidates suggests that state coercion might have had the unintended consequence of sparking backlash in the population. As Nipperdey (2013, p. 400) argues, the Socialist Laws failed to erode support for Social Democ-

racy in the German Empire as repression strengthened identification and support
among the working-class. He declares the laws a failure, being counterproduc-
tive in achieving their intended goal of reducing support for Social Democracy.
Several pieces of historical evidence further support this view. As an illustration,
the police chief of Berlin during the period of the Socialist Laws stated:

> "In a certain sense, the law itself provides a valuable means of agi-
> tation, as evidence of the alleged harshness and injustice with which
> the 'workers' are treated by the ruling classes."[18]

Another piece of historical evidence illustrating that contemporaries were already
expressing doubts about the effectiveness of this policy stems from a parliamen-
tary speech by Ludwig Windthorst, a prominent member of the Centrum faction:

> "I am firmly convinced [...] that this law has significantly strength-
> ened the Social Democratic Party internally; that it has made people
> even more bitter and led them to secret, more sinister ways. I have
> to proclaim this universally: a sore grows stronger the less it is ex-
> posed, therefore any sensible medicine will believe that the best way
> to eliminate sores is to expose them. This applies to physical as well
> as moral ills."[19]

Not only supporters of the opposing camp but also Social Democrats themselves
believed that the Socialist Laws achieved the opposite of their intended purpose,
as is for instance illustrated by caricatures of that time (see Appendix Section
3.C for two examples). This sentiment was also captured in an article in *Der
Sozialdemokrat* on the occasion of the persecution of Social Democrats in Den-
mark. The article states that repressive measures against Social Democracy have
always achieved the opposite of what they intended and reinforces the argument
by referring to German Social Democracy as evidence (Der Sozialdemokrat, 05.
October 1879).

Furthermore, at an illegal party congress the Social Democratic leadership made
a notable declaration stating that the areas facing the most intense repression
were precisely the areas where Social Democrats were motivated the most and
where the illegal newspaper *Der Sozialdemokrat* was distributed most intensely

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[18]Fricke and Knaack (1983, p.240).
[19]Reichstag des Deutschen Reichs (1880, pp. 805-806).

(Herrmann, Heinze, and Rüdiger, 1980, p. 11).

Digitizing micro-data on the distribution of *Der Sozialdemokrat*, I investigate whether this claim is indeed plausible. I run a regression on the cross-section of police directorates where the explanatory variable is the natural logarithm of 1+ the overall number of publications censored under the Socialist Laws. The outcome variables are the average number of subscribers to the illegal newspaper between 1887 and 1890, the number of locations subscribed, and a dummy variable indicating whether at least one place is subscribed to *Der Sozialdemokrat* within the police directorate. The latter two variables are measured in 1888, i.e. close to the abolishment of the Socialist Laws.

The results in Table 3.5 suggest that there is indeed a positive and significant association between repression intensity and the distribution of the newspaper, thereby lending credence to the assertions made by party leaders. The positive and significant association between repression intensity and subscriptions to *Der Sozialdemokrat* also holds when controlling for the average vote share attained by Social Democrats in the elections prior to the onset of repression under the Socialist Laws.

Table 3.5: Der Sozialdemokrat

	Average Subscribers 1887-1890		Number Places subscribed		Dummy Place subscribed	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Ln(Number Publications Censored)	60.8**	44.7**	0.478***	0.463***	0.222***	0.201***
	(26.0)	(19.8)	(0.095)	(0.097)	(0.021)	(0.027)
SD Vote Share Before	-	✓	-	✓	-	✓
Observations	125	125	125	125	125	125
R^2	0.23	0.36	0.26	0.25	0.40	0.42

Note Results from estimating an OLS-regressions on the cross-section of police directorates. The outcomes are the average number of subscribers to the newspaper in the period between 1887 and 1890 (1 and 2), the number of places subscribed in a given police directorate in 1888 (3 and 4), and a dummy indicating that at least one place was subscribed in the area of a police directorate in 1888 (5 and 6). The explanatory variable of interest in the natural logarithm of 1 + the overall number of censored publications in the respective police directorate during the validity of the Socialist Laws, i.e. from 1878 to 1890. SD Vote Share Before controls for the average vote share the Social Democrats gained in the police district in the national elections before the Socialist Laws were enacted, i.e. in the elections of 1871, 1874, 1877 and 1878. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard-errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

3.6   Heterogeneity

In this section, I examine whether the association between repression and vote shares of Social Democratic candidates is specific to large cities or electoral dis-

tricts that host the headquarters of a police directorate. To do so, I assess whether the results exhibit heterogeneity along these dimensions.

Focusing on the role of large cities first, I identify cities with a population of over 250,000 and 150,000 inhabitants in 1880[20] and define corresponding dummy variables that denote whether a given electoral district is located within such a city. These variables are added to equation 3.1 by interacting them with my respective measure of repression.

Column 1 (250,000 inhabitants) and column 2 (150,000 inhabitants) of Table 3.6 display the results and show that the relationship between censorship and vote shares of Social Democratic candidates is not driven by large cities. The coefficients on the censorship measures remain positive, significant (5 percent level in panel A, 1 percent level in panel B) and similar in magnitude to the baseline estimates presented in column 4 of Table 3.3. The coefficient estimates on the interaction terms are not statistically significant, indicating that the relationship does not differ for electoral districts located in large cities.

Next, I investigate the possibility that the relationship between repression and vote shares is mostly driven by electoral districts hosting the headquarters of the police directorate. To do so, I estimate equation 3.1, additionally including an interaction term between a dummy variable indicating whether a particular electoral district hosts the headquarters of the police directorate and the respective variable quantifying repression in the preceding legislative period.

The results in column 3 of Table 3.6 indicate that the positive association between repression and popular endorsement of Social Democracy is not specific to electoral districts hosting the head office of the police directorate. The association between repression and electoral success in electoral districts without headquarters is significant, however slightly smaller in magnitude compared to the baseline estimates in Table 3.3 at both the extensive and the intensive margin of repression. The coefficients on the interaction terms on the other hand are not statistically significant, indicating that I cannot reject that there is no distinct effect in electoral districts with headquarters.

Taking the evidence presented in Table 3.6 together, the main results are not specific to large cities or electoral districts hosting headquarters of the police directorates.

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[20]1880 is the closest census to the implementation of the Socialist Laws.

Table 3.6: Heterogeneity

	SD Vote Share (%)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Extensive Margin			
Censored	1.18**	1.19**	1.04*
	(0.544)	(0.545)	(0.590)
Censored × Larger 250k	4.02		
	(3.35)		
Censored × Larger 150k		1.26	
		(3.65)	
Censored × Head of Police Directorate			0.654
			(0.800)
R²	0.875	0.875	0.875
Panel B: Intensive Margin			
Ln(Number Publications Censored)	0.890***	0.898***	0.718**
	(0.272)	(0.274)	(0.273)
Ln(Number Publications Censored) × Larger 250k	-0.908		
	(0.643)		
Ln(Number Publications Censored) × Larger 150k		-0.731	
		(0.745)	
Ln(Number Publications Censored) × Head of Police Directorate			0.715
			(0.440)
R²	0.876	0.876	0.876
Electoral District FE	✓	✓	✓
Election Period FE	✓	✓	✓
All Controls	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,985	1,985	1,985
Elections	5	5	5
Electoral Districts	397	397	397

Note Results from estimating equation 3.1, additionally including an interaction term between the respective measure for repression and a dummy indicating that the electoral district is part of a city with a population larger than 250 thousand (1), larger than 150 thousand (2), or hosts the headquarters of the police directorate (3). The outcome is the vote share of the Social Democratic candidate. Censored is a dummy that equals 1 if censorship took place, Ln(Numbers Publications Censored) is the natural logarithm of 1+ the number of publications that were censored, in the legislative period preceding the election by the police directorate responsible for the electoral district. All regressions include electoral district and election fixed effects. All controls include the number of publications censored in the preceding legislative period that were published in the police directorate, the average vote share of Social Democrats in the elections prior to the enactment of the Socialist Laws, and the electoral district's population in 1875. The latter two are interacted with a set of election fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the police directorate. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

3.7   ROBUSTNESS

Pre-Determined Support for Social Democracy

Thus far, I have measured pre-determined support for Social Democracy with the average vote share that Social Democrats gained in a given electoral district in the elections prior to the enactment of the Socialist Laws. To examine the robustness of my results with respect to my choice of proxy, I use different mea-

Table 3.7: Repression and Vote Shares, other Pre-Support

	SD Vote Share (%)			
	(1) %1878	(2) Members	(3) #Associations	(4) SD Trend pre
Panel A: Extensive Margin				
Censored	1.31**	1.26**	1.31**	1.21**
	(0.564)	(0.566)	(0.571)	(0.539)
R²	0.869	0.849	0.846	0.875
Panel B: Intensive Margin				
Ln(Number Publications Censored)	0.852***	0.727**	0.702**	0.884***
	(0.282)	(0.301)	(0.336)	(0.263)
R²	0.870	0.843	0.838	0.876
Electoral District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Election FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Number Publications	✓	✓	✓	✓
Population Before	✓	✓	✓	✓
SD Vote Share 1878	✓	-	-	-
Members Founding Congress	-	✓	-	-
Number Associations Closed in 1878	-	-	✓	-
SD Tend Before	-	-	-	✓
Observations	1,985	1,905	1,905	1,985
Elections	5	5	5	5
Electoral Districts	397	381	381	397

Note Results from estimating equation 3.1, but instead of including the average vote share of Social Democrats prior to the Socialist Laws, controlling for different measures of pre-determined support for Social Democracy, all interacted with a set of election FE. These measures are the vote share attained by the Social Democrats in the last election before the Socialist Laws (1), the number of members of the SDAP and the ADAV represented at the SAP's founding congress (2), the number of socialist associations dissolved in 1878 (3), or the average growth in electoral support for Social Democrats before the Socialist Laws (4). The outcome is the vote share of the Social Democratic candidate. Censored is a dummy that equals 1 if censorship took place, Ln(Number Publications Censored) is the natural logarithm of 1+ the number of publications that were censored, in the legislative period preceding the election by the police directorate responsible for the electoral district. All regressions include electoral district and election fixed effects. Number Publications controls for the number of publications censored in the preceding legislative period that were published in the police directorate. Population Before controls for the electoral district's population in 1875 by being interacted with a set of election FE. Standard errors clustered at level of police directorates. Significance: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

sures of pre-determined, local support for Social Democracy and rerun equation 3.1 with those instead of my baseline proxy. Note that all of the measures for pre-determined support considered are constant over the sample period, which is why I interact them with a set of election dummies, respectively. Table 3.7 displays the coefficients derived from the modified regression models.

As an initial alternative measure to gauge pre-determined support for the movement, I utilize the Social Democratic vote share in the last election preceding the

implementation of the Socialist Laws, i.e. the election of 1878 (column 1). For both the extensive and intensive margin, the results are qualitatively and quantitatively comparable to the baseline estimates presented in Table 3.3. Likewise, when I use the number of members of the General German Workers' Association (ADAV) and the Social Democratic Workers' Party (SDAP) represented at the founding congress of the Social Democratic Workers' Party (SAP) in 1875 as a proxy (column 2), the results are similar to the baseline estimates. The same applies to using the number of socialist associations that were dissolved in 1878 in each electoral district in compliance with the Socialist Laws (column 3). Note that data on the number of members represented at the founding congress of the SAP and the count of socialist associations are solely available at the city level. Thus, in cases where a city consists of multiple electoral districts the data do not allow to assign the corresponding values to a district. I drop these cases from the analysis, resulting in the lower number of observations available for estimating the models presented in columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.7.

Lastly, column 4 of Table 3.7 presents evidence for relying on the average growth in the vote share for Social Democrats in the elections prior to the Socialist Laws as a proxy for pre-determined support. Doing so yields similar results to the baseline specification in Table 3.3, both in terms of censorship at the extensive and at the intensive margin.

Taken together, my results are robust to using alternative measures of pre-determined support for the Social Democrats prior to the enactment of the Socialist Laws.

Threats to Identification

State repression does not usually take place at random intensity but is targeted, following some underlying rules. This raises concerns about the causal nature of the positive association between government repression and vote shares of Social Democratic candidates. For instance, government authorities might specifically apply coercive policies in locations that exhibit more activities of Socialists. In the particular context of measuring repression through censorship verdicts, censorship is more likely in places where the supply of socialist literature is higher. At the same time, prevalence of socialist activities is presumably correlated with electoral outcomes of Social Democratic candidates.

To account for this source of bias, I control for pre-determined support for Social Democracy and the number of socialist publications produced in a given location. In addition, I control for electoral district fixed effects, which absorb all factors influencing electoral success of Social Democrats in a constant manner. The impact of population size on Social Democratic electoral success presumably varies across elections due to the movement being initially more successful among urban workers and over time expanding agitation efforts to rural areas, which is why I also flexibly control for population size before the enactment of the Socialist Laws.

For third factors to bias the coefficient estimates, they would need to violate the conditional strict exogeneity assumption underling causal identification in panel settings. That is, they would have to influence Social Democratic vote shares and be correlated with repression in any one of the periods, but not captured by the control variables or fixed effects.

Potentially, labor market characteristics such as the number of employed workers or the share on industrial workers could violate this assumption: The social democratic support base consisted primarily of the working-class. Therefore, repressive strategies might differ between electoral districts depending on the stock of employed workers or the share of workers employed in the industry. If the effect of these labor market factors varies across elections, they are not absorbed by the electoral district fixed effects. To address this concern, I control for the number of employed workers in an electoral district and the share of workers employed in the industry, or both. I have data available for the year 1895 and include these control variables by adding them to X_d in equation 3.1, respectively. A caveat to this approach is that these variables are measured *after* the Socialist Laws were enacted and can therefore be considered as a potential outcome. The results from this exercise should therefore be treated with caution.

The estimates presented in Table 3.8 indicate that the positive relationship between repression and vote shares of Social Democrats is robust to controlling for both the number of employed workers and the share of industrial workers in an electoral district, separately and jointly. All coefficients are positive and significant, although the results for censorship at the extensive margin in panel A of columns 2 and 3 are borderline significant at the 10 percent level with p-values of 0.058 and 0.057, respectively.

Table 3.8: Controlling for Workers

	SD Vote Share (%)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Extensive Margin			
Censored	1.22**	1.09*	1.09*
	(0.549)	(0.565)	(0.568)
R^2	0.877	0.884	0.885
Panel B: Intensive Margin			
Ln(Number Publications Censored)	0.803***	0.861***	0.803***
	(0.294)	(0.276)	(0.300)
R^2	0.885	0.878	0.886
Electoral District FE	✓	✓	✓
Election FE	✓	✓	✓
All Controls	✓	✓	✓
Share Workers in Industry 1895	✓	-	✓
Employed Workers 1895	-	✓	✓
Observations	1,985	1,985	1,985
Elections	5	5	5
Electoral Districts	397	397	397

Note Results from estimating equation 3.1, additionally controlling for the share of workers employed in the industry in 1895 (1), or the number of employed workers in a given electoral district in 1895 (2), or both (3). Both variables are interacted with a set of election dummies. The outcome is the vote share of the Social Democratic candidate. Censored is a dummy that equals 1 if censorship took place, Ln(Number Publications Censored) is the natural logarithm of 1+ the number of publications that were censored, in the legislative period preceding the election by the police directorate responsible for the electoral district. All regressions include electoral district and election fixed effects. All controls include the number of publications censored in the preceding legislative period that were published in the police directorate, the average vote share of Social Democrats in the elections prior to the enactment of the Socialist Laws, and the electoral-district's population in 1875. The latter two are interacted with a set of election fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the police directorate. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

A considerable threat to the causal interpretation of the results is the possibility of repression being adjusted to electoral success of Social Democrats in the last election and electoral support of Social Democrats also influencing election results in the subsequent election. In this case, Social Democratic vote shares in $t-1$ would be an omitted variable biasing the results.

One seemingly natural remedy is controlling for the vote share of Social Democrats in the preceding election, i.e. the lagged dependent variable. However, given the potential for serial correlation in the error terms, this approach

would necessarily create a correlation between the error term and the explanatory variable, producing inconsistent estimates.[21] Instead, I follow the approach suggested by Angrist and Pischke (2009) and bound the coefficient of interest from below and above. I interpret the fixed effects estimator as upper bound and the estimate of a model without electoral district fixed effects but including the lagged dependent variable instead as lower bound.

Table 3.9: Bounding Exercise

	SD Vote Share (%)			
	Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Censored	1.17***	1.20**		
	(0.311)	(0.543)		
Ln(# Publications Censored)			0.370	0.856***
			(0.227)	(0.268)
R^2	0.884	0.875	0.883	0.876
SD Vote Share$_{t-1}$	✓	-	✓	-
Electoral District FE	-	✓	-	✓
Election FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
All Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,985	1,985	1,985	1,985
Elections	5	5	5	5
Electoral Districts	397	397	397	397

Note Results from estimating an equation as laid out in 3.1 (columns 2 and 4), or from estimating equation 3.1, with the first lag of the dependent variable instead of the electoral district FE (columns 1 and 3). The outcome is the vote share of the Social Democratic candidate. Censored is a dummy that equals 1 if censorship took place, Ln(Number Publications Censored) is the natural logarithm of 1+ the number of publications that were censored in the legislative period preceding the election by the police directorate responsible for the electoral district. All regressions include election fixed effects. All controls includes the number of publications censored in the preceding legislative period that were published in the police directorate, the average vote share for Social Democrats in the elections prior to the enactment of the Socialist Laws, and the electoral district's population in 1875. The latter two are interacted with a set of election fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the police directorate. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

The results are presented in Table 3.9, both for repression at the extensive and intensive margin. Columns 1 and 3 exclude the electoral district fixed effects α_i but include the first lag of the dependent variable, i.e. $Y_{dp(t-1)}$, in regression model 3.1. The coefficients from estimating these models constitute the respective lower bound. Estimates presented in columns 2 and 4 reproduce the baseline

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[21]It is worth noting that the inclusion of Social Democratic vote shares prior to the enactment of the Socialist Laws should not lead to the same issue, as Social Democratic support before the enactment of the Socialist Laws was subject to a different data generating process than thereafter. In addition, my results also hold when using other measures of pre-determined support for Social Democracy, as shown in Table 3.7.

estimates, i.e. the estimates resulting from estimating the regression as laid out in equation 3.1 (see Table 3.3) and constitute the upper bound.

The lower bound estimate for the dummy indicator for censorship in column 1 is only slightly smaller than the corresponding coefficient in column 2 and significant at the 1 percent level. The lower bound estimate for the intensive margin of repression in column 3 is substantially smaller than the corresponding upper bound in column 4 and borderline insignificant with a p-value of 0.106. According to this bounding exercise, the true causal effect lies between the estimates in columns 1 and 2 and columns 3 and 4, respectively, suggesting that it is positive.

As a final test, I investigate whether the timing of the results aligns with the Socialist Laws. To do so, I use the sample of all elections in the German Empire. Formally, I estimate the following regression model:

$$VoteShareSD_{pdt} = \sum_t \beta_t \cdot Repression_p \times \delta_t + \alpha_d + \delta_t + \epsilon_{pdt} \qquad (3.2)$$

where $VoteShareSD_{pdt}$ is the vote share for the Social Democrats in electoral district d, that is governed by police directorate p, in election t. $Repression_p$ is a dummy that is 1 if censorship takes place under the Socialist Laws by the police directorate responsible for electoral district d, and 0 if no censorship occurs under the Socialist Laws. The coefficients of interest are denoted by the set of β_ts, capturing how vote shares for Social Democratic candidates have evolved over time in electoral districts where censorship takes place under the Socialist Laws relative to electoral districts where this is not the case. I omit the election in 1878 as this is the last election before the enactment of the Socialist Laws. α_d and δ_t are electoral district and election fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the police directorate.

Figure 3.2 shows that the effect of repression only sets in after the Socialist Laws are enacted, while no differential evolution of Social Democratic electoral success is uncovered prior to the enactment of the Laws. The effect gradually increases throughout the validity period of the laws and the differences in the evolution of vote shares across electoral districts diminish over time, starting with the abolishment of the laws. This pattern is fully consistent with the positive association found being driven by the Socialist Laws.

Figure 3.2: Dynamics of Censorship and Vote Shares of Social Democrats

Note The graph plots the coefficients and 90% confidence intervals that result from estimating equation 3.2. The outcome is the vote share of the Social Democratic candidate in a given electoral district in a national election. The explanatory variables of interest are the set of interaction terms between a dummy that equals 1 if censorship takes place in the given electoral district during the Socialist Laws and election fixed effects. The regression controls for electoral district and election fixed effects. The election in 1878 is the omitted category, being the last election before the Socialist Laws are enacted. The red vertical lines mark the enactment and abolishment of the Socialist Laws, respectively. The election in 1893 is the last election affected by censorship, as the Socialist Laws are still in place during its preceding legislative period.

3.8   POTENTIAL MECHANISMS

After documenting a positive association between repression and electoral success of Social Democracy, the next question concerns the underlying forces driving this finding. Historical accounts, particularly police surveillance reports, provide valuable insights into the activities of Social Democrats during the Socialist Laws. I highlight several key factors that might explain why greater repression is associated with increased support for Social Democracy. It is important to note that these mechanisms may also interact and complement each other rather than

operating in isolation.

Identification with Social Democracy

Nipperdey (2013, pp. 357, 400) argues that the shared experience of repression under the Socialist Laws has fostered a strong sense of identification with the Social Democratic movement among its supporters, leading to their quasi-religious attachment to Social Democracy. Police surveillance records of the time also suggest that individuals expressed their identification with the movement through visible symbols, such as wearing red ribbons or shawls, indicating that membership in the Social Democratic movement had become a fundamental aspect of their personal identity (Fricke and Knaack, 1983, p. 294).

According to Akerlof and Kranton (2000), an individual's identity can significantly influence their actions by altering the payoff of those actions. Repression strengthening social democratic identification may therefore explain Social Democrats' increased willingness to agitate, make sacrifices, risk jail sentences and being hailed as martyrs in such cases, as was observed by contemporaries (Fricke and Knaack, 1983, p. 326). At an illegal party congress, the party leadership emphasized the crucial role of intense agitation and exceptional motivation of Social Democratic members, particularly observed in areas facing severe repression, in the party's electoral success (Herrmann, Heinze, and Rüdiger, 1980, p. 11). The mobilization of resources has plausibly contributed to more effective election campaigns and increased electoral support for the Social Democratic party.

In this sense, repression may have had the unintended consequence of reinforcing the identity and mobilization of Social Democrats, ultimately enhancing agitation efforts and thereby strengthening the party's electoral outcomes.

Moderation and Interaction with other Social Milieus

Social Democrats strategically used non-political associations as a cover to meet with fellow Social Democrats. By participating in events and meetings of these unrelated associations, they were able to create new points of contact and expand their networks into other social milieus (Fricke and Knaack, 1983, pp. 8, 36, 52, 70). To additionally avoid attracting unwanted police attention, Social Democrats made a conscious effort to keep their activities low key and present themselves as moderates whenever they appeared in public (Fricke and Knaack,

1983, pp. 213, 268, 356). Establishing contacts with outside groups and at the same time appearing as moderate reformers, they were able to gain sympathy and create a new, more favorable image of the party in the eyes of the public. This might have been particularly important given that previously, Social Democracy was associated with the violent and tumultuous events of the Paris Commune, which incited a revolutionary scare and deterred many potential supporters (Fricke and Knaack, 1983). Put differently, the more moderate behavior and contact to outside groups under repression may have made Social Democracy more appealing to a broader vote base.

Representative Leaders

A strategy so central to the Social Democratic organization that it was mentioned in every surveillance report of the police authorities, was replacing eminent and profiled functionaries with previously unknown individuals from the lower ranks of the party (Fricke and Knaack, 1983). By doing so, they aimed to avoid drawing attention to their illegal party structures and to minimize the risk of being exposed by the police. Another important aspect of risk minimization was distributing responsibilities across multiple individuals to prevent the entire local party organization from collapsing in case one person was imprisoned or expelled. This required enlisting more personnel and further expanding the base of recruitment.

At an illegal party congress, delegates noted that the aforementioned strategy was employed particularly in areas facing severe repression. They further elaborated that in such locations, men who were previously unknown and likely would have remained so in absence of the Socialist Laws, were appointed as leaders (Herrmann, Heinze, and Rüdiger, 1980, p. 11).

This strategy's effects on popular support of Social Democracy could have been twofold. Firstly, by resulting in less accumulation of power and a less elitist party structure, individuals might have been encouraged to become politically involved in Social Democratic organizations. This effect might have been especially strong for citizens with lower socioeconomic status, who may have faced limited avenues for political engagement within other established political parties. This aligns with a citizen-candidate model, where lowering hurdles to engage in politics translates into the framework by lowering the costs to entering political competition (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997).

Secondly, the strategy to appoint leaders from within the lower party ranks could have resulted in party leaders being more representative of the voter base they aim to appeal to. In a model where voters vote for the candidate that most closely resembles themselves and with whom they identify, this would result in increasing local electoral support.

3.9 Conclusion

Exploiting the infamous Socialist Laws in the German Empire, I examine the association between state repression and electoral success of Social Democratic candidates. Thereby I shed light on the question whether coercive policies can effectively suppress organized political opposition, or whether such strategies spark backlash.

I construct a novel dataset by digitizing information on censorship verdicts by local police authorities related to the Socialist Laws that, to the best of my knowledge, have not been used before. These data allow me to measure state repression locally. I combine these records with election outcomes across the electoral districts of the German Empire during the elections affected by the coercive policy. While the Socialist Laws persecuted any form of Socialist agitation, the electoral procedures remained unchanged, enabling Social Democratic candidates to run for and hold office in the national parliament. I exploit this unique setting, using the fact that vote shares of Social Democratic candidates disclose local support for the repressed movement.

My analysis uncovers a positive association between repression under the Socialist Laws and the level of support for Social Democratic candidates. The panel structure of my dataset enables me to estimate this relationship exploiting variation within electoral districts. To control for potential confounding factors, I additionally account for pre-existing, latent support for Social Democracy as well as a measure of the supply of socialist publications produced in a given location and population size. Moreover, contemporary accounts from both political opponents and supporters of the Socialist movement lend further evidence to the notion that the coercive policy strengthened the political movement instead of eroding support for Social Democracy.

Studying historical accounts about the organization of Social Democracy under the Socialist Laws reveals several factors that would explain a backlash effect in

response to repression. First, the shared experience of repression was found to strengthen the identification of supporters, potentially increasing their willingness to engage in agitation and resulting in electoral success. Second, to meet under innocuous pretences, socialists joined non-political associations of other social groups and to avoid attention, refrained from appearing as radical. In combination, this may have helped them make contact with and spark sympathy among previously unreached groups, ultimately extending their vote base. Third, to minimize risk, illegal local Social Democratic organizations promoted individuals from the lower ranks of the party, who were unknown to the police and not yet compromised, into leading positions and distributed power across multiple people. This strategy, lowering the barriers to engage in politics particularly for individuals from lower socioeconomic backgrounds, might have encouraged individuals to join the movement, similar to a citizen-candidate framework (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997). Also, in a model where voters support candidates that closely resemble themselves, a less hierarchical and elitist party organization with leaders who emerge from the lower ranks of the party may appeal to a larger voter base.

APPENDICES

3.A ADDITIONAL RESULTS

Table 3.A.1: Publications in First Period

	SD Vote Share (1)	Runoff with SD (2)	SD Mandate (3)	Turnout (4)
Panel A: Extensive Margin				
Censored	1.20**	0.007	-0.001	0.010
	(0.539)	(0.020)	(0.008)	(0.812)
R^2	0.875	0.339	0.573	0.738
Panel B: Intensive Margin				
Ln(Number Publications Censored)	0.832***	0.002	0.002	0.273
	(0.267)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.447)
R^2	0.875	0.338	0.573	0.738
Electoral District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Election FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Number Publications First Period	✓	✓	✓	✓
SD Vote Share Before	✓	✓	✓	✓
Population Before	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,985	1,985	1,985	1,985
Elections	5	5	5	5
Electoral Districts	397	397	397	397

Note Results from estimating equation 3.1, but instead of controlling for the number of publications censored in the preceding legislative period that were published in the police directorate, using the corresponding value for the first legislative period under the Socialist Laws and interacting it with a set of election dummies. The outcome is either the vote share of the Social Democratic candidate (1), a dummy indicating whether the Social Democratic candidate advanced to a runoff election (2), a dummy indicating whether the Social Democrat gained the mandate (3), or voter turnout (4). Censored is a dummy that equals 1 if censorship took place, Ln(Number Publications Censored) is the natural logarithm of 1+ the number of publications that were censored, in the legislative period preceding the election by the police directorate responsible for the electoral district. All regressions include electoral district and election fixed effects. SD Vote Share Before controls for the average vote share of Social Democrats in the elections prior to the enactment of the Socialist Laws, Population Before controls for the electoral district's population in 1875, both by being interacted with a set of election fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the police directorate. Significance: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Table 3.A.2: Repression and Electoral Support for SD

	Runoff with SD				SD Mandate				Turnout			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Panel A: Extensive Margin												
Censored	0.003	0.002	0.007	0.008	-0.005	-0.004	-0.0010	0.0005	0.043	0.020	-0.002	-0.031
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.810)	(0.811)	(0.817)	(0.817)
R^2	0.332	0.332	0.338	0.338	0.511	0.517	0.564	0.567	0.725	0.725	0.736	0.736
Panel B: Intensive Margin												
Ln(No. Publications Censored)	-0.0004	-0.005	-0.001	-0.002	-0.015	-0.008	-0.001	-0.0000	0.304	0.184	0.281	0.281
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.473)	(0.475)	(0.453)	(0.446)
R^2	0.332	0.332	0.338	0.338	0.513	0.517	0.564	0.567	0.725	0.725	0.737	0.737
Electoral District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Election FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Number Publications	-	✓	✓	✓	-	✓	✓	✓	-	✓	✓	✓
SD Vote Share Before	-	-	✓	✓	-	-	✓	✓	-	-	✓	✓
Population Before	-	-	-	✓	-	-	-	✓	-	-	-	✓
Observations	1,985	1,985	1,985	1,985	1,985	1,985	1,985	1,985	1,985	1,985	1,985	1,985
Elections	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Electoral Districts	397	397	397	397	397	397	397	397	397	397	397	397

Note Results from estimating equation 3.1. The outcome is either a dummy indicating whether the Social Democratic candidate advanced to a runoff election (1), a dummy indicating whether the Social Democrat gained the mandate (2), or voter turnout (3). Censored is a dummy that equals 1 if censorship took place. Ln(Number Publications Censored) is the natural logarithm of 1+ the number of publications that were censored, in the legislative period preceding the election by the police directorate responsible for the electoral district. All regressions include electoral district and election fixed effects. Number Publications controls for the number of publications censored in the preceding legislative period that were published in the police directorate. SD Vote Share Before controls for the average vote share of Social Democrats in the elections prior to the enactment of the Socialist Laws. Population Before controls for the electoral district's population in 1875, both by being interacted with a set of election fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the police directorate. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 3.A.3: Heterogeneity: Publications in First Period

	SD Vote Share (%)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Extensive Margin			
Censored	1.18**	1.19**	1.04*
	(0.539)	(0.540)	(0.584)
Censored × Larger 250k	4.07		
	(3.39)		
Censored × Larger 150k		1.27	
		(3.65)	
Censored × Head of Police Directorate			0.677
			(0.825)
R^2	0.875	0.875	0.875
Panel B: Intensive Margin			
Ln(Number Publications Censored)	0.846***	0.860***	0.691**
	(0.265)	(0.268)	(0.279)
Ln(Number Publications Censored) × Larger 250k	-1.05		
	(0.781)		
Ln(Number Publications Censored) × Larger 150k		-0.777	
		(0.852)	
Ln(Number Publications Censored) × Head of Police Directorate			0.704
			(0.454)
R^2	0.876	0.875	0.876
Electoral District FE	✓	✓	✓
Election FE	✓	✓	✓
Number Publications First Period	✓	✓	✓
SD Vote Share before	✓	✓	✓
Population Before	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,985	1,985	1,985
Elections	5	5	5
Electoral Districts	397	397	397

Note Results from estimating equation 3.1, additionally including an interaction term between the respective measure for repression and a dummy indicating that the electoral district is part of a city with a population larger than 250 thousand (1), larger than 150 thousand (2), or hosts the headquarters of the police directorate (3). Instead of controlling for the number of publications censored in the preceding legislative period that were published in the police directorate, I use the corresponding value for the first legislative period under the Socialist Laws and interact it with a set of election dummies. The outcome is the vote share of the Social Democratic candidate. Censored is a dummy that equals 1 if censorship took place, Ln(Number Publications Censored) is the natural logarithm of 1+ the number of publications that were censored in the legislative period preceding the election by the police directorate responsible for the electoral district. All regressions include electoral district and election fixed effects. SD Vote Share Before controls for the average vote share of Social Democrats in the elections prior to the enactment of the Socialist Laws, Population Before controls for the electoral district's population in 1875, both by being interacted with a set of election fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the police directorate. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 3.A.4: Other Pre-Support: Publications in First Period

	SD Vote Share (%)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Extensive Margin				
Censored	1.29**	1.19**	1.24**	1.29**
	(0.557)	(0.563)	(0.572)	(0.561)
R^2	0.869	0.843	0.838	0.864
Panel B: Intensive Margin				
Ln(Number Publications Censored)	0.849***	0.727**	0.702**	0.806**
	(0.288)	(0.301)	(0.336)	(0.316)
R^2	0.870	0.843	0.838	0.865
Electoral District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Election FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Number Publications First Period	✓	✓	✓	✓
Population Before	✓	✓	✓	✓
SD Vote Share 1878	✓	-	-	-
Members Founding Congress	-	✓	-	-
Number Associations closed in 1878	-	-	✓	-
SD Tend Before	-	-	-	✓
Observations	1,985	1,905	1,905	1,985
Elections	5	5	5	5
Electoral Districts	397	381	381	397

Note Results from estimating equation 3.1, but instead of including the average vote share for Social Democrats prior to the Socialist Laws controlling for different measures of pre-determined support for Social Democracy, all interacted with a set of election FE. These measures are the vote share attained by the Social Democrats in the last election before the Socialist Laws (1), the number of members of the SDAP and the ADAV represented at the SAP's founding congress (2), the number of socialist associations dissolved in 1878 (3), or the average growth in electoral support for Social Democrats before the Socialist Laws (4). Instead of controlling for the number of publications censored in the preceding legislative period that were published in the police directorate, I use the corresponding value for the first legislative period under the Socialist Laws and interact it with a set of election dummies. The outcome is the vote share of the Social Democratic candidate. Censored is a dummy that equals 1 if censorship took place, Ln(Number Publications Censored) is the natural logarithm of 1+ the number of publications that were censored, in the legislative period preceding the election by the police directorate responsible for the electoral district. All regressions include electoral district and election fixed effects. Population Before controls for the electoral district's population in 1875 by being interacted with a set of election FE. Standard errors clustered at level of police directorates. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 3.A.5: Controlling for Workers: Publications in First Period

	SD Vote Share (%)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Extensive Margin			
Censored	1.23**	1.08*	1.10*
	(0.544)	(0.558)	(0.561)
R^2	0.877	0.884	0.885
Panel B: Intensive Margin			
Ln(Number Publications Censored)	0.781**	0.826***	0.774**
	(0.302)	(0.274)	(0.306)
R^2	0.885	0.877	0.886
Electoral District FE	✓	✓	✓
Election FE	✓	✓	✓
Number Publications First Period	✓	✓	✓
SD Vote Share Before	✓	✓	✓
Population Before	✓	✓	✓
Workers in Industry 1895	✓	-	✓
Employed Workers 1895	-	✓	✓
Observations	1,985	1,985	1,985
Elections	5	5	5
Electoral Districts	397	397	397

Note Results from estimating equation 3.1, additionally controlling for the share of workers employed in the industry in 1895 (1), or the number of employed workers in a given electoral district in 1895 (2), or both (3). Both variables are interacted with a set of election dummies. Instead of controlling for the number of publications censored in the preceding legislative period that were published in the police directorate, I use the corresponding value for the first legislative period under the Socialist Laws and interacting it with a set of election dummies. The outcome is the vote share of the Social Democratic candidate. Censored is a dummy that equals 1 if censorship took place, Ln(Number Publications Censored) is the natural logarithm of 1+ the number of publications that were censored, in the legislative period preceding the election by the police directorate responsible for the electoral district. All regressions include electoral district and election fixed effects. SD Vote Share Before controls for the average vote share of Social Democrats in the elections prior to the enactment of the Socialist Laws, Population Before controls for the electoral district's population in 1875, both by being interacted with a set of election fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the police directorate. Significance: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Table 3.A.6: Bounding Exercise: Publications in First Period

	SD Vote Share (%)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Censored	1.06***	1.20**		
	(0.302)	(0.539)		
Ln(Number Publications Censored)			0.291	0.832***
			(0.213)	(0.267)
R^2	0.884	0.875	0.883	0.875
SD Vote Share$_{t-1}$	✓	-	✓	-
Electoral District FE	-	✓	-	✓
Election FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Number Publications First Period	✓	✓	✓	✓
SD Vote Share Before	✓	✓	✓	✓
Population Before	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,985	1,985	1,985	1,985
Elections	5	5	5	5
Electoral Districts	397	397	397	397

Note Results from estimating an equation as laid out in 3.1 (columns 2 and 4), or from estimating equation 3.1, with the first lag of the dependent variable instead of the electoral district FE (columns 1 and 3). Instead of controlling for the number of publications censored in the preceding legislative period that were published in the police directorate, I use the corresponding value for the first legislative period under the Socialist Laws and interact it with a set of election dummies. The outcome is the vote share of the Social Democratic candidate. Censored is a dummy that equals 1 if censorship took place, Ln(Number Publications Censored) is the natural logarithm of 1+ the number of publications that were censored, in the legislative period preceding the election by the police directorate responsible for the electoral district. All regressions include election fixed effects. SD Vote Share Before controls for the average vote share of Social Democrats in the elections prior to the enactment of the Socialist Laws, Population Before controls for the electoral district's population in 1875, both by being interacted with a set of election fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the police directorate. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

3.B   DATA

Figure 3.B.1: Extract from Censorship Data (Birett, 1987)


```
G88                    Reichsgesetz gegen die ... Sozialdemokratie

Deutscher Reichsanzeiger 13. 2.1888    <1124>              1888/1-023
A80D* Herter, A.
A80W  Siegel (für die Zensurstelle)
B80   Was die Sozialdemokraten sind und was sie wollen
C80   Freiburg                      10. 2.1888
D80 * Zürich
G88                    Reichsgesetz gegen die ... Sozialdemokratie

Deutscher Reichsanzeiger 13. 2.1888    < 953>              1888/1-024
A88W  Siegel (für die Zensurstelle)
A88A  Krasser, Friedrich
B88   Anti-Syllabus
C88   Freiburg                      10. 2.1888
D88C* Hermannstadt
G88                    Reichsgesetz gegen die ... Sozialdemokratie

Deutscher Reichsanzeiger 20. 2.1888    < 955>              1888/1-025
A88Q  Liebknecht, Wilhelm
A88W  Richthofen, von (für die Zensurstelle)
B88F  Wohin auch euer Auge schweifen mag...
C88   Berlin                        18. 2.1888
G88                    Reichsgesetz gegen die ... Sozialdemokratie

Deutscher Reichsanzeiger 21. 2.1888    < 997>              1888/1-026
A88D  Gundersen, R.
A88H  Autonomie
A88W  Richthofen, von (für die Zensurstelle)
A88A  Krapotkin, Peter
B88   Revolutionäre Regierungen
B88S  Anarchistisch-Kommunistische Bibliothek. I
C88   Berlin                        20. 2.1888
D88   London
G88                    Reichsgesetz gegen die ... Sozialdemokratie

Deutscher Reichsanzeiger 21. 2.1888    < 972>              1888/1-027
A88D  Schönfeld und Harnisch
A88W  Koppenfels, von (für die Zensurstelle)
A88V  Trippner, Wilhelm
B88F  Arbeiter! Wähler!
C88   Dresden                       20. 2.1888
D88   Dresden
G88                    Reichsgesetz gegen die ... Sozialdemokratie

Deutscher Reichsanzeiger 22. 2.1888    <+ 9>               1888/1-028
A88W  Richthofen, von (für die Zensurstelle)
A88H  Most, Johann
B88L  Sturmvögel. Nr.1
C88   Berlin                        21. 2.1888
D88   Newyork
G88                    Reichsgesetz gegen die ... Sozialdemokratie

Deutscher Reichsanzeiger 27. 2.1888    <+ 4>               1888/1-029
A87W  Rosen (für die Zensurstelle)
A87V  Londoner Verlags-Genossenschaft
B87Z  Londoner Freie Presse. Jg.1888, 7
C87   Arnsberg                      23. 2.1888
D87   London
G87                    Reichsgesetz gegen die ... Sozialdemokratie

Deutscher Reichsanzeiger 5. 3.1888     <+ 6>               1888/1-031
A88V  Hartebeest
A88W  Hagemann (für die Zensurstelle)
A88A  Wilmsen, H. E.


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3.C   OTHER

Figure 3.C.1: Caricature "The Battle of the Giant against the Dwarf."

Note It says below: "The giant put his mighty foot on the dwarf's neck and wanted to crush him" (left). "Then the dwarf's strength grew and he stood up, causing the giant to stumble and fall" (right). Source: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Figure 3.C.2: Caricature "From Berlin"

Note It says below: "'Now my child, does the basket not weigh heavily on you?' Social democracy: 'Oh no - as you can see, I have become big and strong with it.'" On the basket it says: "Socialist Laws". Source: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

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Eidesstattliche Versicherung

Ich versichere hiermit eidesstattlich, dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit selbständig und ohne fremde Hilfe verfasst habe. Die aus fremden Quellen direkt oder indirekt übernommenen Gedanken sowie mir gegebene Anregungen sind als solche kenntlich gemacht. Die Arbeit wurde bisher keiner anderen Prüfungsbehörde vorgelegt und auch noch nicht veröffentlicht. Sofern ein Teil der Arbeit aus bereits veröffentlichten Papers besteht, habe ich dies ausdrücklich angegeben.

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