

The Mind and Mental Factors According to the
Cheng Weishi Lun (成唯識論)

An Approach to Buddhist Therapeutic Soteriology

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Content

ACKNOWLEDGMENT	III
ABBREVIATIONS	IV
CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 LITERATURE REVIEW: THE STANDPOINT OF THE PRESENT DISSERTATION.....	2
1.2 MAIN RESEARCH QUESTIONS.....	5
1.2.1 Conceptualizing Mind and Mental Factors	5
1.2.2 Mind and Karmic Retribution in the System of Consciousness.....	7
1.2.3 The Soteriological Role of the Mind and Mental Factors	10
1.3 METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE.....	12
CHAPTER TWO MIND AND MENTAL FACTORS.....	16
2.1 THE CONCEPT OF MIND.....	17
2.1.1 <i>Citta</i> , <i>Manas</i> , and <i>Vijñāna</i> from Sectarian Buddhism to Yogācāra	17
2.1.2 Mind: A Complex that Performs the Activity of Consciousness and Accumulates it Influences	21
2.2 THE CONCEPT OF MENTAL FACTORS	26
2.2.2 Mind and Mental Factors in the CWSL	29
2.3. THE SOTERIOLOGICAL ROLE OF THE MIND AND MENTAL FACTORS: THEIR DEPENDENT NATURE TO SUPPORT A PROPER COGNITIVE WORLD.....	46
2.3.1 Disputed Dependent Nature: From the Perspective of Its Historical Development.....	47
2.3.2 The Dependent Mind and the Mental Factors	53
2.4 CONCLUSION	60
CHAPTER THREE COGNITIVE PROCESS AND THE ARISING OF MENTAL FACTORS	68
3.1 THE PERCEPTION IN A DELUSIVE WORLD	70
3.1.1 The Characteristic of the Cognitive Object and Subjective Perceiver	70
3.1.2 The Four-Aspect Theory of Cognition in the CWSL.....	72
3.1.3 The Transformative Power of Self-Cognition and its Relationship to Karmic Retribution. .	76
3.1.4 Mind and Mental Factors in the Context of the Four-Aspect Theory	80
3.2 THE MENTAL FACTORS OF BEING ALWAYS ACTIVE IN THE CWSL.....	84
3.2.1 Sensory Contact (<i>sparśa</i> , <i>chu</i> 觸).....	85
3.2.2 Attention (<i>manaskāra</i> , <i>zuo yi</i> 作意)	89
3.2.3 Sensation (<i>vedana</i> , <i>shou</i> 受).....	92
3.2.4 Conceptualization (<i>saṃjñā</i> , <i>xiang</i> 想)	94
3.2.5 Volition (<i>cetana</i> , <i>si</i> 思).....	96

3.2.6 Collaboration of the Five Factors	97
3.3 MENTAL FACTORS THAT ARE BOUND TO SPECIFIC OBJECTS	98
3.3.1 Wishing (<i>chanda, yu</i> 欲)	100
3.3.2 Decisive Resolve (<i>adhimokṣa, sheng jie</i> 勝解).....	101
3.3.3 Memorizing (<i>smṛti, nian</i> 念)	107
3.3.4 Concentration (<i>samādhi, ding</i> 定).....	110
3.3.5 Discernment (<i>prajñā, hui</i> 慧)	112
3.3.6 The Positive Value of the Beneficial Factor that is Bound to a Specific Object.....	113
3.4 CONCLUSION	115
CHAPTER FOUR:	118
COUNTERACTION BETWEEN BENEFICIAL AND UNBENEFICIAL MENTAL FACTORS	118
4.1. COUNTERACTION: MENTAL PRACTICES THAT AIM AT CORRECT MODES OF APPREHENSION	119
4.1.1 Two modes of Apprehension: The Right View and the Wrong View	120
4.1.2 Wholesome Mental Factors as a Counteragent	123
4.1.3 Counteraction as a Therapeutic Means.....	127
4.1.4 Fundamental Defilements and Discernment	131
4.2. COUNTERACTION BETWEEN THE WHOLESOME AND DEFILED MENTAL FACTORS	134
4.2.1 Faith vs. Non-Faith (<i>śraddhā/ āśraddhya, xin/bu xin</i> 信/不信).....	136
4.2.2 Shame and Embarrassment (<i>hrī/apatrāpya, can/kui</i> 慚/愧) vs. Absence of Shame and Absence of Embarrassment (<i>āhrīkya/anapatrāpya, wu can/ wu kui</i> 無慚/ 無愧)	141
4.2.3 Three Wholesome Roots: Absence of Greed (<i>alobha, wu tan</i> 無貪), Absence of Anger (<i>adveṣa, wu chen</i> 無瞋), Absence of Delusion (<i>amoha, wu chi</i> 無癡) vs. Three Unwholesome Roots: Greed (<i>raga, tan</i> 貪), Anger (<i>pratigha, chen</i> 瞋), Delusion (<i>moha, chi</i> 癡).....	145
4.2.4 Vigor (<i>vīrya, jing jin</i> 精進) vs. Laziness (<i>kausīdya, xie tei</i> 懈怠).....	149
4.2.5 Serenity (<i>praśrabdhi, qing an</i> 輕安) vs. Dullness (<i>styāna, hun chen</i> 昏沈).....	151
4.2.6 Non-Carelessness (<i>apramāda, bu fang yi</i> 不放逸) vs. Carelessness (<i>pramāda, fang yi</i> 放 逸).....	155
4.2.7 Equanimity (<i>upekṣa, xing she</i> 行捨) vs. Excitement (<i>auddhatya, diao ju</i> 掉舉).....	156
4.2.8 Non-harmfulness (<i>ahiṃsā, bu hai</i> 不害) vs. Harmfulness (<i>vihīmsā, hai</i> 害).....	158
4.2.9 Final Remarks.....	159
4.3. CONCLUSION	162
CHAPTER FIVE CONCLUSION	167
BIBLIOGRAPHY	173

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Abbreviations

<i>AKBh</i>	Vasubandhu's <i>Abhidharmakośabhāṣya</i> , Pradhan (1967).
<i>AS</i>	Asaṅga's <i>Abhidharmasamuccaya</i> , Gokhale (1947).
<i>CWSL</i>	成唯識論, * <i>Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra</i> , T 1585.
<i>Dharmaskandha</i>	阿毘達磨法蘊足論 <i>Abhidharmadharmaskandhapādaśāstra</i>
<i>Dhātukāya</i>	阿毘達磨界身足論 <i>Abhidharmadhātukāyapādaśāstra</i> .
<i>Jñānaprasthāna</i>	阿毘達磨發智論 <i>Abhidharmajñānaprasthānaśāstra</i> .
<i>MS</i>	<i>Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra</i> , Lévi (1907).
<i>MSG</i>	Derge 4048, sems tsam, ri 43a7-43a7. Peking 5549, sems tsam, li 1-51a2 (vol.112, p.215-236).
<i>MSGc</i>	攝大乘論本, * <i>Mahāyānasamgraha</i> , T 1597.
<i>MVŚ</i>	阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論, * <i>Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāśāstra</i> , T 1545.
<i>Prakarāṇa</i>	阿毘達磨品類足論 <i>Abhidharmaprakarāṇapādaśāstra</i> .
<i>PSk</i>	Vasubandhu's <i>Pañcaskandhaka</i> , Li & Steinkellner (2008).
<i>PSkh</i>	Sthiramati's <i>Pañcaskandhakavaibhāṣā</i> , Kramer (2013).
<i>Samdh</i>	解深密經, * <i>Samdhinirmocanasūtra</i> , T 676.
<i>Samgītiparyāya</i>	阿毘達磨集異門足論 * <i>Abhidharmasamgītiparyāyapādaśāstra</i> .
<i>Shuji</i>	成唯識論述記 T 1830.
<i>TrBh</i>	Sthiramati's <i>Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya</i> , Buescher (2007).
<i>Xianyang</i>	顯揚聖教論, T1602.
<i>Liaoyideng</i>	成唯識論了義燈, T1832.
<i>Yanmi</i>	成唯識論演祕, T1833.

Chapter One Introduction

The aim of my dissertation thesis is to present how the doctrine of the mind (*citta*, *xin* 心) and the mental factors (*caitasika*, *xin suo* 心所), as it is displayed in the *Complete Treatise on Representation-Only* (*Cheng wei shi lun* 成唯識論, henceforth *CWSL*), can serve as a therapeutic means to counteract (*pratipakṣa*, *duizhi* 對治) defilements within the soteriological system of Yogācāra Buddhism.

The Buddhist mind, situated in the doctrine of non-self, is an agentless agent¹, a temporary center for generating perception, conceptualization and various mental activities. Mental factors, alternatively to be understood as the constituents or subsidiaries of the mind, are discrete specific mental acts including emotional, perceptive or cognitive acts. They are usually intentional acts, and conceptually established on the intentional structure of perception. Their enumeration in Abhidharmic discourse reveals a decided interest in atomizing such phenomena into minimized units. Mental factors represent the result of this process of minimization, constituting the various characteristics of the present mind.

Mental factors begin to be listed as different states of the mind from Abhidharmic literature onwards. Such literature contains fruitful debates between the Buddhist scholastic schools concerning which characteristics and functions of the mental factors belong to wholesome or defiled forms of mentation. However, studies hitherto have advanced little beyond philological inquiry and the preliminary analysis of mental

¹ In Buddhist literature, the mind acts as the operator which exerts psychological reaction and appears to be the center that receives information during perception and responds accordingly. However, such a performer is not an entity on its own but only serves as the temporary medium arising to represent mental activities depending on the causal condition from the past karmic event. Since the Buddhist mind brings cognition forward, it appears as an agent which produces mental activities. Yet, arising of the mind is conditioned and momentarily. It is conceptualized as a functional center because it is comprised of rise-and-fall activities which link like a sequence. As a consequence, one cannot define it as a doer since the mind is not one independent entity and have no permanent self-nature of its own. Therefore, it is itself agentless.

factors as secondary components to more familiar doctrines. This neglect is mainly attributable to the fact that a mental factor is neither an essential element for liberation nor a distinguishing doctrine of the Yogācāra. However, mental factors do hold a distinctive position in the soteriological system of the *CWSL*, even though they are karmically generated. Particularly when they represent particular modes of mentation which are accompanied by insight into the doctrine, they are considered to be beneficial to path of liberation. In this regard, the wholesome mental factors are described as counteragents which have a therapeutic capacity to “cure” the defiled factors.

Proceeding from these premises, the present dissertation addresses three focal points: (1) how the mind and mental factors are conceptualized in the *CWSL* as regards their interrelationship, domains, and different functions; (2) how Xuanzang structuralizes the arising of mental factors and combines their appearance with karmic retribution via the cognitive theory of the four aspects (*si fen shuo* 四分說); and (3) how the soteriological position of the mind and mental factors is situated in the three-nature theory (*trisvabhāva*, *san xing* 三性) of the Yogācāra school to explicate existence in its entirety, and relatedly how the wholesome mental factors serve as counteragents for defilements.

1.1 Literature Review: The Standpoint of the Present Dissertation

The *CWSL* is the doctrinal foundation of the Sinitic Yogācāra tradition², composed by Xuanzang (玄奘; 602-664) and developed by Kuiji (窺基; 632-682) in the Early Tang Period. The *CWSL* comprises ten commentaries on the *Treatise in Thirty Stanzas* (*Triṃśikākārikā*) written by Vasubandhu (4th to 5th century CE), which became one of

² It refers to the Yogācāra tradition in East Asia countries such as China, Japan, Korea, and Chinese speaking areas.

the seminal doctrinal works for the Sinitic Yogācāra tradition (Faxiang school 法相宗 or Cien school 慈恩宗). In most of the studies concerning the *CWSL*, it is often treated as a legacy of Dharmapāla's (530-561)³ philosophy or as a literal translation of the ten Sanskrit commentaries of *Triṃśikā*. However, some studies suggest that Xuanzang had the intention to create a specific Sinitic exegesis with the purpose of developing a Sinitic Yogācāra school. According to this view, his translation seeks to resolve certain conundrums that the Indian Yogācāra thinkers could not. Indeed, Xuanzang does record different debates and theories from the Indic Yogācāra schools and, at the same time, proposes the correct interpretation (*zheng yi* 正義) of several controversial topics. After comparing the *CWSL* and the **Buddhabhūmisūtraśāstra* (佛地經論) which attribute to *Bandhuprabha (親光; ca. mid 6th century) but also translate by Xuanzang, Shunkyō⁴ lists eight points of intersection and suggests that Xuanzang intended to create his own philosophical system when translating and commenting on established treatises. In a similar fashion, Sakuma⁵ and Lusthaus⁶ used texts paralleling the *CWSL* in order to prove that Xuanzang's philosophy of Yogācāra cannot be understood simply as a description of Dharmapāla's or Bandhuprabha's philosophies.

As mental factors are usually considered to be less important in comparison to other central doctrines, studies on the *CWSL* focus more on key theories, such as the three-natures (*tri-svabhāva*), the transformation of the basis (*āśraya-parāvṛtti*), or store consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) and the eight forms of consciousness (*aṣṭa-vijñānāni*). Apart from research to consider the *CWSL*, studies of Buddhist psychology which concern Buddhist conceptualizations of mind and its relationship to liberation usually do not deem mental factors as an important research object and thus have not analyzed

³ See Williams 2008, pp.294, Note 24 on chapter three.

⁴ See Shunkyō 1985.

⁵ See Sakuma 1989.

⁶ See Lusthaus 2008.

them systematically, albeit presenting general descriptions based on scripture.

A lack of systematic inquiry notwithstanding, lists of mental factors in different Abhidharmic treatises are indeed helpful to the primarily philological task in establishing textual, historical and doctrinal relationships. In the history of Buddhist doctrine, mental factors had been systematized as early as the *Dhātukāyaśāstra*.⁷ Later exegetical treatises, even though they disagree on some issues, exhibit a similar perspective concerning the general function of mental factors. Therefore, mental factors are a relatively suitable means for both diachronic and synchronic observations. Accordingly, some studies take mental factors as their main topic and seek to answer historical and textual questions. Dessein⁸ has classified and numbered the lists of mental factors specific to the Abhidharmic schools, laying particular focus on the Sarvāstivādins. Kramer⁹ has also conducted similar research in the case of some Yogācāra texts. By comparing the differences in the descriptions of the mental factors, the former study establishes a chronology for fifteen Sarvāstivāda texts, whilst the latter presents the intertextualities present between the *PSk*, *AS* and the *AKBh*.

In distinction to previous studies, which treat the *CWSL* as a mere translation or legacy of Dharmapāla, I would consider this text as Xuanzang's own philosophical work by means of which he intends to comprehensively demonstrate the doctrine of the Yogācāra whilst establishing a Sinitic tradition of practice. With this renewed focus, I will take mental factors as my central research object; not only to enumerate their characteristics as former studies have done but to moreover situate examine their soteriological role within the system of the *CWSL*.

⁷ See Dhammajoti 2009 p. 215.

⁸ See Dessein 1996.

⁹ See Kramer 2013.

1.2 Main Research Questions

The present dissertation is structured according to the three research questions presented at the beginning: the definition and nature of the mind, how it appears through perception, and how a beneficial mental state counteracts unbeneficial influences.

1.2.1 Conceptualizing Mind and Mental Factors

Scholars broadly agree that the “mind” becomes a topic in Buddhism foremost due to soteriological concerns with helping one surpass a life of suffering by demonstrating the correct understanding of reality through the analysis of human perception.¹⁰ One of the core tasks of Buddhist teaching is to reveal the impermanence of the conventional world¹¹ we perceive and it therefore presents a series of concepts conducive to that end. This includes the establishment of the aggregated personhood (*pudgala*), a notion which considers the individual to be a psycho-physical composition comprised of five accumulations: body, sensation, conceptualization, activities caused by mental functions, as well as sensual awareness and consciousness of mentation. By indicating that personage is in fact a collection of dynamic, interrelated¹² sensual components, this proposition deconstructs the existence of an permanent self (*ātman*) and construes it as a conceptual fiction.¹³ When one takes the aggregated person as real and posits oneself in a dual relationship with the living world, cognitive activities that discriminate objective realms thus arise and create afflictions (*kleśa*, *fan nao* 煩惱) that hinder one from being liberated. In building a correct concept of how these activities appear, Buddhists thus needed to explain perception in a way that befits the doctrine of non-self. And it is here that the discussion of the “mind” intervenes.

¹⁰ See Rhys Davids 1914 p.13; Kalupahana 1987, pp.6-11; Kochumuttom 1989, pp.1-4.

¹¹ The conventional world here refers to the world in *samsāra*, namely, the world which the sentient being of the six realms live.

¹² “Interrelated” refers to a co-existing relation.

¹³ See Siderits 2011, pp. 298-300.

Mind, though ostensibly treated in Buddhist literature as an agent that proceeds cognition, is not a particular entity that exists on its own. On the contrary, it is a complex which encompasses various activities that are considered to be psychological. As Dreyfus states: “In most Indian traditions, the mind is neither a brain structure nor a mechanism for treating information. Rather, the mind is conceived as a complex cognitive process consisting of a succession of related mental states.”¹⁴ Except for being a whole that consists of a series of actions, the other impermanent perspective of the mind hangs on its mutual relationship with cognitive activities. Namely, the mind exists only due to the collective mental states that arise when cognizing, while perceptual activities only fulfill their mission of cognition when there is a mind to collect them. Mental states (*citta*, *xin* 心) that constitute the mind (*caitasika*, *xin suo* 心所) can be various; they can be moments in the process of perception, attitudes toward objects, thoughts that appear due to conceptualization, or impulses that occur due to craving. As Coseru defines, “whereas *citta* denotes the subjective aspect of the mental domain (e.g., a state of pure awareness), *caitta* refers to specific cognitive states, such as sensations, perceptions, feelings, volitions, etc.”¹⁵

One can perhaps readily picture the mind as a whole consisting of various parts. It seems intuitive, for example, to envisage a wholesome mind as having certain qualities, as being vigorous, faithful, introspective and so forth. But the relationship between the mind and constituents such as these is still not clear. In this regard, the *CWSL* draws on the simile of the painting master and his disciple to describe how the mind associates with its constituents.¹⁶ The mind is therein conceived as a painting master who renders the outline (*mo* 模), while the mental factors are the disciples who

¹⁴ Dreyfus and Thompson 2007, P.90.

¹⁵ See Coseru, “Mind in Indian Buddhist Philosophy”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/mind-indian-buddhism/>>. (Quoted date: 25.04.2023)

¹⁶ See T 1585, p. 26, c16-18.

fill in the colors. However, this metaphor is decidedly opaque, merely suggesting that mental constituents assist in completing the pictures of the mind, and according to the discussion above, mental constituents are far more substantial than this. Instead of being colors that decorate an artwork, the mental constituents make up the mind in a manner more akin to the way that plaster and glue form the framework of art.

The *CWSL* describes this kind of relationship between the mind and mental factors as “neither identical nor distinct”.¹⁷ Xuanzang’s stance, in general, is thus to consider the mind and its constituents as co-existing in a mutually supporting way; namely, they do not only define each other but also confirm each other’s existence. This position treats mental constituents as factors that fulfill the karmic characteristic which the mind manifests. It acknowledges the distinctive characteristic of mental factors and grants them their own natures. Dealing with these issues, the first topic of the present dissertation will therefore be the definition of the mental factors and their relation to the mind from the delineating of their historical development.

1.2.2 Mind and Karmic Retribution in the System of Consciousness

Mental factors are included in the list of “actions associated with the mind” (*cittasamprayuktasamskāra*) within Abhidharma scholastic works, a tradition dedicated to analyzing the phenomena that make up the empirical world into minimized units in order to present the status of existence according to Buddhist teaching. Its inclusion within this taxonomy signifies two things: that mental states are considered to be irreducible factors which feature the qualities of the mind, and that they are at the same time “karmic formations” (*samskāra*) conditioned by previous deeds (*karma*) and potentially influence the future. Mental activities such as sensations, emotions, passions, and moral feelings that arise due to cognition are thus the retributed karma determined

¹⁷ For discussion about the relationship between the mind and mental factors see 2.2.2.

by past events. In this regard, the mind therefore has two main capacities: to be the agent that proceeds perception, conceptualizations, and the various psychological reactions that occur during the cognitive process, and to manifest past actions consequentially. The reason which allows the two capacities of the mind to be perfectly integrated grounds on the activity of consciousness.

Considerations of consciousness (*vijñāna*, *shi* 識) have been a long-standing topic in Buddhism, beginning within the *Āgamas/Nikāyas*. As Waldron suggests, consciousness plays a role in three distinct but interrelated areas: (1) the psychological—related to ordinary processes of perception, conception, intention, etc.—(2) the “psycho-ontological”—constituent the causal relationships between these psychological processes (and the karmic activities they instigate) and the long-term destiny of an individual life-stream within cyclic existence; and (3) the soteriological—the cessation of consciousness (*vijñāna*) together with the karmic energies that perpetuate such existence.¹⁸ However, since the Yogācāra school takes consciousness as the sole foundation of reality, its capacity is extended and becomes the fundamental support for all aspects of the existence of a sentient being, including its “creative force” in manifesting the world.

Although mind and consciousness are sometimes treated as synonymous in Buddhist literature, the capacity of consciousness is apparently wider than the mind in the Yogācāra tradition. Consciousness, as regards the three aspects listed above, does not only operate cognitive activities, sustain life forms and mental continuity, and constitute the very thing to be eliminated in ceasing afflictions; it also engenders the sense faculties as well as their corresponding objects that comprise the material world. Proceeding with those tasks requires influences from past actions and, in turn,

¹⁸ See Waldron 2003, pp.21-36.

consciousness functions as an intermediary that actualizes karmic retribution. This means that consciousness brings about mature *karma* by means of its various functions, including the ability to conduct cognitive activities which is the task of the mind. Concluding this karmic description of the characteristics of consciousness, we can say that the mind represents one form of consciousness and becomes active when consciousness proceeds with the task of cognizing.

Even though Yogācāra treatises all acknowledge the mind as forming when consciousness proceeds cognition, there is little consensus on the actual workings of this process. Inheriting the Yogācāra's basic psychological structure, the *CWSL* is also dedicated to the task of elucidating the role of the mind and how it serves as the agent that actualizes past events and enables their manifestation as mental factors. In response to this problem, Xuanzang and his disciple, Kuiji, build an idiosyncratic epistemological system, the cognitive theory of four aspects, which explains the arising of cognitive activities and the manifestations of ripened karma. Premised on the transforming ability of consciousness, this theory assigns to the reflexive capacity of consciousness, that is, self-cognition, an agent over cognitive activity. This not only unfolds subject-object relations in perception but also confirms the perceptual results simultaneously.

Proceeding from these concerns, the second topic of this thesis is to demonstrate how the *CWSL* establishes a system of cognition that amalgamates the arising of perception and karmic retribution along with the eight forms of consciousness and the seed theory. In introducing the perceiving mind, I shall also focus on examining the discrete epistemic elements of the process of cognition: the always active mental factors that accompany the arising of every mental state.

1.2.3 The Soteriological Role of the Mind and Mental Factors

In the framework of consciousness, cognition and the mind, understood as the agent that proceeds from cognitive activities, become topics due to soteriological concerns. Buddhist soteriology aims at freeing sentient beings from suffering. To demonstrate its soteriology, Yogācāra thought distinguishes three existential dimensions according to three levels of existence: the imagined nature, dependent nature, and perfect nature. Imagined nature refers to the type of existence that is based on an illusory concept, while perfect nature refers to the existence as it is and as arising without any external support. Dependent nature, however, denoting cause and consequence, becomes the key to salvation due to its capacity to build a temporary reality that suits soteriological practice.¹⁹ Some Yogācāra treatises, especially those belong to later Yogācāra thought, consider *dharmas* which have a dependent nature as the necessary requirement to establish the perfect nature because the accomplishment of thusness (*tathatā*, *zhen ru* 真如) rests upon tools that work with conditioned elements, the mind and mental factors that constitute the cognitive world being one of them. In the system of the *CWSL*, the mind and mental factors are clearly deemed as having a dependent nature as they are the manifestation of their own seed, the consequence of a past event. This means, the wholesome mind and mental factors, though produced karmically, still serve a beneficial influence in soteriology. For example, wholesome mental factors, such as faith and non-harmfulness, or the factors that help meditative states such as equanimity and serenity, are dependent cognitive modes which are themselves necessary for practitioners pursuing the path to liberation.

Except for their soteriological role in a general sense, the mind and mental factors also serve a therapeutic function in remedying the defilements and thus functioning as counteragents. In almost every Buddhist tradition, the method to reach liberation is

¹⁹ See Williams 2009, pp.89-91.

usually considered to be the eightfold noble path, with its initiating first element, correct view (*samyak-dṛṣṭi*, *zheng jian* 正見), orienting one to think and act according to Buddhist doctrine.²⁰ This refers to the correct understanding of the Buddha's teaching; namely, knowledge of causality and the impermanent nature of existence. Several kinds of right views, which are variously listed in different treaties, derive from this all-encompassing correct view, which can thus serve as a footing for liberation because, according to Fuller, it results in correct apprehension, further effecting beneficial mental activities, whilst rectifying wrong view. A change of propositional attitudes thus influences perception and conceptualization and generates correct thoughts and behaviors which substitute the activities caused by wrong view. If we say the mind consists of mental factors, then a wholesome mind should consist of such factors as the absence of greed, anger, and delusion, etc. The mind thus reflects a propositional attitude, including belief, desire, etc., which accordingly generates mental activities when it perceives and conceptualizes a cognitive object. Following this premise, a counteractive concept, which denotes the therapeutic ability of wholesome mental factors to remedy the defilements, is produced and serves as another soteriological function of the mind and mental factors.

My third topic in this dissertation thus aims to present the two soteriological functions the mind and mental factors perform. Specifically, I will delineate the role of the dependent mind and mental factors within the *CWSL*'s doctrine of the three natures doctrine. This discussion will moreover address the notion of counteraction, together with its therapeutic function, and introduce the way wholesome mental factors serve to counteract defilements.

²⁰ See Bronkhorst 1993 pp.11-18. And also, Harvey 2000, p. 123.

1.3 Methodology and Structure

The methodology of the present dissertation is twofold. The first is in essence taxonomical, aiming to demonstrate the descriptive aspects of the *CWSL* by paraphrasing and translating selected exemplificatory passages. The second situates the doctrine of the mind and mental factors in cognitive theory and the soteriological system of the *CWSL* by accounting for both the *CWSL*'s doctrines itself together with the epistemology and the three-nature theory in the Yogācāra philosophy. In the first part, I will refer to the centermost commentaries on the *CWSL*, such as the *Shuiji*, *Liaoyideng* and *Yanmi*, and then compare the views of these works on the aforementioned three topics with other Abhidharmic and Yogācāra treatises to explore Xuanzang's hermeneutic in delineating the mind and mental factors. For the second, I will examine the historical development of the four-aspect theory and the three natures by drawing on both primary sources and secondary studies as well as consider the doctrine of the mind and mental factors within these schemata to determine their therapeutic role.

The body of the present dissertation takes the three aforementioned emphases as its three main foci; namely, (1) the meaning of mind and mental factors, (2) the cognitive theory of the *CWSL*, and (3) the soteriological functions of the mind and mental factors. In general, the three topics can be neatly divided and therefore form the subjects of chapters two to four. However, the third topic includes two explanations of the soteriological role of the mind and mental factors: in general, they relate to the practical functioning of dependent nature; and in particular, they fulfil the role of counteragents therein, and the way wholesome mental factors serve as therapeutic means to remedy the defilements. Since the first explanation concerns more the nature of the mind and mental factors, I shall put this part in chapter two instead of four.

In detail, chapter two consists of two parts: (1) a conceptual history of the mind and mental factors from Abhidharma thought to the *CWSL*, and (2) the soteriological role of the mind and mental factors on the basis of Xuanzang's definition of dependent nature within the three-nature theory. The composition of the first part requires a review of the theory of mind and mental factors in Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika, and early Yogācāra thought. Accordingly, I shall examine texts such as the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, *Nyāyānusāraśāstra*, *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*, and *Yogācārabhūmi* to clarify the doctrinal differences between those schools. This background research will afford a clarification of definitions of the mind, mental factors, and their domains. On the basis of this, I will further demonstrate how Xuanzang merges this historical development into the doctrine of the *CWSL* and thereby creates a unique system in the Sinitic tradition of Yogācāra. To understand the *CWSL* well, referring to its commentaries is necessary. The main reference will be Kuiji's *Shuji* along with another two commentaries, the *Liaoyideng* and *Yanmi*, written by Hui Zhao (慧沼; 651-714) and Zhi Zhou (智周; 668-723) respectively.

The second part of chapter two focuses on the soteriological role of the mind and mental factors and their dependent nature. Interpreting this system relies on an understanding of the three natures in the *CWSL*. As Xuanzang, following the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, conceptualizes the three natures on the basis of their having a double layer structure and the dependent nature as having a pure quality, in this part, I rely on secondary studies²¹ regarding the two models of the three-nature theory in such Yogācāra treatises as the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*, and *Madhyāntavibhāga*. These will allow me to situate Xuanzang's understanding in the *CWSL* and discuss the tasks that the mind and mental factors perform for the purpose of liberation.

²¹ I mainly rely on Kitano (1999) and Keng's (2014&2015) research in this regard.

Having established how the mind and mental factors, and their function as a toehold for liberation, are conceived, I will then focus on the process which gives rise to them; namely, the composition and arising of cognition. Here, I will begin by demonstrating the four-aspect theory. Based on Kuiji's elaboration of the transforming ability of consciousness in turning karmic cause into effect, I will model the four-aspect theory of cognition and show the way in which it structures cognition together with karmic retribution. This requires a close survey of two streams of thought: (1) Dignāga's (ca. 480–540) epistemology, because it is from here that the four-aspect theory derives, and (2) the description of the four aspects in the *CWSL* and Kuiji's commentaries and how they fit into the Yogācāra doctrine of consciousness-only. On the basis of this survey, I shall examine the five discrete epistemic elements that bring forth cognitive activities: the always active mental factors of sensory contact, attention, sensation, conceptualization, and volition. Except for these five factors, which accompany all mental states, there are also another five factors which are also considered to be omnipresent in the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika tradition, albeit classified as factors that only respond to specific objects. I shall also examine these five—namely, wishing, decisive resolve, memorizing, concentration, and discernment—in order to ascertain the different analyses of the five mental states in Yogācāra thought. As with most Abhidharmic treatises, Xuanzang seeks to establish the correct understanding of certain *dharmas* through doctrinal debate. Therefore, in addition to looking into the *CWSL* and its commentaries, I will also compare the discursive nature of the text with Sthiramati's *Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya* and other Abhidharmic treatises—mainly the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, *Pañcaskandhaka*, *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, and *Nyāyānusārasāstra*—to sort out the reasons for listing doctrinal debates and how it helps to build the correct interpretation of each mental factor.

Premised on results of the first two chapters, in chapter four I shall further discuss the other central soteriological aspect of the mind, namely, counteraction, and the therapeutic function of wholesome mental factors in remedying defilements. To demonstrate this, I will first introduce the taxonomy of right and wrong views in order to demonstrate the influence of a perceptual proposition and how this results in thoughts and mental activities. In this part, I mostly rely on Fuller’s study of views and his interpretation of the ways in which right and wrong views function. In a second step, I consider the relation of *modes of seeing* (views) to the *mode in which the mind apprehends its cognitive object* (mental factors), whether wholesome or unwholesome, and seek to demonstrate the principle of counteraction and how it serves as a therapeutic means to “cure” defilements. To do so, I search descriptions of counteraction in Abhidharmic treatises which focus on the remedial relation between two opposing concepts, and present passages from the *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā*, *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and *Samāhitābhūmi* to introduce a possible understanding of the Chinese term for counteraction, *dui zhi* (對治). Having settled the meaning and the function of counteraction, I shall examine the eleven wholesome mental factors and their counterparts to verify the therapeutic means by which a wholesome mental state “cures” a negative one. The method of the survey in this part is similar to the second section of chapter three: it investigates Xuanzang’s establishment of the correct understanding of each mental factor by comparing his strategy with that contained in Sthiramati’s commentary on the *Triṃśikā* as well as with debates recorded in other Abhidharmic treatises.

Chapter Two Mind and Mental Factors

The mind is raised as a topic foremost in discussions which seek to explain empirical phenomena, such as feeling, thinking, and acting, with the purpose of epistemologically deconstructing the cognitive world. Therefore, the mind is usually depicted as the center which receives stimulation from the outside and processes one's response to it. Treated as the axis of psychological and physical experience, Abhidharma and Yogācāra teachers intensely debated questions concerning the composition of the mind and the generation of its different constituents. Grounded in the views of the Yogācāra school, it was demanded that the concept of mind and mental activities were in accord with their particular system of causality—the eight forms of consciousness—and the school's worldview—the notion of Representation-Only. Controversies between different thinkers thus arose in this regard and solutions to the understanding of mental activities, such as perception, cognition, and conceptualization, varied.

The aims of this chapter are twofold. First, it aims to clarify the meaning of the two terms, “mind” and “mental factors”, as they are employed in the *CWSL* and to situate Xuanzang's understanding thereof within Abhidharma literature. Second, it examines the role played by the mind and mental factors in the soteriological system of the *CWSL*. In the first part of this chapter, I present the discussion in the *AKBh* concerning the three terms that relate to the concept of the mind—*citta*, *manas*, and *vijñāna*—and how their later development which coincide with the distinguishing doctrine of the Yogācāra school—the eight forms of consciousness—in order to reveal the definition of the mind and the domain in which it functions. Thereafter, I lay out the disputations regarding the nature of mental factors in different Abhidharmic schools, the general understanding of the arising of mental factors, and their relationship to the

mind in Yogācāra treatises. On this basis I shall demonstrate how mental factors are conceptualized in the *CWSL* from the perspective of their state of existence, classification, and so forth. In the second part of this chapter, I examine the cognitive characteristic of the mind and mental factors together with the doctrine of three natures, the theory that the Yogācārin uses to elaborate the different dimensions of existence. In doing so, I situate the character of mental activity within the Yogācāric worldview, and, in particular, its significance within the karmic system. By focusing on the form of cognition the mental factors represent, my purpose is to explicate the benefits they bring to the soteriological system and the supportive role they serve in reaching liberation.

2.1 The Concept of Mind

2.1.1 *Citta*, *Manas*, and *Vijñāna* from Sectarian Buddhism to Yogācāra

Studies concerning the Buddhist notion of mind primarily rely on Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika, Dārṣṭāntika, and Yogācāra treatises,¹ for it is here that we first encounter debates regarding the definition of the three terms, *citta*, *manas*, and *vijñāna*. In early Buddhist thought, represented by the *Āgamas* or *Nikāyas*,² these three terms are taken as near-synonyms and the Abhidharmic schools too considered them to be fundamentally identical. However, they also began to distinguish them on the basis of certain aspects.

Thus, in the *AKBh*, *citta*, *manas*, and *vijñāna* still refer to one thing,³ but two interpretations are nonetheless given to explain certain discrete functional aspects

¹ On Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika, and Yogācāra and their disputed relation see Silk 2002 and Kritzer 2005, pp. xi-xii. For the differentiation between the Sautrāntikas and Dārṣṭāntikas see Katō 1989, pp. 75-78, Cox 1995, pp. 37-41, Kritzer 2003, p.202ff, Dhammajoti 2007a, pp. 5-40, Yinshun1981, pp. 355-407, 528-610, and Lin 2015, pp.76-77.

² See Dhammajoti 2015, pp.239.

³ *cittaṃ mano 'tha vijñānam ekārthaṃ*. Pradhan 1975, pp.61,22. In the two Chinese translations, Paramārtha understands the differentiation between *citta*, *manas*, and *vijñāna* as three “names” (*ming* 名) and the one thing (*ekārthaṃ*) as one “referent” (*yi* 義) (*san ming yi yi* 三名一義). Xuanzang understands that these three terms have different “referents” (*yi* 義) but from one “faculty” (*ti* 體) (*yi*

attributed to each. In terms of their etymology, Vasubandhu first explains the different meanings of the three verbal roots, namely, \sqrt{cit} , \sqrt{man} , and $vi-\sqrt{jñā}$:

It is named *citta* because it accumulates or collects together (*cinoti, ji qi* 集起); it is named *manas* because it considers and thinks (*manute, si liang* 思量); it is named *vijñāna* because it cognizes (*vijñānāti, liao bie* 了別) [its cognitive object (*ālambanaṃ*)].⁴

In addition to this, another interpretation is proposed, which focuses not only on the cognitive function of the mind but also on its ability to collect good and bad mental reactions and so become the center that generates potential karmic action:

It is named *citta* because it is variegated with various purities and impurities; it is named *manas* because it is the basis for the thought that follows it; it is named *vijñāna*, because it is based on the sense faculty and the object.⁵

According to this definition, *manas* connects thoughts and enables the mental continuum while *vijñāna* is the awareness that react to perception. Most importantly, *citta* describes the function of mind that assembles the pure and impure elements. In stating that collection of mind includes beneficial and unbeneficial value, it implies that mind has the ability to receive good and bad influences from the objective world. The point of view that “mind” relates not only to cognition but also to collection of good and bad elements is explained much clearer in thought of Yogācāra in the structure of eight forms of consciousness.

yi ti yi 義異體一).

⁴ For the Sanskrit edition see Pradhan 1975, p.61,22-62,2. For Xuanzang’s Chinese translation see T 1558, p. 21c18-25, Paramārtha’s translation see T 1559, p.180, c3-7. Cf. Pruden 1988, pp.205-206; Sangpo 2012, pp.534-535. Similar records can also be found in the *MVŚ*, see T 1545, pp. 371b24-29.

⁵ See footnote 4.

In early Yogācāra thought, *citta*, *manas*, and *vijñāna* respectively refer to the store consciousness⁶ (*ālayavijñāna*, the eighth of consciousness), the notion of subjectivity⁷ (the seventh), and the six forms of cognitive (the sixth) and sensual perception (the first to fifth).⁸ Collectively understood as eight cognitive faculties, they together form the whole cognizing system of a personage. Functioning as their collective basis, the store consciousness not only preserves karmic traits from the past but also their potential manifestations in the future. It is therefore with the support of the store consciousness that *manas* becomes the main force that actualizes and stimulates karmic action with a differentiation between the self and others. Correspondingly, sensual and cognitive perception become tools which carry out the process of perception and form sensual experience and thoughts. Specifically, the Yogācāra describes three kinds of mental ability which serve as the storage of recollection, the subject that creates karma, and the platform that enables the realization of karmic activity.

In the *Triṃśikā*, these mental abilities are defined as three kinds of transforming consciousness whose function activates karmic actions in present and preserves those in the past. Respectively, the first transforming consciousness denotes the store consciousness, and the second and third the notion of subjectivity and the six forms of perception. Despite having its own characteristic and distinctive function, the arising of the seventh consciousness relies on the store consciousness since this latter contains the seeds that could serve as the cause to support the notion of subjectivity and different forms of cognition. Thus, when Xuanzang explains the bases for different types of

⁶ *Ālayavijñāna* is a subliminal mental component that stores previous experiences and forms future karmic retribution. It is described as the fundamental support of life and the force of rebirth in the thought of Yogācāra. On the origin and notion of the *ālayavijñāna*, see Schimthausen 1987; Frauwallner 1951; Rahula 1964; Waldron 1994 & 2003; Yamabe 2018.

⁷ Subjectivity pertains to the subject and his or her particular perspective, feelings, beliefs, and desires. It often used to refer to the experience realm in epistemology after Descartes. See the entry “Subjectivity” in *The Oxford Companion of Philosophy*, p.900. Here, by translating (*kliṣṭa-*)*manas* as “notion of subjectivity”, I emphasize its function of creating an agent-like feeling during cognition and establishing the concept of one being an individual and having a permanent self.

⁸ See T 1579, p. 651b19-2, Derge no.4038, 182a,9-13.

consciousness in the *CWSL*, support from the store consciousness is given as the necessary condition for the arising of the five sensual perceptions, cognitive perception, and the notion of subjectivity.⁹ Accordingly, the store consciousness is not only one consciousness but also the foundation of the entire system of the eight forms of consciousness. It is not difficult to comprehend why store consciousness was afforded such a dominant position: to the extent it contains all the seeds which provide the bases for all the other kinds of consciousness to arise, it thereby gives force to their arising as well as actualizing the karma that ripens through their arising. It namely preserves and manifests past karma through the notion of subjectivity (i.e., *manas*) and the six forms of perception (i.e., *viññāna*). In other words, karmic retribution fulfils its purpose by means of the arising of cognitive activities. Accordingly, the ripen karma not only characterizes the cognitive object and initiates the perception toward the formed object but also triggers the reaction in relation to the perceptual result. In other words, the system consisting of eight forms of consciousness incorporates karmic retribution and the arising of cognition.

The amalgamation of karmic and cognitive systems applies also to the understanding of the mind. When taken as synonymous with the store consciousness, the mind also functions to represent and maintain *karma*, albeit in a different manner to the eighth consciousness. Since this consciousness is the most essential element in Yogācāra thought, it is related to almost every aspect of doctrine explaining cognition and so participates in the arising of all phenomena (*dharma*). The most important task of store consciousness is probably to initiate the formation of life and to create the

⁹ The five forms of sensual perception rely on four supports for their arising: namely, the five faculties, cognitive perception, the notion of subjectivity, and the store consciousness. For the sixth consciousness to arise, it needs only the support of the seventh and eighth consciousness. The arising of the seventh consciousness, the notion of subjectivity, relies only on the function of store consciousness. See T 1585, p. 20c12-26. This doctrine, according to Xuanzang, comes from *Viniścayasamgrahāṇī*. See T 1579, p. 580b9-16.

container world to live in. Therein, the function of the mind acts at the stage of establishing the empirical world, and though the arising of phenomena still depends on the eighth and the seventh consciousness, the state of mind embodies the performance of the six forms of perception.

2.1.2 Mind: A Complex that Performs the Activity of Consciousness and Accumulates its Influences

The *Liaoyideng*¹⁰ and *Shuyao*¹¹ list eighteen synonyms for *ālayavijñāna*, each denoting a different functional aspect. Among these, *ādānavijñāna* and the mind (*citta*) relate to the functioning of the six forms of perception and the influences at work upon them. In attempting to sort out the meaning of the mind, it is thus essential that we examine their descriptions in order.

Ādānavijñāna is described as generating the six forms of consciousness based on the seed in the store consciousness, and the mind as having the ability to perform the activity of these consciousnesses and accumulate their influences. Corresponding to the karmic system, mind refers to the manifestation of sensual experience and the arising of perceptual activities. Furthermore, it collects the wholesome and unwholesome deeds caused by cognition and enables them to grow. We can observe at this point in the discussion that glosses consciousness (*shi* 識, *nam par shes pa*) due to certain distinct functions. As a transitional phase between the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra* and the Yogācāra systems of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu¹², the *Samdh* enumerates three terms for different operational modes of consciousness; it states:

This consciousness is also termed the appropriating consciousness [*ādānavijñāna*] because it is taken up together with the body. It is also

¹⁰ T43, no. 1832, p. 729, b25-27

¹¹ T43, no. 1831, p. 634, c10-12

¹² Lamotte 1935, p.14; Powers 1993, p.4

termed the receptacle consciousness [*ālayavijñāna*] because this consciousness joins itself to and lies hidden [in that body] and shares the same destiny [with the body.] It is also termed mind (*citta*) because this consciousness mines and accumulates material forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and touches.¹³

The three names refer to three operational modes of consciousness. Apparently, *ādānavijñāna* generates the awareness of the perceptual and conceptual situations which form physical and psychological experiences; *ālayavijñāna* supports the establishment of life forms; and the mind collects sensual and mental experiences.

Akin to this passage, Xuanzang also discusses the three terms in the *CWSL* when introducing the different names of *ālayavijñāna* on the premise they perform dissimilar tasks. In the *CWSL*, the store consciousness is understood to participate in the cognition of every observable phenomenon in the mundane world. Based on its core function in containing all seeds, it affects all karmic activities, from the very process of rebirth and experience to the perception of experience, and within this complex *ādānavijñāna* and the mind denote different operational modes of *ālayavijñāna*.

[*Ālayavijñāna*] is termed “mind” because it piles up seeds that are perfumed by many different dharma; and the “*ādānavijñāna*” is so called when it appropriates all seeds and the material forms of sense faculties.¹⁴

In these two passages of the *Samdh* and the *CWSL*, *ādānavijñāna* gives rise to the six forms of perception, while the “mind” assembles and nourishes the good and bad deeds that appear due to the generation of these forms of perception. Their respective descriptions concerning the function of these three consciousnesses are thus similar. In

¹³ Keenan 2017, p.28. See T 676, p. 692b14-28. For the Tibetan parallel see Derge no.106, vol.49, 12b6-10. For a translation based on Tibetan see Lamotte 1935, p.185 and Powers 1994, p.71.

¹⁴ See T 1585, p. 13c8-10: 謂或名心，由種種法熏習種子所積集故；或名阿陀那，執持種子及諸色根令不壞故。

general, *ādānavijñāna* enables the six forms of perception to arise and the mind embodies the beneficial or unbeneficial influences from perception and serves as the platform which allows them to grow. However, it is only in the *CWSL* that the element of karmic influence, namely the seeds and their perfuming, is emphasized. Even though both passages name *ādānavijñāna* as the force for cognition and the describe the mind as a heap of cognitive activities, Xuanzang conflates these two functions through in terms of karmic influence.

In consideration of the essential requirements for forming physical and psychological experience, the six forms of perception constitute core figures in establishing the connection between the oneself and others. In synchronizing the multiple forms of sensual perception and conceptualization, the *ādānavijñāna* is the basis that supports the simultaneous arising of the former six forms of perception. According to the fifteenth verse of *Triṃśikā*, the six forms of perception arise simultaneously and do not conflict with each other due to the support of the root-consciousness (*mūlavijñāna*, *gen ben shi*, 根本識) which is able to integrate dissimilar perceiving functions that result from different sensual domains.

As recorded in the *CWSL*, this explanation of experience comes from the *Samdh*, which draws on the metaphor of the waves and the mirror in order to describe the arising of the six forms of perception. It first defines *ādānavijñāna* as supporting and establishing the generation of the six forms of perception and then presents these two metaphors to elucidate their simultaneous arising:¹⁵

¹⁵ The metaphor of the wave is mentioned in the chapter that discusses *citta*, *manas* and *vijñāna*, translated into Chinese as 心意識相品 (T 676, pp. 692a28-c23) and into Tibetan as *blo gros yangs paḥi leḥu ste lnga paḥo* (see Lamotte, 1935, pp.9). The entirety of this chapter is also preserved in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* (See T 1579, pp. 718a7-c3). For a discussion concerning the relation between the citation in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* and the *Samdh*, see Schmithausen 1987, pp.13-14, §1.6.6-1.6.7, and also 1976, p.240.

Viśālamati, it is like a great rush of flowing waters. If the conditions for one wave are presented, only one wave will develop. If the conditions for two or more are present, then many waves will develop. But that great rush of water flows on constantly without interruption or cessation. It is also like the surface of a very pure mirror. If the conditions for one image are present, then only one image will appear [in that mirror]. If the conditions for two or more images are present, then many images will appear. But the mirror surface does not alter itself into the image and suffers no change at all.¹⁶

In explaining the fiftieth verse of the *Triṃśikā*—“In the root consciousness, the arising of the other five takes place according to the conditions, either all together or not, just like waves in water¹⁷”—both Xuanzang¹⁸ and Sthiramati¹⁹ refer to the metaphor of waves²⁰ in the *Samdh*. In the *CWSL*, Xuanzang identifies the root-consciousness mentioned in the verse as the *ādānavijñāna* and so as the basis for the generation of various impure and pure consciousnesses.²¹ Furthermore, it is also the

¹⁶ 廣慧，譬如大瀑水流，若有一浪生緣現前，唯一浪轉；若二、若多浪生緣現前，有多浪轉。然此瀑水自類恒流無斷無盡。又如善淨鏡面，若有一影生緣現前，唯一影起；若二、若多影生緣現前，有多影起。非此鏡面轉變為影，亦無受用滅盡可得。 See T 676, p. 692, b28-c4. Here, I quote Keenan’s translation. Keenan 2000, pp.28-29. For a translation based on Tibetan see Lamotte 1935, pp.185-186 and Powers 1994, pp.71-72.

¹⁷ Here, I quote Anacker’s translation. See Anacker 1986 pp.187. It is also translated by Frauwallner. See his *Die Philosophie des Buddhismus*, pp. 253.

¹⁸ In *CWSL*, Xuanzang only mentions that this verse has already been explained in a *sūtra*. See T 1585, p. 37 a23-24. However, Kuiji states that this *sūtra* is the *Samdh*. See T 1830, pp. 476b1-8.

¹⁹ Sthiramati also quotes the *Samdh* when explaining the same paragraph. See Buescher 2007 p.102, 17-28.

²⁰ Both Sthiramati and Xuanzang only mention the metaphor of wave but not the mirror.

²¹ Unlike Xuanzang, Sthiramati deems root-consciousness to be *ālayavijñāna*. In response to this difference, Ui considers the explanation in the *CWSL* to be an “innovative” annotation. Because *mūlavijñāna* comes from Mahāsāṃghika discourse, wherein it refers to the fundamental support for the arising of sensual consciousness, it is often taken by Yogācārins as evidence that the concept of *ālayavijñāna* was already implied in early *sūtras*, and they thus considered the root-consciousness to be *ālayavijñāna*. Therefore, Ui regards Sthiramati’s annotation to be correct. See Ui 1952, pp.226-227. Indeed, treatises such as the *MSGc* (T 1594, p. 134a17-b1) treat root-consciousness exactly as Ui describes. However, as the *Samdh* itself also defines it as *ādānavijñāna* when it functions as the support for the generation of the six forms of consciousness, Xuanzang’s intention to define root-consciousness as *ādānavijñāna* is simply following the quoted source.

fundament for the perceptual and cognitive functions of the six forms of consciousness. Hence, the *ādānavijñāna* is the direct and common support for the six forms of consciousness also, supporting their individual arising and integrating their co-working.

When the six types of perception arise simultaneously, the agent that gives rise to the various activities, in dependence on their arising, and collects the good and bad influences of those activities is the mind. Since the activities relate to different forms of perception and are gathered in various types of cognition, the mind works as a complex which embodies perceptual activities that arise due to the interrelated functions of each form of consciousness. To be more precise, with respect to the workings of the six forms of perception, the seed in the store consciousness enables the awareness of what one sees, hears, smells, tastes, touches, and thinks, as well as the attitude that appears due to that awareness. In this regard, the store consciousness is called *ādānavijñāna* when it makes the six forms of consciousness arise and supports their simultaneous operation; and it is called mind when the various attitudes emerge in the awareness of the six perceptions. The different types of attitudes that arise in relation to awareness thus constitute mental activities that are reactions to the object (i.e., the perception) of which one is aware. But such attitudinal mental activities are also related to the maturation of karmic activities, for the activities, depending on the attribute of the seed, which cause good, bad, or neutral influences are concurrently collected by the mind also.

Here, the concept of the mind becomes much clearer. In Yogācāra thought, the mind represents one function of the store consciousness. That is, it reveals the activities that arise due to the six forms of perception, whose function depends on the seed contained in the store consciousness, while collecting and growing the influences of those activities. Since the six forms of perception arise simultaneously, and collectively create sensual as well as conceptual experiences, the mind that embodies the cognitive

activities and collects the good, bad, and neutral deeds caused by them is best described as a complex: in accumulating deeds, the mind enhances the influences of mental activities in addition to forming a platform whence more activities emerge.

2.2 The Concept of Mental Factors

As already stated in the foregoing, the mind is a complex that is made up of various sensual and conceptual activities which actualizes the ripened *karma*. That means, on the one hand, activities caused by the functioning of the six types of awareness appear to shape the mind, whilst on the other hand, it is only when there is a mind that the effects of those cognitive acts are present. The Sinitic Yogācāra tradition educes a relation of mutual support between the mind and its constituents, the mental factors, by drawing on the metaphor of the king-subject. The *CWSL* follows this and depicts the agent that bears the arising of mental factors as a mind-king (*xin wang* 心王).²² Eight such mind-kings respectively mark the cognitive functions of the eight forms of consciousness. Namely, except for the mind-kings of store consciousness and the notion of subjectivity, there are other mind-kings of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, and knowing. The activities that arise due to the cooperation of these eight mind-kings are the mental factors defined as belonging (*suo you* 所有) to them. In the following section, I shall examine how the concept of mental factors developed in the different Abhidharmic schools as well as the where doctrinal disputes occurred between them regarding to the nature of the mental factors.

²² See T 1828, p. 744b24-25: 八心王、五十一心數，本性相是分別正智攝。 “Mind-king” is the synonymous to the “mind” as it refers to the overall cognition function of one’s consciousness. However, it emphasizes the contrast between the mind as the central controller and the mental factors as the different functional aspects of the cognitive agent.

2.2.1 Mind and Mental Factors in the Abhidharma Traditions and Early Yogācāra

Mizuno found that the Chinese *xin suo* (心所) in the *Āgamas* or the Pāli *cetasika* in the *Nikāyas* do occur but are not associated with the concept of “mental factors”, suggesting that the theory which relates the mind and mental factors did not feature in early Buddhism.²³ It was not until the time of Abhidharmic Buddhism that discussions of mental factors began to proliferate. In affirming mental factors as a concrete concept that influences cognition, disputations naturally arose concerning whether the mind and mental factors are distinguishable *dharmas* and, if so, the way in which the two should be understood as associating with each other (*citta-saṃprayukta*, *xin xiang ying* 心相應).

The issue regarding whether the mind and mental factors are distinguishable is rather complicated in Abhidharmic discourse, and one encounters quite divergent explanations and statements within such literature, even from the same school of thought. As demonstrated in the studies of such scholars as Yinshun, Katō, and Dhammajoti, most of the Sarvāstivādins took an affirmative stance on the matter; however, Dharmatrāta²⁴ and Buddhadeva²⁵ forwarded alternative opinions, coinciding with what is termed the Dārṣṭāntika position²⁶. Thus, Dharmatrāta considers the mind and all mental factors, apart from sensation (*vedana*, *shou* 受) and conceptualization (*samjna*, *xiang* 想), to simply be different states of cognition (*cetana*, *si* 思) in the mind, and Buddhadeva similarly deems mental factors to be identical to the mind and hence to not exist independently.²⁷ Contrary to the Sarvāstivādins, moreover, the Sautrāntika

²³ Although some cases of 心所 or *cetasika* in the *Āgamas* and *Nikāyas* do indeed bear the sense of ‘mental factors’, Mizuno suggested that they were likely added later and thus do not represent the views of the early Buddhist tradition. Mizuno 1997, pp. 252-262.

²⁴ See T 1545, p. 662b13-15 尊者法救說：離大種別有造色，說心所法非即是心。

²⁵ See T 1545, p. 661c17-19.

²⁶ See T 1562, p. 395, a1-2.

²⁷ See T 1545, p. 8c7-10. 尊者法救作如是言，諸心、心所是思差別，故世第一法以思為自性。尊者覺天作如是說，諸心、心所體即是心，故世第一法以心為自性。

teacher, Śrīlāta, and Harivarman, the author of **Tattvasiddhi*,²⁸ are famous for denying the existence of mental factors and treating them only as the attributes of the mind.

With an increase in debates on the relationship between the mind and mental factors, the precise nature of the association between the two also grew in importance. In the Dārṣṭāntika theory of association, the mind and its activities are said to arise together in “companionship”²⁹: as stated in *MVŚ*³⁰, the mind and its constituents (depending on different conditions) arise in succession, like a line of merchants going along a narrow road.³¹ According to Dhammajoti, this metaphor represents Dharmatrāta’s opinion on the consecutive arising of the mind and mental factors when they are associated with each other.³² In the case of Buddhadeva³³, since he does not accept any possibility of an existent mental factor, it is most likely that he is not concerned with the association between the mind and mental factors at all.³⁴ Akin to the Dharmatrāta, Śrīlāta also only accepts three mental factors, namely, *cetanā*, *vedanā*, and *samjñā*. He thus describes them as arising “immediately after” (*samanantaram*) another.³⁵ However, for those Sarvāstivādins who agreed on the existence of mental factors, it was understood that the mind and mental factors arise together due to sharing five equivalencies (*pañcadhā samatā*, *wu ping deng* 五平等). In both the *MVŚ*³⁶ and

²⁸ See T 1646, p. 278b5-279 c16.

²⁹ See T 1545, p. 81a26-28 大德說曰：同伴侶義是相應義。識與心所互相容受，俱時而生，同取一境乃是相應。

³⁰ 如譬喻者。彼作是說。心心所法依諸因緣前後而生。譬如商侶涉嶮隘路。一一而度無二並行。心心所法亦復如是。眾緣和合一而生。所待眾緣各有異故。See T 1545, p. 79c8-12.

³¹ See T 1545, p. 493c25-494a1. 謂或有說，諸心所法次第而生，非一時生，如譬喻者。大德亦說，諸心所法次第而生，非一時生。如多商侶過一狹路，要一一過非二非多，諸心所法亦復如是，一一各別生相所生，必無一時和合生義。Also T 1545, p. 79c8-12: 如譬喻者。彼作是說。心心所法依諸因緣前後而生。譬如商侶涉嶮隘路。一一而度無二並行。心心所法亦復如是。眾緣和合一而生。所待眾緣各有異故。

³² Dhammajoti 2009, pp.225-226

³³ See Katō 1989, p. 200.

³⁴ For further discussion on the figures of Dharmatrāta and Buddhadeva, see Dhammajoti 2009, pp.225-226; Yinshun 1981, pp.245-272; and Lin 2015, pp.76-81.

³⁵ See Dhammajoti 2009, p.227 and Katō 1989, pp.202-216.

³⁶ See T 1545, p. 80c14-21: 四事等故說名相應：一、時分等。謂心心所同一剎那而現行故。二、所依等。謂心心所同依一根而現行故。三、所緣等。謂心、心所，同緣一境而現行故。四、行相等。謂心、心所，同一行相而現行故。復次，五事等故說名相應。即前四事及物體等。謂心、

AKBh it is said that the two arise with the same basis (*āśraya*), perceive the same cognitive object (*ālambana*), have the same aspects or mode of activity (*ākāra*), arise at the same time (*kāla*), and have the same number of real entities (*dravya*).³⁷

Such unresolved wranglings in the Abhidharma tradition are quite revealing of the complications the category of mental factors precipitated. And if one further considers the relationship between mind and mental factors in early Yogācāra thought, the situation changes little, for in this school also one finds many other arguments on the matter. In the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*, for instance, it is stated that mental factors such as faith (*śraddhā*, *xin* 信) and attachment have no qualitative different (i.e., pure or impure) because they are both the mind alone.³⁸ However, in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, a difference between the mind and mental factors is given in light of their functioning in the process of perception. Furthermore, this text also mentions that the arising of mental factors depends on their own seeds (*bīja*, *zhong zi* 種子).³⁹ This latter position would not only come to be recognized as the correct doctrine in most later Yogācāra treatises but would also serve as the basis for Xuanzang’s explanation of the relation between the mind and mental factors in the *CWSL*.

2.2.2 Mind and Mental Factors in the *CWSL*

2.2.2.1 “Neither Identical nor Distinct”: The Relationship between the Mind and Mental Factors

The relationship between the mind and mental factors is described as “neither identical nor distinct” (*fei ji fei li* 非即非離). This argument establishes itself on the basis of the

心所各唯一物，和合而起故名相應。

³⁷ Sanskrit edition see Pradhan 1975, pp.62, 8-10. Chinese parallel see T 1558, pp. 21c26-pp.22a3 and also T 1559, p. 180c12-15. Cf. Sangpo, 2012 p.536; Pruden 1988 pp. 205-206. For a discussion on the fivefold equality, see Dharmmajoti, 2009, pp 225.

³⁸ For the Sanskrit edition, see Lévi 1907, pp.63-64. For the Chinese and Tibetan parallels, see T 1604, pp. 613b11-27; Derge no. 4020, pp.129b1-260a1.

³⁹ See Bhattacharya 1957, p.11, 20-21. *ekālambanā anekākārāḥ sahabhuva ekaikavṛttayaḥ svabījanīyatāḥ samprayuktāḥ sākārāḥ sālambanāḥ sāsrayāḥ*.

cognitive theory of the *CWSL*. In general, Yogācāra thought considers all phenomena (including cognitive activities) to arise due to the functioning of consciousness. Elaborating on this doctrine, Xuanzang explains that cognition comprises four parts: (1) the seen-aspect (**nimitta-bhāga, xiang fen* 相分) which represents the cognitive object, (2) the seeing-aspect (**darśana-bhāga, jian fen* 見分) which is the subject that perceives the object, (3) self-cognition (*svasaṃvedana-bhāga, zi zheng fen* 自證分) which serves as the basis that transforms cognition, and (4) the cognition of self-cognition (**svasaṃvittisaṃvitti-bhāga, zheng zi zheng fen* 證自證分) which is the reflexive function that reflects on the result of cognition.⁴⁰ As the basis of cognition, self-cognition has the capacity to make the first two objective and subjective aspects appear, which themselves cause sensual and conceptual perception. It is perception, therefore, that brings about cognitive activity, manifesting as a mental state. As a matter of fact, even though self-cognition and these two aspects relate foremost to the context of cognition, they are actually functions of consciousness, meaning they are also functions of the mind. To give the cognizing mind a basis and to distinguish it from the two aspects which are transformed by it, one can see that Xuanzang intends to bifurcate the concept of mind into “the quality that makes the mind become the mind” and “the appearance of the mind”. Since the mind, as we previously discussed, is a complex that comprises the activities of different forms of consciousness, it is not difficult to understand that the concept of mind includes the “mind itself”; a mental capacity that entails the ability to reflect on the traits of the matured seed of past cognitive activities and on the “manifestation of the mind” that reveals the matured seed in present cognitive activity. To be more precise, in the context of the mind, self-cognition is the mind itself, and the manifestation thereof depends on the perception of the two

⁴⁰ See discussion in 3.1.2.

transformed objective and subjective aspects, a process which renders mental factors reflections of one's state of mind.

By virtue of this premise, Xuanzang sets about presenting his notion of the mind and mental factors being “neither identical nor distinct”. He first defeats one argument to claim mental factors have their own peculiar nature by using the scriptural authority of the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*. Thus, as he writes in the *CWSL*⁴¹:

How can the teaching in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* be understood? As its verse states:

“Affirming that the mind seems to appear as twofold,

It appears to be greed, etc.,

Or it appears to be faith etc.,

Without a distinction between defiled and good dharmas.”⁴²

In the Sanskrit witness of the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, this translation corresponds to following: *cittam dvayaprabhāsam rāgādyābhāsam iṣyate tadvat / śraddhādyābhāsam na tadanyo dharmah kliṣṭakuśalo 'sti* //.⁴³ The commentary upon the verse explains that the mind's “twofold appearance” (*dvayaprabhāsam*) denotes the “subjective perceiver” (*grāhya*) and the “perceived object” (*grāhaka*), or, following the same dualistic premise, that the mind could appear to be impure, such as in the case of greed, or pure, as in the case of faith. These latter two, moreover, appear as mental characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) which cannot stand apart from the mind.⁴⁴

⁴¹ The Chinese version of *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* is translated by Prabhākaramitra (波羅頗蜜多羅). See T 1604. However, when Xuanzang quotes this verse in the *CWSL* in order to explain the twofold appearance of the mind, he does not use the translation from Prabhākaramitra but seems to give his own translation.

⁴² 《莊嚴論》說復云何通？如彼頌言：「許心似二現，如是似貪等，或似於信等，無別染善法。」 T 1585, p. 36c26-28

⁴³ See Lévi 1907, pp.63, 11.34. For the Prabhākaramitra's Chinese translation see T 1604, p. 613 b12-13: 能取及所取，此二唯心光，貪光及信光，二光無二法。

⁴⁴ See Lévi 1907, p.63, 11.34: *cittamātram eva dvayapratibhāsam iṣyate grāhyapratibhāsam grāhakapratibhāsam ca/ tathā rāgādikleśābhāsam tad eveṣyate/ śraddhādikuśaladharmābhāsam vā/ na tu tadābhāsād anyah kliṣṭo dharmo 'sti rāgādilakṣaṇaḥ kuśalo vā śraddhādilakṣaṇaḥ/*

Comparing the Sanskrit with Xuanzang’s translation quoted in the *CWSL*, the word “seems to” (*si* 似)⁴⁵ is emphasized and endued with a meaning that also corresponds to the four-aspect theory in Kuiji’s commentary. When Kuiji elaborates on this point, he states that the “perceived object” and the “subjective perceiver” are the seen-aspect and seeing-aspect respectively, namely the cognized and the cognizer. In Kuiji’s explanation, these two aspects are manifested by the mind itself as subject and object and thereby enable perception. Since perception is initiated by the mind itself, at any given moment perceiving activity resembles the given mental state. Such attitudes such as greed or faith which arise due to perception are thus also resemblances of the mind.⁴⁶ One can discern in Kuiji’s commentary on the twofold appearance, therefore, the specific notion that the mind “seems to” have two aspects which in turn “resemble” the mind itself. As a result, the twofold appearance (or two aspects) that is created by the mind, along with such twofold objects as purity and impurity that arise because of twofold perception which is itself a result of the twofold mind, cannot exist apart from the mind. Proceeding from this, the contaminated and pure mental factors, such as greed and faith, both are resemblances of the momentary mental state; thus, contamination and wholesomeness are not influences from an external world but rather appear because of the manifesting activity of the mind itself.

Thus far, we have considered Xuanzang and Kuiji’s justification for the position that mental factors are “not distinct to the mind”. Now we turn to their explanation for “neither identical”. The *CWSL* begins by refuting another objection which claims that mental factors are merely different states of the mind and only exist nominally. In

⁴⁵ It is not clear whether the Chinese character *si* (似) reflect the Sanskrit term *tadvat* or the character *ru* (如) which comes later.

⁴⁶ See T 1830, p. 474a2-14: 此中「似」言似心外所計實二分等法，故名為「似」。無別染、善法者，謂心變似見、相二分，二分離心無別有法。復言心變似貪、信等故，貪、信等離心之外，無別染善法，體即心也，如二分故。

response to this claim, Xuanzang states right at the beginning of his refutation: “To say [a mental factor] appears by resembling [the different states of the mind] (i.e., attachment, faith, and so on) does not indicate that [the mental factor] is the mind itself.”⁴⁷ To elucidate why the resemblance of the mind is not the mind itself, Kuiji further introduces the four-aspect theory:

The dharmas such as greed and faith which are included in the comprehensive mind, manifest by transforming the resemblances of greed, faith, etc. which are distinct from themselves [in the comprehensive mind]. By means of reasoning, one speaks of generality, distinctiveness, accumulation, and differentiation. The comprehensive mind can manifest the two resemblances by itself. It is just as the self-cognition of the mind resembles the seen-aspect and seeing-aspect. At the same time, the self-essence of greed etc., also resembles the two aspects of greed etc.⁴⁸

The point upon which Kuiji wants to elaborate is that the mind itself is different from the manifested mental state. Therefore, the greedy mind itself is distinct from the manifested greed that resembles the greedy mental state. That is to say, when a greedy mind arises, the proceeding self-cognition thereof transforms the two aspects to manifest greed, the subjective aspect being able to cognize attachment, and the objective aspect serving as the image which is being cognized. To say that a mental factor appears by resembling the mind itself is to say that the seen-aspect and seeing-aspects resemble self-cognition. However, one cannot say that the mind and mental factors are identical, just as one cannot say that the seen-aspect and seeing-aspects are the same as self-cognition. Thus, the mind and mental factors are “neither identical”.

⁴⁷ 說似彼現，非彼即心。T 1585, p. 37, a7.

⁴⁸ 總心聚中貪信等法，亦別變似貪、信等現。以義說之總、別、聚、異。謂總心自能似二現，即心自證分，似自見、相二，俱時貪等自體分，亦現似貪等各二現義。T 1830, p. 475a5-9

In specific regards to the divergence over whether mental factors arise apart from the mind or not, the *CWSL* concludes in two ways, namely, by availing itself of the ultimate (*paramārtha-satya*, 勝義諦) and conventional (*saṃvṛti-satya*, 世俗諦) truths. Saying that mental factors have a self-nature apart from the mind is based on conventional truth, whereas it is ultimately true that the mind and mental factors are neither identical nor distinct.⁴⁹

2.2.2.2 Different Functions of the Mind and Mental Factors and their Association

Akin to the position of Sarvāstivādin, the *CWSL* also considers the different functional relations between the mind and mental factors in the following way:

With respect to what is grasped [by the mind and mental factors], the mind takes only the general characteristic and the mental factors the specific characteristic therefrom, aiding and accomplishing the activities of the mind; [for this reason] it obtains the name “mental factor” (*xin suo*, 心所). Just like the painting master draws an outline and his disciple fills in the color.⁵⁰

In order to clarify the difference between the general and specific characteristics, the *CWSL* quotes the *Yogācārabhūmi* as follows:

Consciousness (*vijñāna*, *shi*, 識) [alone] is able to recognize the general characteristic of an event. Attention (*manaskāra*, *zuo yi* 作意) perceives those not yet recognized characteristics which are the specific characteristics grasped by various mental factors. Sensory contact can perceive those attractive characteristics and so on; sensation can perceive

⁴⁹ 應說離心有別自性，以心勝故說唯識等。心所依心勢力生，故說似彼現，非彼即心。又識、心言亦攝心所，恒相應故。唯識等言及現似彼，皆無有失，此依世俗；若依勝義，心所與心，非離非即，諸識相望，應知亦然。是謂大乘真俗妙理。See T 1585, p. 36c22-p. 37 a11. The translation is based on Cook 1999, pp.218-219, Wei Tat 1973, p.472.

⁵⁰ 心於所緣，唯取總相；心所於彼，亦取別相，助成心事，得心所名。如畫師、資，作模、填彩。See T 1585, p. 26, c16-18. Translation based on Wei Tat 1973, p.355 and Cook 1999, pp.157-158.

those graspable characteristics and so on; conceptualization can perceive causal characteristic (*nimittalakṣaṇa*, *yinxiang* 因相) of speech; volition can perceive correct causal characteristic (*samyaklakṣaṇa*, *zhengyinxiang* 正因相) and so on.⁵¹

According to this definition, during the process of perception, the mind apprehends events only in a general way, and thus cannot behold an object entirely. Therefore, the particular aspects are taken by different mental factors and to that extent it is only these latter that reflect the distinctive quality of the object. In other words, it is a mental factor that plays the core role in discrimination.

According to *AKBh*'s definition, the mind and mental factors are able to associate with each other because they share in five conditions:⁵² depending on the same support (*āśraya*), grasping the same object (*ālambana*), at the same time (*kāla*), the same number in substance (*dravyas*), and acting in the same mode (*ākāra*). However, in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the mind is associated with its factor in a distinct manner:

[Their] object is the same but the mode of acting is not the same. [They] function separately, exist at the same time, but arise from their own seed.⁵³

In the *Yogācāric* system, the mode of acting is thus different in the mind or mental factors, each cognizing the object in different ways and so assuming different appearances when acting. Moreover, they arise from different seeds, which means that the mind and mental factors are substantially different; a position which provided

⁵¹ 故《瑜伽》說，識能了別事之總相。作意了此所未了相，即諸心所所取別相；觸能了此可意等相；受能了此攝受等相；想了此言說因相；思能了此正因等相。See T 1585, pp. 26c18-25. For the original text in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, see T 1579, pp. 291b21-27. For the Sanskrit parallel, see Bhattacharya 1957, pp.59, 16-22, and for the Tibetan, see Derge no.4035, 30a9-14.

⁵² For the Sanskrit edition, see Pradhan 1975, pp.62, 8-10. For the Chinese parallel, see T 1558, pp. 21c26-pp.22a3 and T 1559, p. 180c12-15.

⁵³ 同一所緣，非同—行相。—時俱有，—一而轉，各自種子所生。See T 1579, pp. 280b19-21.

further theoretical support for Yogācāra proponents in affirming that mental factors are distinguishable from the mind.

2.2.2.3 Classification of Mental Factors

Six categories are used to classify the different natures of the fifty-one mental factors in the *CWSL*.⁵⁴ The first category of always active (*sarvatraga*, *pianxing*, 遍行) mental factors denote a collective group containing five mental factors which constitute the steps the mind goes through in every moment of perception. These mental factors, moreover, serve as the foundation for the next five categories: the factor of specific object (*pratiniyataviṣaya*, *biejing*, 別境), the wholesome factor (*kuśala*, *shan*, 善), the factor of defilement (*kleśa*, *fangnao*, 煩惱), the factor of secondary defilement (*upakleśa*, *suifangnao*, 隨煩惱), and the indeterminate factor (*aniyata*, *buding*, 不定). Most of the mental factors, however, have specific definitions and bear certain functions in Abhidharmic literature; these, in turn, are usually related to discrete doctrinal traditions of early Buddhism which serve as the antecedents for subsequent definitions and are the source of much philosophical puzzlement within the scholastic tradition.

The list of mental factors in the *CWSL* follows the *Triṃśikā*, but is similar also to the *Yogācārabhūmi* and almost identical to the *PSk*, *Xianyang*, and *Baifa*. Although the exact enumeration and names of mental factors in these different Yogācāra texts vary slightly, most spring from the Sarvāstivādin listing, recorded, for example, in the later *AKBh*.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ See table one in the end of this chapter.

⁵⁵ The Yogācāra classifies five mental factors which are considered to be of “wild extent” in Sarvāstivādin expositions into “specific objects”; meaning that they did not regard these five to be factors that are necessary for every moment of perception—this may well be the greatest difference between the classifications of mental factors in Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra thought.

The list in the *AKBh* is a rather mature version, having evolved from a categorization found in six treatises (*śaḍpādaśāstra*), foremost among which are the *Dhātukāya* and the *Prakarāṇa*. Already present in these texts is the intention to establish a theoretical fundament for perception and negative mental states, introducing such classificatory groups as “general omnipresent factor” (*mahābhūmika*, *da di fa*, 大地法), “factors of major afflictions” (*klesamahābhūmika*, *da fang nao di fa*, 大煩惱地法), and “factors of minor afflictions” (*parīttaklesābhūmika*, *xiao fang nao di fa*, 小煩惱地法),⁵⁶ and stipulating their contents. Similar listings of such groups are encountered within the *Dhātukāya* and *Prakarāṇa*, which also adds another group of “wholesome factors” (*kuśalamahābhūmika*, *da shan di fa* 大善地法)⁵⁷. However, the systems of these texts were not yet sufficient enough to realise a complete classification and overlapping contents between the different groups all too easily exposed the shortcomings of their categorical method. The *AKBh*, then, clearly structures factors that are associated with the mind (*cittasamprayuktadharmā*, *xin xian ying fa* 心相應法) on the basis of what is listed in the above two treatises, whilst supplementing this with a further two lists of “unwholesome factors” (*akuśalamahābhūmikadharmā*, *da bushandifa* 大不善地法) and “undetermined factors” (*aniyatābhūmika*, *bu ding di fa* 不定地法).⁵⁸

⁵⁶ See T 1540, p. 614b12-14. 有十大地法、十大煩惱地法、十小煩惱地法、五煩惱、五見、五觸、五根、五法、六識身、六觸身、六受身、六想身、六思身、六愛身。The first one marks the ten fundamental mental states that arise in perception, namely, sensation, conceptualization, volition, sensory contact, attention, wish, decisive resolve, memory, concentration, and discernment. The second lists ten afflicted mental states: non-faith, laziness, forgetfulness, confusion, ignorance, wrong knowledge, the wrong attention, evil resolve, restlessness, and carelessness. The third includes ten afflicted mental states which have less influence: fury, resentment, hypocrisy, jealousy, avarice, deceit, guile, pride, and harmfulness. And the remaining eleven classifications either explain the different aspects of one mental state or enumerate elements that relate to perceptual activity. This category shows a greater intention to collect lists from other scriptures or treatises instead of formulating a comprehensive one for its own doctrinal system.

⁵⁷ Having similar contents to the *Dhātukāya*, the *Prakarāṇa* adds several classifications that elaborate on the formation of the living world in addition to one category that lists ten wholesome mental states: faith, vigor, shame, embarrassment, lack of attachment, lack of anger, serenity, equanimity, non-carelessness, non-harmfulness. See T 1542, p. 698 c11-12.

⁵⁸ Regarding the numbers and classification of mental factors, see Willemen, Dessein, and Cox 1998,

Modelling themselves after the classification of mental activities from the *AKBh*, the *PSk* and *Triṃśikā* separate the ten factors of omnipresence into two classes: “factors of always being active” and “factors bound to specific objects”. The two scriptures redistribute some of the undetermined factors into the class of the “factors of primary afflictions”.⁵⁹ Amidst all these fluctuations, the Yogācārinś distinguished six categories of mental factors. Five omnipresent factors (sensory contact, attention, sensation, conceptualization, and volition) act as the fundamental support for the arising of all other mental factors, under which are included the factors of the aforementioned five classes: factors that only respond to particular objects, the wholesome factors, factors causing affliction, factors causing secondary afflictions, and the undetermined factors.

Mental activities such as sensations, emotions, thoughts, attitudes, etc., which could be recognized as defiled or wholesome, are already mentioned in early *sūtras* with the purpose of identifying the barriers to liberation and the means to overcome them. Although the list of mental factors is different from several Abhidharmic treatises, those mental factors that are included in different categories most likely originate from several lists in early Buddhist literature. The list thus represents those factors that are related to the process of cognition, that are of soteriological benefit, and that concern defiled mental states. Lin has analyzed the possible origins of the different categories of mental factors,⁶⁰ finding that such lists as the thirty-seven *dharmas* that contribute to awakening (*bodhipakṣyas*, *pu ti fen*, 菩提分), the noble eightfold path (*āryāṣṭāṅgamārga*, *ba zheng dao*, 八正道) and so forth, were the predecessors of later, more developed listings of wholesome mental factors as well as their opposing defiled

pp.72&208f, and Dhammajoti 2009, pp.213-216.

⁵⁹ Apart this main difference, there are several minor dissimilarities, such as the usage of synonyms and the classification of afflictions. See Kramer 2013, pp.988-989.

⁶⁰ See Lin 2015, pp.52-58.

mental factors which were themselves formulated on the basis of the ten fetters (*samyojana*, *jie* 結), seven underlying tendencies (*anuśaya*, *sui mian* 隨眠), etc. Moreover, those mental factors that are related to the cognitive process could be reductively constituted by the long-established lists of the five aggregates (*skandhas*, *yun* 蘊) and twelve links of dependent arising (*pratītyasamutpāda*, *shi er yuan qi* 十二緣起) which depict the possible trajectories of mental experience when perceiving the external world.

2.2.2.4 Primary and Secondary Relationships between Different Mental Factors: Real and Provisional Existence

Although the fundamental position of Yogācāra thought does not consider *dharmas* to have an intrinsic nature and denies the real existence of the external world, structuring the dependent relation between *dharmas* nonetheless remained necessary work apropos soteriological practice. As a consequence, many of the mental factors are marked as having a real (*dravyasat*, *shi you*, 實有) or provisional (*prajñaptisat*, *jia you*, 假有) existence according to their conditions of arising in order to practicably identify their primary and secondary existential statuses within the whole system of the mind.

Cox has pointed out that the idea of listing *dharmas* was at its heart soteriological; the purpose was to distinguish the quality of every single *dharma* occurring in a sequence of phenomena and to thence ascertain their value to the process of liberation. To that end, the Sarvāstivādins exhaustively itemized every experienced event, including the *dharmas* which are associated with the mind.⁶¹ However, justifying the particularity of each *dharma* somehow urged them to clarify the ontological status of

⁶¹ Scholars to have examined the notion of *dharma* in early Abhidharma suggest that the concept refers not to a static state but rather to a dynamic event. In the context of early Buddhism, the real *dharma* should be understood in the sense of a dynamic property that causes an event or activity. See Warder 1971, pp.275ff, Gethin 2001, pp.147ff, and Cox 2004, pp.547-554.

each. Thus, the term *svabhāva* was proposed to indicate the “intrinsic nature” of a *dharma* alongside the term *dravya* which denotes the sense of a “real existence”. Designating a real existent state for a *dharma* does not only concern its nature, but also marks its impact when it appears including its possible function to support the provisional *dharmas*.⁶²

Based on *Nyāyānusārasāstra*, Williams explains real existence (*dravyasat*) as a primary and provisional existence (*prajñaptisat*) as a secondary, derived existence. Within the division of primary existence there are two subdivisions: those which merely possess self-existence (*svabhāvamātra*) and those which possess function (*sakāritra*). Secondary existence is further divided into those entities which depend on primary existence and those which depend on other secondary existences.⁶³ Analysis of an existing state depends first on verifying a given essential condition and second on determining any derivative phenomena to depend on it. Such analyses by the Sarvāstivādins resulted in an elaboration of ontological structures and more specifically in a systematization of the types of dependencies pertaining between particular existent phenomena as well as their different qualities and states.

This binary of real and provisional is also there in Yogācāra’s doctrine of mind and mental factors. However, different from the Sarvāstivādins, a real existent state of a mental factor does not indicate its possession of an intrinsic nature but rather their strong impact and capacity to arise other provisional factors. The fact that the arising of provisional existence relies on real existence is emphasized by Xuanzang in explaining the real quality of dependent nature. According to him, things which have dependent nature can be real or provisional. When things exist due to the assembling of different elements, successive existences, or other existents, they are regarded as

⁶² Cox 2004, pp.549-570.

⁶³ Williams 1981, pp.237-238.

provisional, whereas when things such as the mind and mental factors arise because of causal conditions, they are considered real.⁶⁴ More precisely, the causal condition here refers to the fact that the mind and mental factors emerge on the basis of their own seeds:⁶⁵ because a momentary mind and its constituents arise on the basis of past *karma* they are categorized as real *dharma*. However, not all the mental factors enumerated in the *CWSL* are labelled as real. According to the definition of the provisional dependent nature, some of the mental factors arise only in dependence on other real factors.

Among the fifty-one mental factors in the *CWSL*, the division into real and provisional is emphasized when defining wholesome and defiled mental factors. Eight of the eleven wholesome mental factors are real, namely, faith, shame, embarrassment, lack of attachment, lack of anger, lack of delusion, vigour, and serenity. The other three, non-carelessness, equanimity, and non-harmfulness are provisional. For the category of defiled mental factors, the fundamental six are all real, namely, greed, anger, self-conceit, delusion, doubt, and wrong view. Of the minor defilements, four are considered to be definitely real, namely, lack of guilt, lack of shame, non-faith, and laziness. Among the remaining sixteen are fury, resentment, hypocrisy, spite, jealousy, avarice, deceit, guile, harmfulness, pride, carelessness, lack of memory, and non-insight, all of which derive from other mental factors. In regard to excitement, dullness, and distraction, Xuanzang accepts different analyses and considers them to be either real or provisional.⁶⁶

For those mental factors which are real, their natures are given in their definition in order that their distinctiveness be specified. For those which are provisional, the *CWSL* discusses, rather, the mental factors whence they derive, that is, those that are

⁶⁴ See T 1585, p. 47, c9-11: 依他起性，有實有假：聚集、相續、分位性故，說為假有；心、心所、色，從緣生故，說為實有。

⁶⁵ See T 1830, p. 553, c1-2: 心、心所、色從因緣種生，故說為實。

⁶⁶ For an analysis of these factors, see chapter four.

considered to be real. Settlement of what constitutes primary and secondary existence in the context of mental factors was intended to sort out the state of a given *dharma*'s dependence by determining the bases upon which it relies for its arising. Primary existence in Yogācāra does not claim the same of self-existence as the Sarvāstivādins, but marks instead the direct arising of a *dharma* from a seed. Secondary arising was consequently presented as being dependent on certain factors of the same kind and as indirectly arising from the maturation of a seed.

2.2.2.5 Mental Factors and their Association with Consciousness: The Actualization of the Past

In constituting the mind, mental factors appear as various sensual and conceptual activities representing different aspects of cognition. As discussed before, these activities are characterized by their own seed, which is brought into the present by means of different kinds of consciousness. In other words, the appearance of mental factors is the actualization of the past *karma*. Each of the fifty-one mental factors are associated with a specific kind of consciousness depending on the different roles they are assigned. Following this premise, Xuanzang discusses the association between specific mental factors and the store consciousness, the notion of subjectivity, and the six forms of perception in the *CWSL*.

As stated in an earlier section of the present chapter, the fifty-one mental factors are classified into six categories. The first of the six classifications, including, namely, the five factors which are always active (sensory contact, attention, sensation, conceptualization and volition), represents the cognitive process and the fundamental support for all other mental activities. These five factors are always associated with the

store consciousness as it is the basis of all cognitive activities.⁶⁷ Furthermore, they are also associated with the notion of subjectivity as it is this that construes the perceptual phenomena related to oneself.⁶⁸ These two types of consciousness are considered to be morally indeterminate; thus, when the five factors are associated therewith, they are understood to be neutral *dharmas*.⁶⁹ This means that the influences of those five factors are not yet determined and the mental activities that arise depending on their cooperative work could be morally good or bad.

All the factors are bound to specific objects do not normally associate with the store consciousness⁷⁰ or the notion of subjectivity since they only arise when certain conditions occur. This is because these two forms of consciousness, by convention, function constantly, regardless of the situation. Moreover, the store consciousness does not have the ability to examine and consider, and is thus not conjoined with decisive resolve, memory, and discernment. Denoting the mental state of the moment in which one makes a choice, discernment is exceptional insofar as it alone is associated with the notion of subjectivity as it relates to the view of self (*ātma-dr̥ṣṭi*, *wo jian* 我見).⁷¹ Apart from the eighth and seventh consciousnesses, these five mental factors can associate with the six forms of perception when the situation allows.

⁶⁷ See T 1585, p. 11, b17-19: 阿賴耶識無始時來乃至未轉，於一切位恒與此五心所相應，以是遍行心所攝故。

⁶⁸ See T 1585, p. 22b17-22: 此意心所唯有四耶？不爾，及餘觸等俱故。有義此意心所唯九，前四及餘觸等五法，即觸作意受想與思，意與遍行定相應故。前說觸等異熟識俱，恐謂同前亦是無覆，顯此異彼故置餘言。及是義集前四後五合，與末那恒相應故。Also T 1585, p. 23b10-12: 然此意俱心所十八，謂前九法、八隨煩惱并別境慧。無餘心所及論三文，准前應釋。

⁶⁹ The store consciousness is described as “undefiled and morally indeterminate” (*anivṛtāvyaḥkrta*) in the *Triṃśikā*, while the notion of subjectivity as “defiled and morally indeterminate” (*nivṛtāvyaḥkrta*). These two terms can be found in the fourth and sixth verses of the *Triṃśikā*. See Lévi 1925, p.13, 9 and 13. They are translated as “unimpeded and indeterminate” (*wu fu wu ji*, 無覆無記) and “impeded and indeterminate” (*you fu wu ji*, 有覆無記) in the *CWSL*. See T 1585, p. 7, c18 and p.19, b5.

⁷⁰ See T 1585, p. 12, a10-11: 如何此識非別境等心所相應？互相違故。

⁷¹ According to Kuiji’s comment: 下顯識俱，有十八法，謂前九法及八隨惑，以別境慧，即我見故，如初師釋。忘念等法非別境為性，故不取別境數。See T 1830, pp. 402, a6-9

Due to the karmic neutrality of the store consciousness⁷² and the contaminated nature of the notion of subjectivity,⁷³ the eleven wholesome mental factors in the mundane world do not associate with either. Except for serenity, all other wholesome mental factors arise together with the functioning consciousness when one is not in a state of meditation.⁷⁴ According to the *CWSL*, there was a certain amount of disputation concerning whether serenity is associated with the five forms of perception. In the text, two interpretations are regarded as acceptable: the first excludes the possibility of serenity conjoining with the five and the second claims the opposite, allowing for a conjunction due to bodily serenity.⁷⁵

All six fundamental afflictions as well as the secondary afflictions do not associate with the store consciousness for precisely the same reason as the wholesome factors (i.e., because the store consciousness is neutral). However, four of the fundamental afflictions (greed, delusion, wrong view and arrogance) do arise together with the notion of subjectivity since they have a strong relation to the four delusions which characterize it (self-centered ignorance, view of self, pride and attachment).⁷⁶ For the same reason, several of the secondary afflictions (excitement, dullness, non-faith, laziness, carelessness, lack of memory, distraction and non-insight) are also associated with this seventh consciousness. Since most of the problems brought about by the afflictions are related to conceptualization, all six fundamental afflictions along with another twenty secondary afflictions can associate with cognitive perception.

⁷² See T 1585, p. 12, a17-18: 此識唯是異熟性故，善、染污等亦不相應。

⁷³ See T 1585, p. 22, b29-c1: 善是淨故，非此識俱。

⁷⁴ See T 1585, pp. 31, b5-7: 此十一種，前已具說。第七、八識，隨位有無。第六識中，定位皆具。若非定位，唯闕輕安。When one is in the state of meditation, all eleven factors are associated with cognitive perception.

⁷⁵ See T 1585, p. 31b7-10: 有義，五識唯有十種，自性散動無輕安故。有義，五識亦有輕安，定所引善者亦有調暢故，成所作智俱必有輕安故。For detailed discussion concerning mental and bodily serenity, see chapter four.

⁷⁶ See T 1585, pp. 32b7-10: 此十煩惱何識相應？藏識全無，末那有四，意識具十，五識唯三調貪瞋癡無分別故，由稱量等起慢等故。

However, sensual perception is only associated with greed, anger, and delusion in addition to all secondary afflictions except for fury, resentment, hypocrisy, spite, jealousy, avarice, deceit, guile, harmfulness and pride.⁷⁷

In actualizing past *karma*, the store consciousness enlists the other seven types of consciousness as its assistants to bring forward the matured seed in the form of cognitive activities. The eight forms of consciousness that function cooperatively are the mind, a complex that is comprised of various cognitive activities which are the manifested seed. Depending on the different characteristic, those activities are brought into the present by different types of consciousness. Therefore, specific mental factors conjoin only with their corresponding forms of consciousness according to their respective functions and faculties.

It was the notion that mental factors grow from a seed and serve as the manifestation of past *karma* which led Xuanzang to qualify them as having a dependent nature, meaning that their arising has a karmic basis and thus reflects the causal condition. The other reason to deem the mind and mental factors as dependent is soteriological. Although it is consciousness that creates discrimination, and to that extent is considered the negative component which needs to be abandoned, the activities that arise from its functioning, however, still serve some beneficial purpose to reach liberation. Most importantly, they build a proper cognitive world that enables the arising of beneficial mental states. That means, in relation to liberation, the role of the mind and mental factors is at once beneficial and unbeneficial. This proposition, its apparent self-contradiction notwithstanding, could be understood in light of dependent nature having a twofold quality which is both pure and impure. In elaborating the dependent mind and mental factors in relation to their soteriological role, I shall in the

⁷⁷ See T 1585, p. 35, a8-11: 此唯染故，非第八俱。第七識中唯有大八，取捨差別，如上應知。第六識俱容有一切。小十麤猛，五識中無。中、大相通，五識容有。

second part of this chapter discuss Xuanzang’s position on the three natures *vis-à-vis* the notion of dependent nature and its relation to the functioning of the mental factors.

2.3. The Soteriological Role of the Mind and Mental Factors: Their Dependent Nature to Support a Proper Cognitive World

To remedy the nihilistic interpretation of emptiness,⁷⁸ proponents of the Yogācāra established the theory of the three natures or three levels of existence. This served as a foundation to explain the manner in which cognitive activities arise as well as the path for reaching liberation. Of the three, the imagined nature (*parikalpita-svabhāva*, *pian ji suo zhi xing* 遍計所執性) refers to the type of existence that is based on illusionary fabrication, the dependent nature (*paratantra-svabhāva*, *yi ta qi xing* 依他起性) to causally conditioned existence, and the perfect nature (*pariniṣpanna-svabhāva*, *yuan zheng shi xing* 圓成實性) to the existence that reveals the ultimate reality without discrimination.⁷⁹ This system does not only express the structure of existence in Yogācāra thought but also its soteriological steps, entailing not only the analysis of existence and the state of its occurrence but also the cultivation of a method to acquire correct understanding of one’s own cognition. Thus, to define *dharma* as having a dependent nature is to affirm two things: that it arises causally and that it has a soteriological function. Defining the mind and mental factors as such is thus to say that they arise from seeds and function stereologically as a toehold for the further pursuit of liberation. Mental factors are the *dharmas* which are caused when the mind discriminates. Their arising is essential in forming proper cognitive activities to

⁷⁸ Here, the “nihilistic interpretation of emptiness” refers to the Madhyamaka doctrine of the two truths. In the *Samdh*, the three-nature theory is defined as the ultimate doctrine in classifying the appearance of all *dharmas*. See Williams 2009, pp.89-91.

⁷⁹ Study concerning the historical development of three-nature theory in Yogācāra school see Boquist 1993.

perceive, conceptualize, understand, contemplate and to do self-observation and self-control and, thus, provides the possibility for one to approach the perfect nature. Although dependent mind and mental factors remains problematic since they occur due to discrimination, however, they should not be considered as fully impure or wholly negative.

The dependent nature is probably the most disputed of the three. And this reflected in the historical development of the three-nature theory, which reveals quite different understandings thereof, focusing on its pure or impure qualities and whether one should eliminate it when trying to reach the perfect nature. In the second part of the chapter, I shall first examine the disputations regarding the characteristic of dependent nature in order we can gain a clearer concept of the soteriological role the mind and mental factors play in the system of Yogācāra more generally and the *CWSL* in particular.

2.3.1 Disputed Dependent Nature: From the Perspective of Its Historical Development

2.3.1.1 Pure or Impure: The Characteristic of Dependent Nature in Reaching Liberation

D'Amato argues that the doctrine of the three natures is a “soteriologico-ontological model”: “the three-nature doctrine is not a model of reality simpliciter; rather, it is a model of how reality is to be realized for the attainment of Buddhahood.”⁸⁰ As this doctrine primarily concerns soteriology, it is inextricably related to the theory of the path, with which it therefore needs to be explained together. Teachings that describe the three aspects of existence provide instruction for how one should know one’s pattern of cognition and reflect on the correct way to cognize. Thus, defining which nature of

⁸⁰ See D’Amato 2005, pp.204.

existence is problematic and in need of abandonment is crucial to the analysis of the three natures.

Imagined nature is a type of knowing that needs to be abandoned in all respects. However, dependent nature is problematic too due to its ambiguous relationship with perfect nature and the function it serves for reaching the ultimate state of knowing. According to the definitions in the *MSG* and *Triṃśikā*, dependent nature is the medium that helps one reach liberation, and therefore it is a necessary condition for reaching the perfect nature.⁸¹ In these two treatises, dependent nature contains both pure and impure qualities. As a consequence, the question concerning the elimination of dependent nature is not affirmed in these two treatises. However, treatises such as *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra*⁸² and *Madhyāntavibhāga* specifically state that the dependent nature hinders the realization of the perfect nature and so needs to be abandoned for this final purpose.

The inconsistent descriptions concerning the characteristics of dependent nature in these treatises have also given rise to disputations in modern scholarship. Sponberg attributes these divergence to different scholastic traditions. He presents three models of three natures: the pivotal, the progressive, and that of Kuiji, which respectively denote the standard model of the three natures in Indian Yogācāra, the reinvention of Buddhism in East Asia (including Medieval Japanese Hossō scholarship), and the mix of the former two.⁸³ He claims that the pivotal model of the three natures considers a part of the dependent nature to be pure and thus not in need of elimination when

⁸¹“If there were no dependent nature, there would also be no perfect nature. [If] there were not all kinds of seeds, there would be no permanent contamination or purity.” 若無依他起，圓成實亦無，一切種若無，恒時無染淨。 See T 1594, vol.31, 22a-29. According to Hakuju Ui’s studies regarding the *MSG* (1935, p. 393) and *Triṃśikā* (1952, p.133), both texts affirm the pure and contaminated quality of dependent nature. Also, Sugawara, based on these two treatises, defines dependent nature as the medium of reaching liberation. He further states that realizing the perfect nature is the removal of the imagined nature which connects with the dependent nature. See Sugawara 1985, pp.40.

⁸² See D’Amoto 2005, p.199.

⁸³ See Sponberg 1983 pp.97-119.

attaining the perfect nature. However, in the progressive model the dependent nature needs to be eliminated because it is completely impure. D'Amato and Brennan both raised objections to this understanding: the former disagrees with Sponberg's idea that the progressive model is an innovation of the East Asian tradition⁸⁴ since it is already found in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*; and the latter argues that the pivotal model is not the model of the three natures that predominated in early and foundational Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda literature because it still considers the dependent nature to be completely impure.⁸⁵

2.3.1.2 The Single and Double Layers of Dependent Nature

Since the different models of dependent nature are already present in the Indian tradition, Kitano suggests observing this doctrinal incoherency as a result of historical developments. As the three-nature doctrine was introduced to China by two translators, namely, by Paramārtha in the *Zhuanshi Lun* (**Pravṛtti-vijñāna-śāstra*) and Xuanzang in the *Triṃśikā*, Ueda considers the three-nature doctrine of the former as the orthodox understanding of the Yogācāra school, whereas Nagao takes Xuanzang's understanding as the correct one. In responding to the main controversies in Paramārtha and Xuanzang's respective systems, Kitano proposes two models of the three-nature doctrine, that of Asaṅga and that of Maitreya. The dependent *dharmas* of Paramārtha's system are in Asaṅga's model the perceivers of the imagined object and those of Xuanzang's system are in Maitreya's model the *dharmas* which transform the subject and object in perception.⁸⁶ Since a *dharma* whose nature is dependent serves only as a

⁸⁴ See D'Amato 2005, pp.199ff.

⁸⁵ See Brennan 2018, pp.623-639.

⁸⁶ See Kitano 1999, pp.71-79. Scholars such as Sugawara (1985), Takemura (1995), and Chen (2000, pp.46-47) all agree with the position Kitano proposes.

faculty of knowing, Kitano names Maitreya's model as a single-layer model and Asaṅga's model as a double-layer model.⁸⁷

To be more precise, the single-layer model corresponds to the earlier understanding of the three natures, which supposes that the eight forms of consciousness to constitute the grasper (*grāhaka*, *nengqu* 能取) have a dependent nature. In this system, what is grasped (*grāhya*, *suoqu* 所取), i.e., the objective realm (*jing*, 境), has an imagined nature, and thus the link between the imagined and dependent natures is a generative relation of the grasper to the grasped, a perceived nexus between subject and object. According to this understanding of the three natures, reaching liberation is the termination of dualistic perception through the elimination of both the knower and the known, of the dependent and imagined natures.

The double-layer model assumes that the eight forms of consciousness first transform the seeing-aspect (*jiang fen*, 見分) and seen-aspect (*xiang fen*, 相分), which serve as the knower and the known respectively. Both have a dependent nature, and therefore the kind of conceptualization which is based on the perception of these two aspects is imagined and illusionary. In this model, the dependent nature is the discriminated (*kun tu rtog pa brtags par bya ba*, **parikalpya*, *suo pian ji* 所遍計), the cognitive faculty is the discriminating (*kun tu rtog pa*, **parikalpa*, *neng pian ji* 能遍計), and the concept that is produced because of discrimination is the imagined nature. In this model, the relationship between the imagined and dependent natures is an interplay of the discriminating and the discriminated, a problematic mode of conceptualization which hinders liberation. According to this understanding of the three natures, realizing the perfect nature is to cut off the imagining that is generated in the erroneous perception of the seen-aspect and seeing-aspect.

⁸⁷ See Kitano 2005, pp3-4.

As Keng points out, texts including the *MS*, *Samdh* and *Madhyāntavibhāga* all preserve two models of the three natures in different chapters.⁸⁸ Among these three texts, the dependent nature proposed in the *MS* is idiosyncratic and directly influences the doctrine of the three natures in the *Triṃśikā* and *CWSL*.⁸⁹ Dependent nature in the *MS* follows the double layered model and is attributed both pure and impure qualities. It is the basis for activities of the imaginary and perhaps most importantly it is also the medium between the imagined and perfect natures. This premise is expressed by way of a metaphor of an illusory snake:

How do they refer to this “penetration of mere cognizance” and in what fashion do they penetrate it? They penetrate that (1) [cognizance] consists of this reductive principle, (2) the duality of image and vision, and (3) various aspects. For, (1) the six kinds of referents that are names, referents, imputations of nature and distinctive features, a nature, and distinctive features represent the lack of referents, (2) they are present as the entities of apprehender and apprehended, and (3) they arise simultaneously as the appearances of various referents.

They penetrate this just as in the case of a rope’s appearing as a snake in a dark house. For example, [to see] a rope as a snake is mistaken because there is no [snake]. Those who realize this point end the mental state of [misperceiving] a snake where there is none and dwell in the mental state of [correctly perceiving] a rope. [However,] when taken in a subtle way, such is also mistaken because [a rope] consists of [nothing but] the characteristics

⁸⁸ In his 2014 and 2015 papers, Keng re-examines the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* and *Madhyāntavibhāga* and reveals that both texts contain two kinds of doctrine. He further suggests that *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* should be viewed as a multi-layered text, consisting of older and newer strata.

⁸⁹ See the entry on “The Three-Nature-Theory in Yogacara Buddhism”(唯識三性), wrote by Keng in “Mandarin Encyclopedia of Philosophy” (華文哲學百科): http://mephilosophy.ccu.edu.tw/entry.php?entry_name=唯識三性說 (quoted date: 17.04.2023)

of its color, smell, taste, and touch. [Thus,] based on the mental state of [perceiving] color and so on, the mental state of [perceiving] a rope is to be discarded too. Likewise, based on the mental state of [perceiving] the perfect nature, [any notion of] real referents with regard to the mental conceptions that appear as the six aspects of letters and referents is eliminated within those six aspects, just as the mental state of [misperceiving] a snake [is eliminated through correctly perceiving a rope]. Given that, the mental state of [perceiving] mere cognizance is also something that is to be dismantled.⁹⁰

In terms of soteriology, the dependent nature serves not only as a necessary condition for conceptualizing reality but also as the support for the establishment of the perfect nature. Following the metaphor, when one realizes that the rope which is mistaken for a snake is due to darkness and is thus actually an illusion, one is able to retain this notion and further realize that it is not only the snake but also the rope that does not exist. In this regard, dependent nature is just like the rope, which is both the basis for the illusory snake as well as the intermediary for perfection in the process of realization.

⁹⁰ See Derge no.4048, 24b,3-10: *rnam par rig pa tsam nyid de la 'jug ces ni ji skad bya/ ci 'dra bar ni 'jug ce na/ de tsam nyid dang / rgyu mtshan dang lta ba dang bcas pa gnyis dang / snang tshogs kyi rnam pa gnyis la 'jug ste/ ming dang don dang / ngo bo nyid dang / khyad par du btags pa dang / ngo bo nyid dang khyad par gyi don rnam pa drug don med pa nyid dang / de dag gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i dngos por nye bar gnas pa dang / lhan cig tu sna tshogs kyi don snang ba 'byung ba'i phyir ro/ /mun khung na sprul du snang ba'i thag pa bzhin du 'jug ste/ dper na med pa'i phyir thag pa la sbrul ni nor pa ste/ de'i don rtogs pa rnam ni med pa la sbrul gyi blo ldog cing / thag pa'i blor gnas so/ /de yang rnam pa phra mor bya na nor pa ste\ kha dog dang / dri dang / ro dang / reg pa'i mtshan nyid yin pa'i phyir ro/ /de la ji ltar kha dog la sogs pa'i blo la brten te/ thag pa'i blo yang bzlog par bya ba de bzhin du yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid kyi blo la brten te/ yi ge dang don rnam pa drug snang ba'i yid kyi rtog pa de dag la/ sbrul gyi blo bzhin du rnam pa drug la yang dag pa'i don bsal na/ rnam par rig pa tsam gyi blo yang rnam par gzhiq par bya ba yin no// Translation based on Tibetan from Brunnhölzl 2019, Vol.I, pp.203-204. For the Chinese edition, see T 1594, pp. 142c27-p. 143a8: 於此悟入唯識性中，何所悟入？如何悟入？入唯識性，相見二性，及種種性：若名，若義，自性，差別假，自性差別義，如是六種義皆無故；所取能取性現前故；一時現似種種相義而生起故。如闇中繩顯現似蛇，譬如繩上蛇非真實，以無有故。若已了知彼義無者，蛇覺雖滅，繩覺猶在。若以微細品類分析，此又虛妄，色香味觸為其相故，此覺為依繩覺當滅。如是於彼似文似義六相意言，伏除非實六相義時，唯識性覺猶如蛇覺亦當除遣，由圓成實自性覺故。Cf. Choldron 1994, pp.154, translated from Lamotte's French translation pp.42 (v.32) based on Chinese edition.*

2.3.2 The Dependent Mind and the Mental Factors

2.3.2.1 Understanding the Three Natures in the *CWSL*

As mentioned above, the *Triṃśikā* and the *CWSL* follow the understanding of the three natures as found in the *MSG*. They accordingly consider dependent nature to already contain the subject-object structure, serving both as the object that is discriminated by the cognitive faculty and producing the form of conceptualization that is imagined in nature. Furthermore, dependent nature contains both pure and impure qualities, of which the former serves as the medium for realizing the perfect nature.

Explanations concerns the characteristics of the three natures are soteriological in their thrust. As the twentieth and twenty-first verses in the *Triṃśikā* state:

This or that thing is discriminated by this or that discrimination, thus, the nature of the imaginary is not there. The nature which is dependent on others is the discrimination born of causal conditions. The perfected is this (the dependent nature) [in a state that] is always free from the former (the imagined nature).⁹¹

In his gloss of these verses, Xuanzang then defines the subject and object of discrimination by taking the *MS* as his scriptural support. Accordingly, the cognitive perception (*manovijñāna*) and the notion of subjectivity (*manas*) which are able to persist on a permanent self and *dharma* serve as the discriminator who discriminates against the object that arises causally.⁹² Most importantly, Xuanzang uses such terms such as “pure portion” (*jing fen*, 淨分) and “contaminated portion” (*ren fen*, 染分) when characterizing the dependent nature and considers the former to be equivalent to

⁹¹ *yena yena vikalpena yadyad vastu vikalpyate / parikalpita evāsau svabhāvo na sa vidyate // (20) paratantrasvabhāvastu vikalpaḥ pratyayodbhavaḥ / (21ab) niṣpannastasya pūrveṇa sadā rahitatā tu yā // (21cd)*, Buescher 2007, pp. 122-124. Translation based on Sanskrit version from Anaeker 1986, p.188 Cf. Kawamura 1964, pp.110-112; Cook 1999, p. 281.

⁹² See T 1585, p. 45c25-p. 46a14.

the perfect nature. Following the *MS*, to reach the perfect nature is to eliminate the imaginary which results from dependent perception. In the *CWSL*, the dependent and perfect natures are neither identical nor distinct since the ultimate truth and the conventional truth exist through mutual support. The pure part of dependent nature is identical to the perfect nature, while the impure part which creates dualistic perception is not. In consequence, one does not need to eliminate both the imagined and dependent natures to reach perfection. Of utmost import is that perfect nature relies on dependent nature, that is, the realization of the former counts on the latter, since the perfect nature is to quit the conceptualization based on the perception between two aspects. This relationship of mutual support reveals that the character of the thusness is apart from both existence and non-existence.⁹³

As the metaphor in the *MS* states, one who wants to acquire ultimate knowing would deconstruct the wrongly conceptualized snake first and then deal with the remaining perception of the rope. When one analyzes the perception of the rope as the collective result of the senses of seeing, smell, taste, and touch, one could further realize that the material rope has no permanent existence. In a similar fashion, as Xuanzang explains, the problem of the mental factor does not ground on the grasping of between the two aspects but rather the conceptualization of the perceptual result since it always accompanies the concept of the permanent mind and *dharma*. Once a person frees oneself from imagining false concepts based on impure dependencies, one acquires perfect knowing and is able to realize the pure quality of dependent nature. At the end

⁹³ See T 1585, p. 46b18-25 由前理故，此圓成實與彼依他起非異非不異，異應真如非彼實性，不異此性應是無常。彼此俱應淨非淨境，則本後智用應無別。云何二性非異非一？如彼無常無我等性。無常等性與行等法，異應彼法非無常等，不異此應非彼共相。由斯喻顯此圓成實與彼依他非一非異。法與法性理必應然，勝義世俗相待有故。

of the explanation, Xuanzang concludes with a statement that all these three kinds of knowing are not distinct from the mind and so forth.⁹⁴

Within this structure of three natures, false conceptualization based on the persistence of the self and dharmas is emphasized as the most problematic issue. Dualistic perception, although contaminated, is not a full illusion, nor is the problem which needs to be dealt with first. This exposition of the problem also marks the need to deconstruct the empirical reality with which one is accustomed. Such a soteriological concern is thus not revealed solely through discussions regarding annihilation but also through existential structurizations of the living world. Steps that relate to approaching perfect knowing have a lot to do with comprehending the arising of different *dharmas* correctly. As the three natures depict three states of existence, the *CWSL* analyzes the different occurrence of *dharmas* in accordance with these states and describes the dependent relations between the *dharmas*:

Among these three natures, how many of them are provisional? How many of them are real? Because the imagined [nature] is established falsely, it can be called provisional. Because it does not have its own essence and characteristic, it is neither provisional nor real. The dependent nature can be real or provisional. Because its nature consists of assembling, continuum, and the divided portion [of other entities], it is said to be provisional. Because the mind, mental factors, and forms arise from the causal condition, it is said to be real. If there is no real *dharma*, there is no provisional *dharma* because provisional [*dharma*] is designated based on the cause of a real

⁹⁴ See T1585, p. 46b29-c13: 雖無始來心心所法已能緣自相見分等，而我法執恒俱行故，不如實知眾緣所引自心心所虛妄變現，猶如幻事、陽焰、夢境、鏡像、光影、谷響、水月、變化所成非有似有。依如是義，故有頌言：非不見真如，而能了諸行，皆如幻事等，雖有而非真。此中意說三種自性皆不遠離心心所法，謂心心所及所變現眾緣生故，如幻事等，非有似有誑惑愚夫，一切皆名依他起性。愚夫於此橫執我法有無一異俱不俱等，如空花等性相都無，一切皆名遍計所執。依他起上彼所妄執我法俱空，此空所顯識等真性名圓成實。是故此三不離心等。

[*dharma*]. The perfected *dharma* is only real because it is not designated based on other conditions.⁹⁵

As previously mentioned, the analysis of real or provisional existence aims at building a primary-secondary relationship in order to systematize the arising of *dharmas* and to show their dissimilar impacts on liberation. Correspondingly, the concept that real existence is the basis for provisional *dharmas* is emphasized here. And because the mind and mental factors emerge from causal conditions, they thus carry the function of supporting provisional existence, which is instrumental not only to the process of conceptualization but also forms the condition for normal life and realization. Such discussions in the *CWSL* allow us to analyze the role that the mind and mental factors play in regard to their function within the structure of the three natures and how this in turn relates to soteriological concerns.

2.3.2.2 Twofold Support: Cognition and Its Potential for Realization

In lights of the functioning of causal conditions, Xuanzang defines “All the mind and mental factors and the two aspects which are transformed via the force of perfuming to be born of the causal condition, and therefore, to be dependent.” Then, he states five reasons to justify that the mind and mental factors and the two aspects upon which their manifestation depends, regardless of whether they are pure or impure, all have a dependent nature.

1. Since the subsequently attained cognition (*pr̥ṣṭha-labdha-jñāna*, *houde zhi* 後得智) is without out-flow, it cannot form by grasping the impure object, such as the

⁹⁵ See T 1585, p. 47c8-13 此三性中幾假？幾實？遍計所執妄安立故，可說為假。無體相故，非假非實；依他起性有實有假。聚集、相續、分位性故，說為假有。心、心所、色從緣生故，說為實有。若無實法，假法亦無，假依實因而施設故；圓成實性唯是實有，不依他緣而施設故。 Translation is based on Wet Tat 1973, p.651 and Cook 1999, p.293.

- imagined seen-aspect. It requires the two aspects which are dependent, otherwise it will fail to appear. Therefore, the two aspects must be dependent.
2. If the two aspects are imagined, causally, they cannot serve as the object of the mind and mental factors (*ālambana-pratyaya*, *suoyuan yuan* 所緣緣); they are just like the rabbit's horn which is only imagined and has no substance of its own.
 3. If the two aspects are imagined, they cannot perfume and create seeds which would mean that the subsequent consciousness would also lack two aspects.
 4. As the habitus is categorized as the seen-aspect, if it is imagined, it cannot serve as the causal condition (*hetu-pratyaya*, *yinyuan* 因緣).
 5. If the two aspects are not dependent, their support would also not be dependent.⁹⁶

Among these five reasons, the first and second concern the forming of valid cognition prior to and after enlightenment, and the third to the fifth concern the proper manifestation of karmic activities and the cultivation of seeds. Here, two points are emphasized in regard to categorizing the mind, mental factors, and their two aspects in dependent nature, namely, their function in forming proper cognition and their manifesting the traits of past *karma*. Cognitive activity, whether with or without outflow, needs a substantial perceived object in the conditioned situation which bears the task of actualizing the karmic trait and serving as the content that fulfils the result of cognizing. Though karmic retribution is problematic and the empirical world needs to be deconstructed, activities of the mind and mental factors perform the lived experience of the mundane world and become fundamental to normal perception. Having a dependent nature, in the case of mind and mental factors, refers to the valid

⁹⁶ See T 1585, p. 46a21-b6 有義：一切心及心所，由熏習力所變二分，從緣生故，亦依他起。遍計依斯妄執定實有無、一異、俱不俱等。此二方名遍計所執。……又若二分是遍計所執，應如兔角等，非所緣緣，遍計所執，體非有故；又應二分不熏成種，後識等生，應無二分；又諸習氣是相分攝，豈非有法能作因緣？若緣所生內相、見分，非依他起，二所依體，例亦應然，無異因故。由斯理趣，眾緣所生心、心所體，及相、見分，有漏、無漏，皆依他起。依他眾緣而得起故。 Translation is based on Cook 1999, p. 284, Wet Tat 1973, p. 631.

perceiving activities together with the karmic manifestation which relates to a given moment of perception.

In this regard, the mental factors, though performing in reaction to the mind which dualistically perceives through the seen-aspect and seeing-aspect with outflow, still play the role of forming correct knowledge which is beneficial for liberation. When Xuanzang answers the question of how the three natures and the two truths are related to each other, he says the conventional truth contains all three natures but the ultimate truth contains only perfect nature. He further distinguishes the conventional truth into three types: provisional conventionality (*jia shi su*, 假世俗), operational conventionality (*xing shi su*, 行世俗), and disclosed conventionality (*xian liao shi su*, 顯了世俗), upon which he maps the three natures.⁹⁷ According to Kuiji, operational conventionality arises dependently and forms a cognitive mundane world that is able to: (1) posit existence in reasoning and structuralize such worldviews as the classification of three realms, five aggregates, and six sense fields; (2) support the establishment of the teaching that guides the understanding of sentient beings to reach liberation, such as the four noble truths (*catur-ārya-satya*, *si sheng di*, 四聖諦), and so on. Such conventionality, especially its second function, provides the locus that displays not only the existing world but also the existing possibility for liberation because it allows conventional knowledge to arise and become comprehensible to the mind.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ See T1585, p. 47b27-c4: 此三云何攝彼二諦？應知世俗具此三種；勝義唯是圓成實性。世俗有三：一、假世俗；二、行世俗；三、顯了世俗。如次應知即此三性。勝義有三：一、義勝義，謂真如，勝之義故；二、得勝義，謂涅槃，勝即義故；三、行勝義，謂聖道，勝為義故。無變、無倒，隨其所應，故皆攝在圓成實性。

⁹⁸ See T1585, p.552c17-27: 述曰：假世俗者，實無體性，可名世俗，唯有其名，假名世俗，四世俗中第一俗攝。第二、體有為行，正體是世俗，簡勝義諦，亦世俗，故名為「行」。舊《中邊》云：取「行世俗」，唯有為依他故，四世俗中第二、第三攝。第三攝者，心上變似四諦相理，不離於事，依他起攝。三、顯了世俗，此三名與彼新《中邊》論同，謂斷染依他，遍計所執無，二空為門顯真如，名圓成實，四世俗中第四世俗，或此世俗亦取四中第三，是無漏故。如次配三性，《顯揚》論亦有此文。

Here, the discussion of the two truths with the three natures not only relates to different forms of knowing in the mundane or supermundane world but also concerns how these forms of knowing serve as tools for liberation. Teachings of the four truths (the example Kuiji cites in his commentary) and of a worldview built in accordance with correct understanding are situated in a conventionality which is highly related to cognition. In other words, one needs a mind to cognize those beneficial notions for approaching the ultimate truth. It is namely through proper mental functions, such as cognizing, acceptance, discernment, and so on, that the mind and mental factors provide the potential for one to reach the other form of knowing.

Mental factors which consist of two aspects are the performance of the mind with outflow. This means that mental factors have an impure dependent nature which reveals perception before one has gained the ability to know perfectly. But even though the mind is with outflow, it contains both pure and impure elements and thus manifests itself through both wholesome and unwholesome mental factors. Except for the omnipresent mental factors that display the process of perception, the remaining factors reveal the reaction of the mind when it comes into contact with the projected outer world. No matter whether the reactions appear to be wholesome or unwholesome, all the mental factors constitute a form of discriminated knowing that generates new karmic action. However, since the existence of the perfect nature relies on ceasing the conceptualization that is supported by the perception of the two aspects of dependent nature, by necessity, dependent nature itself becomes a vehicle for the realization of perfect nature. One could say that the dependent mental factors and their two aspects that reveal the thought, emotions, judgment, impulses, etc. of the mind concurrently form a platform for imagined conceptualization as well as for the potentiality of realizing habitually false modes of knowing—they provide the possibility for illusion but also the possibility to know the illusion's unreality.

2.4 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to sort out the meaning of the “mind” and “mental factors” as well as their soteriological role in the *CWSL*. We first examined the concept of mind in sectarian Buddhism, the Yogācāra tradition, and the *CWSL*. Discussion on this issue often involved a distinction between three terms—*citta*, *manas* and *viññāna*—which in the *AKBh*, notwithstanding two different interpretations therein, are generally treated as identical, indicating the agent that processes the work of cognition and accumulates karmic activities.

Yogācāra thought relates *citta*, *manas* and *viññāna* to store consciousness, the notion of subjectivity, and the six forms of perception. Therein, the mind thus becomes one of the synonyms for store consciousness. As mentioned in the commentaries to the *CWSL*, each synonym of store consciousness presents a certain functional aspect. According to the *Samdh* and *CWSL*, the mind manifests sensual and conceptual experiences and also collects the good and bad karma that occurs as a result. Empirical experience arises due to the maturation of the seed contained in the store consciousness. The precise manner in which a seed appears is based on its attribute. Although store consciousness holds a dominant position in the process of cognition, it relies on the functioning of the six perceptions which bring forward the influences of ripened *karma*. The various mental attitudes that arise in accordance with perception create wholesome and unwholesome activities in response to both the physical and psychological dimensions of awareness. In this context, the mind is the agent that exhibits the activities that themselves reveal the attitudes of awareness. Thus, the “mind” is an exhibitional instrument of perception that brings past *karma* into the present by means

of cognitive activities whilst assembling and nourishing wholesome and unwholesome deeds.

Attitudes toward the different forms of perception are manifold. The appearance of the mind thus encompasses many aspects which represent dissimilar reactions. This suggests the mind is a complex comprising multiple constituents which display wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral activities as responses to discrete cognitive experiences. At the same time, the activities that arise in dependence on and define the appearance of the mind are the mental factors.

The second part of this chapter focused on the historical development of mental factors as well as on clarifying their meaning and characteristics in the *CWSL*. It was not until after the various sectarian systems of Abhidharma had been formulated that the term “mental factor” was treated as a component of displaying cognitive activity. Discussions regarding its nature and characteristic also began to thrive during this period. In general, the relationship between the mind and mental factors became the focal point of the debate. The Sarvāstivādins generally considered mental factors to be separate *dharmas* from the mind and to be associated with the mind only when five conditions of equality appear between them. However, not all Sarvāstivādins were in agreement: Dharmatrāta accepted only three factors as being dependent on the mind, sensation, conceptualization, and thought, making all other mental constituents merely different states of thinking, whereas another master, Buddhadeva, deemed all mental factors to be identical to the mind and to not exist separately, a view held also by the Sautrāntika teachers, Śrīlāta and Harivarman. The problem eventually reached its conclusion within the Yogācāra school, whose treatises for the most part take mental factors as independent *dharmas* (except for the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* which disagrees with the independency of the mental factor itself) on the basis of the

description given in the *Yogācārabhūmi* which claims the mind and mental factors arise depending on their own seed.

Commenting on the *Triṃśikā*, the *CWSL* defines the relationship between the mind and mental factor as “neither identical nor distinct”. The establishment of this statement is based on the cognitive theory of the *CWSL* that claims the mind is itself the basis that transforms the subject and object of perception. Mental factors, as the activities of the perception, are transformed by the mind as aspects of itself to project its own state. In this case, the mind *per se* is self-cognition and the mental factors appear because of the distinction in perception between the seen-aspect and the seeing-aspect. As a consequence, mental factors do not exist apart from the mind but are also not identical to it. Being the basis of the perception, the mind manifests only the general characteristic of an event while the mental factors build the specific aspects of it.

In the *CWSL*, the fifty-one mental factors are classified into six categories according to their different functions or influences. The factors of being always active serve as the five fundamental functions to support the arising of perception and conceptualization. The factors which are bound to specific objects include five mental states that arise when one has a specific intention toward the object. The wholesome factors are eleven mental activities whose occurrence is beneficial for reaching liberation. The six defiled mental factors are the fundamental hindrances that cause the suffering of one’s life. The twenty secondary defilements are the minor disturbances that also obstruct salvation. The four undetermined factors are states whose influence is not certain. The enumeration and categorization of mental factors stem from some lists of early *sūtras*, such as the thirty-seven dharmas that contribute to awakening, the eightfold path, ten fetters, seven underlying tendencies, etc. The attempt to categorize mental factors is already found in the *Dhātukāya* and the *Prakaraṇa*, however, it was

the mature list of Sarvāstivāda records in the *AKBh* which became the basis for Yogācāra thought.

The Sarvāstivāda tradition of distinguishing states of existence for *dharmas* was also adopted in the *CWSL* to describe the dependent relationship between mental factors. For the Yogācāra, “real existence” denotes the *dharmas* that arise depending on their own seed and “provisional existence” those that rely on real or other provisional *dharmas*. Categorizations based on these premises are often found in definitions of wholesome and defiled mental factors, their purpose being to sort out the bases for the arising of *dharmas*. The natures of the real factors are stipulated in such definitions to specify their distinctiveness. And in the case of the provisional factors, the *CWSL* discusses them in terms of the mental factors from which they derive.

In actualizing the activities of consciousness, mental factors perform different functions in concurrence with the type of consciousness with which they are correlated. Since the factors of being always active serve to bring forward *karma*, giving a base for the arising of cognition, their moral qualities are neutral and always linked to the notion of subjectivity; they are thus always associated with the eighth and seventh consciousness. The factors that are bound to specific objects only arise in response to certain situations and hence do not associate with the store consciousness not with the notion of subjectivity, except in the case of discernment which reflects the choice of the individual due to its strong connection with the view of self. The mental factors in these two categories are all able to associate with the six forms of perception, when the situation allows. Due to the conflicted natures of the wholesome factors and the eighth and seventh consciousness, these do not associate but appear for the most part in dependence on the six forms of perception. For the same reason, the afflictions and secondary afflictions likewise do not associate with store consciousness. However, four of the fundamental afflictions plus eight of the secondary afflictions coincide with the

notion of subjectivity because of their self-centered characteristics. Unlike cognitive perception, which is able to support the arising of all afflictions, the five sensual perceptions do not associate with the ten secondary afflictions.

Drawing on the scriptural support of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, Xuanzang deemed the mind and mental factors as having a dependent nature. This does not only reflect the fact that all the mind and mental factors arise on the basis of their own seed but also affirms their soteriological value due, namely, to the special characteristic of the dependent nature.

In explaining existence and cognitive activity, the Yogācārin developed the three-nature theory, wherein the imagined nature refers to the kind of existence which arises out of illusionary fabrication, the dependent nature indicates what arises from causal conditions, and the perfect nature denotes non-discriminated ultimate reality. This analysis is fundamentally bound up with soteriological concerns and is purposely designed to settle the methods of practice. Thus, this theory of the three natures is tightly intertwined with the theory of the path. Among the three, the interpretation of dependent nature varies the most in the different treatises due to divergent understandings of its function in reaching liberation. According to Kitano's studies, there are two models of dependent nature: the single-layer model and the double-layer model. The former understands that the eight forms of consciousness have a dependent nature because they together constitute the perceiver which perceives the illusory objective realm. And the latter includes the eight forms of consciousness and serves to transform the two aspects (the seeing-aspect and the seen-aspect), the perceiving subject and the perceived object which both have a dependent nature; it is only the form of conceptualization that is based on the perception of these two aspects which is considered to be imagined and illusionary.

As Xuanzang's understanding of the three natures follows the doctrine of the *MS*, the dependent nature features two layers which perform proper cognitive activities and form a basis for both false imagining and the establishment of correct knowledge and teaching. For this very reason, the dependent nature serves as the medium between the imagined and perfect natures and therefore becomes the vehicle for reaching liberation. The mind and mental factors appear in accordance with the perception of their seen-aspect and seeing-aspect and together form the basis for the type of imagining which creates by the notion of the continuous self and *dharmas*. Although mental factors occur within the process of perception and as part of the discriminating mind, their appearances form not only defiled mental states but also those that are beneficial for liberation; this is because the mind, despite being with outflow, contains both pure and impure elements. The mundane world and its quotidian experience provide a platform for proper cognitive activities. This locus hence becomes the basis for the establishment of doctrinal categories at the level of conventional truth, such as the four noble truths, and a worldview such as the three realms, five aggregations, and sense fields. The dependent mind and the mental factors represent the mode of cognition that allows one to acquire the correct understanding. In this regard, they also create the possibility for one to obtain the perfect way of knowing and the chance to reach liberation.

Having clarified the concept of mind and mental factors and their soteriological role in the system of the *CWSL*, we will proceed in the next chapter to examine the process of cognition that gives rise to every mental state with its corresponding mental factors. This will involve a close examination of the factors of always active and the factors that bound to specific objects.

Table 1 Fifty-One Mental Factors in the CWSL

Category	Mental Factors		
always active <i>sarvatraga</i> 遍行	sensory contact (<i>sparsā</i> , 觸), attention (<i>manaskāra</i> , 作意), sensation (<i>vedanā</i> , 受), conceptualization (<i>saṃjñā</i> , 想), volition (<i>cetanā</i> , 思)		
specific object <i>pratiniyataviṣaya</i> , 別境	wishing (<i>chanda</i> , 欲), decisive resolve (<i>adhimokṣa</i> , 勝解), memorizing (<i>smṛti</i> , 念) concentration (<i>samādhi</i> , 定), discernment (<i>prajñā</i> , 慧)		
wholesome <i>kuśala</i> 善	real <i>dharma</i>	faith (<i>śraddhā</i> , 信), shame (<i>hrī</i> , 慚), embarrassment (<i>apatrāpya</i> , 愧), absence of greed (<i>alobha</i> , 無貪), absence of anger (<i>adveṣa</i> , 無瞋), absence of delusion (<i>amoha</i> , 無癡), vigor (<i>vīrya</i> , 精進), serenity (<i>praśrabdhi</i> , 輕安)	
	provisional <i>dharma</i>	non-carelessness (<i>apramāda</i> , 不放逸), equanimity (<i>upekṣā</i> , 行捨)	based on vigor and three wholesome roots
		non-harmfulness (<i>avihiṃsā</i> , 不害)	one portion of non- delusion
defilement <i>kleśa</i> 煩惱	real <i>dharma</i>	greed (<i>raga</i> , 貪), anger (<i>māna</i> , 慢), delusion (<i>avidyā</i> , 癡), arrogance (<i>māna</i> , 慢), doubt (<i>vicikitsā</i> , 疑), wrong views (<i>drṣṭi</i> , 惡見)	
secondary defilement <i>upakleśa</i> 隨煩惱	real <i>dharma</i>	absence of shame (<i>āhrīkya</i> , 無慚), absence of shame (<i>anapatrāpya</i> , 無愧), non-faith (<i>āśraddhya</i> , 不信), laziness (<i>kausīdya</i> , 懈怠)	
	provisional <i>dharma</i>	fury (<i>krodha</i> , 忿), resentment (<i>upanāha</i> , 恨), spite (<i>pradāśa</i> , 惱), jealousy (<i>īrṣyā</i> , 嫉), harmfulness (<i>vihiṃsā</i> , 害)	one portion of anger
		hypocrisy (<i>mrakṣa</i> , 覆)	(1) one portion of delusion (2) one portion of greed and anger

		avarice (<i>mātsarya</i> , 慳), pride (<i>mada</i> , 憍)	one portion of greed
		deceit (<i>māyā</i> , 誑), guile (<i>śāṭhya</i> , 諂)	one portion of greed and delusion
		carelessness (<i>pramāda</i> , 放逸)	one portion of laziness, greed, anger, delusion
		absence of memorizing (<i>muṣitasmr̥titā</i> , 失念),	1. one portion of memorizing 2. one portion of delusion 3. one portion of memorizing and delusion
	Can be both	non- insight (<i>asamprajanya</i> , 不正知)	1. one portion of discernment 2. on portion of delusion 3. one portion of discernment and delusion
		excitement (<i>auddhatya</i> , 掉舉)	1. one portion of greed 2. always arise with unwholesome mind 3. real dharma
		dullness (<i>styāna</i> , 惛沈)	1. one portion of delusion 2. always arise with unwholesome mind 3. real dharma
		distraction (<i>vikṣepa</i> , 散亂)	1. one portion of delusion 2. one portion of the three unwholesome roots 3. real dharma
		real <i>dharma</i>	sleepiness (<i>middha</i> , 眠), regret (<i>kaukr̥tya</i> , 悔)
undetermined <i>aniyata</i> 不定	provisional <i>dharma</i>	rough examination (<i>vitarka</i> , 尋), subtle investigation (<i>vicāra</i> , 伺)	one portion of volition and discernment

Chapter Three Cognitive Process and the Arising of Mental Factors

There has been much discussion in scholarship concerning whether the ideology of representation-only in the *CWSL* constitutes an ontological or an epistemological approach. Many passages in the *CWSL* firmly attest to its denial of the existence of the external world with lengthy refutations of opponents who claim there is a world independent of the cognizing subject.¹ Yet when it comes to explanations of cognitive problems, the *CWSL* does have the tendency to describe the cognitive object as a real existent entity. These conflicting stances reveal the difficulties in sustaining a metaphysical position whilst reasoning about effective cognitive activity. Since external existence is denied, perception is solely the activity of consciousness and the elements it consists of (including object and faculty) appear as the mere creation of consciousness. In order that the perception of what is a fundamentally fictional reality has a real effective function and influences—beneficial, unbeneficial, or neutral—it thus became necessary to amalgamate the karmic system together with the process by which cognition arises.

¹ Modern studies to deal with this issue in the *CWSL* exhibit two trends: the phenomenological and the philological approaches. Using the first, Lusthaus concluded that the Yogācāra is not a metaphysical idealism but rather, based on evidence gleaned from the *CWSL*, he affirms the real existence of external matter. See Lusthaus 2002, p. 533. Schmithausen argues contrarily that the work denies the very existence of phenomenal reality, deriving his argument specifically from philological and grammatical analysis of specific passages in the *CWSL* to deal with the “object” (*jing* 境) and “objective support” (*xiang fen* 相分). He thus argues that the *CWSL* shows no evidence in support of the existence of the external world. See Schmithausen 2015, pp.18-46. Sharf argued that the *CWSL* is not merely a phenomenological excursus and is much closer to the classical Yogācāra of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu; the phenomenological turn specifically should be attributed to the *pramāṇa* tradition that developed in Tibet. Furthermore, he clarifies that the *CWSL*’s position on external existence is, in fact, an adjustment of and response to debates between Sautrāntika, Dārṣṭāntika, and Sarvāstivāda schools of thought. See Sharf 2016, pp. 6-9; pp.23-28. Additional to the work that deals specifically with the *CWSL*, scholars such as Wayman 1979; Kochumuttom 1989; Hall 1986; Hayes 1988; King 1998; and Kellner&Taber 2014 have also involved themselves in the debate concerning whether Yogācāra idealism adopts the approach from the *Vimśatikā*. In addition, scholars who try to build the conversation between the Buddhist and phenomenological tradition, such as Ganeri 1999; Arnold 2012; Coseru 2012; and Garfield 2015, also raise some questions regarding the world view of Yogācāra.

The effort to achieve this synthesis is particularly significant in the *CWSL*. With the purpose of reconciling the epistemological framework of Yogācāra with the karmic system, Xuanzang and his disciple Kuiji explain that every cognitive moment has four aspects which themselves function under the influence of the seeds that come into the present due to the alteration of consciousness (*vijñāna-pariṇāma*, *shi zhuan bian* 識轉變). Likewise, the mental factors, being the manifestation of different moments of mind during the cognitive process, are also comprised of the four aspects. Under the influence of “transforming consciousness” (*pravṛtti-vijñāna*, *zhuan shi* 轉識), mental factors represent the moment of perception, the wholesome or afflicted mind or the decisive reaction that changes thought, and also bear the manifestation of a matured seed and thus the actualization of latent *karma* from the past.

To set about investigating how the arising of cognition coincides with karmic theory and to determine the cognitive moment that forms perception, I will first examine the theory of the four aspects and consider how they function in actualizing *karma* from the past. Based upon Xuanzang’s understanding, I will then discuss the relationship between the four aspects and the arising of mind and mental factors in the context of representation-only. In an attempt to clarify how cognitive moments are analyzed within the cognitive theory of the *CWSL*, in the second part of this chapter I will examine the description of the first two categories of the fifty-one mental factors, which respectively mark the five mental reactions during the formation of general perception and the moments in which the mind orients itself towards adopting the moral vision of Buddhist doctrine.

3.1 The Perception in a Delusive World

Presenting the external world as a mere creation of the mind is perhaps the centermost of claims forwarded by the Yogācāra. This ontological premise naturally presents certain difficulties when it comes to explaining cognitive activity which seems highly related to an external or container world (*bhājanaloka*, *qi shi jian* 器世間). By way of resolution, the Yogācarins proposed an epistemology which structures a system of eight forms of consciousness and this enabled them to explain how a fictitious working of perception can cause karmic retribution. Accordingly, the psychological activities which arise with perception can also be well understood within the framework of representation-only.

3.1.1 The Characteristic of the Cognitive Object and Subjective Perceiver

In many treatises of Abhidharma, perception happens at the moment in which the cognitive object, the perceiving faculty, and the physical or psychological awareness concurrently “combine” (*saṃnipāta*, *he he* 和合). This moment is described as “sensory contact” (*sparśa*, *chu* 觸) and is listed as the first of the fifty-one mental factors to mark the initial moment of perception. But how exactly is the object brought into existence in this combination?

According to the Yogācāra’s point of view, these three elements that comprise perception arise due to the transformation of store consciousness. Among these three, the cause which brings about the last, awareness, is the easiest to analyze, for no matter whether awareness occurs together with or after contact between the faculty and its object, it is caused by those two elements.² Thus, the important question is what gives rise to the faculty and object, or, to be more precise, how the store consciousness serves as the support for their arising.

² Discussion regarding this issue will be addressed later in this chapter. See 3.2.1.

In the *CWSL*, it is the faculty that is deemed to be the basis for the arising of the cognitive object. This follows the description of sensory contact in the *AS*, which, when compared to definitions of sensory contact supplied in other treatises, is indeed rather unique and according to Kritzer is probably the first treatise to define sensory contact as *indriyavikāraparichedda* (apprehension of the changing faculty).³ Therein, the faculty (*indriya*) is associated with the power that changes the inner state of a sentient being, becoming the support that produces the objective aspect of the cognitive process. To explain this, Kritzer refers to Schmithausen's study of the store consciousness which points out that certain modifications to the concept of *ālayavijñāna* led to other changes to its function, namely from being considered "a hypostasis of the seeds of mind sticking in the material sense-faculties" to "including the seeds of the sense-faculties and other matter". In tracing this process, Schmithausen observes that in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* store consciousness is not only the cause of forthcoming forms of mind but the material sense faculty also and even the container world. He also found that the sense object arises under the influence of the sense faculty instead of deriving directly from the seed; because the sense faculty originates from the store consciousness it therefore follows that the sense object does too.⁴ According to his study, a faculty in the present, being the direct connection to the seeds in store consciousness, is karmically produced by the experience of a past life. A faculty thus experiences the present and creates an impression that will condition the future. Accordingly, the subject of perception thus derives directly from the store consciousness, while the

³ According to Kritzer, the understanding of sensory contact in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is likely an elaboration of the *Manobhūmi* with further influences from later texts such as *Triṃśikābhāṣya*, *Madhyāntavibhāgaśāstra*, and *CWSL*. And make the sensory contact becomes a separated factor from the combination of the three which arises together with the store consciousness. Based on Schmithausen's research, the faculty in the present is karmically produced by the experience of past lives and it thus experiences the present and creates an impression that conditions the future. See Kritzer 1999, p.126.

⁴ See Schmithausen 1987, pp.63-64. 3.13.3-3.13.5.

appearance of the object relies on changes to the faculty and so the indirect influence of the seed which contains a memory from the past.

Such discussions concerning the connection between the arising of cognition and the karmic system were designed to justify the premise that the whole cognitive process is psychological as well as structure perception in accordance with karmic retribution. Similar concerns also emerge in the *CWSL*, particularly as regards the appearance of elements (under which the faculty and object are included) that enable perception and how the cognitive process coincides with karmic system. Providing answers to the aforementioned problematic of Yogācāra thought, Xuanzang established a schema of cognition that suits the ideology of representation-only and accounted for the mutual influences of psychological activities and the karmic system.

3.1.2 The Four-Aspect Theory of Cognition in the *CWSL*

The “four-aspect theory” denotes a unique schema that was introduced in the *CWSL* to delineate an epistemological position that suits the doctrine of representation-only. According to the *CWSL*, it stems from Dharmapāla and was developed out of the “three-aspect theory” of Dignāga.⁵ However, it was later affirmed by Xuanzang, who took it as the fundamental theory of cognition and with it sought no less than to redefine the very parameters of the Faxiang school (法相宗). Grounded on the opinion that every perception consists of three parameters — a perceiver (*pramātr*, *neng liang* 能量), a perceived (*prameya*, *suo liang* 所量), and a fruit of perceiving (*pramiti*, *liang guo* 量

⁵ In Chinese tradition, Kuiji explicitly mentions that the three-aspects theory comes from Dignāga. See T1830, pp. 320, c20-22: 然安惠立唯一分，難陀立二分，陳那立三分，護法立四分。 Therein, the terms *nimittabhāga* and *darśanabhāga* are not found in Dignāga’s *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. However, in the section that characterizes conceptual construction (*kalpanā-jñāna*), he argues that conceptual construction should not be admissible as perception when it relates to the external object since it serves as the subjective perceiver in the process of cognition. Namely, according to Hattori’s understanding, in Dignāga’s theory, each instance of cognition has a twofold appearance: the appearance of the object and that of itself as the subject. See Hattori’s translation of *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, 1968, pp.27, and Hattori’s explanation of this section in pp.95, footnote I.51.

果) — Dignāga in turn establishes three corresponding elements that form perception: the “seen-aspect” (*nimitta-bhāga*, *xiang fen* 相分), “seeing-aspect” (*darśana-bhāga*, *jiang fen* 見分), and “self-cognition” (*svasaṃvedana-bhāga*, *zi zheng fen* 自證分). Accepting both the three parameters as well as the three elements, Xuanzang added a fourth aspect: the “cognition of self-cognition” (**svasaṃvittisaṃvitti-bhāga*, *zheng zi zheng fen* 證自證分).⁶

As one can easily observe, the seen-aspect and seeing-aspect represent the cognitive object and the perceiving faculty. Self-cognition, however, has a rather different responsibility to the previous two: it is the fruit of perceiving and plays a reflexive role that examines (*zheng* 證) what results from perception. While the first two aspects have another aspect to validate their results, self-cognition is left without an examiner; this is considered to be a flaw in the *CWSL* and thus a fourth aspect is introduced in order that self-cognition too has an examiner.⁷ Yet this modification is not without its problems and accordingly was critiqued. If, namely, one presupposes that every mental aspect requires an examiner, this model of the four aspects does not avoid the infinite regress produced due to the fourth aspect not having an examiner also. In response to this line of questioning from the opponents, the *CWSL* explains as follows:

⁶ According to Yao, Dharmapāla’s addition of the “cognition of self-cognition” is based on the three-aspect theory of Dignāga. There is, however, no definitive source to underpin this derivation in Tibetan and Sanskrit texts and it is treated in but two Chinese works; namely, the *CWSL* and the **Buddhabhūmiśāstra* 佛地經論. Based on the attempt to amalgamate two sub-schools of Yogācāra, the Sākāravādins and Nirākāravādins, Dharmapāla extracts the concept of self-cognition from the context of the *pramāṇa* theory of Dignāga and develops it as part of the eight forms of consciousness. Yao assumes that the seen-aspect and the seeing-aspect which represent the two divisions of the cognition derive probably from “*darśana-vijñapti*” (*jian shi* 見識) and “*nimitta-vijñapti*” (*xiang shi* 相識) in Asaṅga’s *MSG* because they both divide cognition into subjective and objective appearances. See Yao 2005, pp.145-146. For studies concerning Xuanzang’s four-aspect structure of consciousness, see Kern 1988; Chao 2006, pp.94-106.

⁷ 又心、心所若細分別應有四分，三分如前，復有第四證自證分。此若無者，誰證第三？心分既同應皆證故。又自證分應無有果，諸能量者必有果故。不應見分是第三果，見分或時非量攝故。由此見分不證第三，證自體者必現量故。See T 1585, pp. 10b17-22.

With respect to these four aspects, the former two are external while the latter two are internal. The first aspect (the seen-aspect) can only be the grasped object, while the latter three aspects can serve as both [the object and the subject]. That means the second aspect grasps the first aspect alone. [By grasping, the second aspect] cognizes [the first] plausibly, fallaciously, directly, or inferentially. The third aspect can grasp both the second and the fourth. [The fourth aspect,] “cognition of self-cognition,” only grasps the third but not the second because [to grasp the second] would be of no use (since the second has already been cognized by the third). The third and fourth [aspects] are both included in ‘direct perception.’ Thus, mind and mental factors are comprised of four aspects. [Under this circumstance] all four aspects have their own tenet to grasp on to and to be grasped; [therefore] there is no infinite regression. When [the four aspects] are neither identical nor distinct, the principle of “representation-only” is [fully] accomplished.⁸

By assigning a process of mutual examination to self-cognition and the cognition of self-cognition, Xuanzang solves the problem of the infinite regress and avoids the need to establish an nth aspect in this system. The other important point in this quotation is the three types of perception: “direct perception” (*pratyakṣa*, *xian liang* 現量)⁹, “inference” (*anumāna*, *bi liang* 比量), and “fallacious perception” (**apramāṇa*, *fei liang* 非量).¹⁰ “Direct perception” is without differentiation (*avikalpa*, *li fen bie* 離分


⁸ 此四分中前二是外、後二是內。初唯所緣，後三通二。謂第二分但緣第一，或量非量、或現、或比。第三能緣第二第四。證自證分唯緣第三、非第二者，以無用故。第三、第四皆現量攝。故心、心所四分合成。具所能緣，無無窮過。非即非離唯識理成。See T 1585, vol. 31, 10b17-28. Cf. Cook 1999, pp.62-63; Wei Tat 1973, pp. 142-143 and discussed by Sharf 2016, p. 797.

⁹ For research concerning the characteristic of self-cognition in certain doctrines and the historical development of the term itself, see Anālayo 2017; Dreyfus 1996, 1997; Kellner 2010; Matilal 1986; Moriyama 2010; Williams 1998, pp.1-36; Yao, 2005. For its reflexive nature and the disputations in regard to whether it is pure, see Arnold 2005a, pp.13-31, 2005b, 2010, 2012, pp.158-174; Coseru 2012, pp. 945-1092; Garfield 2006; Griffiths 1990; Sharf 2018.

¹⁰ *Pratyakṣa* is explained in chapter one of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, while *anumāna* for one’s own sake and for the others is introduced in chapters two and three. See Hattori, 1968, pp. 23-41. Even though Dignāga might have the concept of *apramāṇa*, he does not discuss it. However, the concept is

別),¹¹ whereas the remaining two are differentiated. Of specific import to the process of mental cognition in the *CWSL* is the addition of the fourth aspect to the cognitive theory and the affirmation that self-cognition is able to perceive directly. These three types of perception are mapped onto the perceptual relation between the four aspects: the seeing-aspect can perceive the seen-aspect directly, with inference, or falsely; however, self-cognition and the cognition of self-cognition only perceive directly. Perception that is formed due to the seeing-aspect grasping the seen-aspect can be correct or incorrect, while perception that is activated by self-cognition and the cognition of self-cognition is always correct. Xuanzang states that the former perception occurs in the outer-sphere and the latter in the inner-sphere of consciousness. Here, Xuanzang attempts to distinguish two abilities in consciousness, the one forming a perception that seems to be outside of the mind and the other inwardly reflecting on perception itself. The system of the four aspects is represented as a chart below:

Diagram 1 The Four-Aspect Theory



intensively discussed by Kumāriḷa, Īsvaraṣena, and Dharmakīrti, wherein they expound the negation of the perception in a different way from the Chinese tradition. See Kellner 1997, 2001, and 2003; Taber 2003. For studies regarding non-perception see Steinkellner 1992, and 1996; Chu 2004; Yao 2011.

¹¹ As discussed by Hattori, in chapter one of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Dignāga defines *pratyakṣa* as “free from conceptual conception (*kalpanā*)”. According to Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary, this state of perception is further connected to the term *avikalpa*. See Hattori 1968, pp. 25-27. Indeed, Chinese literature typically renders *avikalpa* with 無分別 (*wu feng bie*) or 離分別 (*li feng bie*), which literally mean “non-differentiation” or “apart from differentiation”; see the explanation in the *Nyāyapraveśa*: T 1630, vol. 32, p. 12 b28.

Inheriting Dignāga's definition of direct perception, the *CWSL* endows self-cognition with the ability to perceive directly,¹² meaning it is reflexively aware of the content one perceives. Likewise, the cognition of self-cognition that examines the latter also has the same quality. Besides this, Xuanzang also endows self-cognition with a distinctive quality that is only mentioned in the *CWSL*; that is, it serves as the basis which gives rise to the seen-aspect and seeing-aspect, the object and subject that form perception and together create the appearance of an existent external world. This doctrinal change should be understood within the system of karmic retribution and in particular in light of the doctrine of the maturation and manifestation of hidden seeds in store consciousness.

3.1.3 The Transformative Power of Self-Cognition and its Relationship to Karmic Retribution

Scholars have already dealt with the appearance of the faculty and the object as well as their karmic basis in the context of the *AS*. Stating that the perceiving faculty arises directly from store consciousness and further becomes the support for the occurrence of the object, the *AS* delineates the route the growth of perception follows from its karmic origins. In a likely modification thereof, the *CWSL* also demonstrates the origination of the object and subject together with karmic retribution and the transformation of consciousness. However, Xuanzang deems both of their arisings to be direct transformations of consciousness itself. The establishment of the two elements of perception — the objective world and the perceiving subject — relies on the

¹² Scholars broadly maintain that Dignāga accepts self-cognition as a mode of direct perception that is distinct from the other three (sensory perception, mental perception, and yogic perception). See Wayman 1977-1978, 1991 and Yao 2004. However, Hattori (1968, p.27), Nagatomi (1980, p.243-260), and Franco (1993, pp.295-299) argue that Dignāga only accepts three types of direct perception. From the passage quoted above, it is clear the *CWSL* holds that self-cognition is a discrete cognitive aspect able to perceive things in a direct way; namely, it is able to perceive the object without differentiation. As long as the mental factors are composed of four aspects, even when they are afflicted, the self-cognition of all these mental factors perceives directly.

characteristic of self-cognition. Unlike other Abhidharma treatises, the *CWSL* expressly ascribes a transforming ability to self-cognition, such that self-cognition generates perceptual activity whilst containing a reflexive capability that affords a mental awareness of this perceptual activity.

As mentioned in last chapter, the eight forms of consciousness manifest the stored seeds and change their latent state into an active one; for this reason they are named “transformer” (*neng bian* 能變).¹³ In the system of the *CWSL*, the transforming activity of consciousness is twofold: as a “transformation of the cause” (**hetupariṇāma*, *yin neng bian* 因能變) it actualizes the latent seed; and as a “transformation of the effect” (**phalapariṇāma*, *guo neng bian* 果能變) it produces the object and subject corresponding to each of the eight types of consciousness. Since seeds represent a person’s past activity and record one’s former experience, they, according to the *CWSL*, can also be conceptualized as “habituated tendencies” (*vāsanā*, *xi qi*, 習氣).¹⁴ The innate habituated tendencies of the seeds develop the forces that enable the two kinds of transformative activities and enable the seeds to “ripen” and bear “fruits”. There are two kinds of habituated tendency: one, called the “habituated tendency in continuity with the same kind” (*niṣyandavāsanā*, *deng liu xiqi*, 等流習氣), generates a new seed

¹³ The store consciousness, the notion of subjectivity (*kliṣṭa-manas*), and the six forms of perception perform three kinds of transformation (*trividha-pariṇāma*) according to the *Triṃśikā*. Therefore, Xuanzang applies the name “transformer” (*neng bian*, 能變) to these three kinds of consciousness. Store consciousness is called the first transformer while the notion of subjectivity and the six forms of perception are the second and third transformers.

¹⁴ According to Yamabe’s research, “habituated tendency” in the *Basic Section* of *Yogācārabhūmi* means, in most cases, the imprint of *kleśa* or *karma*. However, *bīja* and *vāsanā* become synonymous from the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* onward due to the exposition of the Yogācāra claiming that seeds are the basis of all *dharmas*. It is probably easier to understand the seeds of previous action as equivalent to habituated tendency. However, it is more difficult to relate the seed which brings forward forms (*rūpa*) to the habituated tendency. As Yamabe points out, the fact that conceptualization (*vikalpa*) becomes the main cause for continuous rebirth in *samsāra*, it includes the forms that appear due to the conceptualization of the thinkable objects in psychological activity. Thus, *bīja* can be the basis of all *dharmas* as well as synonymous to *vāsanā*. See Yamabe 2021, pp.465ff. The *CWSL* inherits this exposition and treats “seed” and “habituated tendency” as equivalent. See T 1585, p. 8b8-9

of a like kind; and the other, termed the “habituated tendency in ripening” (*vipākavāsanā, yi shou xiqi*, 異熟習氣) manifests the seeds’ ripening.


The chart below illustrates two kinds of transformation: the seed on the right side transforms the eight forms of the consciousness due to the two tendencies (T1 and T2). The eight forms of consciousness then transform their own seen-aspects and seeing-aspects, or the subjective and objective parts of the consciousness. The first transformation is the transformation of the cause and the second the transformation of effect. In the case of the six forms of consciousness, they transform the sensual and mental faculties, in addition to the corresponding objects, to actualize the ripened seed in the present by means of cognitive activity.¹⁵ In commenting on this part of the *CWSL*, Kuiji deems self-cognition to be consciousness itself (*shi ti* 識體) and to serve as the basis for its transformation. It transforms out of itself the object and subject which serve as the two components comprising the cognitive activities.¹⁶ Namely, when the eight forms of consciousness manifest ripened seeds, their self-cognition becomes the basis that brings forth the perceiving faculties—the seeing-aspect—as well as the perceived object—the seen-aspect—in order to make perception proceed. This interpretation distinguishes the *CWSL* from other Yogācāra doctrines, since it explicitly defines

¹⁵In commenting on the first part of the third verse in the *Triṃśikā—asaṃviditakopādisthānavijñaptikaṃ ca tat* (Its [*ālayavijñāna*] appropriations, dwellings, and perception are unknown)—, Xuanzang considers the things to which the *ālayavijñāna* clings and senses (*upādāna*), as well as the place in which it dwells (*sthāna*), as the seen-aspect of the *ālayavijñāna*, while perception discriminates the seen-aspect as the seeing-aspect. According to the *CWSL* and Kuiji’s annotation, the seeds together with the body with senses and the material world that arise depend on their own seeds are the object which the *ālayavijñāna* perceives. The ways that the *ālayavijñāna* perceives is to differentiate their characteristic in order that it can assign tasks based on their different functions or qualities. See T 1585, p. 10a11-26. The seventh consciousness takes the seeing-aspect of the *ālayavijñāna* and considers it as a perceiving subject. Namely, the function of the *ālayavijñāna* is to discriminate the sensual faculties of the body and phenomena in the container world; this is what the *kliṣṭa-manas* take as its object and so becomes its seen-aspect. The way the *kliṣṭa-manas* perceives its seen-object is through non-stop thinking (*manana, si liang* 思量). That means it continuously contemplates what those objects mean to “oneself”. Accordingly, *kliṣṭa-manas* is a notion of subjectivity and is always associated with the four afflictions: self-ignorance (*ātma-moha, wo chi* 我癡), self-view (*ātma-dṛṣṭi, wo jian* 我見), self-pride (*ātma-māna, wo man* 我慢) and self-attachment (*ātma-tṛṣṇā, wo ai* 我愛). See T 1585, p. 22, a7-13. For related studies, see Yokoyama 1979, pp. 165-166, 188-193.

¹⁶ See T 1830, p.298c3-299b16.

consciousness as the agent which creates the components that fulfil all dimensions of perception.

Diagram 2 Transformation of the Cause and Effect



Within the schema of the four aspects, the habituated tendency and transformation of consciousness amalgamate karmic retribution with cognitive activity. This premise becomes the basis for Yogācāra practitioners to include all elements of human cognition as activities of consciousness as well as exclude influences from the presumed external world. As self-cognition is consciousness itself, and so manifests past events in the form of cognitive activities, it is also the mind itself. Applying this logic to the transformative power of self-cognition, when it produces, on the basis of the ripened seed, the seen-aspect and seeing-aspect from consciousness itself, it actually transforms the cognitive object and perceiving faculty from the mind itself also. These two aspects engender the arising of various cognitive activities, namely, the mental factors which characterize the mind and manifest past *karma* at the same time. As was concluded in chapter two, it is only when the mind is there that the mental factors arise as its activity, and it is only the mental factors that shape the appearance of the mind. This point is again

confirmed in the schema of the four aspects, and it is for this reason that the *CWSL* states that the mind and mental factors are *in toto* comprised of the four aspects.

3.1.4 Mind and Mental Factors in the Context of the Four-Aspect Theory

Having clarified the theory of cognition and its relationship to karmic retribution, we can now turn to examine how the *CWSL* situates mind and mental factors within the framework of the four-aspect theory as premised on Yogācāra’s fundamental doctrine of representation-only. In order to demonstrate the way in which the mind acts during the process of perception, Xuanzang compares how systems of realism and idealism relate the object, subject and the result of perception to components that comprise the mind and mental factors.

Those who maintain the position that the object that is grasped is apart from consciousness say: the external realm is [what the mind] grasps [in perception], the seen-aspect is called the “mode of grasping” (*xing xiang* 行相)¹⁷, and the seeing-aspect is called the “thing” (*shi* 事)¹⁸ because [it] is the very characteristic of the substance of the mind and mental factors. The mind and the mental factors have the same support, object, and a similar mode of grasping, and although their things are equal in number, their

¹⁷ The Sanskrit term for *xing xiang*, *ākāra*, has various connotations due to its different usages in many contexts. According to Kellner, *ākāra* literally means “shape” or “form”, with a secondary meaning of “appearance”, “aspect”, or “image”. In relation to Buddhist epistemology, Kellner suggests that we take *ākāra* as a “mode of grasping” when this term concerns the perception of object-support in the context of mind and mental factors. This is because Vasubandhu, in his *ABKh*, considers mental factors to perform *ākaraṇa* (to determine as different/in a differentiating manner) with respect to the *ālambana* (object-support) in their own *prakāraśah* (distinctive way). See Kellner, 2014, pp. 285-287 and footnote 40. For other research regarding this term, see Schmithausen, 1987, p. 409, footnote 741; Griffiths, 1990, pp.92-99; McClintock, 2014. pp. 327–337; Dhammajoti, 2007b, pp 245-272.

¹⁸ *Shi* is probably a translation of the Sanskrit *dravya*. It is deemed to be the same condition for the arising of the mind and its constituents, a principle which is stated in identical terms in relation to the five equivalencies that allow the mind and mental factors to arise together in the *ABKh*. Such equivalence is called equivalence in *dravya*. See chapter two footnote 34 and 35. In this quotation, *shi* stands in contrast to *xing xiang* and serves as the substance of perception which arises at the very same moment.

characteristics (i.e., functions), for example, cognition, sensation, and conceptualization, are different.

Those who understand that there is no object to be grasped apart from consciousness then say: the seen-aspect [of consciousness] is what is grasped, the seeing-aspect is called the mode of grasping,¹⁹ the self-substance (*zi ti* 自體) upon which the seen- and seeing-aspects are based is called the thing, namely, self-cognition. If it (self-cognition) did not exist, [one] could not recollect one's own mind and mental factors, and therefore one could never recollect the object which has never been perceived before. The mind and mental factors have the same support and similar objects, but different modes of grasping because their functions in discerning and perceiving, etc., are different. Although their things are equal in number, their characteristics are different because the substances of cognition, sensation, etc., are different.²⁰

For realism, perception is the interaction between the internal psychological state and the external world. Thus, when the faculties grasp the external object, the sense object

¹⁹ As Cox mentions in her paper, both the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas and Vasubandhu assume that thought (*citta*) and its concomitants (*caittas*) have their own *ākāra*. However, their conceptualizations of *ākāra* are quite different. The Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas consider *ākāra* to be a “discriminative function of insight”, whereas Vasubandhu deems *ākāra* of thought and its concomitants as “taking shape or taking on an aspect consistent with the type or character of the object-support”. See Cox, 1988, p.81, footnote 92. This distinction is akin to what Xuanzang intends to show by means of comparing the difference between realism and idealism. When the realist assumes the seen-aspect is the mode of grasping, it regards the seen-aspect as having the ability to already discriminate the grasped object and make it appear in the way which suits the characteristic of the arising mind or its concomitants. For the idealist, the mind shows itself by means of creating the object-support and the perceiving faculty in order to operate perception in a way that suits its characteristic. The two elements of perception (the seen-aspect and the seeing-aspect) are tools that carry out the task of displaying the characteristics of the mind or of its concomitants. Therefore, when the seeing-aspect grasps the seen-aspect in a specific way, it makes the object-support take shape in a manner that is consistent with its own characteristic which is also identical to the characteristic of the arising mind or its concomitants.

²⁰ See T 1585, p. 10b2-11. 執有離識所緣境者，彼說外境是所緣，相分名行相，見分名事，是心、心所自體相故。心與心所同所依、緣，行相相似，事雖數等，而相各異，識、受、想等相各別故；達無離識所緣境者，則說相分是所緣，見分名行相，相、見所依自體名事，即自證分。此若無者，應不自憶心、心所法，如不曾更境，必不能憶故。心與心所同所依根，所緣相似，行相各別，了別、領納等作用各異故。事雖數等，而相各異，識、受等體有差別故。Cf. Wei Tat 1973, pp.138-141; Cook 1999, pp.61-62.

(seen-aspect) appears in consciousness accordingly and is perceived by the subject (seeing-aspect). This means the emergence of the perceptual moment depends on the subject's perceiving the sense object. In this case, the subject reveals the result of perception in regard to the content of the sense object that reflects its corresponding external object. It is therefore the core characteristic of the perceptual moment that the seeing-aspect perceives. As a consequence, the quality of the seeing-aspect becomes the self-substance of the momentary mind and its concomitants. It is said that the particularity of the formed cognition is the identity of the mind and mental factors at the same moment. Although the mind and mental factors arise depending on the same faculties (*suo yi* 所依) and external object (*suo yuan* 所緣), the former grasp the latter in different modes because they comprehend differently. Thus, their sense object (namely, their seen-aspect) turns out to be slightly different. However, since they display the same cognitive moment, they share the same self-substance but reflect it in different ways.

For the idealist, perception is the process of the mind perceiving itself. Due to this proposition, the idealist assigns different roles to the components of consciousness. The conditions that fulfil perception are threefold: the perceived object, the perceiver and the basis of perception (namely, the seen-aspect, seeing-aspect and the self-cognition), and these three components comprise the mind. Since there is no external existence, the outwardly perceived objects which the mind ostensibly grasps are in fact the internal cognitive objects. As discussed in 3.1.3, both the faculties and the sense objects are transformed by the basis of perception (self-cognition). It enables the subject-object relationship of perception by altering the matured seed. In an idealist system, therefore, the perceived objects and the perceivers are both characterized by the agent that manifests *karma* (self-cognition). Under such circumstance, self-cognition defines the quality of the cognitive moment and becomes the substance of the mind and its

concomitants. Here, the mind refers to the eight “mind-kings”, the evolving eight forms of consciousness that support the cognizing mind. Arising depends on the same faculties, and thus the seeing-aspect of the mind and the mental factors are also the same. However, the fact that they perceive the sense objects in different modes also makes their seen-aspects appear slightly differently. That is to say, since the seen-aspect and the seeing-aspect are transformed by self-cognition, both their qualities and the way the former perceives the latter are defined by it.

Looking at the afore-cited passage again, we can see that the type of self-cognition which only exists in the idealist analysis of perception is the substance of both the eight forms of consciousness and the eight mind-kings; it serves as the agent that enables the manifestation of past *karma* which is brought forward by consciousness by means of transforming the two aspects that form perception. During the process of perceiving, the mind apprehends only the general characteristic of the sense object, while the mental factors carry out different functions of perceiving according to their characteristic (e.g., discerning and perceiving), reflecting different aspects of the momentary mental experience. As Kuiji also explains, when perceiving the colour blue, although the mind and the mental factors that arise have almost the same seen-aspect (the color blue), their seeing aspects reflect the different characteristics of this color blue and therefore their modes of activity differ.²¹ Hence, they have a similar seen-aspect but a dissimilar seeing-aspect to the mind since they grasp the same object but perceive it with distinct modes of activity.

On the premise of representation-only, the whole process of cognition is the sole activity of consciousness. This includes the formation of object and subject, the perceptual activities between them, and the introspection of the perceiving result. In the

²¹ See Kuiji’s explanation: 相分雖不同，然極相似，如青為境，諸相俱青，相似名同；見分各異，雖俱是青，取像各異，故名不同行相。T 1830, pp. 319, a12-14.

CWSL, cognition is structured by the four-aspects theory which grants self-cognition the ability to not only prove the perceptual result but to further transform the seen- and seeing-aspects. Moreover, this structure is built into a karmic system that involves the seed theory and explains cognition as a mere performance of store consciousness. This allows for the kind of postulate that denies external existence but still establishes a cohesive cognitive process.

Combining the appearance of the mind and mental factors as cognitive activities with the structure of the four aspects is designed to explain cognition in the context of karmic retribution. As said in the last chapter, the fifty-one mental factors are classified into six categories, including the mental factors of being always active, factors that are bound to a specific object, wholesome factors, afflicted factors, factors which are secondary afflicted, and the indeterminate factors. Among these, those factors in the first category belong to the activities that arise in the formation of a cognitive moment.

3.2 The Mental Factors of Being Always Active in the *CWSL*

Classified into six categories, each of the fifty-one mental factors is given a specific definition in the *CWSL*. The general method the text employs in defining a mental factor is as follows. It begins with an explanation of a given mental factor's fixed nature (*xing* 性)²², followed by the potential karmic action which might be triggered by it. Thereafter, it is categorized into wholesome or unwholesome (including the afflictions and the secondary afflictions) and in terms of the counteractions (*pratipakṣa*, *dui zhi* 對治) which constitute the wholesome factors that remedy the opposing defiled factors. Furthermore, in certain definitions, the characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*, *xiang* 相) of the mental factors also become important when related to the issue of distinctiveness. Since

²² Here, "nature" reflects the Sanskrit suffix *-tva* which denotes a quality of being.

the mental factors are activities of the cognizing mind, the natures which define their existence function to determine the arising of a perceptual moment. As a result, the terms used to delineate the natures of mental factors usually contain similar meanings to those which define the types of karmic actions they trigger because the appearance of such actions is contingent on the perceptual moment whose arising is itself the result of the functioning of mental factors.

The mental factors of being always active accompany every other mental factor enumerated in the treatise due to their serving as the basis for the arising of the mental factors in the other five categories. This group includes five factors: sensory contact (*sparśa*, *chu* 觸), attention (*manaskāra*, *zuo yi* 作意), sensation (*vedanā*, *shou* 受), conceptualization (*saṃjñā*, *xiang* 想), and volition (*cetanā*, *si* 思). Denoting the initiation of perception, sensory contact represents the initial moment in which the object, the perceiving faculty, and awareness come into contact with one another in arising at the same time. Attention focuses awareness on what one perceives. And following the workings of these two factors, sensation then determines whether the content of the object is compatible with the current mental state. Conceptualization forms concepts of the perceptual and assigns names and words to the object, whereafter volition finally urges an action in response to the perception.

3.2.1 Sensory Contact (*sparśa*, *chu* 觸)

In defining sensory contact, controversies consistently appear in relation to the question of whether “sensory contact” is identical to the “combination of the three” (i.e., the object, faculty, and consciousness), the common way to describe the initial moment of perception. Thus, when commenting on the *Triṃśikā*, both Sthiramati and Xuanzang respond to this doctrinal disputation in light of their own specific concerns, inheriting the definition of sensory contact from the *AS* whilst emending certain aspects and

supplementing it with their own ideas. In Sthiramati's commentary on the *Triṃśikā*, he states,

Sensory contact is the apprehension (*pariccheda*) of modification (*vikāra*)²³ in the sense faculty when the three (the faculty, the object, and the consciousness) come into contact and it has the function of supporting [the arising of] the feeling. The sense faculty, the object, and the consciousness are these three. The combination of the three is their co-presence, the three being related [to each other] as an effect and as a cause. When the three are there simultaneously, a modification would happen in accordance with the pleasure, suffering, etc. in faculty; the object (external) whose form is to be sensed as pleasure, suffering, etc. resembles this modification in the sense faculty is apprehended. This is sensory contact. Moreover, the faculty behaves as the cause of pleasure, suffering, etc. by the distinctiveness (*viśeṣa*) which is exactly the modification of the sensory faculty. Moreover, sensory contact is so-called because the sense faculty touches the resembling of the modification in the sense faculty or the resembling of the modification in the sense faculty touches faculty. Due to this reason, the apprehension of the modification in the faculty is taught [as sensory contact] even if it is that whose nature is the apprehension of the object.²⁴

We can conclude from this passage that sensory contact occurs in two stages. First, the sense faculty, its corresponding object and consciousness come together and allow sensory contact to take place, which consequently enables the faculty to produce a resemblance of the object in the mind. Second, this object is apprehended by the faculty

²³ Based on his research of the *AS* and *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*, Schmithausen considers *sparśa* to be “a distinct apprehension of such modifications of the sense-organ as are suitable to the arising of the pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral feelings.” See Schmithausen 1987, p.380, footnote 613.

²⁴ My translation is based on Kawamura 1964, pp. 50-51. For the Sanskrit edition, see Buescher 2007, pp. 54-56. Cf. Schmithausen 1987, p.380, footnote 613; Kritzer 1999, pp. 121-130.

once again, which causes the arising of sensation, whether pleasurable, painful, or unspecific, and initiates further cognitive activities. Based on this definition, therefore, sensory contact is equivalent to apprehension and so differs from the combination of the three.

Sthiramati follows the *AS* in emphasizing the modifying ability of the faculty in his definition of sensory contact. But he further specifies that this modification is the distinctiveness of the perceived object whose apprehension thus becomes the main function of sensory contact. In doing so, the association between the subject and object occurs within consciousness and the main function of sensory contact comes to be an action in which the faculty touches an object of its own creation. To clarify his position, Sthiramati says that the three elements bind to each other in both states of cause and effect: the two stages which together mark the beginning and the end of a single event, with the former being the precondition for the latter and the latter the main force that fulfils the conditions for the arising of sensory contact.

By way of contrast, the definition of sensory contact in the *CWSL* is quite distinct from that of Sthiramati; it states:

Sensory contact means the combination of the three (*trikasamnipāta*, *san he* 三和)²⁵ and the replication (*pariccheda*, *fen bie* 分別) of the transformation (*vikāra*, *bian yi* 變異). To make the mind and the mental factors have contact with the object is its nature. Being the basis for sensation (*vedanā*, *sou* 受), conceptualization (*samjñā*, *xiang* 想) and volition (*cetanā*, *si* 思) is its activity. That means, the faculty, object, and consciousness correspond to and are in accord with one another (meaning that the eye-faculty only

²⁵ In the Chinese tradition, the state of contact which is “harmonious” is emphasized. Having contact with each other in a “harmonious” way refers to the corresponding combination of the faculty, object, and consciousness, as is explained later in this definition. Therefore, Xuanzang renders “*trikasamnipāta*” as “the harmonious combination of the three” (*san he he* 三和合).

corresponds to the visual object and the eye-consciousness); therefore, it is named a combination of the three. Sensory contact arises depending thereupon (faculty, object, and the consciousness) and brings them into combination; therefore, it is named [a combination of the three]. In the state of the harmonious combination of the three, [they] all have the ability to give rise to an agreeable mental factor; therefore, it (this state) is named transformation. Sensory contact arises [by] resembling it (the transformation), therefore, it is named the replication.²⁶ The transformative power of the faculty, at the time it triggers sensory contact, is forceful than the [power of] consciousness and the object. Therefore, the *AS* and so on mention only the discrimination of the transformation of the faculty. Combining all mind and mental factors in harmony and having them come together with the same object is the nature of sensory contact.

Instead of apprehending modification in the sensory faculty, in the *CWSL* sensory contact is understood to be the replication of the transformation. Here, the nature of sensory contact is not an apprehension but rather a coalescing of the relevant mind and mental factors around the same cognitive object. When the three touch, two alterations are triggered: first, the three elements acquire the ability to transform the mind and the mental factors; and second, sensory contact arises as a resemblance which is analogous to the combination itself. When compared to the *AS*, one finds that the *CWSL* not only differs on the point of the nature of sensory contact but also in the case of two further important tenets: first of all, it is not only the faculty but also the object and consciousness that can make the mind and mental factors arise; second, sensory contact

²⁶ See T 1585, p. 11b19-20. 觸謂三和分別、變異，令心、心所觸境為性，受、想、思等所依為業。 Cf. Wei Tat 1973, p.155; Cook 1999, p.68; Sharf 2016, p.784.

does not only serve as the basis of perception but also the rest of the mental factors which depend on the condition of this moment.

As mentioned in the last chapter, the category of mental factor in the *CWSL* is distinguishable from the mind only at the conventional level of teaching. Therefore, though they are bilaterally dependent, sensory contact and the combination of the three are two different concepts. The three (sense faculty, object, and consciousness) all change at the moment of contact and generate a different *dharma* called sensory contact. In the definition of sensory contact, the *CWSL* defends this exposition on three grounds: (1) because it is listed as one of six hexads and is treated as a mental factor in this doctrine; (2) it is listed as one of the kinds of food upon which sentient beings rely for subsistence²⁷; and (3) it is listed as one of the links in the twelve-fold chain of dependent arising and serves as the basis for the arising of sensation. Therefore, the self-nature of sensory contact is real and not provisional.

3.2.2 Attention (*manaskāra*, *zuo yi* 作意)²⁸

In those treatises that consider attention to be omnipresent, it is usually defined as a “bending of the mind” (*cetasa ābhogaḥ*). As the term *ābhoga* is used metaphorically, it is consequently given rather different explanations in these texts. For example, the *Abhidharmadīpa* understands *ābhoga* as a directing of the mind to the object that was experienced in the previous moment²⁹; and the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, when

²⁷ There are four kinds of food that are listed in the *Dīrghāgama*, each denoting four kinds of life-support which nourish the physical and mental functions of sentient beings. One of them is “sensory food” (*chushi* 觸食), which refers to the sensation and feelings that are caused by sensation and appear because of the contact between the six faculties and the external stimulation. See T01, p. 133b17-c4.

²⁸ Except for the epistemological usage presented below, *manaskāra* is also closely related to the to spiritual practice in Yogacāra thought. See Kramer, 2018, pp.269f, and 2020, pp.300. For a list and explanation of the different *manaskāra* in the context of meditation, see Deleanu, 2006, p.29-34 (dealing with *manaskāra* in Śrāvakahūmi); Delhey, 2009, pp.157-163 (in Samāhitābhūmi); Pabst von Ohain, 2018, pp.72-125; Kramer, 2018&2020 (dealing with eighteen *manaskāra* in the *Sūtrālaṃkāravṛttibhāṣya*)

²⁹ See Jaini 1959, pp. 70-71. *cittasyābhogo manaskāraḥ pūrvānubhūtādisamanvāhārasvarūpaḥ*.

glossing the *AKBh*, considers *ābhoga* to be a particular exertion of the mind, further explaining “bending the mind” as “making knowing” (*manasaḥ kāro*). Thus, the term *cetasa ābhogaḥ* denotes a sort of action that forces the mind to turn to what it perceives. Problems on the term in the Indian tradition are also echoed in the Chinese translation of *AKBh*. Paramārtha, for instance, translates it as “turning the direction of the mind” (*xin hui xiang* 心迴向), which is very close to what the *Dīpa* understands, whereas Xuanzang contrarily translates it as “enabling the alarming of the mind” (*neng ling xin jing jue* 能令心警覺),³⁰ supplying two further denotations not found in Sanskrit: capacity “*neng*” (能) and the imperative “*ling*” (令). This understanding renders *ābhoga* an action that arouses the interest of the mind in the cognitive process.

Xuanzang’s translation of the *AKBh* is moreover coherent with his definition of attention in the *CWSL*:

The nature of attention is the ability to arouse the mind. Drawing the mind toward the object to which it grasps is its activity. It is to say, this arousing awakes the seeds of the mind that are about to arise and leads them to approach their object; therefore, it is called the attention. Although it (attention) could also arouse mental factors, the mind holds the dominant position; hence, one says [attention] leads the mind. There are (other) interpretations: [attention means] making the mind turn in the direction of a different object or making the mind stay with the same object; therefore, it is called the attention. Both [claims] are incorrect because, [for the first case, attention] should not be always active; [and for the second,] there is no difference [between attention and] concentration.³¹

³⁰ See T 1558, p. 19a21. 作意謂能令心警覺。

³¹ See T1585, p. 11c6-11. 作意謂能警心為性。於所緣境，引心為業。謂此警覺應起心種，引令趣境，故名作意。雖此亦能引起心所，心是主故，但說引心。有說：令心迴趣異境，或於一境，持心令住，故名作意。彼俱非理，應非遍行，不異定故。Cf. Wei Tat 1973, pp.158-159; Cook 1999,

Here, the *CWSL* defines the nature of attention as the ability to make the mind become aware of what it is grasping. When the mind is aware of the cognitive object, it triggers the functioning of activities which follow attention, such as sensation, conceptualization and volition, which allow one to feel, to assigns names, and to act according to one’s judgment. After giving this definition, Xuanzang goes on to criticize two other interpretations: the definition in the *Manobhūmi*³² stating that attention “directs the mind”, and the interpretation from the *AS* which considers the function of attention as fixing the mind to the cognitive object³³. If one says the distinctive characteristic of attention is to change the direction of the mind, attention is to turn the mind towards a new object in the process of cognition. Since not every cognitive moment grasps a new object in the stream of the mental continuum—especially in a state of concentration (*samādhi*, *ding* 定)—one cannot say that attention is always active, and if one says attention attracts the mind to the same object for a certain period of time, then one would be able to be concentrate at every moment and would always in a meditative state.

These defects were also noticed by Sthiramati. In his definition of attention as a turning the mind toward what appears before it, he specifies one function of attention in repeatedly fixing the mind (*citta-dhāraṇa*) on the cognitive object, which only happens in special cases and not at every moment.³⁴ The special case to which Sthiramati refers is, according to Vinītadeva, one of the sustaining powers in the various meditative concentrations.³⁵ This commentary suggests that attention functions

pp.69-70; Sharf 2016, p.787.

³² See Bhattacharya 1957, p.60, 1 and 10: *manaskāraḥ katamaḥ/ cetasa ābhogaḥ//…… tatra manaskāraḥ kiṃkarmakaḥ/ cittāvarjana karmakaḥ/* For the Chinese parallel, see T 1579, p. 291b27 and c28: 作意云何? 謂心迴轉……謂引心為業。

³³ See Gokhale 1947, p.15, 38: *manaskāraḥ katamaḥ/ cetasa ābhogaḥ/ ālambane cittadhāraṇakarmakaḥ//* For the Chinese parallel, see T 1605, p. 664a25-26: 何等作意? 謂發動心為體, 於所緣境持心為業。

³⁴ Buescher 2007, pp. 56. Cf. Kawamura 1964, pp. 52.

³⁵ See Kawamura 1964, p.178.

differently in two discrete circumstances: one in which the mind is directed to its cognitive object, and another in which mental focus upon the same object is sustained in a continuous mental flow.

3.2.3 Sensation (*vedana*, *shou* 受)

The section on sensation in the *CWSL* focuses on refuting the position that sensation perceives the feeling which occurs because of sensory contact. It does this in order to claim that the feeling of what is pleasurable, suffering, and neutral derives directly from experiencing the cognitive object.³⁶ The definition of sensation is as follows:

The nature of sensation is to perceive the sensual attribute of the object which can be agreeable, disagreeable, and neither. To arouse craving is its karmic activity because it is able to arouse the desire of union, separation or neither.

One interpretation states that there are two kinds of sensation. One is the “sensation of the objective realm, which perceives the object; the other is the “sensation of self-nature”, which perceives simultaneous-sensory-contact. Only “to sense the self-nature of simultaneous-sensory-contact” is the self-characteristic of sensation since “to sense the perceived object” can be the characteristic of other [mental activities].

This interpretation is incorrect because sensation does not grasp the simultaneous-sensory-contact for sure. If one claims that perceiving

³⁶ Unlike the *CWSL*, Sthiramati’s focus is more on the relation between store consciousness and sensation. When explaining the nature of sensation, experiencing (*anubhava*), Sthiramati connects the experience of pleasure and suffering together with the matured fruition (*phalavipāka*) of past activities. Accordingly, the pleasurable, suffering and neutral feelings that one experiences come from the maturation of pure and impure seeds or both. Although the opponents consider the idea that the feeling of pleasure and suffering arise from store consciousness which associates only with neutral feeling to be a fallacy, Sthiramati contrarily holds that pleasure and suffering are not themselves maturations but are produced from the maturation of the seeds. As a consequence, it is possible to designate sensation as the experience of maturation. See Buescher 2007, p. 56. Cf. Kawamura 1964, p. 52.

simultaneous-sensory-contact could be named [as the sensation of self-nature] because it arises by means of resembling sensory contact, then the nature of all fruitions, which is similar to their causes, should be sensation. (Because the nature of sensation would be a resemblance of the cause according to this interpretation.) Furthermore, since resembling sensory contact is its cause, it ought to be called “sensation of the cause” instead of “[sensation of] self-nature”. If one claims that sensation of self-nature can be called thus because it is able to perceive the substance of the sensation born from sensory contact, just as the King lives from his various fiefs, it is also a faulty reasoning because [this reasoning] violates its own proposition and fails to prove itself. If one calls it “sensation of self-nature” because it does not abandon its [own] self-nature, then all *dharmas* should be called sensation of self-nature. Therefore, what you are saying deceives only infants. However, sensing the object is not a characteristic shared by other [mental factors] because perceiving the characteristic of agreeable and so forth belongs only to [sensation] itself. Since it does not share [this characteristic] with others, [it is correct to] call [it] sensation of the objective realm.³⁷

Apart from defining the nature of sensation as perceiving the sensual attribute of the cognitive object and its activity as arousing craving, Xuanzang spends almost the entirety of the passage refuting the claim that what sensation perceives is the feeling that emerges from the combination of the cognitive object, faculty, and consciousness.

³⁷ See T1585, p. 11c11-22. 受謂領納順、違、俱非境相為性，起愛為業，能起合離非二欲故。有作是說：受有二種，一境界受，謂領所緣；二自性受，謂領俱觸，唯自性受是受自相，以境界受共餘相故。彼說非理。受定不緣俱生觸故。若似觸生名領觸者，似因之果應皆受性，又既受因應名因受，何名自性？若謂如王食諸國邑，受能領觸所生受體，名自性受，理亦不然。違自所執不自證故。若不捨自性，名自性受，應一切法皆是受自性。故彼所說但誘嬰兒。然境界受非共餘相，領順等相定屬己者，名境界受，不共餘故。 Cf. Wei Tat 1973, pp.158-159; Cook 1999, p.70.

Instead, Xuanzang maintains that sensation is able to experience the cognitive object directly because to feel pleasure, suffering and so forth is precisely what makes sensation distinct.

According to Kuiji, this refutation targets Saṃghabhadra. In his *Nyāyānusāra*, Saṃghabhadra mentions five kinds of sensation. Among them, the first three relate more closely to what is discussed in the *CWSL*: the (1) sensation that experiences self-nature, (2) that experiences association and (3) that experiences the object.³⁸ The first sensation feels pleasure, suffering, and neutrality truthfully as its own substance; and the second sensation feels all kinds of sensory contact. In the *CWSL*, these two sensations together describe what is called “sensation of self-nature”. The description of the third sensation is almost identical, phrased as the “sensation of the objective realm” which experiences the objective world.³⁹

3.2.4 Conceptualization (*saṃjñā*, *xiang* 想)

The main function of conceptualization is to conceptualize the perceived object and ascertains its distinctiveness from the others. The definition of conceptualization in the *CWSL* is as follows:

The nature of conceptualization is to take the [distinctive] image of the object. To designate various names is [its] activity. This means that it is only

³⁸ 一、自性順受，謂諸受體，如契經說：受樂受時，如實了知受於樂受，乃至廣說。二、相應順受，謂一切觸，如契經言：順樂受觸，乃至廣說。三、所緣順受，謂一切境，如契經言：眼見色已，唯受於色不受色貪，乃至廣說。由色等是受所緣故。四、異熟順受，謂感異熟業，如契經說：順樂受業，乃至廣說。五、現前順受，謂現行受，如契經說：受樂受時二受便滅，乃至廣說。See T1562, pp. 569a4-12. The fourth and fifth kinds are the sensation that feels the matured action from the past and the sensation that feels the occurrence of pleasure, suffering, and so forth. This is identical to the definition given in the *AKBh*. See Pradhan 1975, p.229, 10-17, Cf. Sangpo 2012 Vol.II, p.1378-1379. For the Chinese parallel, see T 1558, p. 81b21-c1. For different opinions in regard to the five kinds of sensation see *MVŚ*: T 1545, p. 596a26-27; *Samyuktābhīdharmahrdayaśāstra*: T 1552, pp. 896b5-9.

³⁹ As Kramer points out, in his *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*, Sthiramati also refutes the opinion of Saṃghabhadra, which states that feeling is the experiencing of a desirable or undesirable contact (*sparśa*) or a contact that differs from both. Since sensation shares the quality of accompanying sensory contact (as all mental factors do), it is not suitable to paraphrase its distinctive nature as “feeling accompanying contact” or “feeling having contact as its cause”. See Kramer 2012, p.122.

when the distinctive characteristic of the object is established that the various names and words can be raised accordingly.⁴⁰

Except for distinguishing a given object from others, conceptualization has another important ability, namely, to establish various names for the perceived objects.⁴¹

This explanation is coherent with the *AS*, which also considers conceptualization as that which “expresses things seen, heard, conceived and those one recall” (*draṣṭaśrutamatavijñātānarthān vyavaharati*).⁴² Furthermore, in the *Xianyang*, conceptualization is defined as a “collection of words, phrases and syllables” (*ming ju wen shen* 名句文身), which arise due to perfuming and grow from the seed in store consciousness. It also says that conceptualization as a mental factor arouses speech in accordance with the object one grasps.⁴³

In regard to the arousal of speech, commentaries on the *CWSL* present a challenge concerning the reasons why conceptualization designates names and words but does not serve as their cause. Huizhao⁴⁴ responds to this by suggesting the concept of a “cause according to the (ordinary) language” (*anuvyavahārahetu, sui shuo yin* 隨說因), which is listed among the ten causes in the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi* and further elaborated in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*.⁴⁵ According to these two sections,

⁴⁰ 「想」調於境取像為性，施設種種名言為業，調要安立境分齊相，方能隨起種種名言。T1585, p. 11c22-24. Cf. Wei Tat 1973, pp.160-161; Cook 1999, pp. 70-71.

⁴¹ In Sthiramati’s *TrBh*, he does not mention the ability to designate a perceived object in terms of names and words but only emphasizes its main characteristic as grasping an object’s specific feature (*viśayanimittoḍgrahaṇa*). See Buescher 2007, p. 56. Cf. Kawamura 1964, p. 53. In regard to Sthiramati’s explanation of *saṃjñā* in his *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*, see Kramer 2012, pp. 123-125.

⁴² This translation is based on Boin-Webb 2001, p.3. For the original Sanskrit edition, see Pradhan 1950, p.2, 16-17. *kiṃlakṣaṇā saṃjñā / saṃjñānālakṣaṇā saṃjñā / saṃjñā nānādharmapratibimbodgrahaṇa[svabhāvā] yayā draṣṭaśrutamatavijñātānarthān vyavaharati //* For the Chinese parallel see T 1605, p. 663b5-7: 想蘊何相？構了相是想相，調由想故構畫種種諸法像類，隨所見聞覺知之義起諸言說。

⁴³ 想者，調名句文身，熏習為緣。從阿賴耶識種子所生，依心所起，與心俱轉。相應取相為體，發言議為業。See T 1602, p. 481a26-28.

⁴⁴ *Liaoyideng*, T 1832, p.727b19-22.

⁴⁵ The ten causes, including *anuvyavahārahetu*, are enumerated in the *Savitarkāsavicārābhūmi*. See Bhattacharya 1957, p.106, 17-19: *daśa hetavaḥ katame/ anuvyavahārahetuḥ/ apekṣāhetuḥ/ ākṣepahetuḥ/ abhinirvṛtīhetuḥ/ parigrahaḥetuḥ/ āvāhakaḥetuḥ/ pratiniyamahetuḥ/ saḥakārihetu/ virodhahetuḥ/ avirodhahetuḥca//* For the Chinese parallel, see T1579, pp. 301b9-10: 一隨說因、二觀

conceptualization arises because there is a name, and speech arises because there is conceptualization. Namely, a name which exists from previous experience aids one in discerning what the perceived object is and forming a concept of it. This concept connects the object in the present with the recalled name and initiates the possibility of uttering the name itself. Therefore, the conceptualization is not the direct cause of names and words but only the cause of designating the names of the perceived object.

3.2.5 Volition (*cetana, si* 思)

Volition functions as a transit between thought and action. Regarding what is perceived, it urges the mind to make a judgment of moral value and act accordingly. The definition of volition in the *CWSL* is as follows:

The nature of volition is to make the mind work. To urge the mind towards wholesomeness and so forth is [its] activity. [Volition] is able to grasp the characteristic of the perceived object that causes correct action etc., and drives one's mind to create wholesomeness etc.⁴⁶

The definition of volition in the *CWSL* again corresponds to that in the *AS*⁴⁷ and *Xianyang*⁴⁸. These two texts also treat volition as a moment of shifting from the formation of thought to reaction. Therefore, it has the potentiality to activate wholesome, defiled or neutral psychological activities.

待因、三牽引因、四生起因、五攝受因、六引發因、七定異因、八同事因、九相違因、十不相違因。The definition of *anuvyavahārahetu* and its relation to conceptualization is explained in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. See Dutt 1966, pp. 68-69: *tatra sarvadharmāṇaṃ yannāma nāmapūrvikā ca saṃjñā saṃjñāpūrvakaścābhilāpaḥ / ayamucyate teṣāṃ dharmāṇāmanuvyavahārahetuḥ* / For the Chinese parallel see T1579, p. 501a13-14: 謂一切法名為先故想，想為先故說，是名彼諸法隨說因。

⁴⁶ 「思」謂令心造作為性，於善品等役心為業，謂能取境正因等相，驅役自心令造善等。T1585, p. 11c24-26. Cf. Wei Tat 1973, pp.160-161; Cook 1999, p. 71.

⁴⁷ See Gokhale 1947, p.15, 37: *cetanā katamā/ cittābhisamskāro manaskarma/ kuśalākuśalāvyaḥṛeṣu cittaprerāṇakarmikā//*

⁴⁸ See T 1602, p. 481a29-b5: 思者，謂令心造作得失俱非，意業為體。或為和合、或為別離、或為隨與、或為貪愛、或為瞋恚、或為棄捨、或起尋伺、或復為起身語二業、或為染污、或為清淨行，善不善非二為業。如經說：有六思身。又說：當知我說今六觸處，即前世思所造故業。

In the *TrBh*, the emphasis is slightly different from the aforementioned treatises. Even though Sthiramati mentions that volition is a conception of the mind (*cittābhisamkāra*), he dedicates much of his explication to defining its main function as attracting the mind towards the cognitive object, like a magnet attracts iron. However, when commenting upon volition in the *PSkh*, he focuses more so on describing volition's ability to arouse the activities caused by thoughts (*manaskarma*), which can be wholesome, defiled or neutral.⁴⁹

3.2.6 Collaboration of the Five Factors

Altogether, these five always active mental factors—sensory contact, attention, sensation, conceptualization and volition—represent the process of forming cognition and serve as the fundamental basis for the arising mental activities. As Sharf has already pointed out, the always active mental factors in the *CWSL* are treated as an substratum of the cognitive process, which is described in terms of the complex interaction between discrete entities, each of which serve unique functions.⁵⁰ As the initiation of perception, sensory contact brings the cognitive object, faculty and awareness together. Attention makes the mind and mental factors that arise in correspondence with the perceptual moment focus on the cognitive object. Proceeding from this, one feels the object and acquires sensation, which is agreeable, disagreeable or neutral accordingly. In respect to the perception of the cognitive object, one then forms a concept and links the current

⁴⁹ See Kramer 2013, p.35,14-p.36,11: *cetanā katamā / guṇato doṣato nobhayataś cittābhisamkāro manaskarmeti / guṇataḥ kuśaleṣu dharmeṣu, doṣato 'kuśaleṣu, anubhayato 'vyākṛteṣu / athavā guṇata ity upakariṣu, doṣata ity apakariṣu, anubhayata iti madhyastheṣu / cittābhisamkāra iti manaśceṣṭā / yasyām satyām ālambanam prati cetasaḥ praspando bhavati, ayaskāntavaśād ayaḥprasandavat / āha ca – kṣaṇāntarānavasthānam nirvyāpāram yayā manaḥ / savyāpāram ivākhyāti sā manaskarma cetanā // iti / cittābhisamkāra ity ukte manaskarmeti kimartham/ sarvair eva caitasikais cittaṃ abhisamkriyate / tebhyo vyavacchedārtham manaskarmety āha, vijñānasya pariṣpanda iva yo dharmāḥ, sa eva cetanā nānya iti jñāpanārtham / guṇato doṣato 'nubhayataś cittābhisamkāra iti karmanirdeśaḥ / ma naskarmeti cetanāyāḥ svarūpanirdeśaḥ //*

⁵⁰ Sharf 2016, p.785.

conceptualization to one's previous knowledge in memory. Volition, based on the conceptualization of this object, thence urges the mind to act.

3.3 Mental Factors that are Bound to Specific Objects

Following its listing of the always active mental factors, Yogācāra taxonomies distinguish another five factors— wish, decisive resolve, memorizing, concentration, and discernment—from the “general omnipresent factor” (*mahābhūmika*, *da di fa* 大地法) of Sarvāstivādin thought and explains their arising as responses to specific objects. Most Yogācāra treaties do not fully elucidate the reason for this doctrinal change. However, it seems to be an important point for the *CWSL* in its defining the restricted requirements for the arising of these five factors. Wish, decisive resolve and memorizing arise only in response to a pleasing, determined, and already learned objects. They therefore do not appear when the perceived object is undesirable, makes one waver, or has never been learned before. Concentration and discernment respond only to the object which one observes carefully but not to the object that makes one distracted. Unlike random sense objects with which sense-faculties come into contact during the process of perceiving, those objects apparently reflect clear habitual tendencies and attract one's clear awareness toward their contents. In other words, because the factors of always being active act instinctually toward objects, it is possible that one is not fully aware of the content of the perceived object. However, factors that are bound to specific objects arise only when one has a certain intention to react towards the perceived object.

Another level at which universal factors can be differentiated from factors that arise toward certain objects is the way in which they distinguish their perceived object. In forming general perception, universal factors distinguish the perceived object from

others by revealing its distinctiveness. Dissimilarly, the latter distinguish the perceived object on the basis of quotidian values and judgments or the understanding of Buddhist teachings. As a result, activities of factors that are bound to specific objects might be beneficial or unbeneficial depending on whether the basis to evaluate them is right or wrong. From the soteriological perspective, the good mind, which is beneficial for liberation, is a correct judgment that orientates one's proceeding action towards wholesomeness and *vice versa*. In the *CWSL*, therefore, one can find the concept of a good and a bad wish (*shan yu* 善欲/ *xie yu* 邪欲) referring respectively to beneficial desires that urge the arising of vigor and to unbeneficial desires which pursue harmful purposes. A similar situation also applies to the notion of decisive resolve (*sheng jie* 勝解/ *xie sheng jie* 邪勝解), memory (*shan nian* 善念/*xie nian* 邪念), concentration (*shan ding* 善定/ *xie ding* 邪定), and discernment (*shan hui* 善慧/*e hui* 惡慧); namely, when these five factors arise with a wholesome mind, they trigger the beneficial activities which lead one to liberation.

Responding to specific objects, the five factors are able to arise not only simultaneously but also separately. Moreover, there is a chance that none of them arise when cognitive activity is absent (*acittaka*, *wu xin wei* 無心位). In regard to the problem of their co-arising, another opinion is also cited in the *CWSL*, according to which the five factors can only arise together; that is, when one of the five factors appears, the other four always follow. Kuiji attributes this opinion to Sthiramati.⁵¹ But in the explanation in the *TrBh*, Sthiramati only says that the five *dharmas* function separately unlike decisive resolve which has the possibility of occurring independent of the other four.⁵² Accordingly, Sthiramati does not insist upon the simultaneous arising of these five factors; on the contrary, he understands they have the ability to arise independently.

⁵¹ See T 1830, p. 431, a29-b3.

⁵² See Buescher 2007, p.74, 23-25; Kawamura 1964, p.69. *ete hi pañca dharmāḥ parasparam vyatiricyāpi pravartante/ evañ ca yatrādhimokṣas tatra nāvaśyam itarair api bhavitavyam/*

In fact, even though he does not explicitly allow each of these five factors to arise together with one of the other four in this group, he also does not deny that their simultaneous arising is contradictory—in this regard, Sthiramati’s position is quite akin to the *CWSL*.

3.3.1 Wishing (*chanda*, *yu* 欲)

The central definition of wish in the *CWSL* is similar to the *AS*⁵³ and the *PSk*⁵⁴; it says:

What is wishing? [Wishing is] related to pleasing objects. Longing for [the object] is its nature. Serving as the basis for vigor is its activity.⁵⁵

Three ways to understand “pleasing objects” are mentioned in the commentary: the object that delights, the object one wishes to pursue, and the object one wishes to observe. For the first case, wishing arises only when an object is pleasing but not when it is disconcerting or neutral. Also, even if the pleasing object is there, wishing does not arise when one does not desire it. As for the second case, wishing arises when one wants to come closer to the pleasing object and distance oneself from the disconcerting object; wishing does not arise when the object is neutral and when one does not desire to be closer to the pleasing object or far away from the disconcerting. In the third case, wishing arises together with everything that one desires to observe, no matter whether it be pleasing, disconcerting, or neutral. Since wishing does not respond to some of the mental states, it cannot be an omnipresent mental factor. The explanation of wishing in the *TrBh* focuses also on its ability to urge the mind to approach pleasure and on its function to support vigor.⁵⁶ According to Sthiramati’s understanding, wishing reacts

⁵³ T 1605, p. 664a27-29.

⁵⁴ T 1606, p. 697b5-7.

⁵⁵ 云何為欲？於所樂境，希望為性，勤依為業。 T 1585, p. 28, a20-21. Wei Tat 1973, pp.372-373; Cook 1999, pp.165-166.

⁵⁶ Buescher 2007, p.72, 14-18; Kawamura 1964, p.66.

only to the object that is delightful. Therefore, his position is much closer to the first case that is listed in the *CWSL*.

The other important goal of Xuanzang in his annotation of this factor is the refutation of the claim that wishing is the fundament of all *dharmas*. In the *Madhyamāgama*, wishing is described as the origin of all *dharmas*.⁵⁷ The Sarvāstivādins thus utilize this statement in support of their declaration that wishing is one of the omnipresent mental factors. In the *Nyāyānusāra*, Saṃghabhadra specifically lists wishing as superior among the omnipresent factors because of its scriptural importance.⁵⁸ However, instead of understanding wishing as the initiation of cognitive activity, Xuanzang comprehends the “fundament of all *dharmas*” as the motivation that urges one to create new activities, raising to objections to the Sarvāstivādin position: first, he points out that scripture merely says that wishing is the “fundament of all *dharmas*” and not that “wishing gives rise to the mind and mental factors”; and second that scripture also states that “craving is the fundament of all *dharmas*”. Thus, if one opts to follow the logic of the Sarvāstivādin analysis, one must agree that craving gives rise to the mind and mental factors, including, even, those that are beneficial.⁵⁹

3.3.2 Decisive Resolve (*adhimokṣa*, *sheng jie* 勝解)

Decisive resolve is the mental factor that gives the mind certainty that what is perceived is correct, firmly and unwaveringly determining the correctness of the cognitive object.⁶⁰ The definition of this factor in the *CWSL* is as follows:

⁵⁷ 爾時，世尊告諸比丘：「若諸異學來問汝等：『一切諸法以何為本？』汝等應當如是答彼：『一切諸法以欲為本。』」 See T01, p. 602, c2-4.

⁵⁸ See T1562, pp. 388b27-c3: 又世尊言，謂一切法，欲為根本，作意引生，觸為能集，受為隨流，念為增上，定為上首，慧為最勝，解脫堅固涅槃究竟。想思二法不說自成，故此經中略而不說，由定無有心相續中空無取相，以取境相諸心位中無非勝故。

⁵⁹ See T 1585, p. 28, b4-10.

⁶⁰ Except for epistemological context, *adhimokṣa* plays also an important role in some meditation texts, especially the cultivation of impurity (*aśubhabhāvanā*). See Dhammajoti 2019; Pabst von Ohain 2018, pp. 68-69.

What is decisive resolve? [Decisive resolve is] related to the object of determination. Ascertainment is its nature. Irreversibility is its activity. That means, through the power of false or correct teaching, reasoning, and experience [one] determines and ascertains the object which is grasped. Because of this, other conditions cannot reverse [the mind]. Therefore, in respect to the indefinite object, decisive resolve is wholly absent; likewise decisive resolve is also absent if there is no determinate thought. Thus, decisive resolve is not allocated to the factors of being always active.⁶¹

The notion that ascertaining (*niścita*, *jue ding* 決定) things which are determined (*niścite vastu*, *jue ding shi* 決定事) as the main function of decisive resolve is already found in Yogācāra treatises, such as *AS*⁶², *PSk*⁶³, *Yogācārabhūmi*⁶⁴, and *Xianyang*⁶⁵. However, the principle of affirming the determined object in accordance with the teaching (*upadeśa*, *jiao* 教) and reasoning (*yukti*, *li* 理) is not emphasized until *TrBh*,⁶⁶ on the basis of which the *CWSL* also adds “experience” (*zheng* 證) as the force through which one distinguishes what is morally right from what is wrong.⁶⁷

⁶¹ See T 1585, p. 28b10-14 云何勝解？於決定境印持為性，不可引轉為業。謂邪、正等教、理、證力，於所取境審決印持，由此異緣不能引轉。故猶豫境勝解全無，非審決心亦無勝解，由斯勝解非遍行攝。 Cf. Wei tat 1973, pp.375-377; Cook 1999, pp.167.

⁶² *adhimokṣaḥ katamaḥ/ niścite vastuni yathāniścayaṃ dhāraṇā/ asaṃhāryatākarmakaḥ*// See Gokhale, 1947, p.16, 2-3. For the Chinese parallel, see T 1605, p.664a29-b1: 何等勝解？謂於決定事，隨所決定，印持為體，不可引轉為業。

⁶³ *adhimokṣaḥ katamaḥ/ niścite vastuni tathāivādvadhāraṇam*/ See Li and Steinkellner, 2008, p. 5, 9-10. For the Chinese parallel see T 1612, p.848c15-16: 云何勝解？謂於決定事，即如所了，印可為性。

⁶⁴ *adhimokṣaḥ katamaḥ/ yan niścite vastuni tatra tatra tadanugādvadhāraṇasaktiḥ*// *adhimokṣaḥ kiṃkarmakaḥ/ guṇato doṣato nobhayato vālabanadhrtikarmakaḥ*// See Bhattacharya 1957, p.60, 4-5, 15-16. For the Chinese parallel, see T 1579, p.291c1-2, c12-13:勝解云何？謂於決定事，隨彼彼行，印可隨順性.....勝解作何業？謂於所緣，任持功德過失為業。

⁶⁵ See T 1602, p. 481b8-10: 勝解者，謂於決定境，如其所應，印解為體，不可引轉為業。如經說：我等今者，心生勝解，是內六處必定無我。

⁶⁶ *yuktita aptopadeśato vā yad vastu asaṃdigdham tan niścitam*. See Buescher 2007, p. 72, 20-21 Cf. Kawamura 1964, p. 66.

⁶⁷ As to the first part of the sentence—謂邪、正等教、理、證力，於所取境審決印持—which defines the force that helps one to determine and ascertain the object, Deleanu understands *zheng* (證) as “evidence” and to serve as the head of the genitive construction governing *jiao* (教, teaching) and *li* (理, reasoning). This is contrary to the understanding of *jiao* (教)、*li* (理)、*zheng* (證) as three concepts adopted in three modern translations from de La Vallée Poussin (1928, vol.1, p.310), Wei Tat (1973 pp.375-377), and Cook (1999, p.167). Deleanu suggests interpreting this sentence as 謂邪、正等教

For the *CWSL*, decisive resolve reacts only to the object of determination since its main character in perception is to arouse affirmation toward the content of the object and to fix the mind onto this affirmation without any intention to turn away. For the Sarvāstivādins, although the main function of decisive resolve is likewise ascertainment, it is not, however, directed toward a specific object but to every object. In the *AKBh*, *adhimokṣa* is defined as *adhimukti*⁶⁸ (affirmation) and is classified as the fundamental element that accompanies every mental moment. Similarly, in the *Vyākhyā*⁶⁹, decisive resolve has the ability to determine the cognitive object, as it does in the *Prakaraṇapāda*⁷⁰. In the *Nyāyānusāra*, more details concerning this factor are given; apart from the main definition, Saṃghabhadra also agrees with the statement that explains *adhi* (*sheng* 勝) as superior in the sense of being able to increase and *mokṣa* (*jie* 解) as liberation. Decisive resolve thus gives the mind the ability to perceive without obstacle when grasping the object, just as the superior precept (*sheng jie* 勝戒) makes the mind grasp the object firmly, without scattering.⁷¹

證、理證力 (“the false or correct evidence of teaching and reasoning”). See Deleanu 2006, p. 472, footnote 15. Even though he recognises that this reading relies mainly on Kuiji’s gloss of 證 as “direct perception obtained through the meditative praxis or by means of various cognitive faculties” (即修禪定，或諸識現量。See T 1830, p. 429, b19), he argues that Xuanzang usually renders direct perception as *xian* (現) or *xian liang* (現量) instead of *zheng* (證) and therefore that Kuiji may have incorrectly interpreted this sentence. However, in consideration of the four-aspect theory (see 3.1.2), self-cognition, as the fruit of cognition, only validates (*zheng* 證) the result of perception as correct in a direct way (*xian liang she* 現量攝). In the case of decisive resolve, Kuiji considers direct perception to also have the force of determining the object one grasps. In fact, according to his annotation “direct perception obtained through the cultivation of meditation” likely refers to the situation in which mental perception (*manovijñāna, yi shi* 意識) perceives the meditative object in a direct way. While the “direct perception obtained by means of various cognitive faculties” refers to the situation in which the five sensual perceptions perceive the sense object and mental perception perceives a cognitive object in a direct way. These direct perceptions determine their objects as correct and ascertain this correctness without any possibility of modification. Thus, it is possible that 證 is a third concept quite apart from the other two and has the connotation of direct perception as Kuiji understands.

⁶⁸ For an analysis of this term, see Schmithausen 1982, p.67.

⁶⁹ *adhimuktis tad-ālambanasya guṇato 'vadhāraṇam/ rucir ity anye/ yathānīścayaṃ dhāraṇeti yogācāraccittāḥ/* See Wogihara, 1932-36 pp. 128, 2-4.

⁷⁰ See T 1542, p. 699c15-17. 勝解云何？謂心正勝解已勝解當勝解性，是名勝解。

⁷¹ See T 1562, p. 384b9-12. 於境印可，說名勝解。有餘師言：勝謂增勝，解謂解脫，此能令心於境無礙自在而轉，如勝戒等令心無亂取所緣境。

Criticism against this position in the *CWSL* homes in on the concept “without obstacle”, raising two possible understandings and refuting each in turn. First, if it means “not being able to hinder”, this would suggest that the decisive resolve functions to clear out the obstacles which hinder the arising of mind and mental factors; in this case, all *dharmas* that do not hinder the arising of mind and mental factors could be called decisive resolve. Second, if it means “not to be hindered”, this would suggest that decisive resolve arises only when the conditions allow, as is the case with all other mental factors. The *CWSL* thereafter explains that it is the conditions of faculty (*indriya*) and attention (*manaskāra*) alone which allow a mental factor to arise without obstacles. If one were to insist upon adding another factor that serves to remove the obstacles for arising perception, one would be forced to maintain that faculty and attention are not sufficient to do so and thereby require other conditions. But this, Xuanzang argues, causes an infinite regress.⁷² Insisting that decisive resolve does not arise when the object is indefinite, Kuiji specifies what he considers to be the required conditions, themselves related to the three things that give power to its arising: teaching (*jiao* 教), reasoning (*li* 理), and experience (*zheng* 證): when one is certain that the cognitive object conforms to the teaching; when one finds the object matches one’s learned logic, that is, when it conforms to everyday common sense⁷³; and when one perceives objects directly, as in the case of meditative praxis or perception through a select set of cognitive faculties. In doing so, he excludes the possibility that decisive resolve is involved in every moment of perception.⁷⁴

⁷² See T 1585, p. 28b15-18 彼說非理。所以者何？能不礙者，即諸法故。所不礙者，即心等故。勝發起者，根、作意故。若由此故，彼勝發起，此應復待餘，便有無窮失。

⁷³ According to Kuiji’s understanding, the type of correctness that decisive resolve determines not only includes the truth of Buddhism, e.g., four noble truths, but also common sense perception in daily life, such as, when one determines a tree one in correspondence to the mental concept of “tree”. Sthiramati’s definition of decisive resolve, however, only allows for the affirmation of Buddhist truth. See Buescher 2007, p.72, 19-24; Kawamura 1964, p.66-67. He mentions neither the ascertainment of the object in daily life nor the direct perception that occurs through meditation and common perception.

⁷⁴ See T 1830, p. 429c14-22.

Besides these debates over the specific conditions of the arising of decisive resolve, another debate between Saṃghabhadra and Śrīlāta problematized further controversies concerning the very meaning of decisive resolve. First, Śrīlāta doubts the independent status of decisive resolve on the premise that its function overlaps with discernment (*zhi* 智) insofar as their main characteristics are mental determination. However, in Saṃghabhadra's opinion, the function of discernment relates more to affirmation (*yin ke* 印可) and that of decisive resolve relates more to determination (*jue ding* 決定), meaning that one must first judge the virtue of the cognitive object with insight to bring about the affirmation and then fix the mind on this object and determine its correctness. Thus, discernment and decisive resolve play different roles regarding the decisive moment of the mind. Second, other opponents question the feasibility of allowing every mental factor to be both affirmative and determined in nature since it is difficult even to imagine that doubt (*vicikitsā, yi* 疑), dullness (*styāna, hun zhen* 惛沈), or distraction (*vikṣepa, san luan* 散亂) have these two qualities. In this regard, Saṃghabhadra offers little clarity in his rejection of the possibility that every mental moment inheres determination and responds merely by holding that the efficacy of the determination could be weak and thus that is difficult to become aware of it if the perceptual moment is disturbed by other events.⁷⁵

Compared to the second challenge, the first is by far the more complicated. Although most Abhidharmic treatises agree that decisive resolve is different from discernment, their functions are no doubt very similar. Even if Saṃghabhadra attributes different tasks to these two factors, he does not draw a clear distinction between them

⁷⁵ As Dhammajoti points out, in the Abhidharma period, due to the predominant position *adhimokṣa* holds in some meditative praxis, it continues to condition the meditator's experience even outside of meditation. That is to say, the psychological experience that arises because of *adhimokṣa* in the state of meditation still has the power to influence the perception of the external world even though the practitioner is out of meditative praxis. This is a possible reason why the Sarvāstivādins classify decisive resolve as a universal factor. See Dhammajoti 2019, pp. 142-143.

and in fact states that they mutually support each other's arising. Indeed, the production of decisive resolve is closely related to several concepts, such as liberation (*jie tuo* 解脫), faith (*śraddhā, xin* 信), inclination (*ruci, le* 樂), wishing (*chanda, yu* 欲), and acceptance (*kṣānti, ren* 忍).⁷⁶

Decisive resolve is related to liberation in many texts; the *MVŚ* even considers liberation to be its self-nature.⁷⁷ In the *Nyāyānusāra*, simply keeping distance from the tangle (*fu* 縛) of defilements is insufficient for liberation and rather it is the type of mental state that determines beneficial objects that is the driving force for liberation. Indeed, this special relationship with liberation is one of the justifications given in the *Nyāyānusāra* to support the independence of decisive resolve. However, this claim further leads the opponents to question the determinative function of decisive resolve as overlapping with the wish for faith (*xin yu* 信欲). Replying to this challenge, Saṃghabhadra answers:

Their characteristics though have little similarity and their substances are quite different. The characteristics of decisive resolve are determination and ascertainment, and the characteristic of wishing for faith is seeking with a pure mind.

Furthermore, he also states:

Faith that is compliant with a pleasing wish arises in accordance with ascertainment but is not identical to it. Because faith and wishing function to assist the accomplishment of decisive resolve.⁷⁸

In regard to this point, the *CWSL* concludes that the relation between decisive resolve, faith, and a wish is causal: according to Xuanzang, it is the acceptance of a determined

⁷⁶ See Dhammajoti 2009, p.221 also 2019, pp.148-152.

⁷⁷ See T1545, pp 542c10-13: 然一切法中唯有二法是解脫自性，謂無為法中，擇滅是解脫自性；有為法中，大地法所攝勝解是解脫自性。

⁷⁸ 然上座言：勝解別有，理不成立。See T 1562, p. 390a14. Also, T 1562, p. 390b17-20: 相雖少同而體甚異，謂審印可是勝解相，心淨希求是信欲相。豈不信順及與欲樂即印可耶？信順欲樂隨順印可，非即印可，信欲助成勝解用故。

object that is the cause of faith, and it is due to the arising of faith that wishing occurs together with pleasure.⁷⁹ Although this explanation seems to suggest that decisive resolve, faith, and wishing arise consecutively, Kuiji, Huizhao, and Zhizhao state that both successive and simultaneous arising are possible.

3.3.3 Memorizing (*smṛti*, *nian* 念)

The definition of memorizing in the *CWSL* is as follows:

What is memorizing? [Memorizing is] related to the object that has been learned previously. Causing the mind to record clearly and not to forget is its nature. Supporting concentration (*samādhi*, *ding* 定) is its activity. That means, because [memorizing] recurrently recollects and maintains the object which was once perceived and causes [the mind] to not forget and lose the object, it can induce concentration. There is no memorizing of a given or like object which has itself never been perceived. If what is perceived can't be recollected clearly, memory also doesn't arise. Therefore, memorizing must not be allocated to the factor which is always active. Some say that when the mind arises it must be accompanied by memory because it is the cause for subsequent recollection. This argument is unreasonable. [One] can't say that if [one] arouses delusion, faith, etc., subsequently, it is because [these factors] have arisen before. Because of the powers of the previous mind, mental factors or conceptualization (*saṃjñā*, *xiang* 想) are sufficient causes for a subsequent recollection.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ See T 1585, p. 29, b28-c1: 忍謂勝解，此即信因；樂欲謂欲即是信果。確陳此信，自相是何？

⁸⁰ See T1585, p. 28b18-25: 云何為念？於曾習境，令心明記不忘為性，定依為業。謂數憶持曾所受境，令不忘失，能引定故；於曾未受體、類境中，全不起念。設曾所受，不能明記，念亦不生。故念必非遍行所攝。有說：心起必有念俱，能為後時憶念因故。彼說非理。勿於後時有癡、信等，前亦有故。前心、心所，或想勢力，足為後時憶念因故。Cf. Wei tat 1973, pp.376-377; Cook 1999, p.167.

Recollection is described as the main characteristic of memorizing in many Abhidharmic treatises. In the Yogācāra context, the *AS*⁸¹, *PSk*⁸², and *Yogācārabhūmi*⁸³ all emphasize that memorizing has the ability of “not forgetting” (*asampramoṣa*) “familiar things” (*saṃstute vastu*), deeming its activity to be the non-distraction (*avikṣepakarmikā*) of the mind. To consider the activity of memory as supporting the arising of concentration follows, perhaps, the doctrine of the *Xianyang*.⁸⁴

In the case of an object which has never experienced, Xuanzang includes not only the unexperienced object itself but also object of the same kind. Commenting on this, Kuiji provides us with an example: for sentient beings who have never entered extinction (*nirvāṇa*) before, a memory thereof does not arise when one first experiences it; however, if one has previously heard a teaching regarding extinction, a memory does arise upon encountering the concept.

Refutations of the position that memorizing is a universal factor focus on denying that it is a necessary condition for recording current perceptual results for proceeding thoughts. As already mentioned, in the *CWSL* the previously arisen mind and mental factors, together with the power of conceptualization, are sufficient causes for later recollection. According to Kuiji’s commentary, after the mind and mental factors perceive an object, the results of perception have already been recorded in the store consciousness, to be recalled again when they are later required. On the other hand,

⁸¹ *smṛtiḥ katamā/ saṃstute vastuni cetaso 'saṃpramoṣaḥ/ avikṣepakarmikā*// See Gokhale, 1947, p.16, 3-4. For the Chinese parallel, see T 1605, pp.664b1-2: 何等為念？謂於串習事，令心明記不忘為體，不散亂為業。

⁸² *smṛtiḥ katamā/ saṃstute vastuny asampramoṣas cetaso 'bhilapanatā*// See Li and Steinkellner, 2008, p. 5, 11-12. For the Chinese parallel, see T 1612, p.848c16-17: 云何為念？謂於串習事，令心不忘明記為性。

⁸³ *smṛtiḥ katamā/ yat saṃstute vastuni tatra tatra tadanugābhilapanā/.....smṛtiḥ kiṃkarmikā/ ciracintitakṛtabhāṣitasmaraṇānusmaraṇakarmikā*// See Bhattacharya 1957, pp.60, 4-5, 15-16. For the Chinese parallel, see T 1579, pp.291c2-2, c13-14:念云何？謂於串習事，隨彼彼行明了記憶性……念作何業。謂於久遠所思所作所說憶念為業。。

⁸⁴ See T 1602, p.481b11-12: 念者，謂於串習境，令心明記不忘為體，為等持所依為業。

since conceptualization is superior in forming an image of an object, it is able to clearly apprehend a given form in the process of recollection.⁸⁵

It thus appears, in light of this definition of memorizing and Xuanzang's refutation of universal memory, that there are two kinds of recollection. First, there is recollection of an object that has been learned previously, of which a sentient being is clearly aware in the moment of perception, and when one memorizes such a learned object, one has the ability to mentally retain and not forget its content. The other recollection relates to previous karmic actions; namely, when different mental factors arise, the activities they cause are recorded in the store consciousness to be subsequently recollected. This interpretation, according to the *CWSL*, is held by those schools which insist that memorizing must be universal because every cognitive moment would need memory to record its activity for future recollection.

In fact, the *Nyāyānusāra* mentions this very point⁸⁶ (albeit without further explanation). However, Pukuang, in his commentary on the sentence *smṛtir ālambanāsampramoṣah* (念謂於緣明記不忘) in the *AKBh*, states that the things which are not forgotten are the various activities which have been, are, and should be done (i.e., in the future).⁸⁷ Nevertheless, in the system of the *CWSL*, every arising of a mental factor is monitored and recorded by self-cognition at that perceptual moment; this means that the recollection of activities done previously is possible even without memory. As a consequence, memorizing in the *CWSL* is a reaction to an object that has been learned and clearly memorized before.

⁸⁵ See T 1830, p. 430a29-b3 心等取境已，熏功能在本識中，足為後時有憶念因，何須今念順生後念？或想取像勝故，為因生後時念足得；何待今念，後念方生？

⁸⁶ See T 1562, p. 389b19-21 既見多於過去境上施設有念，便於現在所緣境上有念極成；非於現境曾無明記，後於過去有憶念生。

⁸⁷ See T 1821, p. 74b24-26: 念謂令心於境明記。即是不忘已、正、當作諸事業義。

3.3.4 Concentration (*samādhi*, 定)

The most important characteristics of concentration are a singleness of mind (*cittasyaikāgratā*) towards the thing to be examined (*upaparīkṣye vastuni*) and the action of giving support to knowledge (*jñānasannīśrayadānakarmakaḥ*).⁸⁸ The *CWSL* follows this description for the most part but also introduces some changes.

What is concentration? [Concentration is] related to the examined object.

Causing the mind to focus [on the object] without distraction is its nature.

Giving support to knowledge is its activity. That means, when examining

the objects which are virtuous, defective, or neither virtuous nor defective

on the basis of the concentration that causes the mind to focus [on the object]

without distraction, knowledge with firm decision is born.⁸⁹

Instead of defining concentration as a fixing of the mind upon one object, the *CWSL* specifically explains “mental focus” as the ability to dwell upon that which it intends to dwell but not on a single object. This is practice concerned mostly with the path of seeing (*darśana-mārga*, 見道). When the practitioners contemplate the four aspects of the four truths, sixteen kinds of mind arise in accordance with sixteen meditative objects. In this case, the practitioner on the path of seeing should be able to maintain concentration for the entirety of the practice even if he contemplates different objects.

⁸⁸ The *AS*: *samādhiḥ katamaḥ/ upaparīkṣye vastuni cittasyaikāgratā/ jñānasannīśrayadānakarmakaḥ//* See Gokhale 1947, pp.16, 4-5. For the Chinese parallel, see T 1605, p.664b2-4: 何等三摩地？謂於所觀事，令心一境為體，智所依止為業。

The *PSk*: *samādhiḥ katamaḥ/ upaparīkṣye vastuni cittasyaikāgratā//* See Li and Steinkellner 2008, p. 6, 1-2. For the Chinese parallel, see T1612, p. 848c17-18: 云何三摩地？謂於所觀事，令心一境不散為性。

The *Yogācārabhūmi*: *samādhiḥ katamaḥ/ yat parīkṣye vastuni [tatra tatra] tadanugam upanidhyānasannīśritam cittaikāgryam// samādhiḥ kimkarmakaḥ/ jñānasannīśrayadānakarmakaḥ//* See Bhattacharya 1957, pp. 60, 6-7; 61,1. For the Chinese parallel, see T1579, pp. 291c3-5; pp. 291c15: 三摩地云何？謂於所觀察事，隨彼彼行審慮所依心一境性 三摩地作何業？謂智所依為業。

⁸⁹ See 1585, pp. 28b25-28 云何為定？於所觀境，令心專注不散為性，智依為業。謂觀德、失、俱非境中，由定令心專注不散，依斯便有決擇智生。Cf. Wei Tat 1973, pp.378-379; Cook 1999, pp.167-168.

As was the case above with other factors that are bound to specific objects, Xuanzang also argues that the characteristic of concentration is non-universal. Generally speaking, concentration does not arise when the mind is not focused on what it perceives. Xuanzang lists (and of course negates) three possible critiques which his opponents may forward in support of the universal characteristic of concentration. First, concentration combines the mind with other conditions that are necessary for the arising general perception and for focusing on one object. Second, the arising of concentration allows the mind to grasp the perceived object steadily and without distraction. Third, concentration is the factor that enables the mind to grasp the object. His refutation of these three statements focuses on certain overlapping function between the mind and other factors. According to the *CWSL*, the first perceptual function belongs to sensory contact, while the third belongs to attention. As for the second, the momentary mind does not change its object in any case and therefore no other condition is needed to ensure the mind sticks to the same object.⁹⁰

Interestingly, the three refuted objections listed are also recorded in the *Nyāyānusāra*. Here, Saṃghabhadra rejects the view which holds there is no concentration apart from the mind. In this debate, Śrīlāta first claims that concentration is not an independent mental factor but only a characteristic of the mind. He then argues against similar versions of the above three claims, attributed to the Sarvāstivādins, which they use to support the independence of concentration.⁹¹ Saṃghabhadra later objects to each of Śrīlāta's refutations in turn and concludes that concentration is not the mind itself but a mental factor which is distinguished from the mind.

⁹⁰ See T 1585, p. 28b28-c8: 心專注言顯所欲住即便能住，非唯一境，不爾，見道歷觀諸諦，前後境別應無等持。若不繫心，專注境位便無定起，故非遍行。有說：爾時亦有定起，但相微隱，應說誠言，若定能令心等和合，同趣一境，故是遍行。理亦不然，是觸用故。若謂此定令剎那頃心不易緣，故遍行攝，亦不應理，一剎那心自於所緣無易義故。若言由定心取所緣，故遍行攝。彼亦非理，作意令心取所緣故。

⁹¹ See T1562, p. 390b22-391a14

The problem is that Śrīlāta's claim that concentration is the mind itself is canonically supported. Xuanzang, therefore, also justifies his own reasoning with resort to scripture. Thus, it is said that concentration is included in several lists, such as the five faculties (*indriya*, *gen* 根), five powers (*bala*, *li* 力), seven aspects of awakening (*bodhyaṅga*, *jue zhi* 覺支), and eight paths (*mārga*, *dao* 道), etc., all of which suggest that concentration is distinct from the mind itself.⁹²

3.3.5 Discernment (*prajñā*, *hui* 慧)

In most Yogācāra treatises, the main characteristic of discernment is described as distinguishing (*pravīcaya*). In the *AS*, discernment distinguishes the special characteristic of the thing which is examined.⁹³ The *CWSL*'s definition is very similar to this:

What is discernment? [Discernment is] related to the examined object. Its nature is selecting. And its activity is cutting off doubt. That means, when examining the objects which are virtuous, defective, or neither virtuous nor defective, due to the inspecting of discernment, one obtains determination.⁹⁴

As with concentration, discernment works also on the object one examines and distinguishes its quality depending on whether it is virtuous, defective, or neutral. And since the characteristic of discernment is to distinguish the object one intends to examine, it does not arise when the mind is deluded and obtuse.

⁹² T 1585, p. 28c8-11: 有說：此定體即是心，經說為心學，心一境性故。彼非誠證，依定攝心令心一境說彼言故，根力、覺支、道支等攝，如念、慧等非即心故。

⁹³ See Gokhale, 1947, pp.16, 5-6. *prajñā katamā/ upaparīkṣya eva vastuni dharmānām pravīcayaḥ saṁśayavyāvartanakarmikā*// For the Chinese parallel, see T1605, pp. 664b4-5: 何等為慧？謂於所觀事，擇法為體，斷疑為業。

⁹⁴ 云何為慧？於所觀境簡擇為性，斷疑為業。謂觀德失俱非境中，由慧推求得決定故。See T 1585, p. 28c11-14. Cf. 17 Wei Tat 1973, pp.380-381; Cook 1999, p.168.

In regard to the principle that discernment distinguishes the quality of the examined thing, Sthiramati follows the *PSk*⁹⁵ and the *Yogācārabhūmi*⁹⁶: depending on whether the object is befitting (*yoga, ru li* 如理), unbefitting (*ayoga, bu ru li* 不如理) to one's reasoning or otherwise. Ascertaining whether the examined thing is befitting or not relies on reliability of the teaching, inference, or direct perception, and when one judges an object by means of a conventional (*laukikavyavahāra*) understanding acquired by birth (*upapatti*), the quality of the examined object is neither befitting nor unbefitting.⁹⁷

3.3.6 The Positive Value of the Beneficial Factor that is Bound to a Specific Object

As already stated in the foregoing, factors bound to specific objects can trigger activities which are beneficial or unbeneficial depending on the wholesome or unwholesome nature of mind that accompanies their arising. Therefore, unlike factors belonging to the three categories of wholesomeness, afflictions, and secondary afflictions (whose virtue is already determinate because the quality of their accompanying mind is also determinate), factors that are bound to specific objects have the opportunity to become beneficial or unbeneficial. If we look more closely at those factors within this category which are classed as beneficial, most of them are mentioned in the thirty-seven dharmas that contribute to awakening (*bodhipakṣyas*, 菩提分), which itself includes several lists from early *sūtras* that describe the basic elements to reach liberation.

⁹⁵ *prajñā katamā/ tatraiva pravicyo yogāyogavihito 'nyathā ca/* See Li and Steinkellner 2008, p.6, 3-4. For the Chinese parallel, see T 1612, p.848c18-20: 云何為慧？謂即於彼擇法為性，或如理所引，或不如理所引，或俱非所引。

⁹⁶ *prajñā katamā/ yat parīkṣya eva vastuni tatra tatra tadanugo dharmāṇā pravicyo yogavihitato vāyogavihitato vā naiva yogavihitato nāyogavihitataḥ// prajñā kiṃkarmikā/ prapañcapracārasaṃkleśavyavadānānukūlasantīraṇakarmikā//* See Bhattacharya 1957, p.60, 7-9; p.61, 1-2. For the Chinese parallel, see T 1579, p. 291c5-7; p.291c15-16: 慧云何？謂即於所觀察事，隨彼彼行簡擇諸法性。或由如理所引，或由不如理所引，或由非如理非不如理所引.....慧作何業？謂於戲論所行染污、清淨隨順推求為業。

⁹⁷ *ete hi pañca dharmāḥ parasparaṃ vyatiricyāpi pravartante/ evañ ca yatrādhimokṣas tatra nāvaśyam itarair api bhavitavyam/* See Buescher 2007, p. 74, 13-22. For a translation, see Kawamura 1964, p. 68.

In particular, memorizing, concentration and discernment are included in the five faculties (*pañca-indriyāni*, *wu gen* 五根) and five powers (*pañca-balāni*, *wu li* 五力), which respectively refer to five fundamental abilities for practicing correct *dharma* and the powers one obtains therefrom. Wishing, for example, is one of the four bases of supernatural powers (*catvāra-rddhipādāḥ*, *si shen cu* 四神足) that leads to the kind of meditation which allows the body to be free from mundane restrictions. These bases are the abilities and forces which create the potentiality for one to attain the correct mental state and psychological power that leads to liberation. Therefore, proper mindsets, such as correct memory (*samyak-smṛti*, *zheng nian* 正念) and correct concentration (*samyak-samādhi*, *zheng ding* 正定), are included in the eight correct paths. Though correct discernment is not in the list of eight correct paths, discernment is highly related to correct view (*samyag-drṣṭi*, *zheng jian* 正見), correct thought (*samyak-saṃkalpa*, *zheng si wei* 正思維), and correct vigor (*samyag-vyāyāma*, *zheng qin* 正勤).⁹⁸

As the thirty-seven *dharmas* that contribute to awakening list selected beneficial mindsets, which are the correct psychological activities that arise in conformity with the doctrine, the arising of the above five factors serves to fix the momentary mind on specific values, themselves based on the teaching, and orient the following mental moment in a conformable direction. Accordingly, the five factors mark the moment of judgment and the determined change of thought in the continuous mind stream. Because they represent a decisive value for the proceeding mental activities and settle the mind

⁹⁸ In the *Liaoyideng*, Huizhao quotes the Chinese translation of the *Mahāyānābhīdharmasamuccayavyākhyā* (T 1606, p. 743a1-4) and *AKBh* (T 1558, p. 19b13-16) to point out the close relationship between discernment, correct view, correct thought, and correct vigor. See T 1832, p. 701, b18-23 and p. 766, a13-16. One can also find this opinion in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. See Shukla 1973 p.327,3-7: *tatra yā ca samyagdrṣṭiryaśca samyaksamkalpaḥ/ yaśca samyagvyāyāmaḥ/ ayam prajñāskandhaḥ// tatra ye samyakkarmāntājīvāḥ/ayam śīlaskandhaḥ// tatra yā ca samyaksmr̥tiḥ/ yaśca samyaksamādhirayaṃ samādhiskandhaḥ//* For the Chinese parallel, see T 1579, p. 445a10-12.

on a certain path, when they arise with wholesomeness and appear as beneficial, they give strong support for one engaged in liberative practice.

3.4 Conclusion

In accordance with the premises of representation-only, cognition is the mere activity of consciousness. Explaining the arising of perception and human experience, the *CWSL* structures cognition according to four aspects: the seen-aspect, the seeing-aspect, self-cognition, and the cognition of self-cognition. Together with the doctrine that elaborates the transformation of consciousness in the system of cause and effect, the reflexive aspect of the four, self-cognition, is granted with the special ability to transform the object and subject, enabling perception itself, while validating results thereof. On this basis, Kuiji further explains that self-cognition bears the past karmic activities and is the basis for the transformation of the eight forms of consciousness. That means, in Xuanzang and Kuiji's system of thought, self-cognition activates perceptual activities by transforming the object and subject of the eight forms of consciousness. These the eight kinds of consciousness thus become the very agents conducting cognition—the so-called mind-kings. Depending on the nature of the matured seed that actualises karma in the present, the eight mind-kings together reflect the general appearance of the cognitive moment, and the mental factors, which are different aspects of these mind-kings, represent the specific details that shape it. Accordingly, in analysing the formation of the mind and mental factors within the system of the *CWSL*, self-cognition, being the basis for the transformation of the eight forms of consciousness, becomes the very essence of the mind and its concomitants, dictating their appearance and characteristic. This innovative character of self-cognition

not only distinguishes the *CWSL* from other Yogacāra treatises but also establishes a new, cognitively processual way of explaining the manifestation of *karma*.

Latent *karma* comes into present through cognitive activities. Thus, the mental factors that represent different aspects of the mind are the activities that reflect the content of the matured seed. We can say, therefore, that the first category of the fifty-one mental factors, the factors of being always active, including sensory contact, attention, sensation, conceptualization, and volition, represent the process of forming a cognitive moment. In initiating cognition, sensory contact brings together the sense object, faculty and consciousness, and makes the mind dwell upon one object. Proceeding from this, attention makes the mind aware of the existence of the cognitive object and further investigates its content. When the cognitive object is in the domain of awareness, sensation then determines whether it is agreeable, disagreeable, or neither; conceptualization forms a concept thereof and designates it; and volition urges the mind to act towards it. These five factors constitute a sequence which serves as the fundament for the completion of the cognitive process. They accompany all other mental factors and are thus the necessary condition for the arising of cognition.

The factors of being always active and the second category in the fifty-one mental factors, factors that are bound to specific objects, are both categorized as omnipresent factors in the *AKBh*. In justifying this exposition, the text claims that these five factors—wish, decisive resolve, memorizing, concentration, and discernment—respond only to certain objects but are not always active in the perceptual process. The *CWSL* further details the specific requirements for the arising of those factors: the first three responding to a pleasing object, the object of determination, and the object which has been learned previously; and the latter two responding to an examined object. Unlike the object with which the mind has come into contact in the context of general cognition when the perceiver may not be conscious, the mind that arises in relation to

a specific object is fully aware of the object and has the intention to investigate it when these five factors arise. That means, the arising of wishing and so forth reflects one's preference and tendency: it emerges when one desires the company of the perceived object, whereby decisive resolve reveals one's idea of correctness, memorizing recollects the learned object that one intended to observe and keep in mind, concentration appears when one directs oneself towards the object one wants to contemplate, and discernment is the judgement of its moral value. Whether the nature of the mind is wholesome or unwholesome determines the beneficial or unbeneficial influences that arise with those five factors. When they occur alongwith a wholesome mind, the activities triggered by them become beneficial for liberation. As a consequence, four of the beneficial factors of this category are enumerated in thirty-seven *dharma*s that contribute to awakening.

In this chapter, we first examined the causal mechanisms of the cognitive theory in the *CWSL*, thereafter examining the definition of the five factors of always being active and their functions in the arising of cognition, as well as surveying the debates within the Yogācāra school concerning the classification of the five factors bound to a specific object as non-omnipresent or, as its opponents insisted, universal. These first two categories of the fifty-one mental factors respectively explain general mental states of cognition and the mental abilities which circumstantially appear due to specific objects. Having detailed the intricate workings of this theory of cognition, we are now in a position to move in the next chapter to consider more closely the soteriological dimensions of these categories in which factors are characterized as wholesome or defiled. Therein, I shall introduce and elaborate the concept of counteraction (*pratipakṣa*); namely, the process by which remedial wholesome mental states serve to cure their opposing negative mental states, or defilements.

Chapter Four:

Counteraction between Beneficial and Unbeneficial Mental Factors

The soteriological concern of the Yogācāra school, or rather, of all Buddhist schools, rests upon the correct understanding of the Buddha's words as leading to right apprehension and perception of the world. This principle reflects the notion of counteraction (*pratipakṣa*, *dui zhi*, 對治), the curing capacity wholesome mental factors exert on the defilements, whereby counteracting rectifies wrong apprehension by means of allowing right apprehension to arise in accordance with the correct understanding of the Buddha's teaching.

The notion of counteraction is grounded on the principle that thoughts corresponding to the Buddhist values of morality can orientate beneficial behaviors and mental activities. This principle is founded in the noble eightfold path, of which correct view holds the leading role in causing the occurrence of the other seven tenets because it denotes the correct propositional attitude in perceiving the world. Following this logic, wholesome mental factors denote the beneficial psychic reactions and karmic influences that occur based on the orientation caused by the correct understanding of the Buddhist teaching. To that extent, such mental factors can serve as counteragents for defiled mental states. Therefore, the mind that intends to continuously give rise to wholesome mental factors can naturally remedy a mind that is full of attachments and unbeneficial karmic influences. This requires self-observation and self-control based on a clear knowledge of the categorization of wholesome and defiled mental factors in order that one can alter one's thinking and conduct. This psychological practice is therefore fundamentally therapeutic in nature and fulfills the soteriological purpose of the Buddhist law.

In this chapter, I will first discuss the understanding of right and wrong views to exemplify the wholesome and defiled mental factors. Also, I would examine the way in which right view functions in order to ascertain the precise meaning of counteraction and demonstrate

how it works in remedying defilements. Based on the conceptualization of counteraction, in the second part of this chapter, I shall go on to analyze the description of wholesome factors and their counterparts in the *CWSL*.

4.1. Counteraction: Mental Practices that Aim at Correct Modes of Apprehension

In both the *Samyukta Āgama*¹ and *Samyutta Nikāya*², the Buddha describes the eightfold noble path as a stream (*strotā*) that leads one to liberation. To attain stream-entry, there are four modes of practice, namely, “associating with superior persons” (*satpuruṣasamsevā*), “listening to the correct doctrine” (*saddharmaśravaṇa*), “proper contemplating” (*yoniso-manaskāra*) and “practicing in accordance with the dharma” (*dharmānudharmacārī*).

The first two factors assure the acquisition of the knowledge is agreeable with Buddha’s teaching and the last enables the type of action that coincides with what is correct. However, the third, proper contemplating³, emphasizes the psychological function that enables the mental process of understanding the “correct doctrine” to occur and so amend one’s behavior accordingly. The importance of proper contemplating (to orientate one’s thought in accordance with the correct teaching) is also mentioned by the commentators of the *CWSL*. When commenting on delusion, one of the affiliated mental factors, Zhizhou even attributes the state of being ignorant to one’s disability in correct apprehension.⁴ However, what does “correct

¹ See T 99, p. 215b15-c1.

² See *Samyutta Nikāya* No.55.5 Cf. Bhikkhu Bodhi 2000, p. 1792.

³ Based on the Pāli sources, Anālayo suggests that *yoniso-manasikāra* indicates a form of “attention” that is “thorough” and “penetrative”, and therefore “wise”. In some cases, *yoniso* can also convey the sense of “proper” or “appropriate”. As Anālayo states, “to investigate the teachings in a manner that is *yoniso* leads to purification and wisdom. Thus, *yoniso* can qualify as the type of wise mental investigation that leads to liberation; or stand for wisely seeing with insight the true characteristics of reality.” See Anālayo, 2010, pp. 69-71. Similarly, in this context, when dealing with the passage regarding *samyagjñāna*, correct knowledge, Schmithausen translates “*yoniso-manaskāra*” in the *Samdh* as “appropriate contemplation” and the whole sentence, which occurs in *Vinīscayasamgrahaṇī*, into “listening to the right doctrine and correct reflection.” See Schmithausen, 2014, p.540, footnote 2241 and p. 579, footnote 2368. The usage of *yoniso-manaskāra* in the *Samāhitābhūmiḥ* see Pabst von Ohain, 2018, pp.89-90. Corresponding to these understandings, the Chinese translation also suggests that the *yoniso-manaskāra* (*ru li zuo yi* 如理作意) that follows *saddharmaśravaṇa* (*ting wen zheng fa* 聽聞正法) should be understood as “to raise thoughts according to the principle of the correct dharma one hears”.

⁴ 答：且然。《瑜伽》是主者說，五十八云：又此無明總有二種：一、煩惱相纏相應；二、獨行，若無貪

doctrine” mean, and how does one orientate one’s own thought toward it? In particular, how are we to understand the meaning of “correct doctrine” in the several Abhidharma and Yogācārā schools? Moreover, why does its proper apprehension lead one to liberation?

4.1.1 Two modes of Apprehension: The Right View and the Wrong View

In the *Samgītiparyāya*, proper contemplating is described as follows:

What is proper contemplating? [It means] what the ear [-faculty] hear and what the ear-consciousness comprehend do not conflict with the meaning of the Dharma. Due to the guiding of the ear-consciousness, the mind is caused to be concentrated and apprehend what can be apprehended. [At this apprehending moment,] attention generates consciousness and scrutinizes and corrects the thinking, [such that] the mind [in general] is alarmed. This is meant by “proper contemplating”.⁵

As this passage shows, the main function of proper contemplating is to apply the correct understanding of *dharma* to the awareness of the mind’s activity. Namely, proper contemplating aims to attribute higher awareness to sensual and cognitive activities in order to change modes of apprehension in accordance with the Buddhist *dharma*. It also urges the mind to reflect on its own perceiving and thinking and to produce perception and thoughts in the proper way. In other words, proper contemplating enables one to perceive and apprehend sensual objects with a correct view. In fact, as recorded in the *MVŚ*, many Abhidharmic masters associate the first element of the eightfold noble path, correct view (*samyag-drṣṭi*, *zheng jian* 正見), with proper contemplating.⁶ This affirms that proper contemplating directly reflects the

等諸煩惱纏，但於苦等諸諦境中，不如理作意力故，鈍惠士夫諸不如實簡擇，覆障纏裹闇昧等心所性名獨行無明。又非主者，多迷理起，從多分言，由斯《疏》中不言唯也。See T 1833, p. 917, b16-22.

⁵ See T 1536, p. 393a29-b3: 云何如理作意？答：於耳所聞、耳識所了，無倒法義。耳識所引，令心專注，隨攝等攝。作意發意，審正思惟，心警覺性，如是名為如理作意。

⁶ 尊者望滿作如是說：「以信分別親近善士，以聞分別聽聞正法，以正見分別如理作意，以餘分別法隨法行。」尊者妙音作如是說：「以信戒分別親近善士，以聞分別聽聞正法，以正見分別如理作意，以餘分別法隨法行。」阿毘達磨諸論師言：「以信戒分別親近善士，以聞及慧分別聽聞正法，以正見分別如理作意，以餘分別法隨法行。」尊者世友作如是說：「以信戒捨分別親近善士，以聞及慧分別聽聞正法，以正見分別如理作意，以餘分別法隨法行。」 See T 1545, p. 487a22-b3

influence of the correct view that is attained through the teaching of Buddha and it is an important step toward liberation since it produces the right mode of perceiving things and precipitates correct action also.

Dr̥ṣṭi and *Diṭṭhi*, which originally mean “seeing”, “viewing”, and “beholding”, are the Sanskrit and Pāli terms for “view”. As Gethin suggests in consideration of the general usage of *dr̥ṣṭi* and *diṭṭhi* in Buddhist thought, view can be either cognitive or affective. Cognitive views, such as the “view of eternalism” (Pāli: *sassata-vāda*, Sanskrit: *śāśvata-dr̥ṣṭi*), “view of nihilism” (*uccheda-vāda*, *uccheda-dr̥ṣṭi*), and “view of corporeal-self” (*sakkāya-diṭṭhi*, *satkāya-dr̥ṣṭi*), denote a formal proposition about the way things are. Affective view, however, refers to a case in which one stubbornly grasps or holds on to a particular way of seeing. “View”, in general, therefore describes not only the way of seeing but also the fact that certain ways of seeing become fixed views.⁷

In teachings, views are usually categorized into right or wrong as an instruction for practitioners to observe their own mindset. However, since *dr̥ṣṭi* indicates a fixed or rigid view of things, it is a negative element that hinders liberation, no matter if it is a right view or a wrong view. Thus, Gethin further suggests, “when perfect seeing is precisely the transcending of all viewpoints, the right view should not be understood as a view itself, but as freedom from all views.”⁸ Fuller elaborates this notion much more clearly in his book, by examining the doctrine of practicing “no-view” in the *Aṭṭhakavagga* and *Pārāyanavagga* of the *Sutta Nipāta* in particular. He argues that right view is having no view, since the view itself is considered to be an obstacle that hinders one in seeing things as they are (*yathābhūta-dassana*). Furthermore, “all views and opinions, both ‘wrong’ and ‘right’ and even ‘knowledge’ (*ñāṇa*), are rejected as the means towards the goal of complete non-attachment.”⁹ Muller seconds this point with a reference to Asian tradition. In Sinitic Buddhism (Chinese, Japanese, and Korean), *jian* (見)

⁷ Gethin, 2004, pp.20-23.

⁸ Gethin, 2004, p.20.

⁹ Fuller, 2005, pp.1-2.

gradually stops carrying negative connotations and is replaced by other synonymous notions, such as conception (*xiang* 相, 想), cognitive distortion (*dian dao*, 顛倒) and other expressions that describe attachment to personal understanding.¹⁰ These synonyms represent a rigid mental grasping of a certain object which leads people to cognize with attachment.

However, if the view is to be abandoned anyway, what is the purpose of distinguishing between right and wrong views? And how do we understand the function of right view? As Fuller suggests, since right views denote correct knowledge and apprehension of the Buddha's doctrine in agreement with the basic tenets of his teaching, such as karmic retribution, non-self, and so on, they describe a mode of seeing that is beneficial to liberation. As long as a view is rigid and attached to something it cannot serve as the actual cure for wrong view since it won't benefit the goal that sets one free from attachments in the cycle of life and death. As emphasized by Fuller, right view is not a correction of wrong view; it only provides a different mode of seeing which serves as a remedy for craving. Thus, "the right view is practiced, not adopted or believed in. Also, it is not a correct proposition in opposition to the wrong one but the correct knowledge of doctrine."¹¹

Thus, "right", in the context of right view, indicates the mode which is in accordance with the Buddhist teaching in apprehending the sensual and mental object. Furthermore, it is said to be "right" because it follows the Buddhist way of conceptualizing and thus is advantageous for freeing one from afflictions. Therefore, the continuous practice of seeing things with right view builds up a beneficial psychological disposition which creates beneficial influences and opportunity to bring forth the beneficial mode of seeing.

¹⁰ Muller, 2008, p.363.

¹¹ Fuller, 2005, pp.157-159.

4.1.2 Wholesome Mental Factors as a Counteragent

Now, in order to understand wholesome mental factors as counteragents that “cure” defilements, we are to apply the concept of modes of apprehension into our analysis of mental factors. As mentioned in chapter two and analyzed already in chapter three, the arising of mental factors that are bound to specific objects, wholesome factors, defiled factors, secondary defiled factors, and the undetermined factors, depends on the always active factors. That means, they appear through the process of apprehending the object, namely, through sensory contact, attention, sensation, conceptualization, and volition. In other words, they are the cognitive results caused by apprehension. However, the cognitive result, in the case of the Yogācāra school, is not only the reflection of the mind but also the transformation of the mind; and more precisely in the system of *CWSL*, it is the transformation of self-cognition. Therefore, mental factors, despite being the result of cognition, in nature are identical to the mind itself, the perceived object, as well as the cognizing mode, or, in the context of our present discussion, the mode of apprehension. This means, on the one hand, that views to denote beneficial or unbeneficial modes of apprehension lead to the arising of wholesome or unwholesome mental factors, and, on the other, mental factors result from views, and their nature is equivalent to the mode of apprehension that brings their occurrence. On this premise, right views cause wholesome mental factors while wrong views trigger defiled ones. This principle reflects clearest on the wholesome, defiled, and secondary-defiled mental factors.

Among the fifty-one mental factors, the always active factors are activities that support the arising of cognition. They do not really relate to the way of seeing but rather to the process of seeing. Mental factors that are bound to specific objects, as we have discussed, are mental abilities that respond to special situations. The influence of these five factors depends on the moral value to arise with them; therefore, when they arise with the right view, they can cause the correct wishing, ascertainment, memorizing, concentration and discernment. They are rather the abilities that aid certain moments in the cognitive process. Two of the undetermined

four mental factors—sleepiness (*middha*, *mian* 眠) and regret (*kaukr̥tya*, *hui* 悔)—describe two disturbing mental states that hinder one from concentration and clear cognition. The other two—rough examination (*vitarka*, *xun* 尋) and subtle investigation (*vicāra*, *si* 伺)—are two fine qualities of volition and discernment which could also be considered as the tenets of general cognition. The remaining factors—wholesome, defiled and secondary-defiled—clearly reflect the influences of right or wrong view because their moral value has been defined. As a consequence, counteraction is specified in their definition. The wholesome mental factors are caused due to the beneficial mode of apprehension toward the cognitive object and thereby serve as counteragents that remedy the defilements which are related to them.

Even though right or wrong view and mental factors in these three categories describe the mode in which an individual cognizes the objective realm, their domains of signification differ. View delineates the way one sees the world and mental factors are the way the mind grasps the object. The former is the cause that brings about the mode of apprehension and the latter is the result that is triggered by the cause. Namely, if one has the view *A*, the mental factor of *A* appears when one apprehends the object with that view. Though distinction is made here between cause and result, the cause *A* and the result *A* both denote mode of apprehension *A*. Akin to right and wrong views, wholesome and defiled mental factors can also be cognitive or affective. Most of them, however, are affective, with but one regarded as cognitive—a defiled mental factor that has exactly the same name with wrong view (*dr̥ṣṭi*, *e jian* 惡見).¹² Among the remaining factors, all are affective; they describe, namely, the result that occurs because the mind grasps the perceived object with a firm position. These positions include impulse (i.e., greed), emotion (i.e., anger), disposition (i.e., delusion, faith, etc.), morality (i.e., shame, embarrassment, etc.), or attitude (i.e., serenity, vigour, equanimity, etc.).

¹² We will further discuss this factor later in this chapter. See 4.1.4.

As discussed in the third chapter¹³, in addition to the general definition of every mental factor in terms of its particular nature (*xing* 性) and particular activity (*ye* 業), the characteristic in relation to counteraction (*pratipakṣa*, *dui zhi*, 對治) is also specified for the wholesome and defiled mental factors. As the Sanskrit terms suggest, the meaning of counteraction is “the opposite (*prati*) side (*pakṣa*)”. The Chinese equivalent includes a metaphorical denotation *zhi* (治) emphasizing that the opposing side is taken for the purpose of curing a given problem. Indeed, the term denotes the function by which a wholesome mental factor rectifies its opposing defiled factor; this happens naturally when the characteristics of these two factors repel one another. The term *pratipakṣa* can be found several times in passages of the *Āgama* that describe the Buddha as a great healer (*da yi wang* 大醫王) and his teaching as a remedy for suffering. In the *Samyuktāgama*, it says that a great king of the healers is the one who knows the four laws of healing: knowing the illness, knowing the origin of illness, knowing how to counteract the illness, and knowing the treatment is completed will ensure that the illness does not reoccur in the future.¹⁴ Cases as such reveal that the purpose of Buddhist practice is to resolve the conditions which cause one to remain in the cycle of rebirth and lead to endless pain. Here, human suffering is considered a psychological state which is unhelpful to free one from the bound to *samsāra*. This requires that we transfer our mind into a more suitable state such that it functions in the direction to liberation and does not need therapeutic aid anymore. The illness that should be cured is the unbeneficial manner of perceiving reality; counteraction, therefore, relates mostly to the psychological practice that prevents the wrong and turns one to the right view. Thereby, negative *karma* does not arise.

However, since views, no matter whether they be right or wrong, are themselves regarded as attachments to be abandoned, any mode of cognition which apprehends an object is

¹³ See the beginning of 3.2.

¹⁴ 爾時，世尊告諸比丘：「有四法成就，名曰大醫王者，所應王之具、王之分。何等為四？一者善知病，二者善知病源，三者善知病對治，四者善知治病已，當來更不動發。See T02, no. 99, p. 105, a25-29.

consequently considered as defiled. Following this premise, when wholesome factors serve as the antidote to “cure” defiled ones, this neither means to take a dose of medicine to release the disease nor does it indicate a treatment that eliminates painful symptoms. In this case, the question becomes: how can we understand the metaphor of “cure”? And to what state does the “cure” aim at? Most importantly, in what way does this “cure” function?

Coming back to Fuller’s study of “view”, the concept “accomplishment in view” (*diṭṭhi-sampāda*) in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* is raised to explain how one can acquire the right view. That is, one needs to have the knowledge that *karma* is one’s own and that one’s actions have consequences. This requires achieving the “purification of view” (*diṭṭhi-visuddhi*) which is a sequence of practices based on calming the mind and having insight. In analyzing the “nine factors of the effort for perfect purification”, listed in *Dīghanikāya*, mind-calming and insight are presented as the two fundamental elements to repel craving and ignorance, and that it is only with these two that one can overcome doubt, have a pure view in the perception of reality as it is, and reach the goal of releasing oneself from suffering. This means the purification of view refers to a change of thought and an alteration of mental state, which lead to the form of cognition that is beneficial to liberation. Proceeding from the explanations regarding the purification of view given in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*, and *Visuddhimagga*, Fuller then specifies that having a correct understanding of impermanence (*udayabbaya*) based on the teaching of the four noble truths, of the conditions of arising of name and form, and others, are the preconditions which purify view. On the basis of this, he further deems right view to be a practical knowledge (*paññā*) of how to see things instead of a correction of wrong views, and suggests that “the function of the right view is to abandon [the wrong view] by substitution of the opposite (*tadaṅgappahāna*).”¹⁵

¹⁵ Fuller pp.92-99.

Applying Fuller’s explanation of the right view to our discussion of how wholesome factors counteract defiled mental factors, we can thus get an idea about how to understand the metaphor of curing. Wholesome mental factors—the activities that are due to correct apprehension—arise on the basis of correct knowledge. This means that the knowledge which corresponds to the Buddhist teaching becomes the insight that is beneficial to forming cognition and creating mindset which are suitable for the practice. Knowledge such as recognizing the truth of *karma*, the fact of the arising and falling of all phenomena, and so forth, takes the side of believing in the notion of impermanence. It naturally repels the opposite opinion and therefore prevents the occurrence of mental factors relating to unbeneficial apprehension. Thus, wholesome mental factors are able to “cure” the defiled ones since the standpoints of their arising are conflicted with each other. Correct knowledge, namely, replaces the wrong way of thinking and consequently leads to the correct forms of behavior that repel the wrong. “Cure”, as it requires the acquisition of knowledge in accordance with Buddha’s teaching, is related to the change of belief that alters the wrong forms of knowing and produces the right thoughts. This includes not only the change of belief itself; it also entails a modification of the very knowledge that relates to this belief and the conceptualization that occurs in accordance with it. Namely, having awareness of the right and wrong thoughts that occur in the mind and holding to changing conscious through self-control are the necessary conditions to remedy the defilements. As a consequence, one could say that counteraction is to abandon the defiled factors by substituting them with the wholesome ones by means of a psychological practice that aims to change cognition, including the impulses, emotions, dispositions, moralities, or attitudes that link to it.

4.1.3 Counteraction as a Therapeutic Means

Having discussed the meaning of counteraction in relation to the curing ability of wholesome factors, we can now turn to the discussion about the way it works when serving as a therapeutic

means to remedy the defilements, particularly in the context of the fifty-one mental factors in the *CWSL*. Xuanzang does not specify how counteraction works when the wholesome mental factors “cure” the negative ones. However, if we take a quick look at the way the defiled mental factors that are to be cured are assigned to their counteragents, we can easily find some opposite elements in regard to their nature and their activities. For some mental factors, one can even observe the opposition in their names. For example, faith is the counteragent for non-faith and absence of greed for greed.

One passage in the *MVŚ* gives us a clue as to the nature of the opposition between the defilements and their counteragents:

If one says, nescience is the guiding determination (*shang shou* 上首) and the initial characteristic (*qian xiang* 前相), it generates immeasurable defilements, unwholesome dharma, and it arouses [mental factors] of this kind (unwholesomeness), such as an absence of shame and an absence of embarrassment; [but if] enlightenment is the guiding determination and the initial characteristic, it arouses immeasurable pure wholesome *dharmas* and arouses [*dharmas*] of this kind such as shame and embarrassment. Furthermore, since nescience and enlightenment directly counteract each other, nescience is the direct counteraction to enlightenment, and enlightenment is the direct counteraction to nescience. Furthermore, since nescience and enlightenment mutually repel each other, nescience repels enlightenment, and enlightenment repels nescience. Furthermore, nescience and enlightenment do not include each other, although their objects include each other.¹⁶

¹⁶ See T 1545, p. 126c27-127a5: 如說，無明為上首，無明為前相，生無量種惡不善法，及起此類無慚無愧。明為上首。明為前相。生無量種清淨善法。及起此類增上慚愧。復次明與無明近相治故。謂無明是明近對治。明是無明近對治。復次明與無明互相違故。謂無明違明明違無明。復次明與無明互不相攝。而所緣境互相攝故。

As the origin of all the wholesome and unwholesome *dharmas*, enlightenment and the *dharmas* that arise depending on it represent the counteragents that remedy nescience and the *dharmas* which appear because of ignorance. Conditions enabling counteraction depend on their opposite natures and their objects of the same kind. Though nescience and enlightenment are categorized as different kinds due to their producing opposite kinds of activities, they apprehend objects of the same kind. This creates a mutual repulsion between their very arisings and thus makes it possible for enlightenment to counteract nescience and *vice versa*. The form of repelling that is created through the opposite natures of the two factors also dictates how the wholesome mental factors counteract their correlated defilements. If we take vigor as an example, this factor counteracts laziness because its nature, “being courageous and tenacious” (*yong han* 勇悍), is contrary to “being lazy” (*lan duo* 懶惰). This nature thus enables it to counteract the factors that also arise when encountering situations that are correlated to “cultivating wholesomeness” or “ceasing unwholesomeness”.

Except for the antipodal characteristic, opposition refers also to absence or distancing. The *AKBh* introduces four kinds of counteragents that cut off mental disturbances when practising the “seeing path” (*darśanamārga*, *jian dao* 見道) and the “cultivating path” (*bhāvanāmārga*, *xiu dao* 修道). Among these, there are two kinds of counteractions, the “counteragent of abandonment” (*prahāṇapratipakṣa*, *duan dui zhi* 斷對治) and “counteragent of distancing” (*dūrībhāvapratipakṣa*, *yuan fen dui zhi* 遠分對治).¹⁷ As one can immediately discern from their names, the former refers to the elimination of afflictions and the latter to ensuring that the affliction remains removed. These two counteractions function on the basis of the total understanding of the four noble truths. Accordingly, the counteragent of

¹⁷ The other two counteragents are the “counteragent of support” (*ādhārapratipakṣa*, 持對治) and the “counteragent of disgust” (*vidūṣaṇāpratipakṣa*, 厭患對治). See Pradhan, 1975, p. 319, 24-320,4: *ālambanaparījñānāt tadālambanasamkṣayāt / ālambanaprahāṇāc ca/pratipakṣodayāt kṣayaḥ* // 60(abcd) Cf. Sangpo, 2012, Vol.2, pp.1744-1746. Chinese parallel see T 1560, p. 320b10-13: 遍知所緣故，斷彼能緣故，斷彼所緣故，對治起故斷。對治有四種，謂斷持遠厭，應知從所緣，可令諸惑斷。These four counteractions are also listed in the *MVŚ*. See T 1545, p. 907c12-1: 然對治有四種，謂斷對治、厭壞對治、持對治、遠分對治。

abandonment eliminates the affliction by interrupting unbeneficial apprehension and replacing it with the beneficial one. And the counteragent of distancing sustains the states caused by right apprehension and thus cuts off all possibilities for the affliction to arise again.

The concept of the absence of a defilement itself serving as a means of counteraction is also mentioned in the *Samāhitābhūmi*. Among the six ways to eliminate the fundamental defilements—the six renunciations (*ṣaḍ ime niḥsaraṇīyā dhātavaḥ*, 六種順出離界)—the concentration on the absence of form (*animitta*, *wu xiang* 無相) is the means that counteracts all forms.¹⁸ Forms, including perceptual images, mental concepts, and so forth, which occur due to the activity of consciousness tangle one’s mind and hinder its obtaining freedom. And therefore, meditative contemplation on the non-existence of forms, such as sound, odour, taste, and tactile and mental representations, repels the appearance of forms and thus detaches one from the influences and afflictions triggered by them. Here, to observe the absence of one characteristic is considered as the opposite appearance of that characteristic. Similarly, to remedy a defiled mental factor by means of its absence is often the case in counteracting the defilements in the *CWSL*, for instance, therein the “absence of greed” is the antidote for “greed”.

Concluding from the foregoing discussion, the main condition (the opposition) that enables counteraction can be understood as having an opposite nature but also as a reaction toward objects of the same category as well as an absence of the defilement itself. As wholesome mental factors represent both the beneficial mode and result of apprehension, the efficacy of counteracting defilements relies on adapting Buddhist knowledge to provide a perceptual stance that generates beneficial mental states when encountering a cognitive object.

¹⁸ See Delhey, 2009, p.155,15: *nimittavirodhavād ānimitto sarvanimittapratipakṣaḥ*. For the Chinese parallel see T 1579, p. 332a20: 無相對治一切眾相·相相違故。 The other five renunciations are concentration on kindness (*maitrī*, *zi* 慈), compassion (*karuṇā*, *bei* 悲), delight (*muditā*, *xi* 喜), impartiality (*upekṣā*, *she* 捨) and removal of arrogance (*vigatāsmimāna*, *li wo man* 離我慢). Respectively, they counteract anger, harmfulness, non-joy, greed, and arrogance. See Delhey, 2009, pp.155, 6-17. Ceasing attachment to desirable objects by contemplating the non-existence of the characteristic of those objects is already recorded in the *Samyuktāgama*. See T 99, p. 20a25-b27.) See also *Samgītiparyāya*: T 1536, p. 430c27-431a6.

In order to inform practitioners of the beneficial and unbeneficial mental states they should and should not have in cognition, wholesome and defiled mental factors are listed as an instruction of what to observe in one's own mind. By knowing the nature, activity, and other characteristics of certain mental factors, one can become aware of one's current mental state and acquire the relevant counteragent when defilements arise. To reach this, one needs to learn and adapt oneself to the Buddhist truth and adjust one's thoughts correspondingly; namely, contemplate in accordance with the Dharma to which one listens. In other words, in the context of the counteraction of mental factors, counteracting refers to a psychological practice based on the correct teaching, which aims to generate the opposite mode of apprehension towards the cognitive object.

4.1.4 Fundamental Defilements and Discernment

Having examined the correlations between right and wrong views and wholesome and defiled mental factors, we can go about surveying the wholesome factors and their counterparts in detail. Before we go straight into describing these factors, it is necessary to first look through the six fundamental defilements which are considered to be the roots of the problem due to their arising bringing about other kinds of causes of suffering.

In the system of the *Triṃśikā*, the six fundamental defiled mental factors are listed as follows: greed, anger, delusion, arrogance, doubt, and unwholesome views. The former three are primary causes which produce the other afflictions; they are impulses that urge one to act in accordance with false desire, and so create negative karma, and their counteragents are their states of absence, namely, absence of greed, anger, and delusion. The latter three—arrogance, doubt, and unwholesome views—are obstacles that hinder one's adapting to Buddhist knowledge. Arrogance is the attitude of superiority. It arises when one considers oneself to be above others. An arrogant mental state obstructs one from being humble towards the accumulation of merit and the person who has it, and thus causes one to remain in the cycle of

life and death and experience various kinds of suffering. Having hesitation as its nature, doubt denotes a lack of confidence in the Buddhist truth, which hinders the arising of goodness.¹⁹ And the unwholesome views are numbered as five; namely, the “view of corporeal-self” (*satkāya-drṣṭi*, *sa jia ye jian* 薩迦耶見), an “extreme view on existence” (*antaparigraha-drṣṭi*, *bain zhi jian* 邊執見), a “heterodox view that denies causality” (*mithyā-drṣṭi*, *xie jian* 邪見), the “view of attachment to view” (*drṣṭi-parāmarśa-drṣṭi*, *jian qu jian* 見取見), and the “view of attachment to the precepts” (*śīla-vrata-parāmarśa-drṣṭi*, *jie jinqu jian* 戒禁取見).²⁰ Possessing these views causes suffering and hinders correct understanding of the Buddhist teaching because these five views are considered perverse judgments *vis-à-vis* Buddhist truth.²¹

The *CWSL* specifies counteragents for the first three alone, leaving out the remaining seven. However, one factor—discernment—is mentioned when Xuanzang describes the characteristic of arrogance, doubt, and the five unwholesome views or when analyzing the conditions that support their arising. In characterizing doubt, Xuanzang refutes the opponent which claims that hesitating is one form of judgment and thus that doubt too is a form of discernment instead of an independent mental factor.²² This opinion likely derives from

¹⁹ Xuanzang does mention that arrogance and doubt can hinder non-arrogance and non-doubt, the two factors which are wholesome but not listed in the eleven wholesome mental factors. According to the *CWSL*, they are not enumerated due to their having overlapping functions with the other wholesome factors. Non-arrogance is said to be one part of faith, equanimity, and shame. Likewise, there are also three interpretations recorded for non-doubt, namely, as being one form of faith, and as being identical to decisive resolve or correct discernment. Though Xuanzang does not determine the correct understanding of these interpretations, Kuiji affirms the third understanding of non-arrogance since it shares a similar quality of reverence and respect to the state of shame. Furthermore, he agrees with the relation between discernment and non-doubt since the characteristics of the latter relates to the correct selection of value (*zheng jian ze* 正簡擇) and correct view. See T 1585, p. 30c17-23 and also T 1830, p. 440, b5-12.

²⁰ The first one is the view which clings to the five aggregates as self and that which the five aggregates accumulate in experience as belonging to the self. Conceptualizing the five aggregates in this way reifies a sense of the body as belonging to oneself and so engenders physical and psychological experiences which pertain to this ostensibly embodied individual. The second view includes two extreme ways of seeing, namely, nihilism and eternalism, which denote, respectively, the view of complete annihilation and the view of a permanent self after death. Heterodox views refer to a mode of seeing which refuses to accept the effects of karmic retribution and the reality of the mundane and supermundane. The view of attachment to view happens when one holds a wrong view to be soteriologically superior. Similarly, the view of attachment to the precepts indicates a situation in which one hold the wrong precept as the superior.

²¹ See T 1585, p. 31, c11-12: 云何惡見？於諸諦理，顛倒推求度，染慧為性；能障善見，招苦為業。 Cf. Wei Tat, 1973, pp. 416-417; Cook, 1999, p.186.

²² The other reason given by the opponents center on the etymological understanding of the Sanskrit for “doubt”, *vimati*. As *vimati* is formed of the prefix *vi-* with the noun *mati* and because it shares the same meaning as *prajñā*, doubt must be one form of discernment. However, the fact that cognizing (*vijñāna*) has a different

schools that consider discernment to belong to the “general omnipresent factor” because omnipresent discernment is designated an attribute of the mind that makes choices in the context of general perception. Contrastingly, in the Yogācāra system, discernment only appears when one has a strong intention to judge the cognitive object in accordance with a set of moral values. Xuanzang thus denies the possibility that an uncertain judgment can be called discernment. Furthermore, if we again take a look at the definition of discernment, we find that the activity of discernment is to cut off doubt.²³ Doubt, therefore, as a hesitant judgment, is not only not a discernment at all, in the system of the *CWSL* it is its very opposite.

Arrogance does not have an obvious connection to discernment. It is rather, following a comment made by Kuiji, associated with one of the five unwholesome views: the view of corporeal-self. He deems the arising of the feeling that considers oneself to be superior to others to be premised on a real existent self. This view generates a tendency towards conceit and overbearing manners. The corporeal-self (in fact all the five unwholesome views) is by nature a “defiled discernment” (*ran hui* 染慧) and as such is the product of incorrect judgment.

These five views denote the considered positions of a conscious judgment.²⁴ It is probably easier to understand the production of the last three views—a heterodox view, the view of attachment to view, and the view of attachment to the precepts—as being due to wrong thoughts and a misunderstanding of the teaching. Their arising is indeed deemed as being dependent on the activities of discrimination instead of an inborn affliction. However, the first two—the view of corporeal-self and extreme views on existence—can either be inborn or learned. To be more precise, even though they can be the intrinsic nature of a sentient being,

meaning from gnosis (*jñāna*) shows that the prefix can take the connotation of a root-form in quite another direction.

²³ See chapter three 3.3.5.

²⁴ The five unwholesome views are only enumerated as mental factors in the system of the one-hundred *dharmas* and in the Yogācāra classification of the five *skandhas*. They are not listed in the system of the seventy-five *dharmas* of the Sarvāstivādins. As Jaini points out, the latter consider right view to originate in discernment (*prajñā*), which is one of the universal factors that accompany all mental activity. Accordingly, unwholesome views also emerge from discernment since *prajñā* is the capacity of the mind to judge. See Jaini, 1977, pp.403-415.

one is nonetheless able to stick to these two views out of choice or likewise cut them out of one's decision-making process.

To conclude the above discussion, doubt and arrogance are caused indirectly by wrong judgment, which leads to hesitation and improper attitudes toward others, while the five unwholesome views are the direct effects of incorrect judgment, which results in perverse propositions when observing the world. Although discernment is not the direct counteraction for them, it is the necessary requirement for their arising and, thus, be able to restrict the occurrence of doubt, arrogance, and unwholesome views. Since correct discernment makes determinations on the basis of Buddhist knowledge, it brings about the right view which results from correct thinking and activity. Thus, defiled discernment does not only relate to these three defiled factors but serves to trigger all other defiled mental factors; contrarily, correct discernment does not only confine doubt, arrogance, and unwholesome views but further serves as an assistant in the arising of the counteragent for the factors that cause suffering. This means that discernment facilitates counteraction since it decides whether one can apprehend things correctly. Proceeding from this conclusion, I would like to now discuss the counteraction between the beneficial and unbeneficial mental factors listed in the *CWSL* and examine the way in which Xuanzang describes them.

4.2. Counteraction between the Wholesome and Defiled Mental Factors

Belief in the Buddhist truth engenders the types of right view which lead to correct modes of seeing without greed, anger, delusion, or any other attachment or defilement. Wrong views thus discredit the teaching of the Buddha and are associated with incorrect modes of seeing with attachments. On the basis of this principle, there are sixteen beneficial and twenty-six unbeneficial mental factors, when we exclude always active factors whose virtue is usually neutral since their main function is to bring forth cognitive activity and the factors of

indetermination whose influences are unclear. These sixteen beneficial mental factors include five that are bound to specific objects, namely, wishing, decisive resolve, memorizing, concentration and discernment (discussed in 3.3), in addition to the other eleven wholesome factors, including, faith, shame, embarrassment, absence of greed, absence of anger, absence of delusion, vigor, serenity, non-carelessness, equanimity, and non-harmfulness, which we are to consider in the following section. On the contrary, the twenty-two negative factors include six fundamental defilements and twenty secondary defiled mental factors.

Premised on the notion that counteracting is the practice of overcoming defiled mental factors and their activities, beneficial mental factors are characterized as being in conflict with unbeneficial mental factors. According to the list of mental factors and their descriptions given in the *CWSL*, there are eleven sets of mental factors which stand in opposition to each other, that is, the eleven wholesome factors and their counterparts. Readily observable in the descriptions of the wholesome mental factors and their counterparts is the usage of negation to denoties the manner of their opposition. Specifically, two kinds of negation are encountered in this context: “*wu*” (無) and “*bu*” (不), referring to an “absence” and “contrary situation” respectively. An example of the former is “delusion” (*moha*, *chi* 癡) and the “absence of delusion” (*amoha*, *wu chi* 無癡), which shows that the lack of the affliction is itself a sufficient counteragent. And in the case of the latter, faith (*sraddhā*, *xin* 信), for instance, counteracts its contrary mental state, non-faith (*āśraddhya*, *bu xin* 不信), exemplifying that a conflicted situation could remedy the negative influence caused by the defiled factor.

In the following section, we shall examine the eleven sets of counteractions and the remaining defilements not listed in the eleven whose counteragents are specified. As seen in the context of the factors we have analyzed in chapter three, in the *CWSL* each mental factor is described according to its “nature” (*xing* 性) and its “activity” (*ye* 業). In addition to these two standard descriptions, wholesome and defiled factors are often explicated in terms of their “characteristic” (*xiang* 相), the idiosyncrasies which distinguish them from other mental factors.

There are two kinds of characteristics mentioned in this context: the specific-characteristic (*bie xiang* 別相) or self-characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*, *zi xiang* 自相), referring to the distinctive appearance that only belongs to a particular mental factor, and the common-characteristic (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, *gong xiang* 共相), which denotes the aspect of a mental factor that is shared with the other factors.²⁵

4.2.1 Faith vs. Non-Faith (*sraddhā/ āsraddhya*, *xin/bu xin* 信/不信)

Faith is a factor denoting the mental state of deep conviction in the Buddha's teaching as that which includes the rules governing how everything works in the living world and the practices that generate merit. It is the very condition for the intention to release oneself from suffering. The definition of faith in the *CWSL* is as follows:

What is faith? With respect to the actuality [of Buddha's law], merit [of the three treasures], and capacity [of all wholesomeness], it is to accept, delight and wish. Purifying of the mind is its nature. To counteract non-faith and [ensure one] feels delighted in wholesomeness is its activity. However, there are approximately three distinctive [appearances] of faith: First, faith in actuality, meaning to accept thoroughly and faithfully the phenomenality and conditionality of all the various *dharma*s in reality; second, faith in merit, meaning to delight thoroughly and faithfully in the true and pure merit of the three treasures; third, faith in capacity, meaning to believe thoroughly in the goodness of every single mundane and supramundane [doings] and that it has the power to obtain and to accomplish the arising of hope in [the Buddha's truth].²⁶

²⁵ Self- or specific-characteristic is usually the opposite of the common-characteristic (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, 共相) which describes the character of certain *dharma*s that is shared with others. On the distinction between these two and their relation to the specific soteriological concerns of the Chinese Yogācāra tradition, see Lin, 2016.

²⁶ 云何為信？於實德能深忍樂欲心淨為性，對治不信樂善為業。然信差別略有三種：一信實有，謂於諸法實事理中深信忍故；二信有德，謂於三寶真淨德中深信樂故；三信有能，謂於一切世出世善深信有力能得能成起希望故。See T 1585, p. 29b22-27. Cf. Wei Tat, 1973, pp. 388-391; Cook, 1999, pp.173.

The domains that fulfill the three appearances of faith, though described in slightly different terms in Sthiramati and Xuanzang’s definitions, are basically similar. In demonstrating the domain of faith, Sthiramati considers it to be a full acceptance of real existence (*astitva*), merit (*guṇa*), the power (*śakti*) of karma and its fruition (*phala*), the four truths, and the three treasures (*ratna*).²⁷ Depending on these conditions, faith manifests in three ways, coinciding with the three appearances given by Xuanzang: belief in causality as the rule which forms reality, belief in the merit of the Buddha, his teaching and the *saṃgha*, and belief in the merit of wholesomeness as having real consequences and the concomitant wish to acquire it.

Furthermore, Sthiramati and Xuanzang both define the nature of faith as “purifying of the mind” (*prasādaścetaso*, *xin jing* 心淨). However, the latter emphasizes the purifying function more through the metaphor of “the water-purifying pearl” (*udakaprasādakamaṇi*, *shui qing zhu*, 水清珠). In the *CWSL*, the pearl symbolizes the substance of faith (*xin ti*, 信體) and the turbid water represents the afflicted mind. Upon throwing the pearl into polluted water, the water becomes clean.²⁸ This metaphor is not stated in either in the *TrBh*²⁹ or in other Abhidharmic treatises that explain faith as a mental factor, including the *AS*, *PSkh*, *AKBh*³⁰. However, Pukuang records it in his *Jushelunji*³¹ when explaining the function of faith by quoting the *Abhidharmāvatāraprakaraṇa*³². According to him, the principle that faith removes and disbands the impurity and dirt of the mind is the same as the pearl purifying the impure and dirty water inside the pond.

²⁷ See Buescher 2007, pp. 76, 6-8. Cf. Kawamura, 1964, pp. 69-70.

²⁸ See Kuiji’s commentary on the pearl of water purifying. 喻如水清珠能清濁水。濁水喻心等，清珠喻信體，以投珠故濁水便清，以有信故其心遂淨。(T 1830, pp. 434c5-8)

²⁹ Although the *udakaprasādakamaṇi* is not used to explain faith by Sthiramati in the *TrBh*, he does mention it in his *PSkh*. As a supplement to the definition of *cetasah prasāda*, he adds, “representation of the water purifying pearl is a special kind of *dharma* called faith. It is called purifying of the mind in order to show that it is not the transparent matter (*rūpaprasāda*)” (*udakaprasādakamaṇiṣṭhānīyaṃ dharmāntaraṃ caitasikaṃ śraddhā na rūpaprasādātmiketi pradarśanārtham āha cetasah prasāda iti*, see Kramer, 2013, pp.43,12-14).

³⁰ Also in the *AKBh*, see Pradhan, 1967, pp.55, 6-7; PSk see Li and Steinkellner 2008, pp.6, 5-6. For the *AS*, see Gokhale, 1947, pp.16, 7-8 and Pradhan, 1950 6,9-11.

³¹ See T 1821, pp. 75a14-22: 信謂令心澄淨。理亦能令心所淨，從強說心。由此信珠在心皆得澄淨。故《入阿毘達摩》解信云：「是能除遣心濁穢法，如水清珠置於池內，令濁穢水皆即澄淨。如是信珠在心池內，心諸濁穢皆即除遣。」有說，此信於四諦、三寶、善惡業、異熟果中，現前忍許，故名為信。

³² For the passage that Pukuang quotes from *Abhidharmāvatāraprakaraṇa*, see T 1554, pp. 982a29-b2.

Since “purifying of mind” is the centermost quality of faith, it is designated as its self-characteristic. Targeting this, the opponent questions the referent of this term as its meaning is ambiguous. According to their challenge, *xin jing* (心淨) could be interpreted in three ways: (1) purity is the mind itself (*jing ji xin*, 淨即心), (2) purifying the mind (*ling xin jing*, 令心淨), and (3) that the mind is together with the pure *dharma* (*xin ju jing fa*, 心俱淨法). In the first case, faith takes purity as its main quality and becomes the mind itself; it for this reason fails to be a mental factor. In the second case, faith would share the same characteristic with other factors, such as shame, which also function to purify the mind; it thus fails to be an independent factor. The fallacy in the third case is the same as the second: since all wholesome factors can enable the mind to arise with the pure *dharma*, faith does not warrant the specific position of a unique mental factor.

According to the metaphor of the water-purifying pearl, it is clear Xuanzang considers the second interpretation to be correct. He defends this position by denying that the main characteristics of other wholesome factors also serve to purify the mind and instead claims that they are various and so not the same as faith. Concerning the meaning of purity of mind, Kuiji provides a grammatical approach to support Xuanzang’s interpretation. In his annotation, he suggests viewing the three possible understandings of the opponent in terms of Sanskrit grammar, rendering three analyses of the compound, *xin jing*. Understanding *xin jing* as “the mind which is pure”, as the first of the opponent’s interpretations proposes, is to treat the term as a *karmadhāraya* (*chi ye shi*, 持業釋), taking *jing* (pure) as the adjective for the *xin* (mind). If one follows the second interpretation which considers *xin jing* as “purifying the mind” or “purification of the mind”, one construes it as a “*tatpuruṣa* instrumental”. The third interpretation, in Kuiji’s opinion, comprehends *xin jing* as an *avyayībhāva*.³³ This

³³ See T 1830, pp. 434b19-25: 三外難言，此由未了彼心淨言。若淨體即是心，持業釋者，信應非心所，淨即心故。若淨體非即心，令心淨者。心之淨故，依依士釋第三轉聲。慚等何別？亦令心淨故。若心俱淨法，隣近釋者。淨與心俱故，為難同令淨，亦慚等無別。

interpretation is somehow confusing as *avyayībhāva* usually “consist of an indeclinable first member (e.g., an adverb or preverb) and a second member in its neutral accusative singular form.”³⁴ The two components, “mind” and “purity”, obviously do not qualify in the formation of such a compound.³⁵ No matter Kuiji’s reasoning for deeming the third interpretation an *avyayībhāva*, both this and the first possible understandings are denied since faith is neither the mind itself nor identical to other wholesome mental factors.

Following Xuanzang’s opinion, it is the second interpretation that Kuiji affirms. However, there are several points that need to be clarified. Upon examining the other Abhidharmic treaties that also give definitions for faith, one immediately notices that none have the compound “purifying of mind” but the expression *cetasah prasādaḥ*³⁶. We could of course assume that Kuiji read a Sanskrit version that differs from those treatises, or indeed that he was simply using Sanskrit grammar to interpret the two Chinese words *xin jing* as a compound. Either way, to deem *xin jing* a *tatpuruṣa* is possible. In light of the metaphor of the water-purifying pearl, we could probably assume that Xuanzang and Kuiji understand faith as purification of the mind. The problem here is Kuiji’s “instrumental”. One may, at first glance, suppose that the instrumental here refers to the relation between the two components, mind and purity, which comprise the *tatpuruṣa*. However, this hypothesis is likely wrong, for it would result in the meaning of “purification by the mind”, which simply does not fit the context. According to Xuanzang’s definition, *xin jing* is the nature of faith because it is able to purify

³⁴ See Ruppel 2017, pp.142.

³⁵ It should be noted here that the Chinese tradition’s conceptualization of this compound is unlike that of the Sanskrit tradition. According to the former, *avyayībhāva* is used to express a “neighbouring association”, whereby the meaning of the first element of the compound is closely related to another term, for which it stands as a substitute. The most common example is *nian chu* (念處, *smṛtyupasthānāna*), the abiding of mindfulness. Although this practice essentially relies on 慧 (*prajñā*), discernment, the function of 念 is similar to 慧 in this context, and therefore one replaces 慧 with 念 in the compound 念處. See *Dasheng Fayuan Yilin Zhang* (大乘法苑義林章) T 1861, p. 255b28-c4: 隣近釋者，俱時之法義用增勝，自體從彼而立其名，名隣近釋。如說有尋及有伺等，諸相應法皆是此體，但尋伺增名有尋等。亦如念住體唯是慧，但念用增名為念住。意業亦爾。餘一切法類此應知。 However, *xin jing* is also unable to form a compound in this manner.

³⁶ This sentence is found in the definitions of faith in the *PSk* (Li and Steinkellner, 2008, p. 6, 6), *PSkh* (Kramer 2013, p.43, 9-10), *AKBh* (Pradhan 1967, p.55, 6), and *TrBh* (Buescher 2007, p.76, 10).

the mind when the faith arises. Proceeding from this, any instrumentality should apply to faith and not to mind or purity. Thus, in conceptualizing the instrumental function of *xin jing*, one must involve the third element of faith, which would make the compound a *bahuvrīhi*, with the literal sense, namely, of “faith by which there is purification of the mind”.

Contrary to faith, the definition of non-faith is as follows:

What is non-faith? With respect to actuality, merit, and capability, one neither accepts deeply, is delighted in, nor desires them. Pollution of the mind is its nature. To be able to hinder pure faith and to be a support for laziness is its activity because one who is non-faithful is usually lazy. One should know the three aspects of non-faith are in opposition to faith. However, each of the defiled *dharma*s has a distinctive characteristic. Only the self-characteristic of this non-faith is turbid. It is able to further make the other [kinds of] mind and mental factors turbid, like an extremely dirty thing. It pollutes not only itself but also other stuff; therefore, it is said that this pollution of mind is the nature [of non-faith]. Due to non-faith, in respect to actuality, virtue, and capability, [one] does not accept deeply, be delighted in, or desire them. [Non-acceptance, non-delight, and non-desire] are not separately existing natures of non-faith. If one wrongly accepts, is delighted in, and desires other things, it is the consequence of this (non-faith), but not the self-nature thereof.³⁷

Again, the justification for the uniqueness of this factor relies on its self-characteristic. Being in direct opposition to faith, the core attribute of non-faith, “dirtiness” (*hui*, 穢), is contrary to “purity” (*jing*, 淨). Instead of purifying the mind, “polluting the mind” (*xin hui*, 心穢) is the function that makes the mind unclean. Within the description of how purifying and pollution

³⁷ See T1585, pp. 34b4-11: 云何不信？於實、德、能不忍樂欲，心穢為性；能障淨信，惰依為業。謂不信者多懈怠故。不信三相，翻信應知。然諸染法，各有別相，唯此不信，自相渾濁，復能渾濁餘心、心所，如極穢物，自穢、穢他，是故說此心穢為性。由不信故，於實、德、能不忍樂欲，非別有性，若於餘事，邪忍樂欲，是此因果，非此自性。 Cf. Wei Tat, 1973, p. 445; Cook, 1999, p.202.

work, the *CWSL* imagines a scene of making water clean or dirty. For the part of faith, it acts like the pearl which purifies water, cleaning up the impurities that muddy the water: when entering the mind, faith makes the mind become pure. And for the part of non-faith, it is depicted as a dirty thing that causes turbidity in water: when entering the mind, non-faith makes the mind become polluted. Emphasizing such an oppositional description and metaphor (i.e., purifying and dirtiness, clean and turbid water) to show the adverse qualities of faith and non-faith is quite idiosyncratic to the *CWSL*.³⁸ The antipodal states of faith and non-faith reveal their different self-characteristics fundamentally. By refuting the other opinion concerning the self-characteristic of faith and non-faith, the counteraction between them is thus settled due to the diametric relationship between these two factors.

4.2.2 Shame and Embarrassment (*hrī/apatrāpya, can/kui* 慚/愧) vs. Absence of Shame and Absence of Embarrassment (*āhrīkyā/anapatrāpya, wu can/ wu kui* 無慚/ 無愧)

Both shame and embarrassment perform like one's conscience, urging one to act correctly in accordance with moral standards. They are of a similar appearance but they differ in their causes. Shame is a kind of self-control based on one's inner motivation, while embarrassment is to constrain oneself due to fear of the blameful judgments of others. This framework of shame and embarrassment is followed by both Sthiramati and Xuanzang. According to Sthiramati's understanding, being compelled by inner motivation exists because sin is despised by the sages and therefore committing a sin would cause an undesirable consequence (*aniṣṭavipāka*).³⁹ Xuanzang's definitions are as follows:

What is shame? Based on one's own strength and on the power of the *dharma*, reverence and respect in moral paradigms and goodness is its nature. To counteract the absence of shame and to cease unwholesome actions is its activity.

³⁸ *Cetasah prasāda* exists in most of the definitions of faith in different Abhidharmic treatises. But the description of the dirtiness of the mind is either not emphasized or is entirely absent, as is the water metaphor and their correlation to the opposition between faith and non-faith.

³⁹ See Buescher 2007, p. 76, 14-20. Cf. Kawamura, 1964, p. 70.

That means, by compelling esteem for one's own strength and value for the power of the *dharma*, one respects the moral paradigms and goodness, feels ashamed in regard to transgression and unwholesomeness, and counteracts the absence of shame and ceases unwholesome action.⁴⁰

What is an embarrassment? Based on the power of worldly opinion, to despise and resist vileness and evil is its nature. To counteract absence of embarrassment and cease unwholesome action are its activities. That means, by compelling worldly condemnation and aversion, one despises and resists vileness and unwholesomeness, feels ashamed in regard to transgression and guilt, and counteracts the absence of embarrassment and ceases unwholesome action.⁴¹

Debates regarding the independence of these two factors, with emphasis on the specific characteristic of shame and embarrassment, are recorded after the main definition. There are three critiques. The first and second challenges doubt the establishment of shame and embarrassment as two independent factors. They first assume that “feeling ashamed” is the main characteristic that is shared by shame and embarrassment, meaning they have no uniqueness as two separate factors. The second challenge is supplementarily raised if the first assumption is denied. It is based on the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*⁴² which claims that both shame and embarrassment are real *dharma*; it says, if “based on self” and “based on others” are the qualities distinguishing the two factors, they cannot both be real *dharma* and still arise together since they are based on different conditions which do not occur at once. The third challenge follows the thoughts of the second and brings additional scriptural support, again from the

⁴⁰ 云何為慚？依自、法力，崇重賢、善為性；對治無慚，止息惡行為業。調依自法尊貴增上，崇重賢、善，羞恥過惡，對治無慚，息諸惡行。See T 1585, p. 29, c13-16. Cf. Wei Tat, 1973, pp. 391-393; Cook, 1999, p.174.

⁴¹ See T 1585, p. 29, c16-19: 云何為愧？依世間力，輕拒暴惡為性；對治無愧，止息惡行為業。調依世間訶、厭增上，輕拒暴惡，羞恥過罪，對治無愧，息諸惡業。Wei Tat, 1973, p. 393; Cook, 1999, p.174.

⁴² See T 1579, p. 602b22-27: 問，是諸善法幾世俗有幾實物有？答，三世俗有，調不放逸、捨及不害。所以者何？不放逸、捨是無貪、無瞋、無癡、精進分故。即如是法離雜染義建立為捨。治雜染義立不放逸。不害即是無瞋分故無別實物。

Viniścayasamgrahaṇī,⁴³ which assumes that shame and embarrassment appear simultaneously and are always together with the wholesome mind by claiming that ten of the wholesome factors are always there when the wholesome mind arises. Therefore, if Xuanzang intends to deem shame and embarrassment as real, he would have to agree that they arise separately. And this is in conflict with the teaching.⁴⁴

Xuanzang refutes the first two challenges easily by affirming “revere and respect” and “despise and resist” as two distinct specific characteristics of shame and embarrassment. On this basis, “feeling ashamed” should be understood as a common characteristic that is shared by both factors. And “based on oneself” and “based on others” are the contingent conditions which increase the possibility of the mental factors occurring but do not pertain to their fundamental basis.⁴⁵ As to the third challenge, Xuanzang refutes it with a claim that shame and embarrassment actually take the same support in their arising; therefore, it is not erroneous to say that they arise together and are both real. He declares, “when the wholesome mind (*shan xin* 善心) is there, no matter what object it faces, it is capable of respecting goodness and resisting the evil.” That means, the actual base to support the appearance of shame and embarrassment is the wholesome mind which takes the same object they do. Taking the wholesome mind as their basis, these two factors arise in response to two different situations that the wholesome mind encounters—“moral paradigms and goodness” and “vileness and

⁴³ See T 1579, p. 684a9-14: 遍善心起復有十種。謂慚愧無貪。無瞋無癡。信精進。不放逸不害捨。如是十法若定地若不定地善心皆有。定地心中更增輕安不放逸等。唯是假法。此相應識皆能了知一切境法。

⁴⁴ Although the second and third objections are, according to Kuiji, hypothetical, one finds a passage in the *AKBh* that discusses a similar question. An objection is raised therein regarding whether it is possible that absence of shame and absence of embarrassment arise together when their arising depends on considering oneself and others. See Pradhan, 1967, pp.60, 24-61, 3. *anye punar āhuḥ / ātmāpekṣayā doṣair alajjanam āhrīkyam parāpekṣayānapatrāpyam iti / evam api dve apekṣe yugapat katham setsyataḥ / na khalūcyate yugapat ātmānam param cāpekṣata ity api tv asty asau kadācid alajjā yā ātmānam apekṣamāṇasyāpi pravartate sā āhrīkyam / asti yā param apekṣamāṇasya pravartate sā'napatrāpyam / viparyayaṇa hrīr apatrāpyam ca veditavyam // Chinese parallel see 有餘師說：於所造罪自觀無恥名曰無慚，觀他無恥說名無愧。若爾，此二所觀不同，云何俱起？不說此二一時俱起別觀自他。然有無恥，觀自時勝說名無慚。復有無恥，觀他時增說為無愧。慚愧差別翻此應知，謂翻初釋有敬有崇、有所忌難、有所隨屬說名為慚，於罪見怖說名為愧。翻第二釋，於所造罪自觀有恥說名為慚，觀他有恥說名為愧。(T 1558, p. 21a17-25) Cf. Sangpo, 2012, p.529.*

⁴⁵ As Kuiji comments, the role of these two conditions is more like an assistant that helps their arising. See T 1830, p. 435b20-22 彼雖言他、自增上等，然是起緣，非是別相，今難彼言。

evil”—and show the two qualities which belong to the wholesome mind—“to revere and respect” and “to despise and resist”. These two qualities not only become the different natures of shame and embarrassment but their distinctive self-characteristics also; two bases for enumerating them as independent factors.

The focal point for the counterparts of shame and embarrassment is, of course, their oppositional function in relation to respect and resistance:

What is the absence of shame? Disregard for oneself and the *dharma* and despising and resisting moral paradigms and wholesomeness are its nature. To be able to hinder shame and proliferate unwholesome action are its activities. That means, those who disregard themselves and the *dharma* despise and resist the moral paradigms and wholesomeness, are unashamed of transgression and unwholesomeness, and hinder the proliferation of shame due to the various unwholesome actions.⁴⁶

What is the absence of embarrassment? Disregarding the world, revering and respecting vileness, and unwholesomeness is its nature. To be able to hinder embarrassment and proliferate unwholesome action are its activities. That means, those who disregard the world, revere and respect vileness and unwholesomeness, are unashamed of transgression and guilt, and hinder the proliferation of embarrassment due to the various unwholesome actions.⁴⁷

The debate with the opponent over the self-characteristic of the absence of shame and the absence of embarrassment is worded in almost precisely the same terms as shame and embarrassment, albeit with the positive meaning being negated and *vice versa*. One point is added to this section; namely, these two factors derive from greed and as a “continuity of

⁴⁶ 云何無慚？不顧自、法，輕拒賢善為性；能障礙慚，生長惡行為業。謂於自、法無所顧者，輕拒賢善，不恥過惡，障慚生長，諸惡行故。See T 1585, p. 33, c19-22. Cf. Wei Tat, 1973, p. 441; Cook, 1999, p.199.

⁴⁷ 云何無愧？不顧世間，崇重暴惡為性；能障礙愧，生長惡行為業。謂於世間無所顧者，崇重暴惡，不恥過罪，障愧生長，諸惡行故。See T 1585, p. 33, c22-26. Cf. Wei Tat, 1973, p. 441; Cook, 1999, p.199.

sameness” (*niṣyanda, deng liu* 等流). Since they derive from greed, they are real *dharmas* instead of being only a portion of greed.

4.2.3 Three Wholesome Roots: Absence of Greed (*alobha, wu tan* 無貪), Absence of Anger (*adveṣa, wu chen* 無瞋), Absence of Delusion (*amoha, wu chi* 無癡) vs. Three Unwholesome Roots: Greed (*raga, tan* 貪), Anger (*pratigha, chen* 瞋), Delusion (*moha, chi* 癡)

There are three major causes or “roots” (*indriya, gen* 根) that lead to bad action and characterizes the unwholesome mind: greed, anger, and delusion. Greed lets one crave for possession (*bhava, you* 有); anger directly causes suffering; delusion provides support for all kinds of defilements. On the account of the significance of these three “unwholesome roots”, to counteract them hold soteriological importance and necessitate the establishment of three independent wholesome factors which could do so:⁴⁸ the three wholesome roots, i.e. the absence of greed, the absence of anger and the absence of delusion. Their definition is as follows⁴⁹:

“Absence of greed and so on” [in the *Triṃśikā*] means [besides the absence of greed] absence of anger, and absence of delusion. These three are named “roots” because they are predominant in arising of wholesomeness and because [they] are the direct counteraction to the three unwholesome roots.

⁴⁸ Though Sthiramati does not have the tendency to introduce these three factors in the way of justifying their independency from their function of direct counteraction to the three unwholesome roots, his commentary concerning these three factors mentions similar points to the *CWSL*. There are, however, three bigger differences between them: First of all, Sthiramati noted that absence of anger is *maitrī*, and also, the perspective that absence of anger reveals itself includes not only suffering and the cause of suffering but also the sentient being; second, he also named the content which one who arises absence of delusion understand clearly, the karma and its fruition, the four truths, and the three treasures; third, unlike the *CWSL*, Sthiramati does not mention the connection in between absence of delusion and the discernment.

⁴⁹ 「無貪等」者，等無瞋、癡。此三名根，生善勝故。三不善根，近對治故。云何無貪？於有、有具，無著為性；對治貪著，作善為業。云何無瞋？於苦、苦具，無恚為性；對治瞋恚，作善為業。善心起時，隨緣何境，皆於有等，無著、無恚，觀有等立，非要緣彼。如前慚、愧，觀善、惡立，故此二種，俱遍善心。云何無癡？於諸理事，明解為性；對治愚癡，作善為業。See T 1585, p. 30a3-10. Cf. Wei Tat, 1973, pp. 394-397; Cook, 1999, pp.176-177.

What is the absence of greed? In respect to the existence [of three realms] and the cause of existence, absence of attachment is its nature. To counteract greed and cause the wholesomeness is its activity.

What is the absence of anger? In respect to the [three kinds of] suffering and the cause of suffering, absence of hate is its nature. To counteract anger and cause the wholesomeness is its activities. When the wholesome mind arises, no matter what kinds of object [the mind] grasps, in respect to its existence [and the suffering it caused], [the mind] always is absent from abiding (*wu zhu* 無住) and absent from hating (*wu hui* 無恚). [The absence of greed and anger] are established considering the existence etc. but not necessary because [the absence of greed and anger] grasp the existence etc. as object. As it is the case in previously mentioned shame and embarrassment, [they] are established considering the [way treating] goodness and evil. Therefore, these two [factors] are always together with a wholesome mind.

What is the absence of delusion? In respect to various principles and phenomena, to understand [them] clearly is its nature. To counteract delusion and cause the wholesomeness is its activities.⁵⁰

The same as the shame and embarrassment, the first two factors—absence of greed and anger—also arise when the wholesome mind is present and represent aspects of the wholesome mind. So to speak, they grasp the same object the mind confronting but only response to the elements regarding the existence of this object and the suffering it causes. Namely, the two factors show two abilities of the wholesome mind: (1) not clinging onto the quality of the object which seems

⁵⁰ The main content of Sthiramati's definition is similar to Xuanzang, but differs in several respects: (1) Sthiramati points out that absence of anger is loving-kindness (*maitrī, ci* 慈) which corresponds to the doctrine given in *Xianyang* and *PSk*; (2) he features the function of these three factors as giving support for stopping unwholesomeness (*duścaritāpravṛttisamṅgīśrayadānakarmakāḥ*); (3) he specifically signifies the knowledge required for making delusion absent, namely, knowledge about the cause and effect of karma, the four truths, and the three treasures (Buddha, dharma, and Buddhist assembly). See Buescher 2007, p. 78, 1-12. Cf. Kawamura, 1964, pp. 70-71.

to be permanent, (2) not being angry about the suffered feeling the object caused. As the *CWSL* follows the position of *Yogācārabhūmi* and agree that ten wholesome mental factors and the wholesome mind always arise simultaneously. Apart from the aforementioned shame, embarrassment, absence of greed, absence of anger and absence of delusion, there are still faith and three factors we are to discuss, vigor, non-carelessness, equanimity, and non-harmfulness. It seems, all these factors are representatives of one functional aspect of a wholesome mind, in turns, the wholesome mind is formed because of the co-existing wholesome mental factors.

Apart from the relationship with wholesome mind, there are two interpretations regarding the substance of the absence of delusion. The first one considers discernment (*prajñā*, *hui 慧*) is exactly the nature of absence of delusion with scriptural support from the *AS*⁵¹. The other interpretation, on the contrary, supports the independency of absence of delusion since it is the opposition to one of the fundamental defilements—delusion, the ignorant mental state that cause afflictions. Xuanzang deems the latter the correct interpretation. He explains, the greed, anger and delusion are allocated in the original afflictions due to their direct association with the six forms of perception. That means, they represent three capacities to generate various of defilements and, thus, are named the “the unwholesome roots”. Capacity to generate unwholesomeness need to be cut off by means of opposite capacity which is hold by a real *dharma*. Therefore, to establish the counteraction, which is able to remedy the unwholesome roots directly, the absence of delusion should have its own nature. ⁵²

The three unwholesome roots are greed, anger, and delusion. Their functions are orientated toward possessing, suffering, and principles and phenomena respectively.

⁵¹ See Gokhale, 1947, pp. 16, 11-12; Pradhan, 1950, pp. 6,15-16: *amohaḥ katamaḥ/ vipākato vā āgamato vā'dhigamato vā jñānaṃ pratisaṃkhyā/ duṣcaritāpravṛttisanniśrayadānakarmakaḥ//* Chinese parallel see: T 1605, p. 664b12-13: 何等無癡？調由報教證智決擇為體，惡行不轉所依為業。 Translation see Boin-Webb (2001) p.18.

⁵² 以貪、瞋、癡六識相應，正煩惱攝。起惡勝故，立不善根。斷彼必由通、別對治。通唯善慧，別即三根。由此無癡必應別有。 See T 1585, pp. 30, a21-23.

What is greed? In respect to possessing and the causes of possessing, “contaminated abiding” is its nature. To be able to hinder the absence of greed and cause suffering is its activity. That means, due to the force of craving, the aggregates [which initiate grasping activities] arise.

What is anger? In respect to the suffering and the cause of suffering, hating is its nature. To hinder the [the factor] absence of anger [to work], to make the mind feel discomfort, and to [provide] support for unwholesomeness is its activities. That means, anger definitely causes the bother which make one feel being burnt (*re nao*, 熱惱) to the body and mind because it generates unwholesome activities and has an unwholesome nature.

What is delusion? In respect to various principles and phenomena, being confused and blind is its nature. To be able to hinder the absence of delusion and [provide] the support for all the defilements are its activities. That means, due to ignorance, the karmic activity of defilements and secondary defilements such as doubt, wrong view, greed, etc., which in turn instigate subsequent arising defilements, arises.⁵³

Here, three focal points of the three factors: (1) the cause of craving that arises the aggregates, (2) the discomforting that arises the hatred, and (3) the ignorance that becomes the support for all the defilements, are identical with Sthiramati's commentaries. However, he adds a few extra explanations to the definition in the *CWSL*. First of all, corresponding to the doctrine in *Xianyang*, Sthiramati mentions that anger would make one arise wish to “bind” and “kill” (*vadhabandhana*) others. Second, in regard to the delusion, he explains the knowledge that one

⁵³ 云何為貪？於有、有具染著為性，能障無貪，生苦為業。謂由愛力取蘊生故。云何為瞋？於苦、苦具憎恚為性，能障無瞋，不安隱性，惡行所依為業。謂瞋必令身心熱惱，起諸惡業，不善性故。云何為癡？於諸理事，迷闇為性，能障無癡，一切雜染所依為業。謂由無明起疑、邪見、貪等煩惱、隨煩惱業，能招後生雜染法故。 T 1585, p. 31b19-26 Cf. Wei Tat, 1973, pp. 413-415; Cook, 1999, p.185.

absence of delusion would hold and also the basis of the defilements Xuanzang does not go into detail in his commentary.⁵⁴

4.2.4 Vigor (*vīrya*, *jing jin* 精進) vs. Laziness (*kausīdya*, *xie tei* 懈怠)

The definition of vigor is as follows in the *CWSL*,

Diligence means “vigor”. In respect to practicing the wholesome and ceasing the unwholesome, being courageous and tenacious is its nature. To counteract laziness and complete wholesomeness is its activities. Courage refers to “undeflected progress” (*sheng jin* 勝進) [which] picks the various defiled dharmas up [and excludes them]; tenacity refers to the “fine purity” (*jing chun* 精純) [which] picks completely the indeterminacy (*avyākṛta*, *wu ji* 無記) up [and excludes it]. This shows that vigor allocates only to the wholesome nature [of the mind].⁵⁵

Emphasis of this definition lies on the vigor’s ability to exclude impure and neutral dharma to assure the exertion of the mind focuses only on wholesome practice. Later, Xuanzang gives following explanation: vigor is said to have five different characteristics: donning armor (*pi jia* 披甲), deepening practice (*jia xing* 加行), not willing to become inferior (*wu xia* 無下), not willing to retreat (*wu tui* 無退), and not willing to become satisfy (*wu zu* 無足). These five characteristics elaborate on another list of five kinds of attitudes connected with vigor: possessing power (*you shi* 有勢), possessing diligence (*you qin* 有勤), possessing courage (*you yong* 有勇), being firmly fierce (*jian meng* 堅猛), and not giving up the “yoke” of goodness (*bu she shan e* 不捨善軛).⁵⁶ The five characteristics are used to explain the specific features

⁵⁴ See Buescher 2007, pp. 84,1-17. Cf. Kawamura, 1964, pp. 75-77.

⁵⁵ 勤調精進，於善惡品修斷事中勇悍為性，對治懈怠滿善為業。勇表勝進簡諸染法，悍表精純簡淨無記，即顯精進唯善性攝。See T 1585, pp. 30a23-26. Cf. Wei Tat, 1973, p. 399; Cook, 1999, p.177.

⁵⁶ This kind of description of the vigor could also be found in the *Samgītiparyāya[pādaśāstra]* and the *Yogācārabhūmi*. For the description in the *Samgītiparyāya* see T 1536, p. 422b23-27: 諸聖弟子勤精進住有勢、有勤、有勇、堅猛，於諸善法常不捨軛，假使唯餘皮筋骨在、身諸血肉皆悉乾枯，為得所求殊勝善法，發勤精進有勢、有勤、有勇、堅猛、不捨善軛，若求證得精進熾然終無中廢，是名第四勝支。The other passages in the text see T 1536, p. 395a1-9. Passages that contain these descriptions are found in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* and the *Vastusamgrahaṇī*. One passage in the *Vastusamgrahaṇī* states, 又由五相發勤精進速證通慧：謂有勢力者，由被甲精進故；有精進者，由加行精進故；有勇捍者，由於廣大法中無怯劣

of vigor in the *AS*. In the section of explaining mental states, the *Xianyang*⁵⁷ also includes these five elaborations to describe the appearance of vigor. Considering the reference that the *CWSL* usually takes account of, Xuanzang combines the former with the latter and transforms them in a complete comment at his disposal. The five characteristics and their correlated elaborations are used to concretize the understanding of vigor in order to describe the correct attitudes which appear when one is vigorous. As Kuiji comments, donning armor denotes possessing power in the moment when the mind is fearless just like an armored soldier who takes part in the battle. Accordingly, deepening practice means possessing diligence that is needed to solidify the mind (*jian gu qi xin* 堅固其心) and to spur it toward the good; lack of being inferior (not willing to give up) releases one from self-despising and cowardice; lack of retreat (not willing to retreat) increases bravery and fierceness (*zeng yong rui* 增勇銳) and enables one to endure suffering from coldness and hotness; lack of satisfaction refers to the strength that eliminates wishes of moving backward. Therefore, it holds the mind to proceed in the right way as a “yoke” holds the cow and make it walking in the right direction.⁵⁸

On the contrary to the definition of vigor, the counterpart of it is as follows,

What is laziness? In respect to the practicing of the wholesome and ceasing of the unwholesome, being lazy (*lan duo* 懶惰) is its nature. To be able to hinder the vigor and increase defilements is its activities. Being encouraged in respect to the

精進故；有堅猛者，由寒熱蚊虻等所不能動精進故；有不捨善軛者，由於下劣無喜足精進故。(See T 1579, p. 778a16-21.) One could also see two passages that describe the five characteristics in different wording, and they are both slightly different from what is recorded in the *CWSL*. One in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*: 問：「世尊依何根處，說如是言，住有勢有勤，有勇健堅猛，於諸善法中，常不捨善軛？」

答：「依精進根說。此精進根略顯其相差別有五，謂被甲精進、方便精進、不下精進、無動精進、無喜足精進。」(T 1579, pp. 617b11-16.) One in the *Vastusamgrahaṇī*: 一、被甲精進，二、加行精進，三、不下精進，四、無動精進，五、無喜足精進。此中最初當知發起猛利樂欲，次隨所欲發起堅固勇悍方便，次為證得所受諸法，不自輕蔑亦無怯懼，次能堪忍寒熱等苦，後於下劣不生喜足。(T 1579, p. 801c13-18)

⁵⁷ 如經說：起精進住，有勢、有勤、有勇、堅猛、不捨善軛。See T 1602, p. 481c10-11.

⁵⁸ 述曰：即以經屬。《顯揚》但有經之五名，《對法》二名皆悉具有。八十九云：最初發起猛利樂欲，名被甲。經名有勢，如著鉀入陣即無所畏，有大威勢；次起堅固勇悍方便，名加行。經名有勤，堅固其心自策勤也；次為證得，不自輕蔑亦無怯懼，名無下。經名有勇，不自卑下更增勇銳；次能忍受寒、熱等苦，於劣等善不生厭足，欣求後勝品功德等，名無退。經名堅猛，遭苦不屈，堅猛其志；次後乃至漸次入諦觀等後勝道，名無足。經名不捨善軛，軛謂車軛，以軛牛者，令牛不出能有所往；善法亦爾，軛修行者不越善品，往涅槃宮修曾不足，從喻為稱。下顯位異。T 1830, p. 437c2-p. 643, a16.

various defilement is also named laziness because it retreats one from wholesome dharmas.⁵⁹

Only being motivated toward wholesome things can be called vigor. Motivation toward defilements is considered to be lazy; being motivated toward things which are neither wholesome nor unwholesome is considered to be identical with wishing and decisive resolve and therefore, their reaction not only does not have a nature by its own. Consequently, it cannot be called vigor or laziness.⁶⁰

4.2.5 Serenity (*praśrabdhi*, *qing an* 輕安) vs. Dullness (*styāna*, *hun chen* 昏沈)

Serenity is the mental state that considered to be beneficial for gaining meditative insight. In the *CWSL*, the definition of serenity is as follows,

Serenity means to lighten [the body and mind] and to be serene. To keep [one] away from the rough and heavy, to harmonize and to soothe the body and mind, and to become controlled and adaptive⁶¹ [in the mind] is its nature. To counteract dullness and to transform the basis⁶²[of perception] is its activity. It means that it oppresses and removes the dharmas which are able to obstruct the concentration

⁵⁹ 云何懈怠？於善惡品修斷事中懶惰為性，能障精進增染為業。調懈怠者滋長染故。於諸染事而策勤者，亦名懈怠，退善法故。See T 1585, p. 34b11-14. Cf. Wei Tat 1973, pp. 446-447; Cook 1999, pp. 202-203.

⁶⁰ Definition in the *TrBh* regarding these two factors are rather short and quite similar to the *CWSL*. The main difference is that Sthiramati adds some details in the definition of laziness and consider it as provisional *dharma* which is one portion of delusion, different from the *CWSL*. In the *TrBh*, it is also account as laziness if one indulges oneself in the comfort feeling such as sleeping and relaxing while practicing wholesomeness. This could be the response to one of the perspectives of vigor, namely, the lack of retreat which allows one to endure the uncomfortableness, recorded in *śāstra* such as *Yogācārabhūmi*. For the definition of vigor see Buescher 2007, pp. 78, 13-15. Cf. Kawamura 1964, pp. 72. For the definition of laziness see Buescher 2007, pp. 96, 15-17. Cf. Kawamura 1964, pp. 88.

⁶¹ The possible Sanskrit for the term for *kan ren* (堪任) is “*karmaṇya*”. See the *PSk*, Li and Steinkellner 2008, p. 7, 3-4. According to Monier-Williams Sanskrit-English Dictionary, this term has the meaning such as “skillful in work” or describes something is “proper or fit for any act”.

⁶² Transformation of the basis is to transform the defiled basis that gives rise to all the pure and defiled dharmas with out-flow into pure one which does not generate karmic acts. It is a transformation of the cognition, it turns the discriminated cognition into the undiscriminated form and thus turn the unenlightened state into enlightened. For studies related to this concept, see Yokoyama 1978 and 1979, pp.228-231; Hattori 1985; Davidson 1985. Research specifically regarding the doctrine of transformation of basis in the *CWSL* see Chao 2011.

because it causes [the current] basis [of arising perception] to transform into a serene and comfortable [state].⁶³

In the *CWSL*, when the serenity arises it works on both the body and mind, however, the *TrBh* explains the serenity of the body and mind separately.⁶⁴ The mental serenity refers to the light and smooth mental state which arise during meditative practice; bodily serenity means the physical comfort caused by a delightful mind. Although Xuanzang does not emphasize this distinction, Kuiji does mention two kinds of serenity in his commentary, the serenity with outflow (*you lou qing an* 有漏輕安) and the other kind without outflow (*wu lou qing an* 無漏輕安).

According to Pukuang's commentary on the *AKBh*, the Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika argue about the problem concerning bodily serenity and mental serenity. In short, the former thinks both bodily and mental serenity belong to the field of wholesome mental factors, whilst the latter recognizes only mental serenity as wholesomeness, and bodily serenity as a kind of sensory contact which is not necessarily wholesome. Since serenity is one limb of enlightenment (*bodhy-aṅga*, *jue zhi* 覺支), it, obviously, should be without outflow. If one classifies the bodily serenity among the wholesome mental factors, then, this factor will associate with sensual perception and become a factor with outflow. However, as in many cases mentioned before, Sarvāstivāda insists that one could name a thing together with its cause. Furthermore, bodily serenity is capable to yield mental serenity to occur, which is one limb of enlightenment. Therefore, bodily serenity can be named as serenity and also be included in the category of wholesome mental factors.⁶⁵

⁶³ 「安」謂輕安，遠離麤重，調暢身心，堪任為性；對治昏沈，轉依為業。謂此伏除能障定法，令所依止轉安適故。See T 1585, p. 30b5-7. Cf. Wei Tat, 1973, p. 401; Cook, 1999, p.178.

⁶⁴ One could find *kāya-karmaṇyatā* and *citta-karmaṇyatā* in Sthiramati's definition of serenity. See Buescher 2007, p. 78, 16-80,7. Cf. Kawamura, 1964, p. 72.

⁶⁵ The controversy concerning whether bodily serenity could be count as one member of enlightenment is recorded in *ABKh*. See Pradhan, 1967, p.55,11-16: *katham sā bodhyaṅgam ity ucyate / bodhyaṅgānukūlyāt / sā hi kāyakarmaṇyatā cittakarmaṇyatā bodhyaṅgam āvahati / asti punaḥ kvacit anyatrāpy evaṃ drśyate / astīty āha / tad yathā prītiḥ prītiśānīyās ca dharmāḥ prītisambodhyaṅgam uktam bhagavatā / pratighaḥ pratighanimittam ca vyāpādanivaraṇam uktam / samyakdṛṣṭisamkalpavyāyāmās ca prajñāskandha uktāḥ / na*

This debate, probably, provides the background that leads to different distinguished names given to serenity in the *TrBh* and Kuiji's commentary on the *CWSL*. In the *TrBh*, both the arising of bodily and mental serenity eliminates roughness of thoughts and sensual feelings; they only correlate to wholesome activities. Mental serenity refers to the mental state of meditation and bodily serenity indicates the physical experiences of pleasure caused by the pleasing mind. It seems that the concern regarding serenity with outflow might conflict with its position to be a limb of enlightenment is not an important issue here.

Taking a different approach, Kuiji follows the tradition that distinguishes serenity into serenity with and without outflow. Serenity without outflow eliminates the roughness with outflow (*you lou cu zhong* 有漏麤重), the remaining habitus of *Arhat* and the self-enlightened one (*pratyekabuddha*, *du jue* 獨覺) from the prior contamination and the impregnation (*xun xi*, 熏習) before their latent tendency (*sui mian* 隨眠) is cut off. On the other hand, serenity with outflow eliminates the roughness of affiliations (*fan nao cu zhong* 煩惱麤重) and general disturbances, including bodily and mental, of sentient beings.⁶⁶ The distinction might suggest that the meaning of serenity include not only psychological and physical experiences that are

ca saṃkalpavyāyāmau prajñāsvabhāvau tasyās tv anuguṇāv iti tācchabdyam labhete / evaṃ kāyaprasārabdhir api bodhyaṅgānugūnyād bodhyaṅgaśabdaṃ labhate//; Chinese parallel see T 1558, p. 19b6-16: 輕安者謂心堪任性。豈無經亦說有身輕安耶？雖非無說，此如身受應知亦爾，如何可立此為覺支？應知此中身輕安者身堪任性。復如何說此為覺支？能順覺支故無有失。以身輕安能引覺支心輕安故。於餘亦見有是說耶？有，如經說：喜及順喜法名喜覺支。瞋及瞋因緣名瞋恚蓋。正見、正思惟、正勤名慧蘊。思惟及勤雖非慧性，隨順慧故亦得慧名，故身輕安順覺支故得名無失。 Cf. Sangpo, 2012 pp516. In Pukuang's commentary, he first signifies the two schools who were arguing about this issue are Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika. Then, he points out that Sautrāntika considers only the mental serenity a member of enlightenment but not the bodily serenity which in their doctrine, is one kind of body experience and could be understood as part of sensory contact. However, Sarvāstivāda consider both mental and bodily serenity as member of enlightenment since bodily serenity could serve as the cause to bring forward the mental serenity. This principle of Sarvāstivāda is also recorded in the *Nyāyānusāra* (See T1562, p. 391b6-14). Pukuang's explanation see T 1821, p. 75a29-76a18.

⁶⁶ For Kuiji's comment on two kinds of serenity see T 1830, p. 438, a13-20: 亦牒頌解，謂輕而安隱；離重名輕，調暢名安。此有二種：一、無漏者。除有漏麤重，麤重通三性；二、有漏者。除煩惱麤重，唯是善性。此正對治昏沈一法，然《對法》說：「除一切障」，《顯揚》云：「除麤重」；然《對法》第十說亦同之。彼約通障，此約別障；以昏沈是無堪任性，安是堪任，故唯除彼。 Serenity with out-flow and the serenity without out-flow are also mentioned in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*. See T 1579, p. 625b16-25.: 復次略有二種麤重：一、漏麤重，二、有漏麤重。漏麤重者，阿羅漢等修道所斷，煩惱斷時皆悉永離。此謂有隨眠者，有識身中不安隱性，無堪能性；有漏麤重者，隨眠斷時從漏所生漏所熏發，本所得性不安隱性，苦依附性與彼相似無堪能性，皆得微薄。又此有漏麤重名煩惱習，阿羅漢獨覺所未能斷，唯有如來能究竟斷，是故說彼名永斷習氣不共佛法，是名煩惱雜染由五種相差別建立。

beneficial for gaining meditative insight but also the remedy that removes the subtle fetter of people who has already achieved supermundane mental state.

The opposite factor that serenity counteract is dullness which hinders meditative insight,

What is dullness? In respect to the object, to let the mind not to have any control [of the object] and not to become adaptive [to the object] is its nature. To hinder serenity and the [meditative] observation is its activities.⁶⁷

Dullness and two other factors, excitement and distraction, are the three factors which Xuanzang does not give a correct interpretation but only lists three different interpretations regarding whether their states of becoming are real or provisional.

The three opinions are as follows: (1) dullness is a portion of delusion, since it shares characteristics, torpor and heaviness (*hun mei shen zhong* 昏昧沈重), with delusion.⁶⁸ (2) Characteristic of dullness is non-adaptability (*wu kan ren* 無堪任), a quality that all the defilements contain. Since delusion is the predominate condition in arising all the defilements, we say that dullness is one portion of delusion. (3) Dullness has its own self-nature, blunt heaviness (*meng zhong* 瞢重), and should be seen as a real *dharma*. The blunt heaviness makes *dharmas* that arise together with dullness become unadaptable. If dullness has no specific character other than being a kind of defilement, how could it hinder meditative observation (*vipaśyanā*, 毘鉢舍那)? Though Xuanzang does not give a judgment of his own, Kuiji comments that the third interpretation should be the correct one: dullness has its own characteristic, and excitement and distraction as well.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ 云何昏沈？令心於境，無堪任為性；能障輕安、毘鉢舍那為業。See T 1585, p. 34, a19-20. Cf. Wei Tat, 1973, p. 445; Cook, 1999, p.201.

⁶⁸ This opinion is recorded in *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*: 覆、誑、諂、昏沈、睡眠、惡作是癡分故，皆世俗有。See T 1579, p. 604b2-3. And also in the *AS*: *styānaṃ katamat/ mohāṃśikā cittākarmaṇya[tā / sa]rvakleśopakleśāhāyākarmankam*// See Gokhale, 1947, p. 17, 29; Pradhan (1950), p.9, 8-9 Chinese parallel: 何等昏沈？謂愚癡分，心無堪任為體，障毘鉢舍那為業。See T 1605, p. 665a24-25. Tibetan parallel: *rmugs pa gang zhe na/ gti mug gi char gtogs pa'i sems las su mi rung ba nyid de/ nyon mongs pa dang/ nye ba'i nyon mongs pa thams cad kyi grogs byed pa'i las can no* See D. no.4049, ri 51a5, P. vol.112, no.5550, li 59a2-3.

⁶⁹ 掉、昏、亂三有義是假，有義是實，如前說故，今取實者為勝。See T 1830, p. 462, b24-26.

Sthiramati's commentary somehow touches upon all three interpretations. Even though he agrees that the nature of dullness is heaviness (*staimitya*), dullness shares similarities with the nature of delusion that makes one's mind blind. In his own words, due to heaviness, the mind could not move and is thus blind. For this reason, Sthiramati considers dullness as one portion of delusion co-existing with all the defilements.⁷⁰

4.2.6 Non-Carelessness (*apramāda, bu fang yi* 不放逸) vs. Carelessness (*pramāda, fang yi* 放逸)

Non-carelessness is one of the three provisional dharmas in the eleven wholesome factors. Depending on the function of vigor and the three wholesome roots, the non-carelessness plays a role to smooth the process of these three. Apart from these four bases, non-carelessness does not have its own basis because it does not have its own self-characteristic.

Non-carelessness [arise together with] vigor and the three [good] roots. In respect to what needs to be ceased and cultivated, avoiding and cultivating is its nature.

To counteract the carelessness and to achieve and complete every single mundane (*shi* 世) and supramundane (*chu shi* 出世)⁷¹ wholesomeness is its activities.⁷²

Facing the challenges from the opponents, Xuanzang reveals the fact that non-carelessness lacks a self-characteristic by means of inference. The most distinctive description which could be argued for being the self-characteristic is “avoiding and cultivating”. Xuanzang then takes it as a starting point to declare that avoiding and cultivating are common characteristics that can be observed in vigor and the three roots as well. Thereafter, he further proposes three possible characteristics: non-distraction (*bu san luan* 不散亂), synchronizing with the object, and non-forgetting. Relatively, he assigns those three characteristics to equanimity, sensory

⁷⁰ See Buescher 2007, pp. 96, 1-4. Cf. Kawamura, 1964, pp. 86-87.

⁷¹ The *CWSL* and its commentaries do not specify the meaning of mundane and supramundane. However, one could understand these terms in reference to the world that sentient being lives and the world out of the six realms.

⁷² 「不放逸」者：精進、三根，於所斷、修、防、修為性；對治放逸，成滿一切世、出世間善事為業。T31, no. 1585, p. 30, b7-9. Cf. Wei Tat, 1973, p. 401; Cook, 1999, p.178.

contact, and memorizing. As a consequence, non-carelessness must not have its own character but only relies on other factors to arise.

Accordingly, the counterpart of non-carelessness, carelessness, is based on three unwholesome roots and the laziness,

What is carelessness? In respect to avoiding the defilements and cultivating purity, not being able to avoid and cultivate, to be self-indulging and undisciplined are its nature. To hinder non-carelessness, being the basis of increasing unwholesomeness and damaging wholesomeness is its activity.⁷³

Sthiramati's explanation is almost the same as what is spoken in *CWSL*. Most importantly, he also agrees that non-carelessness and carelessness are both provisional and arise depending on the three roots (wholesome and unwholesome), vigor, and laziness.⁷⁴

4.2.7 Equanimity (*upekṣa*, *xing she* 行捨) vs. Excitement (*auddhatya*, *diao ju* 掉舉)

Both definitions of equanimity and its influence are defined similarly in the *TrBh* and the *CWSL*. In short, the two commentators bring forward three qualities of equanimity and their influences on three practicing stages. The definition in the *CWSL* is as follows,

What is equanimity? [It arises together with] the vigor and the three [wholesome] roots. To let the mind be even, upright, and abiding on effortlessness are its nature. To counteract excitement and to [let the mind] calmly abiding is its activities. This means the four dharmas (vigor and the three roots) that draw the mind away from the hindrances such as excitement etc., and let it abide calmly, [therefore], it is named equanimity. Evenness, uprightness, and effortlessness, distinguish initial

⁷³ 云何放逸？於染、淨品，不能防、修，縱蕩為性；障不放逸，增惡損善所依為業。See T 1585, p. 34, b17-19. Cf. Wei Tat, 1973, p. 447; Cook, 1999, p.203.

⁷⁴ For the definition of non-carelessness see Buescher 2007, pp. 80, 7-11. Cf. Kawamura, 1964, p. 73. For the definition of carelessness see Buescher 2007, p. 96, 18-21. Cf. Kawamura, 1964, p. 88.

middle and final levels [of equanimity]⁷⁵. The non-carelessness first eliminate the defilements and the equanimity later lets the mind calmly abide.⁷⁶

Equanimity is similar to non-carelessness: it arises dependent on the four dharmas listed in the definition, and therefore, it is provisional. Equanimity seems not to be a controversial factor, both Sthiramati⁷⁷ and Xuanzang does not specify an oppositional interpretation to refute.

The opposite factor counteracted by equanimity is excitement.

What is excitement? In respect to the object, to let the mind not calm is its nature.

To be able to hinder the equanimity and stability (*śamatha*) is its activity.⁷⁸

Similar to the case of dullness, there are three interpretations recorded in the *CWSL*: (1) Excitement is one portion of greed since it helps one to recall the pleasure one had before.⁷⁹ (2) Excitement is a common characteristic that is shared by all defilements. (3) Due to its ability to hinder meditative stability (*śamatha*), excitement is a real dharma that has restlessness (*xiao dong* 囂動) as its self-characteristic since it makes the related mental state not calm.⁸⁰

Sthiramati's interpretation is identical to the first one which considers the arising of excitement depends on the remembrance of the laughter, delight, and fun that previously

⁷⁵ According to Kuiji's commentary, the initial, middle and final level refer to three intensities of the serenity. The initial level of serenity makes the mind even; the middle level makes the mind being honest and fearless; the final level makes the mind being serene without exertion. See T 1830, p. 439 a3-5: 初心平等，遠離加行；次心正直，於染無怯；後無功用。

⁷⁶ 云何「行捨」？精進、三根，令心平等、正直、無功用住為性；對治掉舉，靜住為業。調即四法，令心遠離掉舉等障、靜住，名捨。平等、正直、無功用住，初、中、後位，辯捨差別。由不放逸先除雜染；捨復令心寂靜而住。See T 1585, p. 30, b21-26. Cf. Wei Tat, 1973, p. 403; Cook, 1999, p.179.

⁷⁷ See Buescher 2007, p. 80,17-82,8. Cf. Kawamura, 1964, pp. 73-74.

⁷⁸ 云何掉舉？令心於境不寂靜為性；能障行捨、奢摩他為業。T 1585, p. 34, a7-8. Cf. Wei Tat, 1973, pp. 442-443; Cook, 1999, p.200.

⁷⁹ Both *Yogācārabhūmi* and the *AS* recorded excitement as one portion of greed. *Yogācārabhūmi*: 慳、橋、掉舉是貪分故，皆世俗有。See T 1579, pp. 604b1-2. The *AS*: *auddhatyaṃ katamat/ śubhanimittam anusarato rāgāṃśikaś cetaso 'vyupaśamah/ śamathaparipanthakarmakam//* See Gokhale (1947) pp. 17, 30; Pradhan (1950), pp.9, 9-10. Chinese parallel: 何等掉舉？謂貪欲分，隨念淨相，心不寂靜為體，障奢摩他為業。See T 1605, pp. 665a25-27. Tibetan parallel: *rgod pa gang zhe na/ sdud pa'i mtshan ma rjes su 'jug pa'i 'dod chags kyi char gtogs pa'i sems rnam par ma zhi ba ste/ zhi gnas kyi bar du gcod pa'i las can no//* See D. no.4049, ri 51a5-6, P. vol.112, no.5550, li 59a3-4.

⁸⁰ Restlessness (囂動) is similar to the description in *Prakarāṇa*: 掉舉云何？謂心不寂靜、心不擔怕、心不寧謐掉動飄舉，心躁擾性，是名掉舉。See T 1542, pp. 700b6-8.

happened. His interpretation is similar to the description given in the *Xianyang*, which attributes the cause of excitement to the clinging to pleasures from the past.⁸¹

4.2.8 Non-harmfulness (*ahiṃsā, bu hai* 不害) vs. Harmfulness (*vihiṃsā, hai* 害)

Non-harmfulness in the *CWSL* is defined as,

What is non-harmfulness? In respect to sentient beings, not injuring [them], not being annoyed [by them], and being absence of anger is its nature. To be able to counteract the harmfulness, and to be compassionate is its activity.⁸²

The arising of non-harmlessness depends only on absence of anger whose main characteristic is non-irritation and coherent with non-annoyed, thus, non-harmlessness is designated and only one portion of absence of anger. The reason to still list this factor as one separated dharma is to distinguish absence of anger and non-harmlessness by the possible activities that follow their arising, the loving-kindness and compassion. The two important qualities of the *Buddhisatva* are two sides of one state, the former appears in order to give pleasure to sentient beings, and the latter to remove suffering. According to the doctrine of the *CWSL*, the absence of anger is one essential trait of kindness, whilst compassion bears non-harmfulness as its characteristic. Moreover, nuances appear in the descriptions of their counteracting factors: anger is a fury that makes one intend to take others' life; harmfulness is annoyance injuring others. According to Kuiji's commentary, this description is in accord with the one given in the *Xianyang*⁸³.

Sthiramati also mentions the connection between the non-harmfulness and compassion. For him, the non-harmfulness is in nature the compassion. It is also the reason for a non-harmful

⁸¹ 掉舉者，謂依不正尋求，或復追念曾所經見戲樂等事，心不靜息為體。能障奢摩他為業，乃至增長掉舉為業。如經說：汝為掉動亦復高舉，乃至廣說。See T 1602, p. 482c10-14.

⁸² 云何「不害」？於諸有情，不為損惱，無瞋為性；能對治害，悲愍為業。See T 1585, p. 30, b28-p. 439, a26. Cf. Wei Tat, 1973, pp. 403-405.

⁸³ 謂慈以無瞋善根為體，悲以不害善根為體，喜以不嫉善根為體，捨以無貪、無瞋善根為體。See T 1602, p. 497b13-15.

mind to empathize other's position. In this regard, Sthiramati provides an interesting etymological analysis: since the Sanskrit term for compassion, *karuṇā*, is the combination of *ka* (happiness) and *rudh* (confine)⁸⁴, the arising of compassion interrupts pleasing feeling, stops one's own happiness and enable one to feel the suffering of others. Therefore, he would probably agree with the distinction between non-harmfulness and absence of anger.⁸⁵

Harmfulness, on the hand, hinders empathy toward others,

What is harmfulness? In respect to all sentient beings, having no compassion, [the intend] to injure [others], and becoming annoyed [by them] is its nature. To hinder the non-harmfulness, to force and to annoy [others] is its activity. This means, a harmer [is named so] because [he] force and annoy other. [Harmfulness] is also one portion of anger because apart from anger, there is no characteristic and function of harmfulness. The distinctiveness of anger and harmfulness, one should know in accordance with what is explained in the eleven wholesome mental factors.⁸⁶

Whilst non-harmfulness arises as a real dharma, the arising of non-harmfulness is provisional and based on greed. It is the one portion of greed which contradicts the nature of non-harmfulness and its appearance including the absence of anger.

4.2.9 Final Remarks

Some mental factors are not specified clearly in the *CWSL*, namely, (1) some provisional factors in the category of secondary defilement, and (2) the four undetermined factors.

In case of the provisional dharmas, they rely on real dharmas to arise. Therefore, when the real factor becomes rectified, the provisional factor that depend on it will lose the basis for

⁸⁴ See Buescher 2007, p.82, 10. *kaṃ ruṇaddhīti karuṇā*.

⁸⁵ See Buescher 2007, p. 82, 9-12. Cf. Kawamura, 1964, pp. 74-75.

⁸⁶ 云何為害？於諸有情，心無悲愍，損惱為性；能障不害，逼惱為業。謂有害者，逼惱他故。此亦瞋恚一分為體，離瞋無別害相用故。瞋、害別相，准善應說。See T 1585, p. 33, c13-16. Cf. Wei Tat, 1973, pp. 439-441; Cook, 1999, p.199.

support. This principle can be applied to all the secondary mental factors whose counteraction is not defined. Fury (*krodha*, *fen* 忿), resentment (*upanāha*, *hen* 恨), spite (*pradāśa*, *nao* 惱), and jealousy (*īrṣyā*, *ji* 嫉) all are classified as portions of anger. The remedy to avoid the arising of angers to substitute them with the factor “absence of anger”. Factors which arise with support of greed –avarice (*mātsarya*, *jian* 慳) and pride (*mada*, *jiao* 驕) – the absence of greed will be their remedy. Factors which rely on both greed and delusion – deceit (*māyā*, *kuang* 誑) and guile (*śāṭhya*, *chan* 諂) – the absence of greed and the absence of delusion together counteract their negative influences. Hypocrisy (*mrakṣa*, *fu* 覆) can be explained as one portion of greed or as portion of both greed and delusion. The remaining three factors – “absence of memorizing” (*muṣitasmr̥titā*, *shi nian* 失念), distraction (*vikṣepa*, *san luan* 散亂), and non-insight (*asamprajanya*, *bu zheng zhi* 不正知) – relatively hinders correct memorizing, correct concentration, and correct discernment. Reconsidering the opinion in the *AKBh*⁸⁷ and the *Yogācārabhūmi*,⁸⁸ the *CWSL* categorizes the absence of memorizing as one portion of delusion and memorizing. Likewise, non-insight is considered one portion of delusion and discernment. With regard to distraction, three interpretations are recorded and no definitive answer is given. The *Yogācārabhūmi* takes distraction also as one portion of delusion, similar to the absence of memorizing and non-insight. The second opinion belongs to the *AS* and *Sthiramati*, saying that distraction is one portion of all three bad roots, greed, anger, and delusion. The third opinion deems distraction as an independent factor whose self-characteristic is “agitated disturbance” (*zao rao* 躁擾).

The four factors in the last category are sleepiness (*middha*, *mian* 眠), regret (*kaukr̥tya*, *hui* 悔), rough examination (*vitarka*, *xun* 尋), and subtle investigation (*vicāra*, *si* 伺). They

⁸⁷ The *AKBh* considers absence of memorizing as one form of memorizing arising from contaminated mind. See T 1558, p. 19c20-21: 染污念名為失念，染污等持名為心亂，諸染污慧名不正知。According to this point, the *CWSL* further elaborates its position that absence of memorizing cannot be one portion of only memorizing. Considering the fact that absence of memorizing always arises together with the contaminated mind and the memorizing is always not there when the mind is contaminated, the memorizing alone cannot support the occurrence of absence of memorizing but needs delusion as the arising requirement.

⁸⁸ See T 1579, p. 604, b4-5: 忘念、散亂、惡慧是癡分故，一切皆是世俗有。

are said to be undetermined by virtue of the uncertainty of their influences since indefinite circumstance may cause their arising. This means, the domain of the cognitive object that support their arising is indefinite and changes according to the condition. Their appearances vary often and cannot be defined easily as the other mental factors. As a consequence, discussing their counterparts cannot be done.

Concluding from our discussion about wholesome and defiled mental factors on counteraction (4.1.3), the correlation between wholesome and defiled mental factors exists if two factors operate with the object of the same kind but hold opposite mode of apprehension. This principle can be observed easily in the eleven wholesome factors and the unwholesome factors they counteract. Faith, for example, delineates the acceptant, delight, and desirable ways to apprehend the cognitive objects relate to actuality, merit, and capability. To be more precise, a faithful mind conceives the cognitive object with full acceptance of the four truths and thus have awareness of its impermanent nature and causal appearance. Furthermore, a faithful mind also perceives the three treasures in the way of being delightful and have confident that their doing is virtuous and bring merit. Finally, a faithful mind grasps every mundane and supramundane wholesomeness with desire and have a belief that one could achieve such wholesomeness. Based on these qualities, faith is able to counteract non-faith whose characteristic is to make the mind to be unacceptance, unpleasant and undesirable in apprehending the actuality of the beings, the virtue of three treasures and the wholesome doing in and out of this world. Different responses to objects come from the opposite nature of the mind, if purified or polluted. As a consequence, the karmic activities set free by these opposing mental factors is also opposed to each other and repel each other. One cannot enjoy the good but is lazy practicing good at the same time. This structure of counteracting can also be seen in the description of other wholesome factors and their counterparts.

Counteraction functions on the premise of having fully understood the Buddha's teaching. With the teaching as basis, thoughts that coincide with the true teaching arise and, therefore,

the beneficial apprehension toward the cognitive object becomes manifest whilst substituting unbeneficial apprehension. This principle enables the wholesome factor to repel the defiled factor with its opposite characteristic whereby working on the same object. Furthermore, the right order of apprehending becomes the remedy that helps one to abandon the wrong order. Thus, counteraction serves as a therapeutic means aiming to change the cognitive patterns in favor of correct knowledge. Enumerating all the factors and classifying them according their beneficial and unbeneficial values is an indispensable guidance and practice of the soteriology of the *CWSL*.

4.3. Conclusion

In order to orientate the thought correctly and strengthen the arising of correct activity, one needs to see things on the basis of correct understanding of Buddha's teaching. Responding to this point, right and wrong views which are listed in Buddhist treatises demonstrate the beneficial and unbeneficial way to apprehend the sensual and mental perception. Since a view itself is rigid, no matter right or wrong it is not a correction of the wrong view but rather a substitution to the wrong one. In general, the right view is the mode of seeing which is free from attachment. It is a way to be practiced not to a view that can be adopted.

Following the principle of the right and wrong view, mental factors which reflect the mode the mind apprehends cognitive objects are classified into wholesome and defiled. The function of the beneficial mental factor rests in its ability to "counteract" the negative factors, what is described as a "cure" against defilement. Since a factor, similar to a view, cannot be adopted, "cure" refers to therapeutic means that forms the mind and enable it to make cognitive changes. In principle, the way to counteract the defiled mental factors is to practice opposite factors as it is the case with abandoning wrong views. Namely, counteraction means that the wholesome factor rectifies the defiled factor with the opposite characteristic. "Opposition"

denotes two factors having conflicted characteristics, but it also may indicate the absence of the opposing factor. Among the fifty-one mental factors, discernment has the characteristic to select the correct value according to the right teaching and is related to the first element of the eightfold path, the correct view. Discernment listed in the *CWSL* is the form of judgment which correspond to the Buddhist teaching. On the contrary, the wrong view is the inaccurate form of discernment that makes a judgment without Buddhist knowledge.

In the second part of this chapter, we have analyzed the definitions of the eleven wholesome mental factors and the defilements they counteract. The eleven wholesome factors are faith, shame, embarrassment, absence of greed, absence of anger, absence of delusion, vigor, serenity, non-carelessness, equanimity, and non-harmfulness. Each of them has counterparts with opposite characteristics.

Description of the first wholesome factor, the faith, is usually related to the full conviction, desire to be pure, and the mental state of purity in many Abhidharmic treatises. In the *CWSL*, Xuanzang specifies its nature and activity in order to coincide with the formal structure of the definition. Slightly distinctive from other treaties, the *CWSL* emphasizes describing the meaning of “purifying of the mind” with a metaphor of the “pearl of water purifying”. This leads to Pukuang and Kuiji’s further elaboration. The former tries to coincide the function of the pearl to the water with the function of faith to the mind while the latter aims to explain the relation between purifying and the mind from a grammatical perspective. The faith counteracts the non-faith whose self-characteristic, polluting of the mind, opposite to it.

The shame and embarrassment are a force to bring about the correct action on the basis of the moral judgment of oneself and worldly views. Sharing the common characteristic of “feels ashamed in regard to the transgression and unwholesomeness”, these two factors are similar but distinguishable due to their different specific characteristics, “revere and respect” and “despise and resist”. Having the opposite attitude toward sages and vileness, the “lack of

shame” and “lack of embarrassment” are the unwholesome factors that shall be counteracted by the shame and embarrassment.

The three wholesome roots—the absence of greed, absence of anger, and absence of delusion—are the predominant condition for the elimination of the unwholesomeness caused by their counterparts- greed, anger, and delusion. Among the three roots, absence of delusion whose function eliminates nescience is highly related to the discernment, the mental ability of judgment, and, therefore, the discussion concerning their difference is recorded in the *CWSL*. The discernment though is not identical to the absence of delusion, it is a major factor that causes the arising of the three wholesome roots and also serves as the assistant to counteract the three unwholesome ones.

The vigor and laziness are the seventh pair of counteractions in the list. Following the *AS* and the *Xianyang*, five characteristics are listed when Xuanzang comments on the vigor, namely, donning armor, deepening practice, lack of being inferior [of oneself], lack of retreat, and lack of satisfaction. Relatively, they represent five kinds of attitude when the vigor arises, possessing power, possessing diligence, possessing courage, being firmly fierce, and not giving up the yoke of goodness. These idiosyncrasies of vigor enable its counteracting against laziness. Contradicted to vigor, laziness is the inactive mental state regarding practicing wholesomeness and ceasing unwholesomeness. In addition, it is also defined as laziness, if one is vigorous toward the unwholesomeness.

Having the characteristic which lightens the mental and physical burden and keeps one serene, the serenity counteracts the dullness which makes the mind unable to adapt to the object and hinders the meditative insight. The debate regarding the necessity to establish bodily serenity and its virtue between Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika is not a big concern in *TrBh* and the *CWSL*. For Yogācāra, mental serenity refers to the mental state of meditation while bodily serenity refers to the physical pleasing experiences caused by the pleasing mind. In Shuji, serenity is distinguished into serenity without outflow and serenity with outflow. The former

refers to the antidote against the subtle fetter of *Arhat* and the self-enlightened one and the latter means the serene empirical phenomena, psychological and physical. As to the dullness that is counteracted by the serenity, because of its nature of non-adaptability which distracts the mind and hinders the meditative insight, it is said to be heaviness. Xuanzang does not give a certain answer concerning the independency of dullness, however, he tends to affirm it as having unique nature that is different from delusion.

Non-carelessness and carelessness are both provisional factors and designated on the basis of three good roots vigor and laziness. The equanimity is also provisional and depends on the same cause as non-carelessness to arise. However, whether the factor it counteracts, the excitement, is real or provisional is undetermined although there are three interpretations recorded in the *CWSL*. Non-harmfulness is the third provisional dharma in the list of eleven wholesome factors. It is one portion of absence of anger. In general, arising of absence of anger help the fulfillment of loving-kindness and non-harmfulness assist the occurrence of compassion. The counterpart of it, the harmfulness, is one portion of anger whose activity hinders empathy toward others.

In regard to those negative factors whose counterparts are not specified, two ways are possible to give a hint concerning their antidotes. First, one could tell the possible remedies of them through the beneficial mental states they hinder. According to Kuiji's understanding of non-arrogance and non-doubt, the factors which are able to counteract doubt and arrogance are most likely the shame and discernment since their arising repel the characteristics that raising oneself higher than others and hesitation. The second way which one could consider is to tell the support of those provisional factors which has negative influences. For some secondary defiled mental factors such as fury, resentment, spite, and jealousy that arise as one portion of anger; the avarice and pride that are supported by greed; deceit and guile relying on greed and delusion, to substitute the real defiled factors they depend on is sufficient to counteract them. Similarly, the counteraction for the absence of memorizing, distraction, and non-insight are

related to the factors they hinder, namely, the correct memorizing, correct concentration, and correct discernment. The counteraction of the four factors that belong to the category of indetermination—the sleepiness, regret, rough examination, and subtle investigation—is also not specified since both their arising condition and influence are uncertain.

The counteraction works when two factors function on the same object but hold an opposite mode of apprehension. The conflicted characteristics allow the wholesome factor to repel the correlated defiled one and, thus, substitute the unbeneficial mode of apprehending with the beneficial one. From the acceptance of the correct teaching to the alteration of thought and further influences the mode of apprehension toward the cognitive object, the counteraction refers to a therapeutic means that aims to change the cognitive patterns including the impulses, emotions, dispositions, moralities, or attitudes that link to it. Thus, enumerating the wholesome and defiled mental factors and the counteraction between them are purpose to demonstrate the practicing guidance for practitioners to orient their own thought and act accordingly.

Chapter Five Conclusion

To answer to the three research questions posed in the introduction—concerning, (1) how the mind and mental factors and their relationship are defined, (2) how cognitive activities embody the manifestation of karmic events and how the *CWSL* situates its doctrine of cognition in relation to the eight forms of consciousness, and (3) what the soteriological role of the mind and mental factors is—I examined the *CWSL* together with its commentaries as well as the related passages in Abhidharmic treatises. This has led me to propose the following conclusions.

Addressing the first point, I examined the definitions of mind (*citta*, *manas* and *vijñāna*) in the *AKBh*, *Samdh* and the *Yogācārabhūmi*. In the Yogācāra doctrine, and particularly in the *CWSL*, the mind is but one aspect of the transforming consciousness which functions to bring forth cognition. Proceeding from this, the mind only comes into being when consciousness is operating perceptual tasks and is conceptualized due to the cognitive activities that have arisen. The mind, whilst performing as the operator of cognition, collects the pure and impure influences and activities from the perceptual process which are triggered by perception. Such descriptions from Yogācāra treatises provide us with two understandings of the nature of the mind: it is (1) the center that produces the cognition and (2) the agent that actualizes karmic retribution. From the way the mind appears and due to its capacity to carry out cognizing events, we can know that it is a dynamic existent which simultaneously conducts perceptual reactions whilst being itself formed by the characteristics of arisen cognitive activities. Since consciousness is the agent that transforms the matured seed—the past karmic deed—from its latent state—the *ālayavijñāna*—into the presence, the mind, representing one form of consciousness, thus performs the same ability. To be more precise, in operating

cognition, the mind at once enables the appearance of cognitive activities, based on their own seeds, and at the same time accumulates reactions towards arisen activities, the newly created *karma*. In a nutshell, the mind bears the manifestation of past *karma* while collecting the pure, impure and neutral karmic influences. Thus, we know the mind to be a complex that consists of various mental activities which appear due to the process of cognition; it is an exhibitional instrument of perception that brings past *karma* into the present by means of cognitive activities whilst assembling and nourishing wholesome and unwholesome deeds.

The mental activities representing the cognitive moments—the so-called mental factors—concurrently constitute the appearance of the mind and define its nature in various ways. They can be impulses (i.e., greed), emotions (i.e., anger), dispositions (i.e., delusion, faith, etc.), morality (i.e., shame, embarrassment, etc.), or attitudes (i.e., serenity, vigor, equanimity, etc.). A wholesome mind, being beneficial to liberation, can consist of faith, equanimity, non-carelessness, non-harmfulness, etc. These factors, though generated by the mind, in turn define the appearance of the mind. As the domains of mind and mental factors seem to be overlapped, the relationship between them becomes an issue within debates between different teachers, who focus on the question of whether mental factors are independent *dharmas*. Although not without controversies, the Sarvāstivādins took the position that mental factors are independent *dharmas* which exist apart from the mind; a stance opposed by such teachers as Śrīlāta and Harivarman who deem them to be mere aspects of the mind. Akin to most of the early Yogācāra treatises, Xuanzang agrees with the former group and distinguishes the mental factors from the mind, albeit at the conventional level. This position coincides with the four-aspect theory of cognition, which explains cognition by distinguishing the concept of the nature of the cognitive moment and the manifestation of cognitive activities. Whilst self-cognition defines the characteristic of the cognizing mind *per se*,

the two components that enable the appearance of perceptual activities, the seen-aspect and the seeing-aspect, represent mental manifestations and reveal the state of the cognizing mind along with its cognitive activities. Therefore, mental factors do not exist apart from the mind; but they are also not identical to it. Being the basis of perception, the mind only manifests the general characteristic of an event while the mental factors determine its specific aspects.

Proceeding from this cognitive theory, I can now turn to answering the second research question. As already mentioned, the four aspect theory introduces four components that comprise cognition: the “seen-aspect”, “seeing-aspect”, “self-cognition” and “cognition of self-cognition”. Though this theory stems from Dignāga’s epistemology, Xuanzang adds two modifications so that it better suits the doctrine of the *CWSL*. First of all, he includes a reflexive component, the fourth aspect, to validate the cognitive result of perception (which seems to happen outside of the consciousness) that is confirmed by self-cognition. Second, he grants self-cognition the transformative power of creating the seen-aspect and seeing-aspect; namely, the capacity to bring forth perception and generate cognitive activities. According to this explanation, self-cognition is the very substance of the cognizing mind, which bears the characteristic of matured *karma* and, on the basis of this, transforms all activities of the perceptual complex.

This cognitive theory of the *CWSL* is established in cooperation with the eight forms of consciousness. In explaining the way consciousness brings forth latent *karma* and performs its manifestation in forms of cognition, Kuiji establishes two dimensions of transformation, the “transformation of the cause” and the “transformation of the effect”. The former denotes the maturation of the latent seed: in this dimension, the eight forms of consciousness are transformed and readied for the manifestation of the matured seed. The latter is the occurrence of cognition: here, the eight forms of

consciousness transform the seen-aspect and the seeing-aspect. This is exactly the phase in which the mind comes into existence conducts the task of cognition. Self-cognition, which bears the traits of the matured seed, becomes the basis of that cognizing mind, which transforms the subject and object of perception when manifesting past *karma*. When the seeing-aspect perceives the seen-aspect the cognitive moment is actualized. This cognitive moment contains five always active mental factors which accompany the arising of every mental state: First, sensory contact brings together the sense object, faculty and consciousness, and makes the mind dwell upon one object. Second, attention makes the mind aware of the existence of the cognitive object and further investigates its content. Third, sensation determines whether the cognitive object is agreeable, disagreeable, or neither. Fourth, conceptualization forms a concept of what one perceives. And fifth, volition urges the mind to act. These five mental factors become the substratum enabling the arising of various wholesome and unwholesome mental states; and this brings us to an important concept, counteraction, referring to the remedial wholesome mental states that serve to cure their opposing negative mental states or defilements.

Examining the supportive capacity of the mind and mental factors in reaching liberation, and their therapeutic function, was the third focus of my research. One can elaborate on the soteriological value of the mind and mental factors at two levels. First, at the more general level of understanding the mind and mental factors, their dependent nature indicates their supportive position in serving as a medium to reach liberation. Unlike the type of existence that is based on an imagined nature, which is only an illusionary fabrication, or the perfect nature, which denotes the true nature of all things, the dependent *dharmas* arise based on causes and conditions and therefore appear from their own seed. Dependent nature holds a special standing in establishing perfect nature, especially in the doctrine which accepts its double layers, and, in the *MS*, is considered

to have both pure and impure qualities. Except for accepting this notion provided by the *MS*, Xuanzang also takes the two layered model, also found in the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* and *Madhyāntavibhāga*, as the foundation in building his doctrinal system in the *CWSL*. The double-layered model of the doctrine of the three natures is grounded on the assumption that the eight forms of consciousness transform the perceiving subject (the seeing-aspect) and the perceived object (the seen-aspect). Existence which arises based on these two aspects is dependent and not necessarily problematic; the conceptualization of the result of perception is here imaginary and always contaminated. The combination of the pure dependent nature and its double layers suits the doctrine of the mind and mental factors in the *CWSL*. It is not only because their appearance is based on the perception of the two transformed aspects but also because the mind and mental factors can be wholesome and unwholesome, depending on the moral value of their own seeds. According to Kuiji's elaboration, beneficial mental states are helpful in building a mundane world and its quotidian experience to provide a platform for proper cognitive activities. As a consequence, the dependent mind and mental factors enables one's understanding to the established doctrinal categories at the level of conventional truth and creates possibilities for one to obtain the perfect way of knowing and the chance to reach liberation.

The other level concerns the therapeutic function of the wholesome mental factors when serving as counteragents to remedy the defilements. Counteraction functions on the basis of correct knowledge of the Buddha's teaching. Listed as the first element in the noble eightfold path, correct view leads to correct thought, contemplation, action, and so forth. Treatises that elaborate on this point derive various right views. According to Fuller's research, right and wrong view demonstrate the beneficial and unbeneficial propositional attitudes in apprehending this world. However, a view, no matter right or wrong, denotes a rigid way of seeing, and thus all have a negative influence when it

come to practices directed towards liberation and hence must ultimately be abandoned. Since right view is also a hindrance—it is to be practiced but not to be adopted. Certainly, it cannot serve as a correction to the wrong view but only as a substitution for it. Following the principle of right and wrong views, a mental factor categorized into the wholesome or defiled represents the right or wrong mode of apprehending the cognitive object. The definition of wholesome mental factors usually contains a term, counteraction, in describing the therapeutic function of this factor to “cure” its correlated defilement. A wholesome mental factor does not serve as a real medicine to detoxify unwholesomeness, it rather rectifies the factor by way of opposition. Counteracting works when two factors apprehend in the opposite mode but grasp cognitive objects of the same kind. “Opposition”, here, can refer to the antipodal characteristics of two factors, the absence of the defilements or the counteragent. With this principle, the *CWSL* enumerates eleven wholesome factors as counteragents that “cure” the factors that are opposite to them.

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