Essays on the International Political Economy of the United Nations General Assembly

Inauguraldissertation
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades
Doctor oeconomiae publicae (Dr. oec. publ.)
an der volkswirtschaftlichen Fakultät
an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

vorgelegt von
Simon Martin Thomas Mosler

2021

Referent: Prof. Dr. Niklas Potrafke
Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Uwe Sunde
Promotionsabschlussberatung: 14. Juli 2021

Our faith in freedom does not rest on the foreseeable results in particular circumstances but on the belief that it will, on balance, release more forces for the good than for the bad.

Friedrich August von Hayek (1960)

Acknowledgments

Niklas Potrafke has been a supervisor par excellence. I could not have wished for a better mentor, motivator and co-author. He has always had a sympathetic yet critical ear for my ideas, opened his doors whenever I needed advice, encouraged lively policy discussions, and made office days pleasant with his open-minded personality. He established an environment in which thoughts were free and research was fostered. I am grateful for his academic, professional and personal guidance throughout this journey.

My wholehearted gratitude extends to Uwe Sunde who quickly agreed to be the co-supervisor of my dissertation. His helpful feedback and academic advice enhanced my work. I thank him for his dedication to endorse junior researchers, and for his commitment to devote his time to my thesis. I thank Panu Poutvaara for completing the committee. I greatly benefited from his insightful comments over the last years.

Arye Hillman invited me to spend a research semester at Bar-Ilan University. He introduced me to a fascinating region, and laid the foundation for a chapter of my dissertation. I will always be grateful for his hospitality and our intellectual exchange.

The team at the ifo Center for Public Finance and Political Economy has been fantastic. Florian Dorn, Luisa Dörr, Stefanie Gäbler and Klaus Gründler answered numerous questions about econometrics, theory and life in general. Anina Harter and Fabian Ruthardt provided helpful feedback. Björn Kauder, Manuela Krause, Markus Reischmann and Marina Riem made my onboarding smooth and easy. I thank them all.

Clemens Fuest has been an inspiring example through his superb leadership and candour. Meinhard Knoche and Stephanie Dittmer have bolstered my academic development by granting numerous trips to present my research at academic conferences worldwide and attend international summer schools. It has been a privilege to be a doctoral student at the ifo Institute. I thank the board members for their continuous support and trust.

Martin Braml has been a splendid colleague and companion. His sharp thoughts strengthened my economic intuition, and his buoyant nature made life even more cheerful.

My greatest gratitude goes to my wonderful parents, Birgit and Dieter. This endeavour was only possible because of their unconditional and tireless support throughout the last three decades. They backed me in every step I took to accomplish this thesis: from nurturing my curiosity when I was a young child to last-minute checks to correct typos in the chapters[1]. Words cannot express my love and gratefulness for them.

[1] All remaining errors are my own.

Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Acronyms

G7 Group of Seven.

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

p.p. percentage points.

UN United Nations.

UN WEOG United Nations Group of Western European and Other States.

UNGA United Nations General Assembly.

US United States of America.

Preface

The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is the world's most prominent forum for international relations. As the chief deliberative, policy-making and representative organ of the United Nations (UN), discussions and outcomes in the UNGA have shaped global foreign affairs. Country representatives witnessed numerous memorable moments over the last 75 years. Some six decades ago, Nikita Khrushchev famously took off his shoe and furiously banged it on his table to protest against the Philippine delegation's claim that "Eastern Europe had been deprived of political and civil rights". Muammar Gaddafi was once introduced as the 'king of kings' before ripping a copy of the UN Charter in defiance of the organization, and Hugo Chavez perceived the "devil's smell of sulphur" after George W. Bush had delivered his speech the day before. When Yasser Arafat was invited to be the first speaker from a non-governmental organization, he entered the stage with an olive branch and a gun holster. "Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand", he warned the audience.

Member states of the UNGA regularly vote on resolutions which are non-binding, non-enforceable documents. Still, many decisions have made history: resolutions have led to the foundation of UNICEF which has saved millions of children's lives, proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that enshrines undeniable basic freedoms, or established the Sustainable Development Goals which fundamentally impact modern policy-making. More generally, a country's vote decisions on resolutions signal its stance on foreign policies. Through voting, a nation can send a message that expresses aspirations or concern, affirmation or condemnation, alignment or enmity. As a strategic instrument of a foreign ministry's repertoire, resolution voting may also be used to steer public discussions, express diplomatic intentions or reach political agreements. Yet, the reasons why a nation ultimately takes a certain voting decision are manifold, and often remain opaque. My thesis aims at shedding light on three factors: spatial peer effects, decoy voting, and fundamental policy shifts.

In **Chapter 1**, I address spatial peer effects on resolution voting in the UNGA. Scholars have shown that seat adjacency of fellow legislators affects voting decisions of members of

parliament at the sub-national (Masket, 2008), national (Cohen and Malloy, 2014; Saia, 2018) and trans-national level (Harmon et al., 2019). Physical proximity facilitates the interpretation of non-verbal expressions and emotions of counterparts (Dolan Jr, 2016; Renshon et al., 2017; Wong, 2020). 'Face-to-face' interactions may even activate neural synchronization processes which affect how diplomats interact (Holmes, 2013, 2018). I focus on delegates at the highest intergovernmental level who officially represent the foreign policy stance of their country, examine the directional component of peer effects, and distinguish between the strategic relevance of vote decisions.

I have compiled novel data on seating arrangements at the UNGA since country representatives first met at the UN Headquarters' General Assembly Hall in 1952. Data were obtained through historical, previously unpublished floor plans. Information include the date-specific physical position of delegations in the meeting venue, i.e. their seat, row and column number, and their location relative to neighboring delegations for 92 seating arrangements and votes on 5,334 contested resolutions. Institutionally, seating set-ups at the UNGA are subject to exogenous shocks: lots are drawn to determine which country occupies the first seat at the beginning of each session, new member states alter seating arrangements when they are admitted to the UNGA, and existing member states switch seats when they change their official English country name.

To examine whether voting behavior is affected by delegations seated nearby, I exploit the random variation of the exact position of country representatives in the UNGA. My results suggest that physical proximity in the meeting venue matters for voting outcomes: on average, the vote agreement rate of adjacently seated delegations is 0.23 to 0.29 percentage points (0.7 to 0.9 percent of a standard deviation) lower compared to all non-adjacent delegations for all resolutions. Opposite effects are observed for strategically important resolutions, however: seat neighbors are 0.72 to 1.24 percentage points (2.4 to 4 percent of a standard deviation) more likely to vote in line with Arab League member states on resolutions that deal with Middle Eastern issues. Vote agreement rates between former colonial powers and delegations seated across the aisle in the back or directly behind are 1.76 to 2.36 percentage points (5.6 to 7.5 percent of a standard deviation) higher compared to non-neighboring country representatives.

In **Chapter 2**, I examine whether autocratic governments use decoy voting in the UNGA to hide repression of their regimes. Becker et al. (2015) propose a model of expressive behavior to explain autocratic voting. In their model, autocratic rulers experience a loss of esteem when a resolution criticizes actions of their governments. Thus, they seek to deflect international attention from their repressive behavior by criticizing another country. To avoid a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in which autocratic regimes blame

each other, they establish a logrolling agreement, which is stable as voting outcomes at the UNGA are publicly published, and choose a decoy outside of their voting bloc.

Indeed, one member country of the UNGA appears intriguingly often on the debating agenda: the State of Israel. Since 1950, about one out of five of all contested resolutions in the UNGA was related to Israel or Palestinian issues, and more than nine out of ten of such resolutions entailed criticism towards the only Jewish-majority nation. Despite military confrontations in the 1950s and 1960s, average vote agreement rates with Israel have started to decrease during the 1970s. This decline did not only coincide with the admission of new autocratic regimes to the UNGA, but also with an increase in the number of resolutions that primarily dealt with recurring, non-topical issues related to Israel. Initial resentments against the State of Israel at the UN have made the country a natural decoy for autocratic regimes.

I empirically test the decoy voting hypothesis. My sample includes votes on 4,878 contested resolutions involving Israel between 1950 and 2018. The vote agreement rate of fully autocratic regimes with Israel is on average 3.2 percentage points or 18 percent of a standard deviation lower than among fully democratic governments for Israel- and Palestinian issues-related resolutions. The effect is more pronounced for resolutions that primarily deal with the State of Israel, with an estimated decline in voting alignment of 3.6 percentage points or 20 percent of a standard deviation. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that autocratic governments use resolutions against the only Jewish-majority state to fill the voting agenda and deflect attention from their regimes.

Finally, **Chapter 3** deals with foreign policy shifts of the United States of America (US) during the tenure of Donald Trump. To the surprise of many but himself, the Republican Party's nominee won the presidential election and assumed office in January 2017. The diplomatic relationship between the US and its Western allies deteriorated shortly thereafter. Donald Trump initiated trade wars with partners at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), threatened to withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and publicly snubbed heads of states of the Group of Seven (G7). The concurrent decline in common voting behavior between the US and Western countries on resolutions in the UNGA, as measured by the vote agreement rate and the absolute difference of ideal points, turns out to be statistically significant.

Heterogeneity analyses show a more diverse picture. While the US shifted its position relative to Western partners on resolutions that dealt with the Middle East or economic developments, for example, differences between both sides hardly changed for votes on nuclear proliferation or disarmament. Some countries such as the Republic of Korea or Hungary even had, on average, higher vote agreement rates with the US since Donald Trump's inauguration compared to all preceding US presidents. Concerning previous US

administrations, we note that relations with Western partners did not hit an all-time low during the Trump presidency: average vote agreement rates during George W. Bush's tenure were up to 7.0 percentage points lower.

One could conjecture that the ideological position of Western governments matters for political alignment with the Trump administration. Especially leftwing governments in allied countries may have been inclined to vote against the US since Donald Trump became president. The empirical results suggest that the alienation of Western allies is not driven by ideological distance based on a classical leftwing-rightwing government ideology scale, however.

Each chapter of my thesis is a self-contained research article and can be read independently. A consolidated bibliography and appendices for each chapter are included at the end of the thesis.

Chapter 1

Spatial Peer Effects on Resolution Voting Behavior

1.1 Introduction

"For some reason, we have a certain chemistry." The global community was bewildered when Donald Trump, then-president of the United States of America (US), summarized his relationship with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un after the Singapore Summit in 2018. After threats of nuclear annihilation, tense hostility and angry tweets late at night, a personal meeting led to a twist in US foreign policy. Although president Trump's diplomatic efforts may have been rather unorthodox, he was not the first to recognize the importance of face-to-face meetings. History provides many examples of personal interactions which shaped the trajectory of international diplomacy, including the July crisis before World War I, the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, or recent Middle East negotiations (Wong, 2016).

The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) constitutes the highest level of intergovernmental diplomacy. Delegates which execute voting on behalf of their countries, however, are still humans. Their decisions are not bounded by pure rationality, but may be subjected to trust, sensibilities, or affection (Van Rythoven and Sucharov, 2019). Such emotions are shaped by personal interactions with fellow delegates, and extend to how diplomats game the political arena. It is conceivable that physical proximity facilitates personal interactions, as well as information exchange, and thus affects voting behavior. Institutionally, seating arrangements in the UNGA are determined by a lottery and exogenous shocks, providing a source of random variation in physical proximity - and hence the likelihood of personal interactions - among delegates.

I compile novel data on seating set-ups in the UNGA since 1952. Using historical, previously unpublished floor plans, I reconstruct the date-specific physical location of each country delegation during sessions of the UNGA, which predominantly took place in the General Assembly Hall. My sample covers 92 exogenous alterations of seating arrangements which were triggered by the commencement of a new session, admission of member states and changes of official country names. To examine whether physical proximity matters for political alignment in the UNGA, I compare the vote agreement rates of adjacently and non-adjacently seated country delegations for votes on 5,334 resolutions.

My empirical results suggest that, on average, the vote agreement rate is 0.23 to 0.29 percentage points or 0.7 to 0.9 percent of a standard deviation lower for seating neighbors compared to all non-neighboring delegations. Further heterogeneity analyses show that spatial peer effects have been more pronounced in recent decades, depend on the exact relative position of two delegations, and may even lead to an increase in voting alignment for strategically important resolutions.

Scholars have long established that social networks matter for political outcomes. As Routt (1938) puts it, "personal contacts between human beings lie at the very heart of all problems of government". A common alumni connection among legislators, for example, sharply increases the likelihood of trading votes in the US Senate (Cohen and Malloy, 2014) and affects how interest groups allocate monetary contributions to political campaigns (Battaglini and Patacchini, 2018). Social connections are even considered a key determinant of overall legislative effectiveness (Battaglini et al., 2020).

A growing literature highlights the importance of physical proximity to reinforce political networks. For example, non-verbal expressions of intentions and emotions during diplomatic meetings, such as hand gestures or body language, carry enough emotive information to ultimately influence policy decisions of governments[1] (Dolan Jr, 2016; Renshon et al., 2017; Wong, 2020). Research in social neuroscience has identified subconscious mechanisms: physical proximity induces a feeling of intersubjectivity which let the human nervous systems become mutually attuned, enabling social bonding among political peers (Collins, 2005). In addition, face-to-face interactions activate the mirroring system of the human brain, a neural synchronization process between individuals, which facilitates to parse another diplomat's intentions (Holmes, 2013, 2018).

Scholars have shown that seating arrangements, as a mode of physical proximity, influence political outcomes. Deskmates at the California State Assembly are more likely to vote identically compared to non-deskmate legislators (Masket, 2008), and seat locations on the chamber floor impact the voting behavior of newly elected US Senators (Cohen and Malloy, 2014). Spatial effects also matter at the parliament of Iceland, where seat distributions are based on a lottery system: politicians are more likely to diverge from their own party line when the fraction of adjacently seated peers from an opposing party is higher (Saia, 2018). At the European Parliament, elected members are seated by surnames within each party group, and seat neighbors in the same row are 0.6 percentage points less likely to differ in their vote (Harmon et al., 2019). The proximity of randomly allocated offices for members of the US Congress, however, does not predict common voting patterns (Rogowski and Sinclair, 2012).

My research fills a gap in the political economy literature on spatial peer effects. Previous studies have focused on individual members of parliament in usually (sub-)national settings, rather than official representatives of countries at the highest intergovernmental level. I use novel data to identify directional effects of spatial positions on political align-

[1] Rapport (2017) notes that many theories in foreign policy analysis about cognitive mechanisms are biased toward populations that are Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic.

ment, distinguish between the strategic relevance of voting decisions, and cover a time period of over six decades.

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: section 1.2 presents a brief history of seating arrangements at intergovernmental organizations. Section 1.3 derives the research hypotheses to be examined empirically, describes the data on and institutional background of seating set-ups at the UNGA, and presents the empirical model to examine whether physical proximity influences resolution voting outcomes. The results are shown in section 1.4. Robustness tests are discussed in section 1.5. Section 1.6 concludes.

1.2 History of Seating Arrangements at Intergovernmental Organizations

The League of Nations was among the first global forums after World War I. Founded in 1920, the organization fostered diplomatic exchange, especially through its Assembly which was the principal body and consisted of representatives of all 47 member states. The organization held its first Assembly meetings between 15 November and 18 December 1920 at the Salle de la Réformation in Geneva, Switzerland. From the beginning, seating space at the venue was constrained. Each delegation was allowed to bring only three members, who shared tables with delegates from other member states (League of Nations, 1920). Seats were arranged in straight lines and divided by an aisle in the middle of the hall (see Figure A.2). Coupled with rather poor acoustics, the seating set-up hindered observing and hearing at the rostrum or across the hall (Mikkelson and Jourdenais, 2015).

Even before the first Assembly of the League of Nations took place, one of the organization's specialised agencies began its work. In late 1919, the plenary body of the International Labour Organization held its first annual meeting. Diplomats convened at a conference hall of the Pan American Union Building in Washington, D.C., United States. Delegates faced each other on tables which spanned the entire length of the floor and were arranged in multiple straight lines. To face the rostrum, attendees had to turn sideways, and space for personal items was cramped (see Figure A.1). The protocol of the first meeting mentions that complaints about acoustic difficulties were made early on. Delegates specifically attributed poor hearing conditions to physical seating arrangements. On 5 November 1919, for example, the South African delegation asked the chairman to hear an amendment again because he "(...) could not hear anything at this end of the hall" (ILC, 1920, p. 50). The Secretary-General responded to the complaints and altered seating arrangements two days later to overcome "(...) the difficulties which were experienced by some of the delegates seated at the farthest end of the room" (ILC, 1920, p. 57). To make matters worse, delegates regularly engaged in private

conversations with seatmates during plenary sessions[2]. The informal talks were so vivid that on 20 November 1919, the chairman interrupted a speaker to "(...) ask delegates to listen attentively, and to suspend private conversation in order to give [a delegate] the opportunity of making her argument heard" (ILC, 1920, p. 102). Private conversations continued, however, as a remark by the chairman that "(...) it is very difficult for [a gentlemen on the left of the plenum] to hear what is going on, because of conversations around the center of the floor" (ILC, 1920, p. 149) illustrates.

The League of Nations ceased to exist in April 1946. The organization was succeeded by the United Nations, whose charter was already ratified in late 1945. Seating arrangements at its main organ, the UNGA, have shaped policy discussions since the organization's very beginning.

The first meeting of the UNGA took place at the Methodist Central Hall in London, United Kingdom, on 10 January 1946. With more floor space available, the UNGA used a classroom-style seating arrangement with forward-facing tables in a middle column and slightly inclined table rows at the left and right columns. The U-shaped set-up made following the debates easier for delegations seated at the lateral extremes. With the hall's flat ground, however, views for delegations sitting at the opposite end of the rostrum remained obstructed by representatives of member states sitting in front (see Figure A.3). Delegates shared tables with other country delegations sitting adjacently, including a second row of chairs for support staff.

The second, fourth, fifth and sixth sessions of the UNGA were held at Flushing Meadows in New York City, United States. The UN used a building from the 1930 World's Fair as their temporary headquarters, and the UNGA met in converted ice- and roller skating-rings (Reiter, 2015). Arranged in three columns and ten rows, seats were slightly tilted towards the rostrum. A delegation had five seats at the desk and five seats behind them available, and shared a table with other country representatives. With an upward-sloping ground floor, views - and thus preconditions for participation - improved for delegates sitting at the back of the hall (see Figure A.4). Additional space for spectators and the media was provided at the rear through an elevated stand and glassed boxes at the sidewalls of the hall.

For a single occasion, delegates moved to Paris, France. The third session of the UNGA was held at the underground theater of the Palais de Chaillot. Spatial circumstances surrounding the meeting were chaotic: craftsman were still renovating the hall when

[2] Baigorri-Jalón (2005) notes that many diplomats as well as delegates of employers' and workers' organizations could not follow speeches in the official languages of the conference, English and French, which may have fostered private conversations.

the session had already started, crowded elevators got stuck and staircases were blocked by construction material, spectators crowded the steps to the plenum, and most support offices located in the building's maritime museum were not ready. Seating capacity at the meeting venue was scarce, too: of the 3,000 seats in the hall, 900 were reserved for each the press and distinguished guests. The remaining 1,200 seats for delegates did not fulfil the country members' demand for support staff, and many diplomats were blusterously wandering around to find a seat (Katzander, 1948). Those who did settle in a chair found themselves arranged in three columns with the outer ones being slightly inclined. Two delegations shared a table which accommodated ten delegates plus another ten seats installed behind the desk-seats (see Figure A.5).

Finally, the UNGA moved to the permanent headquarters of the UN at the East River in New York City, United States, for the opening of the seventh session. Since 14 October 1952, delegates have met at the General Assembly Hall which is 50 meters long and 35 meters wide. It occupies the second, third and fourth floors of the General Assembly Building. Country delegations may occupy six seats, three at the tables for delegates and another three seats behind them for support staff. Usually, two delegations share one table in each column, and adjacent tables are divided by an aisle. Tables extend to the back in rows which are upward-sloping and form a slightly U-shaped layout facing a raised rostrum. The original set-up had four columns and ten rows which allowed for a total of 70 UN member states (see Figure A.6).

The originally planned capacity was already exceeded in 1955. As UN membership grew, the number of seats in the General Assembly Hall was increased. At first, new rows in the back were appended, including an aisle between the 13^{th} and 14^{th} row. A major expansion program, which added another column of seats on each side of the hall, was completed before the 19^{th} session in 1964. After the seating capacity was reached again in 1976, the UNGA decided to refurbish the hall, and added more rows in the back (United Nations, 2008).

Due to renovations which started in May 2013, the 68^{th} session was held at a temporary meeting venue in the North Lawn Building of the UN Headquarters. Seats were arranged in straight lines spanning four columns and nine rows. Each delegation occupied three seats at the table and another three seats directly behind them. Six country representatives shared a single table at the inner two columns, and five delegations sat adjacently at tables at the outer two columns. Because views of the rostrum were obstructed by pillars, television screens were installed for delegations at the extreme ends of the conference room to broadcast the speaker at the podium (see Figure A.7). Delegates returned to the General Assembly Building for the closing of the regular session in September 2014.

As of 2021, the General Assembly Hall hosts 193 country delegations seated in six columns and 17 rows (see Figure A.8). To cast votes, delegations press red, yellow or green buttons installed on the tables in front of them. Large panels behind the speaker's rostrum list country-specific votes (see Figure A.9). Glass-walled rooms are installed on the sides of the room and host interpreters, media representatives and UN staff.

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, only one representative per country was allowed to attend meetings during the 75^{th} session, and delegates were seated at the extreme ends of each table (see Figure A.10).

In short, seating arrangements at the UNGA have regularly undergone modifications over the last decades to improve preconditions for interactions among country delegates.

1.3 Empirical Analysis

1.3.1 Hypotheses

Informal interactions play a major role in political decision-making. Legislators consider advice by their colleagues before casting a vote (Kingdon, 1989), and may even just follow the lead of someone who immediately precedes them in the alphabet (Matthews and Stimson, 1975). Studies concurrent with my research find spatial peer effects on voting behavior in different legislative settings (Cohen and Malloy, 2014; Harmon et al., 2019). It is conceivable that spatial interactions extend to UNGA delegates.

Hypothesis 1. *Adjacently seated delegations influence voting decisions of country representatives on resolutions at the UNGA.*

Repeated face-to-face interactions can undergo a process of emergent alienation and be characterized by estrangement or even local enmity (Holmes and Wheeler, 2020). Such negative social bonds may be motivated by domination preferences where individuals seek to control the rhythm of interactions through conflictual acts (Bramsen, 2017). I expect that negative social bonds dominate when a country representative does not have strong preferences for vote decisions and resorts to spatial cue-taking.

Hypothesis 2. *Adjacently seated delegations are less likely to vote aligned on general resolutions.*

The case of buying votes for strategically important resolutions is well documented. Scholars have linked strategic vote influence at the UN to monetary benefits, such as bilateral foreign aid (Wang, 1999; Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Carter and Stone, 2015; Alexander and Rooney, 2019) or multilateral development loans (Andersen et al., 2006; Dreher and

Jensen, 2007; Dreher et al., 2009; Dreher and Sturm, 2012). I assume that vote buying has a non-monetary component, too: delegations may sway other representatives to vote in a certain manner through persuasion, cajoling or social pressure. Salient issues may foster interactions with seating neighbors and encourage more in-depth discussions among representatives. Hence, I expect that voting alignment between seating neighbors is higher if a resolution is strategically important for one of the country delegations.

Hypothesis 3. *Adjacently seated delegations are more likely to vote aligned on strategic resolutions.*

The physical direction of interactions matters (Saia, 2018). Engaging with another delegation is facilitated when both share the same table and do not need to bridge an aisle. Delegations in direct back and front seat locations may be more difficult to address, as representatives have to fully turn around to engage with each other. I expect that the relative position of seating neighbors at the UNGA has different effects on voting alignment.

Hypothesis 4. *Spatial peer effects on voting behavior are anisotropic.*

Overall, I expect that the average vote agreement rate between two country delegations at the UNGA is smaller for seating neighbors compared to all non-adjacently seated delegations for general resolutions, and is higher for strategically important resolutions. The spatial effect on voting alignment should depend on the relative orientation of adjacently seated delegations.

1.3.2 Data and Institutional Setting

I compile novel data on seating arrangements of country delegations at the UNGA since 1952 when delegates first convened at the General Assembly Hall. The data include the date-specific physical position of delegations in the meeting venue, i.e. their seat, row and column number, and spatial information on their location relative to neighboring delegations for votes on 5,334 contested resolutions.

The basic seating layout in the General Assembly Hall has remained unchanged since the seventh session in 1952. Usually, each country delegation has eight other delegations as direct seating neighbors: one neighbor sits next to the delegation at the same table, another delegation is seated across the aisle in the same row, representatives of two countries have seats diagonally at the front and back table, another two delegations sit diagonally across the aisle in the front and back, and two delegations sit straight to the front and back in the adjacent rows. Figure 1.1 exemplary illustrates the spatial positions of adjacently seated delegations.

Figure 1.1: Spatial positions of adjacently seated delegations, stylized example



The exact physical location of each country delegation in the General Assembly Hall is determined at random. Four exogenous shocks may alter seating arrangements:

First, the initial seating set-up at the beginning of each session is randomly determined. The UNGA usually meets every year in fall for a regular session (United Nations, 2016, I.1). On the day of the election of the President of the UNGA, the Secretary-General draws lots to determine which country delegation will occupy the first seat at the right end of the front row as seen from the podium. The remaining delegations are then seated in alphabetical order according to the official English names of their country (United Nations, 2019a).

Historical and previously unpublished copies of floor plans for initial seating arrangements at the beginning of sessions have been obtained through the United Nations (2019b) for the seventh to 44$^{\text{th}}$ session[3], and through the Federal Foreign Office of Germany (2019) for the 55$^{\text{th}}$, 61$^{\text{st}}$ to 65$^{\text{th}}$, 67$^{\text{th}}$ and 68$^{\text{th}}$, 70$^{\text{th}}$ and 71$^{\text{st}}$, and 73$^{\text{rd}}$ sessions. The floor plan for the 72$^{\text{nd}}$ session was obtained through United Nations (2017). I reconstructed the initial seating arrangements for the 52$^{\text{nd}}$ to 54$^{\text{th}}$, 56$^{\text{th}}$ to 60$^{\text{th}}$, 63$^{\text{rd}}$, 66$^{\text{th}}$ and 69$^{\text{th}}$ sessions using information on which country occupies the first seat, which is provided in the Delegates Handbooks (United Nations, 2021a), and the official roster of member states from the Yearbooks of the UN' appendices (United Nations, 2021g). No data were available for the 45$^{\text{th}}$ to 51$^{\text{th}}$ session.

My sample includes 60 new seating arrangements due to the commencement of a session.

[3] See Figure A.11 for the initial floor plan of the 37$^{\text{th}}$ session as an example.

Second, seating arrangements change when a new member state is admitted to the UNGA after a session has already started. Once a country has applied to the Secretary-General and the Security Council recommends the applicant state for membership, the UNGA needs to pass a resolution with a two-thirds majority of the existing members to approve the application (United Nations, 2016, XIV.134 and 136). If the application is approved, the membership becomes immediately effective (United Nations, 2016, XIV.138). The newly admitted country's delegates are seated after the resolution is passed and before the next resolution is voted on. The representatives are seated according to their country's official English name, and all existing delegations that follow behind in alphabetical order move one seat up (United Nations, 2019c).

Data on votes of new member states were obtained through Voeten (2013). 24 changes of the seating order occurred due to the admission of new member states.

Third, a country may change its official English name during an ongoing session. A name change may occur with or without a jurisdictional change, and can be announced at any time. The permanent mission to the UN of the member state informs the UN Chief of Protocol of any change to the official country name (United Nations, 2020, XVII.). Once the name change is received, the UNGA delegation gets seated alphabetically as per their new English country name, and a revised seating plan is put together (United Nations, 2019c). Historic examples during ongoing sessions include the name change of Dahomey to Benin or of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to North Macedonia.

Data on official country name changes were obtained through press releases by the United Nations (2021c). The seating order was altered eight times because countries changed their official name during a live session.

Finally, a country may be removed from the UNGA once a session has already begun. The concerned delegation would vacate their seat, and all delegations from countries whose name follow behind the removed member in the English alphabet move one seat down (United Nations, 2019c). A removal of a delegation may occur for three reasons: First, a member state may be dissolved or merged with other existing member states. Examples include Tanganyika and Zanzibar, which merged to form the single member of the United Republic of Tanzania, or the German Democratic Republic which was dissolved after the reunification of Germany. Second, a member state against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council can be suspended by the UNGA (United Nations, 2016, II.5). Third, a member of the UN which has persistently violated the principles contained in the UN Charter may be expelled upon the recommendation of the Security Council (United Nations, 2016, II.6). Theoretically, a country may also unilaterally withdraw from the UN. The UN Charter does not regulate this process, however.

In my sample, no change of the seating order occurred due to the removal of a delegation during an ongoing session[4,5].

Table A.1 lists all seating arrangements since the seventh session of the UNGA in my sample. Note that each session has at least one unique seating arrangement, as the first seat in the hall is allocated randomly at the beginning of a session.

1.3.3 Econometric Model

I estimate the following fixed effects model to examine whether seat adjacency of country delegations in the General Assembly Hall affect political alignment on resolution voting:

$$\begin{aligned} Voteagreement_{ijrtys} =& \alpha + \mathbf{Seatneighbor_{ijrtys,m}}'\beta_{ijrtys,m} + \mathbf{P_{iy}}'\gamma_{iy} + \Delta\ \mathbf{P_{ijy}}'\zeta_{ijy} \\ &+ \mathbf{R_{rtys}}'\upsilon_{rtys} + \mathbf{D_{irtys}}'\omega_{irtys} + \Delta\ \mathbf{D_{ijrtys}}'\vartheta_{ijrtys} + \mathbf{E_{iy}}'\iota_{iy} \\ &+ \Delta\ \mathbf{E_{ijy}}'\tau_{ijy} + \mathbf{L_{ijrtys}}'\kappa_{ijrtys} + \mathbf{S_{is}}'\psi_{is} + \eta_i + \xi_j + \mu_s + \epsilon_{ijrtys} \end{aligned}$$

where $Voteagreement$ is the vote agreement rate in percentage points between the UNGA delegations of country i (the 'focal country') and j (the 'paired country') on the contested resolution r on date t in year y given the seating arrangement s according to Voeten (2013). The vote agreement rate is 100 if the focal country voted the same as the paired country delegation, 50 if country i voted with either 'in favor' or 'against' and country j voted with 'abstain' (or vice versa), and zero if the focal country voted with 'in favor' and the paired country voted with 'against' (or vice versa).

The vector **Seatneighbor** contains up to $m = 1, \ldots, 8$ seating dummy variables that capture physical proximity in the General Assembly Hall. *Table neighbor* has the value one if the paired country shares a table with the focal country delegation, and zero otherwise. *Aisle neighbor* is one if delegation i sits across the aisle in the same row as delegation j, and zero otherwise. *Diagonal front table neighbor* is one if country j sits diagonally at the table in front of country delegation i, and zero otherwise. *Diagonal*

[4] UNGA Resolution 47/1 marginalized Yugoslavia from the General Assembly in support of Security Council Resolution 777. Yet, Yugoslavia still remained a member of the UN because the legal successor state was disputed, and the country's official expulsion from the UNGA did not influence the seating order. The state kept an empty seat without delegates even after its effective dissolution (Jovanovic, 1997). The placeholder was only removed from the UN country roster and UNGA seating lists once all five independent successor states had been admitted as new UN members.

[5] In a letter to the Secretary-General dated 20 January 1965, Indonesia unilaterally announced its withdrawal from the UN "(...) at this stage and under the present circumstances". After a coup d'état, however, the country sent a telegram to the Secretary-General dated 19 September 1966 stating that they would "(...) resume full cooperation with the United Nations and resume participation in its activities". Shortly thereafter, the UNGA invited representatives of Indonesia to take their seats in the General Assembly Hall (United Nations, 2021b). The absence has retrospectively been interpreted as a cessation of cooperation rather than a full withdrawal.

back table neighbor is one if the paired country occupies the seat diagonally behind the focal country at the table in the same column, and zero otherwise. *Diagonal front aisle neighbor* and *diagonal back aisle neighbor* are one if country j sits diagonally across the aisle either in front or behind delegation i, and zero otherwise. *Front neighbor* has the value one if the paired country is seated directly in front of country i in the same column, and zero otherwise. Finally, *back neighbor* is one if country j sits directly behind the focal country in the same column, and zero otherwise. In a more generalized specification, only the variable *seat neighbor* is included. It has the value 1 if one of the previous seating variables is one, and zero otherwise.

Variables that control for political characteristics of each focal country are included in the vector $\mathbf{P}$. Previous research has shown that the type of government influences UNGA voting decisions (Dreher and Jensen, 2013; Hillman and Potrafke, 2015; Mosler, 2020). I use the continuous democracy index by Gründler and Krieger (2019) to classify the level of democracy of country i. The index is one for fully democratic countries and zero for autocratic regimes.[6] The 'political color' of governments affects voting decisions at the UNGA (Dreher and Sturm, 2012). I consider the ideological position of a government by including a binary indicator by Bjørnskov and Rode (2020) which is one if the focal country i has a communist government, and zero otherwise. I assume that not only a focal country's level of characteristics, but also the difference to its paired country matters for vote agreement rates. $\mathbf{\Delta P}$ includes the absolute differences of the democracy index and the communism indicator between countries i and j.

More than half of the topics on the agenda of the UNGA in a given year are not novel, but have been discussed in the past (Panke, 2014). The vector $\mathbf{R}$ controls for the content of contested resolutions. I include a set of binary indicators for six recurring topics: the variables are one if a resolution concerns either colonialism, human rights, economic development, the Middle East conflict, nuclear proliferation, or disarmament, and are zero otherwise. Data are provided by Voeten (2013).

$\mathbf{D}$ are control variables at the delegation-level. Scholars have shown that the gender of legislators influences voting behavior (O'Regan, 2000; Jenkins, 2012; Ramstetter and Habersack, 2020). I use Christensen (2021)'s data to construct three dummy variables which are one if the focal country i has either a female executive state leader, female Minister of Foreign Affairs, or female Permanent Representative to the UN, and are zero otherwise. I assume that experience and legacy of a member state affect its voting decision, and include the number of days since a focal country first voted on a contested

[6] Gründler and Krieger (2019)'s democracy index is built using support vector machines which recognize data patterns. See Gründler and Krieger (2016) for a detailed description of the estimation procedure.

UNGA according to Voeten (2013). Moreover, elected members of the UN Security Council are shown to behave similarly with the council's permanent members in the UNGA (Hwang et al., 2015). I include a binary indicator for non-permanent UN Security Council membership of country i. $\mathbf{\Delta D}$ adds the absolute differences between countries j and i for all delegation-level variables.

Following related studies (Dreher and Jensen, 2013; Smith, 2016), I control for the growth of output-side real GDP, real GDP per capita, and the population size of country i according to Feenstra et al. (2015) with the vector $\mathbf{E}$. I include the differences of all macro-variables between each focal and paired country with $\mathbf{\Delta E}$.

The vector $\mathbf{L}$ contains two variables which address linguistic similarities between the official English country names of the focal and paired country. Country names may indicate underlying characteristics of nations, such as state building, geographical characteristics or forms of government[7]. Orthographic similarity of country names is measured by the standardized Levensthein distance, i.e. the smallest number of changes needed to transform the characters of one country name into the other. For phonetic similarities, I use a dummy variable which is one if both country names sound similar according to the SoundEx algorithm, and is zero otherwise. The SoundEx algorithm encodes homophones to the same letter-number code representation, and disregards potential differences in spelling.

$\mathbf{S}$ controls for the overall seating position of the focal country. It contains the country's seat and column number in the General Assembly Hall.

I include η and ξ as country-fixed effects. μ are seating arrangement-fixed effects which control for spatial-fixed effects of the seating set-ups, which change over time as rows and columns at the meeting venue are added to accommodate the growing number of UN member states, and for time-fixed effects of voting sessions. Finally, ϵ denotes the error term. Standard errors are clustered at the seating arrangement-level.

Table A.2 lists the summary statistics of all variables.

1.4 Results

1.4.1 General Spatial Peer Effects

Seating arrangements affect political alignment in the UNGA. Table 1.1 presents the estimation results for the average effect of seat adjacency on the vote agreement rates

[7] Note, however, that most UN member states have chosen to not include their form of government in their official English country name.

for contested resolutions between 1952 and 2019. Column (1) shows coefficient estimates without control variables. Political and resolution-specific variables, delegation-level variables, as well as economic and population variables are included as additional controls in columns (2) to (4). Variables that control for name similarity and a delegation's location in the meeting venue are added in column (5). The full specification with country- and seating arrangement-fixed effects is shown in column (6).

Table 1.1: General spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
General seat neighbor	-0.4135***	-0.5947***	-0.4319***	-0.2867***	-0.3944***	-0.1466**
	(0.1533)	(0.1604)	(0.1151)	(0.1608)	(0.1031)	(0.0727)
Constant	82.5061***	90.5025***	88.2217***	89.9109***	88.5862***	557.7821***
	(0.4003)	(0.9245)	(1.3316)	(1.1206)	(1.2411)	(113.6666)
Political variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	79,742,480	68,079,315	68,079,315	55,040,433	48,947,754	48,947,754
Adjusted R^2	0.0000	0.0407	0.0429	0.0526	0.0534	0.1460

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

All coefficient estimates in Table 1.1 are negative and statistically significant at the one (columns [1] to [5]) and five percent-level (column [6]). With fixed-effects included in column (6), the coefficient estimate suggests that on average the vote agreement rate of seat neighbors is 0.15 percentage points or 0.5 percent of a standard deviation lower compared to all non-adjacent delegations in the General Assembly Hall.

The average effect of seat adjacency on vote agreement rates has varied over time. Figure 1.2 presents the coefficient estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals of the seat neighbor variable employing the full empirical specification with fixed-effects (column [6]) for each decade separately.

Figure 1.2: Coefficient estimate and 95 percent confidence intervals of the seat neighbor variable by decade



Note: The dot indicates the coefficient estimate, the horizontal line vizualizes the 95 percent confidence interval.
Sources: Voeten (2013), own calculations

The results suggest that seat adjacency did not have a statistically significant effect on political alignment during the first three decades from the 1950s until the 1970s. The coefficient estimate does turn out to be statistically significant for the 1980s, however: physical proximity in the General Assembly Hall increased vote agreement rates in the years preceding the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Iron Curtain. Physical proximity has negatively affected political alignment in the UNGA only during the two most recent decades, the 2000s and 2010s.

Table 1.2 shows the estimation results if the spatial peer effect is disentangled into its directional components. The effect of seat adjacency on resolution is measured for each

neighbor of a delegation: table and aisle neighbors in the same row, the four diagonally seated delegations, and the seat neighbors directly in front and at the back.

Table 1.2: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-0.1930	-0.2662	-0.1146	-0.2027	-0.6589***	-0.2726**
	(0.2252)	(0.2074)	(0.1703)	(0.1608)	(0.1606)	(0.1225)
Aisle neighbor	-0.1585	-0.0169	0.1747	0.0486	-0.3664**	0.0769
	(0.2049)	(0.1915)	(0.1552)	(0.1524)	(0.1619)	(0.1408)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.5530***	-0.8692***	-0.7176***	-0.4502***	-0.4386**	-0.2881**
	(0.1918)	(0.2064)	(0.1689)	(0.1466)	(0.1772)	(0.1303)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.4294**	-0.7199***	-0.5610***	-0.3334**	-0.3099**	-0.1721
	(0.1760)	(0.1813)	(0.1507)	(0.1298)	(0.1494)	(0.1321)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.3629*	-0.7080***	-0.5244***	-0.3522*	-0.4157**	-0.2344*
	(0.2123)	(0.2170)	(0.1818)	(0.1813)	(0.1895)	(0.1303)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.3599*	-0.7696***	-0.5836***	-0.4751***	-0.5145***	-0.2603*
	(0.1983)	(0.2001)	(0.1648)	(0.1707)	(0.1754)	(0.1332)
Front neighbor	-0.6080***	-0.6900***	-0.5470***	-0.1911	-0.1766	-0.0134
	(0.1783)	(0.1907)	(0.1574)	(0.1612)	(0.1987)	(0.1403)
Back neighbor	-0.6419***	-0.7224***	-0.5850***	-0.3507***	-0.2738	-0.0059
	(0.1541)	(0.1635)	(0.1343)	(0.1241)	(0.1655)	(0.1332)
Constant	82.5061***	90.5030***	88.2221***	89.9111***	88.5837***	557.7885***
	(0.4003)	(0.9244)	(1.3315)	(1.1206)	(1.2413)	(113.6673)
Political variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	79,742,480	68,079,315	68,079,315	55,040,433	48,947,754	48,947,754
Adjusted R^2	0.0000	0.0407	0.0429	0.0526	0.0534	0.1460

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

The coefficient estimates for table and aisle neighbors lack statistical significance in columns (1) to (4). Once I include linguistic and spatial location variables, however, the coefficient estimates of both variables become negative and statistically significant at the one and five percent-level (column [5]). The coefficient estimate of the table neighbor indicator remains statistically significant at the five percent-level once fixed effects are included in column (6). On average, a given country delegation is 0.27 percentage points or 0.9 percent of a standard deviation less likely to vote in line with delegations with which it shares the same table compared to all non-neighboring delegations on all contested UNGA resolutions since 1952.

Seating neighbors in adjacent rows are on average less likely to be politically aligned with diagonal seat neighbors compared to all other non-neighboring country delegations in the General Assembly Hall. The four coefficient estimates of the diagonally seated delegations are negative and statistically significant at least at the five percent-level once all controls but the fixed effects are included in column (5). If country- and seating arrangement-fixed effects are added in column (6), the coefficient estimates of the diagonal back table, diagonal back aisle and diagonal front aisle neighbors remain statistically significant at least at a ten percent-level. On average, the vote agreement rates of those diagonally seated representatives are 0.23 and 0.29 percentage points or 0.7 to 0.9 percent of a standard deviation lower than rates of non-neighboring delegations.

For front neighbors, the coefficient estimates are negative and statistically significant at the one percent-level in column (3), and for back neighbors in column (4). The coefficient estimates of both variables lack statistical significance once I add controls for country name similarity and the spatial location (columns [5] and [6]).

1.4.2 Strategic Peer Effects on Middle Eastern Issues

The Middle East conflict has dominated discussions at the UNGA since delegates first met in New York. On average, every fifth contested resolution at the UNGA dealt with issues related to the topic, including the question of Palestine and related UN missions.[8] I consider a group of countries with high foreign policy interests in the issue, namely the member countries of the League of Arab States. Only resolutions about Middle Eastern issues remain in the sample. Table 1.3 presents the estimation results for the effects of seat adjacency on political alignment with Arab League member states.

Direct seat neighbors in the same row are more likely to vote in line with Arab League member states on Middle Eastern resolutions compared to non-adjacent delegations. The

[8] See Chapter 2 and Mosler (2020) for more details concerning Israeli- and Palestinian issues-related UNGA resolutions.

Table 1.3: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Arab League member states					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-0.5768	0.9110*	1.2710***	1.6656***	2.4834***	-0.1719
	(0.5214)	(0.4609)	(0.4210)	(0.3908)	(0.3589)	(0.2601)
Aisle neighbor	0.0755	1.2929***	1.9041***	2.7268***	3.9967***	0.7507***
	(0.4369)	(0.3959)	(0.3711)	(0.3849)	(0.3629)	(0.2225)
Diagonal front table neighbor	1.0377*	0.8872*	0.8984*	1.0764**	1.3258**	0.0762
	(0.5912)	(0.4896)	(0.4696)	(0.4921)	(0.5502)	(0.3717)
Diagonal back table neighbor	0.7930	-0.4725	-0.2644	-0.3885	0.1193	0.8689***
	(0.6555)	(0.6506)	(0.6250)	(0.7249)	(0.7811)	(0.3130)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	0.1006	0.7287	0.9082*	1.1936**	1.5723***	1.2440***
	(0.7403)	(0.5431)	(0.4870)	(0.5035)	(0.5468)	(0.3191)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	0.7624	-0.2113	0.1147	0.1952	0.3403	0.7209**
	(0.5879)	(0.4878)	(0.4566)	(0.5456)	(0.6256)	(0.2848)
Front neighbor	1.3110**	1.3656**	1.5912***	1.8383***	1.9764***	0.5360
	(0.4919)	(0.5172)	(0.5254)	(0.6297)	(0.6312)	(0.3559)
Back neighbor	-1.6981**	-3.3359***	-3.0860***	-3.4869***	-4.2761***	-1.3254
	(0.7345)	(0.7282)	(0.7160)	(1.0197)	(1.1339)	(1.0506)
Constant	90.3622***	98.3148***	91.0362***	90.5369***	90.1272***	360.7761***
	(0.3604)	(0.4646)	(1.0727)	(1.0501)	(1.0772)	(87.4881)
Political variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	1,764,621	1,548,893	1,548,893	1,230,606	1,080,148	1,080,148
Adjusted R^2	0.0001	0.0627	0.0844	0.0877	0.0903	0.3958

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

coefficient estimates of the table and aisle neighbor are positive and statistically significant at the one percent-level without fixed effects in column (5). With the full specification in column (6), only the aisle neighbor variable remains statistically significant at the one percent-level: the estimated increase in voting alignment is 0.75 percentage points or 2.4 percent of a standard deviation.

The coefficient estimates of three diagonal seat neighbors are positive and statistically significant at least at the five percent-level once fixed effects are included in column (6): the diagonal front and back aisle neighbors, and the diagonal back table neighbor. Vote agreement rates increase by 0.72 to 0.87 percentage points or 2.3 to 2.8 percent of a standard deviation if a delegation is seated diagonally to the back of representatives of an Arab League member state. Voting alignment between an Arab League member state and a delegation which is seated diagonally in front across the aisle is estimated to be 1.24 percentage points or 4 percent of a standard deviation higher compared to non-adjacent delegations.

For column neighbors, the coefficient estimates are statistically significant at least at the five percent-level without fixed effects (columns [1] to [5]). The coefficient estimates do not turn out to be statistically significant, however, when country- and seating arrangement-fixed effects are included in column (6).

1.4.3 Strategic Peer Effects on Colonialism

The issue of decolonization has played a major role in negotiations at the UNGA. About one out of six resolutions that were ever tabled in the UNGA was related to colonialism. In the decade between 1960 and 1970 alone, 28 former colonies gained independence and were admitted to the UN as new member states. The topic has prominently remained on the agenda of the UNGA until today.

I examine the political alignment of nine countries with a colonial past with their seating neighbors: Australia, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. The countries may or may not have ruled colonies at the time of each resolution. Solely UNGA resolutions which cover topics surrounding colonialism remain in the sample. I assume that such resolutions are strategically important for countries with a colonial past.

Table 1.4 shows the estimation results for spatial peer effects on voting alignment with the colonial powers for UNGA resolutions covering colonialism between 1952 and 2019.

The results suggest that direct seating neighbors in the same row support colonial powers even less than all other non-adjacent delegations in the UNGA. Once linguistic and spatial control variables are added in columns (5) and (6), however, coefficient estimates on both

Table 1.4: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with countries with a colonial past					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	0.6309	0.0795	0.7904	0.8859	-2.1760***	-2.9247***
	(0.7754)	(0.6931)	(0.6973)	(0.5915)	(0.6522)	(0.6049)
Aisle neighbor	-1.1768	-1.1785*	-0.3039	-0.0453	-3.9753***	-3.2671***
	(0.7841)	(0.6050)	(0.5997)	(0.6062)	(0.9343)	(0.8014)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.8313	0.8326	1.0404	0.1211	0.2536	0.4440
	(0.7087)	(0.7797)	(0.7161)	(0.7961)	(0.9186)	(0.7882)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.7038	-0.9220	-0.1902	0.0634	0.7678	1.0145
	(0.8584)	(0.9174)	(0.9941)	(0.9270)	(0.9223)	(0.6821)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-2.5088***	-0.1509	0.3907	0.7717	1.0335	0.1356
	(0.7920)	(0.8867)	(0.8250)	(0.8633)	(0.9375)	(0.7962)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-1.1191	-0.4886	0.3491	1.4540**	2.2364***	1.7562***
	(0.8961)	(0.7475)	(0.7404)	(0.6584)	(0.6641)	(0.5460)
Front neighbor	-2.3284***	-0.0569	0.5716	0.4572	0.6016	0.3718
	(0.6679)	(0.6678)	(0.6284)	(0.6318)	(0.7550)	(0.5647)
Back neighbor	-2.9018***	-1.1009	-0.5260	0.9661	1.6592**	2.3620***
	(0.6105)	(0.7573)	(0.7275)	(0.6741)	(0.7387)	(0.4574)
Constant	66.8453***	60.9893***	56.0594***	67.1480***	66.6721***	1,076.3880
	(1.2744)	(4.1320)	(4.3587)	(4.9976)	(5.0511)	(942.4094)
Political variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	678,266	616,201	616,201	545,879	500,936	500,936
Adjusted R^2	0.0001	0.0714	0.1063	0.2081	0.2125	0.3067

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

variables are negative and statistically significant at the one percent-level. With fixed effects included, the vote agreement rate between countries with a colonial past and their table neighbors decreases by 2.92 percentage points or 9.3 percent of a standard deviation for resolutions about colonialism. Aisle neighbors are 3.27 percentage points or 10.4 of a standard deviation less likely to vote in line with colonial powers on colonialism topics.

Opposite effects on vote agreement rates are observed for delegations which sit diagonally across the aisle or directly behind countries with a colonial past. Both coefficient estimates are positive and statistically significant at the one percent-level with the full specification in column (6). The results indicate that sitting diagonally to the back and across the aisle of a country with a colonial past leads to an increase of vote agreement rates by 1.76 percentage points or 5.6 percent of a standard deviation. Seating neighbors directly at the back row are 2.36 percentage points or 7.5 percent of a standard deviation more likely to vote in line with colonial powers on resolutions covering colonialism.

All remaining coefficient estimates do not turn out to be statistically significant once control variables are included.

1.5 Robustness Checks

Spatial peer effects should be observed for the first circle of seating neighbors, i.e. direct neighbors. Personal interactions with delegations in the second seating circle, i.e. the neighbors of neighbors, are hampered by country representatives seated in between. I examine spatial peer effects with the 16 seating neighbors in the second circle for general and strategically important resolutions (Tables A.3 to A.5). Out of the 48 estimated coefficients, only one turns out to be statistically significant at the five percent-level and only six are statistically significant at the ten percent-level.

Seating neighbors are drawn from a subset of the population as seats are arranged according to the official English country names. A delegation whose country name begins with ‘M’, for example, is likely be seated next to representatives from countries named ‘I’ to ‘R’, but is unlikely to sit close to delegations from countries whose official names start with ‘A’ or ‘Z’. I exclude all paired countries that never sat adjacently to the focal country. Instead of all country delegations in the UNGA, the coefficient estimates now indicate the difference in vote agreement rates between countries that are seating neighbors at the date of the resolution vote and all countries that have at least once sat together. On average for all resolutions, only the estimated coefficient for table neighbors remains negative and statistically significant at the five percent-level (Table A.6). Inferences regarding spatial peer effects for strategic resolutions about the Middle East conflict and colonialism do not change (Tables A.7 and A.8).

As an alternative measure of voting alignment, I disregard voting outcomes with an abstention from either the focal country or the paired country. Results for the dichotomous vote agreement rate without abstentions are shown in Tables A.9 to A.11. Inferences regarding spatial peer effects do not change.

I check whether inferences depend on including or excluding individual control variables. I replace the democracy index with the dichotomous version of Gründler and Krieger (2019)'s index in Tables A.12 to A.14, Marshall et al. (2019)'s Revised Combined Polity score (Tables A.15 to A.17) and Institutionalized Autocracy score (Tables A.18 to A.20), and the democracy indicator by Bjørnskov and Rode (2020) in Tables A.21 to A.23. For all resolutions, the coefficient estimates of the diagonal front and back aisle neighbor variables lack statistical significance once I use the Revised Combined Polity score or the democracy indicator. These results depend on the specific samples, however: if I run the estimation with the continuous democracy index by Gründler and Krieger (2019), but only use observations for which data by Marshall et al. (2019) or Bjørnskov and Rode (2020) are available, the seating neighbor indicators lack statistical significance. For all other specifications, inferences regarding spatial peer effects do not change.

I replace the growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population variables with data by Bolt and Van Zanden (2014). Results are shown in Tables A.24 to A.26 Inferences regarding spatial peer effects on voting behavior do not change.

Personal interactions are facilitated if two delegates have the same native tongue. I create a dummy variable that is one if one of the four de-facto most widely spoken languages in a country is the same in the focal and paired country, and 0 otherwise. I include the binary indicator for having the same language as an additional control variable (Tables A.27 to A.29). Inferences do not change.

Former colonial powers have often established strong diplomatic ties with their previous colonies after the nations gained independence, and countries with a common colonial history may share institutional characteristics such as a similar legal system. I add a binary indicator which is one if the focal and paired country gained independence from the same colonizing nation after 1952, and zero otherwise. Tables A.30 and A.31 present the estimations for all resolutions and strategic votes about the Middle East. Inferences regarding spatial peer effects do not change.

To control for all characteristics that do not vary over time between the focal and paired country, I include country pair-fixed effects. Spatial peer effects on vote agreement rates do not turn out to be statistically significant once I consider all contested resolutions (Table A.32). Inferences for strategically important resolutions dealing with Middle Eastern issues and colonialism, however, do not change (Tables A.33 and A.34).

Finally, Tables A.35, A.36 and A.37 show the estimation results for all resolutions as well as strategic resolutions about Middle Eastern topics and colonialism if standard errors are clustered at the year-level. Inferences regarding spatial peer effects do not change.

1.6 Conclusion

I compile novel data on the physical location of country delegations at the United Nations General Assembly since 1952 and exploit shocks to seating arrangements to examine spatial peer effects on resolution voting. My results suggest that adjacently seated delegations are, on average, less likely to vote in line with their neighbors: vote agreement rates on contested resolutions are 0.27 percentage points (0.9 percent of a standard deviation) lower for delegations that share the same table compared to all non-neighboring delegations in the General Assembly Hall. Sitting diagonally across the aisle and at the back table of a delegation decreases vote agreement rates by 0.23 to 0.29 percentage points (0.7 to 0.9 percent of a standard deviation).

Opposite effects are observed for resolutions which are strategically relevant for the foreign policy of a country. For resolutions dealing with the Middle East conflict, vote agreement rates between Arab League member states and their aisle and diagonal seating neighbors are 0.72 to 1.24 percentage points (2.3 to 4 percent of a standard deviation) higher compared to non-neighboring country representatives. Regarding resolutions about colonialism, vote agreement rates increase by 1.76 to 2.36 percentage points (5.6 to 7.5 percent of a standard deviation) between countries with a colonial past and delegations seated across the aisle in the back or directly behind them. Former colonial powers are, however, less likely to vote in line with their direct row neighbors.

Global politics depend on where people sit. As a policy implication, the United Nations may implement strategic seating set-ups as a low-cost way of encouraging diplomatic exchange. More generally, physical proximity among political agents facilitates 'face-to-face' interactions in many settings. Seat adjacency allows for informal coordination, and may bridge a divide between two parties when formal relations are restricted. On the contrary, "if you're not at the table, you're on the menu" as a common saying puts it. Policy-makers should consider such spatial peer effects when deciding on how to arrange seats in their political forum.

Chapter 2

Autocrats in the United Nations General Assembly

This chapter is published in the European Journal of Political Economy (Mosler, 2020).

2.1 Introduction

There is evidence of pervasive corruption and rent seeking in countries with autocratic governments (Gupta and Abed, 2002; Mbaku and Kimenyi, 2015; Liu and Peng, 2015; Jetter and Parmeter, 2018; Gründler and Potrafke, 2019; Aidt et al., 2020). Further evidence has shown that unethical behavior in autocratic governments extends to the personal behavior of representatives of autocracies in the United Nations (Fisman and Miguel, 2007, 2010). I empirically examine whether unethical behavior is transposed to voting in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).

In principle, unethical behavior is not expected in the United Nations (UN). The stated purpose of the organization is to sustain peaceful relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights according to Article 1 of the UN Charter. Member states of the UNGA unanimously adopted resolution A/RES/67/1 which states that all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to just, fair and equitable laws and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. Countries' governments have publicly reaffirmed their commitment to disavow discrimination many times. Yet, empirical evidence points to a special place for Israel in UNGA voting. Since 1950, the first full year in which the State of Israel participated in voting at the UNGA, around one out of five of all contested resolutions was related to Israel. More than nine out of ten of these resolutions entailed criticism or blame. Then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan obliquely addressed the "long-standing anomaly that kept Israel from participating fully and equally in the work of the organization" (United Nations, 2005).

In previous research, Becker et al. (2015) found that some two-thirds of UNGA resolutions between 1990 and 2015 that named a country related to the State of Israel, almost invariably in the context of criticism. They showed that data on human-rights violations were inconsistent with the observed voting to criticize or blame Israel. To explain the voting pattern, they proposed the decoy voting hypothesis that autocracies use UNGA voting as a façade to hide their repression of their peoples. The façade is facilitated by using voting to criticize Israel as a decoy to fill the voting agenda to deflect attention from their regimes. Autocratic governments that have repressed their citizens and committed atrocities faced limited resolutions or no resolutions at all, suggesting effectiveness of decoy voting.

In this chapter, I empirically examine the decoy voting hypothesis. I test whether authoritarian governments are less likely to be politically aligned with the State of Israel in UNGA voting than democracies. A measure of political alignment is the vote agreement rate in the UNGA, that is, the share of resolutions on which countries voted in the

same or a similar way with either yes, no, or abstain. Voting alignment with the United States of America (US) has been used to examine vote buying (Kegley Jr and Hook, 1991; Kim and Russett, 1996; Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Dreher et al., 2008; Woo and Chung, 2018; Adhikari, 2019b), changes in leadership (Dreher and Jensen, 2013), intelligence cooperation (Cordell, 2019), and foreign policy shifts under US president Donald Trump (Mosler and Potrafke, 2020). Regarding political alignment with Israel, research has shown that autocratic countries were more likely than democracies to vote in favor of UNGA resolutions on the Goldstone Report[1] which were critical towards Israel (Hillman and Potrafke, 2015).

My sample includes votes on all 4,878 UNGA resolutions in which Israel participated between 1950 and 2018. Of these resolutions, 957 deal with Israel and/or Palestinian issues including related missions by the UN. On Israel- and Palestinian issues-related resolutions, the average vote agreement rate of fully autocratic regimes is 3.2 percentage points or 18 percent of a standard deviation lower than the vote agreement rate of fully democratic governments. 404 UNGA resolutions deal primarily with the State of Israel. Autocratic regimes were 3.6 percentage points or 20 percent of a standard deviation less likely to vote in line with Israel on these resolutions compared to democracies. Autocrats require repressive behavior for regime security. My results support the hypothesis that autocracies use UNGA decoy voting to deflect attention from their repressive behavior toward their citizens.

The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: section 2.2 describes the theoretical and institutional background concerning a potential voting bias against Israel by autocratic regimes; data and descriptive statistics are presented in section 2.3; section 2.4 details the empirical specification; the results are presented in section 2.5; section 2.6 deals with robustness tests; and section 2.7 concludes.

2.2 Theory and Institutional Background

Becker et al. (2015) propose a model of expressive behavior to explain voting of autocratic regimes in the UNGA. Non-decisive expressive behavior applies because UNGA resolutions are non-binding. In the model, autocrats choose a level of repression to maximize the sum of expressive utility and net material benefit, the latter being the sum of gross material benefit from regime security minus the cost of repression. At the UNGA,

[1] After military actions of Israel in Hamas-controlled Gaza in late 2008 and early 2009 to end missile attacks on Israeli civilians, the United Nations Human Rights Council initiated a report on the war. The Goldstone Report focused on accusations against Israel. It also proposed a principle that could criminalize self-defense against state-supported terror that could be applied to the actions of any country. The UNGA voted on two resolutions that were supportive of the Goldstone Report.

delegations can criticize other governments through resolutions. If a government chooses to criticize an autocratic regime, the autocratic ruler suffers a loss of expressive utility through a loss of esteem. Said esteem decreases with the size of the majority that votes in support of the resolution. If a resolution criticizes another government, however, an autocratic ruler has higher expressive utility increasing with the size of the voting bloc for the resolution from deflecting international attention from his or her own actions.

Becker et al. (2015) assume that the probability that a resolution which criticizes an autocratic ruler is put up for a vote increases with the degree of repression by the autocratic regime and decreases with the level of repressions applied by all other governments. With simultaneous and independent voting, an autocratic government does not vote for a resolution that criticizes itself but votes for any resolution that criticizes any other government. The Nash equilibrium without voting discipline is thus a 'tragedy of the commons' in which autocratic governments criticize one another. This non-cooperative equilibrium can be avoided by cooperating on voting on resolutions. A credible logrolling agreement among autocracies decreases the likelihood that any autocratic government is criticized in an UNGA resolution. Logrolling is possible because voting outcomes on UNGA resolutions are publicly published at the country-level. A coalition is stable if the disutility from being criticized by other governments is greater than the expressive utility derived from criticizing other governments of the voting bloc. With a stable logrolling coalition in place, no autocratic government is criticized. To derive utility from criticizing another government, a decoy is chosen as a Schelling focal point. Applying the model to UNGA voting, Becker et al. (2015) identify the State of Israel as the unique decoy.

The history of Israel at the UN makes the only Jewish-majority state a natural decoy. The UNGA passed resolution A/RES/181 on 29 November 1947 that provided for the creation of separate Jewish and Arab states in the part of Mandatory Palestine that remained after the United Kingdom had unilaterally created Transjordan in 1921. Israel accepted the resolution, while the Arab states did not, whereupon Israel's War of Independence ensued[2]. The UNGA approved the admission of the State of Israel to the UN on 11 May 1949. Resolution A/RES/273 passed with 37 delegations voting in favor, 12 voting against and nine abstentions. Countries voting in opposition were almost all governed by autocratic regimes.

[2] Shortly after the vote on resolution A/RES/181, fighting broke out. In an attempt to stop the fighting, resolution A/RES/186 was passed on 14 May 1948. On the same day, the prime minister of Israel, David Ben-Gurion, announced the foundation of the modern State of Israel in a declaration of independence, which in turn set off the first Arab-Israeli War in which seven Arab armies confronted the new state.

Initial resentment against Israel was present to be exploited in choice of a voting decoy as the number of autocratic regimes that were UNGA members increased in the post-colonial era. The State of Israel has experienced ongoing discrimination at the UNGA. For example, since the establishment of the United Nations Regional Groups in the 1960s, which are geopolitical blocs for voting and personnel decisions at the UNGA, Israel's entry into the Asian and the Pacific Group was blocked by autocratic states. Specific resolutions[3] and official UN documents[4] discriminated against Israel.

The puzzle is that many countries with autocratic regimes do not have a historical tradition of anti-Semitism. It is unlikely that autocratic rulers themselves have had personal (negative) relationships or experiences with Jews. The bias against the Jewish-majority nation can also not be ascribed to a general diplomatic denial of the State of Israel. As of October 2020, 162 out of the 193 UNGA member countries (84 percent) had de-jure recognized Israel and established official diplomatic relations. Some of the remaining countries have acknowledged other indications of Israeli sovereignty or have had trade relations. The decoy voting model addresses autocratic voting in the UNGA when autocratic rulers have no 'personal' reason to single out Israel as the focus point for criticism.

2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics

To empirically test the decoy voting hypothesis, I examine whether autocratic governments are less likely to vote in line with Israel in the UNGA than governments of democratic countries. I use resolution-specific data from Voeten (2013) on voting outcomes of the UNGA for the period from January 1950 to December 2018. My sample includes all 4,878 contested resolutions in the UNGA on which Israel voted[5]. I identify all contested UNGA resolutions that deal with Israel and/or with Palestinian issues including missions by the UN related to Israel or Palestinian issues[6]. As of 2018, 957 resolutions are in

[3] On 14 December 1973, UNGA resolution A/RES/3151 condemned the "unholy alliance between apartheid in Southern Africa and Zionism". Shortly thereafter in late 1975, UNGA resolution A/RES/3379 even called Zionism "a form of racism and racial discrimination". On 19 October 1983, a letter signed by 50 mostly autocratic countries questioned the credentials of Israel and tried to expel the Jewish-majority state from the UNGA. The related resolution A/RES/38/180 called for a suspension of all diplomatic and economic relationships with Israel, a demand reaffirmed by resolutions put forward every year until 1988.

[4] Official UN documents from 1974 onwards name territories captured by Israel on the course of the Six-Day War as "Occupied Arab Territories" or "Occupied Palestinian Territories", while no such phrase was used before 1967 during the Jordanian occupation of the West Bank and Egypt's occupation of Gaza.

[5] I do not consider votes on paragraphs or amendments.

[6] Resolutions at the UNGA with contested votes about UN missions have covered the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, which is a subsidiary body of the UNGA, and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon whose funding is regularly approved by the

this category. Out of these identified resolutions, 873 resolutions or 91.2 percent have criticized Israel. 404 resolutions have primarily dealt with the State of Israel (and not primarily with Palestinian issues and/or related UN missions) with 387 resolutions or 95.8 percent entailing criticism towards Israel.

To measure political alignment with Israel in the UNGA, I follow related studies (Thacker, 1999; Dreher and Sturm, 2012; Mosler and Potrafke, 2020) and set the vote agreement rate between a country and Israel equal to 1 if both countries voted the same, equal to 0.5 if Israel voted 'in favor of a resolution' or 'against a resolution' and the other delegation voted 'abstain' (and vice versa), and equal to 0 if Israel voted 'in favor' and the other delegation voted 'against' (and vice versa).

Vote agreement rates with Israel were on average above 70 percent for the first two decades after the country had joined the United Nations. Despite heightened tensions due to military confrontations, the General Assembly was relatively little concerned with Israel or Palestinian issues: only one out of thirty contested UNGA resolutions in the 1950s and 1960s dealt primarily with the Middle Eastern conflict. Matters changed afterwards, however: the average vote agreement rate has constantly decreased since the 1970s and has been below 40 percent during the last decade. Major trends correlate with the declining average vote agreement rate since the 1970s:

First, the absolute and relative number of UNGA resolutions dealing with Israel and Palestinian issues has increased since the 1970s. Compared to the first two decades combined, the UNGA voted on six times more Israel- and Palestinian issues-related resolutions during the 1970s and even 20 times more resolutions during the 1980s. Overall, more than one out of five contested resolutions between 1970 and 2018 dealt directly or indirectly with the Jewish-majority nation.

Second, the content of such resolutions has changed. Initially, Israel- and Palestinian issues-related resolutions mainly addressed temporary events, including the so-called Suez Crisis in 1956 and the Six-Day War in 1967. During the last decades, however, tabled resolutions mostly dealt with recurring issues, such as the status of Jerusalem, the continuation of UN missions or assistance to Palestinian people. The general tenor and content of such repeated resolutions has varied little over time.

Third, the UNGA has become dominated by autocratic regimes. I classify government types as either democratic or autocratic using Gründler and Krieger (2019)'s dichotomous

UNGA. Numerous other UN agencies, funds and programs have been active, especially in the West Bank and Gaza. They were not considered because the UNGA either decided about their general (and not only Israel- or Palestinian issues-related) operations or program funding, or because UN organs other than the General Assembly, such as the Security Council, were concerned with their activities.

democracy index. On average, about two thirds of UNGA member states during the 1950s and 1960s were democratic. The political composition of the UNGA has turned afterwards, however: on average, more than half of all country delegations since 1970 have represented autocratic regimes.

Political alignment with Israel is closely linked to a country's government type. Since the State of Israel joined the UN, democratic countries maintained a higher political alignment with Israel than autocratic regimes[7]. Among the countries with the highest vote agreement rates with Israel have been the United States, Canada, Australia and The Federal Republic of Germany, i.e. democracies of high integrity. Highly autocratic regimes such as Turkmenistan, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Eritrea and Cuba, on the other hand, have had low vote agreement rates with Israel.

Figure 2.1 shows the vote agreement rate with Israel in the UNGA for autocratic and democratic governments according to the dichotomous version of Gründler and Krieger (2019)'s democracy variable. On average, the difference in vote agreement rates between both government types has been 10.5 percentage points since the State of Israel joined the UN. This voting gap widened over time, however, from 7.3 percentage points before 1970 to 11.3 percentage points afterwards. Put differently, the difference in vote agreement rates with Israel by government type is positively correlated with the absolute and relative number of Israel- and Palestinian issues-related resolutions.

The history of the UN provides many case studies that anecdotally support the link between autocracy and political alignment with the State of Israel. Several delegations changed their voting alignment with Israel when their countries transited from Eastern Bloc-styled authoritarian regimes to rather Western-type democracies, for example. Compared to the Cold War era, Poland and Romania doubled their vote agreement rate with the State of Israel since 1990 for resolutions covering Israeli and Palestinian issues, and Hungary even tripled its rate. Uruguay voted in line with Israel on two thirds of resolutions that covered Middle Eastern issues before its coup d'état in 1973. During the following right-wing military dictatorship until 1985 the rate dropped by almost 50 percent, only to (at least partially) recover again in the first years after democracy was re-established. Diplomatic ties between Cambodia and Israel were completely cut when the autocratic Khmer Rouge took power, and only restored once the UN-led transitional authority in Cambodia had sponsored the first general elections in 1993.

[7] The absolute levels of average vote agreements rates with Israel of some democratic countries, especially in Europe, are still rather low. Potential explanations could be an ideological disapproval of the State of Israel based on supersession (Longenecker, 2007) or anti-Semite tendencies (Voigtländer and Voth, 2012; Hillman, 2013).

Figure 2.1: Yearly average agreement rate between Israel and UNGA member countries for votes on all contested resolutions between 1950 and 2018 by government type



Sources: Voeten (2013); Gründler and Krieger (2019), own calculations

2.4 Empirical Model

I estimate the following baseline panel model to examine whether autocratic regimes are indeed less likely to vote in line with Israel at the UNGA than democratic governments:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta \times Autocracy_{it} + \sum_{l=1}^{12} \gamma_l \times X_{it,l} + \mu_i + \eta_t + \epsilon_{it}$$

where Y as the dependent variable measures whether country i in year t voted in line with Israel. Political alignment is defined as the yearly average of a country's vote agreement rate with the State of Israel for contested UNGA resolutions using data by Voeten (2013).

Autocracy determines the degree of autocracy of a country's government. It is measured using the democracy index by Gründler and Krieger (2019) who apply support vector machines, i.e. data-driven machine learning algorithms designed for pattern recognition, to classify a country's government type[8]. I use the continuous version of the index and mirror the variable: it assumes the value zero if a country's government is considered

[8] See Gründler and Krieger (2016) for a detailed description of the estimation procedure.

fully democratic, and takes the value one if the government is fully autocratic.[9] I expect that the higher the level of autocracy, the lower the political alignment with Israel.

X contains $l = 1$, ..,12 control variables. To account for the economic development of a country, I include the chained purchasing power parities corrected growth of output-side real GDP and real GDP per capita in logarithmic terms according to Feenstra et al. (2015). Following related studies (Dreher and Jensen, 2013; Smith, 2016), I control for the population size in logarithmic terms using data from Feenstra et al. (2015).

The share of the Jewish population relative to the total population is included as a proxy for a country's cultural affinity to Israel. Maoz and Henderson (2013) provide data on the Jewish population at five year-intervals for the period from 1950 to 2010. The share of Jews is linearly approximated for the years between two data points[10].

States of the Arab League have boycotted Israel and were involved in several military conflicts. I include a dummy variable that takes the value one if a country was a member of the Arab League, and zero otherwise. Five countries have had an exceptionally high average vote agreement rate with Israel of at least 70 percent for resolutions dealing primarily with the Jewish-majority country: the United States of America, Palau, Nauru, the Marshall Islands and Micronesia. I include a dummy variable that is one for each of these country delegations, and zero otherwise[11].

Voeten (2013) provides binary variables that have the value one if a resolution deals with recurring topics, namely the Middle East, economic development, disarmament, human rights, nuclear proliferation and colonialism, and are zero otherwise. I calculate the country-specific share of votes on each topic relative to the number of votes on all contested UNGA resolutions in each year and include the six topic-share variables as control variables.

μ denotes country-fixed and η denotes year-fixed effects. ϵ represents the error term. To address the issue of potential serial autocorrelation, I use Newey-West standard errors. Following the approach of Greene (2018), I set the lag length of the Newey-West standard errors to two.

Summary statistics of all variables are listed in Table B.1.

[9] Spain between 1986 and 1988 and The Republic of Korea in 1996 have the lowest autocracy scores of almost zero. Gambia in 1965 and Iraq in 2003 have the highest autocracy score of one.

[10] There is no data available on the Jewish population after 2010. For the years 2011 until 2018, I assume that the share of the Jewish population in each country remains constant at the 2010 value.

[11] On average for Israel- and Palestinian issues-related resolutions, the countries with the next highest vote agreement rates with Israel are South Sudan (49 percent), Canada (44 percent), the Federal Republic of Germany (42 percent) and Australia (39 percent).

2.5 Results

Table 2.1 shows the regression results for the yearly average agreement rate between Israel and other UNGA member countries for resolutions concerning Israel, Palestinian issues or related UN missions for the period 1950 to 2018. If a government type switches from fully democratic to fully autocratic, the regime is less likely to vote in line with Israel. All coefficient estimates for the autocracy variable are negative and statistically significant at the one percent-level. If fixed effects are excluded [column (2)], the coefficient estimate indicates a decrease in vote agreement rates by 6.7 percentage points. With year- and country-fixed effects included, the absolute value of the point estimate decreases to 3.2 percentage points or 18 percent of a standard deviation [column (4)]. The estimated coefficients of the control variables all display the expected signs.

Table 2.1: Yearly average agreement rate between Israel and UNGA member countries for contested votes on Israel- and Palestinian issues-related UNGA resolutions

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Israel			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Continuous autocracy index	-0.0670***	-0.0666***	-0.0744***	-0.0317***
	(0.0071)	(0.0084)	(0.0082)	(0.0111)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita		0.0196***	0.0203***	0.0075
		(0.0023)	(0.0022)	(0.0081)
Growth of real GDP		-0.0003	-0.0001	0.0002
		(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)
Logarithm of population		-0.0026*	-0.0018	0.0614***
		(0.0014)	(0.0013)	(0.0161)
Share of Jewish population		6.1406***	5.8238***	-3.9192
		(1.3878)	(1.3153)	(2.6741)
Member of Arab League		-0.0792***	-0.0757***	0.0665
		(0.0067)	(0.0067)	(0.0421)
US and Pacific islands delegation		0.4358***	0.4376***	0.1247
		(0.0686)	(0.0660)	(0.1159)
Constant	0.1632***	0.2129***	0.1028	0.6669
	(0.0049)	(0.0322)	(0.7463)	(0.7743)
Topic-share variables included?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓
Year-fixed effects included?	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects included?	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	8,405	6,261	6,261	6,261
Countries	185	167	167	167
Adjusted R^2	0.0227	0.3810	0.4878	0.6089

Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of two are in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: The resolution topics are Middle Eastern, economic development, disarmament, nuclear proliferation, colonialism and human rights issues.

Table 2.2 shows the results if the dependent variable includes only resolutions that primarily deal with the State of Israel but do not deal with Palestinian issues or related UN missions. The results suggest that autocratic regimes are even less likely to vote in line with Israel than democratic governments when the State of Israel is directly addressed. The point estimates of the autocracy variable are negative and statistically significant at the one percent-level. With year-fixed effects in column (3), the point estimate of the autocracy variable indicates a decrease in vote agreement rates by 8.5 percentage points. When country-fixed effects are included, the estimated coefficient indicates that fully autocratic regimes are 3.6 percentage points or 20 percent of a standard deviation less likely to vote in line with Israel than fully democratic governments (column [4]).

Table 2.2: Yearly average agreement rate between Israel and UNGA member countries for contested votes on State of Israel-related UNGA resolutions (excluding Palestinian issues and related UN missions)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Israel			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Continuous autocracy index	-0.0925***	-0.0827***	-0.0846***	-0.0359***
	(0.0073)	(0.0094)	(0.0095)	(0.0126)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita		0.0172***	0.0186***	0.0119
		(0.0025)	(0.0025)	(0.0094)
Growth of real GDP		-0.0002	-0.0001	0.0001
		(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Logarithm of population		-0.0042***	-0.0038**	0.0991***
		(0.0016)	(0.0015)	(0.0183)
Share of Jewish population		6.8080***	6.5724***	-2.8709
		(1.5185)	(1.4876)	(3.0171)
Member of Arab League		-0.0911***	-0.0913***	0.0567
		(0.0070)	(0.0075)	(0.0439)
US and Pacific islands delegation		0.4336***	0.4372***	-0.2978
		(0.0671)	(0.0654)	(0.1325)
Constant	0.1576***	0.1785***	0.4138	0.7242
	(0.0050)	(0.0348)	(0.8364)	(0.7725)
Topic-share variables included?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓
Year-fixed effects included?	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects included?	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	7,763	6,040	6,040	6,040
Countries	185	167	167	167
Adjusted R^2	0.0436	0.3469	0.3942	0.5523

Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of two are in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: The resolution topics are Middle Eastern, economic development, disarmament, nuclear proliferation, colonialism and human rights issues.

2.6 Robustness Checks

Government ideology may well relate to political alignment with Israel[12]. I use government ideology data by Cruz et al. (2018) which is available until 2017, and self-compile data for the year 2018 to construct two dummy variables: the first variable has the value one if a country's chief executive is left-wing, and zero otherwise. The second variable has the value one if the chief executive is right-wing, and zero otherwise. I use the baseline specification and add both ideology variables as additional controls[13]. The coefficient estimates for left-wing governments do not turn out to be statistically significant for Israel- and Palestinian issues-related resolutions (see Table B.2). The coefficient estimate for right-wing governments is statistically significant at a one percent-level once the country- and year-fixed effects are included in column (4). Right-wing governments are 2.8 percentage points more likely to vote in line with Israel than center governments for resolutions involving Israel or Palestinian issues. For the sub-sample of resolutions that primarily deal with the State of Israel, right-wing governments are 3.7 percentage points more likely to vote in line with Israel once all control variables are included. Inferences regarding autocratic regimes do not change (see Table B.3).

To examine whether the results depend on the classification of regime types, I replace the autocracy variable in the baseline model with alternative measures. First, I use the binary indicator by Gründler and Krieger (2019) instead of the continuous measure (Tables B.4 and B.5). For (rather) democratic countries the dummy variable has the value zero, for (rather) autocratic regimes it takes the value one. The variable does not turn out to be statistically significant once all fixed-effects are included in column (4). For all other specifications, however, the point estimates remain negative and statistically significant at a one percent-level. Second, I use the dichotomous democracy variable from the dataset of regime types by Bjørnskov and Rode (2020) and mirror it: the dummy variable has the value zero if a country held free and fair elections with a peaceful turnover of legislative and executive offices, otherwise the dummy variable takes the value one. All point estimates are negative and statistically significant (see Tables B.6 and B.7). Third, I mirror the Revised Combined Polity score derived from the Polity IV Project by Marshall et al. (2019) and use it as an alternative autocracy measure (Tables B.8 and B.9). The estimated coefficients are negative and statistically significant in columns (1) to (3). The point estimates remain negative, but do not turn out to be statistically significant once all fixed effects are included in column (4). Moreover, I replace the autocracy measure

[12] On how government ideology relates to political alignment with individual countries such as the United States and China see, for example, Potrafke (2009), Strüver (2016) and Mosler and Potrafke (2020).

[13] A center government serves as the reference category.

by the Institutionalized Autocracy score of Marshall et al. (2019) which ranges from zero (not autocratic) to ten (fully autocratic). Inferences regarding autocracy and political alignment with Israel do not change (see Tables B.10 and B.11).

I test whether my results are biased by 'voting noise' in my dependent variable, which may result from a shifting thematic focus in the UNGA over time. I replace the measure for political alignment in the baseline specification with the absolute difference in ideal points between Israel and UNGA member countries for the period 1950 to 2018 according to Bailey et al. (2017). Ideal points only include voting results on UNGA resolutions that are identical over time. They are calculated for each country on a yearly basis and take a US-led liberal order as a reference point. Because the measure is less sensitive to the political zeitgeist of the UNGA agenda, it captures changes in foreign policy standpoints on recurring issues[14]. A higher absolute difference in ideal points indicates a lower political alignment between a country and Israel. Again, the empirical results suggest that the regime type matters: all point estimates of the autocracy variable are positive and statistically significant at a one percent-level. When country- and year-fixed effects are included in column (4), the coefficient estimate equals 0.34 or 33 percent of a standard deviation, which implies that for resolutions that are thematically consistent over time, autocracies are also less likely to vote in line with Israel than democratic governments (see Table B.12).

Finally, I investigate whether the negative correlation between the level of autocracy and voting in line with Israel depends on the choice of standard errors. I re-estimate my baseline model using either standard errors clustered at the country-level (Tables B.13 and B.14) or the jackknife resampling method for standard error computation (Tables B.15 and B.16) instead of Newey-West standard errors. Inferences do not change.

2.7 Conclusion

It is fair to say that voting in the United Nations General Assembly has extensively revolved around a small Middle Eastern country: the State of Israel. About one out of five of all contested resolutions between 1950 and 2018 was related to Israel, and nine out of ten of these resolutions entailed criticism of the only Jewish-majority state. My empirical results show that political institutions are related to the preoccupation of the United Nations with Israel. Examining all resolutions that involve Israeli and/or Palestinian issues, the average vote agreement rate with the State of Israel among fully autocratic regimes is 3.2 percentage points or 18 percent of a standard deviation lower than among

[14] Note that in the sub-sample which only includes resolutions on the State of Israel, the general tenor of the resolutions also changes little over time.

fully democratic governments. The difference in voting behavior is more pronounced for resolutions that directly deal with the State of Israel, excluding Palestinian issues or related missions by the United Nations, with an estimated decline in voting alignment of 3.6 percentage points or 20 percent of a standard deviation. The results are consistent with the proposal that autocratic governments in the United Nations General Assembly have used Israel as a decoy to deflect attention from their behavior and to avoid criticism of their regimes.

Chapter 3

Political Alignment during the Trump Presidency

This chapter is joint work with Niklas Potrafke and is published in International Interactions (Mosler and Potrafke, 2020).

3.1 Introduction

Prime examples of political alliances have long been the Western world and countries that belonged to the Warsaw Pact. Since the end of the Cold War, such alliances seemed to enjoy less importance. The relationship between Western countries and the United States of America (US) deteriorated, however, since early 2017. The president of the US, Donald Trump, has intimidated allied countries. For example, Trump called the Canadian prime minister "very dishonest and weak" when he left the Group of Seven (G7)-meeting in 2018 (Trump, 2018a) and criticized European North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members for spending too little on military expenditure (Trump, 2018b,c).

The strategic US foreign policy relative to Western partners has drastically shifted since Donald Trump took office.[1] The United States initiated a trade war putting tariffs on goods traded with Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member countries, backed out of the Iran nuclear deal prompting harsh criticism by other Group of Seven (G7) member states, or moved its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem against the condemnation of many members of the United Nations Group of Western European and Other States (UN WEOG). We examine the extent to which political alignment between the United States and allied Western countries has been affected by changes of the substance of the United States foreign policy.[2]

A measure for political alignment is voting behavior in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), where countries are politically aligned through common voting patterns on resolutions. Previous studies measured political alignment by the share of (dis)agreeing on resolutions in the UNGA, that is two countries voting with either 'in favor', 'against' or 'abstain' (Dreher and Jensen, 2013), or by estimating dynamic state preferences based on UNGA voting data (Bailey et al., 2017; Bailey and Voeten, 2018). Determinants and consequences of voting in line with the United States at the UNGA are a well-discussed topic in political economy studies. For example, scholars show that the United States used foreign aid to buy votes in the UNGA (Kegley Jr and Hook, 1991; Kim and Russett, 1996; Dreher et al., 2008; Allen and Flynn, 2018; Woo and Chung, 2018; Adhikari, 2019b,a)[3]

[1] Domestic policy in the United States has also changed since Donald Trump took office. For example, Donald Trump influenced the domestic electoral environment with his polarizing focus on national-, partisan- and president-centered topics (Jacobson, 2019), and high-ranking public servants have less experience in government and policy drafting under Trump than under previous presidents of the United States (King and Riddlesperger, 2018).

[2] On how national economic conditions influence foreign policy rhetoric of presidents of the United States, see Carter (2020).

[3] On how aid is used to win a temporary seat in the UN Security Council see, for example, Reinsberg (2019).

and had a higher cooperation in intelligence service operations with countries that voted more in line with the United States on human rights issues (Cordell, 2019). Developing countries were also more likely to vote in line with the United States in the UNGA when they received loans from United States-led regional development banks (Obydenkova and Rodrigues Vieira, 2020). Countries got a more positive review from the United Nations (UN)'s Committee against Torture when they voted in line with the United States in the UNGA (Kahn-Nisser, 2019).

We examine the voting behavior of Western countries on resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly in line with the United States. The data set includes resolutions over the period 1949 until 2019. Descriptive statistics show that voting in line with the United States was on average 7.2 percentage points (p.p.) lower under Donald Trump than under previous presidents of the United States. The results do not suggest that the declining voting alignment between the United States and Western allies was driven by the ideological distance based on a classical leftwing-rightwing government ideology scale. Rather, the United States has changed foreign policy, especially on topics related to the Middle East.

3.2 Empirical Analysis

We use UNGA voting data prepared by Voeten (2013) for the period 1949 until 2018. We have self-compiled UNGA vote outcomes at the delegation-resolution-level until August 2019 using United Nations (2019d). To measure political affinity, we follow related empirical studies (Thacker, 1999; Dreher and Sturm, 2012) and use the vote agreement rate between a country and the United States, which is one if both countries vote the same, 0.5 for weak deviations[4], and zero for strong deviations[5]. Our extended sample includes all 4,911 resolutions in the UNGA since 1949 on which the United States voted.[6] The vote agreement rate serves well for descriptive purposes. It is sensitive, however, to the agenda of resolution topics and may pick up the 'noise of the zeitgeist' rather than actual shifts in foreign policy preferences. To address this issue, we also consider the absolute difference in ideal points between the United States and allied countries until 2018 according to Bailey et al. (2017) in our empirical model. Bailey et al. (2017) use UNGA resolutions that were identical across years to approximate dynamic state preferences relative to a US-led liberal order. Ideal points are thus well-suited for intertemporal comparisons.

[4] We define weak deviations as votes in which one nation voted 'in favor' or 'against', while the other nation to be compared to voted 'abstain'.

[5] Under strong deviations, we define votes in which one nation voted 'in favor', while the other nation to be compared to voted 'against'.

[6] We do not consider votes on either paragraphs or amendments.

3.2.1 Vote Agreement Rates under Presidents of the United States

Figure 3.1 shows how often the G7, NATO, OECD and UN WEOG member countries voted in line with the United States in the UNGA. Concordant voting between the United States and its partners in the UNGA decreased over the last decades. In the 1960s during the presidencies of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, the agreement rate was on average above 85 percent. The UNGA vote agreement rates of Western country groups decreased on average by around ten percentage points during the 1970s and another 20 percentage points by 1990.

Figure 3.1: Average agreement rate per year between the US and Western countries during votes in the UNGA, all resolutions



Note: The unweighted average for UNGA resolutions per year across all countries of each country group without the United States is displayed. Sources: Voeten (2013), United Nations (2019d), own calculations

The UNGA vote agreement rate has decreased since Donald Trump became president of the United States (see Table 3.1). Since Donald Trump took office in January 2017 until August 2019, the United States has voted on 197 resolutions. Overall, the vote agreement rate of Western countries in the UNGA with the United States since January 2017 was only between 52.0 percent (OECD member states) and 56.8 percent (G7 countries). Compared with the average of all votes before Trump took office, the consensus rate between Western countries and the United States decreased by 7.2 percentage points.

The weakest decline is observed among the OECD countries (-6.7 percentage points), while the agreement rate with NATO member states had the strongest decrease (-7.9 percentage points).

We examine votes in the UNGA that took place only in the first two years of a US presidency to determine whether the declined UNGA vote agreement rates under Donald Trump are based on becoming acquainted with each other or whether the United States and Western allies have politically steered away from each other (Table 3.1).

Table 3.1: Average agreement rate between the US and Western countries during votes in the UNGA, all resolutions and resolutions during first two years of a US presidency between April 1949 and December 2016 before Trump and between January 2017 and August 2019 since Trump

	all UNGA resolutions before Trump's presidency	all UNGA resolutions during the 1st and 2nd year of a US presidency before Trump	all UNGA resolutions since Trump's presidency
G7	64.0 percent N = 22,728	66.6 percent N = 6,840	56.8 percent N = 1,179
OECD	58.7 percent N = 106,546	61.3 percent N = 31,505	52.0 percent N = 6,763
NATO	61.3 percent N = 78,832	63.5 percent N = 22,178	53.4 percent N = 5,489
UN WEOG	59.2 percent N = 104,767	61.9 percent N = 32,006	52.2 percent N = 5,481

Note: The unweighted average for UNGA resolutions per year across all countries of each country group without the United States is displayed. Sources: Voeten (2013), United Nations (2019d), own calculations

The differences between Trump and other presidents of the United States are even more pronounced for the first two years of a presidency. Newly elected presidents of the United States enjoyed much higher agreement rates with Western partners than Trump. On average, the agreement rate of all Western countries during Trump's first two years of presidency was 9.5 percentage points lower than the average agreement rate in the first two years of the preceding presidents of the United States for all resolutions. By Western country groups, the agreement rates were lower by 9.3 percentage points for OECD countries and up to 10.1 percentage points for NATO member states.

Politicians are often election-motivated. Donald Trump may have wanted to gratify his constituency rather than the international community. If this is true, lower vote agreement rates since Trump took office would be based on reelection considerations rather than fundamental policy shifts during the president's first term. Previous agreement rates in the first and second presidential terms do not suggest, however, that presidents of the United States enjoyed higher political alignment in their second than their first presidential term (Table 3.2).

Table 3.2: Average agreement rate between the US and Western countries during votes in the UNGA, resolutions during the first and second term of presidents of the US before Trump and all resolutions since Trump

	all UNGA resolutions during the first term of a US president before Trump's presidency	difference to Donald Trump	all UNGA resolutions during the second term of a US president before Trump's presidency
G7	66.5 percent N = 13,926	+ 9.7 p.p.	60.0 percent N = 8,802
OECD	60.8 percent N = 63,566	+ 8.8 p.p.	55.6 percent N = 42,980
NATO	63.0 percent N = 44,904	+ 9.6 p.p.	59.0 percent N =33,928
UN WEOG	61.2 percent N = 63,614	+ 9.0 p.p.	56.2 percent N = 41,153

Note: The unweighted average for UNGA resolutions per year across all countries of each country group without the United States is displayed. Sources: Voeten (2013), United Nations (2019d), own calculations

Vote agreement rates between the United States and Western allies were on average higher during the first than the second presidential term before Donald Trump took office. The largest decrease between presidential terms is observed among G7 partners (6.5 percentage points), while the difference for NATO member countries is 4.0 percentage points. Former presidents of the United States have seemed to seek recognition abroad during their first term, but became less restrained by international vote alignments in their second term. Overall, vote agreement rates during Donald Trump's first term as president of the United States are even lower than the average of all preceding presidents of the United States in their first or second term.

Since the 2000s, an intriguing observation is that differences in the UNGA voting between the United States and Western countries were smaller during Barack Obama's presidency, but greater during the George W. Bush administration (Table 3.3).

Vote agreement rates with Western partners in the UNGA under Donald Trump have been 4.1 (UN WEOG) to 7.0 percentage points (G7) higher than under George W. Bush. It is conceivable that the lower agreement rate under President George W. Bush is based on his controversial foreign policy decisions. For example, George W. Bush did not implement the Kyoto Protocol, withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and prioritized the United States' hegemonic supremacy over multilateral agreements within the framework of the National Security Strategy (Jervis, 2003). Most importantly, however, George W. Bush declared the War on Terror, which included inter alia a large-scale military engagement in Iraq. Johnstone (2004) proposes that the United States-led Iraq War was perceived as a major breach of the prevailing normative and institutional framework at

Table 3.3: Average agreement rate between the US and Western countries during votes in the UNGA, all resolutions for selected presidents of the US

	George W. Bush	difference to Donald Trump	Barack Obama	difference to Donald Trump
G7	49.8 percent N = 3,686	- 7.0 p.p.	64.2 percent N = 3,398	+ 7.4 p.p.
OECD	46.1 percent N = 17,710	- 5.9 p.p.	57.6 percent N = 18,428	+ 5.6 p.p.
NATO	47.1 percent N = 13,789	- 6.3 p.p.	59.1 percent N = 15,253	+ 5.7 p.p.
UN WEOG	48.1 percent N = 17,041	- 4.1 p.p.	58.8 percent N = 15,805	+6.6 p.p.

Note: The unweighted average for UNGA resolutions per year across all countries of each country group without the United States is displayed. Sources: Voeten (2013), United Nations (2019d), own calculations

the United Nations with which most member states did not acquiesce, and thus damaged foreign relations between the United States and other UN members.

The vote agreement rate in the UNGA during the Trump administration is smaller than under former US president Barack Obama. Voting alignments between the United States and its Western allies have changed since 2017. The agreement rates since Donald Trump took office compared to Obama's presidency decreased by 5.6 (OECD) to 7.4 percentage points (G7). Under President Obama, the National Security Strategy was reframed to emphasize multilateralism and global engagement. Examples of cooperation with Western partners include international sanctions together with OECD member countries against Russia following the Crimean crisis and a joint NATO mission to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya. However, vote agreement rates during the presidency of Barack Obama still just reached the previous average under US president Bill Clinton, but remained lower than the average vote agreement rate before the 1980s.

We examine voting alignment between the United States and individual Western countries. The results suggest some heterogeneity in average agreement rates across countries (Figure 3.2).

Overall, the average agreement rate increased in 13 Western allied countries since Donald Trump became president of the United States. The largest increases are observed in Israel, Hungary and the Republic of Korea. For the remaining 31 countries, average agreement rates decreased under Donald Trump's presidency. Especially close allied countries such as the United Kingdom, France or Germany voted less in line with the United States when Trump was in office.

Figure 3.2: Average agreement rate between the US and Western countries during votes in the UNGA, average across all resolutions by country



Note: The unweighted average for UNGA resolutions by country since they became part of the G7, NATO, OECD and/or UN WEOG before and since Donald Trump took office is displayed. Sources: Voeten (2013), United Nations (2019d), own calculations

3.2.2 Vote Agreement Rates by Topics

We examine the voting behavior for UNGA resolutions on six repeated issues in more detail. Compared to all previous presidents of the United States, resolutions on human rights and economic development were more frequent by 7.2 and 6.1 percentage points since Donald Trump took office. The share of UNGA resolutions dealing with colonialism decreased by 7.0 percentage points. For Middle Eastern, disarmament and nuclear proliferation issues, the share of resolutions hardly changed since Donald Trump became president.

The decline in voting alignment between the United States and Western allies could be based on three dynamics: (1) the United States voted since 2017 as it has always done and the Western partners have changed their foreign policy course, (2) vice versa, or (3) the United States and its allies have both changed their foreign policy positions. We consider topic-related resolutions to examine such voting dynamics. Individual resolutions differ from vote to vote. If resolutions on repeated issues differ on average, however, we would expect to observe the same shift of approval rates among the United States and

its Western partners if their foreign policy stance did not change. Figure 3.3 shows the percentage of resolutions on the Israel-Palestine conflict, economic development and colonialism on which the United States and the other Western countries voted with 'in favor'. The results for the specific country groups (G7, OECD, NATO and UN WEOG) are qualitatively and quantitatively comparable.

The approval rate of the United States changed for resolutions that have covered Middle Eastern topics, precisely the Israel-Palestine conflict. Israel has been discriminated against in the UNGA for decades (Becker et al., 2015; Hillman and Potrafke, 2015; Mosler, 2020). The United States has, however, mostly voted against resolutions criticizing Israel for the last decades. This trend has strengthened under Donald Trump: while other Western countries slightly increased their approval rate on resolutions on the Israel-Palestine conflict, the approval rate of the United States on resolutions dealing with the Middle East declined from 16.7 percent before Trump's presidency to 2.9 percent since Trump has been in office. The relocation of the United States embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and the recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights are prime examples of the changing foreign policy of the United States regarding Middle Eastern topics.

Second, under Donald Trump the United States agreed to only 21.6 percent of all resolutions regarding economic development worldwide, whereas its approval rate before the Trump presidency was about 33.9 percent. This voting pattern of the United States contrasts with the voting behavior of the other Western partner countries, which have voted 'in favor' on almost 80 percent of the economic development resolutions since 2017, increasing their approval rate by about 5.5 percentage points.

Third, approval of resolutions by the United States on colonialism under the Trump administration decreased by almost 12.9 percentage points from about a quarter to slightly above 11 percent of all votes. The voting approval rate of the other Western countries slightly increased by 1.8 percentage points, however, to almost 75 percent.

On human rights issues, the resolution approval rate of the United States increased by some 6.0 percentage points, while the approval rate of the Western countries only increased by 2.5 percentage points. Regarding resolutions on nuclear proliferation, the average approval rate of both the United States and Western countries decreased by about the same order of magnitude since Donald Trump took office (-11.5 and -13.2 percentage points). The resolution approval rate for resolutions on disarmament decreased by about 8.5 percentage points for the United States and by 7.0 percentage points for Western countries.

A concern is that the general resolution content has changed since Donald Trump took office, while resolutions are still classified into the same topic category. For example,

Figure 3.3: Average approval rate of the US and Western countries during votes in the UNGA, all resolutions for individual topics before and since president Donald Trump



A country's vote as 'in favor' is coded as 1, 'abstain' is coded as 0.5, and 'against' is coded as 0. The unweighted averages for UNGA resolutions for the United States and across all Western countries without the United States are displayed.
Sources: Voeten (2013), United Nations (2019d), own calculations

more human rights resolutions dealt with individual countries, especially Israel, rather than general human rights issues, and the United States under Donald Trump put forward new topics such as condemning Hamas for using own-population human shields and firing rockets at civilian targets in Israel (Hillman, 2019; Jelnov, 2019). We examine two repeated issues in the UNGA: resolutions about the status of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. The United States did not vote 'in favor' on a single resolution dealing with the status of Jerusalem since 2017, down from an approval rate of about a third before Trump's presidency. In contrast, the approval rate of Western countries for resolutions about Jerusalem remained almost unchanged at 95 percent before and 92 percent after Donald Trump took office. Similarly, the United States decreased its approval rate for Golan Heights resolutions from 28 percent to 13 percent after the Trump presidency, while Western countries maintained an approval rate of 77 percent and 72 percent before and after the Trump presidency.

Overall, the results suggest that the United States stance on foreign policy, especially on Middle Eastern topics, has changed under Donald Trump.

3.2.3 Did especially leftwing Western governments turn away?

Previous studies have shown that political alignment between the United States and other countries was pronounced when government ideology in the United States and other countries were aligned. For example, leftwing governments in OECD countries were more likely to vote in line with the United States in the UNGA when the president of the United States was a Democrat rather than a Republican (Potrafke, 2009).[7] We examine whether leftwing governments in Western countries were less likely to vote in line with the United States since Donald Trump took office than rightwing governments.

We estimate the following baseline panel model:

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{it,m} =& \alpha * Trump_t + \beta * ideologicaldistance_{it} + \gamma * Trump_t * ideologicaldistance_{it} \\ &+ \sum_{l=1}^{10} \gamma_l \times X_{it,l} + Y_{it-1,m} + \mu_i + \epsilon_{it,m} \end{aligned}$$

where Y are $m = 1, 2$ dependent variables measuring the political alignment between the United States and country i in year t, namely the yearly average of the resolution agreement rate in the UNGA with the vote of the United States and the yearly absolute difference of ideal points between the United States and Western partners in the UNGA.

[7] On ideology-induced policies in OECD countries see, for example, Potrafke (2017, 2018)

$Trump$ is a dummy variable that takes on the value one if Donald Trump was president of the United States in year t and zero otherwise[8].

$Ideologicaldistance$ measures the distance in the political ideology between country i's executive leader and the president of the United States in year t. It assumes the value one if a country's leader is leftwing and the president of the United States is a Republican or if a country's leader is right-wing and a president of the United States is a Democrat, 0.5 if a country's leader is moderate-center, and zero otherwise. We measure the political ideology of country i's chief executive with data by Cruz et al. (2018) and self-compile data for the years 2018 and 2019. We expect the correlation between the ideological distance of Western chief executives and the president of the United States and voting in line with the United States to be negative.

$X_{it,l}$ contains l = 1, ..,10 control variables. Following related studies (Dreher and Jensen, 2013; Smith, 2016), we include real GDP per capita in logarithmic terms, growth of real GDP per capita, and population in logarithmic terms. We consider data provided by IMF (2019) that starts in the year 1980 and is available till the year 2019 as an estimate. We include a dummy variable taking the value one if a Western country was a military ally with the United States in an armed conflict according to Pettersson et al. (2019), and zero otherwise.[9] We also include the shares of resolutions a country voted on in year t that dealt with six individual topics: the Middle East, economic development, disarmament, human rights, nuclear proliferation and colonialism. We include the first lag of the dependent variable to account for serial correlation.

μ are country-fixed effects. ϵ is the error term. Standard errors are robust.

Table C.1 presents summary statistics of the individual variables.

Table 3.4 shows the regression results for the yearly average agreement rate on resolutions between 1980 and 2019.

Since Donald Trump took office as president of the United States, the vote agreement rate of Western countries with the United States on UNGA resolutions has decreased compared to the voting behavior of all previous presidents. When control variables are included, the coefficient estimates of the Trump dummy variable are negative and statistically significant at the one percent-level in columns (2) to (5). When the country-fixed effects and topic-share variables are not included [column (2)], the coefficient estimate suggests that the decrease in vote agreement rates since Donald Trump took office is 4.9 percentage

[8] There was no roll-call vote in the UNGA between 1 January 2017 and Donald Trump's inauguration as US president on 20 January 2017.

[9] No Western country was a military opponent of the United States in an armed conflict according to Pettersson et al. (2019).

Table 3.4: Yearly average agreement rate between the US and Western countries during votes in the UNGA, all resolutions between 1980 and 2019

	Dependent variable: yearly average agreement rate				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
US president Donald Trump	0.0122	-0.0491***	-0.0515***	-0.0563***	-0.0440***
	(0.0195)	(0.0128)	(0.0132)	(0.0112)	(0.0127)
Ideological distance	0.0021	0.0028	0.0023	0.0020	0.0020
	(0.0038)	(0.0018)	(0.0018)	(0.0018)	(0.0018)
US president Donald Trump	-0.0271**	-0.0041	-0.0041	0.0006	0.0002
times ideological distance	(0.0121)	(0.0085)	(0.0078)	(0.0074)	(0.0071)
Log of real GDP per capita		0.0103**	0.0077*	-0.0108	-0.0171
		(0.0043)	(0.0044)	(0.0124)	(0.0152)
Growth of real GDP		-0.0036***	-0.0038***	-0.0037***	-0.0035***
		(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.0007)	(0.0007)
Log of population		0.0004	0.0002	0.1392***	0.1205***
		(0.0010)	(0.0010)	(0.0327)	(0.0331)
Allied with US in conflict		0.0024	-0.0020	-0.0150***	-0.0125***
		(0.0035)	(0.0039)	(0.0042)	(0.0044)
1st lag of UNGA vote		0.8562***	0.8596***	0.6908***	0.6735***
agreement rate		(0.0161)	(0.0161)	(0.0246)	(0.0258)
Constant	0.5432***	-0.0240	-0.0726	-0.1506	-0.0857
	(0.0050)	(0.0446)	(0.0507)	(0.0931)	(0.1419)
Topic-share variables?	✗	✗	✓	✗	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Conditional marginal effect	-0.0251**	-0.0013	-0.0018	0.0026	0.0021
of ideological distance[a.]	(0.0114)	(0.0083)	(0.0077)	(0.0071)	(0.0068)
Observations	1,059	1,020	1,020	1,020	1,020
Countries	38	38	38	38	38
Adjusted R^2	0.0024	0.7788	0.7844	0.8000	0.8042

Robust standard errors are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
Only countries that have been either G7, NATO, OECD and/or UN WEOG members without the US are included.
Note a.: Conditional marginal effects evaluated at president Trump dummy variable taking value of 1, and control variables at means.

points. Once the topic-share variables and country-fixed effects are included, the point estimate increases to around -4.4 percentage points [column (5)]. The point estimates of the ideological difference variable do not turn out to be statistically significant. The coefficient estimate of the interaction term is negative and statistically significant in column (1), but lacks statistical significance in all other columns. The marginal effect of the ideological distance during the Donald Trump administration in column (1) without control variables is statistically significant at the five percent-level and suggests that the agreement rate was around 2.5 percentage points lower when the ideological distance

increased by one point. Once control variables are included in columns (2) to (5), the marginal effects of the ideological distance lack statistical significance.

Table 3.5 shows the results if the dependent variable is replaced by the absolute difference of ideal points between the United States and Western countries in the UNGA for the period 1980 until 2018.

Table 3.5: Yearly absolute difference of ideal points between the US and Western countries during votes in the UNGA, all resolutions between 1980 and 2018

	Dependent variable: absolute difference of ideal points				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
US president Donald Trump	-0.0794	0.0954***	0.1155***	0.1168***	0.1411***
	(0.0906)	(0.0226)	(0.0276)	(0.0222)	(0.0276)
Ideological distance	0.0072	-0.0053	-0.0034	-0.0007	0.0001
	(0.0160)	(0.0056)	(0.0056)	(0.0055)	(0.0053)
US president Donald Trump	0.1013	0.0146	0.0116	-0.0004	0.0000
times ideological distance	(0.0622)	(0.0153)	(0.0149)	(0.0147)	(0.0145)
Log of real GDP per capita		-0.0284**	-0.0152	0.0379	0.1040**
		(0.0123)	(0.0120)	(0.0394)	(0.0450)
Growth of real GDP		0.0032	0.0019	0.0037	-0.0010
		(0.0026)	(0.0027)	(0.0023)	(0.0023)
Log of population		-0.0037	-0.0029	-0.3431***	-0.3060***
		(0.0033)	(0.0033)	(0.0885)	(0.0904)
Allied with US in conflict		-0.0250***	0.0044	0.0121	0.0411***
		(0.0095)	(0.0105)	(0.0119)	(0.0124)
1st lag of absolute		0.9131***	0.9243***	0.7493***	0.7171***
ideal points difference		(0.0132)	(0.0133)	(0.0270)	(0.0288)
Constant	1.6361***	0.4590***	0.6767***	1.0876***	0.7655*
	(0.0216)	(0.1339)	(0.1541)	(0.3033)	(0.4161)
Topic-share variables?	✗	✗	✓	✗	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Conditional marginal effect	0.1086*	0.0093	0.0083	-0.0011	0.0001
of ideological distance[a.]	(0.0601)	(0.0142)	(0.0137)	(0.0135)	(0.0134)
Observations	1,031	1,020	1,020	1,020	1,020
Countries	38	38	38	38	38
Adjusted R^2	0.0001	0.8984	0.9029	0.9094	0.9145

Robust standard errors are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
Only countries that have been either G7, NATO, OECD and/or UN WEOG members without the US are included.
Note a.: Conditional marginal effects evaluated at president Trump dummy variable taking value of 1, and control variables at means.

The point estimates of the Donald Trump dummy variable are positive and statistically significant at the one percent-level in columns (2) to (5). The coefficient estimates range between 0.10 in column (2) and 0.14 in column (5), or about a quarter of a standard

deviation, with fixed country effects and the topic-share variables included. The point estimates of the ideological distance variable and of its interaction with the Donald Trump dummy variable do not turn out to be statistically significant. The marginal effect of the ideological distance under Donald Trump is positive and statistically significant at the ten percent-level in column (1), but lacks statistical significance once control variables are included.

As a robustness check, we exclude individual countries from the Western countries group. Inferences for both political alignment variables do not change. Inferences also do not change if only G7, OECD, NATO or UN WEOG member countries are considered.

We do not find evidence that Donald Trump's cabinet members obstructed the president's policy decisions at the UNGA. The longest-serving ambassador of the United States to the United Nations under Donald Trump, Nikki Haley, publicly supported the president's agenda (United States Mission to the United Nations, 2017) and did not state dissent as a reason for her resignation (Haley, 2018). Acting ambassador of the United States to the United Nations Jonathan Cohen, a career diplomat who followed Haley in February 2019, defended the United States policy shift at the United Nations on topics such as the Iranian nuclear deal (United States Mission to the United Nations, 2019a) and the Golan Heights (United States Mission to the United Nations, 2019b).

3.3 Conclusion

Voting in line with the United States of Western country groups at the United Nations General Assembly declined since Donald Trump's presidency. The decrease is especially pronounced for member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and topics regarding the Middle East. Econometric evidence suggests that the vote agreement rate of Western countries under Donald Trump decreased by 4.4 percentage points and that absolute ideal point differences increased by 25 percent of a standard deviation compared to preceding presidents of the United States.

One may well conjecture that leftwing governments in Western allied countries are especially inclined to vote against the United States of America since Donald Trump became president. Our results, however, do not suggest that the declining political alignment between the United States and Western allies was driven by the ideological distance based on a classical leftwing-rightwing government ideology scale.

Bibliography

Adhikari, B. (2019a). Power politics and foreign aid delivery tactics. *Social Science Quarterly*, 100(5):1523–1539.

Adhikari, B. (2019b). United Nations General Assembly voting and foreign aid bypass. *International Politics*, 56(4):514–535.

Aidt, T. S., Hillman, A. L., and Qijun, L. (2020). Who takes bribes and how much? Evidence from the China Corruption Conviction Databank. *World Development*, 133. Article 104985.

Alexander, D. and Rooney, B. (2019). Vote-Buying by the United States in the United Nations. *International Studies Quarterly*, 63(1):168–176.

Allen, S. H. and Flynn, M. E. (2018). Donor government ideology and aid bypass. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 14(4):449–468.

Andersen, T. B., Harr, T., and Tarp, F. (2006). On US politics and IMF lending. *European Economic Review*, 50(7):1843–1862.

Baigorri-Jalón, J. (2005). Conference interpreting in the first International Labor Conference. *Translators Journal*, 50(3):987–996.

Bailey, M. A., Strezhnev, A., and Voeten, E. (2017). Estimating dynamic state preferences from United Nations voting data. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 61(2):430–456.

Bailey, M. A. and Voeten, E. (2018). A two-dimensional analysis of seventy years of United Nations voting. *Public Choice*, 176(1-2):33–55.

Battaglini, M. and Patacchini, E. (2018). Influencing connected legislators. *Journal of Political Economy*, 126(6):2277–2322.

Battaglini, M., Sciabolazza, V. L., and Patacchini, E. (2020). Effectiveness of connected legislators. *American Journal of Political Science*, 64(4):739–756.

Becker, R. N., Hillman, A. L., Potrafke, N., and Schwemmer, A. H. (2015). The preoccupation of the United Nations with Israel: Evidence and theory. *The Review of International Organizations*, 10(4):413–437.

Bjørnskov, C. and Rode, M. (2020). Regime types and regime change: A new dataset on democracy, coups, and political institutions. *The Review of International Organizations*, 15:531–551.

Bolt, J. and Van Zanden, J. L. (2014). The Maddison Project: Collaborative research on historical national accounts. *The Economic History Review*, 67(3):627–651. Maddison Project Database 2020, last updated on 2 November 2020.

Bramsen, I. (2017). How violence breeds violence: Micro-dynamics and reciprocity of violent interaction in the Arab uprisings. *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*,

11:625–649.

Carter, D. B. and Stone, R. W. (2015). Democracy and multilateralism: The case of vote buying in the UN General Assembly. *International Organization*, 69(1):1–33.

Carter, E. B. (2020). Diversionary cheap talk: Economic conditions and US foreign policy rhetoric, 1945-2010. *International Interactions*, 46(2):163–198.

Christensen, M. I. (2021). *Worldwide Guide to Women in Leadership Database*. Villanova University, Villanova, Pennsylvania.

Cohen, L. and Malloy, C. J. (2014). Friends in high places. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 6(3):63–91.

Collins, R. (2005). *Interaction ritual chains*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.

Cordell, R. (2019). Security-Civil Liberties Trade-offs: International Cooperation in Extraordinary Rendition. *International Interactions*, 45(2):369–400.

Cruz, C., Keefer, P., and Scartascini, C. (2018). *Database of Political Institutions 2017*. Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, D.C.

Dolan Jr, T. M. (2016). Go big or go home? Positive emotions and responses to wartime success. *International Studies Quarterly*, 60(2):230–242.

Dreher, A. and Jensen, N. M. (2007). Independent actor or agent? An empirical analysis of the impact of US interests on International Monetary Fund conditions. *The Journal of Law and Economics*, 50(1):105–124.

Dreher, A. and Jensen, N. M. (2013). Country or leader? Political change and UN General Assembly voting. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 29:183–196.

Dreher, A., Nunnenkamp, P., and Thiele, R. (2008). Does US aid buy UN General Assembly votes? A disaggregated analysis. *Public Choice*, 136(1-2):139–164.

Dreher, A. and Sturm, J.-E. (2012). Do the IMF and the World Bank influence voting in the UN General Assembly? *Public Choice*, 151(1-2):363–397.

Dreher, A., Sturm, J.-E., and Vreeland, J. R. (2009). Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council. *European Economic Review*, 53(7):742–757.

Federal Foreign Office of Germany (2019). Private email correspondence with representatives of the department OR01-9 Elections, Security Council Candidature, General Assembly, Specific National Situations. Message dated 23 April 2019, correspondence available upon request.

Feenstra, R. C., Inklaar, R., and Timmer, M. P. (2015). The next generation of the Penn World Table. *American Economic Review*, 105(10):3150–82. Penn World Table version 10.0, last updated on 14 January 2021.

Fisman, R. and Miguel, E. (2007). Corruption, norms, and legal enforcement: Evidence from diplomatic parking tickets. *Journal of Political Economy*, 115(6):1020–1048.

Fisman, R. and Miguel, E. (2010). *Economic gangsters: Corruption, violence, and the poverty of nations*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.

Frankl, A. (1920). Photograph titled 'The first meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations took place on 15 November 1920 at the Salle de la Réformation in Geneva'. *National Library of Norway*.

Greene, W. H. (2018). *Econometric analysis*. Pearson Education, London, eighth edition.

Gründler, K. and Krieger, T. (2016). Democracy and growth: Evidence from a machine learning indicator. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 45:85–107.

Gründler, K. and Krieger, T. (2019). Should we care (more) about data aggregation? Evidence from Democracy Indices. *CESifo Working Paper Series*, 7480.

Gründler, K. and Potrafke, N. (2019). Corruption and economic growth: New empirical evidence. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 60. Article 101810.

Gupta, S. and Abed, G. (2002). *Governance, corruption, and economic performance*. International Monetary Fund Press, Washington, D.C.

Haley, N. (2018). Resignation Letter. October 3. `https://unwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Read-Nikki-Haley-s-resignation-letter.pdf`, last accessed on 9 March 2021.

Harmon, N., Fisman, R., and Kamenica, E. (2019). Peer effects in legislative voting. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 11(4):156–80.

Hayek, F. A. v. (1960). *The Constitution of Liberty*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois.

Hillman, A. L. (2013). Economic and behavioral foundations of prejudice. In *Global antisemitism: A crisis of modernity*, pages 51–67. Brill Nijhoff, Leiden.

Hillman, A. L. (2019). Harming a favored side: An anomaly with supreme values and good intentions. *Public Choice*, 1:1–11.

Hillman, A. L. and Potrafke, N. (2015). The UN Goldstone Report and retraction: An empirical investigation. *Public Choice*, 163(3-4):247–266.

Holmes, M. (2013). The force of face-to-face diplomacy: Mirror neurons and the problem of intentions. *International Organization*, 67(4):829–861.

Holmes, M. (2018). *Face-to-face diplomacy: Social neuroscience and international relations*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Holmes, M. and Wheeler, N. J. (2020). Social bonding in diplomacy. *International Theory*, 12(1):133–161.

Hwang, W., Sanford, A. G., and Lee, J. (2015). Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence Voting in the UN General Assembly? *International Interactions*, 41(2):256–278.

ILC (1920). *International Labour Conference: First Annual Meeting, October 29, 1919 – November 29, 1919*. Washington Government Printing, Washington, D.C.

IMF (2019). *World Economic Outlook, April 2019: Growth Slowdown, Precarious Recovery*. International Monetary Fund Press, Washington, D.C.

International Labour Organization (2021). *ILO Multimedia Download Platform, Historical Images*. International Labour Organization, Geneva.

Jacobson, G. C. (2019). Extreme Referendum: Donald Trump and the 2018 Midterm Elections. *Political Science Quarterly*, 134(1):9–38.

Jelnov, A. (2019). Third-party intervention in the presence of supreme values. *Public Choice*, 1:1–8.

Jenkins, S. (2012). How gender influences roll call voting. *Social Science Quarterly*, 93(2):415–433.

Jervis, R. (2003). Understanding the Bush doctrine. *Political Science Quarterly*, 118(3):365–388.

Jetter, M. and Parmeter, C. F. (2018). Sorting through global corruption determinants: Institutions and education matter, not culture. *World Development*, 109:279–294.

Johnstone, I. (2004). US-UN relations after Iraq: The end of the world (order) as we know it? *European Journal of International Law*, 15(4):813–838.

Jovanovic, V. (1997). The Status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United States. *Fordham International Law Journal*, 21:1719.

Kahn-Nisser, S. (2019). When the targets are members and donors: Analyzing intergovernmental organizations' human rights shaming. *The Review of International Organizations*, 14(3):431–451.

Katzander, S. (1948). The United Nations set up shop in Paris. *Stars and Stripes*. Newspaper article published 25 September 1948.

Kegley Jr, C. W. and Hook, S. W. (1991). US foreign aid and UN voting: Did Reagan's linkage strategy buy deference or defiance? *International Studies Quarterly*, 35(3):295–312.

Kim, S. Y. and Russett, B. (1996). The new politics of voting alignments in the United Nations General Assembly. *International Organization*, 50(4):629–652.

King, J. and Riddlesperger, J. (2018). The Trump transition: Beginning a distinctive presidency. *Social Science Quarterly*, 99(5):1821–1836.

Kingdon, J. W. (1989). *Congressmen's voting decisions*. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Kuziemko, I. and Werker, E. (2006). How much is a seat on the Security Council worth? Foreign aid and bribery at the United Nations. *Journal of Political Economy*, 114(5):905–930.

League of Nations (1920). *The Records of the First Assembly, Plenary Meetings*. League of Nations, Geneva.

Liu, Q. and Peng, Y. (2015). Corruption in college admissions examinations in China. *International Journal of Educational Development*, 41:104–111.

Longenecker, B. (2007). On Israel's God and God's Israel: Assessing supersessionism in Paul. *The Journal of Theological Studies*, 58(1):26–44.

Maoz, Z. and Henderson, E. A. (2013). The world religion dataset, 1945–2010: Logic, estimates, and trends. *International Interactions*, 39(3):265–291.

Marshall, M. G., Gurr, T. R., and Jaggers, K. (2019). *Polity IV project: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800-2018*. Center for Systemic Peace, Vienna, Virginia.

Masket, S. E. (2008). Where you sit is where you stand: The impact of seating proximity on legislative cue-taking. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 3:301–311.

Matthews, D. R. and Stimson, J. A. (1975). *Yeas and nays: Normal decision-making in the US House of Representatives*. Wiley, Hoboken, New Jersey.

Mbaku, J. M. and Kimenyi, M. S. (2015). Rents and development failure in Africa. In *Companion to the political economy of rent seeking*. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham.

Mikkelson, H. and Jourdenais, R. (2015). *The Routledge Handbook of Interpreting*. Routledge, Abingdon.

Mosler, M. (2020). Autocrats in the United Nations General Assembly: A test of the decoy voting hypothesis. *European Journal of Political Economy*. Article 101973.

Mosler, M. and Potrafke, N. (2020). International political alignment during the Trump presidency: Voting at the UN General Assembly. *International Interactions*, 46(3):1–17.

Obydenkova, A. V. and Rodrigues Vieira, V. G. (2020). The limits of collective financial statecraft: Regional development banks and voting alignment with the United States at the United Nations General Assembly. *International Studies Quarterly*, 64(1):13–25.

O'Regan, V. R. (2000). *Gender matters: Female policymakers' influence in industrialized nations*. Greenwood Publishing Group, Westport, Connecticut.

Panke, D. (2014). The UNGA—a talking shop? Exploring rationales for the repetition of resolutions in subsequent negotiations. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 27(3):442–458.

Pettersson, T., Högbladh, S., and Öberg, M. (2019). Organized violence, 1989–2018 and peace agreements. *Journal of Peace Research*, 56(4):589–603.

Potrafke, N. (2009). Does government ideology influence political alignment with the US? An empirical analysis of voting in the UN General Assembly. *The Review of International Organizations*, 4(3):245–268.

Potrafke, N. (2017). Partisan politics: The empirical evidence from OECD panel studies. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 45(4):712–750.

Potrafke, N. (2018). Government ideology and economic policy-making in the United States: A survey. *Public Choice*, 174(1-2):145–207.

Ramstetter, L. and Habersack, F. (2020). Do women make a difference? Analysing environmental attitudes and actions of Members of the European Parliament. *Environmental Politics*, 29(6):1063–1084.

Rapport, A. (2017). Cognitive Approaches to Foreign Policy Analysis. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Reinsberg, B. (2019). Do Countries Use Foreign Aid to Buy Geopolitical Influence? Evidence from Donor Campaigns for Temporary UN Security Council Seats. *Politics and Governance*, 7:127–154.

Reiter, B. (2015). *Flushing Meadows-Corona Park: Historic Preservation Studio*. Historic Preservation Studio at Columbia University's Graduate School of Architecture, Planning and Preservation, New York City, New York.

Renshon, J., Lee, J. J., and Tingley, D. (2017). Emotions and the micro-foundations of commitment problems. *International Organization*, 71:S189–S218.

Rogowski, J. C. and Sinclair, B. (2012). Estimating the causal effects of social interaction with endogenous networks. *Political Analysis*, 20(3):316–328.

Routt, G. C. (1938). Interpersonal relationships and the legislative process. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 195(1):129–136.

Saia, A. (2018). Random interactions in the Chamber: Legislators' behavior and political distance. *Journal of Public Economics*, 164:225–240.

Smith, A. (2016). Leader turnover, institutions, and voting at the UN General Assembly. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 60(1):143–163.

Strüver, G. (2016). What friends are made of: Bilateral linkages and domestic drivers of foreign policy alignment with China. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 12(2):170–191.

Thacker, S. C. (1999). The high politics of IMF lending. *World Politics*, 52:38–75.

Trump, D. (2018a). Twitter message by @realDonaldTrump. Published on 9 June 2018 `https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1005586562959093760?lang=de`, last accessed on 9 March 2021.

Trump, D. (2018b). Twitter message by @realDonaldTrump. Published on 11 June 2018. `https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1017288317342224384?lang=de`, last accessed on 9 March 2021.

Trump, D. (2018c). Twitter message by @realDonaldTrump. Published on 11 July 2018. `https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1017290478839050240`, last accessed on 9 March 2021.

United Nations (2005). Secretary-General's remarks at dinner hosted by H.E. Mr. Moshe Katsav, President of the State of Israel. Statement on 15 March 2005. Office of the United Nations Secretary-General, New York City, New York.

United Nations (2008). *History of the United Nations Headquarters*. United Nations Press, New York City, New York.

United Nations (2016). *Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, A/520/Revision 18*. United Nations Press, New York City, New York.

United Nations (2017). Twitter message by @UNDGACM_EN. Published on 19 September 2017. `https://twitter.com/undgacm_en/status/910141132654481408?lang=en`, last accessed on 9 March 2021.

United Nations (2019a). How are member states seated in the General Assembly? `https://ask.un.org/faq/14612`, last accessed on 9 March 2021.

United Nations (2019b). Private email correspondence with representatives of the United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library. Messages dated 31 May 2019, correspondence available upon request. Data now available via `https://ask.un.org/faq/14612`, last accessed on 9 March 2021.

United Nations (2019c). Private email correspondence with Senior Intergovernmental Affairs Officer, General Assembly Affairs Branch, General Assembly and ECOSOC Affairs Division Department for General Assembly and Conference Management. Message dated 26 August 2019, correspondence available upon request.

United Nations (2019d). *UN General Assembly Voting Records*. United Nations, New York City, New York.

United Nations (2020). *Manual of Protocol, Protocol and Liaison Service*. United Nations Press, New York City, New York.

United Nations (2021a). *Delegates' Handbooks*. United Nations, New York City, New York.

United Nations (2021b). *Growth in United Nations membership from 1945 until present*. United Nations, New York City, New York.

United Nations (2021c). *UN General Assembly Meetings Coverage and Press Releases Database*. United Nations, New York City, New York.

United Nations (2021d). *United Nations Audiovisual Library Database*. United Nations, New York City, New York.

United Nations (2021e). *United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law*. United Nations, New York City, New York.

United Nations (2021f). *United Nations Photo Digital Asset Management*. United Nations, New York City, New York.

United Nations (2021g). *Yearbooks of the United Nations*. United Nations, New York City, New York.

United States Mission to the United Nations (2017). Ambassador Nikki Haley Delivers Remarks to the UN Security Council on Conflicts in Europe. Published on 21 February 2017.

United States Mission to the United Nations (2019a). Remarks at UN Security Council: Briefing on Non-Proliferation, Iran. Published on 26 June 2019.

United States Mission to the United Nations (2019b). Remarks at UN Security Council: Briefing on the Middle East. Published on 26 March 2019.

Van Rythoven, E. and Sucharov, M. (2019). *Methodology and Emotion in International Relations: Parsing the Passions*. Routledge, Abingdon.

Voeten, E. (2013). Data and analyses of voting in the United Nations General Assembly. In Reinalda, B., editor, *Routledge Handbook of International Organization*. Routledge, Abingdon. Last updated on 22 April 2020.

Voigtländer, N. and Voth, H.-J. (2012). Persecution perpetuated: The medieval origins of anti-Semitic violence in Nazi Germany. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 127(3):1339–1392.

Wang, T.-Y. (1999). US foreign aid and UN voting: An analysis of important issues. *International Studies Quarterly*, 43(1):199–210.

Wong, S. S. (2016). Emotions and the communication of intentions in face-to-face diplomacy. *European Journal of International Relations*, 22(1):144–167.

Wong, S. S. (2020). Mapping the Repertoire of Emotions and Their Communicative Functions in Face-to-face Diplomacy. *International Studies Review*, 22(1):77–97.

Woo, B. and Chung, E. (2018). Aid for vote? United Nations General Assembly voting and American aid allocation. *Political Studies*, 66(4):1002–1026.

Appendix A

Spatial Peer Effects on Resolution Voting Behavior

A.1 Figures

Figure A.1: Seating arrangements at the first annual meeting of the International Labour Conference in Washington, D.C., United States, 1919

Source: International Labour Organization (2021)

Figure A.2: Seating arrangements at the first Assembly of the League of Nations at the Salle de la Réformation in Geneva, Switzerland, 1920

Source: Frankl (1920)

Figure A.3: Seating arrangements at the first session of the UNGA at Methodist Central Hall in London, United Kingdom, 1946

Source: United Nations (2021d)

Figure A.4: Seating arrangements at the session of the UNGA at Flushing Meadows in New York City, United States, 1950

Source: United Nations (2021e)

Figure A.5: Seating arrangements at the third session of the UNGA at the Palais de Chaillot in Paris, France, 1949

Source: United Nations (2021d)

Figure A.6: Seating arrangements at the eighth session of the UNGA in the General Assembly Hall in New York City, United States, 1953

Source: United Nations (2021d)

Figure A.7: Seating arrangements at the 68th session of the UNGA at the North Lawn Building in New York City, United States, 2013

Source: United Nations (2021f)

Figure A.8: Seating arrangements at the 74th session of the UNGA in the General Assembly Hall, 2019

Source: United Nations (2021d)

Figure A.9: Vote display panels at UNGA in the General Assembly Hall, 2021

Source: United Nations (2021d)

Figure A.10: Seating arrangements at the 75th session of the UNGA in the General Assembly Hall, 2020

Source: United Nations (2021f)

Figure A.11: Floor plan of the 37th session of the UNGA



Source: United Nations (2019b)

A.2 Tables

Table A.1: List of seating arrangements since the seventh session of the UNGA

Seating arrangement	First date	Reason for change of seating order
1st arrangement, 7th session	2 October 1952	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 8th session	7 September 1953	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 9th session	2 September 1954	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 10th session	3 September 1955	beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 10th session	1 December 1955	first vote of Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Nepal, Portugal, Romania and Spain
1st arrangement, 11th session	1 November 1956	beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 11th session	2 December 1956	first vote of Japan
3rd arrangement, 11th session	4 March 1957	first vote of Ghana
1st arrangement, 12th session	3 September 1957	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 13th session	3 September 1958	beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 13th session	1 December 1958	first vote of Guinea
1st arrangement, 14th session	5 September 1959	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 15th session	6 September 1960	beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 15th session	1 October 1960	first vote of Nigeria
1st arrangement, 16th session	1 August 1961	beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 16th session	7 September 1961	first vote of Sierra Leone
3rd arrangement, 16th session	2 October 1961	first vote of Mauritania and Mongolia
4th arrangement, 16th session	1 December 1961	first vote of Tanganyika
1st arrangement, 17th session	5 July 1962	beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 17th session	1 September 1962	first vote of Burundi, Jamaica, Rwanda and Trinidad & Tobago
3rd arrangement, 17th session	4 October 1962	first vote of Algeria and Uganda
1st arrangement, 18th session	4 June 1963	beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 18th session	1 October 1963	country name change to Malaysia
No data available for seating arrangement of 18th session before first votes of Kenya and Zanzibar.		
1st arrangement, 19th session	6 February 1965	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 20th session	3 November 1965	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 21st session	4 September 1966	beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 21st session	4 October 1966	first vote of Botswana and Lesotho
3rd arrangement, 21st session	3 December 1966	first vote of Barbados
1st arrangement, 22nd session	3 September 1967	beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 22nd session	1 December 1967	first vote of Southern Yemen
3rd arrangement, 22nd session	3 June 1968	first vote of Mauritius
1st arrangement, 23rd session	6 September 1968	beginning of session

Continuation on next page.

Continuation from previous page.

Seating arrangement	First date	Reason for change of seating order
2nd arrangement, 23rd session	1 November 1968	first vote of Equatorial Guinea
1st arrangement, 24th session	1 September 1969	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 25th session	1 September 1970	beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 25th session	25 July 1970	country name change to Khmer Republic
3rd arrangement, 25th session	1 December 1970	country name change to People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
1st arrangement, 26th session	2 September 1971	beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 26th session	3 October 1971	first vote of Oman
3rd arrangement, 26th session	3 November 1971	country name change to Zaire
4th arrangement, 26th session	1 December 1971	country name change to Congo and first vote of United Arab Emirates
1st arrangement, 27th session	5 September 1972	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 28th session	1 October 1973	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 29th session	2 September 1974	beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 29th session	2 December 1974	country name change to Benin
1st arrangement, 30th session	1 November 1975	beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 30th session	3 December 1975	first vote of Suriname
1st arrangement, 31st session	4 October 1976	beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 31st session	1 December 1976	first vote of Samoa
1st arrangement, 32nd session	5 October 1977	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 33rd session	1 November 1978	beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 33rd session	1 December 1978	first vote of Dominica
1st arrangement, 34th session	5 September 1979	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 35th session	1 October 1980	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 36th session	1 September 1981	beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 36th session	2 November 1981	first vote of Antigua and Barbuda
1st arrangement, 37th session	3 October 1982	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 38th session	4 October 1983	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 39th session	5 September 1984	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 40th session	6 October 1985	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 41st session	2 October 1986	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 42nd session	4 October 1987	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 43rd session	2 October 1988	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 44th session	5 September 1989	beginning of session
No data available for seating arrangements between the 45th and 51st session.		
1st arrangement, 52nd session	3 November 1997	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 53rd session	2 October 1998	beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 53rd session	8 June 1999	first vote of Kiribati, Nauru and Tonga
1st arrangement, 54th session	2 November 1999	beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 54th session	15 June 2000	first vote of Tuvalu
1st arrangement, 55th session	3 October 2000	beginning of session

Continuation on next page.

Continuation from previous page.

Seating arrangement	First date	Reason for change of seating order
1st arrangement, 56th session	4 November 2001	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 57th session	3 September 2002	beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 57th session	5 June 2003	country name change to Serbia & Montenegro
1st arrangement, 58th session	4 November 2003	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 59th session	22 October 2004	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 60th session	31 October 2005	beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 60th session	30 June 2006	first vote of Montenegro
1st arrangement, 61st session	30 October 2006	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 62nd session	30 October 2007	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 63rd session	8 October 2008	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 64th session	28 October 2009	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 65th session	26 October 2010	beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 65th session	3 May 2011	first vote of South Sudan
1st arrangement, 66th session	16 September 2011	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 67th session	13 November 2012	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 68th session	29 October 2013	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 69th session	28 October 2014	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 70th session	27 October 2015	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 71st session	26 October 2016	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 72nd session	1 November 2017	beginning of session
1st arrangement, 73rd session	16 October 2018	beginning of session
2nd arrangement, 73rd session	22 May 2019	country name change to Northern Macedonia

The first date refers to the first contested vote on a resolution for each seating arrangement.

Table A.2: Summary statistics of variables, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Vote agreement rate	79,742,480	82.4863	31.3476	0	100
General seat neighbor	79,742,480	0.048	0.2137	0	1
Table neighbor	79,742,480	0.0061	0.0779	0	1
Aisle neighbor	79,742,480	0.0059	0.0768	0	1
Diagonal front table neighbor	79,742,480	0.0061	0.0776	0	1
Diagonal back table neighbor	79,742,480	0.0061	0.0776	0	1
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	79,742,480	0.0059	0.0766	0	1
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	79,742,480	0.0059	0.0767	0	1
Front neighbor	79,742,480	0.006	0.0772	0	1
Back neighbor	79,742,480	0.006	0.0773	0	1
Continuous democracy index by Gründler and Krieger (2019)	70,952,536	0.5228	0.4185	0	1
Difference of cont. democr. index by Gründler and Krieger (2019)	69,168,117	0.3991	0.3657	0	0.9995
Communism indicator	76,583,255	0.0942	0.2921	0	1
Difference of communism indicator	75,570,438	0.1612	0.3677	0	1
Middle East resolution indicator	79,742,480	0.1778	0.3823	0	1
Nuclear proliferation resolution indicator	79,742,480	0.17	0.3756	0	1
Disarmament resolution indicator	79,742,480	0.2143	0.4103	0	1
Human rights resolution indicator	79,742,480	0.2002	0.4002	0	1
Colonialism resolution indicator	79,742,480	0.1413	0.3484	0	1
Economic development resolution indicator	79,742,480	0.1312	0.3376	0	1
Number of days since first vote on a contested resolution	79,742,480	121.0257	64.8921	0	245
Difference of number of days since first vote on a contested resolution	79,742,480	47.0976	45.315	0	214
Non-permanent UN Security Council membership	79,742,480	0.0655	0.2475	0	1
Difference of non-permanent UN Security Council membership	79,742,480	0.1197	0.3246	0	11
Female executive state leader indicator	79,742,480	0.0632	0.2434	0	1
Difference of female exec. state leader indicator	79,742,480	0.1173	0.3218	0	1

Continuation on next page.

Continuation from previous page.

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Female Minister of Foreign Affairs indicator	79,742,480	0.0693	0.2539	0	1
Difference of female Minister of Foreign Affairs indicator	79,742,480	0.1218	0.327	0	1
Female Permanent Representative to the UN indicator	79,742,480	0.0731	0.2604	0	1
Difference of female Permanent Representative to the UN indicator	79,742,480	0.1304	0.3368	0	1
Growth of real GDP by Feenstra et al. (2015)	66,302,996	4.4591	9.0885	-71.0986	132.0176
Difference of growth of real GDP by Feenstra et al. (2015)	58,225,030	8.1729	9.0828	0	142.33
Real GDP per capita by Feenstra et al. (2015)	66,417,785	12,626.35	17,157.18	425.3024	25,3329.9
Difference of real GDP per capita by Feenstra et al. (2015)	58,392,477	14,073.85	19,320.9	0.05	25,2710.6
Population by Feenstra et al. (2015)	66,417,785	29.6593	93.5798	0.041	1,339.18
Difference of population by Feenstra et al. (2015)	58,392,477	44.8589	123.3851	0	13,39.125
Standardized Levensthein distance	71,704,504	0.1463	0.1019	0	0.7895
SoundEx indicator	71,704,504	0.0014	0.0386	0	1
Row number	79,651,501	8.2151	3.7092	1	16
Column number	79,651,501	2.8953	1.5387	1	11
Vote agreement rate without abstentions	65,006,973	89.8501	30.1988	0	100
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor	51,348,831	0.0057	0.0756	0	1
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor	51,348,831	0.0057	0.0756	0	1
Front neighbor's front neighbor	51,348,831	0.0058	0.0763	0	1
Back neighbor's back neighbor	51,348,831	0.0059	0.0763	0	1
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor's front neighbor	51,348,831	0.0057	0.0756	0	1
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor's back neighbor	51,348,831	0.0058	0.0758	0	1
Table neighbor's front neighbor's front neighbor	51,348,831	0.006	0.0769	0	1
Table neighbor's back neighbor's back neighbor	51,348,831	0.006	0.077	0	1
Aisle neighbor's front neighbor's front neighbor	51,348,831	0.0057	0.0754	0	1

Continuation on next page.

Continuation from previous page.

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Aisle neighbor's back neighbor's back neighbor	51,348,831	0.0058	0.0757	0	1
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor's front neighbor	51,348,831	0.0058	0.0756	0	1
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor's back neighbor	51,348,831	0.0058	0.0757	0	1
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor's front neighbor's front neighbor	51,348,831	0.0057	0.0754	0	1
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor's back neighbor's back neighbor	51,348,831	0.0058	0.0757	0	1
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor's front neighbor's front neighbor	51,348,831	0.0057	0.0756	0	1
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor's back neighbor's back neighbor	51,348,831	0.0058	0.0757	0	1
Dichotomous democracy index by Gründler and Krieger (2019)	70,952,536	0.5257	0.4876	0	1
Difference of dicht. democr. index by Gründler and Krieger (2019)	69,168,117	0.4289	0.4716	0	1
Revised Combined Polity score	68,590,853	1.3635	7.4157	-10	10
Difference of Revised Combined Polity score	60,428,412	7.4658	6.3498	0	20
Institutionalized Autocracy score	66,973,435	3.1411	3.5155	0	10
Difference of Institutionalized autocracy score	57,612,365	3.2925	3.1594	0	10
Democracy indicator by Bjørnskov and Rode (2020)	76,583,255	0.4904	0.4999	0	1
Difference of democracy index by Bjøornskov and Rode (2019)	75,570,438	0.4635	0.4987	0	1
Growth of real GDP by Bolt and Van Zanden (2014)	63,019,487	204.3688	8.468	133.629	324.7044
Difference of growth of real GDP by Bolt and Van Zanden (2014)	54,685,899	7.5228	8.5754	0	144.1335
Real GDP per capita by Bolt and Van Zanden (2014)	63,079,667	12,087.91	16,371.29	269	22,0717
Difference of real GDP per capita by Bolt and Van Zanden (2014)	54,784,748	13,173.88	17,674.17	0	22,0055
Population by Bolt and Van Zanden (2014)	63,572,534	31,016.23	89,981.25	64	126,8155
Difference of population by Bolt and Van Zanden (2014)	55,731,578	45,806.56	117,802.2	0	126,8081
Same language	79,742,480	0.191	0.3931	0	1
Same colonizer	79,742,480	0.0803	0.2718	0	1

Table A.3: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness test: second circle seating neighbors

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor	-0.5587***	-0.8805***	-0.6882***	-0.6202***	-0.4814**	-0.2947
	(0.1990)	(0.2006)	(0.1843)	(0.2041)	(0.2199)	(0.2358)
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor	-0.1100	-0.4926***	-0.3291**	-0.3579	-0.2960	-0.1642
	(0.1960)	(0.1831)	(0.1614)	(0.2222)	(0.2271)	(0.1454)
Front neighbor's front neighbor	-0.5161**	-0.7688***	-0.6491***	-0.5172**	-0.6109**	-0.0785
	(0.2205)	(0.2171)	(0.1988)	(0.2497)	(0.2663)	(0.1909)
Back neighbor's back neighbor	-0.2932	-0.4942**	-0.3591*	-0.3448	-0.4929*	0.0015
	(0.2011)	(0.2046)	(0.1903)	(0.2258)	(0.2652)	(0.1793)
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor's front neighbor	-0.1393	-0.5004*	-0.3802	0.0524	0.0638	0.1946
	(0.2664)	(0.2609)	(0.2406)	(0.2837)	(0.3105)	(0.2333)
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor's back neighbor	0.0665	-0.3832	-0.2759	0.0394	-0.1584	0.2239
	(0.2575)	(0.2546)	(0.2265)	(0.2414)	(0.2495)	(0.1778)
Table neighbor's front neighbor's front neighbor	-0.2822	-0.6666***	-0.5450**	-0.3923	-0.4620	-0.0753
	(0.2225)	(0.2506)	(0.2290)	(0.2771)	(0.3235)	(0.2284)
Table neighbor's back neighbor's back neighbor	-0.1667	-0.4194	-0.2942	-0.2780	-0.3381	-0.0948
	(0.2235)	(0.2633)	(0.2400)	(0.2696)	(0.2978)	(0.2236)
Aisle neighbor's front neighbor's front neighbor	-0.1035	-0.5877***	-0.4545**	-0.2406	-0.2593	-0.0198
	(0.2077)	(0.2048)	(0.1854)	(0.2102)	(0.2178)	(0.1717)
Aisle neighbor's back neighbor's back neighbor	-0.4511*	-0.4744**	-0.4131**	-0.4098	-0.4983	-0.4158
	(0.2341)	(0.217)	(0.1931)	(0.2937)	(0.2618)	(0.2702)
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor's front neighbor	-0.0768	-0.4875**	-0.3428*	-0.1528	-0.2420	0.2621
	(0.2486)	(0.2226)	(0.2018)	(0.1988)	(0.2276)	(0.1988)
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor's back neighbor	-0.2660	-0.5344**	-0.3871*	-0.1851	-0.1957	0.2148
	(0.2239)	(0.2406)	(0.2202)	(0.1899)	(0.2123)	(0.1779)
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor's front neighbor's front neighbor	0.1699	-0.3319	-0.2087	-0.1506	-0.2031	0.2621
	(0.2404)	(0.2249)	(0.1957)	(0.1717)	(0.2186)	(0.1727)

Continuation on next page.

Continuation from previous page.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor's back neighbor's back neighbor	0.1332 (0.2295)	-0.3764* (0.2228)	-0.2531 (0.1958)	-0.0882 (0.2246)	-0.2679 (0.2231)	0.2873* (0.1701)
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor's front neighbor's front neighbor	-0.1283 (0.2467)	-0.6540*** (0.2285)	-0.5181** (0.1959)	-0.1783 (0.2086)	-0.1554 (0.2315)	0.2415* (0.1405)
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor's back neighbor's back neighbor	0.2687 (0.2034)	-0.2336 (0.2023)	-0.0978 (0.1833)	-0.1103 (0.2187)	-0.2716 (0.2650)	0.2169 (0.1885)
Constant	82.5527*** (0.3706)	90.8731*** (0.8828)	88.9891*** (1.2446)	90.3334*** (1.0719)	88.7806*** (1.2200)	603.7411*** (108.2045)
Political variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	48,932,180	41,376,527	41,376,527	33,549,594	29,790,959	29,790,959
Adjusted R^2	0.0001	0.0423	0.0440	0.0547	0.0553	0.1487

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

Table A.4: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: second circle seating neighbors

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Arab League member states					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor	0.0347	-0.7834	-0.1629	-0.1905	0.5523	0.5660
	(0.8256)	(0.9060)	(0.8871)	(1.0136)	(1.1517)	(0.4552)
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor	-0.3388	-0.2183	0.3704	0.1974	1.5606	0.9905
	(0.7978)	(0.8333)	(0.8025)	(0.9449)	(1.1386)	(0.951)
Front neighbor's front neighbor	0.9946	0.6652	0.7271	0.8611	0.3866	-0.1453
	(0.5957)	(0.4967)	(0.5088)	(0.5890)	(0.6674)	(0.4257)
Back neighbor's back neighbor	2.1920***	1.0925	1.5143**	2.1649***	2.4939***	0.2654
	(0.7073)	(0.6755)	(0.6604)	(0.7945)	(0.8414)	(0.2900)
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor's front neighbor	-1.9580**	-0.7697	-0.1457	-0.0913	0.1788	-0.5533
	(0.9712)	(0.8744)	(0.8549)	(0.9403)	(1.0922)	(0.4711)
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor's back neighbor	1.5963*	0.4121	0.7725	0.4605	0.3903	-0.3265
	(0.8491)	(0.8570)	(0.8462)	(0.9612)	(1.0522)	(0.3986)
Table neighbor's front neighbor's front neighbor	0.4161	-0.1602	0.0948	0.2062	1.1486	-0.4874
	(0.5969)	(0.5719)	(0.6127)	(0.6825)	(0.9211)	(0.4473)
Table neighbor's back neighbor's back neighbor	0.5897	0.1740	0.5004	0.5110	0.3523	-0.6649
	(0.8446)	(0.8680)	(0.8921)	(0.9858)	(1.1840)	(0.6446)
Aisle neighbor's front neighbor's front neighbor	0.0134	1.2415**	1.6430***	2.4094***	2.8312***	0.5712
	(0.8172)	(0.5362)	(0.5077)	(0.5467)	(0.6248)	(0.4282)
Aisle neighbor's back neighbor's back neighbor	0.1068	-0.7795	-0.3293	-0.0722	-0.8056	-0.2926
	(0.7467)	(0.7606)	(0.7437)	(0.7393)	(0.8587)	(0.4595)
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor's front neighbor	-1.1634	-0.1151	0.6496	0.7476	0.9772	-0.6217
	(0.9747)	(0.7215)	(0.6762)	(0.7606)	(0.7084)	(0.4228)
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor's back neighbor	1.8986**	1.1417*	1.7175***	1.4756**	1.5963**	0.8083*
	(0.7565)	(0.6746)	(0.6215)	(0.6512)	(0.6981)	(0.4687)
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor's front neighbor's front neighbor	0.5558	-0.6562	-0.0554	0.0150	-0.1216	-0.5065*
	(0.7292)	(0.8293)	(0.8314)	(0.8834)	(0.9699)	(0.2623)

Continuation on next page.

Continuation from previous page.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor's back neighbor's back neighbor	-1.2392 (1.0836)	-1.9205 (1.1477)	-1.4711 (1.1145)	-1.5400 (1.2408)	-2.6841* (1.3515)	-0.7739 (0.5007)
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor's front neighbor's front neighbor	0.4545 (0.8771)	-0.2381 (0.8403)	0.1589 (0.7689)	0.0308 (0.9436)	-0.0749 (0.9763)	-0.2482 (0.3181)
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor's back neighbor's back neighbor	-0.3503 (0.8522)	-0.1457 (0.7811)	0.5195 (0.7368)	0.9609 (0.7914)	0.2178 (0.9555)	-0.0391 (0.5952)
Constant	90.3917*** (0.3524)	98.5097*** (0.4272)	91.3948*** (1.0557)	90.9145*** (1.1049)	90.1304*** (1.1087)	333.4252*** (95.1566)
Political variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	1,061,742	928,695	928,695	749,022	652,718	652,718
Adjusted R^2	0.0002	0.0626	0.0836	0.0879	0.0899	0.4009

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

Table A.5: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019, robustness test: second circle seating neighbors

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with countries with a colonial past					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor	-0.7725	0.0387	0.8571	0.3446	-3.6424***	0.2962
	(1.2372)	(0.9032)	(0.8752)	(1.0390)	(1.2501)	(1.1441)
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor	-2.8834***	-0.8831	-0.2931	0.4816	-2.6284***	0.3350
	(0.9347)	(0.8369)	(0.8027)	(0.9615)	(0.9497)	(0.7916)
Front neighbor's front neighbor	-4.4857***	-2.4545*	-1.9864	-2.8824**	-2.8852**	-0.2415
	(1.1949)	(1.2977)	(1.2999)	(1.3716)	(1.3930)	(1.0931)
Back neighbor's back neighbor	-1.0837	-0.4744	0.4040	0.6982	0.4238	0.6861
	(0.8961)	(0.9648)	(0.8882)	(0.9011)	(1.0718)	(0.8657)
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor's front neighbor	-1.8266	0.2050	0.4731	1.6044	1.7976*	1.2027*
	(1.2243)	(1.1760)	(0.9937)	(0.9840)	(1.0123)	(0.6853)
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor's back neighbor	-4.7609***	-3.6535***	-2.5002***	-2.4299***	-2.7743***	-1.3554**
	(1.0760)	(1.0138)	(0.7955)	(0.7423)	(0.7929)	(0.6569)
Table neighbor's front neighbor's front neighbor	0.4972	0.3760	0.9318	0.0182	-0.6343	0.3722
	(1.2202)	(1.0824)	(0.9647)	(0.8490)	(1.0602)	(0.6770)
Table neighbor's back neighbor's back neighbor	-0.5719	-0.7826	-0.1331	0.2460	0.4045	0.7609
	(1.4579)	(1.3427)	(1.0888)	(1.1144)	(1.2531)	(0.8314)
Aisle neighbor's front neighbor's front neighbor	-2.3881*	-1.7639	-0.8078	0.3873	-1.0596	1.2041
	(1.2132)	(1.1860)	(1.0297)	(1.1951)	(1.3024)	(1.0117)
Aisle neighbor's back neighbor's back neighbor	-2.0769	-2.2274*	-1.3342	-1.1909	-1.3561	-0.5930
	(1.4530)	(1.1236)	(1.0610)	(1.0588)	(1.3162)	(0.9148)
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor's front neighbor	0.0806	1.0492	1.8414**	1.0799	1.2938	0.9972
	(0.7578)	(0.7809)	(0.7519)	(0.7201)	(0.7813)	(0.9681)
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor's back neighbor	-3.3591***	-2.8983***	-1.6153*	-1.9304*	-1.2629	-1.3194
	(1.1416)	(1.0263)	(0.8479)	(1.0025)	(1.1088)	(0.9094)
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor's front neighbor's front neighbor	-3.4043***	-1.9314*	-1.1736	-1.5780	-1.3705	-0.2521
	(1.2427)	(1.1198)	(1.0621)	(0.9755)	(1.0726)	(0.8749)

Continuation on next page.

Continuation from previous page.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor's back neighbor's back neighbor	-0.8037 (1.0715)	-0.6850 (0.9856)	0.1249 (0.8907)	-0.0936 (1.0484)	-0.5044 (1.2203)	-0.4850 (0.9338)
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor's front neighbor's front neighbor	-2.6998** (1.2346)	-1.4488 (1.0423)	-0.6399 (1.0864)	-1.2775 (1.2638)	-1.2346 (1.3058)	-0.7475 (1.0023)
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor's back neighbor's back neighbor	-1.1480 (1.2412)	-1.1066 (1.2504)	-0.3461 (1.1799)	0.2467 (1.2008)	-0.2366 (1.1359)	-0.1827 (0.8043)
Constant	66.1883*** (1.6259)	57.9539*** (5.4244)	52.4749*** (5.6255)	63.0923*** (6.0296)	62.4804*** (6.7145)	1,419.1480 (955.3383)
Political variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	386,580	343,858	343,858	306,530	282,631	282,631
Adjusted R^2	0.0004	0.0715	0.1224	0.2285	0.2333	0.3257

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

Table A.6: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness test: only paired countries with non-zero likelihood of seat adjacency

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-0.1741	0.2366	0.2454	0.2342	-0.3393**	-0.3226**
	(0.2054)	(0.1833)	(0.1537)	(0.1568)	(0.1564)	(0.1256)
Aisle neighbor	-0.1396	0.4927**	0.5645***	0.5076***	-0.0258	-0.0524
	(0.1954)	(0.1879)	(0.1592)	(0.1702)	(0.1781)	(0.1635)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.5340***	-0.3667*	-0.3576**	0.0081	0.0755	-0.1004
	(0.1908)	(0.1895)	(0.1529)	(0.1463)	(0.1794)	(0.1355)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.4104**	-0.2163	-0.1956	0.1355	0.2254	0.0091
	(0.1895)	(0.1712)	(0.1405)	(0.1429)	(0.1651)	(0.1387)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.3439	-0.2020	-0.1391	0.1220	0.1160	-0.0839
	(0.2121)	(0.2033)	(0.1720)	(0.1829)	(0.1942)	(0.1283)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.3409*	-0.2624	-0.1960	-0.0006	0.0215	-0.1015
	(0.2008)	(0.1864)	(0.1586)	(0.1752)	(0.1802)	(0.1266)
Front neighbor	-0.5890***	-0.1820	-0.1874	0.2941*	0.3680*	0.1863
	(0.1560)	(0.1869)	(0.1579)	(0.1716)	(0.2134)	(0.1483)
Back neighbor	-0.6229***	-0.2145	-0.2235	0.1257	0.2577	0.1829
	(0.1323)	(0.1611)	(0.1409)	(0.1406)	(0.1807)	(0.1411)
Constant	82.4871***	89.8420***	86.5917***	88.8063***	87.0226***	512.1063***
	(0.4132)	(1.0106)	(1.4749)	(1.2238)	(1.4052)	(117.7021)
Political variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	15,339,3450	13,549,9065	13,549,906	11,079,597	9,811,188	9,811,188
Adjusted R^2	0.0000	0.0378	0.0416	0.0541	0.0558	0.1505

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

Table A.7: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: only paired countries with non-zero likelihood of seat adjacency

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Arab League member states					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-0.8222	1.1467**	1.5549***	1.8530***	2.2906***	-0.0618
	(0.5086)	(0.4515)	(0.4351)	(0.4327)	(0.4101)	(0.2611)
Aisle neighbor	-0.1699	1.5355***	2.2972***	2.9950***	3.8678***	0.9306***
	(0.4498)	(0.3801)	(0.3746)	(0.4207)	(0.4015)	(0.2366)
Diagonal front table neighbor	0.7923	1.0621**	1.0601**	1.2397**	1.3533**	0.2386
	(0.6201)	(0.5031)	(0.4827)	(0.4878)	(0.5175)	(0.3684)
Diagonal back table neighbor	0.5476	-0.3032	-0.0414	-0.1010	0.4746	0.8742***
	(0.6461)	(0.6362)	(0.6003)	(0.7290)	(0.7835)	(0.3162)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.1448	0.8989	1.0991**	1.4249***	1.8130***	1.3955***
	(0.7613)	(0.5387)	(0.4775)	(0.5043)	(0.5415)	(0.3502)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	0.5170	-0.0329	0.3863	0.5314	0.7473	0.7736**
	(0.5900)	(0.4867)	(0.4489)	(0.5572)	(0.6695)	(0.2989)
Front neighbor	1.0656**	1.5624***	1.8238***	1.9546***	2.0728***	0.5420
	(0.5139)	(0.5587)	(0.5555)	(0.6648)	(0.6521)	(0.3666)
Back neighbor	-1.9435**	-3.1803***	-2.8356***	-3.0540***	-3.7445***	-0.5104
	(0.7677)	(0.7697)	(0.7554)	(1.0735)	(1.1704)	(0.4182)
Constant	90.6076***	98.4301***	89.9877***	90.0403***	90.0859***	406.9525***
	(0.3800)	(0.5392)	(1.2814)	(1.2227)	(1.2791)	(97.2890)
Political variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	347,539	308,237	308,237	247,473	216,697	216,697
Adjusted R^2	0.0003	0.0625	0.0895	0.0947	0.1027	0.3987

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

Table A.8: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019, robustness test: only paired countries with non-zero likelihood of seat adjacency

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with countries with a colonial past					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	1.1348	0.5309	1.1863	0.7385	-2.0352***	-7.0456***
	(0.8081)	(0.7206)	(0.7381)	(0.6446)	(0.6785)	(0.8541)
Aisle neighbor	-0.6730	-0.7239	0.1810	0.0262	-3.5678***	-7.6660***
	(0.8060)	(0.6238)	(0.6319)	(0.6456)	(0.9091)	(1.0973)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.3275	1.3146	1.5994**	0.5280	0.7061	0.9153
	(0.7686)	(0.8376)	(0.7970)	(0.8543)	(0.9823)	(0.9053)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.1999	-0.4367	0.5491	0.7586	1.3944	1.7383**
	(0.9377)	(0.9889)	(1.0672)	(0.9767)	(0.9615)	(0.7654)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-2.0050**	0.3480	0.8619	1.1570	1.4623	0.1924
	(0.8187)	(0.9055)	(0.8602)	(0.9273)	(1.0062)	(0.9266)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.6153	0.0014	0.9729	2.1209***	2.8133***	2.3688***
	(0.9301)	(0.7716)	(0.7702)	(0.6842)	(0.6938)	(0.7195)
Front neighbor	-1.8246**	0.4210	0.7754	0.4441	0.6755	0.3162
	(0.6967)	(0.6998)	(0.6915)	(0.6718)	(0.7806)	(0.6949)
Back neighbor	-2.3980***	-0.6017	0.2283	1.9281**	2.5867***	3.0238***
	(0.6720)	(0.7989)	(0.8067)	(0.7555)	(0.8162)	(0.6214)
Constant	66.3415***	60.3602***	55.1803***	67.2397***	67.8235***	942.3308
	(1.3179)	(4.1267)	(4.3631)	(5.1583)	(5.0087)	(950.5786)
Political variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	149,451	137,227	137,227	120,677	109,573	109,573
Adjusted R^2	0.0002	0.0718	0.1054	0.1947	0.1994	0.2991

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

Table A.9: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness test: vote agreement rates without abstentions

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate without abstentions					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-0.1519	-0.2488	-0.1789	-0.2741**	-0.6546***	-0.3090**
	(0.1987)	(0.1753)	(0.1498)	(0.1369)	(0.1315)	(0.1178)
Aisle neighbor	0.0029	0.0751	0.1684	-0.0244	-0.3818***	-0.0334
	(0.1807)	(0.1630)	(0.1374)	(0.1366)	(0.1412)	(0.1283)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.3313*	-0.6171***	-0.5587***	-0.3000**	-0.2859*	-0.2668**
	(0.1771)	(0.1935)	(0.1660)	(0.1450)	(0.1685)	(0.1250)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.2314	-0.4736***	-0.4055***	-0.1875	-0.1627	-0.1777
	(0.1600)	(0.1674)	(0.1448)	(0.1269)	(0.1399)	(0.1236)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.1923	-0.5229***	-0.4567***	-0.2660*	-0.3079*	-0.2377*
	(0.1895)	(0.1903)	(0.1644)	(0.1531)	(0.1654)	(0.1224)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.1912	-0.5692***	-0.4998***	-0.3603**	-0.3963**	-0.2740**
	(0.1804)	(0.1820)	(0.1572)	(0.1534)	(0.1630)	(0.1273)
Front neighbor	-0.4144**	-0.5622***	-0.5152***	-0.2429*	-0.2139	-0.0661
	(0.1710)	(0.1761)	(0.1523)	(0.1408)	(0.1819)	(0.1324)
Back neighbor	-0.4408***	-0.5782***	-0.5350***	-0.3467***	-0.2816*	-0.0538
	(0.1529)	(0.1589)	(0.1381)	(0.1230)	(0.1600)	(0.1351)
Constant	89.8617***	96.6355***	95.5633***	97.5271***	96.4634***	412.9347***
	(0.4173)	(0.6224)	(1.0556)	(0.8310)	(0.9496)	(124.1088)
Political variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	65,006,973	55,486,885	55,486,885	44,973,016	40,022,248	40,022,248
Adjusted R^2	0.0000	0.0332	0.0343	0.0445	0.0457	0.1487

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

Table A.10: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: vote agreement rates without abstentions

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate without abstentions with Arab league member states					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-0.1321	1.0818***	1.2493***	1.4734***	2.0933***	-0.4362*
	(0.4590)	(0.3098)	(0.3104)	(0.2933)	(0.2743)	(0.2354)
Aisle neighbor	0.8607**	1.6925***	2.1161***	2.5671***	3.3779***	0.4868**
	(0.3702)	(0.2072)	(0.2234)	(0.2541)	(0.2915)	(0.2320)
Diagonal front table neighbor	0.9358*	0.8620*	0.8975**	0.9397**	1.2288**	0.2911
	(0.4781)	(0.4471)	(0.4239)	(0.4679)	(0.5441)	(0.1823)
Diagonal back table neighbor	0.7212	-0.3390	-0.0886	0.0905	0.2683	0.7630***
	(0.5742)	(0.6299)	(0.6091)	(0.7242)	(0.7766)	(0.2286)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	0.0064	0.6437	0.8104**	0.8515*	1.1491**	0.8656***
	(0.5556)	(0.4386)	(0.3888)	(0.4448)	(0.5096)	(0.2093)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	0.1334	-0.5674	-0.1936	0.4050	0.5225	0.4657**
	(0.5408)	(0.5003)	(0.4744)	(0.4987)	(0.5444)	(0.2306)
Front neighbor	1.5512***	1.2227**	1.4822***	1.2584**	1.2952**	0.4829**
	(0.5158)	(0.4610)	(0.4751)	(0.5794)	(0.5880)	(0.2008)
Back neighbor	-2.4640***	-3.8346***	-3.5474***	-3.5257***	-4.1243***	-0.8685
	(0.7682)	(0.7880)	(0.7720)	(1.0360)	(1.1497)	(0.7608)
Constant	95.7530***	100.3245***	94.7190***	94.9589***	94.5915***	120.6226***
	(0.2406)	(0.2338)	(0.7345)	(0.6670)	(0.7597)	(23.1431)
Political variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	1,556,804	1,373,085	1,373,085	1,092,580	960,448	960,448
Adjusted R^2	0.0001	0.0301	0.0493	0.0538	0.0591	0.4948

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

Table A.11: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019, robustness test: vote agreement rates without abstentions

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate without abstentions with countries with a colonial past					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	0.4231	-0.3395	0.2791	0.1636	-3.4244***	-4.5353***
	(0.9371)	(0.8782)	(0.9182)	(0.7623)	(0.9610)	(0.8661)
Aisle neighbor	-1.7272*	-1.9669**	-1.0514	-1.0792	-5.4594***	-4.8394***
	(0.9723)	(0.7891)	(0.8132)	(0.7907)	(1.3713)	(1.1062)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.7840	1.8209	1.9395*	0.4762	1.0507	1.2306
	(0.9647)	(1.1197)	(1.0670)	(1.0650)	(1.2507)	(1.0920)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.2755	-0.4833	0.2339	0.5184	1.5391	1.7377
	(1.2081)	(1.3426)	(1.4762)	(1.2570)	(1.2545)	(1.0458)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-3.2673***	-0.1112	0.4410	0.5418	1.0302	0.0122
	(1.1396)	(1.2793)	(1.2069)	(1.2031)	(1.3157)	(1.1531)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-1.2264	-0.4383	0.3052	1.8848**	2.8248***	2.6250***
	(1.2302)	(1.1056)	(1.1006)	(0.8926)	(0.8998)	(0.7725)
Front neighbor	-2.9239***	-0.2697	0.2641	-0.0965	0.4554	0.7976
	(0.9503)	(0.9856)	(0.9276)	(0.8610)	(1.0730)	(0.9141)
Back neighbor	-3.1748***	-1.5508	-0.7701	1.8924**	2.5743**	3.8502***
	(0.9758)	(1.1205)	(1.0729)	(0.9435)	(0.9790)	(0.6903)
Constant	74.8241***	65.7094***	60.8049***	75.1781***	73.9264***	1,389.572
	(1.5071)	(6.0729)	(6.3322)	(7.0835)	(7.0859)	(1,340.065)
Political variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	459,849	413,558	413,558	368,872	338,807	338,807
Adjusted R^2	0.0001	0.0786	0.1217	0.2763	0.2840	0.3880

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

Table A.12: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness test: dichotomous democracy indicator by Gründler and Krieger (2019)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate				
	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-0.3042	-0.1570	-0.2513	-0.7421***	-0.3256**
	(0.2177)	(0.1824)	(0.1685)	(0.1699)	(0.1259)
Aisle neighbor	-0.1022	0.0841	-0.0639	-0.5127***	-0.0232
	(0.1981)	(0.1642)	(0.1634)	(0.1704)	(0.1502)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.8433***	-0.6974***	-0.4666***	-0.4466**	-0.2698**
	(0.2053)	(0.1692)	(0.1438)	(0.1767)	(0.1341)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.6893***	-0.5364***	-0.3339**	-0.3116**	-0.1555
	(0.1819)	(0.1533)	(0.1340)	(0.1526)	(0.1366)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.6916***	-0.5159***	-0.3679**	-0.4264**	-0.2294*
	(0.2179)	(0.1839)	(0.1846)	(0.1930)	(0.1314)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.7418***	-0.5632***	-0.4545**	-0.5050***	-0.2472*
	(0.1993)	(0.1647)	(0.1742)	(0.1799)	(0.1339)
Front neighbor	-0.6805***	-0.5422***	-0.1989	-0.1845	-0.0234
	(0.1886)	(0.1558)	(0.1552)	(0.1901)	(0.1369)
Back neighbor	-0.7072***	-0.5744***	-0.3572***	-0.2974*	-0.0125
	(0.1604)	(0.1317)	(0.1199)	(0.1582)	(0.1299)
Constant	88.3790***	86.1550***	87.9080***	86.5750***	557.0561***
	(0.9253)	(1.3477)	(1.1346)	(1.2662)	(113.5287)
Political variables?[a.]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	68,079,315	68,079,315	55,040,433	48,947,754	48,947,754
Adjusted R^2	0.0346	0.0367	0.0471	0.0481	0.1435

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the dichotomous democracy index by Gründler and Krieger (2019) and a communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

Table A.13: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: dichotomous democracy indicator by Gründler and Krieger (2019)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Arab League member states				
	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	0.5170	0.8951*	1.1918***	1.9219***	-0.2142
	(0.4997)	(0.4744)	(0.4213)	(0.3977)	(0.2599)
Aisle neighbor	0.8870**	1.4832***	2.1862***	3.3157***	0.6953***
	(0.3949)	(0.3776)	(0.3634)	(0.3535)	(0.2227)
Diagonal front table neighbor	1.1174**	1.1501**	1.3292**	1.5129**	0.0910
	(0.4917)	(0.4714)	(0.5088)	(0.5874)	(0.3716)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.3804	-0.1745	-0.2604	0.2910	0.8963***
	(0.6677)	(0.6423)	(0.7494)	(0.8021)	(0.3111)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	0.8100	1.0054*	1.3162**	1.6259***	1.2524***
	(0.5630)	(0.5078)	(0.5335)	(0.5851)	(0.3222)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.1974	0.1057	0.2879	0.4296	0.7466**
	(0.5134)	(0.4870)	(0.5768)	(0.6615)	(0.2817)
Front neighbor	1.3740***	1.5961***	1.8156***	1.9503***	0.5500
	(0.4877)	(0.4864)	(0.6074)	(0.6072)	(0.3573)
Back neighbor	-3.0272***	-2.7466***	-2.9485***	-3.8846***	-0.8648
	(0.7342)	(0.7212)	(1.0426)	(1.1496)	(0.8882)
Constant	96.4823***	89.0173***	88.4525***	88.0109***	359.8442***
	(0.4417)	(1.0743)	(1.0554)	(1.0824)	(87.6239)
Political variables?[a.]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	1,548,893	1,548,893	1,230,606	1,080,1480.0761	1,080,148
Adjusted R^2	0.0511	0.0714	0.0734	0.0761	0.3954

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the dichotomous democracy index by Gründler and Krieger (2019) and a communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

Table A.14: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019, robustness test: dichotomous democracy indicator by Gründler and Krieger (2019)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with countries with a colonial past				
	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	0.0878	0.8614	1.0433*	-2.1920***	-2.8966***
	(0.7001)	(0.7077)	(0.5969)	(0.6390)	(0.6035)
Aisle neighbor	-1.1907*	-0.2354	0.0567	-4.0092***	-3.2353***
	(0.6198)	(0.6139)	(0.6219)	(0.9477)	(0.8047)
Diagonal front table neighbor	0.7759	1.0522	0.1497	0.3401	0.4631
	(0.7795)	(0.7118)	(0.7963)	(0.9152)	(0.7845)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-1.1384	-0.2710	0.0188	0.7129	1.0041
	(0.9345)	(1.0051)	(0.9362)	(0.9291)	(0.6859)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.2616	0.3617	0.7040	1.0323	0.1508
	(0.8863)	(0.8189)	(0.8679)	(0.9429)	(0.7972)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.6964	0.2824	1.3816**	2.1714***	1.7087***
	(0.7497)	(0.7426)	(0.6586)	(0.6639)	(0.5447)
Front neighbor	-0.2173	0.4964	0.4092	0.6144	0.4060
	(0.6781)	(0.6403)	(0.6453)	(0.7645)	(0.5682)
Back neighbor	-0.9795	-0.3571	1.1484*	1.8412**	2.4090***
	(0.7642)	(0.7238)	(0.6812)	(0.7514)	(0.4491)
Constant	63.8222***	57.9890***	67.3178***	66.9366***	1,077.128
	(4.3711)	(4.5011)	(4.9781)	(5.0436)	(942.2663)
Political variables?[a.]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	616,201	616,201	545,879	500,936	500,936
Adjusted R^2	0.0689	0.1054	0.2065	0.2110	0.3063

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the dichotomous democracy index by Gründler and Krieger (2019) and a communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

Table A.15: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness test: Revised Combined Polity score by Marshall et al. (2019)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate				
	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-0.1673	-0.0069	-0.2340	-0.3398*	0.2331*
	(0.2270)	(0.1987)	(0.1941)	(0.1876)	(0.131)
Aisle neighbor	-0.1511	0.0234	-0.2605	-0.4239**	0.2060
	(0.1922)	(0.1772)	(0.1869)	(0.1899)	(0.1511)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.9372***	-0.7909***	-0.3936**	-0.4009**	-0.3140*
	(0.2299)	(0.1997)	(0.1669)	(0.1950)	(0.1628)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.7522***	-0.6164***	-0.2119	-0.2293	-0.2135
	(0.1964)	(0.1754)	(0.1508)	(0.1657)	(0.1653)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.6435***	-0.4868***	-0.3419*	-0.4269**	-0.2342
	(0.2101)	(0.1815)	(0.1980)	(0.2124)	(0.1585)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.6396***	-0.4886**	-0.3925*	-0.4441*	-0.2369
	(0.2132)	(0.1947)	(0.2061)	(0.2266)	(0.1780)
Front neighbor	-1.3096***	-1.1741***	-0.6856***	-0.6196***	-0.2399
	(0.1978)	(0.1704)	(0.1625)	(0.1972)	(0.1584)
Back neighbor	-1.3729***	-1.2529***	-0.8861***	-0.7756***	-0.2559
	(0.1736)	(0.1509)	(0.1417)	(0.1792)	(0.1569)
Constant	87.7238***	85.1968***	86.7967***	85.6277***	609.1286***
	(0.6953)	(1.2603)	(1.0562)	(1.1853)	(113.7983)
Political variables?[a.]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	59,014,475	59,014,475	47,394,778	42,108,331	42,108,331
Adjusted R^2	0.0422	0.0444	0.0541	0.0551	0.1472

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the Revised Combined Polity score and a communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

Table A.16: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: Revised Combined Polity score by Marshall et al. (2019)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Arab League member states				
	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	0.7306	0.7952	1.2488***	2.2606***	-0.2817
	(0.5231)	(0.4865)	(0.4426)	(0.4430)	(0.2607)
Aisle neighbor	1.2543***	1.6080***	2.5647***	3.9834***	0.6568***
	(0.3977)	(0.4097)	(0.3540)	(0.3604)	(0.2325)
Diagonal front table neighbor	1.7005***	1.7101***	1.5432***	1.7945***	0.2951
	(0.5615)	(0.5310)	(0.5132)	(0.5867)	(0.3335)
Diagonal back table neighbor	0.0756	0.3231	0.3105	0.9228	1.0846***
	(0.6633)	(0.6642)	(0.7532)	(0.8199)	(0.3451)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	0.9288	1.0780**	1.4223**	1.6911***	1.2726***
	(0.5575)	(0.5214)	(0.5450)	(0.5422)	(0.3292)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	0.2471	0.5129	0.6352	0.8662	0.9095***
	(0.6280)	(0.6154)	(0.6894)	(0.8002)	(0.3151)
Front neighbor	1.1348**	1.1053**	0.8691	1.0118	0.5069
	(0.5080)	(0.4934)	(0.6525)	(0.6405)	(0.3716)
Back neighbor	-3.0741***	-2.8099***	-2.8798***	-3.6466***	-1.1608
	(0.7654)	(0.7535)	(1.0620)	(1.1589)	(1.0478)
Constant	97.8156***	89.4180***	89.5528***	88.6371***	403.5025***
	(0.4225)	(1.2002)	(1.1216)	(1.1407)	(94.1490)
Political variables?[a.]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	1,439,700	1,439,700	1,131,492	994,039	994,039
Adjusted R^2	0.0594	0.0752	0.0782	0.0819	0.4041

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the Revised Combined Polity score and a communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

Table A.17: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019, robustness test: Revised Combined Polity score by Marshall et al. (2019)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with countries with a colonial past				
	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	0.5291	1.3349*	1.5467**	-0.9623	-3.4693***
	(0.7130)	(0.7101)	(0.6032)	(0.6362)	(0.6831)
Aisle neighbor	-0.3832	0.5027	1.0252	-2.6941***	-3.8856***
	(0.6753)	(0.6859)	(0.6259)	(0.9694)	(0.8770)
Diagonal front table neighbor	0.7093	1.0736	-0.0070	-0.0268	0.2180
	(1.0049)	(0.9392)	(0.9110)	(1.1326)	(0.8910)
Diagonal back table neighbor	0.0187	0.8812	1.4073	2.1351**	1.3989*
	(1.0767)	(1.1073)	(1.0118)	(0.9882)	(0.7193)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.5872	-0.1535	1.2803	1.8999*	0.4018
	(0.9089)	(0.8859)	(0.9591)	(1.0724)	(0.9571)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.4378	0.5865	2.3230***	2.8571***	1.9860***
	(0.9734)	(0.9004)	(0.7913)	(0.8031)	(0.6508)
Front neighbor	0.1315	0.9808	0.6294	1.0489	0.1336
	(0.7437)	(0.6969)	(0.6815)	(0.8138)	(0.6265)
Back neighbor	-2.1665***	-1.3773*	0.3613	0.9462	2.4689***
	(0.8069)	(0.7892)	(0.7025)	(0.7390)	(0.4930)
Constant	65.1913***	57.6348***	70.4186***	70.2231***	1051.2930
	(2.0491)	(2.6464)	(3.0674)	(3.3366)	(998.8562)
Political variables?[a.]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	541,342	541,342	482,986	446,373	446,373
Adjusted R^2	0.0680	0.1046	0.2220	0.2252	0.3137

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the Revised Combined Polity score and a communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

Table A.18: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness test: Institutionalized Autocracy score by Marshall et al. (2019)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate				
	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-0.3201	-0.1852	-0.3522*	-0.5302**	0.0147
	(0.2383)	(0.2151)	(0.2116)	(0.2023)	(0.1421)
Aisle neighbor	-0.4169**	-0.2676	-0.4861**	-0.7393***	0.0860
	(0.2086)	(0.1983)	(0.2177)	(0.2272)	(0.1618)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.9765***	-0.8554***	-0.4135**	-0.4530**	-0.3665**
	(0.2254)	(0.2010)	(0.1643)	(0.2013)	(0.1719)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.7897***	-0.6769***	-0.2198	-0.2660	-0.2872
	(0.1995)	(0.1845)	(0.1596)	(0.1744)	(0.1730)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.7762***	-0.6348***	-0.4469**	-0.5573**	-0.3388**
	(0.2205)	(0.1988)	(0.2061)	(0.2210)	(0.1670)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.7472***	-0.6197***	-0.5072**	-0.5973**	-0.3456*
	(0.2160)	(0.2037)	(0.2071)	(0.2259)	(0.1819)
Front neighbor	-1.3476***	-1.2310***	-0.6905***	-0.6293***	-0.2901*
	(0.1950)	(0.1721)	(0.1669)	(0.2021)	(0.1648)
Back neighbor	-1.4435***	-1.3450***	-0.9153***	-0.8221***	-0.3156*
	(0.1655)	(0.1502)	(0.1435)	(0.1749)	(0.1605)
Constant	82.8737***	80.3092***	82.1328***	80.8514***	616.9247***
	(0.5367)	(1.2405)	(1.0185)	(1.1513)	(114.5713)
Political variables?[a.]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	56,232,515	56,232,515	45,395,340	40,305,583	40,305,583
Adjusted R^2	0.0319	0.0339	0.0455	0.0464	0.1427

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the Institutionalized Autocracy score and a communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

Table A.19: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: Institutionalized Autocracy score by Marshall et al. (2019)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Arab League member states				
	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	0.0379	0.0515	0.6554	1.7490***	-0.3408
	(0.5913)	(0.5382)	(0.5107)	(0.4779)	(0.2749)
Aisle neighbor	0.7448*	1.0649**	1.9133***	3.4249***	0.6293**
	(0.3917)	(0.4101)	(0.4002)	(0.3951)	(0.2465)
Diagonal front table neighbor	1.9018***	1.8543***	1.8496***	2.0061***	0.2301
	(0.6173)	(0.5907)	(0.5576)	(0.6613)	(0.3528)
Diagonal back table neighbor	0.0808	0.2969	0.3127	0.7707	1.2228***
	(0.7417)	(0.7365)	(0.7791)	(0.8420)	(0.3344)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	1.1031*	1.3171**	1.3581**	1.4986**	1.3106***
	(0.5822)	(0.5443)	(0.5680)	(0.5696)	(0.3396)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.2200	-0.0352	0.1081	0.1186	1.0764***
	(0.7098)	(0.7051)	(0.7199)	(0.8494)	(0.3768)
Front neighbor	0.8236	0.7817	0.5915	0.6455	0.5584
	(0.5522)	(0.5455)	(0.7002)	(0.6829)	(0.3911)
Back neighbor	-3.1480***	-2.8884***	-2.7365**	-3.7160***	-1.2340
	(0.8270)	(0.8097)	(1.1056)	(1.1977)	(1.0363)
Constant	95.3055***	85.7494***	87.4014***	86.4530***	409.1110***
	(0.4426)	(1.2841)	(1.2101)	(1.2737)	(96.5490)
Political variables?[a.]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	1,338,066	1,338,066	1,072,037	944,277	944,277
Adjusted R^2	0.0432	0.0592	0.0612	0.0650	0.4070

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the Institutionalized Autocracy score and a communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

Table A.20: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019, robustness test: Institutionalized Autocracy score by Marshall et al. (2019)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with countries with a colonial past				
	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	0.6049	1.4476*	1.8205***	-1.2168*	-3.7969***
	(0.7587)	(0.7571)	(0.6329)	(0.6998)	(0.6976)
Aisle neighbor	0.0840	1.0851	1.2829*	-2.9962***	-4.2119***
	(0.7669)	(0.7593)	(0.6547)	(1.0253)	(0.8767)
Diagonal front table neighbor	0.6783	1.1411	-0.1477	-0.3203	0.1863
	(1.0647)	(0.9902)	(0.9475)	(1.1702)	(0.8929)
Diagonal back table neighbor	0.3504	1.1700	1.7339*	2.4721**	1.7165**
	(1.0788)	(1.1134)	(0.9928)	(0.9753)	(0.6931)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.9379	-0.5078	0.9157	1.3544	0.2310
	(0.9547)	(0.9321)	(0.9914)	(1.1110)	(0.9985)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.5178	0.4187	2.1898***	2.7206***	1.8981***
	(1.0377)	(1.0039)	(0.8155)	(0.8318)	(0.6518)
Front neighbor	0.1290	1.0128	0.5524	0.7365	-0.0748
	(0.7765)	(0.7363)	(0.6952)	(0.8405)	(0.6336)
Back neighbor	-2.6655***	-1.9686**	0.0160	0.7261	2.3018***
	(0.8760)	(0.8603)	(0.7767)	(0.7627)	(0.5197)
Constant	69.7617***	58.7913***	75.0148***	74.6448***	1,090.684
	(1.0034)	(2.2987)	(2.3303)	(2.8338)	(1,012.835)
Political variables?[a.]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	518,854	518,854	464,263	429,378	429,378
Adjusted R^2	0.0720	0.1099	0.2279	0.2307	0.3182

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the Institutionalized Autocracy score and a communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

Table A.21: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness test: democracy indicator by Bjørnskov and Rode (2020)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate				
	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-0.1812	-0.0869	-0.1139	-0.6135***	-0.1929*
	(0.2094)	(0.1790)	(0.1563)	(0.1625)	(0.1138)
Aisle neighbor	-0.1191	-0.0139	-0.0957	-0.5458***	-0.0388
	(0.1994)	(0.1760)	(0.1675)	(0.1691)	(0.1467)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.7222***	-0.6281***	-0.3835***	-0.3647**	-0.2622**
	(0.1999)	(0.1722)	(0.1337)	(0.1651)	(0.1183)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.5713***	-0.4746***	-0.3152**	-0.2774*	-0.1879
	(0.1809)	(0.1577)	(0.1418)	(0.1540)	(0.1397)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.4962**	-0.3973**	-0.3319*	-0.3836*	-0.2119
	(0.2139)	(0.1867)	(0.1828)	(0.1956)	(0.1341)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.5129**	-0.4211**	-0.3959**	-0.4264**	-0.2125
	(0.1986)	(0.1696)	(0.1709)	(0.1799)	(0.1358)
Front neighbor	-0.5955***	-0.5069***	-0.2452*	-0.2361	-0.1076
	(0.1721)	(0.1416)	(0.1454)	(0.1821)	(0.1307)
Back neighbor	-0.6218***	-0.5401***	-0.3443***	-0.3178**	-0.1051
	(0.1449)	(0.1179)	(0.1096)	(0.1513)	(0.1257)
Constant	88.2292***	86.7794***	88.0414***	86.6853***	600.0361***
	(0.7834)	(1.2518)	(1.0940)	(1.2296)	(113.5536)
Political variables?[a.]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	75,570,438	75,570,438	57,593,961	51,271,914	51,271,914
Adjusted R^2	0.0352	0.0366	0.0488	0.0496	0.1428

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy indicator and a communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

Table A.22: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: democracy indicator by Bjørnskov and Rode (2020)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Arab League member states				
	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	0.5047	0.7734	1.6294***	2.2627***	-0.2769
	(0.5377)	(0.5354)	(0.4231)	(0.4011)	(0.2652)
Aisle neighbor	1.6680***	1.9829***	2.5350***	3.5770***	0.6950***
	(0.4560)	(0.4550)	(0.3707)	(0.3443)	(0.2180)
Diagonal front table neighbor	1.0201*	1.0164*	1.4028**	1.5400**	0.1234
	(0.5561)	(0.5283)	(0.5767)	(0.6560)	(0.3729)
Diagonal back table neighbor	0.4733	0.4706	-0.0670	0.3193	0.9274***
	(0.6217)	(0.6096)	(0.7294)	(0.7776)	(0.3026)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	0.0564	0.2540	1.5022***	1.8528***	1.2830***
	(0.6443)	(0.5930)	(0.5260)	(0.5545)	(0.3301)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	0.3776	0.3346	0.1437	0.1513	0.6675**
	(0.5109)	(0.4949)	(0.6098)	(0.6929)	(0.2923)
Front neighbor	1.8386***	1.9160***	1.4574**	1.5930***	0.4510
	(0.4715)	(0.4743)	(0.5751)	(0.5744)	(0.3471)
Back neighbor	-2.1634***	-2.0631***	-2.8914***	-3.8355***	-1.2052
	(0.6848)	(0.6839)	(1.0428)	(1.1437)	(1.0442)
Constant	96.5806***	92.3543***	89.3534***	88.8010***	422.1475***
	(0.3620)	(1.0432)	(1.0352)	(1.0698)	(95.9963)
Political variables?[a.]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	1,659,197	1,659,197	1,269,381	1,115,245	1,115,245
Adjusted R^2	0.0660	0.0785	0.0790	0.0819	0.3910

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy indicator and a communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

Table A.23: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019, robustness test: democracy indicator by Bjørnskov and Rode (2020)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with countries with a colonial past				
	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	0.7627	1.3986*	1.5112**	-1.5354**	-2.8191***
	(0.7143)	(0.7169)	(0.6129)	(0.6583)	(0.5987)
Aisle neighbor	-0.6316	0.1973	0.5239	-3.4826***	-3.2849***
	(0.6493)	(0.6453)	(0.6298)	(0.9138)	(0.7814)
Diagonal front table neighbor	0.3778	0.9154	-0.0464	0.1250	0.3786
	(0.7231)	(0.6783)	(0.8009)	(0.9263)	(0.7825)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.5931	0.0178	0.2299	0.8243	1.0205
	(0.8915)	(0.9387)	(0.8833)	(0.8844)	(0.6551)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.5673	0.1303	0.3547	0.6613	0.0326
	(0.8342)	(0.7820)	(0.8462)	(0.9218)	(0.7906)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.3120	0.5525	1.4524**	2.1625***	1.8337***
	(0.8052)	(0.7704)	(0.6901)	(0.7028)	(0.5556)
Front neighbor	-0.6653	0.1800	0.4535	0.6842	0.2404
	(0.6311)	(0.6170)	(0.6375)	(0.7523)	(0.5579)
Back neighbor	-1.1623	-0.4109	1.1679*	1.7253**	2.5433***
	(0.7415)	(0.7177)	(0.6482)	(0.7150)	(0.4560)
Constant	61.0126***	55.4842***	64.5062***	64.1264***	1,166.646
	(3.4605)	(3.7313)	(4.5473)	(4.6192)	(984.1038)
Political variables?[a.]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	646,560	646,560	562,132	515,952	515,952
Adjusted R^2	0.0626	0.0992	0.2109	0.2151	0.3097

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy indicator and a communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

Table A.24: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness test: economic and population data by Bolt and Van Zanden (2014)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate		
	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-0.3266	-0.5991***	-0.3478**
	(0.1979)	(0.2141)	(0.1423)
Aisle neighbor	-0.1615	-0.3810*	-0.1072
	(0.1867)	(0.1989)	(0.1388)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.6116***	-0.6816***	-0.3660**
	(0.1821)	(0.1966)	(0.1513)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.4261***	-0.4439**	-0.2429*
	(0.1572)	(0.1766)	(0.1425)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.4415**	-0.6143***	-0.2786*
	(0.1924)	(0.1992)	(0.1519)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.4945**	-0.6239***	-0.2405
	(0.1919)	(0.1976)	(0.1544)
Front neighbor	-0.7402***	-0.8431***	-0.2856**
	(0.1753)	(0.2053)	(0.1377)
Back neighbor	-0.9005***	-0.9507***	-0.2613*
	(0.1615)	(0.1916)	(0.1415)
Constant	84.3679***	82.5131***	457.5458***
	(4.2565)	(4.3918)	(134.5776)
Political variables?[a.]	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✓
Observations	54,104,602	48,406,456	48,406,456
Adjusted R^2	0.0579	0.0591	0.1459

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and a communism indicator of a country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include the number of days since a delegation first voted on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, and indicators whether a country's executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN is female, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population, and the the differences of the variables between each country-pair according to Bolt and Van Zanden (2014).
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables available upon request.

Table A.25: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: economic and population data by Bolt and Van Zanden (2014)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Arab League member states		
	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	1.3182***	1.8767***	-0.2721
	(0.4299)	(0.4407)	(0.2958)
Aisle neighbor	2.1993***	3.3913***	0.6197**
	(0.4771)	(0.4631)	(0.2813)
Diagonal front table neighbor	1.0453**	1.2305**	0.0003
	(0.5078)	(0.5640)	(0.3412)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.7865	-0.3129	0.7664**
	(0.7890)	(0.8674)	(0.3221)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	1.0380*	1.3816**	0.8952***
	(0.5284)	(0.5574)	(0.2728)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.5138	-0.5443	0.5096
	(0.5800)	(0.6715)	(0.3060)
Front neighbor	2.5652***	2.7775***	0.7136**
	(0.6318)	(0.6308)	(0.3126)
Back neighbor	-3.9397***	-4.7662***	-0.9083
	(0.7948)	(0.8886)	(0.7912)
Constant	91.5102***	90.7691***	388.6570***
	(3.0236)	(2.9122)	(91.8702)
Political variables?[a.]	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✓
Observations	1,253,950	1,107,925	1,107,925
Adjusted R^2	0.0901	0.0917	0.3998

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and a communism indicator of a country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include the number of days since a delegation first voted on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, and indicators whether a country's executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN is female, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population, and the the differences of the variables between each country-pair according to Bolt and Van Zanden (2014).
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables available upon request.

Table A.26: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019, robustness test: economic and population data by Bolt and Van Zanden (2014)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with countries with a colonial past		
	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	1.4439**	-1.6199**	-2.9349***
	(0.6983)	(0.7383)	(0.6139)
Aisle neighbor	0.5165	-3.4648***	-3.8291***
	(0.5869)	(0.8727)	(0.7947)
Diagonal front table neighbor	0.3455	0.4230	0.4851
	(0.8021)	(0.8729)	(0.7074)
Diagonal back table neighbor	0.7873	1.4021	1.1372
	(1.0266)	(1.0104)	(0.7927)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	0.2299	0.2531	-0.3490
	(0.8418)	(0.9030)	(0.7898)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	1.0383	1.6853**	1.2354*
	(0.8240)	(0.8385)	(0.7088)
Front neighbor	0.1204	0.1159	0.5952
	(0.7037)	(0.7943)	(0.5766)
Back neighbor	0.0105	0.5510	1.4954***
	(0.6596)	(0.7303)	(0.4586)
Constant	89.1230	89.8516	631.6486
	(57.7806)	(57.1760)	(845.9246)
Political variables?[a.]	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✓
Observations	553,148	508,250	508,250
Adjusted R^2	0.2098	0.2136	0.3054

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population, and the the differences of the variables between each country-pair according to Bolt and Van Zanden (2014).
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

Table A.27: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness test: same language

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-0.1572	-0.2285	-0.0654	-0.1729	-0.5059***	-0.2191*
	(0.2293)	(0.2114)	(0.1733)	(0.1610)	(0.1612)	(0.1225)
Aisle neighbor	-0.1449	0.0020	0.2071	0.0588	-0.2262	0.1220
	(0.2050)	(0.1913)	(0.1542)	(0.1532)	(0.1601)	(0.1385)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.5510***	-0.8556***	-0.6953***	-0.4228***	-0.3620**	-0.2614**
	(0.1905)	(0.2055)	(0.1673)	(0.1428)	(0.1727)	(0.1274)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.4373**	-0.7183***	-0.5514***	-0.3252**	-0.2546*	-0.1518
	(0.1727)	(0.1782)	(0.1464)	(0.1228)	(0.1405)	(0.1275)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.3595*	-0.6989***	-0.5043***	-0.3322*	-0.3412*	-0.2099
	(0.2091)	(0.2142)	(0.1774)	(0.1753)	(0.1813)	(0.1266)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.3495*	-0.7540***	-0.5561***	-0.4479***	-0.4408**	-0.2358*
	(0.1953)	(0.1974)	(0.1607)	(0.1655)	(0.1675)	(0.1294)
Front neighbor	-0.6346***	-0.7069***	-0.5591***	-0.1800	-0.1313	-0.0027
	(0.1798)	(0.1927)	(0.1595)	(0.1651)	(0.2024)	(0.1413)
Back neighbor	-0.6691***	-0.7423***	-0.5999***	-0.3430***	-0.2399	0.0035
	(0.1535)	(0.1643)	(0.1347)	(0.1244)	(0.1669)	(0.1330)
Constant	81.8707***	89.7090***	87.2184***	89.1242***	87.9074***	557.5048***
	(0.4115)	(0.9526)	(1.3504)	(1.1454)	(1.2661)	(113.6427)
Political variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Same language indicator?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	79,742,480	68,079,315	68,079,315	55,040,433	48,947,754	48,947,754
Adjusted R^2	0.0017	0.0421	0.0446	0.0537	0.0543	0.1462

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

Table A.28: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: same language

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Arab League member states					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-0.2779	0.9147*	1.3004***	1.6332***	2.3640***	-0.1645
	(0.5131)	(0.4578)	(0.4193)	(0.3940)	(0.3618)	(0.2605)
Aisle neighbor	0.3471	1.2958***	1.9279***	2.6999***	3.8863***	0.7561***
	(0.4350)	(0.3973)	(0.3785)	(0.3960)	(0.3746)	(0.2230)
Diagonal front table neighbor	1.0710*	0.8877*	0.9029*	1.0619**	1.2916**	0.0785
	(0.5929)	(0.4902)	(0.4711)	(0.4965)	(0.5548)	(0.3726)
Diagonal back table neighbor	0.7189	-0.4729	-0.2668	-0.3913	0.1073	0.8654***
	(0.6526)	(0.6503)	(0.6242)	(0.7255)	(0.7841)	(0.3123)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	0.1259	0.7295	0.9149*	1.1803**	1.5366***	1.2473***
	(0.7438)	(0.5427)	(0.4872)	(0.5028)	(0.5456)	(0.3192)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	0.6964	-0.2117	0.1118	0.1935	0.3298	0.7169**
	(0.5842)	(0.4883)	(0.4565)	(0.5456)	(0.6287)	(0.2840)
Front neighbor	1.1805**	1.3630**	1.5707***	1.8562***	2.0249***	0.5218
	(0.4856)	(0.5193)	(0.5274)	(0.6337)	(0.6326)	(0.3569)
Back neighbor	-1.7188**	-3.3355***	-3.0821***	-3.5062***	-4.3294***	-1.1175
	(0.7329)	(0.7295)	(0.7178)	(1.0213)	(1.1358)	(0.9863)
Constant	89.8308***	98.3002***	90.9073***	90.6459***	90.3902***	360.7404***
	(0.4107)	(0.5887)	(1.2039)	(1.1627)	(1.1760)	(87.4851)
Political variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Same language indicator?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,764,621	1,548,893	1,548,893	1,230,606	1,080,148	1,080,148
Adjusted R^2	0.0016	0.0627	0.0844	0.0877	0.0904	0.3956

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

Table A.29: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019, robustness test: same language

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with countries with a colonial past					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	0.9071	0.4994	1.1783	1.1107*	-2.3672***	-2.8568***
	(0.8082)	(0.7382)	(0.7377)	(0.6137)	(0.6656)	(0.5973)
Aisle neighbor	-0.7805	-0.5949	0.2160	0.2486	-4.0927***	-3.1761***
	(0.8071)	(0.6391)	(0.6339)	(0.6363)	(0.9321)	(0.7884)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.8588	0.8780	1.0805	0.2059	0.1801	0.4406
	(0.7042)	(0.7933)	(0.7303)	(0.8021)	(0.9378)	(0.7832)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.7539	-1.1226	-0.3907	-0.0444	0.6480	1.1181
	(0.8522)	(0.9262)	(0.9939)	(0.9202)	(0.9184)	(0.6876)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-2.5249***	-0.0391	0.4972	0.9002	0.9877	0.1149
	(0.8054)	(0.9135)	(0.8569)	(0.8929)	(0.9585)	(0.7911)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-1.1749	-0.5920	0.2479	1.4124**	2.1936***	1.7912***
	(0.9117)	(0.7617)	(0.7497)	(0.6702)	(0.6787)	(0.5412)
Front neighbor	-2.3695***	0.0049	0.6622	0.5349	0.4890	0.3398
	(0.6690)	(0.6718)	(0.6210)	(0.6322)	(0.7562)	(0.5647)
Back neighbor	-2.9666***	-1.0058	-0.4693	0.9992	1.7106**	2.4090***
	(0.6224)	(0.7621)	(0.7270)	(0.6712)	(0.7363)	(0.4623)
Constant	67.6748***	61.5119***	56.5762***	67.3823***	66.9131***	1,077.035
	(1.3405)	(4.1474)	(4.3675)	(4.9966)	(5.0530)	(942.4203)
Political variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Same language indicator?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	678,266	616,201	616,201	545,879	500,936	500,936
Adjusted R^2	0.0016	0.0740	0.1083	0.2087	0.2133	0.3068

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

Table A.30: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness test: same colonizer

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-0.0636	-0.1188	0.0805	-0.0059	-0.2737*	-0.1851
	(0.2136)	(0.1985)	(0.1598)	(0.1468)	(0.1460)	(0.1217)
Aisle neighbor	-0.0216	0.1344	0.3844**	0.2275	0.0139	0.1607
	(0.1898)	(0.1777)	(0.1467)	(0.1469)	(0.1539)	(0.1373)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.6210***	-0.8969***	-0.7013***	-0.4246***	-0.4226**	-0.3122**
	(0.1796)	(0.1949)	(0.1618)	(0.1421)	(0.1673)	(0.1289)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.4673***	-0.7233***	-0.5194***	-0.3523***	-0.2832**	-0.1871
	(0.1642)	(0.1673)	(0.1417)	(0.1221)	(0.1315)	(0.1276)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.4425**	-0.7413***	-0.5037***	-0.3427*	-0.3674**	-0.2550*
	(0.1980)	(0.2015)	(0.1739)	(0.1756)	(0.1801)	(0.1293)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.3964**	-0.7741***	-0.5315***	-0.4771***	-0.4207**	-0.2729**
	(0.1844)	(0.1864)	(0.1603)	(0.1695)	(0.1729)	(0.1310)
Front neighbor	-0.6334***	-0.6649***	-0.4725***	-0.0994	-0.0665	-0.0156
	(0.1708)	(0.1804)	(0.1504)	(0.1511)	(0.1870)	(0.1374)
Back neighbor	-0.6722***	-0.7265***	-0.5428***	-0.2715**	-0.1483	-0.0197
	(0.1468)	(0.1531)	(0.1260)	(0.1166)	(0.1495)	(0.1314)
Constant	81.8513***	88.7195***	85.6735***	87.5352***	86.4896***	557.5145***
	(0.3747)	(0.9037)	(1.2204)	(1.0184)	(1.1262)	(113.6445)
Political variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Same colonizer indicator?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	79,742,480	68,079,315	68,079,315	55,040,433	48,947,754	48,947,754
Adjusted R^2	0.0161	0.0517	0.0552	0.0645	0.0656	0.1466

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

Table A.31: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: same colonizer

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Arab League member states					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-0.2832	1.0267**	1.4809***	1.9357***	2.9001***	-0.1686
	(0.5189)	(0.4641)	(0.4148)	(0.3980)	(0.3750)	(0.2604)
Aisle neighbor	0.1675	1.2545***	1.9599***	2.8032***	4.2609***	0.7504***
	(0.4608)	(0.4169)	(0.3957)	(0.4083)	(0.3885)	(0.2225)
Diagonal front table neighbor	0.8563	0.6963	0.7479	0.8983	1.1284*	0.0721
	(0.6376)	(0.5341)	(0.5152)	(0.5389)	(0.6053)	(0.3729)
Diagonal back table neighbor	0.7152	-0.5429	-0.2795	-0.4368	-0.0575	0.8628***
	(0.6388)	(0.6365)	(0.6137)	(0.6929)	(0.7389)	(0.3125)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.0821	0.5642	0.7749	0.9868*	1.2934**	1.2361***
	(0.7500)	(0.5500)	(0.4948)	(0.5201)	(0.5558)	(0.3194)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	0.7462	-0.2618	0.1144	0.2005	0.2288	0.7145**
	(0.5668)	(0.4697)	(0.4353)	(0.5354)	(0.6112)	(0.2843)
Front neighbor	0.9004	1.0158*	1.3123**	1.3447**	1.4918**	0.5287
	(0.5439)	(0.5308)	(0.5412)	(0.6553)	(0.6565)	(0.3570)
Back neighbor	-1.4726*	-3.1644***	-2.8626***	-3.2399***	-4.1171***	-1.0922
	(0.7454)	(0.7354)	(0.7246)	(0.9945)	(1.0965)	(0.938)
Constant	89.5553***	97.4276***	89.3824***	88.5042***	88.3952***	360.7356***
	(0.3738)	(0.4854)	(1.1127)	(1.0938)	(1.0588)	(87.4854)
Political variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Same colonizer indicator?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,764,621	1,548,893	1,548,893	1,230,606	1,080,148	1,080,148
Adjusted R^2	0.0082	0.0680	0.0931	0.0961	0.0985	0.3956

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

Table A.32: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness test: country pair-fixed effects

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-2.0645***	-2.3670***	-1.5352***	-0.6250*	-0.9986***	0.0710
	(0.6622)	(0.5989)	(0.4038)	(0.3237)	(0.3458)	(0.267)
Aisle neighbor	-2.1267***	-2.3809***	-1.5275***	-0.6512**	-0.9987***	0.0446
	(0.6639)	(0.5997)	(0.4089)	(0.3176)	(0.3518)	(0.2671)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.8690***	-0.9423***	-0.6606***	-0.5532***	-0.5264***	-0.1686
	(0.2107)	(0.2080)	(0.1443)	(0.1303)	(0.1343)	(0.1126)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.8158***	-0.8751***	-0.5965***	-0.4338***	-0.4265***	-0.1053
	(0.1955)	(0.1944)	(0.1337)	(0.1317)	(0.1287)	(0.1225)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.6356***	-0.7460***	-0.4341***	-0.3274**	-0.3307**	-0.0181
	(0.2262)	(0.2145)	(0.1617)	(0.1554)	(0.1568)	(0.1114)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.5839**	-0.7031***	-0.3935**	-0.2954*	-0.3152*	-0.0276
	(0.2234)	(0.2126)	(0.1600)	(0.1589)	(0.1591)	(0.1128)
Front neighbor	-0.9098***	-0.9848***	-0.6885***	-0.3990***	-0.3709***	-0.0811
	(0.2490)	(0.2308)	(0.1618)	(0.1251)	(0.1236)	(0.1121)
Back neighbor	-0.8682***	-0.9350***	-0.6442***	-0.4074***	-0.3920***	-0.0740
	(0.2433)	(0.2204)	(0.1532)	(0.1196)	(0.1208)	(0.1068)
Constant	82.5395***	83.2642***	81.2785***	82.9648***	82.4316***	-5135706***
	(0.2929)	(0.6722)	(0.9354)	(0.7991)	(0.8504)	(0.5022)
Political variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Country pair-fixed effects?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	79,742,478	68,079,314	68,079,314	55,040,432	48,947,754	48,947,754
Adjusted R^2	0.1588	0.1753	0.1768	0.1828	0.1866	0.1947

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

Table A.33: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: country pair-fixed effects

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Arab League member states					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-4.8984***	-5.6286***	-2.6430***	0.1533	-0.3126	0.3738
	(0.9602)	(0.9288)	(0.6364)	(0.8143)	(0.8517)	(0.8739)
Aisle neighbor	-4.5725***	-5.3313***	-2.3274***	0.6279	0.5586	1.2276
	(0.9274)	(0.9168)	(0.6103)	(0.8272)	(0.8037)	(0.8504)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.2283	-0.3700	-0.0932	0.2807	0.3458	0.5401
	(0.3426)	(0.3651)	(0.3252)	(0.3952)	(0.4183)	(0.3873)
Diagonal back table neighbor	0.3251	0.3817	0.6511*	0.9674**	1.1513***	1.0637***
	(0.3530)	(0.3380)	(0.3572)	(0.3875)	(0.3721)	(0.3751)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	0.5245	0.4701	0.7791**	1.0238***	1.4032***	1.7044***
	(0.3825)	(0.3730)	(0.3285)	(0.3614)	(0.3912)	(0.3839)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	0.2061	0.4264	0.7362**	1.0453***	1.1317***	0.9278**
	(0.3807)	(0.3392)	(0.3183)	(0.3686)	(0.3920)	(0.3641)
Front neighbor	0.0996	-0.1250	0.3042	0.4838	0.6712	0.8496*
	(0.3729)	(0.3963)	(0.3552)	(0.4625)	(0.4578)	(0.4481)
Back neighbor	-0.7913*	-0.7282*	-0.6897*	-1.2812***	-1.4769***	-0.4224
	(0.4144)	(0.4278)	(0.3949)	(0.4464)	(0.4691)	(0.4094)
Constant	90.4269***	90.6118***	84.8873***	85.5201***	88.2682***	97.4141***
	(0.3470)	(0.6720)	(1.3309)	(1.1624)	(1.1618)	(0.7335)
Political variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Country pair-fixed effects?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,764,621	1,548,893	1,548,893	1,230,606	1,080,148	1,080,148
Adjusted R^2	0.3865	0.3454	0.3578	0.3679	0.3775	0.3963

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

Table A.34: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019, robustness test: country pair-fixed effects

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with countries with a colonial past					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-5.1441***	-4.2661***	-2.3961**	-5.0723***	-5.4157***	-5.8565***
	(1.2105)	(1.0094)	(1.0038)	(1.1202)	(1.2632)	(1.1915)
Aisle neighbor	-6.0942***	-4.5850***	-2.6369**	-5.1672***	-6.0696***	-5.4350***
	(1.2358)	(1.0793)	(1.0102)	(1.1762)	(1.5533)	(1.4876)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.7429	1.1669	1.7337**	1.3804	1.1103	1.2738
	(0.7680)	(0.8058)	(0.8152)	(0.9671)	(0.9857)	(0.9168)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.4689	1.0652	1.8404*	1.4906	2.0022**	2.1470**
	(0.8172)	(0.9597)	(1.0133)	(0.9300)	(0.9081)	(0.8834)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-1.7820**	0.6155	1.1658	1.7159*	1.4966	0.8723
	(0.8519)	(0.8326)	(0.8245)	(0.9624)	(1.0232)	(0.9215)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.6680	1.4684*	2.1942***	1.8739***	2.6012***	2.5264***
	(0.8380)	(0.8736)	(0.8093)	(0.6776)	(0.7246)	(0.6830)
Front neighbor	-1.1044*	0.8470	1.2806**	0.6833	0.1699	0.9274
	(0.6416)	(0.6186)	(0.6372)	(0.7128)	(0.7562)	(0.6924)
Back neighbor	-0.7611	1.1187	1.9921***	2.6590***	3.1783***	2.7656***
	(0.6671)	(0.7389)	(0.6740)	(0.7137)	(0.7548)	(0.6537)
Constant	66.8837***	50.4880***	46.4313***	54.4528***	56.3395***	70.0200**
	(1.0948)	(3.8925)	(4.1396)	(5.0292)	(5.3223)	(28.2687)
Political variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Country pair-fixed effects?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	678,266	616,201	616,201	545,879	500,936	500,936
Adjusted R^2	0.1979	0.2565	0.2635	0.2717	0.2746	0.3076

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

Table A.35: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness test: standard errors clustered at the year-level

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-0.1930	-0.2662	-0.1146	-0.2027	-0.6589***	-0.2726**
	(0.2190)	(0.1988)	(0.1612)	(0.1563)	(0.1612)	(0.1253)
Aisle neighbor	-0.1585	-0.0169	0.1747	0.0486	-0.3664**	0.0769
	(0.2043)	(0.1930)	(0.1538)	(0.1526)	(0.1618)	(0.1483)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.5530***	-0.8692***	-0.7176***	-0.4502***	-0.4386**	-0.2881**
	(0.2009)	(0.2178)	(0.1779)	(0.1533)	(0.1849)	(0.1327)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.4294**	-0.7199***	-0.5610***	-0.3334**	-0.3099*	-0.1721
	(0.1877)	(0.1946)	(0.1601)	(0.1337)	(0.1548)	(0.1312)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.3629*	-0.7080***	-0.5244***	-0.3522*	-0.4157**	-0.2344*
	(0.2137)	(0.2199)	(0.1799)	(0.1757)	(0.1811)	(0.1299)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.3599*	-0.7696***	-0.5836***	-0.4751***	-0.5145***	-0.2603*
	(0.1985)	(0.2008)	(0.1609)	(0.1620)	(0.1644)	(0.1337)
Front neighbor	-0.6080***	-0.6900***	-0.5470***	-0.1911	-0.1766	-0.0134
	(0.1847)	(0.1989)	(0.1623)	(0.1638)	(0.1986)	(0.1403)
Back neighbor	-0.6419***	-0.7224***	-0.5850***	-0.3507***	-0.2738	-0.0059
	(0.1609)	(0.1734)	(0.1403)	(0.1252)	(0.1651)	(0.1341)
Constant	82.5061***	90.5030***	88.2221***	89.9111***	88.5837***	557.7885***
	(0.4072)	(0.9571)	(1.3920)	(1.2099)	(1.3252)	(116.8664)
Political variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	79,742,480	68,079,315	68,079,315	55,040,433	48,947,754	48,947,754
Adjusted R^2	0.0000	0.0407	0.0429	0.0526	0.0534	0.1460

Standard errors clustered at the year-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

Table A.36: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: standard errors clustered at the year-level

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Arab League member states					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-0.5768	0.9110*	1.2710***	1.6656***	2.4834***	-0.1719
	(0.5259)	(0.4718)	(0.4291)	(0.3986)	(0.3690)	(0.2660)
Aisle neighbor	0.0755	1.2929***	1.9041***	2.7268***	3.9967***	0.7507***
	(0.4405)	(0.3839)	(0.3574)	(0.3734)	(0.3370)	(0.2148)
Diagonal front table neighbor	1.0377*	0.8872*	0.8984*	1.0764**	1.3258**	0.0762
	(0.5840)	(0.4941)	(0.4729)	(0.4904)	(0.5500)	(0.3794)
Diagonal back table neighbor	0.7930	-0.4725	-0.2644	-0.3885	0.1193	0.8689**
	(0.6673)	(0.6638)	(0.6399)	(0.7415)	(0.7914)	(0.3264)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	0.1006	0.7287	0.9082*	1.1936**	1.5723***	1.2440***
	(0.7557)	(0.5377)	(0.4798)	(0.4895)	(0.5298)	(0.3249)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	0.7624	-0.2113	0.1147	0.1952	0.3403	0.7209**
	(0.5700)	(0.4631)	(0.4358)	(0.5261)	(0.6000)	(0.2796)
Front neighbor	1.3110**	1.3656**	1.5912***	1.8383***	1.9764***	0.5360
	(0.4904)	(0.5171)	(0.5220)	(0.6266)	(0.6278)	(0.3586)
Back neighbor	-1.6981**	-3.3359***	-3.0860***	-3.4869***	-4.2761***	-1.3254
	(0.7215)	(0.7108)	(0.6993)	(0.9915)	(1.0992)	(1.0406)
Constant	90.3622***	98.3148***	91.0362***	90.5369***	90.1272***	360.7761***
	(0.3741)	(0.5040)	(1.1749)	(1.0930)	(1.1234)	(78.6743)
Political variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	1,764,621	1,548,893	1,548,893	1,230,606	1,080,148	1,080,148
Adjusted R^2	0.0001	0.0627	0.0844	0.0877	0.0903	0.3956

Standard errors clustered at the year-level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

Table A.37: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019, robustness test: standard errors clustered at the year-level

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with countries with a colonial past					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	0.6309	0.0795	0.7904	0.8859	-2.1760***	-2.9247***
	(0.8014)	(0.7292)	(0.7213)	(0.5908)	(0.6610)	(0.6044)
Aisle neighbor	-1.1768	-1.1785*	-0.3039	-0.0453	-3.9753***	-3.2671***
	(0.7741)	(0.6052)	(0.6139)	(0.5858)	(0.9093)	(0.7780)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.8313	0.8326	1.0404	0.1211	0.2536	0.4440
	(0.7164)	(0.7883)	(0.7369)	(0.8266)	(0.9435)	(0.8421)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.7038	-0.9220	-0.1902	0.0634	0.7678	1.0145
	(0.9056)	(0.9889)	(1.0736)	(0.9987)	(0.9970)	(0.7334)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-2.5088***	-0.1509	0.3907	0.7717	1.0335	0.1356
	(0.7843)	(0.8838)	(0.8292)	(0.8671)	(0.9496)	(0.8124)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-1.1191	-0.4886	0.3491	1.4540**	2.2364***	1.7562***
	(0.9293)	(0.7832)	(0.7898)	(0.7036)	(0.7155)	(0.5995)
Front neighbor	-2.3284***	-0.0569	0.5716	0.4572	0.6016	0.3718
	(0.6691)	(0.6577)	(0.6170)	(0.6221)	(0.7522)	(0.5730)
Back neighbor	-2.9018***	-1.1009	-0.5260	0.9661	1.6592**	2.3620***
	(0.6319)	(0.7912)	(0.7656)	(0.7297)	(0.7733)	(0.4824)
Constant	66.8453***	60.9893***	56.0594***	67.1480***	66.6721***	1,076.388
	(1.3123)	(4.9718)	(5.1946)	(5.8945)	(5.8539)	(820.7188)
Political variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables?[b.]	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables?[c.]	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables?[d.]	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables?[e.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables?[f.]	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	678,266	616,201	616,201	545,879	500,936	500,936
Adjusted R^2	0.0001	0.0714	0.1063	0.2081	0.2125	0.3067

Standard errors clustered at the year–level are shown in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.
Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.
Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.
Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.
Full tables are available upon request.

Appendix B

Autocrats in the United Nations General Assembly

B.1 Tables

Table B.1: Summary statistics, resolutions between 1950-2018 without Israel

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
UNGA vote agreement rate with Israel, Israel- and Palestinian issues-related resolutions	8,405	0.13	0.18	0	1
UNGA vote agreement rate with Israel, only State of Israel-related resolutions	8,049	0.11	0.18	0	1
Continuous autocracy index, mirrored democracy index by Gründler and Krieger (2019)	8,405	0.47	0.41	0	1
Logarithm of real GDP per capita	7,472	8.68	1.18	5.37	12.44
Growth of real GDP	7,421	4.35	9.43	-71.10	116.16
Logarithm of population	7,472	1.86	1.84	-3.20	7.20
Share of Jewish population relative to total population	6,951	0	0	0	0.04
Member of Arab League	8,405	0.12	0.32	0	1
US and Pacific islands delegation	8,405	0.01	0.08	0	1
Share of Middle Eastern topic resolutions	8,405	0.21	0.08	0.02	0.38
Share of economic development topic resolutions	8,405	0.12	0.06	0	0.40
Share of disarmament topic resolutions	8,405	0.21	0.07	0	0.35
Share of nuclear proliferation topic resolutions	8,405	0.15	0.05	0	0.24
Share of colonialism topic resolutions	8,405	0.17	0.06	0	0.37
Share of human rights topic resolutions	8,405	0.22	0.09	0	0.37
Dichotomous autocracy variable, mirrored democracy index by Gründler and Krieger (2019)	8,405	0.47	0.50	0	1
Mirrored democracy index by Gründler and Krieger (2019)	8,631	0.52	0.50	0	1
Autocracy index by Marshall et al. (2019)	7,459	3.17	3.52	0	10
Mirrored Revised Combined Polity score by Marshall et al. (2019)	7,675	-1.24	7.37	-10	10
Left-wing government	4,014	0.54	0.50	0	1
Right-wing government	4,014	0.34	0.47	0	1
Absolute difference of ideal points with Israel	9,552	2.15	1.04	0	4.94

Table B.2: Yearly average agreement rate between Israel and UNGA member countries for contested votes on Israel- and Palestinian issues-related UNGA resolutions, robustness test: government ideology

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Israel			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Continuous autocracy index	-0.0925***	-0.0675***	-0.0732***	-0.1044***
	(0.0098)	(0.0122)	(0.0125)	(0.0156)
Left-wing government	-0.0143	-0.0125	-0.0128	-0.0056
	(0.0106)	(0.0091)	(0.0089)	(0.0094)
Right-wing government	0.0329***	0.0127	0.0109	0.0282***
	(0.0114)	(0.0093)	(0.0092)	(0.0097)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita		0.0363***	0.0375***	0.0036
		(0.0030)	(0.0030)	(0.0138)
Growth of real GDP		-0.0009***	-0.0005**	-0.0000
		(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0002)
Logarithm of population		0.0013	0.0017	0.1649***
		(0.0016)	(0.0016)	(0.0282)
Share of Jewish population		4.7358***	4.2397***	-6.9500***
		(1.3005)	(1.3171)	(2.1081)
Member of Arab League		-0.0678***	-0.0654***	-0.0423
		(0.0103)	(0.0109)	(0.0808)
US and Pacific islands delegation		0.5425***	0.5496***	-0.1672**
		(0.0466)	(0.0476)	(0.0745)
Constant	0.1564***	0.2696***	-5.0608***	-3.1804
	(0.0088)	(0.0414)	(1.7041)	(2.0187)
Topic-share variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓
Year-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	4,014	2,996	2,996	2,996
Countries	138	125	125	125
Adjusted R^2	0.1150	0.4737	0.5060	0.6716

Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of two are in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: The resolution topics are Middle Eastern, economic development, disarmament, nuclear proliferation, colonialism and human rights issues.

Table B.3: Yearly average agreement rate between Israel and UNGA member countries for contested votes on State of Israel-related UNGA resolutions (excluding Palestinian issues and related UN missions), robustness test: government ideology

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Israel			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Continuous autocracy index	-0.1177***	-0.0756***	-0.0767***	-0.1005***
	(0.0101)	(0.0141)	(0.0144)	(0.0182)
Left-wing government	-0.0141	-0.0138	-0.0149	-0.0013
	(0.0105)	(0.0104)	(0.0103)	(0.0113)
Right-wing government	0.0382***	0.0187*	0.0162	0.0370***
	(0.0113)	(0.0106)	(0.0106)	(0.0116)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita		0.0353***	0.0369***	0.0039
		(0.0034)	(0.0034)	(0.0149)
Growth of real GDP		-0.0006**	-0.0005	0.0001
		(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Logarithm of population		-0.0005	-0.0003	0.2065***
		(0.0018)	(0.0018)	(0.0317)
Share of Jewish population		4.9243***	4.4398***	-6.4740**
		(1.2702)	(1.2983)	(2.5315)
Member of Arab League		-0.0828***	-0.0816***	-0.0634
		(0.0112)	(0.0120)	(0.1369)
US and Pacific islands delegation		0.5186***	0.5264***	-0.4879**
		(0.0501)	(0.0507)	(0.2215)
Constant	0.1506***	0.1045**	-3.6988*	1.9677
	(0.0085)	(0.0501)	(2.0912)	(14.1556)
Topic-share variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓
Year-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	3,974	2,966	2,966	2,966
Countries	137	124	124	124
Adjusted R^2	0.1150	0.4737	0.5060	0.6716

Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of two are in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: The resolution topics are Middle Eastern, economic development, disarmament, nuclear proliferation, colonialism and human rights issues.

Table B.4: Yearly average agreement rate between Israel and UNGA member countries for contested votes on Israel- and Palestinian issues-related UNGA resolutions, robustness test: mirrored dichotomous democracy variable by Gründler and Krieger (2019)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Israel			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Mirrored dichotomous democracy variable	-0.0448***	-0.0379***	-0.0427***	-0.0123
	(0.0058)	(0.0063)	(0.0061)	(0.0077)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita		0.0239***	0.0249***	0.0074
		(0.0023)	(0.0022)	(0.0080)
Growth of real GDP		-0.0003*	-0.0002	0.0002
		(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)
Logarithm of population		-0.0023*	-0.0015	0.0618***
		(0.0014)	(0.0013)	(0.0162)
Share of Jewish population		6.4546***	6.1900***	-3.9062
		(1.3900)	(1.3181)	(2.6640)
Member of Arab League		-0.0910***	-0.0886***	0.0683
		(0.0065)	(0.0065)	(0.0420)
US and Pacific islands delegation		0.4286***	0.4295***	0.1212
		(0.0685)	(0.0659)	(0.1732)
Constant	0.1525***	0.1632***	0.1379	0.6871
	(0.0044)	(0.0313)	(0.7057)	(0.7990)
Topic-share variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓
Year-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	8,405	6,261	6,261	6,261
Countries	185	167	167	167
Adjusted R^2	0.0150	0.3754	0.4811	0.6081

Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of two are in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: The resolution topics are Middle Eastern, economic development, disarmament, nuclear proliferation, colonialism and human rights issues.

Table B.5: Yearly average agreement rate between Israel and UNGA member countries for contested votes on State of Israel-related UNGA resolutions (excluding Palestinian issues and related UN missions), robustness test: mirrored dichotomous democracy variable by Gründler and Krieger (2019)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Israel			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Mirrored dichotomous democracy variable	-0.0646***	-0.0472***	-0.0482***	-0.0144
	(0.0060)	(0.0071)	(0.0072)	(0.0089)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita		0.0224***	0.0238***	0.0117
		(0.0025)	(0.0025)	(0.0093)
Growth of real GDP		-0.0003	-0.0002	0.0001
		(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Logarithm of population		-0.0038**	-0.0035**	0.0992***
		(0.0016)	(0.0015)	(0.0185)
Share of Jewish population		7.1915***	6.9926***	-2.8450
		(1.5227)	(1.4922)	(3.0108)
Member of Arab League		-0.1057***	-0.1062***	0.0587
		(0.0068)	(0.0072)	(0.0437)
US and Pacific islands delegation		0.4250***	0.4281***	-0.2989
		(0.0669)	(0.0652)	(.)
Constant	0.1443***	0.1163***	0.4096	0.7367
	(0.0044)	(0.0336)	(0.3214)	(0.6965)
Topic-share variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓
Year-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	8,049	6,039	6,039	6,039
Countries	185	167	167	167
Adjusted R^2	0.0313	0.3388	0.3858	0.5513

Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of two are in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: The resolution topics are Middle Eastern, economic development, disarmament, nuclear proliferation, colonialism and human rights issues.

Table B.6: Yearly average agreement rate between Israel and UNGA member countries for contested votes on Israel- and Palestinian issues-related UNGA resolutions, robustness test: mirrored democracy variable by Bjørnskov and Rode (2020)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Israel			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Mirrored democracy variable	-0.0809***	-0.0474***	-0.0518***	-0.0180**
	(0.0063)	(0.0065)	(0.0062)	(0.0087)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita		0.0215***	0.0224***	0.0070
		(0.0023)	(0.0022)	(0.0080)
Growth of real GDP		-0.0003*	-0.0002	0.0002
		(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)
Logarithm of population		-0.0024*	-0.0016	0.0640***
		(0.0014)	(0.0013)	(0.0160)
Share of Jewish population		6.4172***	6.1775***	-3.9216
		(1.3956)	(1.3246)	(2.6580)
Member of Arab League		-0.0844***	-0.0820***	0.0693*
		(0.0064)	(0.0065)	(0.0418)
US and Pacific islands delegation		0.4287***	0.4291***	0.9426***
		(0.0684)	(0.0658)	(0.1724)
Constant	0.1803***	0.1863***	1.0344*	0.0339
	(0.0053)	(0.0320)	(0.5884)	(0.7371)
Topic-share variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓
Year-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	8,633	6,284	6,284	6,284
Countries	193	168	168	168
Adjusted R^2	0.0431	0.3795	0.4855	0.6084

Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of two are in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: The resolution topics are Middle Eastern, economic development, disarmament, nuclear proliferation, colonialism and human rights issues.

Table B.7: Yearly average agreement rate between Israel and UNGA member countries for contested votes on State of Israel-related UNGA resolutions (excluding Palestinian issues and related UN missions), robustness test: mirrored democracy variable by Bjørnskov and Rode (2020)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Israel			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Mirrored democracy variable	-0.0990***	-0.0592***	-0.0607***	-0.0201**
	(0.0065)	(0.0073)	(0.0072)	(0.0098)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita		0.0193***	0.0206***	0.0112
		(0.0026)	(0.0026)	(0.0093)
Growth of real GDP		-0.0002	-0.0002	0.0001
		(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Logarithm of population		-0.0039**	-0.0035**	0.1020***
		(0.0016)	(0.0015)	(0.0183)
Share of Jewish population		7.1430***	6.9468***	-2.8564
		(1.5273)	(1.4964)	(3.0023)
Member of Arab League		-0.0974***	-0.0975***	0.0599
		(0.0068)	(0.0072)	(0.0435)
US and Pacific islands delegation		0.4252***	0.4284***	-0.3229
		(0.0668)	(0.0650)	(.)
Constant	0.1730***	0.1469***	0.4406	1.1646
	(0.0055)	(0.0345)	(0.6530)	(.)
Topic-share variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓
Year-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	8,269	6,062	6,062	6,062
Countries	193	168	168	168
Adjusted R^2	0.0630	0.3446	0.3923	0.5517

Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of two are in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: The resolution topics are Middle Eastern, economic development, disarmament, nuclear proliferation, colonialism and human rights issues.

Table B.8: Yearly average agreement rate between Israel and UNGA member countries for contested votes on Israel- and Palestinian issues-related UNGA resolutions, robustness test: mirrored Revised Combined Polity score by Marshall et al. (2019)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Israel			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Mirrored Revised Combined Polity score	-0.0043***	-0.0029***	-0.0033***	-0.0011
	(0.0004)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0007)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita		0.0221***	0.0225***	0.0032
		(0.0024)	(0.0023)	(0.0084)
Growth of real GDP		-0.0004**	-0.0003	0.0001
		(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Logarithm of population		-0.0054***	-0.0048***	0.0448***
		(0.0017)	(0.0016)	(0.0163)
Share of Jewish population		6.5086***	6.2695***	-3.8304
		(1.4040)	(1.3298)	(2.8031)
Member of Arab League		-0.0873***	-0.0835***	0.0674
		(0.0074)	(0.0074)	(0.0421)
US and Pacific islands delegation		0.4349***	0.4358***	0.6209***
		(0.0682)	(0.0655)	(0.1369)
Constant	0.1257***	0.1576***	-0.0090	-0.3008
	(0.0030)	(0.0320)	(0.4288)	(0.4150)
Topic-share variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓
Year-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	7,675	5,676	5,676	5,676
Countries	169	151	151	151
Adjusted R^2	0.0296	0.3855	0.4906	0.6131

Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of two are in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: The resolution topics are Middle Eastern, economic development, disarmament, nuclear proliferation, colonialism and human rights issues.

Table B.9: Yearly average agreement rate between Israel and UNGA member countries for contested votes on State of Israel-related UNGA resolutions (excluding Palestinian issues and related UN missions), robustness test: mirrored Revised Combined Polity score by Marshall et al. (2019)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Israel			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Mirrored Revised Combined Polity score	-0.0053***	-0.0033***	-0.0034***	-0.0011
	(0.0004)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0008)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita		0.0208***	0.0219***	0.0041
		(0.0026)	(0.0026)	(0.0097)
Growth of real GDP		-0.0003*	-0.0003	0.0000
		(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Logarithm of population		-0.0060***	-0.0057***	0.0755***
		(0.0018)	(0.0018)	(0.0184)
Share of Jewish population		7.2110***	7.0252***	-2.7480
		(1.5435)	(1.5059)	(3.1661)
Member of Arab League		-0.1024***	-0.1012***	0.0556
		(0.0079)	(0.0082)	(0.0440)
US and Pacific islands delegation		0.4300***	0.4333***	0.2126
		(0.0664)	(0.0646)	(0.1514)
Constant	0.1056***	0.1020***	1.1347***	1.3089
	(0.0031)	(0.0346)	(0.2946)	(.)
Topic-share variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓
Year-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	7,356	5,482	5,482	5,482
Countries	169	151	151	151
Adjusted R^2	0.0470	0.3475	0.3936	0.5587

Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of two are in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: The resolution topics are Middle Eastern, economic development, disarmament, nuclear proliferation, colonialism and human rights issues.

Table B.10: Yearly average agreement rate between Israel and UNGA member countries for contested votes on Israel- and Palestinian issues-related UNGA resolutions, robustness test: Institutionalized Autocracy score by Marshall et al. (2019)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Israel			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Institutionalized Autocracy score	-0.0067***	-0.0050***	-0.0059***	-0.0023*
	(0.0009)	(0.0011)	(0.0011)	(0.0014)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita		0.0266***	0.0277***	0.0045
		(0.0023)	(0.0022)	(0.0086)
Growth of real GDP		-0.0005**	-0.0003	0.0002
		(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Logarithm of population		-0.0051***	-0.0045***	0.0441***
		(0.0017)	(0.0016)	(0.0165)
Share of Jewish population		6.2375***	5.9486***	-4.9087*
		(1.3584)	(1.2770)	(2.6849)
Member of Arab League		-0.0928***	-0.0882***	0.0684
		(0.0077)	(0.0076)	(0.0423)
US and Pacific islands delegation		0.4395***	0.4410***	0.6183***
		(0.0677)	(0.0650)	(0.1340)
Constant	0.1524***	0.1411***	0.0893	-0.2379
	(0.0046)	(0.0328)	(0.4179)	(0.5409)
Topic-share variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓
Year-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	7,459	5,523	5,523	5,523
Countries	168	150	150	150
Adjusted R^2	0.0165	0.3907	0.4978	0.6234

Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of two are in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: The resolution topics are Middle Eastern, economic development, disarmament, nuclear proliferation, colonialism and human rights issues.

Table B.11: Yearly average agreement rate between Israel and UNGA member countries for contested votes on State of Israel-related UNGA resolutions (excluding Palestinian issues and related UN missions), robustness test: Institutionalized Autocracy score by Marshall et al. (2019)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Israel			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Institutionalized Autocracy score	-0.0092***	-0.0058***	-0.0063***	-0.0024
	(0.0009)	(0.0012)	(0.0012)	(0.0015)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita		0.0257***	0.0269***	0.0051
		(0.0025)	(0.0025)	(0.0099)
Growth of real GDP		-0.0004*	-0.0004*	0.0001
		(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Logarithm of population		-0.0055***	-0.0052***	0.0742***
		(0.0018)	(0.0018)	(0.0187)
Share of Jewish population		6.6637***	6.4841***	-4.4309
		(1.4010)	(1.3798)	(2.9244)
Member of Arab League		-0.1069***	-0.1054***	0.0568
		(0.0081)	(0.0084)	(0.0441)
US and Pacific islands delegation		0.4409***	0.4436***	0.6104***
		(0.0645)	(0.0631)	(0.0873)
Constant	0.1418***	0.0854**	-0.3138	-0.6173
	(0.0046)	(0.0353)	(0.2879)	(0.8548)
Topic-share variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓
Year-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	7,163	5,345	5,345	5,345
Countries	167	150	150	150
Adjusted R^2	0.0317	0.3517	0.3972	0.5655

Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of two are in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: The resolution topics are Middle Eastern, economic development, disarmament, nuclear proliferation, colonialism and human rights issues.

Table B.12: Robustness test: absolute difference of ideal points between Israel and UNGA member countries for votes on all contested UNGA resolutions

	Dependent variable: absolute difference of ideal points with Israel			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Continuous autocracy index	0.6466***	0.5238***	0.5480***	0.3383***
	(0.0406)	(0.0415)	(0.0399)	(0.0478)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita		-0.2384***	-0.2440***	-0.0601**
		(0.0130)	(0.0123)	(0.0279)
Growth of real GDP		0.0048***	0.0038***	0.0004
		(0.0009)	(0.0008)	(0.0006)
Logarithm of population		-0.0285***	-0.0290***	1.2509***
		(0.0073)	(0.0069)	(0.0898)
Share of Jewish population		-10.9983*	-9.2906	38.4174***
		(5.9508)	(5.7017)	(8.7494)
Member of Arab League		0.6246***	0.6139***	-0.2325
		(0.0379)	(0.0363)	(0.1514)
US and Pacific islands delegation		-0.0399	-0.0660	0.7795**
		(0.2603)	(0.2664)	(0.3041)
Constant	1.8312***	2.2893***	1.5267***	-8.6217***
	(0.0245)	(0.1360)	(0.2828)	(0.7330)
Topic-share variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓
Year-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	9,552	7,126	7,126	7,126
Countries	185	168	167	167
Adjusted R^2	0.0654	0.5873	0.6468	0.8045

Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of two are in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: The resolution topics are Middle Eastern, economic development, disarmament, nuclear proliferation, colonialism and human rights issues.

Table B.13: Yearly average agreement rate between Israel and UNGA member countries for contested votes on Israel- and Palestinian issues-related UNGA resolutions, robustness test: standard errors clustered at country-level

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Israel			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Continuous autocracy index	-0.0670***	-0.0666***	-0.0744***	-0.0317
	(0.0199)	(0.0164)	(0.0169)	(0.0217)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita		0.0196***	0.0203***	0.0075
		(0.0046)	(0.0046)	(0.0130)
Growth of real GDP		-0.0003	-0.0001	0.0002
		(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Logarithm of population		-0.0026	-0.0018	0.0614**
		(0.0028)	(0.0029)	(0.0286)
Share of Jewish population		6.1406*	5.8238*	-3.9192
		(3.1850)	(3.2393)	(7.4050)
Member of Arab League		-0.0792***	-0.0757***	0.0665
		(0.0114)	(0.0115)	(0.0493)
US and Pacific islands delegation		0.4358***	0.4376***	0.1247
		(0.0759)	(0.0768)	(0.3483)
Constant	0.1632***	0.2129***	0.1028	0.6669
	(0.0149)	(0.0472)	(0.7618)	(0.6860)
Topic-share variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓
Year-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	8,405	6,261	6,261	6,261
Countries	185	167	167	167
Adjusted R^2	0.0227	0.3810	0.4878	0.6089

Standard errors clustered at country-level in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: The resolution topics are Middle Eastern, economic development, disarmament, nuclear proliferation, colonialism and human rights issues.

Table B.14: Yearly average agreement rate between Israel and UNGA member countries for contested votes on State of Israel-related UNGA resolutions (excluding Palestinian issues and related UN missions), robustness test: standard errors clustered at country-level

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Israel			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Continuous autocracy index	-0.0925***	-0.0827***	-0.0846***	-0.0359
	(0.0193)	(0.0186)	(0.0194)	(0.0246)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita		0.0172***	0.0186***	0.0119
		(0.0049)	(0.0050)	(0.0147)
Growth of real GDP		-0.0002	-0.0001	0.0001
		(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Logarithm of population		-0.0042	-0.0038	0.0991***
		(0.0031)	(0.0031)	(0.0318)
Share of Jewish population		6.8080*	6.5724*	-2.8709
		(3.6004)	(3.6531)	(7.7717)
Member of Arab League		-0.0911***	-0.0913***	0.0567
		(0.0131)	(0.0135)	(0.0585)
US and Pacific islands delegation		0.4336***	0.4372***	-0.2978**
		(0.0839)	(0.0849)	(0.3640)
Constant	0.1576***	0.1785***	0.4138	0.7242**
	(0.0141)	(0.0520)	(0.2824)	(0.3110)
Topic-share variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓
Year-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	8,049	6,039	6,039	6,039
Countries	185	167	167	167
Adjusted R^2	0.0436	0.3469	0.3942	0.5523

Standard errors clustered at country-level in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: The resolution topics are Middle Eastern, economic development, disarmament, nuclear proliferation, colonialism and human rights issues.

Table B.15: Yearly average agreement rate between Israel and UNGA member countries for contested votes on Israel- and Palestinian issues-related UNGA resolutions, robustness test: Jackknife standard errors

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Israel			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Continuous autocracy index	-0.0670***	-0.0666***	-0.0744***	-0.0317***
	(0.0048)	(0.0060)	(0.0056)	(0.0081)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita		0.0196***	0.0203***	0.0075
		(0.0016)	(0.0015)	(0.0062)
Growth of real GDP		-0.0003*	-0.0001	0.0002
		(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)
Logarithm of population		-0.0026***	-0.0018*	0.0614***
		(0.0010)	(0.0009)	(0.0125)
Share of Jewish population		6.1406***	5.8238***	-3.9192**
		(0.9731)	(0.8664)	(1.9329)
Member of Arab League		-0.0792***	-0.0757***	0.0665*
		(0.0047)	(0.0046)	(0.0384)
US and Pacific islands delegation		0.4358***	0.4376***	0.2832***
		(0.0483)	(0.0446)	(0.0945)
Constant	0.1632***	0.2129***	0.5815	0.4241
	(0.0032)	(0.0276)	(2.3147)	(2.0104)
Topic-share variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓
Year-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	8,405	6,261	6,261	6,261
Countries	185	167	167	167
Adjusted R^2	0.0227	0.3810	0.4878	0.6089

Jackknife standard errors in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: The resolution topics are Middle Eastern, economic development, disarmament, nuclear proliferation, colonialism and human rights issues.

Table B.16: Yearly average agreement rate between Israel and UNGA member countries for contested votes on State of Israel-related UNGA resolutions (excluding Palestinian issues and related UN missions), robustness test: Jackknife standard errors

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Israel			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Continuous autocracy index	-0.0925***	-0.0827***	-0.0846***	-0.0359***
	(0.0048)	(0.0065)	(0.0065)	(0.0092)
Logarithm of real GDP per capita		0.0172***	0.0186***	0.0119
		(0.0017)	(0.0017)	(0.0071)
Growth of real GDP		-0.0002	-0.0001	0.0001
		(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Logarithm of population		-0.0042***	-0.0038***	0.0991***
		(0.0011)	(0.0010)	(0.0138)
Share of Jewish population		6.8080***	6.5724***	-2.8709
		(1.0073)	(0.9622)	(2.1435)
Member of Arab League		-0.0911***	-0.0913***	0.0567
		(0.0048)	(0.0051)	(0.0409)
US and Pacific islands delegation		0.4336***	0.4372***	0.0083
		(0.0455)	(0.0438)	(0.1043)
Constant	0.1576***	0.1785***	-0.1621	-0.1536
	(0.0031)	(0.0280)	(2.5021)	(2.4676)
Topic-share variables?[a.]	✗	✓	✓	✓
Year-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	8,049	6,039	6,039	6,039
Countries	185	167	167	167
Adjusted R^2	0.0436	0.3469	0.3942	0.5523

Jackknife standard errors in brackets.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.
✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.
Note a.: The resolution topics are Middle Eastern, economic development, disarmament, nuclear proliferation, colonialism and human rights issues.

Appendix C

Political Alignment during the Trump Presidency

C.1 Tables

Table C.1: Summary statistics

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Yearly average agreement rate	1,336	0.54	0.103	0.2	0.95
Yearly absolute difference of ideal points	1,291	1.67	0.446	0.11	3.6
US president Donald Trump	1,340	0.1	0.3	0	1
Ideological distance	1,059	0.99	0.924	0	2
Log of real GDP per capita	1,230	10.31	0.407	8.99	11.5
Growth of real GDP	1,239	2.6	2.983	-14.81	25.01
Log of population	1,230	2.26	1.669	-3.51	4.85
Allied with US in conflict	1,295	0.36	0.479	0	1
Share of Middle Eastern resolutions	1,340	0.23	0.069	0	0.38
Share of economic development resolutions	1,340	0.11	0.042	0	0.33
Share of disarmament resolutions	1,340	0.23	0.059	0	0.35
Share of nuclear proliferation resolutions	1,340	0.16	0.044	0	0.24
Share of colonialism resolutions	1,340	0.15	0.049	0	0.22
Share of human rights resolutions	1,340	0.24	0.081	0	0.67

Only countries that have been either G7, NATO, OECD and/or UN WEOG members since 1980 are included (excluding the United States)

Declaration of Authorship

Eidesstattliche Versicherung

Ich versichere hiermit eidesstattlich, dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit selbständig und ohne fremde Hilfe verfasst habe. Die aus fremden Quellen direkt oder indirekt übernommenen Gedanken sowie mir gegebene Anregungen sind als solche kenntlich gemacht. Die Arbeit wurde bisher keiner anderen Prüfungsbehörde vorgelegt und auch noch nicht veröffentlicht. Sofern ein Teil der Arbeit aus bereits veröffentlichten Papers besteht, habe ich dies ausdrücklich angegeben.

München, den 11. März 2021

Simon Martin Thomas Mosler