

**MANAGING INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANT YOUTH
IN THE UNITED STATES, GERMANY, AND POLAND**

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*This dissertation is dedicated to all immigrants
whose voices have not yet been heard,
whose fates are still unknown,
and who are still waiting to join “us”...*

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Abbreviations

ACS	American Community Survey
AFSC	American Friends Service Committee
AICE	Association of International Credentials Evaluators
AIM	Affirmative Integration Management
ARGE	Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Beschäftigung München
BAMF	Federal Office for Migration and Refugees
BIBB	Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training
BMAS	Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
BMBF	Federal Ministry of Education and Research
BMI	Federal Ministry of the Interior
CBP	Customs and Border Protection
CBPs	Common Basic Principles
CEAS	Common European Asylum System
CMC	City Middle College
CROs	Community Relations Officers
CSO	Central Statistical Office
CTE	Career and Technical Education
DG EAC	Directorate-General for Education and Culture
DG EMPL	Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs, and Inclusion
DHHS	Department of Health and Human Services
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DIHK	German Chamber of Industry and Commerce
DIK	German Conference on Islam
DOL	Department of Labor
DREAM Act	Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors Act
ECC	Educational Cultural Complex
ECVET	European Credit System for VET
ED	Department of Education
EDD	Employment Development Department
EEA	European Economic Area
EIF	European Integration Fund
ELLs	English Language Learners
EMN	European Migration Network
EQF	European Qualifications Framework
ERF	European Refugee Fund
ESEA	Elementary and Secondary Education Act
ESF	European Social Funds
ETA	Employment and Training Administration
EWSI	European Web Site on Integration
GCIR	Grantmakers Concerned with Immigrants and Refugees
GMF	German Marshall Fund
GT	Grounded Theory
GTM	Grounded Theory Method
IB youth	Immigrant youth at the US-Mexico border
ICE	Immigration and Customs Enforcement
IMISCOE	International Migration, Integration, and Social Cohesion Research Network
INA	Immigration and Nationality Act
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRC	International Rescue Committee
IRCA	Immigration Reform and Control Act
IWG	Integration Working Group
JADE	Jugendliche an die Hand nehmen

JCCS	Juvenile Court and Community School
KMK	Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs of the States of the Länder in the Federal Republic of Germany
LMU	Ludwig Maximilian University in Munich
LPRs	Legal Permanent Residents
MBQ	Münchener Beschäftigungs- und Qualifizierungsprogramm
MG	Matching Grant
MIPEX	Migrant Integration Policy Index
MPG	Migration Policy Group
MPI	Migration Policy Institute
MVHS	Münchener Volkshochschule
NAC	National Americanization Committee
NACES	National Association of Credential Evaluation Services
NAEP	National Assessment of Educational Progress
NARIC	National Academic Recognition Information Centers
NCLB	No Child Left Behind Act
NCLR	National Council of La Raza
NCPs	National Contact Points on Integration
NGOs	Non-governmental organizations
NIP	National Integration Plan
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OESE	Office of Elementary and Secondary Education
OMC	Open Method of Coordination
ORR	Office of Refugee Resettlement
OVAE	Office of Vocational and Adult Education
PAH	Polish Humanitarian Action
PCRN	Perkins Collaborative Resource Network
Perkins IV	Perkins Career and Technical Education Act of 2006
PIQE	Parent Institute for Quality Education
PISA	Program for International Student Assessment
PRWORA	Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
PWC	Phoenix Workforce Connection
PYD	Positive Youth Development
RRP	Refugee Resettlement Program
SCHIP	State Children's Health Insurance Program
SDAYO	San Diego Asian Youth Organization
SDCCD	San Diego Community College District
SDCE	San Diego Continuing Education
SDRC	San Diego Rights Consortium
SSI	Supplemental Security Income
SVR	Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration
TANF	Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
TCNs	Third Country Nationals
TPS	Temporary Protected Status
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
URBACT	European Program for Urban Sustainable Development
USCIS	United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
USCRI	US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants
USRP	US Refugee Program
VET	Vocational Education and Training
VOLAGs	National Voluntary Resettlement Agencies
VPA	Verbundprojekt Perspektive Arbeit
WIA	Workforce Investment Act

1 Introduction: Bridging Research and Praxis on Both Sides of the Atlantic

The average American would likely have a difficult time navigating “the system” – it becomes much more difficult for a newcomer who is trying to learn the basics about living in a new country and culture. Thus, immigrants become an easy target for policymakers who seek to fix the financial problems and budget deficit by cutting services to them, because the possibility of immigrants getting heard or uprising (*sic*) is much lower than any other group.¹

Immigrants in the US and the EU face similar challenges in adjusting to a new context and setting and learning how to “navigate the new system,” in which they now have to live, willingly or not. Integration policies are supposed to ease this learning process. Whether immigrants are being heard by local and national authorities or local communities, and how integration services for immigrants are managed on both sides of the Atlantic, are crucial questions for both integration researchers and practitioners.

1.1 Purpose Statement

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine ways of managing immigrant integration and integration policies in the receiving societies, with a special focus on the labor market integration of young immigrants.² The study addresses key interrelated aspects of integration policymaking: youth development strategies and the participation of immigrants in the local workforce. It also seeks to bridge the gap between the theoretical framework of the research on integration and the grounded, local reality of “practicing integration.”

Indeed, even though the discourse on integration has been evolving rapidly throughout the end of the last century and beginning of this one, the focus of research on local sites, as the places where the integration of immigrants with the host society actually happens or at least should happen, is quite new. The application of a theoretical framework for managing integration, developed in this dissertation, is then tested in several different local contexts. The hope is that this work will be useful for both theorists and practitioners of immigrant integration and youth policies.

Thus, along with new theoretical insights into the complex research area of immigrant integration, the study presents a portrait of integration practices, describing successes and shortcomings on both sides of the Atlantic. Simultaneously, the dissertation should foster a transatlantic dialog on immigrant integration. By looking at the advanced industrial societies

¹ Delgado M., Jones K., and Rohani M. (2005). *Social Work Practice with Refugee and Immigrant Youth in the United States*. Boston, MA: Pearson Education, Inc., p. 234.

² The term “the receiving society” will be used interchangeably with “the host society.”

of the United States, Germany, and Poland, the study seeks to fill a gap in the academic field, addressing the need for comparative empirical research and promoting the exchange of good and bad practices in providing integration services for young immigrants in America and in Europe.

It is believed that such an exchange is an important step in improving integration. By spreading knowledge about local integration practices for immigrant youth, this dissertation can and should be a force for social cohesion and defuse local taboos and controversies surrounding the issue of immigration, so that “the local” transgresses its borders and becomes “the global.” In fact, the globalization of local research on integration can teach, warn, and encourage: comparing yourself to others is sometimes the best incentive for making improvements and thereby generating innovative ideas, in this case in the field of immigrant integration. The showcase of different approaches as a result of the empirical study in four city case studies should contribute not only to a critical appreciation of theory application and practices, but also stimulate scholars to further transatlantic research on managing the integration of immigrant youth.

1.2 Unit of Analysis and Research Questions

The unit of analysis focuses on the supranational, national, state, and local contexts for managing the integration of immigrant youth and the work methods of integration service providers in the city case studies. The cities in the European case studies are in both old and relatively new EU member states, Germany and Poland, which have different bonds and a different understanding of what it means to belong to the structure of the Union. They also have a different history of immigration. Similarly, on the other side of the Atlantic, the American cities are situated in two US states, Arizona and California, which were admitted to the United States at different times and have different experiences with immigration. Inside these two EU countries and two US states, four cities of a relatively comparable population size and distance from each other were selected: San Diego in California, Phoenix in Arizona, Munich in Germany, and Warsaw in Poland. The cities are unique in terms of the size and diversity of the immigration populations, labor markets, and the roles these cities play as immigrant destinations.

The inconsistencies in definitions of immigrant youth are not conducive to setting clear boundaries for empirical comparative research on managing integration of immigrant youth in different national and local contexts. Interestingly, no worldwide, universally applicable definition of an immigrant³ exists. The study partially follows a rather broad

³ “Migrant” is a broader category, including immigrants (people coming to a particular country) and emigrants (people leaving a given country). However, migrants and immigrants are often used interchangeably and the terms are commonly applied to immigrants both in research and practice.

definition of the term, proposed by UNESCO. According to this definition, “an immigrant is considered any person who lives temporarily or permanently in a country where he or she was not born, and has acquired some significant social ties to this country.”⁴ Consequently, for UNESCO and for this research, tourists who do not intend to stay in a given place for a longer period of time are not immigrants. Although UNESCO also does not include refugees, displaced persons or others forced to leave their homes among immigrants, these groups of people are included here under the single category of “immigrant.”

Nevertheless, each country seems to have adopted its own interpretation of the term in line with its own migration policies and each researcher defines an immigrant in a way that best fits into his or her research context. Confusion usually arises about the question of whether a refugee is an immigrant and whether second or third generation immigrants should still be included in this group. In fact, the term immigrant is widely used without any attempt at defining it, and the interpretation of what an immigrant is usually varies from person to person and from institution to institution. Similarly, no consensus exists as to what a youth is. The age boundaries of this group are quite flexible and have changed throughout human history. However, in contemporary America and Europe, the period between 15 and 30 years of age may be seen as the crucial period in determining integration into the labor market.

This thesis is centered around certain key aspects of integration which intersect but are rarely put together under one common denominator in research frameworks: immigrant youth, the involvement of the receiving society, integration policies, the labor market, and, finally, transatlantic comparative research from European and American perspectives in all four of these fields.

The focus on integration places the thesis in the rapidly developing context of migration and integration studies in the US and, recently, in the EU – since the 1990s.⁵ Furthermore, narrowing down the study to its second crucial aspect, namely to the importance of managing immigrant youth integration, is considered of invaluable importance for academic and practical purposes. Immigrant youth are perceived as an underprivileged group, both in research and integration measures in practice.

Nevertheless, immigrant youth are not the focal point of the analysis, but the integration policies and measures on the part of those who welcome them, namely the receiving society. The need for this shift of perspective in integration research from immigrant groups to the host society has already been recognized in academia in view of new, changing migration flows and the formation of “super diversity” in metropolises. Accordingly, immigrants cannot be so easily grouped into single ethnic categories in one location

⁴ United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). (n.d.). Glossary of Migration Related Terms.

⁵ Penninx, R. (2008). Migration and the City: Local Citizenship and Integration Policies. In M. L. Fonseca (Ed.), *Cities in Movement: Migrants and Urban Change* (pp. 225-240). Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Geográficos, University of Lisbon.

nowadays.⁶ Therefore, the study seeks to investigate integration policies and measures for all young immigrants, regardless of their ethnic roots.

However, it is beyond the scope of this research to take into consideration all aspects of integration processes targeting immigrant youth. The focus of integration measures is on the preliminary stage, when immigrants are making their way to independence: integrating into the workforce, which is considered an indispensable step toward self-sufficiency and participation in the structure of the society.

Finally, the research is carried out against the background of the emerging comparative transatlantic research in the field of immigrant integration, bridging the gap between two continents which are very attractive for immigrants: America and Europe. The exchange of integration measures and techniques and their implementation both in research and practice in different integration traditions are the fifth aspect of the study.

The analysis of the interplay of five pieces of the conceptual framework should provide the reader with the answers to the following questions:

- 1) What factors influence the development of local labor market integration initiatives for helping young immigrants enter the labor market?
- 2) How do these factors enable the receiving society to tap into the potential of young immigrants?
- 3) Can the exchange of integration policy research and of practical experience with integration management between the United States and the European Union be of use?

1.3 Organization of the Study

Following the Introduction, chapter 2 familiarizes the reader with the first task of this dissertation: the theoretical framework for researching and managing the integration of immigrant youth. This framework incorporates the following key aspects: 1) the concept of integration; 2) understanding integration through the lens of integration into the labor market; 3) the role of integration policies and primary stakeholders in immigrant integration on the part of the host society; 4) the reason for focusing on integration measures for immigrant youth. Finally, the chapter provides the rationale for the study of Affirmative Integration Management, as well as the role of good practice exchanges in both integration theory and practice.

Chapter 3 presents the rationale, design, and methods of the transatlantic study against the background of existing and newly-developing models of transatlantic cooperation

⁶ Vertovec, S. (2006). *The Emergence of Superdiversity in Britain*. Center on Migration, Policy and Society, Working Paper 25. Oxford: COMPAS, University of Oxford.

within the field of integration policies. It explains the process of selecting the case studies and the research methodology, and introduces the research guidelines. The main points of investigation are presented in the criteria catalog of measures for the labor market integration of immigrant youth. Finally, the empirical research guidelines for the interview questions are summarized.

In chapters 4 and 5, the focus shifts towards empirical research, examining whether and how the theory presented thus far functions in praxis. Chapter 4 focuses on top-down contexts for local integration management. Various levels of governance which influence local integration policies and integration practices in the case studies are analyzed. For Munich and Warsaw, both the EU as well as the German and Polish integration frameworks, respectively, are presented. With regard to Phoenix and San Diego, both the US federal and the state policies of Arizona and California are examined.

The analysis of the national and regional contexts for the cities is guided by seven points of investigation with reference to the countries and states in focus: historical insights into immigration in the post-Second World War period; the scale of immigration accompanied by available statistical data; political and public discourse on migration and integration; national integration policies; and national immigration policies concerning citizenship, education, and the labor market, which have an impact on the integration challenges immigrant youth face.

Chapter 5 presents local integration frameworks and practical efforts toward immigrant integration in city case studies focusing on San Diego, Phoenix, Munich, and Warsaw. Firstly, the cities are briefly examined from a comparative perspective, with regard to their current status and as gateways to integration for both young immigrants, and as receiving societies. Secondly, the integration work of local organizations is analyzed separately for each local case study in the context of top-down national and state policies and the cities' own modes of integration. The following issues, which focus on the labor market integration of immigrant youth, are discussed in each case study in relation to the top-down integration policies and the local integration context: the perception of immigrant integration in the organizations interviewed; local integration challenges for immigrant youth; integration programs offered by immigration and youth service providers; the ways the organizations reach out to immigrants and the local society; methods of network-building for governmental and non-governmental organizations working on immigrant integration in the city.

Chapter 6 presents the conclusions based on the analysis of local institutions' measures for integrating immigrant youth into the labor market in different contexts and a discussion of the research questions. It also elaborates on the limitations of the research,

introduces prospects for further study, and finally proposes recommendations for integration work for immigrant youth and transatlantic research on immigrant integration.

1.4 Research Context Setting

In empirical research on integration, nothing is more important than understanding the local context in which individual immigrants land. The same is true for the research context. The time-frame of the field visits, the world economic situation, and the atmosphere around the subject of integration heavily impacted the process of scientific inquiry and the writing of this dissertation.

As already noted, and something that will often recur throughout the next pages, the subject of immigrant integration became very topical and contentious on both sides of the Atlantic as the empirical research was being conducted, in Poland, Germany, and the United States, between November 2007 and April 2009. Following the September 11th terrorist attacks, many countries began to rethink who is welcome and who is not. Moreover, as an economic and financial crisis had engulfed the world, this was also a time of rethinking who is profitable and who is not. Given these contexts, migration and integration turned out to be a very touchy issue both in academia and politics. During my research and the process of writing, I had to confront challenges arising from an overwhelming flow of new information. Breaking news on integration and immigration, which arrived regularly in my email box from migration institutes and organizations I had interviewed in the United States, Germany, and Poland, was both intriguing and distracting. In fact, trying to keep up to date with the latest developments in the topic of my research on both sides of the Atlantic seems almost as challenging as compiling research findings and the analyses of personal experiences deriving from my transatlantic field work into a single dissertation project. The hope is that this endeavor, which has resulted in the piece of work the reader is now holding in her or his hands, will prove useful for both migration researchers and integration practitioners and inspiring to anyone who has never thought about the challenges immigrant youth may face in dealing with “the new system.”

2 Researching and Managing Integration

Immigrant integration research should by no means serve only one purpose: either as a sole report on the situation of immigrant integration in a given context or simply as a theoretical but abstract debate on the concept of integration, without any reference to integration practices. An ambitious aim of integration research is to accomplish both tasks by combining practices which are sometimes isolated, bringing together various perspectives and constructing new theoretical approaches to integration in order to produce the best applicable solutions to the challenges of integration. The fragmentation and lack of a variety of perspectives in migration and integration research have already been noted by many researchers, for example the Economic and Social Research Council, and will be addressed in chapter 3.⁷

This chapter will introduce the reader to the first task of this dissertation: the theoretical framework for researching and managing the integration of immigrant youth. This framework encompasses the following key aspects: 1) the concept of integration; 2) understanding integration through the prism of integration into the labor market; 3) the role of integration policies and primary stakeholders in immigrant integration on the part of the host society; 4) the reason for focusing on integration measures for immigrant youth. Finally, the chapter will provide the rationale for the study in the thesis of Affirmative Integration Management, and the role of good practice exchanges in both integration theory and practice.

2.1 Immigrant Integration as a Concept and Process

Although integration is a very individual, autonomous and complex process, the examination and discussions of potential patterns may help to better manage immigrant inclusion into the structure of the host society. Generating categories and forming a conceptual framework become helpful tools in facing certain immigrant integration management challenges, presented in the research questions.⁸ As Richard D. Alba and Victor Nee elaborate on the meaning of any theory: “The test of a theory lies in the power of its application to empirical reality, in the reach of its ability to organize and give interpretive coherence to otherwise disparate facts.”⁹ My hope is that the hypothesis and theories

⁷ Penninx, R., Spencer, D., and van Hear, N. (2008). *Migration and Integration in Europe: the State of Research*. Oxford: COMPAS, University of Oxford.

⁸ See chapter 1.

⁹ Alba, R. D. and Nee, V. (2003). *Remaking the American Mainstream. Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 36.

The empirical reality in the case of this research refers to manifold aspects of the labor market integration of young immigrants in local contexts of four cities. The challenges of this comparative framework will be developed in chapter 3.

discussed here will pass such a test. In fact, the complexity of individual integration processes might discourage integration-practitioners from even thinking of the concepts behind their work. Nevertheless, it can be argued that organizing scattered thoughts on integration research might also prove useful in practical work with immigrants.

The theoretical framework for integration to be developed and applied here situates this dissertation within the rapidly expanding fields within sociology, which conceptualize and monitor immigrant integration. This task is difficult, as views of immigrant integration are very often distorted, combined with other concepts in the social sciences, often politicized and interpreted differently by individual policy-makers. The first step in addressing these challenges is to focus on managing immigrant integration in a general framework, taking into account though not yet contextualizing the national and the local realm of the receiving society, which will be the focus of chapters 3 and 4.

Despite the complexity of the concept of integration, an attempt must be made at defining it. Following Adrian Favell's optimism in tackling controversial public issues, I fully agree that "[d]ilemmas might be a resource of social progress, [and] failure to manage will be a loss of moral social order."¹⁰ Indeed, immigrant integration contributes to the sustainability of moral social order, which in turn gives the society cohesion and unity.¹¹

In order to define the concept of immigrant integration, it is important to agree first on the meaning of the word "integration." Wolfgang Bosswick and Friedrich Heckmann provide a good summary of generally applicable interpretations of integration.¹² According to them, integration can be generally defined as "the stability of relations among parts within a system like a whole." It refers to one of three general processes, applicable to any area of study:

- forming a new structure by relating single elements to one another;
- forming interconnected wholes, including single elements or partial structures into an existing structure;
- maintaining or developing relations within a system or structure.

Each of them, although different in the interdependent relations of the new elements, aims at progress and is process-oriented.

In a sociological context, integration refers to the stability of relations among actors or groups in a given social system. How this stability can be achieved and maintained in the context of local and national immigrant integration challenges is of great importance to local practitioners and policy makers on integration.

This stability might be perceived at two levels. According to social system theories, there are two crucial concepts: the system and social integration. System integration results

¹⁰ Favell, A. (2003). *Philosophies of Integration*. Hampshire: Palgrave, p. 4.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 16.

¹² Bosswick, W. and Heckmann, F. (2006). *Integration of Migrants: Contribution of Local and Regional Authorities*. Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, p. 2.

from the cooperative functioning of institutions, organizations, and particular mechanisms: the state, the legal system, markets, corporate actors, and finance system. Social integration, on the other hand, is defined as the inclusion of an individual in a system.¹³ It could be argued that these two processes are interrelated. Effective system integration, which provides a society with both rights and constraints, is a prerequisite for social integration. The degree of social integration, in turn, promotes the development of new incentives and the system's structural development (e.g. new institutions or new legislation).

The integration of immigrants into the receiving society is the subject of the second type of integration: social integration. This integration is influenced by a number of factors dependent on system integration, among others the integration policies as a product of this system.¹⁴ Moreover, just as immigration flows fluctuate in particular societies throughout their histories, the rhetoric of immigrant integration is also constantly undergoing change. The evolution of integration is closely connected to the development of migration processes in a given time and in a given local context. Therefore, it is crucial that integration research focuses not only on a particular group of migrants but first of all on the spatial context of their integration.¹⁵ This social environment will be the subject of tests in the empirical part of this study, which will make a theoretical concept of integration more operational.

I will now present an overview of the evolution of the key concepts used, compared or contrasted in integration research.

2.1.1 The Roots of Integration Theories in American Experience

Contemporary concepts of integration, initially referred to as “assimilation” by scholars, stem from the American experience and American process of nation-building through the incorporation of immigrants since colonial times. The idea of what a settler society should look like has been continuously disputed and evolving, while simultaneously new groups of immigrants have been entering the receiving society.¹⁶ As Aristide Zolberg notes, the process of identity-formation in America followed the usual route of nation-building

¹³ Lockwood, D. (1964). Social Integration and System Integration. In G. K. Zollschan and W. Hirsch (Eds.), *Explorations in Social Change* (pp. 244-257). London: Routledge & Kegan.

¹⁴ The impact of integration policies on the integration process is discussed in later sections of this chapter.

¹⁵ O. Asselin (et al.) identify three dimensions of integration, each with their own indicators, which are crucial for the development of new strategies for integration research: 1) different levels of integration (e.g. individuals, groups, and institutions); 2) social context at local, national, and international levels; and 3) spatial dimensions (e.g. immigrants' access to urban resources and their role in the production and transformation of urban spaces). Each of these dimensions is relevant for the empirical framework of this study, presented in chapter 3.

Asselin, O., et al. (2006). Social Integration of Immigrants with Special Reference to the Local and Spatial Dimension. In R. Penninx, M. Berger, and K. Kraal (Eds.), *The Dynamics of Migration and Settlement in Europe* (pp. 133-170). Amsterdam: AUP, p. 158.

¹⁶ Alba, R. and Nee, V., op. cit., p. 18.

and national integration, “involving a crystallization of the us and a reinforcement of the boundary between ‘us’ and ‘others.’”¹⁷ This nation was first based on the common ethnic background of Anglo–Saxons but soon, after a number of conflict with Britain and with a lack of confidence in the new nation’s future, the “us” was more about a civic nation bounded by one political entity, with its own American version of the English language, although it still sought to exclude many ethnic groups. In fact, American distinctiveness, although already of importance in the late colonial period, fully blossomed in and after the separation of the colonies from Great Britain.

Americanization as a strategy to create one nation evolved over the course of the history of immigration to the US and finally culminated in a new trend in American society the Americanization movement.¹⁸ It dates back to the later period, from about 1900 to the early 1920s, when an increasing number of new immigrant groups, primarily from eastern and southern Europe, started to flood into the Promised Land. It was no longer clear who was still alien and who was already “truly American.”

The first two decades of the 20th century was a time when, after a period of welcoming immigrants, a growing number of Americans began to reconsider the importance of maintaining their old culture and began emphasizing mutual solidarity and cohesion among the homogeneous group of Americans of Anglo-Saxon origin.¹⁹ In the most radical version it took the form of Anglo-Saxon racism, and in the second half of the 20th century, instead of Americanization, the term “WASPification” (from “White Anglo-Saxon Protestant”) was coined.²⁰ WASPification signified the process of imposing on immigrants the values of the Anglo-Saxon founders, such as the Protestant work ethic, the worship of usefulness, civic-mindedness and reverence for the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.

Americanization is considered both a sociological and a political movement. As a political movement it was “a concerted policy” with an activist role for the federal government in molding the newcomers into Americans, which was part of the Progressive Era’s centralized effort to construct a modern and cohesive social order.²¹ Federal agencies such as the Bureau of Naturalization in the Department of Labor, the Bureau of Education in the Department of Interior, the Committee on Public Information, Council of National Defense

¹⁷ Zolberg, A. R. (2006). *A Nation by Design. Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 108.

¹⁸ The following section on Americanization is partially based on my article, see Ziótek, M (2007). Americanization as Globalization of Cultures? Theories and Their Relevance for Polish Cultural Identity Today. *Polish-AngloSaxon Studies*, 12-13, 105-128.

¹⁹ Thernstrom, S. (Ed.). (1980). *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 39.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

²¹ Zolberg, A. R., *op. cit.*, p. 263.

were the main actors involved. The measures of those times were as controversial as were the various approaches employed in Americanization.

Some Americans, considering their own national identity as (largely) the heritage of their British ancestors, opted for a restrictive policy to curb the influx of immigrants and invoked American nationalism. Others supported the process of Americanization by providing immigrants with various institutions and help. The purpose, as Isaac Berkson put it, was to adapt them to the new reality often by “divesting [them] of old characteristics” rather than cultivating their old ways of life.²² Naturally, the process of evolving into a full-fledged citizen of the United States was much more difficult than simply meeting the demands of the 1802 Naturalization Act (“five years of residency, loyalty to the Constitution, and the forsaking of foreign allegiance and titles.”)²³ What was crucial for developing in the newcomers a sense of belonging to a new, large collective group was first familiarizing them with this group’s culture. Such was the role among Jewish minorities of the Education Alliance, the largest Jewish organization in the country, which offer new immigrants lessons in English, literature, civics, and history, as well as industrial classes and recreation. Another noteworthy organization was the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), which came into being in the US in 1851, offering, among other things, practical educational programs set up for immigrants. These and other state and local bodies became the driving force of the Americanization campaign. Many of them joined the National Americanization Committee (NAC) during the wartime period. Its character, as the director of the organization Frances A. Kellor put it, was “half reformer, half nationalist,”²⁴ which resulted in the forced assimilation movement both in schools and in education programs. Some strict conditions were imposed on schools, such as the admission requirement of American citizenship or restrictions on the use of languages other than English.²⁵ Therefore, the very term Americanization has often had unfavorable associations with cultural antagonism toward foreign traditions and with a violation of freedom, a dear tenet of the American Constitution.

These associations have prevailed up to the present, although Americanization is currently being reinterpreted both by politicians and researchers.²⁶ Zolberg tries to find a common ground in many opposing stances, summing up the controversy surrounding the

²² Berkson, I. B. (1920). *Theories of Americanization*. New York, NY: Columbia University, p. 55.

²³ Katzman, N. Chudacoff, E., and Tuttle, P. (Eds.). (1999). *A People and a Nation* (5th ed.). Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, p. 229.

²⁴ Thernstrom, S., op. cit., p. 40.

²⁵ For a detailed account of the Americanization movement see Glazer, N. (1998). Governmental and Nongovernmental Roles in the Absorption of Immigrants in the United States. In P. H. Schuck and R. Münz, *Paths to Inclusion: The Integration of Migrants in the United States and Germany* (pp. 59-82). New York, NY: Berghahn Books.

²⁶ An interesting attempt to rehabilitate the Americanization movement has been made by Pickus, N. (2005). *True Faith and Allegiance: Immigration and American Civic Nationalism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

For more on today’s view of Americanization in the US see subchapter 4.1 on the US and its perception of integration.

Americanization movement in a mild sort of way: “However painful Americanization might be, it nevertheless constituted a genuine invitation, which ultimately held out the promise of incorporation and full membership for those who conformed.”²⁷

In contrast to Americanization understood as the suppression of immigrants and their consent to conformity, other approaches to assimilation in the United States began to emphasize not only immigrants’ adaptability but also their contribution to the formation of the new nation. Such a model of ethnic interaction, described as the “melting pot,” was popularized by Israel Zangwill, whose play *The Melting Pot* attracted large audiences in New York in 1909. It was the story of the Russian Jew David settling down in New York. The protagonist advocated the fusion of all nationalities to create a new American one. As he preached, “America is God’s Crucible, the great melting pot where all the races of Europe are melting and reforming.”²⁸

Much as the idea of the melting pot has turned out to be a utopian vision, its principle of universalism and its emphasis on newness in the developing American culture have been commented upon in many texts on the ethnic diversification from America and elsewhere. In this framework all the immigrants were supposed to become new people, and merge into one community together with the first descendents.²⁹ However theoretically, it would lead to melting away what made the immigrants unique, which was starting to be associated with conformism by melting pot’s critics.³⁰

Cultural pluralism was the next step in the search for the explanation of the complex nature of the transformation of immigrants’ identity and the generation of social cohesion between the newcomers and the host society. The roots of cultural pluralism also go back to the debates about America as a civic nation. It was a reaction to the utopian version of melting pot and to Anglo-Saxon conformity.

The concept was first used by Horace M. Kallen, a German-born Jewish-American philosopher, during a class he was teaching at Harvard around 1906 or 1907.³¹ It was

²⁷ Zolberg, A. R., op. cit., p. 264. The controversy on the American strategy of incorporation might be referred to contemporary debate about the role and necessity of integration policies (see subchapter 2.3).

²⁸ Kraut, A. H. (1982). *The Huddled Masses: The Immigrant in American Society 1880-1921*. Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, Inc, p. 146.

²⁹ The two different assimilation projects, Americanization and the melting pot, have proved utopian if one considers the maintenance of cultural distinctiveness by a number of immigration groups, such as the Jewish East Side community in New York. There, the expected full Americanization together with a complete fusion with American society have never actually happened. The discussions about the inevitability and desirability of cultural homogenization were stirred by a controversial book by critics of the melting pot: Glazer, N. and Moynihan D. P. (1963). *Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

An interesting account of worldwide approaches to America as a symbol is to be followed in: Ceaser, J. W. (1997). *Reconstructing America: The Symbol of America in Modern Thought*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

³⁰ Hollinger, D. A. (1995). Cultural Pluralism and Multiculturalism. In R. W. Fox and J. T. Kloppenberg (Eds.), *A Companion to American Thought*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, p. 163.

³¹ Ratner, S. (1984). Horace M. Kallen and Cultural Pluralism. *Modern Judaism* 4 (2), 185-200;

publicly introduced and popularized much later in Kallen's publications.³² The concept allows for hyphenated identities of immigrants and propagates the celebration of their ethnic roots. Kallen questioned America's own distinctive nationality and advanced the idea of America as "a great republic consisting of a federation or commonwealth of nationalities."³³ As he argued, an immigrant's cultural consciousness was even strengthened by the attempts of Americanization, which resulted in their dissimulation.³⁴ In Kallen's view, the harmony of different ethnic societies in one nation can only be achieved in accordance with the principles of democratic society: respect for self-realization in accordance with one's own ethnic roots, which are seen as an immigrant's spiritual assets. The development of these assets should be guaranteed by the government: "There are human capacities which it is the function of the state to liberate and to protect." Such a function on the part of the state would result in "a multiplicity in a unity."³⁵ According to Kallen, this form of unity is only possible in a democratic society "whose institutions encourage individuality in groups, in persons, in temperaments, whose program liberates these individualities and guides them into a fellowship of freedom and cooperation."³⁶ However, the real role of the government in this process was not clear. Kallen envisioned America as an ideal "orchestration of mankind" based on an idealistic tenet of Americanism: democracy. The unresolved challenge for such a vision is the question who would be the conductor of such an orchestra of many different tunes and where is the unifying force of its members.

Inspired by Kallen's cultural pluralism, his contemporary Randolph Bourne tried to answer this question and further developed the idea of the merging of cultures into a "Trans-National America." Within such an America many heterogeneous national groups would be unified in "a democratic cooperation in determining the ideals and purposes and industrial and social institutions of a country." Bourne called for a national effort to cherish the distinctiveness of transnationality, rejecting the ideals of the melting pot or homogenous Americanism. According to Bourne America should be a "cosmopolitan enterprise" of "distinct but cooperating foreign cultures." Kallen's focus on the individual's freedom to cultivate his or her own ethnic identity was shifted in Bourne's vision towards the principles of common freedom in a democratic "Beloved Community." Their cosmopolitan members were to be

p. 185.

³² The idea was first proposed in Horace M. Kallen's article "Democracy versus the Melting Pot: A Study of American Nationality," in: *The Nation*, 18, 25 Feb. 1915, pp. 190-194, 217-220. It was first publicly coined in Kallen H. M. (1970). *Culture and Democracy in the United States: Studies in the Groups Psychology of the American People*. New York, NY: Anro Press and New York Times. (Original work published in 1924.)

³³ Kallen H. M. (1915, February 25). Democracy versus the Melting Pot: A Study of American Nationality. *The Nation*, 217-220.

³⁴ Kallen H. M. (1970), op. cit., p.106.

³⁵ Ibid., pp. 115-116.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 35.

united by a national acceptance of the ideal of mutual respect and understanding.³⁷ This would be a unifying force for Kallen's orchestration of mankind.

Indeed, cultural pluralism has undergone changes and even in Kallen's later work was associated with the liberal strain of Americanization, defined as "Americanization, supporting, cultivating a cultural pluralism."³⁸

Today, Kallen's and Bourne's ideas are rejected by the advocates of multicultural society who are constantly searching for an ideal frame for maintaining cultural diversity.³⁹ In the end cultural pluralism has expanded beyond the American context and established itself as an "intellectual ancestor of contemporary multiculturalism."⁴⁰ It gave rise to multiculturalism and its "politics of recognition," which have been adopted as official policy in many western nations since 1970.⁴¹ The latter emphasizes the recognition of the cultural diversity contributed by the minority.⁴² Much as the idea of multiculturalism has been extensively discussed both in politics and research, of the many controversies there is one important unresolved challenge in the multiculturalists' framework for immigrant integration into the host society. As Alba correctly notes, the assumed parity of cultures is difficult to achieve in the mainstream society, as there are asymmetrical expectations: members of a majority culture impose many requirements upon the minority (e.g. to be successful they must be bicultural) whereas no expectations are put on the majority.⁴³

Although cultural pluralism is seen as an early-twentieth-century version of a multicultural United States,⁴⁴ the concepts of dual identities and hyphenated nature of

³⁷ Bourne, R. (1916). *Trans-National America*. *Atlantic Monthly*, 188, 86-97.

³⁸ Thernstrom, S., *op. cit.*, p. 50.

³⁹ Hollinger, D. A. (1995). *Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism*. New York, NY: Basic Books, p. 12.

⁴⁰ Alba, R. D., and Nee, V., *op. cit.*, p. 26.

⁴¹ Taylor, Ch. (1992). *Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition"*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

⁴² These ideas resemble those of the advocates of cultural pluralists from the turn of the 20th century. Cultural pluralism, however, is to be seen as an ideological alternative to the melting pot ideal and the Americanization movement and is strongly Eurocentric. Multiculturalism, in turn, is more a policy-driven approach referring primarily to cultural diversity in educational institutions and political and economic inequalities among ethnic groups outside Europe. For more see:

- Alba, R. D. and Nee, V., *op. cit.*, p. 141.

- Hollinger, D. A. (1995). *Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism*. New York, NY: Basic Books, p. 164.

⁴³ Alba, R. D. (1998). Assimilation, Exclusion, or Neither? Models of the Incorporation of Immigrant Groups in the US. In P. H. Schuck and R. Münz (Eds.), *Paths to Inclusion: The Integration of Migrants in the United States and Germany* (pp. 1-31). New York, NY: Berghahn Books, p. 18.

The need for such parity will be emphasized in the proposed theory of immigrant integration as a multi-level process, for more see subchapter 2.5.

For more on the idea of multiculturalism see:

- Schlesinger, M. (1998). *The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society*. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company;

- Klymicka, W. (1995). *Multicultural Citizenship*. Oxford: Oxford University Press;

- Glazer, N. (1997). *We Are All Multiculturalists Now*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press;

- Parekh, B. (2000). *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

⁴⁴ Alba, R. D., *op. cit.*, p. 17.

immigrants have a strong influence on the integration theories which are applicable to a context outside the US as well. Similarly, the aforementioned Americanization movement and the melting pot ideal are fundamentals for integration research examining other democratic states, even though they appear in throughout the literature on the US rather than on other countries. Consequently, the contemporary reinterpretations of these four core ideas: Americanization, the melting pot, cultural pluralism, and multiculturalism, such as David A. Hollinger's "post-ethnicity" or Noah Pickus' "new civic nationalism" might be more universal for research on regions outside the US than expected.⁴⁵ Roger Waldinger points out the relevance of American concepts for international research as follows: "As international migration is an exception to the system by which states bind mutually exclusively populations, the fundamental dilemmas it produces are experienced by the residents of all the rich democracies, not just by Americans."⁴⁶ By the same token, American assimilation theories, as scientific interpretations of the aforementioned four concepts which are crucial for American nation-building, may be considered first drafts of contemporary integration theories.

2.1.2 Assimilation Theory

The first scientifically-oriented assimilation theory can be traced to the 1920s, in the Chicago School of Sociology, with Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess. They based their concepts on the close observation of the urban environment around them.⁴⁷ Their early definition of assimilation referred to "a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons and groups and by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them into a common cultural life."⁴⁸ Soon, Park became a pioneer of "race relations cycle theory," which claims that relations between migrants and non-migrants go through the sequence of contact, competition, accommodation and eventually assimilation.⁴⁹ In contrast to what is

⁴⁵ Pickus, N., op. cit., p. 160.

Hollinger, D. A. (1995). *Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism*. New York, NY: Basic Books. Pickus revised the theory of Americanization as a form of civic nationalism: "a conception of citizenship which can engage citizens in negotiating multiple identities and institutional relations, while emphasizing a sense of attachment to a broader whole that integrates those commitments." David Hollinger, in his vision of "Postethnic America," proposed cosmopolitanism as a reinterpretation of the multiculturalists' ideology, allowing for a shift in ethnic boundaries and multiple identities with recognition of the value of one American national culture. Postethnicity gives individuals freedom of choice regarding their identities, not confining them to any ascribed ethno-racial groups. These ideas will be further developed in reference to the US and EU member states in chapter 4.

⁴⁶ Waldinger, R. (2007). Transforming Foreigners into Americans. In M. Waters and R. Ueda, (Eds.), *The New Americans*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 139.

⁴⁷ Asselin, O., et al., op. cit., p. 134.

⁴⁸ Park, R. E. and Burgess E. W. (1921 reprint 1969). *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, Chicago University of Chicago Press, p. 735. Quoted in R. D. Alba and V. Nee, op. cit., p. 19.

⁴⁹ Park, R. E. (1950). *Race and Culture*. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.

often believed, these first concepts of assimilation theory should be understood as a two-way process of interaction between newcomers and the residing inhabitants, living in “cultural solidarity”⁵⁰ without eradication of immigrant ethnic culture.

William L. Warner and Leo Srole introduced the familiar concept of assimilation as a one-sided process, as a “straight-line assimilation theory,” according to which all immigrant groups would inevitably evolve toward the American way of life at their own pace.⁵¹

Furthermore, a multitude of concepts and theories about assimilation were synthesized by Milton Gordon in *Assimilation in American Life*, in which he introduced a multidimensional index of assimilation variables: cultural, structural, marital, identificational, attitude receptional, behavior receptional, and civic. Acculturation, a one-way process of adopting the unchanged core culture, was supposed to be a prerequisite for further structural assimilation, that is for an entry into the socio-economic mainstream. In Gordon’s framework only the latter would lead to other dimensions of assimilation.⁵²

A radical version of a one-sided assimilation model triggered many hostile reactions. Tamotsu Shibutani and Kian Kwan argued that the success of structural assimilation is largely influenced by categorization of human beings, which results in the creation of social distance. Referring to the Chicago School of Sociology, they claimed that the boundary between ethnic groups mostly stems from competition for resources and symbolic domination.⁵³

Another skeptical reaction to straight-line assimilation was raised by Herbert Gans in his bumpy line theory. According to Gans, assimilation may not turn out to be such a smooth process and may result in either upward or downward mobility.⁵⁴ Similar doubts can be found in the notion of “segmented assimilation,” introduced by Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou, who argue that immigrants are incorporated in different strata of the host society, either moving into the middle class or into a disadvantaged social strata.⁵⁵

Currently, there is a tendency among scholars towards recovering the original concept of assimilation. Relating to the significance of social boundaries, Alba and Nee remake the concept of assimilation through the notion of an “assimilatory boundary change.”⁵⁶ The latter implies narrowing social distances between immigrants and the

⁵⁰ Ibid., quoted in O. Asselin, et al., op. cit., p. 134.

⁵¹ Warner, W. L. and Srole L. (1945). *The Social Systems and American Ethnic Groups*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p. 292.

⁵² Gordon, M. M. (1964). *Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

⁵³ Shibutani, T. and Kwan K. (1965). *Ethnic Stratification: A Comparative Approach*. New York, NY: Macmillan Company. Quoted in R. D. Alba and V. Nee, op. cit., p. 32.

⁵⁴ Gans, H. (1992). Comment: Ethnic Invention and Acculturation. A Bumpy Line Approach. *Journal of American Ethnic History* 12, 42-52.

⁵⁵ Portes, A. and Zhou M. (1993). The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 530 (1), 74–96.

⁵⁶ Alba, R. D. and Nee, V., op. cit., p. 286.

receiving society, described as the “attenuation of distinctions based on ethnic origin.”⁵⁷ Assimilation is reinterpreted as a two-sided process, as “members of the minority must seek entry into social contexts occupied by majority group: and members of the majority must find their entrance acceptable.”⁵⁸ This marks a return to the first two-way concept of the assimilation theory, developed by Park and Burgess, with some innovations. The new assimilation theory allows for alternative patterns of incorporation: assimilation is not inevitable nor is it irreversible. Assimilation depends on many factors such as individual choices, the collective actions of ethnic groups, and institutional mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement of assimilation. Therefore, in this “remade” assimilation theory great emphasis is placed on interdependencies among the individual, social groups and the system.

The rhetoric of integration and assimilation is influenced to a great extent by the historical context of migration movements in a given time and place. Accordingly, a European perspective must be different from an American one.⁵⁹

With the rise of the importance of the nation state and citizenship in the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Europe, policies of assimilation were associated with cultural suppression, forcing minorities to adapt to the mainstream. Assimilation became a taboo concept after World War II, as a reaction to the extremist nationalism and the expulsion of minorities.⁶⁰ Many researchers and policy-makers nowadays seem to stick to the concept of integration rather than assimilation. The word “integration” is more politically correct and does not have bad connotations. In the US on the other hand, the society is more used to the idea of building one nation out of many cultures, due to “a progressive shrinking of socially relevant differences between groups.”⁶¹ Therefore, the concept of assimilation is not as loaded as it is in Europe, where it is highly politicized and associated with the enforcement of constraints and limitations on immigrants.⁶²

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 39.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 286.

⁵⁹ The use of the notion of Europe or European might be confusing, as it has many diverse intellectual, cultural, and political interpretations. Research on “Europe” might be biased and reductive, overlooking the diversity of countries within the continent of Europe, especially in the comparative America – Europe discourse. However, some argue that it is legitimate to consider the common political and cultural make-up of Europe, taking two important factors into consideration: 1) the long history of European nation states characterized by common events on the continent and 2) the current trend towards increased unity in Europe within the structure of the European Union (especially since the fall of the Iron Curtain and the collapse of the Eastern Bloc of Communist states). At the same time, it is important to be aware of the national peculiarities of the EU member states, which determine their different approaches to official EU politics and recommendations. This dissertation follows these assumptions and provides more insights into the EU integration framework and the different Polish and German experiences with migration and integration in chapter 4.

⁶⁰ Bosswick, W. and Heckmann, F., op. cit., p. 4.

⁶¹ Asselin, O., et al., op. cit., p. 136.

⁶² The current use of the term of “integration” instead of “assimilation” in policy-making in Europe might in some cases represent a cover for strict policies to curb cultural diversity, which is thought to pose a

However, a new interpretation of assimilation theories has also been traced in Europe, though perhaps to a lesser extent than in the US. More researchers refer to integration as assimilation nowadays, signaling the need for reconceptualizing the implications of assimilation in light of a new trend towards transnationalism.⁶³ These two processes of assimilation and transnationalism can in fact be viewed as complimentary. In face of growing transnational connections Michael Bommès provides an interesting interpretation of assimilation as a unifying process for all individuals, irrespective of their ethnic background. According to Bommès, assimilation is a general necessity for all individuals who want to succeed in modern society, not merely immigrants. By the same token, transnationalism with cultural plurality and assimilation is not contradictory. Whoever wants to gain access to society has to fulfill “the bundles of social expectations” about the given roles they take in the society. Therefore, the issue of immigrant assimilation corresponds to more or less favorable conditions of participation in social systems.⁶⁴ Assimilation is still perceived as a change process both for immigrants, assimilating to the expectations linked to their new roles, and the social systems, transformed by the immigrants themselves. “They [immigrants] not only do conform to these expectations, but they develop corresponding expectations’ expectations.”⁶⁵ Again, the commonly accepted perception would be that the host society should be willing to undergo change in order to guarantee social cohesion. Such an approach corresponds to Alba’s vision of assimilation as “assimilatory boundary change.”⁶⁶

There are some more points of convergence in theories and trends in research on assimilation in America and in Europe. As Nee and Alba rightly point out:

The theoretical framework [of American concepts of assimilation] can be extended to global cities elsewhere by taking into account the differing institutional contexts, especially with respect to cultural beliefs and the informal and formal rules governing citizenship. The theory of assimilation turns on distal causes stemming from the institutional mechanisms of monitoring and enforcement that structure incentives in the institutional environment.⁶⁷

danger to the cohesion of European society. For more on such political symbolism see later sections of this chapter and Asselin, O., et al., op. cit., pp. 136-137.

⁶³ For example see:

- Morawska, E. (2002). Immigrant Transnationalism and Assimilation: A Variety of Combinations and the Analytic Strategy it Suggests. In E. Morawska, and Ch. Joppke, (Eds.), *Toward Assimilation and Citizenship in Liberal Nation-States* (133 -176). London: Palgrave Macmillan;

- Bommès, M. (2005). Transnationalism or Assimilation? *Journal of Social Science Education* 1;

- Esser, H. (2004). Welche Alternativen zur ‘Assimilation’ gibt es eigentlich? *IMIS-Beiträge*, 23, 41 - 60.

⁶⁴ Bommès, M., (2005), op. cit.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Alba, R. D. and Nee, V., op. cit., p. 286.

⁶⁷ Nee, V. and Alba R. (2009). *Assimilation as Rational Action. The CSES Working Paper Series, Paper 46*. Ithaca, NY: Center for the Study of Economy and Society.

With regard to possible synergies among transatlantic perspectives on assimilation, one should take into account national and local differences, although the theoretical frameworks seem to have very much in common on both sides of the Atlantic.

2.1.3 From Assimilation to Integration

In a number of interpretations of assimilation throughout the rather short history of its rapid development presented above, there seem to be a number of overlaps with the concept of integration.⁶⁸ Although it seems quite impossible to set the boundaries between contemporary concepts of assimilation and integration, the conceptual framework for the process of integration proposed here attempts to clarify the relation of assimilation to integration.

First, it should be stressed that there are some problems and ongoing debates in theories of immigrant integration among past and contemporary scholars. One of issue is a constant imprecision in the use of different terms for integration. Although the concept of integration is relatively new, there have been other widely-used alternatives, such as assimilation, acculturation, or inclusion. They have paved the way for current integration research. Nevertheless, they have often been used interchangeably or confused with integration. In researchers' dialogues with practitioners, such scientific concepts might acquire normative connotations, making it difficult for scientists to use them in communication with a broader audience.⁶⁹ Some of these terms, like "assimilation" in Europe, have negative associations, so they are quickly replaced by terms which are less ideologically loaded.⁷⁰

The strategy among scholars and/or policy-makers for using terms associated with immigrants entering the receiving society seems to be rather unclear and is apparently influenced by the local political climate and debates on the subject of immigration. As a result, if one term is not politically correct, an alternative is used, putting many concepts under one umbrella, and letting others decide where the boundaries between the concepts are located. Such an approach complicates the task of drawing the lines between theories of assimilation and integration.

I will here draw on the concept of integration developed by German scholars Friedrich Heckmann and Hertmut Esser, who categorize the dimensions and stages of immigrant integration in a structured and comprehensible way. Comparing the frameworks of the two illustrates how closely related the concepts of assimilation and integration remain.

⁶⁸ For more on the "old problem" of differentiating between integration and assimilation, see Esser, H. (2004), *op. cit.*

⁶⁹ Penninx, R., Spencer, D., and van Hear, N. (2008), *op. cit.*, p. 9.

⁷⁰ For example, avoiding the term assimilation and using integration instead. Bosswick, W. and Heckmann, F., *op. cit.*, p. 6.

As mentioned previously, following Lockwood's framework, immigrant integration pertains to social integration, meaning the inclusion of immigrants as individual actors in existing social structures of the host country.⁷¹ According to Esser, the latter involves both the host society and ethnic communities.⁷² Immigrant integration is considered "a multilevel and multidimensional process" with different dimensions.⁷³ Reinterpreting Gordon's assimilation theory, Esser proposes four basic forms of social interaction and integration into the existing social structure across four dimensions: acculturation, placement, interaction, and identification.⁷⁴ Heckmann, alternatively, labels them cultural, structural, interactive, and identificational integration.⁷⁵

These four categories are discussed here in more detail:

- a) Acculturation (cultural integration) is the process by which an individual acquires the knowledge, cultural standards, and competencies needed to interact successfully in a society. This stage is a prerequisite for any other form of integration. Language acquisition plays a key role in this process. Acculturation does not require that the immigrant abandon cultural practices. In contrast, immigrants may profit, ideally, from their ethnic cultures, using their biculturalism as an asset in the host society.
- b) Placement (structural integration) relates to obtaining a position in society by acquiring an access to full legal rights, education, the labor market, and public institutions. One may also call it socio-economic integration in the educational or economic systems.⁷⁶ Placement also implies the acquisition of rights associated with particular positions and the opportunity to establish social relations. Integration into the labor market is a crucial part of this process.
- c) Interaction (interactive integration) is the formation of relationships and communication networks by individuals who share a common orientation, resulting in membership in social groups within the host society. This integration can be in the form of friendships, relationships, marriages, voluntary activities,

⁷¹ Heckmann, F. and Schnapper, D. (Eds.). (2003). *The Integration of Immigrants in European Societies. National Differences and Trends of Convergence*. Stuttgart: Lucius und Lucius, p. 10.

⁷² Esser, H. (2004), op. cit.

⁷³ Asselin, O., et al., op. cit., p. 138.

⁷⁴ Esser, H. (2000). *Soziologie. Spezielle Grundlagen. Band 2: Die Konstruktion der Gesellschaft*. Frankfurt-New York, NY: Campus.

⁷⁵ Bosswick, W. and Heckmann, F., op. cit., p. 10.

⁷⁶ Entzinger, H. and Biezeveld, R. (2003). *Benchmarking in Immigrant Integration*. Rotterdam: European Research Center on Migration and Ethnic Relations (ERCOMER). Similar to Alba's and Nee's definition of socio-economic assimilation as a minority participations in socio-economic institutions (e.g. on labor market and in education) Alba, R. D., and Nee, V., op. cit., p. 28.

or more generally in memberships within social groups. This process of integration may of course be extended to other locations and, unlike acculturation and placement, is not bounded by the local context of the immigrant's residence.

- d) Identification (identificational integration) refers to the development of an individual's emotional bonds and sense of belonging to a local community or country and involves immigrants forming their own perceptions of how they see themselves as part of the receiving society. This form of integration takes place at a very subjective level of the immigrant's self-identification and is not considered a condition for other dimensions of integration. Accordingly, one may participate in a core social structure without identifying oneself with the host society.

It should be noted that Heckmann's dimensions of integration – cultural, structural, interactive, and identificational – have a narrower focus and refer to integration into the host society. Esser's terminology, on the other hand, encompasses integration both into the host society and ethnic/immigrant communities. Esser places the concept of assimilation in the framework of social integration. Within this framework, he distinguishes "individual assimilation" putting it on a par with individual integration into the host society but not with the ethnic community. Individual assimilation can occur within the aforementioned four dimensions: acculturation, placement, interaction, and identification.⁷⁷ However, the following alternatives to such complete assimilation are possible (see table 1):

Table 1 Assimilation in Esser's Framework for Social Integration into the Host Society and into an Ethnic Group⁷⁸

		Social integration into the host society	
		YES	NO
Social integration into ethnic group	YES	multiple inclusion	individual segmentation
	NO	individual assimilation	marginality

- a) marginality as the failure of integrating either within the host society or the ethnic community,
- b) individual segmentation as integration only with ethnic community, or
- c) multiple inclusion as integration in both social systems (e.g. bilingualism).

⁷⁷ Resulting in cultural, structural, interactive and identificational assimilation, respectively.

⁷⁸ My translation from German into English from Esser, H. (2004) op. cit., p. 47.

It might be assumed that complete social integration into the host society takes place only in the form of individual assimilation.

These detailed differentiations between levels of integration into ethnic communities and the host society are considered a bit too confusing for the purposes of this thesis. Since the scope of the empirical research in this work is more oriented toward the host-society, throughout the dissertation the concept of immigrant integration will be used with reference to a given host society only, without reference to existing ethnic communities. Moreover, it is crucial to keep in mind that Heckmann's understanding of social integration into the host society adopted in this research corresponds to Esser's individual assimilation.

Esser's and Heckmann's frameworks address integration in a very structured way and seem to be the most transparent ones for application in research.⁷⁹ However, in using any framework, one runs the risk of oversimplifying individuals' integration process in different contexts. It is important to be aware of these limitations during any empirical study. In fact, the confusion over integration extends beyond theoretical concepts and terminology to application of the theories in practice at the national and local level, which will be explored in later chapters.

There is an ongoing debate on whether integration should be viewed as a one-way or two-way process, in other words whether a prerequisite for successful integration involves adaptability on the part of immigrants only or of the host community as well. The need for a contribution on the part of the local community toward the process of immigrant integration remains a very thorny issue. Opinions vary according to different political agendas and the pro- or anti-immigration moods in different local contexts.

I consider integration an interactive, two-way process between immigrants and the host society. Therefore, not only are immigrants expected to change, but the receiving society also has to be willing to absorb some new trends and to transform itself as well. At the institutional level it means being open to dealing with the challenges of immigrant integration and granting immigrants the same opportunities as other residents.

Integration should be also seen as a long-term process. The question arises then whether reaching the end-stage is feasible. Theoretically, it is possible to reach the goal of complete integration within Heckmann's four dimensions of integration. Practically, however, it would be hard to measure the success of integration for a couple of reasons.

First, it is difficult to measure and monitor the integration process: the easiest and the most widely-used measurement methods among policy makers and researchers exist for structural and cultural integration (with such indicators as intermarriages, citizenship, level of

⁷⁹ Of course, German theories are influenced by a national context of migration and integration, and these theories are not widespread in American scholarship. However, I argue that transatlantic research and theories might be more complimentary than oppositional.

proficiency with the host society's language) while other process: interactive and identificational ones are much harder to calculate.

Secondly, some factors which influence the extent of immigrants' integration vary. As Wayne Cornelius notes, these include:

- a) the differing vulnerabilities and coping resources;
- b) different patterns of exposure to racial discrimination;
- c) proximity to educationally dysfunctional inner-city subcultures;
- d) changing economic conditions (e.g. the disappearance of traditional occupational mobility ladders triggered by economic restructuring);
- e) the legal and political context affecting documented and undocumented immigrants.⁸⁰

Thus individual immigrants' attributes and willingness to integrate are not solely responsible for their integration, but a network of interdependent factors also determines the outcome of integration.

Finally, what is the mainstream to which immigrants are supposed to integrate? However absurd it may sound, defining the mainstream as an unchanging and stable strata of society is quite difficult. The host society is constantly evolving and is being challenged by ever-changing trends: globalization with exposure to new ethnic influences and increased access to distant contacts, the current political and economic situation, new transnational networks, and changing concepts of race in a particular society.⁸¹ Accordingly, new pluralistic patterns of coexistence are emerging in the host society and for the immigrants: e.g. immigrants establishing ethnic enclaves or maintaining ethnic affiliations, while simultaneously participating in the core institutions of the host society.⁸² This form of transnationalism need not hamper integration and may even facilitate the building of

⁸⁰ Cornelius, W. A. (1995). Educating California's Immigrant Children in California. In R. G. Rumbaut and W. A. Cornelius. *California's Immigrant Children: Theory, Research, and Implications for Educational Policy* (pp. 1-16). La Jolla (CA): Center for US-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.

⁸¹ A dynamic process of reconstructing race constitutes an important factor influencing integration: a given skin color acquires a different meaning in different locations at different times (for example, in the US stigmatization of black-skinned immigrants has recently shifted significantly towards discrimination against brown-colored skin, especially at the US-Mexican border). The issue of the changing concept of race recurs among contemporary integration researchers, e.g.: - race as "mutable concept" interpreted as "a movable color line" in: Kasinitz P., et al. (2008). *Inheriting the City. The Children of Immigrants Come of Age*. London: Harvard University Press. p. 368;

- fluidity of racial boundaries in: Alba, R. D. and Nee, V., op. cit., p. 286;

- race as "a highly elastic concept" in: Lucassen, L., Feldman D., and Oltmer J. (2006). Immigrant Integration in Western Europe, Then and Now. In L. Lucassen, D. Feldman, and J.Oltmer (Eds.), *Paths of Integration. Migrants in Western Europe (1880-2004)* (7-26). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, p. 12.

⁸² Alba, R. D. and Nee, V., op. cit., p. 66.

international relations in the host society.⁸³ In this way, the host society is never homogenous. By the same token immigrants' biculturalism in no way prevents them from joining the "mainstream," as vividly illustrated in the case of the US. As Philip Kasinitz and others argue, children of immigrants have a unique opportunity to blend their traditional and "Americanized" ways, "keeping some elements and discarding others as they go along."⁸⁴ Although some destination countries refuse to acknowledge the fact that they are countries of immigrants, the influence of new immigrant groups and the consequent changes to the mainstream are undeniable.

Since the host society is never a uniform and coherent system, integration happens to different segments of society (with immigrants' upward or downward mobility). The phenomenon of immigrant admission into different segments of the host society refers to the aforementioned concept of "segmented assimilation."⁸⁵ However, in the interest of employing coherent terminology the concept of segmented integration will be used here instead.⁸⁶ Suarez-Orozco provides the following explanation of this phenomenon in the US:

Given their diverse origins, financial resources, and social network, immigrants gravitate to very different sectors of American society. While some are able to join integrated well-to-do neighborhoods, the majority of today's immigrants come to experience American culture from the vantage point of poor urban neighborhoods.⁸⁷

The mainstream can be understood as that part of society which takes advantage of full participation in the structures and core institutions of a society and guarantees its new members advancement and upward mobility. Therefore, the idea of joining the mainstream as a successful integration strategy does not mean joining one homogenous culture and values but this segment of society which provides opportunities for immigrants' development and their upward integration. Ideally, immigrants should gain access to these opportunities, join the mainstream, and by the same token transform it as well. Thus neither the mainstream nor integration to the mainstream are static.

In fact, as previously discussed, social integration is dependent both on the new members as well as those receiving the immigrants, dependent on the so-called "glue of the society."⁸⁸ Therefore, it is impossible to operationalize the concept of immigrant integration without making reference to a particular society. Although the theories of immigrant

⁸³ For more on the correlation between assimilation and transnationalism see Bommers, M., (2005), op. cit.

⁸⁴ Cited in Johnson, Al. and Menounos M. (October 15, 2008). Children of Immigrants Reshaping America. *TOWSON, NBC News*.

⁸⁵ Portes, A. and Zhou M., op. cit.

⁸⁶ Following Bosswick, W. and Heckmann, F., op. cit.

⁸⁷ Suárez-Orozco, C. and Suárez-Orozco M. M. (2001). *Children of Immigration*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 157.

⁸⁸ Favell, A., op. cit., p. 3.

integration presented here might seem to be abstract now, without reference to particular conditions, they will be contextualized in later chapters with case studies on managing of immigrant youth integration. Of the multitude of complex fields of integration processes, the focus for this dissertation will be on the management of integration into the labor market as the most crucial dimension for immigrant youth integration.

2.2 Labor Market Integration

“If there was enough work and money to live normally, it would be very good. Now there is nothing as you can see: no work, nothing. We would like to work normally.”⁸⁹ This comment from a refugee in Poland illustrates the underlying motives for migration and the decision to stay or leave a host country: to get a job and live a decent life. Indeed, people usually migrate in search of new opportunities, except in cases of forced migration by those who are victims of persecution, violence, and wars and seek asylum. The motivation for migration is frequently economic opportunity, faith and optimism in a better future, or strong family bonds.⁹⁰ As James Hollifield puts it: “immigrants are highly motivated individuals, whose primary objective in moving from one country to another is to find employment and improve their and their families’ standard of living and quality of life.”⁹¹ Such an optimistic approach to immigrants in the host country might be both inspiring and threatening to the local population. Therefore, immigrant integration into the labor market is of particular interest for those who wish to foster the coexistence of newcomers and the host society.

Migration itself represents an attempt at accessing social systems.⁹² In order to achieve this, immigrants have to gain an appropriate social status, adequate for their aspirations. A person’s socioeconomic position plays a significant role in status formation in a society, which can further pave the way to new opportunities.

Among other complex dimensions of the integration process, socioeconomic integration with integration into the labor market is considered the first crucial step to establishing one’s position in a society. If members of an immigrant minority and others similarly positioned have the same life chances in the pursuit of contested goods, such as desirable occupations, one can talk about the success of socio-economic integration in society.⁹³ To what extent this competition (referring to Park’s race relation cycle)⁹⁴ is successful is determined by four issues key to understanding integration processes:

⁸⁹ Ząbek, M. and Łodziński, S. (2008). *Uchodźcy w Polsce — próba spojrzenia antropologicznego* (Refugees in Poland. Attempt at Anthropological Insight). Warsaw: Polska Akcja Humanitarna, p. 324.

⁹⁰ Suárez-Orozco, C. and Suárez-Orozco, M. M. (2001), op. cit.

⁹¹ Hollifield, J. (1992). *Immigrants, Markets, and States: The Political Economy of Postwar Europe*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p.12.

⁹² Bommes, M. (1999). *Migration und nationaler Wohlfahrtsstaat. Ein differenzierungstheoretischer Entwurf*. Opladen/Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, p. 5.

⁹³ Alba, R. D. and Nee, V., op. cit., p. 28.

- a) the characteristics of immigrants;
- b) the nature of transnational networks and communities;
- c) the structure of the labor market;
- d) the opportunity structure of the receiving society.⁹⁵

Whereas the first two are not so dependent on the host society, the last two are determined by the host society's structure. Social and political institutions and organizations, which not only create legislation but lobby and are a driving force for bottom-up integration initiatives, in turn represent access to opportunities and available resources.⁹⁶

Each of the four above-mentioned determinants of socioeconomic immigrant status are conditions for structural integration outlined in chapter 1. Structural integration should open the gate for "a better life": gaining rights and status in the core institutions of the host society – in the economy and labor market, education and qualification systems, the housing system, state welfare institutions, and full political citizenship.⁹⁷ These core areas are decisive for the socioeconomic position of any immigrant in a new society. Therefore, it is necessary to devote some attention to their functioning in the field of immigrant integration. This dissertation focuses on those responsible for integrating immigrants into the local workforce.

In fact, integration research has made many attempts to rank the most important subfields of integration, summarized in the previous section of this chapter. Gordon, for instance, still using the rhetoric of assimilation with reference to our today's understanding of integration, claimed that structural assimilation would stimulate all other types of assimilation, so that once structural assimilation had taken place, all other forms of assimilation would follow.⁹⁸ However, this does not always seem to be the case. Gordon assumed that structural integration is the key to further processes of integration, but it does not automatically trigger other integration processes in different spheres of immigrants' lives. For example, immigrants can easily be integrated into an educational system yet still identify with citizens of their native land. In fact, structural integration is indispensable for helping immigrants to reach a better socio-economic status and to fulfill their immigration goals: getting new life chances, which immigrants feel they cannot achieve "at home."⁹⁹

⁹⁴ Park's theory, which conceives of the development of a sequence of contact, competition, accommodation and, in the end, assimilation, focuses in particular on the relations between immigrants and indigenous inhabitants of urban spaces.

Park, R. E. (1950), op. cit.

⁹⁵ Lucassen, L., Feldman D., and Oltmer J., op. cit., p. 9.

⁹⁶ The role of the host society's organizations and policy making will be elaborated upon in subchapter 2.3.

⁹⁷ Bosswick, W., and Heckmann, F., op. cit., p. 9.

⁹⁸ Alba, R. D. and Nee, V., op. cit., p. 24.

⁹⁹ The question arises whether their standards of living in the host country are significantly better than the ones immigrants had in their home countries and how long living without real advancement but

Moreover, one should not overemphasize the importance of the economy for social cohesion in society. Although one can agree with Esser's claim that structural assimilation is an irreplaceable core of all social integration processes, it seems less probable that for the receiving society it is the only central and important dimension of immigrant inclusion. It is difficult to entirely agree with Esser, who claims that nowadays there is only one social goal worldwide: economic profit and knowledge about technological efficiency, which pertains to immigrant integration into the labor market.¹⁰⁰ On the contrary, culture and identity of immigrants do matter to certain strata of the host society. Simply looking at Samuel Huntington's fears of the cultural clash in civilization and the alleged "Hispanic invasion of the American Nation"¹⁰¹ or the recent rise of racist anti-immigrant movements on both sides of the Atlantic to talk about important factors beyond the economy which demonstrate host societies responses to immigration.

Indeed, focusing my research on the management of structural integration on the part of the host society, I prefer not to downplay the significance of the other three fields of integration (the cultural, interactive and identificational). As Kasinitz and others emphasize in *Inheriting the City*, culture does play a very important role in immigrant integration:

Whereas traditional sociological accounts of racial and ethnic inequality tend to emphasize structural factors such as residential segregation, neighborhood isolation, low-quality schools and discrimination in the labor market, the authors break new ground by concluding that culture also matters in explaining divergent outcomes across groups.¹⁰²

Drawing conclusions from the above "ranking attempts," all dimensions of integration are interdependent and interconnected. The focus of research on structural integration of immigrants into the labor market, however, is not arbitrary and can be quickly explained.

First, when examining integration measures for immigrants, focusing on the primary steps of immigrant inclusion in the host society is logical. These are the interactions of institutions and organizations with immigrants in the fields relevant to their structural integration, like labor market, the education system, and social welfare. In fact, it is easier to conduct research on the formal points of contact of the host society with immigrants within the key institutional structures than on the cultural distance between individual members of the host society and immigrants.

constant hope for a better livelihood, which often leads to segmented integration, will keep them in the same place.

¹⁰⁰ Esser, H. (2003). *Does the New Immigration Require a New Theory of Intergenerational Integration?* Working Paper 71. Mannheim: Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung, p. 30.

¹⁰¹ Ostendorf, B. (2007). Samuel Huntington and the Mexican Threat to the American Dream. In B. Vincent, P. Rigobon, and F. Bisutti De Riz, (Eds.), *Il sogno delle Americhe: Promesse e tradimenti (The American Dream)* (pp. 273-296). Padova: Studio Editoriale Gordini.

¹⁰² Review by Van Tran, C. (2009). Remaking the USA Mainstream. *ReVista, the Harvard Review of Latin America*, 8 (29), 68-70.

Second, labor market integration as a subfield of structural integration is particularly interesting and emotional for both immigrants and the receiving society. Immigrants see their access to the labor market as key to the fulfillment of their immigration aspirations, whereas members of the receiving society feel endangered and challenged by immigrants in the battle for better wages, career and social status. This area constitutes the first step in Park's race-relation cycle in the competitive encounter with the host population.

Finally, in the face of global development and the economic crisis, immigrants have now become a major area of interest in economics. As the freedom of movement and demographic gaps between regions increases, two parallel trends in the world labor market dynamics are emerging: the decline in the demand for unskilled labor and the rising importance of human capital in the production of goods and services. Accordingly, there are two causes of migratory moves from two adverse situations:

- a) high-skilled immigrant workers have to work more flexibly across the countries;
- b) low-skilled immigrant workers are increasingly forced to move to find a safe place in their struggle to earn their living.¹⁰³

These two migratory labor forces support a dual labor market system, which divides the economy into "primary" and "secondary" sectors.¹⁰⁴ Primary jobs guarantee high salaries, good working conditions, stable employment, opportunities for advancement and equity. Jobs in the secondary market, in contrast, offer low wages, unsatisfactory working conditions, little chance of advancement and bad supervision. This dual market leads to a devaluation of the human capital which immigrants represent but which is not always recognized in the host country.¹⁰⁵

With the exception of a special group of highly-skilled immigrants, "imported" by the host countries to fill the needs of their high value-added sectors, there is no doubt that most immigrants usually find it harder to make themselves marketable. They usually end up in the secondary sector. They often lack mastery of the language of the host society, to say nothing of the human capital resources necessary for their employment. Even if immigrants possess high skills and credentials, these skills may not always be recognized or relevant to the local needs of their new residence. These workers are initially employed below their educational potential and often adjust to have to go down the career ladder, taking more and more undesirable work. In the hourglass economy with many good jobs at the top, many bad jobs at the bottom and few options in between, immigrants find it even more difficult to escape the

¹⁰³ Constant, A. and Zimmermann K. (2004). How Do Labor Migrants Fare. In A. Constant, and K. Zimmermann (Eds.), *How Labor Migrants Fare* (pp.1-13). Berlin: Springer, p. 1.

¹⁰⁴ Doeringer, P. B. and Piore M. J. (1971). *Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis*. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company.

¹⁰⁵ Kogan, I. (2004). Labor Market Careers of Immigrants in Germany and the United Kingdom. *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 4, 417-447.

degrading job positions and hope for upward mobility. The situation used to be different. As Carola Suárez-Orozco and Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco note,

At the turn of the century low skilled immigrants workers with very little formal schooling could, through floor-shop mobility, attain living wages and a comfortable lifestyle. Today' s global economy is unforgiving of those without skills and credentials.¹⁰⁶

It seems that the American socioeconomic model of advancement has become more difficult. It is hardly possible for anybody to move from the bottom of the hourglass to the top without much formal education. It is even more difficult for immigrants, who face more challenges than natives in the education systems of the host countries.

According to economic liberalism, markets should not be regulated and labor is a commodity to be bought and sold. According to these principles, immigrants are easily treated as expendable commodities that can be used according to the needs of the market. They are easier to hire and fire than citizen workers, which is also observable in the current economic crisis.¹⁰⁷ On the other hand, according to the principles of political liberalism, immigrants should be granted the same civil, political and social rights as every member of a society.

This conflict points at the so-called “liberal paradox” of rights versus markets in the host countries. In opposition to the needs of the market, nation states protect their citizens against the potential competitive working migrants, setting up restrictive immigration policies and turning their countries into “fortresses” and foreign workers into “the objects of political conflict.”¹⁰⁸ Unlike goods or capital, immigrants should acquire rights under the protection of the laws and constitutions of the liberal host states.

The liberal paradox has not been resolved, but it can be assumed that it will gradually wane with the growth of a labor international market and the expansion of civil rights for immigrants. Practically within the labor market organizations of the host societies it is necessary to recognize the reality of an unjust dual labor market. Immigrants are often doomed to failure, because of “the lack of knowledge of the ropes in their new society.”¹⁰⁹ These can be provided through appropriate integration policies and services, such as remedial educational opportunities, job training programs, and apprenticeships at the local level. These measures will be discussed in the empirical part of this study. It is worth reflecting here, however, that the opportunity structure for immigrants is influenced not only

¹⁰⁶ Suárez-Orozco, C. and Suárez-Orozco, M. M., (2001), op. cit., p. 61.

¹⁰⁷ Papademetriou, D. G. and Terrazas A. (2009). *Immigrants and the Current Economic Crisis*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

¹⁰⁸ Hollifield, J., op. cit., p. 41.

¹⁰⁹ Reitz, J. G. (1998). *Warmth of the Welcome: The Social Causes of Economic Success for Immigrants in Different Nations and Cities*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, p. 241.

by the economy but also by the institutions in the host society. This explains why the same minority groups fare differently in different locations.

The need for institutional involvement underscores the concept of integration as a two-way process, which necessitates change on the part of the receiving society and the immigrants. Logically, such an involvement on the part of the state should also bring mutual benefits of integration into the labor market to these two parties involved. The question then arises whether it pays off to accept immigrants and further invest in their training and development?

The first part of the question refers to selective immigration policies of countries, policies which aim at attracting those who are clear economic assets to the receiving society.¹¹⁰ Although immigration has proven to be economically beneficial, there is still a strong desire among the public and politicians in the industrial democracies to control immigration: border control symbolizes the essence of state sovereignty and protection of their citizens.¹¹¹ In the US and the EU countries, a broad categorization system enables better management of the admission into or exclusion from labor markets (e.g. the developed system of categories of immigrants: workers, seasonals, family members, frontier workers, or refugees assigned to an individual as the basis of the motivation for their arrival).¹¹² It is beyond the scope of this chapter to estimate the degree of usefulness of immigration policies. Suffice it to say that immigration policies both stipulate selection of immigrants with respect to human capital and determine whether and how this capital is to be utilized.¹¹³

The question arises whether it pays off to invest in those already within the boundaries of a country and a local community. Once immigrants are deliberately selected for low-skilled jobs and no permanent settlement is envisaged, they are consigned to the secondary labor market and have little chance of escaping their outsider status. As Hollifield points out, in the long run immigration makes the most positive contribution to a host society when immigrants have been offered the most favorable economic prospects under the formula of "higher is better." This is for three main reasons: immigrants who earn more pay higher taxes and in this way are less dependent on social service or unemployment compensations. Moreover, stronger and better established immigrants boost the labor market, creating more jobs. Though cheap immigrant labor can be viewed as lucrative, the benefits of keeping them in the low paid sector are short term. Within a few years they might prove to be a burden for society in terms of economic independence as well as social and political outcasts, downgraded to the social underclass.¹¹⁴

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 237.

¹¹¹ Hollifield, J., op. cit., p. 5.

¹¹² Ibid., p. 12.

¹¹³ Kogan, I., op. cit.

¹¹⁴ Hollifield, J., op. cit., pp. 13-14.

Assigning immigrants to specific sectors of the labor market determines immigrants' future status in the society. This stigmatization will be seen, in the empirical part of the research, in case studies on managing immigrant integration (e.g. like creating specific job training programs aimed only at specific categories of immigrants, for example refugees). The host society's institutions and integration policies determine whether and how immigrants are given support in the face of increasing labor market inequality. These societies are capable of providing immigrants with help, training and networks to make it into the upper half of the hourglass economy.

2.3 The Role of the Host Society and Integration Policies

Although nowadays it is often taken for granted that integration should be seen as a two-way process involving both immigrants and the host society, this does not mean that both partners are equally powerful. In fact, the outcome of the integration process cannot be expected to be uniform, since this process necessitates the interaction of two parties at different levels.¹¹⁵ The relations between these two parties vary according to different dimensions of integration. Focusing on structural integration, especially into the labor market, the integration process is influenced to a large extent by both the governmental and non-governmental frame of welcoming and supporting newcomers in a local environment. The development of this frame is, of course, determined by supranational, national, and local structures of rules and legal boundaries.

Considering how great the dependency of an individual immigrant is on these factors, the focus of the research shifts towards the more powerful partner: the host society with its institutions and integration policies. The shift in the perspective, which is usually focused on immigrants, towards the host society supports a new trend in the research emphasizing the responsibilities of the host society for immigrant integration.¹¹⁶ This approach also goes in line with IMISCOE recommendations to focus migration and integration research on multilevel governance of integration, looking at the formal distribution of competencies in the host society.¹¹⁷

The host society is a very broad category, ranging from the organized forms of a formal apparatus of governance in a host country to individual neighbors in the vicinity of immigrants' new surroundings. For the purpose of this research, the scope of the host society will be narrowed down to the representatives of its national and local governments

¹¹⁵ Penninx, R. (2003, October). Integration: The Role of Communities, Institutions, and the State. *Migration Information Source*.

¹¹⁶ Penninx, R., Spencer D., and van Hear, N. (2008). *Migration and Integration in Europe: the State of Research*. Oxford: COMPAS, University of Oxford.

¹¹⁷ IMISCOE International Migration, Integration, and Social Cohesion Research Network is a Network of Excellence uniting 23 established European research institutes and 500 researchers working on themes of international migration, integration, and social cohesion.

and other important institutions, which are stakeholders in education and labor market systems. In fact, these are the sectors of the host society with the greatest capacity for creating a welcoming or unwelcoming atmosphere for immigrant reception.

Indeed, the impact of immigration (as well as integration) is a social product shaped by institutional structures.¹¹⁸ By the same token, institutions influence the process of immigrant integration into the local labor market, providing or hindering their advancement. As Alba and Nee note, institutions “create the structure of opportunities and limitations for individuals.” As a web of interrelated norms, formal and informal, institutions represent both constraints and resources.¹¹⁹

Apart from the host society’s institutions, immigrant groups form their own religious or cultural institutions, which definitely influence the management of integration processes at the local level, although they are not the main focus of this research, which centers on the host society’s organizations.¹²⁰ It is not my intention to downplay either the individual immigrant’s stake in the integration process or the impact of immigrant institutions. Two institutional levels of immigration reception both on the part of the host society and immigration groups shape individuals’ perception of the immigrants in the receiving society. As Alba and Nee point out, “institutions structure incentives and specify the rules of legitimate social action within which individuals and organizations compete for control over resources.”¹²¹ On the other hand, institutions can also be influenced by the actions of individuals, thus contributing to institutional changes. All these bottom-up and top-down trends in the interaction between the receiving society and immigrants determine whether or not “developmentally attentive communities”¹²² and safety nets for immigrants are established in a host country’s labor market.

In fact, “a patchwork of institutions and policies” influences the outcome of integration processes.¹²³ There are formal rules which govern these relations in the form of immigration policies or immigrant policies (integration policies).¹²⁴ The first policies deal with those who want to enter the host country, whereas the second policies focus on immigrants already in

¹¹⁸ Reitz, J. G., (1998), op. cit., p. 3.

¹¹⁹ Alba, R. D. and Nee, V., op. cit., p. 36.

¹²⁰ Penninx, R. (2003, October), op. cit.

¹²¹ Alba, R. D. and Nee, V., op. cit., p. 36.

¹²² The vision of “developmentally attentive communities” describes multiple arenas of asset-building capacity, including individual-level actions by community residents in informal relationships with children and adolescents, socializing system actions and community-building actions that can be triggered directly or indirectly by the economic and governmental infrastructures of a community” in: Benson, P. L. (2007). *Developmental Assets: an Overview of Theory, Research and Practice*. In R. K. Silbereisen and R. M. Lerner (Eds.), *Approaches to Positive Youth Development* (pp. 33-58). London: SAGE.

¹²³ Delgado, M., Jones K., and Rohani M., op. cit., p. 19.

¹²⁴ The terms “immigrant policy” and “integration policy” are considered synonymous and are used interchangeably throughout the study.

the country. The question arises as to which actors and factors influence the development of these rules.

In traditional political science, policy making is narrowed down to the decision of the parliament and political administration.¹²⁵ However, since 1970s there has been a new trend in practical policy-making toward focusing on the dialogue between various actors influencing policy processes.¹²⁶ As Ulrich Beck notes, the hierarchical model of policy making

[...] is being displaced by theories that emphasize consultation, interaction, negotiation, network: in short, the interdependency and process character in the context of the responsible, affected and interested agencies and actors from the formulation of programs through the choice of measures to the forms of their enforcement. While the traditional understanding of politics proceeded with a certain naiveté from the assumption that the goals set can be reached by politics, provided the proper means are taken, politics in newer approaches is now viewed as the collaboration of different agents even contrary to formal hierarchies and across fixed responsibilities.¹²⁷

These agents involve both the private sector and the so-called “third sector,” often attributed to the concept of civil society. The latter is still elusive and indefinite, although currently widely-used with reference to this segment of society which can be differentiated from the government and business.

2.3.1 Civil Society

What is meant by the notion of civil society depends on the historical, political and geographical context. Michael Walzer points to local distinctions in conceptuals of civil society as follows:

Central and East European dissidence flourished within highly restricted versions of civil society and the first task of the new democracies created by the dissidents, so we are told, is to rebuild the networks [...] In the West by contrast, we have lived in civil society for many years without knowing it.¹²⁸

Indeed, the concept of civil society received special attention during struggles against communist and military dictatorships in Europe of the last century.¹²⁹ In communist countries,

¹²⁵ Boswell, Ch. (2005). *Knowledge Transfer and Migration Policy Making*. Geneva: International Institute for Labor Studies.

¹²⁶ Richardson, J. (1996). *Actor Based Models of National and EU Policy-Making. Discussion Paper 103*. Essex: University of Essex, Dept of Government, quoted in *ibid*.

¹²⁷ Beck, U. (1996). *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*. London: SAGE, p. 199.

¹²⁸ Walzer, M. (Ed.) (1998). *Toward a Global Civil Society*. Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, p. 7.

¹²⁹ Khilnani S. (2001). The Development of Civil Society. In S. Kaviraj and S. Khilnani (Eds.) *Civil Society, History and Possibilities* (pp. 11-32). Cambridge: University Press, p. 15.

like Poland, the predominance of most vertical social bonds were relinquished during the transition period in the nineties whereas new social groups, built on horizontal relationships, started to emerge and change the realm of social society which had been restricted up to then.¹³⁰

There are two important contexts where the idea of civil society flourishes nowadays. One is the danger of “capitalist atomization” in society, which can be counterbalanced with the revival of the associative initiatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in civil society. The other context concerns the emergence of new social movements and the simultaneous decline of old interest-based groupings. In fact, we have seen a constant increase in feminists, environmentalists, and other social activists holding strong positions on special issues, e.g. abortion, capital punishment, as well as immigration, in contrast to a decreasing popularity of old political parties, trade unions, and professional associations.¹³¹

The recent rediscovery of civil society should not obscure the historical roots of the term, which is not new and has undergone many conceptual changes in different times and in different spaces. The term civil society can be traced back to the classical era and is a direct translation of Aristotle’s *koinonia politike* and Cicero’s *societas civilis*, which meant “a community, a collection of human beings united within a legitimate political order.”¹³² The concept was widely used during the Enlightenment, when the absolutist nature of the state was disputed by thinkers such as John Locke and Thomas Hobbes. In their quite different social contract theories, both emphasized the co-existence of the state and civil society.¹³³ In their views, civil society consisted of a cluster of institutions of law-making, law-enforcing and law-abiding state.¹³⁴ The terms civil society and political society were then used interchangeably.

Civil society was considered indistinguishable from the state until the late 18th century. Hegel, who first introduced the distinction between the state and civil society, is a pivotal figure in contemporary understandings of the idea of civil society. This last emerged in capitalism, incorporating liberal individual freedoms and needs for recognition and identification between people.¹³⁵ Hegelian civil society (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*) was a realm of conflict and fragmentation, where economic interests, religious views, and affiliations were organized, expressed, and confronted. It also encompassed voluntary organizations,

¹³⁰ Gliński, P. (2001). The Civil Society in Poland. In P. Sałustowicz (Ed.), *Civil Society and Social Development* (pp. 21-50). Bern: Peter Lang, p. 28.

¹³¹ Walzer, M., op. cit., p. 2.

¹³² Khilnani, S., op. cit., p. 18.

¹³³ In the social contract theory of Thomas Hobbes the state is imperative to sustain civil society, John Locke, on the other hand, forged a social contract theory of a limited state and a powerful society.

¹³⁴ Harris, J. (2008). Development of Civil Society. In R. A. W. Rhodes, S.A. Binder, and B. A. Rockman (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions* (pp. 131-162). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

¹³⁴ Khilnani, S., op. cit.

¹³⁵ Ibid., p. 24.

described in Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right* as "the ethical root of the state."¹³⁶ Of course in this realm the possibility of conflicts and inequalities was much greater. Hegel considered the state the highest unity whose constant surveillance was indispensable for keeping moral order in society and at the same time guaranteeing democratic union.¹³⁷

Alexis de Tocqueville in *Democracy in America* extended Hegel's differentiation between state and civil society, further dividing society into three realms. First, there is the state with its parliamentary assemblies, courts, bureaucracies, police, and army. Then, there is civil society, which represents private and economic interests. Finally, there is political society with its political associations such as local government, juries, political parties and its civil associations such as churches, schools, scientific societies, and commercial organizations. Political society serves as "the independent eye of society," exercising surveillance over the state. In this way Tocqueville emphasized the importance of civilian and political associations, calling for active participation on the part of citizens in the institutions as a key to democracy.¹³⁸

These thoughts were continued and extended in Antonio Gramsci's idea of three-fold society. He differentiates among state, the economy and civil society, rejecting the Hegelian inclusion of principles of capitalist economy in the same realm as civil society.¹³⁹ This division has led further to the contemporary interpretation of civil society by Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, adopted for this research.

According to Cohen and Arato, civil society is understood as a sphere of social interaction between economy and state, in which political and economic societies are to be distinguished. Political society includes such actors as political parties, political organizations, and parliaments, whereas economic society consists of the organization of production and distribution into companies, cooperatives, consortia, and so on.¹⁴⁰ Both parts of societies arise from the structure of civil society, but they are directly involved in the decision-making processes of the state and economy, so their channels of communication are generally restricted. In consultation with other civil society organizations, public discussions between representatives of the outside structure of the formal apparatus of politics and economy are possible. In this way, the borders between Gramsci's sectors are not sealed off and both political and economic societies are mediators in these cross-sector relations.¹⁴¹

¹³⁶ Femia, J. (2001). Civil Society and the Marxist Tradition. In S. Kaviraj and S. Khilnani, *Civil Society, History and Possibilities* (pp. 131-146). Cambridge: University Press, p. 141.

¹³⁷ Walzer, M., op. cit., p.7.

¹³⁸ Tocqueville, A. [1835/1840] (1969). *Democracy in America*. New York, NY: Harper and Row. interpreted by Rowley Ch. K. (1998). On the Nature of Civil Society. *The Independent Review*, 2 (3), 401-420; p. 420.

¹³⁹ Femia, J., op. cit., p. 141.

¹⁴⁰ Cohen, J. L. and Arato A. (1994). *Civil Society and Political Theory*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, p. IX.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p. 20.

Civil society does not refer to all members of a society who are not directly connected to the state or the economy. In fact, civil society is only one dimension of the “sociological world” organized around given norms, competencies, and roles. This dimension should be understood as the institutionalized and organized structures of active socialization, associations, and communication in society. These would include, for example, NGOs, academia, and church groups, as distinct from but not in opposition to those involved in the formal apparatus of governance in the political and economic sphere. Moreover, civil society also encompasses independent but organized initiatives from below, based on self-constitution and self-mobilization, including aforementioned new social movements such as pro- or anti-immigration organizations.

The role of civil society is open-ended communication with their actors in a formalized political and economic society of state and economy sectors. This dialog is a tool for controlling and protecting civil society from false and destructive resolutions in these spheres. According to Tocqueville, without the active participation of civil society in egalitarian institutions, the democratic character of the latter would be threatened.¹⁴² The maintenance of democracy is considered the prime function of civil society, which legitimizes its activities.¹⁴³

The engagement of civil society actors in lobbyism, demonstrations, and open public debates pushes policy making into a more liberal direction, where the decision-making process is influenced by those functional and institutional structures out of apparatus. The question is what kind of channels and receptors of influence are practically possible in the field of managing immigrant integration and integration policies at a local level. Civil society organizations usually act locally, and therefore this sector of society is of particular importance for the empirical focus of this research.

2.3.2 Integration Policies

Until recently there had been some imbalance between the scopes of public debates and research about immigration versus immigrant policies in the EU and in the US. The focus on “fortress” rules: protection of borders and reining in uncontrolled migration flows had been of greater importance than the focus on contending with those who had already entered and were living in the host society. However, current trends in research are changing. Research has increasingly taken up the importance of both immigration and integration policies and their interconnectedness in the attempt to manage international migration.¹⁴⁴ As

¹⁴² Ibid., p. 19.

¹⁴³ Sałustowicz, P. (Ed.). (2001). *Civil Society and Social Development*. Bern: Peter Lang, p. 14.

¹⁴⁴ These trends are to be seen both in research in the US and in the EU e.g. in the establishment of The National Center on Immigrant Integration Policy at the Migration Policy Institute in Washington,

Rinus Penninx points out, “the lack of a consistent and transparent immigration policy is an impediment to effective integration policies. In many cases, poor integration policy has contributed to negative perceptions of immigrants, which in turn has led to the reinforcement of defensive immigration policies.”¹⁴⁵ The conflict between these policies might be due to their varying importance at the national level of governance in the host countries.¹⁴⁶

The gap between immigration and integration policies in practice can be traced back to European disillusionment with guest workers programs in the early 1970s. Swiss novelist Max Frisch’s famous expression from those times – “we asked for workers but instead human beings came” – has become a famous citation among integration researchers and practitioners.¹⁴⁷ This remark points to the short-sightedness of immigration policies unaccompanied by any integration measures. In fact, as Irena Kogan notes, once immigrants are recruited for low-skilled jobs by special programs of immigration policies, “they are segmented in the secondary labor market with hardly any chance to escape their outsider status.”¹⁴⁸ Integration policy is crucial to remove this imbalance and transform immigrants from workers to full-fledged members of the host society. There should be a cause and effect relation between the immigration policies and integration measures for those who enter a country. The question about immigration policies, “whom we shall welcome” simultaneously triggers the question about integration policies, “how we shall welcome them.”¹⁴⁹

Although this research focuses primarily on the management of immigrant integration and integration policies, it recognizes the importance of immigration policies for integration measures in the host country. Therefore, national immigration policies in reference to the labor market will be briefly outlined in the empirical chapters about particular case studies.

How is integration policy to be understood? The Urban Institute, Washington DC provides a short and compact definition, easily applicable to different national and local contexts of immigrant reception:

DC or a multitude of publications on integration policies which call for the importance of a more extensive research on integration policies: e.g.:

- Martin, S. (1999). *Becoming an American: The Integration of Immigrants in the United States*. In R. Münz and W. Seifert (Eds.), *Inclusion or Exclusion of Immigrants: Europe and the US at the Crossroads* (pp. 17-25). Berlin: Humboldt University;
- Suarez-Orozco, C. and Suarez-Orozco M. M. (2002). *Children of Immigration*. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press;
- Süssmuth, R. and Weidenfeld, W. (Eds.). (2005). *Managing Integration: The European Union’s Responsibilities towards Immigrants*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.
- Oltmer, J. (Ed.). (2006). *Historische Integrationssituationen. IMIS-Beiträge, 29*. Osnabrück: Verlag des Instituts für Migrationsforschung und Interkulturelle Studien (IMIS).

¹⁴⁵ Penninx, R. (2003, October), op. cit.

¹⁴⁶ The differences between the US, Germany and Poland will be developed in chapter 4 and chapter 5.

¹⁴⁷ Frisch, M. (1972). *Tagebuch 1966-1971*, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, p. 8.

¹⁴⁸ Kogan, I., op. cit., p. 440.

¹⁴⁹ Glazer, N. (1998), op. cit., p. 60.

Integration policy encompasses the laws, regulations, and programs that influence the integration of immigrants once they are in this country. Its range is broad, including laws and regulations that determine non-citizens' eligibility for public benefits as well as spending on programs that are targeted to immigrants.¹⁵⁰

General and special integration policies have to be distinguished. The first, also called indirect policies, are aimed at the entire population without distinguishing between.¹⁵¹ This indirect way of approaching immigrants, often called mainstreaming, is meant in part to avoid stigmatizing immigrants and to prevent negative feelings which might arise among the host population.¹⁵² Immigrants are therefore included in the same integration actions as anyone else eligible for such a service, for example unemployment benefits. Special integration policies, on the other hand, refer to measures explicitly and directly designed for immigrants. They often imply creation of new institutions or the expansion of the existing ones for the purpose of immigrant services, such as native language courses.¹⁵³

Explicit integration policies are still typically absent in most domains of integration. According to Gary Freeman's multicultural framework for understanding processes of immigrant incorporation, there are four key sets of regulatory institutions: the state, the market, welfare, and the cultural sector. Of them, usually the state and the cultural sectors have specific policies for immigrants. However, as Freeman claims, the state generally creates the same incentives for both immigrants and natives.¹⁵⁴ Whether such a statement is justifiable in reference to incentives for immigrant integration into a local labor market will be explored in the empirical part of the study with reference to several cities in different countries.

The extent to which immigrant policies are developed derives from many national specific factors. Both direct and indirect integration policies of a given country form the so-called "national mode of integration," which is determined by a specific immigration situation, a sense of nationhood, and the professed principles of social order in the countries, such as Germany's *soziale Marktwirtschaft* or France's republicanism. Quite purposefully, the inventor of the concept, Friedrich Heckmann, seeks to avoid the usage of a popular term like "national integration strategy," which is much too narrow for cross-country comparative

¹⁵⁰ Fix, M. and Passel, J. (1991). *Immigration and Immigrants: Setting the Record Straight*. Washington, DC: Urban Institute, p. 16.

¹⁵¹ Heckmann, F. (2003). From Ethnic Nation to Universalistic Immigrant Integration: Germany. In F. Heckmann and D. Schnapper (Eds.), *The Integration of Immigrants in European Societies. National Differences and Trends of Convergence* (pp. 45-78). Stuttgart: Lucius und Lucius.

¹⁵² Entzinger, H. and Biezeveld, R. op. cit.

¹⁵³ Heckmann, F. (2003), op. cit.

¹⁵⁴ Multicultural framework for understanding immigrant incorporation processes developed by Freeman, G. (2008). Immigrant Incorporation in Western Democracies. In A. Portes and J. DeWind (Eds.), *Rethinking Migration: New Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives* (pp. 122-147). New York, NY: Berghahn Books Inc.

research.¹⁵⁵ In fact, integration strategy is always specific, planned, and goal oriented, as in the National Integration Plan in Germany. However, the term “strategy” cannot be universally applied to integration measures in such countries as Poland and the US, where integration management is still in a formative phase on the political national agenda. However, it can be assumed that each country has a specific national mode of integration, regardless of the stage of its development. National modes of integration reflect similarities or differences in the status of immigrant integration in various countries, which by the same token determines the platform of comparison for specific case studies.¹⁵⁶

It should be stressed that immigrant policy-making is by no means without difficulties in the management and assessment of outcomes. The question then arises regarding the real role of integration policies and the measurement of their success. In fact, one should not overestimate the significance of integration policies for the whole process of integrating immigrants into the receiving society. According to Christian Joppke, “it is misleading to assume that something as multidimensional and complex as immigrant integration could ever be the result of a single policy [...]”¹⁵⁷ Ideally immigrant policies should promote immigrant participation in the major institutions and public services of a host society. However, in the liberal countries “it is impossible for the authorities to steer integration completely.”¹⁵⁸ Integration policies do not guarantee social cohesion between immigrants and the host society. They are only an attempt at or a tool for integration but not a guarantee that integration will be achieved.¹⁵⁹

Moreover, there are some controversies with regard to the rationale behind the development of integration policies. There is a risk that immigrant policies might turn into measures for control of immigrants, restricting rather than providing them with a wide range of opportunities. Obligatory language courses and other requirements for gaining citizenship might be examples of exercising such a power over immigrants, imposing on them conditions they are obliged to fulfill in order to get a free access to services available to the natives.¹⁶⁰

Integration and integration policies might also easily become a tool of political campaigns and political symbolism. As Favell notes, the issue can be easily directed away from technical and heavily loaded questions of political economy and welfare management,

¹⁵⁵ Heckmann, F. (2003), op. cit., p. 11.

¹⁵⁶ The national modes of integration for case studies in Germany, Poland, and the US will be presented in chapter 4.

¹⁵⁷ Joppke, Ch. (2007). Do Obligatory Civic Integration Courses for Immigrants in Western Europe Further Integration? *Focus Migration, Policy Brief 8*, Hamburg: Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI), p. 5.

¹⁵⁸ Entzinger, H. and Biezeveld, R., op. cit., p. 44.

¹⁵⁹ Michael Bommes takes a critical position towards exaggerating the significance of local integration policies in current public debates.

Bommes, M. (2008). 'Integration findet vor Ort statt' - über die Neugestaltung kommunaler Integrationspolitik. In M. Bommes, and M. Krüger-Potratz (Eds.), *Migrationsreport 2008. Fakten - Analysen – Perspektiven* (pp. 159-194). Frankfurt a.M.: Campus Verlag, p.184.

¹⁶⁰ Joppke, Ch., op. cit.; Bommes, M. (2008), op. cit.

towards more fundamental, symbolic public issues. In the rhetoric of integration, both left-wing and right-wing social movements can voice their concerns about social order and national identity so that integration can become “a good vehicle” for giving a voice to marginalized, non-elite political groups within the host society.¹⁶¹ There might be also a tendency to stigmatize immigrants by emphasizing their failure to adjust to an established social order and the need for a remedy: integration policies. This often occurs when an individual immigrant happens to be the perpetrator of a widely-publicized crime or incident (like the murder of film-maker Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam in 2004) and the blame is simultaneously shifted towards immigrant groups in general.¹⁶²

In sum, constructing integration policies is a complex process for a number of reasons. First, integration policies have to contend with complex domains of integration (structural, interactive, identificational, and cultural) and their interrelationship. Then, the goals of integration policies are largely dependent on the national mode of integration. Furthermore, the goal of integration policies might not be always clear for policy makers, who may try to use policies as measures for restricting immigrants rather than aiding in their integration. Finally, there is a complex network of factors and actors influencing the development of integration policies. As Penninx notes:

[F]ormulating the appropriate policy depends greatly on conditions at all levels, from town halls to national capitals. A long-term framework that balances the concerns of both sides may succeed; a short-sighted policy that puts politics before realities can lead to losses on all sides.¹⁶³

Indeed, one needs to refer to supranational, national, as well as local integration measures to generate a comprehensive depiction of integration policies in a single locality.

In order to find a solution to these challenges and controversies, there is a strong need to develop methods of measuring the goals and the level of success of integration policies, based on the perception of two main actors in integration: the host society and the immigrants themselves.¹⁶⁴ Much as this demand is crucial for the future development of comprehensive integration policy research, it is beyond the scope of this project on the

¹⁶¹ Favell, A., op. cit., p. 24.

¹⁶² Bommers, M. (2008), op. cit., p. 176.

¹⁶³ Penninx, R. (2003, October), op. cit.

¹⁶⁴ In order to assess integration measures, it is necessary to monitor their impact and acceptance in the host society. One such attempt was the establishment of the Advisory Board of German Foundations on Migration and Integration (Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration, SVR) in October 2008 in Berlin. Chaired by an immigration researcher, Klaus J. Bade, the task of this independent council of experts is to monitor and analyze immigration policy at the national and regional levels, taking a stand on integration and immigration issues, and recommending courses of action to be taken. With the “Integration Barometer” the plan is to regularly monitor the attitudes and moods prevailing in German society with respect to immigration and integration based on various surveys.

integration policies' outcomes on both sides of the Atlantic. However, it is taken for granted that integration policies promoting and facilitating at least the structural integration of immigrants into the host society will ease the transition of immigrant youth from childhood to adulthood. The smoother the process is, the more benefits are available for both the young immigrants who are the contributors to the receiving society and its members. Immigrant policies represent a formal and institutionalized approach to connecting these two groups. The ultimate goal for those responsible for integration policy-making should be governments and public and civil society institutions working together to create this win-win situation.

2.4 Immigrant Youth as Entrepreneurs in a New Local Context

The young seem to bring new ideas and new promise for progress. As Julio Cammarota notes, "The true blessings that all young people can bring to us are their critical perspectives and their willingness to create a world better than what the adults have given them."¹⁶⁵ However, youth energy can be wasted unless it finds a good breeding ground for its development.

Numerous factors influence the transition from childhood to adulthood. One factor is community involvement and support, which can either facilitate or hinder the process. Just as youths are challenged in their adolescence to prove their value and to get recognition, social workers, educators, and employers are faced with the challenge of not overlooking the hidden skills and potentials of youth.¹⁶⁶ It is both intriguing and challenging to work with youth and try to take part in their development. This development can be compared to the process of building a "pipeline" for youths, which leads to the successful realization of their potential. Indeed, for many young adults the attempt at discovering and cultivating their strengths or talents comes too late.

The first years after school are very crucial for the directions the lives of young immigrant adults take: who they become, how they live, and how they can contribute to the host society. These are the years when they should be establishing themselves in the local labor market. However, the crucial period starts even earlier, at school, when they make the educational decisions which will determine their life and career paths. If something goes wrong in this time it might have dramatic consequences for their future. Drop-outs will not find it easy to complete their educations, which closes the doors to many job opportunities.

¹⁶⁵ Cammarota, J. (2008). *Sueños Americanos: Barrio Youth Negotiating Social and Cultural Identities*. Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, p. 170.

¹⁶⁶ For more on the significance of youth mentoring in local contexts see Roffman, J., Suárez-Orozco, C., and Rhodes, J. (2003). Facilitating Positive Development in Immigrant Youth: The Role of Mentors and Community Organizations. In F. A. Villarruel, F. A., Perkins, D. F., Borden, L. M., and Keith, J. G. *Community Youth Development: Programs, Policy, and Practices* (pp. 90-117). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.

Who is actually considered a youth and what are young adults? The United Nations defines youths as people between the age of 15 and 24 years old.¹⁶⁷ The youth turns into an adult at some point, but it is often far above the official legal boundaries, which are usually 18 in most countries. In fact, youth overlaps with the initial stages of adulthood, so-called “adults in waiting.”¹⁶⁸ Quoting other sources, even people up to 35 years old might be considered young adults, caught in the time of “betwixt and between”¹⁶⁹ or “adulthood.”¹⁷⁰ The latter describes the prolonged period of acquiring independence, starting from adolescence even up to the age of 30, when people are still considered on the threshold to adulthood. They are still too inexperienced to achieve the milestones of adulthood: finishing school, working full time, being able to support a family, or becoming financially independent.¹⁷¹ Of course, these boundaries are quite flexible and have been changing throughout human history, but in contemporary America and Europe the time between 15 and 30 may be seen as the crucial period determining integration into the labor market.

Immigrant youth, both first and second generation, comprise a unique group among young people, interesting to researchers for a number of reasons. First, they bring with them stocks of risks, potential, and innovation both to research and the receiving society. Secondly, they are the most flexible and mobile group among other immigrants, more eager to move to new surroundings and to adapt to the new environment quickly. Finally, because of the wealth of immigration experience, they might often be marginalized and left outside the mainstream. In fact, they are often forced much earlier than others to lead lives with adult responsibilities, which creates a huge gap between them and the local youth.

Two approaches to talking about immigrant youth are possible. The first one focuses on risks associated with them, whereas the second examines their potential. Unfortunately, these two approaches do not always overlap, being either too pessimistic or too optimistic. I attempt to bring the two extremes together under one umbrella.

According to the first approach, immigrant youth face challenges of a two-fold nature, or they are “doubly underprivileged” on the path to self-realization. Their often complex transition periods from adolescence to adult life is additionally affected by their migration background and integration problems. Learning a new language, living up to the expectations of two cultures, and juggling the contrasting worlds of their family and the host society are

¹⁶⁷ United Nations, General Assembly. (1981). International Youth Year: Participation, Development, Peace. Resolution A/RES/36/28.

¹⁶⁸ Delgado, M., Jones, K., Rohani, M., op. cit., p. 167.

¹⁶⁹ Draut, T. (2007). *Strapped: why America's 20- and 30-somethings Can't Get ahead*. New York, NY: Doubleday, p. 22.

¹⁷⁰ The term coined in the Newsweek magazine by Tyre, P., Springer, K., and Scelfo, J. (2002. March 25). Bringing up Adulthood. *Newsweek*, 34.

¹⁷¹ Settersten, Jr., R. A., Furstenberg Jr., F. F., and Rumbaut, R. G. (2005). *On the Frontier of Adulthood: Theory, Research, and Public Policy*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

only some of their challenges they face in negotiating their transcultural lives.¹⁷² The crucial question is whether the immigrant youth are able to realize themselves or whether they are forced to lower their sights and adjust in any way they can to local realities.¹⁷³

The second approach to immigrant youth shifts from a less risk-driven approach to a more potential-rich one: immigrant youth are not necessarily only a challenge but also a source of power, talents, and new energy for the receiving society. In fact, such assets stem from their various migration experience. Doing research on different young immigrants, Rubén Rumbaut notes: “Although these students, primarily from Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, display wide variations by national origin in terms of their vulnerabilities and resources, broad trends have emerged, some of which challenge popular beliefs.” Rumbaut points to the noteworthy achievements of immigrants, like greater school retention, greater levels of fluency in English than in the parental language, the perception of education as an enduring value, and higher education aspirations and expectations.¹⁷⁴ This set of commonalities among different ethnic groups challenges popular perception that ethnicity shapes the integration capacity of young immigrants and that different approaches should be adopted for different nationalities.

Another interesting summary of common potentials for immigrant youth is provided by the Act For Youth Upstate Center of Excellence.¹⁷⁵ Its report elaborates on four assets of immigrant youth, which should be taken into account by organizations working with the youth:

- a) Values of the family’s culture of origin, such as the importance of the extended family, the placing of the needs of the community above individual needs, and collective decision-making;
- b) Bilingualism as an asset in an increasingly global world;¹⁷⁶
- c) Migration-related challenges, which make the youth mature faster and develop confidence and leadership skills;
- d) Balancing two cultures, which develops resiliency, flexibility, and the ability to live in multicultural communities.

¹⁷² Hoerder, D., Hebert, Y., and Schmitt I. (Eds.). (2006). *Negotiating Transcultural Lives*. Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press.

¹⁷³ Rumbaut, R. G. and Portes, A. (2001). *Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation*. Berkeley, CA and New York, NY: University of California Press and Russell Sage Foundation, p. 71.

¹⁷⁴ Rumbaut, R. G. (2002, May). *Competing Futures: The Children of America's Newest Immigrants*. *Migration Information Source*.

¹⁷⁵ Easter, M. and Refki, D. (2004) *Practice Matters: Creating Successful Programs for Immigrant Youth*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University.

¹⁷⁶ As Julio Cammarota notes about immigrant biculturalism and bilingualism referring to the Latino youth: “the use of flexibility or creativity when confronted with shaping cultural practices may be the strategy employed for advancement,” therefore preserving their Latino should not come at the cost of their immigrants’ failure, see Cammarota J., op. cit., p. 6.

Such an approach to immigrants leads to the Positive Youth Development (PYD) theory which emphasizes talents to be encouraged and developed in young people. This approach does not exclude risk-behaviors, but supposes prevention and treatment of these problems through working on youth strengths.

The field of Positive Youth Development has been developing over the last several decades resulting in various models.¹⁷⁷ The following three assumptions may be considered common to the various PYD frameworks:

- a) Focus on strengths and assets, emphasizing the skills and competencies that are needed in the transition to adulthood, rather than deficits and problems.
- b) Strengths and assets are usually acquired through positive relationships, especially with pro-social and caring adults, such as parents and family, teachers, neighbors, business owners, and mentors.
- c) The development and acquisition of youth assets occurs in multiple contexts and environments. For example, schools, workplaces, community organizations, and social programs all offer opportunities to acquire developmental resources.¹⁷⁸

The PYD model has developed as a response to the risk-focused approach. The latter has been criticized for emphasizing only what goes wrong in youth. According to its critics, such an approach aims at reducing at-risk behavior in youth, but does not guarantee the development of youth potentials and aspirations. In fact, these two approaches should be complimentary, as neither of them can fully address all the needs of youth. It is noteworthy that developing assets by no means entails ignoring the adversity youth face. The best approach to working with immigrant youth should be balanced between these two perspectives. As Peter L. Benson notes “the health and well-being of children and adolescents require as much attention to promoting developmental strengths as to directly combating risks, environmental threats, and social dysfunctions that obstruct human

¹⁷⁷ The best known PYD model is Peter L. Benson’s, promoted by the Search Institute in Minneapolis, built around forty developmental assets, i.e. individual and contextual factors which encourage youth to avoid harmful behavior and which engage them in activities that promote positive development. Benson, P. L. (2006). *All Kids Are Our Kids: What Communities Must Do to Raise Caring and Responsible Children and Adolescents*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. The other widely known PYD framework is Richard Lerner et al’s concept of the ‘five Cs’: *competence, character, connection, confidence, and caring*, to be extended in adulthood by the sixth C: *contribution*. All these assets are developed through interaction with individuals in varying contexts, such as the family, school, and the community. Lerner, R. M., Fisher, C. B., and Weinberg, R. A. (2000). Toward a Science for and of the People: Promoting Civil Society through the Application of Developmental Science. *Child Development*, 71, 11-20.

¹⁷⁸ Butts, J., Mayer, S., and Ruth, G. (2005). *Focusing Juvenile Justice on Positive Youth Development*. Issue Brief 105. Chicago, IL: Chapin Hall, p.5.

development.”¹⁷⁹ Balancing these two foci of attention for immigrant youth should guarantee success in creating an avenue for their strengths while simultaneously trying to solve the problems and deal with the risks they are exposed to.

Such an awareness is especially important for community organizations. Any service which works with immigrant youth should consider these PYD and risk-driven approaches, in order to identify positive aspects of the skills of immigrant youth as well as their ability to juggle many worlds, developed throughout their lives as immigrants. It is crucial to apply this PYD approach to young immigrants, so as to prevent, as Cornelius puts it, “the underdevelopment of the human capital that is being received through international migration.”¹⁸⁰ According to PYD theory, immigrant youth may be seen as a useful resource for researchers, the community, and the receiving country. What are the benefits for each of these groups?

For researchers, immigrant youth constitute an interesting source of knowledge on cultural negotiation and culture transfer processes. Generally, the importance of research on the culture of the youth had been neglected until 1990s.¹⁸¹ Moreover, it seems that immigrant youth have thus far received insufficient attention in integration research.¹⁸² Distinct features of the first, 1.5, and second generations of immigrants have been the focus of some research studies.¹⁸³ However, community based organizations do not typically distinguish among these groups and adjust their services based on their differences. Accordingly, these discrepancies do not fall within the scope of this research.

Little research has been done on the youth development in connection with immigrant youth.¹⁸⁴ Up to the 1970s, immigrant youth were considered “in between cultures” or “in limbo.” Now, they are a newly-emerging and promising field of research. Youth development theories can be tested in the context of the transcultural lives immigrant youth lead and their intercultural communication abilities. Moreover, the findings of PYD research on immigrant youth can appease some anti-immigrants sentiment in the host society and serve as a healthy base for consulting with community organizations attempting to create a bridge between researchers and practitioners. This brings community residents and scholars together “in the pursuit and production of knowledge” about youth development.¹⁸⁵

¹⁷⁹ Benson, P. L. (2007), op. cit., p. 53.

¹⁸⁰ Cornelius, W. A. (1995), op. cit., p. 10.

¹⁸¹ Hoerder, D., Hebert, Y., and Schmitt I. (Eds.), op. cit., p. 20.

¹⁸² Board on Children and Families. (1995). Immigrant Children and their Families: Issues for Research and Policy. *The Future of Children*, 5 (2), 72-89, quoted in Delgado, M., Jones K., and Rohani M., op. cit., p. 6.

¹⁸³ The “1.5 generation” refers to people who immigrate to a new country before or during their early teens. It should be acknowledged at this point that the different characteristics of these generations bear a significant influence on the process of their integration as evidenced by the research: Portes, A. and Zhou, M (1993), op. cit.; Rumbaut R. G, and Portes A. (2001), op. cit.; Delgado, M., et al., (2005), op. cit.; Kasinitz, P., et al., op. cit.

¹⁸⁴ Delgado, M., Jones K., and Rohani M., op. cit., p. 167.

¹⁸⁵ Benson, P. L. (2007), op. cit., p. 53.

Researchers should examine how immigrant youth have been embraced by the receiving society and whether they have been neglected not only by migration researchers but first and foremost by practitioners.

For the community, immigrant youth must be seen as a new resource of intercultural skills to tap into. "It is the young immigrant generation who cross cultural and linguistic barriers, breaking them down while absorbing the best of both worlds."¹⁸⁶ Therefore, it is in the interest of local communities and also the receiving country to take advantage of these enormous, often hidden assets. They should facilitate the transformation of immigrant youth from their traditional roles as being social outcasts to major contributors, cultural mediators, and help-providers within their respective environments.¹⁸⁷

For the nation, especially in the current period of economic crisis, the question is what immigrant youth can contribute to the society and how the receiving country can best tap into this resource. Considering the demographic downturn in western countries, native and immigrant youth will be key stakeholders for future economic and demographic development. Cheap, illegal labor recruited from among young flexible immigrants has long been alluring to employers in the receiving countries. However, the time has come at last to examine longer term perspectives and think about benefits in investing in the immigrant youth rather than overlooking their assets and forcing them to take on degrading work. Indeed they are part and parcel of the entire population of youth in the receiving country. As Melvin Delgado and Lee Staples suggest:

A nation that systematically neglects its youth must be prepared to invest considerable sums of money in remedial services and correctional supervision, both now and in the future. These resources, in turn, can better be spent as social capital investment, helping to prepare youth to assume contributing roles in society.¹⁸⁸

There is also a special niche for researchers, the local community, and the receiving country: a demand for research on and knowledge about undocumented youth, which is still a taboo and often politically incorrect on both sides of the Atlantic.¹⁸⁹ Drawing on German experience, the researcher Philip Anderson points out:

¹⁸⁶ Johnson, Al. and Menounos M, op. cit.

¹⁸⁷ Delgado, M., Jones K., and Rohani M., op. cit., p. 6.

¹⁸⁸ Delgado, M. and Staples, L. (2008). *Youth-Led Community Organizing: Theory and Action*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 3.

¹⁸⁹ The term "illegal immigrants" is commonly used to describe foreign nationals who are not able to legitimize their residence or work in the specific country. According to the ideas of researchers from Undocumented Worker Transitions Project, it is assumed here that using the term "illegal" in connection with migrants has political and societal consequences, which leads to denying the humanity or basic human rights of an immigrant and perpetuates an aura of criminality. Roskilde University and Working Lives Research Institute. (2008). *Undocumented Migration: Glossary*. Undocumented Worker Transitions Project.

The question which should be addressed is that of the actual life situation of migrants without valid papers in the large German cities and whether a more inclusive, resources-oriented policy would not be more appropriate than the defensive “fortress mentality“ which all too often dictates policy constraints.¹⁹⁰

In fact, the undocumented are part and parcel of the host society, which is often denied or overlooked both in the research on immigrants and in programs for immigrants. Undocumented immigrant youth are normally considered unintentional criminals, when the blame for their illegal status is shifted onto their undocumented parents. Sometimes, quite obviously, they are seen as part of the most vulnerable group of “the poor,” drop-outs, and socially excluded. They are not able to follow the usual path of finishing school and then finding work. Perhaps they are excluded from research on integration because of the assumption that it is not even appropriate to think about their integration.¹⁹¹

However, network-building for undocumented immigrant youth deserves particular attention. Of the many challenges in managing integration of immigrant youth network-building is the most controversial and sensitive issue among integration practitioners. This study offers a different perspective, incorporating the undocumented into the scope of research on integration. As American researchers rightly note, “undocumented populations are [not only] part of our nation economically, socially and culturally but [also] politically.”¹⁹² The extent to which both documented and undocumented immigrant youth are a target of integration measures of local administration and civil society organizations is the focus of the empirical research presented in the forthcoming chapters.

As noted above, it is important to combine positive PYD models with the prevention of problem behaviors early enough to not let the assets of immigrants go to waste. Indeed, settling and growing up in a receiving country and its local community represents a sort of investment for both sides.

Young immigrants on the brink of adulthood might be considered entrepreneurs who wish to invest their assets in their society to ensure future success. This might be the dream of any young person. However, for immigrants the system of social networks and official bureaucracy they have to navigate to make “their investment” is often strange and unfamiliar to immigrants. In order to make their dreams come true, they need lots of stamina and perseverance to cope with language challenges, social stigma, and anti-immigrant tensions in local communities. The local community and national politics can greatly influence the

¹⁹⁰ Anderson, P. (2004). Survival on the Margins – Summary of a Research Project on the Undocumented in Munich. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 5 (1), 53-76.

¹⁹¹ Such an approach is reflected in the official stance and/or policies on integration in the US, Germany or Poland, which makes the issue of integration measures for young, undocumented immigrants an extremely divisive and touchy subject.

¹⁹² This quotation refers to the large undocumented population in the US and the difficult journey they have to legalize their status. This approach, however, might be applied to any country with undocumented immigrants, irrespective of their numbers. Kasinitz, P., et. al., op. cit., p. 368.

process of transition from adolescence to adulthood or, put differently, from dreamers to entrepreneurs, building the pipeline for their assets and working together towards their successful development. Quite intentionally, I draw here on the rhetoric of entrepreneurship, pointing out the correlation between a successful life and successful labor market incorporation, which along with a satisfactory education constitute first steps to social inclusion and integration.

It is important that the transition from dreamers to entrepreneurs be available to both legal and undocumented young immigrants. The latter do not differ much from the former in their skills, assets, and aspirations. One of the undocumented students in Arizona, commenting on her aspirations and the hurdles to getting financial support to attend the college, noted: “Still, I hold on to my dreams. My dream is to overcome these obstacles, to finish high school, college and one day to become a nursing assistant.”¹⁹³ Whether legal or undocumented, these immigrants and their future are dependent on what the host society can offer them. In fact, it is within the capacity of the receiving society, its practitioners, policy-makers, and its researchers to shed some light on the dreams of immigrant youth and to help them to develop their dreams into economically viable concepts. In other words, such a task pertains to developing the system of supportive measures on integration into the labor market.

2.5 Affirmative Integration Management as a Multi-Level Process

The responsibility for immigrant integration lies on the shoulders of local authorities and other organizations where the immigrants reside. In fact, the claim that real integration always happens “at the local level” is nothing new.¹⁹⁴ The process of local integration into the mainstream might be facilitated or hindered, either by institutionalized large-scale actions or the less formal measures of grassroots groups and civil society organizations. In an attempt to balance the concerns and interests on the subject of integration in the receiving society and on the part of immigrants, cooperation among the supranational, national, and local levels towards one common goal – Affirmative Integration Management (AIM) – is vital.

Following my thesis about AIM proposed here, immigrant integration is not only seen as a two-way process (involving the receiving society and immigrants) but also as a multi-dimensional one, dependent on mutual relations between institutions in society (either obstructive or cooperative). In order to provide immigrants with good preparation for a future on the local labor market, one needs to aim toward a comprehensive policy, removing barriers between the sectors and key stakeholders. Educators, administrators, and employers should be involved in the integration strategy for immigrants, evaluating their

¹⁹³ Watterson, Y. (2008). *Documented DREAMs*, Mesa, AZ: Hispanic Institute of Social Issues, p. 48.

¹⁹⁴ Bommers, M. (2008), op. cit.

assets and potential. Such a positive approach towards integration emphasizes a true commitment to its success. AIM recognizes and addresses integration problems while at the same time focusing on the benefits immigration brings to the receiving society.

Special attention should be devoted to network-building for the integration of immigrant youth into the labor market using PYD strategies. Both direct and indirect integration policy measures should aim at ensuring equal educational opportunities for immigrant youth and development of such immigrant services as language and vocational training, job counseling, recognition of qualifications, promotion of entrepreneurship, and workplace discrimination prevention. We assume that the success of these measures will be facilitated by the national or even supranational coordination and monitoring. In fact, AIM consists of a combination of top-down and bottom-up measures, which influence social cohesion in society and should be of interest to both immigrants and the host society.

Tremendous variation exists, of course, across the US and the EU in the development of the way national and local governments network, share power, and deliver integration services.¹⁹⁵ However, the exchange of transatlantic national and local good practices might prove to be useful in generating new approaches to dealing with integration.

2.6 Good Practice Exchange and its Role for Research and Practice

The multilevel governance of integration and the local context of integration have been increasingly emphasized in research on integration recently, shifting the focus from the national to local and city level of integration management.¹⁹⁶ Cities in particular, both in America and in Europe, have gained much attention recently as the context for immigrant incorporation and a main unit of analysis in migration research and networks. The city usually attracts immigrants and, using the demographer Audrey Singer's terminology, is the first

¹⁹⁵ Ray, B. (2002). Immigrant Integration: Building to Opportunity. *Migration Information Source*.

¹⁹⁶ International Metropolis Project is a sign of these trends. It is an international network for comparative research and public policy development on migration, diversity, and immigrant integration in cities around the world.

Other examples of similar international networks include OPENCities, or Eurocities, see subchapter 4.4.

For extensive research on the role of the city for immigrant integration see:

- Brettell, C. (2003). Bringing the City Back In: Cities as Context for Immigrant Incorporation. In N. Foner (Ed.), *American Arrivals: Anthropology Engages the New Immigration* (pp. 163-195), Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research.

- Hanley, L. and Blair, M., et al. (Eds.). (2008). *Immigration and Integration in Urban Communities*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press;

- Kasinitz, P. et. al, op. cit.;

- Singer, A., Hardwick, S. W., and Brettell, C. B. (Eds.). (2008). *Twenty-First-Century Gateways: Immigrant Incorporation in Suburban America*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press;

- Fonseca, M. L. (2008). *Cities in Movement: Migrants and Urban Change*. Lisbon: *Centro de Estudos Geográficos*.

- Musterd, S., Ostendorf, W. J. M., and Breebaart, M. (1998). *Multi-ethnic Metropolis: Patterns and Policies*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

“gateway” to immigrants’ opportunities in a new host country. Municipalities in turn, can open the gates for immigrants and turn into real “moderators of integration.”¹⁹⁷

As suggested earlier, the focus on the local perspective should not be detached from national and global trends in integration policies. Although some researchers postulate a diminishing role for national decisions regarding migration management at the local level as an outcome of globalization, multilevel governance involving national migration and integration policies should not be neglected.¹⁹⁸ However, it is at the local level that best or worst practices of immigrant integration management reflect the impact of the lack of top-down supranational or national measures. As Demetrios G. Papademetriou points out: “Ultimately, it is at the local level that practical ideas are tested, adapted, and re-tested.”¹⁹⁹ Looking at cities’ institutional design of integration management, one can gather more insights into the applicability and reasons for national integration frameworks, which is one argument for the importance of gathering knowledge and doing research on integration best practices. Two other arguments are also worth mentioning here.

One is the need to raise interest in the subject of integration among the local host society and policymakers, even if the subject remains taboo or is rarely discussed. Accordingly, collecting data on one city and then comparing it with that from another will lead to further monitoring, evaluation, and healthy competition. In fact, the platform of comparison may motivate municipalities to focus more on forming “developmentally attentive communities” for immigrants.²⁰⁰ Finally, research on good practices for integration management produces dialogues and encourages partnership between scholars and practitioners on integration. As Delgado rightly indicates, out of such cooperation there are “two-sided benefits: practitioners need the proof of their effectiveness, and academics must be able to join practitioners to increase their relevance in helping to shape practice and social policy.”²⁰¹ In fact, social science seems to lag behind in applying its results in practice, and a cooperation between researchers and integration practitioners might be a good way to change that.

It should be noted, however that best practice research is generally a never ending process, like “a journey without a final destination.”²⁰² It is quite obvious that there will always be something that could be done better in the local approach to immigrants and possibly adapted from other promising practices. Researching “what works and how or what does not

¹⁹⁷ Bommès, M. (2008), op. cit., p. 187.

¹⁹⁸ For the state of the art of the researchers’ and public debates on the integration policies in local communities see *ibid.*, p. 160.

¹⁹⁹ Papademetriou, D. G. (2003, October). Policy Considerations for Immigrant Integration. *Migration Information Source*.

²⁰⁰ Benson, J. (2007), op. cit., p. 53, (see subchapter 2.3.)

²⁰¹ Delgado, M., Jones K., and Rohani M., op. cit., p. 16.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 100.

work and why” stimulates mutual learning from others’ experience and its adaptation to other contexts.

3 Transatlantic Research: Framework, Scope and Methodology

Taking into account the current economic crisis and subsequent changes in the global division of labor, it is controversial to what extent Europe and North America will remain attractive to immigrants in the near future. However, according to the UN statistics these two regions have had the fastest growing share of migrants in total population since 1990 (with the estimates for North America 14.2%, and Europe 9.5% of the population in 2010).²⁰³ Two significant immigrant destinations are located in these two regions: the European Union (the union of 27 member states) and the United States of America. While they may have different migration experiences and migration histories with heterogeneous immigrant groups, they share similar domestic policy concerns with regard to migration. As transatlantic researchers point out, on the issue of immigration in the EU and the US there is a similar split between public opinion on the one hand and academics on the other. The public fears are directed at massive inflows of immigrants and their allegedly negative impact on social cohesion, security and the labor market. According to some public opinion polls, a general belief exists that immigrants lower wages, raise competitiveness, and overburden the welfare system. On the other hand, some economists and demographers emphasize the long range positive effects of immigration. Immigrants, they argue, sustain population growth in the aging Western Democracies, counterbalance the increasing brain drain, and stimulate the economy.²⁰⁴

Although North America and Europe are still the main immigrant destination targets, this preference might soon change for certain groups of migrants. The global economy now makes alternative career paths possible in many parts of the world for the most talented people. In the increasing competition for “global talent the EU and the US have started thinking about how to attract highly qualified immigrants to their countries.”²⁰⁵ Additionally, they have to start considering how to encourage the educated migrants to stay and how to make use of the potential of many immigrants overrepresented in the low skilled sector. Immigrant integration policies on both sides of the Atlantic represent an appropriate tool to

²⁰³ United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs. (n.d.). *International Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision, Population Database*.

According to UN definition North America consists of 5 countries (Bermuda, Canada, Greenland, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, the United States of America), while Europe consists of 50 countries (for the whole list of 50 countries, see the online source “Definition of major areas and regions” at <http://esa.un.org/migration/index.asp?panel=3>).

²⁰⁴ For more on statistical reports in reference to US and EU demography and economy see:

- Piirto, J., et.al. (Eds.). (2010). *Europe in Figures. Eurostat Yearbook 2010*. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities;

- Wadhwa, V. (2009, March 12). A Reverse Brain Drain. *Issues in Science and Technology*;

- Papademetriou, D. G., Sumption, M, and Somerville, W. (2009). *Migration and the Economic Downturn: What to Expect in the European Union*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

²⁰⁵ Papademetriou, D. G., Somerville, W., and Tanaka, H. (2008). *Talent in the 21st Century Economy*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

address all of the abovementioned concerns: public fears as well as demographic and economic needs. As transatlantic researchers point out: “the public is unlikely to be convinced by the economic benefits of immigration unless people see immigration working at the local level.”²⁰⁶ The exchange of experience and forming comparative transatlantic frameworks between the US and the EU can assist in finding solutions to common challenges. Apart from the research aims highlighted in the last chapter, this study seeks to contribute to this transatlantic dialogue and transatlantic research methods.

This chapter introduces the reader to the rationale, design, and methods of the transatlantic study against the background of existing and newly developing models of transatlantic cooperation within the field of integration policies. It explains the selection process of case studies and research methodology. Furthermore, it presents research guidelines. Then, the main points of investigation are presented in the criteria catalog of measures for labor market integration of immigrant youth. Finally, the empirical research guidelines for interview questions are summarized.

3.1 Transatlantic Research Projects

The comparison of European and North American perspectives is both challenging and promising, for practical cooperation as well as for research projects within the field of immigrant integration. Accordingly, the study presented here pursues a recently increasing interest among researchers and policy-makers in the transatlantic exchange of information, data, and experience in migration management.

There has been a recent boom in new initiatives, buttressed by conferences and top-level meetings at local and more global levels of collaboration between the US and the EU countries within the broad field of world migration.²⁰⁷ One of the first of such movements in integration policies was established by the Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research in cooperation with the German Marshall Fund of the United States, who gathered researchers from within the Transatlantic Learning Community. In their paper *Migration in the New Millennium* the researchers strongly emphasize the need for an exchange of best integration practices across the Atlantic: “[T]here is no mechanism for regular transatlantic sharing of information on best practices. Both governments and the private sector need information on

²⁰⁶ Somerville, W. and Sumption, M. (2009). *Immigration and the Labor Market: Theory, Evidence, and Policy*. London: Equality and Human Rights Commission.

²⁰⁷ Since the boom of new transatlantic initiatives in the field of migration and integration, it has become almost impossible to monitor all newly emerging transatlantic networks and research projects within the time frame of my study and writing. Thus, the overview presented here may not be comprehensive.

programs that work to foster immigrant integration.”²⁰⁸ Sparked by the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US and later the Madrid and London bombings in Europe, the focus of transatlantic discussions on immigration policies has shifted towards the issue of security.

One of the most significant recent resolutions for transatlantic political collaboration on the issues of migration and security was presented in the *EU-US Joint Statement on Enhancing Transatlantic Cooperation in the Areas of Justice, Freedom and Security* made in October 2009. The authors, a group of US and EU officials and experts, known as the US-EU High Level Contact Group (HLCG), have set up a framework for cooperation and the sharing of information relating to human mobility for the common purpose of fighting against terrorism.²⁰⁹ Interestingly enough, this non-binding statement does not include any consideration of the significance of integration policies²⁰⁸ for establishing security in the EU and the US.

There are, however, recent new transatlantic initiatives among scholars and think-tanks, which initiate dialogue between the EU and the US on the implications of integration policies. The contributors to the volume: *Immigration, Integration, and Security: America and Europe in Comparative Perspective* analyze the common current public and policy-makers' concerns on both sides of the Atlantic: perceiving immigrant populations as a potential security threat, and focusing on stricter border patrol rather than on social policies for immigrants. These trends divert attention from the needs for integration management of the existing immigrant groups.²¹⁰ According to the book, the failure of immigrant integration, both in the EU and in the US, is considered “a major source of insecurity.” Therefore, the collaboration between national and local governments is needed to adopt a more comprehensive approach towards integration across social, educational, and urban policies. As the authors argue, “it is crucial [therefore] that alternative means for managing the immigrant-host society interaction be negotiated and elaborated in broader forums.”²¹¹

There was an attempt to address this need at the political level in June 2004 during a joint seminar by the Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs, and Inclusion (DG EMPL) of the European Commission and the United States Department of Labor (DOL). Together with participating officials from other US agencies, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Canadian Government, and EU representatives,

²⁰⁸ Bertelsmann Foundation, Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research and German Marshall Fund of the United States (Eds.). (2000). *Migration in the New Millennium*. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers.

²⁰⁹ US-EU High Level Contact Group (HLCG). (2009, October 28). *EU-US Joint Statement on Enhancing Transatlantic Cooperation in the Areas of Justice, Freedom and Security*.

²¹⁰ Chebel d'Appollonia, A., and Reich, S. (Eds.). (2008). *Immigration, Integration, and Security: America and Europe in Comparative Perspective*. Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 340.

Some common trends on both sides of the Atlantic, such as exploitation of immigrants on the labor market, fears of cultural invasion, and xenophobia, which have also been addressed in the book, will also be briefly reviewed with reference to the case studies in chapter 4.

the organizers discussed, among other migration issues, the common challenges for designing and implementing effective immigration and integration policy with a special focus on the integration of immigrants into the labor market.²¹² Among many postulates on managing integration policy, a greater “horizontal” coordination on policy matters was advocated. This call for cooperation across many governmental sectors also supports my interpretation of integration policy as a multi-dimensional process, presented in subchapter 2.5.

The OECD’s International Migration Division is currently continuing its research on integration with a special focus on cross-country comparative analysis of integration of immigrants into the labor market and integration policies in 15 European and non-European OECD countries.²¹³ The key findings of their study resulted in “Recommendations for an effective integration policy and examples of good practices from the countries under review.”²¹⁴ The OECD research has been extended to a deeper analysis of the fate of children of immigrants and their integration on the labor market. Its key findings were presented at the international seminar, jointly organized by the EU Commission and the OECD Secretariat in Brussels in October 2009 and recently published in the book *Equal Opportunities? The Labor Market Integration of the Children of Immigrants*.²¹⁵ The publication also includes insights into the US experience with immigrant integration, adding new perspectives for comparative transatlantic integration research.²¹⁶

The interest in the exchange of the US and EU experiences in migration and integration has won the attention of some American migration policy think–tanks and some German foundations. One of the most prominent examples is the Migration Policy Institute which, together with German Bertelsmann Foundation, launched the Transatlantic Task Force on Immigration and Integration in 2006. During the two years of its existence, the Task Force addressed its recommendations about migration and integration policies to the

²¹² For a summary of the seminar and conclusions see Chao, E. and Levine, A. (Eds.). (2004). *Integrating Immigrants into the Workforce: North American and European Experiences*. Washington, DC: US Department of Labor.

²¹³ The US and Germany are also part of the OECD comparative research. As I learned in a personal conversation with one of the authors of the study, Poland is still considered a country with an immigration rate too low for comparative quantitative research.

²¹⁴ Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2009). *The Labor Market Integration of Immigrants and Their Children. Key Findings from OECD Country Reviews*. Paris: OECD Printing, p. 22.

²¹⁵ Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2010). *Equal Opportunities? The Labor Market Integration of the Children of Immigrants*. Paris: OECD Printing.

²¹⁶ Picot, G. and Hou, F. (2010). Seeking Success in Canada and the United States - Labor Market Outcomes among the Children of Immigrants. In Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Equal Opportunities? Children of Immigrants in EU and OECD Countries* (pp. 79-114). Paris: OECD Printing.

Holzer, H. J. (2010). Enhancing Diversity through Affirmative Action: What Other Industrial Countries Can Learn from the US Experience. In Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Equal Opportunities? Children of Immigrants in EU and OECD Countries* (pp. 211-228). Paris: OECD Printing.

governments of the United States and Canada, state and local governments and civil society, European Union institutions and EU member state governments. In 2008, it expanded internationally and was transformed into the Transatlantic Council on Migration. Since then the Council has convened several meetings on both sides of the Atlantic to discuss and analyze the transatlantic immigration and integration agenda for policy issues. The Council's transatlantic members and guests come from the academic, policymaking, business, and media worlds. Their aim is to serve as a resource for international governments on the issues of both migration and integration.²¹⁷

The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) pursues similar aims in their projects within transatlantic cooperation for migration issues. After their aforementioned milestone publication for transatlantic cooperation in 2000 together with other foundations they extended their scope of programs and projects into three basic areas, beginning in 2008. One of these programs, the Transatlantic Forum on Migration and Integration, like the Transatlantic Council on Migration serves as an international forum for exchange for governments, the media, academia, and the non-profit sector. Secondly, the Transatlantic Academy is a scholarly forum, whose first group of fellows has concentrated on transatlantic integration research and produced a significant collection of comparative projects. Finally, the third project "Transatlantic Trends: Immigration" is a public opinion survey (of the US, Canada, and six EU countries), which addresses immigration and integration issues (for example, the effect of the economic crisis on attitudes toward immigration and the impact of the immigrants labor market on wages).²¹⁸

Other smaller scale research projects and programs at the university level have also emerged in the last few years. They aim at establishing learning communities and exchange platforms for research findings among individual European and American scholars of transatlantic comparative studies on migration and integration.²¹⁹ Looking at the existing programs it may appear that in recent years Germany has become a key player in fostering the transatlantic exchange on migration. However, there are some other global international

²¹⁷ Migration Policy Institute, Transatlantic Council on Migration. Web page: <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/transatlantic/>

During my research visit at the Migration Policy Institute in April 2008 I was able to learn more in informal talks with the MPI members about the commencement of the work of the Council and its goals and the challenges of the coordination of research projects on both sides of the Atlantic. Their successful development since then is reflected in the transatlantic interest and an increasing demand for cooperation in integration management in practice.

²¹⁸ The data sources come from the following websites:

- Transatlantic Forum on Migration and Integration: [http://www.gmfus.org](http://www.gmfus.org;);

- Transatlantic Academy: [http://www.transatlanticacademy.org](http://www.transatlanticacademy.org;);

- Transatlantic Trends: Immigration: <http://209.200.80.89/trends/immigration/index.html>

²¹⁹ One of them is the initiative of German and American universities, founded also by GMF: Transatlantic Exchange for Academics in Migration Studies (TEAMS), whose workshops by turns takes place at the universities in Germany and the US.

migration and integration forums, whose focus is not solely transatlantic but whose work intersects with abovementioned transatlantic initiatives.²²⁰

The brief overview of current transatlantic project presented above demonstrates that the scope of my research does not diverge from recent common trends and is part and parcel of the rapidly developing interest in sharing European experiences in migration and integration issues with American scholars. However fashionable and common it is now to compare EU cities to those in the US, it is crucial that reductionism be avoided and the challenges transatlantic comparative research involves be realized. The selection process of case studies for my empirical research has been one of them.

3.2 The Selection Process

The process of selecting case studies for my research project turned out to be both intriguing and challenging. The question I faced was how to demonstrate that the cities on both sides of the Atlantic, which are difficult to compare, can be placed into one research framework. In order to be successful, the plan of comparing cities in Poland, Germany and the United States, which to the best of my knowledge had never before been put into a similar constellation of comparative migration research, required some fundamental criteria. First, the idea behind such a choice was to conduct research on both old and relatively new EU member states, which have different bonds and a different sense of belonging to the structure of the Union as well as a different history of immigration. Similarly, on the other side of the Atlantic the plan was to choose those US states, which differ in the time of their admissions to the United States and in their experience with immigration. The number of case studies could not exceed my research capacities, so I decided to choose two cities of two neighboring EU countries, Poland and Germany, and two cities of two neighboring US states, California and Arizona. These two countries and two states represent a wide range of experiences with immigration. Moreover, the periods of Poland's and Germany's memberships in the EU and Arizona's and California's belonging to the US differ by more than half a century.²²¹ It is assumed that this difference between the countries and states can

²²⁰ For example:

- Cities of Migration is a Canadian internet platform for all stakeholders engaged in the integration of urban migrants. Home page: <http://citiesofmigration.ca>;
- Metropolis Project is also Canadian project open to international participants (for more information on the project see subchapter 2.6);
- The Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) is an initiative of the United Nations member states, which since 2007 has been a discussion platform on migration and development interrelations and exchange of good practices and experiences "to maximize development benefits of migration and migration flows." See Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD). Home page: <http://gfmd.org/>

²²¹ Arizona was admitted to the US in 1912, 62 years after California. Poland entered the EU 53 years after the Treaty of Paris was signed in 1951 by Germany and five other future EU members. The

lead to a different sense of belonging to “their unions” and model certain patterns of local governance.²²² In fact, both Arizona and Poland seem more defiant than their western neighbors towards top down recommendations from Washington and Brussels respectively.²²³ A desire for a certain degree of sovereignty may influence local patterns of governance in migration and integration policies.²²⁴

Within these two EU countries and two US states I chose four cities of a relatively comparable population size and distance from each other: Phoenix in Arizona, San Diego in California, Munich in Germany, and Warsaw in Poland.²²⁵ Of course, the cities are unique in terms of the size and diversification of immigration populations and labor markets. Accordingly, the choice of the cities was also determined by their different immigration patterns and the role these cities play as destination for immigrants. According to Singers’ classification of certain American cities as immigrant gateways, San Diego is considered a post-World War II gateway, which began attracting immigrants in large numbers only in the past fifty years or so. Long-established destinations for immigrants which continue to receive large numbers of foreign-born, such as the city of Munich, are termed “continuous gateways.” Phoenix, in turn, is considered an “emerging gateway,” with rapidly growing immigrant populations which have settled there during the past twenty-five years. Warsaw might one day be one of Singer’s “pre-emerging gateways,” which is used to describe places where immigrant populations have grown very rapidly and are likely to continue to expand as immigrant destinations.²²⁶

The case studies have proven to be an interesting testing ground for the effects of local institutional conditions on the integration management for immigrant youth, which will be further developed in the analysis of the empirical research in chapter 5. The following methodological approach has been instrumental for this transatlantic cross-city research design.

Treaty established the European Coal and Steel Community, which formed the foundation for the modern-day EU.

²²² “Their Unions” refers here to the political entities of the United States of America and the European Union. Of course, the intention is not to compare the EU political system to that of the US.

²²³ These trends might be exemplified by Poland’s determined struggle for the best possible terms for Polish farmers in the EU or by Arizona’s recent immigration laws, which are very controversial for the US Federal Government. For more on Arizona’s new immigration law, see subchapter 4.3.

²²⁴ The attitudes towards top-down recommendations are considered important for the politics of migration and integration at the local level.

²²⁵ The population of each city: Munich (1.3 million), Warsaw (1.7 million), San Diego (1.2 million), Phoenix (1.5 million). The distance between Warsaw and Munich is 810 km, between San Diego and Phoenix 490 km.

²²⁶ Singer distinguishes two other immigrant gateway types. “Former gateways” attracted considerable numbers of immigrants in the early years of the 20th century but no longer do so. “Re-emerging gateways” began the twentieth century as magnets for immigrants, waned as popular destinations in the middle of the century, but are once are reemerging as immigrant gateways.

Singer puts both continuous and the post-World War II gateways into the single category of “established gateways.” See Singer, A., Hardwick S. W., and Brettell C. B. (Eds.), *op. cit.*

3.3 A Methodological Framework for Transatlantic Research

The methodological framework for this research is founded on a mixed methodological design,²²⁷ which employs both qualitative and quantitative research methods. The research is based on triangulation, using many sources of information and research methods to increase the credibility and validity of the results. Analyses of statistical data, research literature, press articles, and field work in the four cities are assembled. The empirical methods consist of observations, field visits, as well as informal discussions with immigrants and migration researchers. These various sources serve to add depth to the evidence at the core of the empirical research: expert interviews. Exploring and systematizing expert interviews provides orientation for the analysis of integration measures in case studies and aids in organizing the information gathered.²²⁸

Following the typology of expert interviews by Michael Meuser and Ulrike Nagel, the word “expert” refers to either a person who is responsible for the development, implementation, or monitoring of solutions under examination or a person who has a privileged access to information about groups of persons or decision processes.²²⁹ In the context of this research, the interviews were conducted with “potential experts in immigrant youth integration in a given city.” The latter describes representatives in the governmental and non-governmental sectors who were either thought to be knowledgeable about or responsible for or directly involved in integration work for urban immigrants. I use the expression “potential” to emphasize the challenges faced in the process of sampling interviewees.

Two basic methods were used in the selection of interviewees: a pre-selection and in-process selection method. Pre-selection took place during the preparatory research on possible key integration stakeholders and umbrella integration organizations across all four case studies. Next, snowball sampling was used during the study visits as a strategy to get to the most important organizations within the fields of labor market integration of immigrant youth.²³⁰ In fact, this field of integration work lies within the capacities of school representatives, job agencies, and immigrant organizations, whose fields of work are not restricted merely to the subject under investigation (for example, job counselors serve all

²²⁷ Creswell, John W. (2003). *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.

²²⁸ According to the differentiation of expert interviews three types are distinguished: explorative-, systematizing-, and theory-generating expert interviews. Bogner, A. and Menz, W. (2002). Das theoriegenerierende Experteninterview. Erkenntnisinteresse, Wissensformen, Interaktion. In A., Bogner, B. Littig, B., and W. Menz (Eds.), *Das Experteninterview. Theorie, Methoden, Anwendungen* (pp. 36-38). Opladen: Leske & Budrich.

²²⁹ Meuser, M. and Nagel, U. (2005). ExpertInneninterviews – vielfach erprobt, wenig bedacht. Ein Beitrag zur qualitativen Methodendiskussion. In A., Bogner, B. Littig, B., and W. Menz (Eds.), *Das Experteninterview. Theorie, Methoden, Anwendungen* (pp. 71-99). Opladen: Leske & Budrich.

²³⁰ The fields of integration work for immigrant youth are presented in the form of a criteria catalog in subchapter 3.5.

citizens of a given city, not only immigrant youth). Therefore, the interviewees, first considered as experts sometimes turned out to be only partially involved in the field of integration. In such cases, they referred me to colleagues thought to be more competent. In fact, there were only few cases where I could get to the institutions which dealt solely with immigrant youth. However, all interviews analyzed were equally important for the empirical study and its findings on social networking for labor market integration in each city.

I conducted face-to-face and telephone interviews: 16 interviews in each of the cities in the countries' native languages (English, German, and Polish).²³¹ Most of the interviews were recorded, with only a few exceptions, when the interviewees were opposed to the recording of some confidential information or to the conversation as a whole. The interviews were intended to be semi-structured and organized around key question group categories and points of investigation of the research.²³² The time span planned for an interview was up to one hour.

Each of the interviews conducted was followed by an analysis of the additional documentation and information materials provided by the interviewees and their online resources. Follow-up questions were clarified by email or per telephone. Upon the request of some interviewees, their names and the names of their organizations have been omitted.

The empirical research and data collection took just over two years, between October 2007 and December 2009. Different factors determined the time I was able to spend doing field research on each case study. Since I was not able to afford a longer stay in the US, the empirical research in the cities of Phoenix and San Diego had to be completed within one month in each of the cities (May 2008 and June 2008 respectively). The field visits were preceded by a one-month stay at the Migration Policy Institute in Washington DC, where I consulted with American migration and integration experts, conducted interviews with the stakeholders in federal integration policies, and prepared for my field work in Phoenix and San Diego. My empirical research in Poland was also restricted to a one month stay in Warsaw (March 2009), whereas the field work in the city of Munich, which was then my place of residence, was conducted throughout the whole time frame of the research.

I used some empirical methods applied in the Grounded Theory (GT) developed by Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss (1967). In their work they reject formulating any theories before the field work is done and are strongly committed to empirical evidence rather than pre-formulated theoretical arguments.²³³ Based on these principles, my study

²³¹ All citations from Polish and German interviews, used in the dissertation, have been translated into English by me.

²³² See subchapter 3.6.

²³³ Glaser, B. G., and Strauss, A. L. (1967). *Discovery of Grounded Theory. Strategies for Qualitative Research*. New York, NY: Aldine Publishing Company.

The work of Glaser and Strauss has given rise to many variations on the postulates of Grounded Theory, which has also led to a rift between its authors. There is still an ongoing debate regarding what the principles of Grounded Theory (GT) and Grounded Theory Method (GTM) are. I use the

methodology evolved over the course of the collection of both qualitative and quantitative data. The research guidelines were being continually revised according to the contextual needs and new emerging areas of investigation discovered during the research process.

It should be noted here that during the course of the interviews there were some alterations in length and thematic area. Some interviews were more narrative in structure and more extensive, while others were rather short and sometimes did not cover all questions as planned.²³⁴ The way of conducting interviews and their lengths depended on the rapport and level of trust while developed between me and the interviewees, their fields of work, and their eagerness to share additional information, which sometimes diverged from the scope of my interview questions.

Another change to the planned procedure of the study concerns the subject of undocumented immigration in three of the countries included in the case studies. In fact, this issue was not included in the first draft of the research questions. Upon initial consultation with American migration researchers and immersion in the US integration debate on illegal immigration, I became aware of the scale of the problem and of the challenges for the focus of my research but decided not to exclude them from my study. Such an exclusion would have contradicted my commitment to the subject of immigrant integration.²³⁵ As a consequence of extending the focus of my field work, I had to restructure my initial interview questions (adding two more questions) and sometimes break taboos about services provided to the undocumented during the interviews. In fact, the inclusion of the issue of undocumented youth in the interviews was very helpful in obtaining better insight into the real challenges for integration work among interviewees and into their organizations' backgrounds. The willingness or refusal to talk about the undocumented on the part of interviewees was determined by the profile of the organizations (governmental or non-governmental) they represented and other contextual factors of a given city in a given country.

recent definition of the GT as “a systematic, inductive and cooperative approach for conducting inquiry for the purpose of constructing theory,” so-called “grounded theory.” However, as is obvious from my research questions, the aim of my study is not theory formulation. Following the common use in the literature, I use the term of GT to refer only to the method, not its end result: the theory. GTM is understood as “[t]he method designed to encourage researcher’s persistent interaction with their data, while remaining constantly involved with their merging analysis. Data collection and collection proceed simultaneously and each informs and streamlines each other.” Charmaz, K. and Bryant, A. (2010). *The SAGE Handbook of Grounded Theory*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, p.1.

²³⁴ For example, the subject of organizing and obtaining financial support for undocumented immigrant youth was a touchy issue for many interviewees, who tried to avoid giving direct answers.

²³⁵ In fact, writing about integration management, while excluding an underprivileged group, undocumented youth, would be highly biased, turning a blind eye to existing challenges of integration policies.

The data collected during the time frame of my research resulted in the formation of my theory of Affirmative Integration Management,²³⁶ which was developed in the process of analyzing the findings in my four case studies. The results and conclusions were examined from a comparative perspective in order to specify the conditions for the application of this theory in the US, Germany, and Poland and its relation to the research questions.

The analysis of the transatlantic case studies required a special comparative framework, so that the research would not turn into disparate, incoherent elements of empirical field work. The groundwork for this frame was laid by the research guidelines presented in subchapters 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6.

The study employs various types of comparisons, which, according to the theorists Andrew Bennett and Alexander L. George, often happens when “[o]ne case may be most similar to another and both may be least similar to a third case.”²³⁷ As one can see in the analysis of the selection process in subchapter 3.2 and in the discussion of the case studies in chapter 5, there are many areas of comparison. However, it is quite difficult to use all of them for all of the cases. For example, the situation of immigrants in the city of Warsaw may be comparable to that in Phoenix, as both cities have less experience in dealing with immigrants than the other two, Munich and San Diego. On the other hand, the latter two cities vary in the number of immigrants and immigration groups they host. The question therefore arises, how can the comparison of cases with some similarities but many differences be justified?²³⁸

In fact, the comparison of seemingly disparate case studies lies at the very core of this research design. The assumed difference of the antecedent conditions for integration processes (e.g. the different scale of immigration, ethnic immigration groups, and geographical location) determined the choice of the case studies.²³⁹ These different antecedent conditions pose challenges for transatlantic research. However, they do not rule out the existence of the same independent variables: case studies’ synergies, which will be presented in chapter 6. Consequently, this collective case-study research should increase the applicability of the results, exploring new dimensions of measures necessary for the successful implementation of the Affirmative Integration Management Theory (AIM) in different localities under different circumstances.²⁴⁰ Such a research approach draws on a

²³⁶ See subchapter 2.5.

²³⁷ George, A. L. and Bennett, A. (2004). *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge MA: MIT Press, p. 83.

²³⁸ For more on the selection process see subchapter 3.2.

²³⁹ For more on the antecedent conditions of the case studies see subchapters 3.2 and 3.4.

²⁴⁰ Robert E. Stake differentiates among three types of case study research:

- intrinsic (the research interest is in the particular case only);
- instrumental (the case under investigation is used to derive conclusions about a phenomenon broader than the single case study);

method that Kenneth Burke developed, called perspective by incongruity.²⁴¹ Following his method, the argument is that by juxtaposing seemingly contrasting case studies of countries with such different histories of migration (as discussed in chapter 4) their similarities will emerge. The incongruity of the cities should bring into focus new perspectives on integration management and encourage the exchange of good or bad practices within the field of the integration of immigrant youth.

The process of discovering which factors hinder or facilitate the AIM for immigrant youth has been guided by George's and Bennet's "Building block procedure." Using this procedure, the research guidelines, which form the subtypes – "blocks" of one phenomenon: integration management for immigrants on the labor market – have been identified. According to the building block procedure, "each subtype can be regarded as a candidate for separate study and each study will investigate instances of that subtype."²⁴² Similarly, each of the points of the guidelines have been investigated in each of the cities and analyzed with regard to the development of other integration measures and contextual settings. The research guidelines build the blocks of 1) the list of main points of investigation for transatlantic research; 2) the list of key labor market integration measures for immigrant youth; 3) groups of interview questions. These blocks will all be discussed in detail in the following subchapters.

3.4 Points of Investigations for Transatlantic Cases

Seven major points of investigation have been chosen for the analysis of the pre-existing conditions in the case studies. The following list constitutes the first set of research guidelines:

- 1) Historical context of immigration;
- 2) Immigration scale;
- 3) Public and political discourse (the government's "body language" and society's "body language"),²⁴³

- collective study (as in this research, different case studies broaden the perspective and all are instrumental to understanding the patterns of a phenomenon, here: management of immigrant integration).

Stake, R. E. (1995). *The Art of Case Study Research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, pp. 3-4.

For more on my theory of Affirmative Integration Management (AIM), see subchapter 2.5.

²⁴¹ Burke, K. (1964). *Perspective by Incongruity*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

²⁴² George, A. L. and Bennett, A., op. cit., p. 78.

²⁴³ Papademetriou describes the significance of these two body languages, regarding both immigrants and migration policies, as follows:

"Overall social and political attitudes toward immigrants help determine to what extent immigrants seek out services and opportunities. Furthermore, setting social as well as legal standards for the appropriate treatment of immigrants by employers help shape whether native workers view immigrants as competitors or allies, and create the backdrop for good and mature social interactions."

- 4) National and local modes of integration;
- 5) Citizenship policies²⁴⁴ and the role of legal status for integration;
- 6) The education system and its policies;
- 7) The labor market and its policies.

The pre-existing conditions of international, national, state and local contexts of the cities are considered of equal importance to the research findings, and many of these points of investigation cut across these dimensions. In fact, conducting transatlantic research in EU and US cities without a deeper analysis of their national contexts seems wrong-headed. The points of investigations will be discussed in detail in the analysis of the top-down context for each of the city case studies in chapter 4²⁴⁵ and will be raised again in the discussions of local integration management in the cities in chapter 5.

The analysis of these points should result in generating a list of significant factors in the research which have been found to influence local management of immigrant labor market integration: the catalog of differences and similarities among the EU and US case studies for the comparative transatlantic research framework.

3.5 Catalog of Criteria of Labor Market Integration Measures

A list of key labor market integration measures for immigrant youth comprises the second set of research guidelines. These measures are factors which have a significant impact on the degree of labor market integration “with” immigrants on the part of the host society. In other words, they determine the options available to the local host society for facilitating labor market integration, specifically for immigrant youth.

The key labor market integration measures for immigrant youth have been chosen in eight fields for case study research. They are ordered according to the sequence of measures a young immigrant may need at different stages during the process of their transition from school to work. These measures are presented in the following criteria catalog:

- 1) offer language training;

Papademetriou, D. G. (2004). E.U. Employment and Social Affairs Directorate-General and US Department of Labor. Labor Market Integration Seminar. In E. Chao and A. Levine (Eds.), *Integrating Immigrants into the Workforce: North American and European Experiences* (pp. I i-iv). Washington, DC: US Department of Labor, p. iv.

²⁴⁴ Whether citizenship is granted on the basis of *jus soli* ("right of the soil") or *jus sanguinis* ("right of blood") represents a key factor for immigrant youth and their access to labor market and education.

²⁴⁵ The analysis of the top-down context for case studies will be narrowed down to the contexts of: the US, California and Arizona; the EU, Germany and Poland. The EU and the US obviously have different levels of governance. Moreover, various interrelations among the EU member states and states in the US exist. Consequently, not all seven points will be discussed in all six contexts. For more on the different dimensions of the top-down contexts for the cities, see chapter 4.

- 2) provide access to education;
- 3) provide vocational training;
- 4) recognize qualifications;
- 5) offer job counseling;
- 6) provide access to labor market information;
- 7) promote entrepreneurship;
- 8) eliminate discrimination in the workplace.

These fields are merely a part of a larger picture of local measures for the integration management for immigrants which are crucial for implementation of the AIM within the field of labor market integration. The selection of only the eight aforementioned fields was made intentionally to narrow the focus of the research to “a more circumscribed scope conditions” and “avoid less precise generalizations.”²⁴⁶ In fact, other fields of policies and integration measures also determine labor market integration, for example an immigrant’s access to citizenship rights, the welfare and healthcare systems, transportation or housing.²⁴⁷

It is important to note that determinants of “individual” integration of immigrants are not included in the criteria catalog, since individual immigrants themselves are not the subject of the study. The labor market integration factors which vary depending on the immigrants refer to their:

- 1) age at arrival;
- 2) household composition;
- 3) entry class,²⁴⁸
- 4) legal status;
- 5) country of origin and networks.²⁴⁹

These background characteristics of immigrants were also the subject of the expert interviews, in which the interviewees always emphasized the role of immigrants in the success of the integration measures undertaken by the institutions. Although I am not going to discuss these factors in detail in the case studies, I acknowledge their indisputable importance for the immigrant integration process.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁶ Narrowing down the scope of the research is considered an indispensable case study research method for reducing otherwise unavoidable generalizations: George, A. L. and Bennett, A., op. cit., p. 77.

²⁴⁷ For an interesting addition to the role of household structure in the integration of immigrant youth see Hill, C. and Chen, H. (2009). *Against the Tide: Household Structure, Opportunities and Outcomes among White and Minority Youth*. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.

²⁴⁸ “Entry class” refers to the way an immigrant has been admitted to the host society or has entered the host society (e.g. on tourist visa, family reunion, guest worker program).

²⁴⁹ For a full account of the elements of successful immigrant integration see Papademetriou, D. G. (2004), op. cit.

²⁵⁰ For more on the role of individual immigrants in the integration process see subchapter 2.3.

The criteria catalog was developed on the basis of hypothetical guesses supported by my study of integration literature and consultations with migration scholars. The following background assumptions will explain the reasons for the choice of the eight points of investigation.

Language training for immigrant youth as a tool for facilitating the improvement of language skills acquired thus far is considered the most fundamental integration measure which the host society can offer. Both mentoring and motivation to learn are extremely important, especially for those who lack such support from their families or schools. Mastery of the language of a given country is “a must” in order to function in the receiving society. As Tamar Jacoby notes, referring to the US context, learning language (along with respect for law, habits and principles of democracy in the receiving society) was and still is considered the fairly “minimalist rules of the game.”²⁵¹ This also applies to the EU countries with their language policies and, in some cases, obligatory language courses. Obviously, unless a young immigrant plans to engage in ethnic economies, there are hardly any prospects of integration into the labor market without language competence in the host country. On the other hand, the process of integration should not discourage immigrant youth from using their native languages, which should ideally be an asset on the labor market.²⁵² Language training is sometimes but not always part of the curricula in the fields of education and vocational training, which are the next points of investigation.

The educational system plays an important role not only in the acquisition of knowledge and skills but also in the healthy psychosocial functioning of immigrants both in the US and in the EU.²⁵³ This functioning is a prerequisite for an immigrant’s success on the labor market. Access to education and an “immigrant friendly” education system is therefore another measure to be investigated in these case studies. As Han Entzinger and Renske Biezeveld rightly point out, “[t]he educational system is not always sufficiently geared towards the specific needs of migrant children[,] and quite often suffers from segregation and ‘white flight.’”²⁵⁴ Improving access to education would require all measures which encourage immigrant youth to make progress, for example by lowering dropout rates and reducing

²⁵¹ Jacoby, T. (2004). What it Means to be American in the 21st century. In T. Jacoby (Ed.), *Reinventing the Melting Pot: the New Immigrants and What It Means to be American* (pp. 293-314). New York, NY: Basic Books, p. 306.

²⁵² Richard D. Alba points to the fact that “[t]he desire to compete on an equal footing with the majority has inspired many ethnics to shed their ethnic language and accent and other external vestiges of their ethnicity.” Considering language training as a point of investigation in my study it would also be interesting to focus on measures for facilitating immigrants’ native language skills, but unfortunately this is beyond the scope of this research.

Alba, R. D., op. cit., p. 6.

²⁵³ Suárez-Orozco, C. and Suárez-Orozco, M. M. (2007). Education. In M. Waters and R. Ueda (Eds.), *The New Americans: A Guide to Immigration since 1965*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p 243.

²⁵⁴ “White flight” stands for the tendency of non-migrant parents to move their children from school with a big rate of migrant children to another school. Entzinger, H. and Biezeveld, R., op. cit., p. 21.

segregation, offering second-chance education opportunities for early school dropouts and providing higher education opportunities for young immigrants who aspire to academic careers. Since the choice of educational path is quite often made by parents, integration measures should also focus on educating migrant parents about local educational systems. Accordingly, training programs for parents are here considered indirect measures for the development of a future workforce among immigrant youth.

The following points of investigation refer directly to the integration measures attending the first steps of immigrant youth on the labor market. The aim of these measures is to bring about a good mutual “orientation” for immigrants and for their prospective employers.²⁵⁵ Therefore, those who provide labor market services in these fields should be part of a good network system among immigrant communities and employers.

Vocational training and apprenticeships are considered the first job experiences available to youth, which very often determine their future career opportunities. It might be difficult for immigrant youth to find suitable placements, especially when their language competencies or self-esteem are too low to make them stand out from among other candidates. Usually mediating institutions like vocational schools or job counselors (depending on the vocational education system of a given country) take the responsibility for showing underprivileged youth the paths to a first job training. It is also crucial that those attending vocational education be presented opportunities to further develop their qualifications, for instance by transitioning to or returning to mainstream education.

Vocational and job training are also a remedial qualification opportunity for those immigrants whose foreign credentials are not documented, accredited, or otherwise recognized in the host society. Such training might be the fastest way for immigrants to obtain a job certificate in the host country, although their real qualifications and skills may well exceed the job they would be allowed to perform afterwards. Many studies have shown that the lack of an efficient system for validating foreign credentials leads to downgrading jobs among immigrants.²⁵⁶ Moreover, a complicated system of credential recognition might be discouraging for potential employers of immigrant youth. Similarly Peter Creticos and others assert that “the apparent difficulty in validating the credentials of those educated or trained outside of the US [and other host countries] coupled with general confusion on

²⁵⁵ Reitz, J. G. (2001). Immigrant Success and the Expansion of Education in American and Canadian Cities, 1970-1990. Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Anaheim, CA, August 18-21, 2001, pp. 18-21, p. 21.

²⁵⁶ For example:

- Batalova, J., Fix, M., and Creticos, P. A. (2008). *Uneven Progress: The Employment Pathways of Skilled Immigrants in the United States*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.
- Bauer, T. and Zimmermann, K. (1999). Occupational Mobility of Ethnic Migrants. *IZA Discussion Papers Series*, 58. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor.
- Carneiro, R., et al. (2006). *A Mobilidade Ocupacional do Trabalhador Imigrante em Portugal* (Occupational Mobility of the Immigrant Worker in Portugal). Lisbon: Direcção-Geral de Estudos, Estatística e Planeamento (DGEEP).

immigration law contribute to the view that hiring immigrants brings added risk.²⁵⁷ Therefore, assessment and qualification recognition services should work in close collaboration with job counseling services.

Individual job counseling and job placement services are of special importance to those who are recognized as disadvantaged for a number of reasons, for example social status, lack of self-confidence or interpersonal competence. Young people with migration backgrounds might feel stigmatized and disoriented in the competition on the labor market. Therefore, together with the intercultural training, assessment centers and job application courses are crucial for immigrant youth. These services may help immigrants to find out about their own potential, boost their self esteem, and learn the rules of the local labor market.

Apart from job counselors, other channels of information about the needs of local labor market, such as formal and informal networks for job placement, might also be available. Indeed, young immigrants might even be unaware that there are job vacancies for which they are eligible, if they do not have access to these networks. Hence, finding out whether methods other than job counseling agencies exist and which of these are used to inform young immigrants about the needs of the labor market and available job openings constitutes a separate point of investigation.

Another crucial aspect of supporting labor market integration for immigrant youth is the promotion of their entrepreneurship. Quite often the phenomenon of entrepreneurship among immigrants is usually understood in terms of creating ethnic economies and consequently ethnic enclaves. Since the workforce in ethnic businesses usually stems from those same ethnic communities, whether ethnic economies support or prevent immigrant integration into the host society is debatable. On the other hand, evidence does exist that ethnic enterprises encourage immigrants to acquire new skills and start their own businesses, which is also beneficial for the local economy. According to Malcolm Cross and Waldinger, "a growing ethnic economy creates a virtuous circle: business success gives rise to distinctive motivational structure, breeding a community-wide orientation towards small business and encouraging the acquisition of skills within a stable, commonly accepted framework."²⁵⁸ Moreover, ethnic enterprises do not necessarily cooperate only with immigrant groups of the same ethnic origins. Young immigrant entrepreneurs may well become the future employers of local community members outside the ethnic enclaves, which supports the process of integration with the host society. Consequently, making young immigrants

²⁵⁷ Creticos, P., et al. (2006). *The Integration of Immigrants in the Workplace*. Chicago, IL: Institute for Work and the Economy, p. 13.

²⁵⁸ For more on ethnic economies in an urban context see Cross, M., and Waldinger, R. (2002). Migrants and Urban Labor Markets in Europe and North America. In M. Cross and R. Moore (Eds.), *Migrants, Minorities and Urban Transformations in Comparative Perspective* (pp. 16-31). London: Macmillan, p. 23.

realize that starting their own businesses can be a rewarding, albeit challenging endeavor is important. Offering special training for developing business plans, counseling on how to overcome bureaucratic obstacles, or showing examples of best practices from local success stories among immigrants might be encouraging. The question for empirical investigation is how immigrant entrepreneurial activity among the young start ups in the city is supported by the local institutions.

For immigrants, starting their own businesses can also be a way of avoiding labor market discrimination.²⁵⁹ Indeed, young immigrants may experience discrimination at the final stage of their transition from school to work, trying to obtain a first interview or a job. It might be much harder for a person with very little or only limited work experience to win when competing with a more experienced adult on the labor market. A migration background may even raise more concerns among employers. According to an OECD report, “[e]mployers may perceive the children of immigrants as less productive than other job seekers or they are more uncertain about their potential productivity.”²⁶⁰ The question arises whether and how the host society helps to combat discrimination both during recruitment and in the workplace.²⁶¹ The level of discrimination on the local labor market, it is worth noting, is difficult to measure and necessitates a focus on employers, which is beyond the scope of this study. My points of investigation concern, first, anti-discriminatory actions of those institutions outside the business sector and, second, recruitment agencies which would monitor and offer counseling to young immigrants in cases of discrimination. Such pro-integration activities constitute the last point of the criteria catalog for my field work.

3.6 Interview Question Groups

The third pillar of the research guidelines are the interview question groups. They are based both on the criteria catalog presented above and some additional points of investigation from the research questions.

The interview questions were organized along the following thematic lines with reference to integration work and the working environment of a given organization:

- a) understanding by the organization of labor market integration processes for immigrant youth;

²⁵⁹ Cross and Waldinger argue that immigrants usually work below their level of their qualifications and therefore “entrepreneurship must be seen in part as a strategy to overcome the effects of discrimination.” Ibid.

²⁶⁰ Schröder, L. (2010). Labor Market Characteristics and their Impact on the Integration of Immigrants’ Offspring. In Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Equal Opportunities? The Labor Market Integration of the Children of Immigrants* (pp. 129-162).

²⁶¹ For a detailed account of the various kinds of discrimination and measures to promote equal opportunities in the work place see Kraaland, K. and Roosblad, J. (2008). *Diversity, Equality and Discrimination in Working Life. Policy Brief 6*. Amsterdam: IMISCOE.

- b) challenges for immigrant youth on the local labor market;
- c) actions taken for immigrant youth and their labor market integration (with a follow-up on eight integration measures from the criteria catalog);
- d) integration measures for undocumented youth;
- e) ways of reaching out to immigrants and the host society;
- f) source of funding of the organization and its challenges;
- g) network building for immigrant youth and cross-sector cooperation with other organizations (county, province, country, international community);
- h) the influence of top- down integration policies for the organization's practical integration work;
- i) prospects for the future: challenges and plans for integration work of a given organization.

The list of sixteen interview questions, which were developed around the above points, are presented in appendix 1. As mentioned earlier, the questions were sometimes modified, shortened or extended over the course of the research as well during an interview itself to adjust their scope to a given interviewee and the type of organization.²⁶²

Additional points of investigation, which arose unexpectedly during the field work, and which was not planned before the research guidelines were developed, will be discussed in the analysis of the case studies in the following chapter 4 and chapter 5.

²⁶² See subchapter 3.3.

4 Top-Down Contexts for Local Integration Management

Chapters 2 and 3 focus on theoretical aspects of and speculation about the successful management of integration policies to assist immigrant youth in gaining access to local labor markets. In chapters 4 and 5, the focus now shifts towards empirical research, which examines whether and how the theory, presented thus far, functions in practice.

As previously mentioned, integration takes place first and foremost at the local level.²⁶³ At the same time it is obvious that local integration management is determined by both national and regional integration measures. Together they set general policy frameworks and can be used to establish integration instruments that either facilitate or hinder local attempts at integration.²⁶⁴ Various levels of governance, which influence local integration policies and integration practices in the case studies, are discussed in this chapter. In the cases of Phoenix and San Diego, both the US federal and state policies of Arizona and California are examined. For Munich and Warsaw, both the EU as well as German and Polish integration frameworks, respectively, are presented.

The following seven points will be highlighted with reference to the countries and states in focus: historical insights into immigration in the post-Second World War period; the scale of immigration accompanied by available statistical data; political and public discourse on migration and integration; national modes of integration; and national immigration policies concerning citizenship, education, and the labor market, which have an impact on integration challenges immigrant youth face.

From the outset it should be noted, however, that not all seven points will be discussed in all six contexts: the US, California and Arizona; and the EU, Germany and Poland. Different levels of governance and various interrelations among these political entities make it impossible to present the top-down contexts in the case studies in the same way. The EU obviously has much less authority over its member states than is the case with the US federal government and the individual states. Moreover, Poland and Germany have distinct integration modes and citizenship, education and labor market policies, whereas Arizona and California are under the single umbrella of US federal legislation. Accordingly, the description of the US context for integration management will be more extensive than that of the EU. Sections on the national mode of integration, legal status, and a more extensive consideration of the integration framework for education and the labor market will be included in subchapter 4.1 on the US. Subchapter 4.3 on the EU will be much shorter and will not cover the EU mode of integration and legal issues on migration, which will be

²⁶³ See chapter 2.

²⁶⁴ Penninx, R. (2003, October), *op. cit.*

analyzed separately for Germany and Poland. All of the data collected on top-down contexts has been updated, where available, to the end of 2010.²⁶⁵

4.1 The United States

4.1.1 US Scale of Diversity

The US scale of diversity will not be discussed solely through the prism of statistical data, reminiscent of the case of the European Union.²⁶⁶ As Peter Schuck points out, two levels of thinking about diversity in reference to diversity in America must be distinguished: “diversity as fact” and “diversity as ideal.” Accordingly, American diversity as fact is interpreted as the demographic reality of ethnic diversification, which has shaped the US since its earliest years. Diversity as ideal, in contrast, is quite a new phenomenon, which emerged in the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, emphasizing American “notions of fairness, equal opportunity, and growing global responsibility” for world migration movements.²⁶⁷

The ideology of the past and present American ideal of diversity, which needs to be included in any discussion of the US as a typical immigration country, will be considered first. In fact, three commonly-used associations with America could be employed to briefly characterize the landscape of US immigration: diversified, unified, and hyphenated. These opposing expressions already indicate the great complexity of the US scale of diversity.

First, Hollinger’s metaphor of “diversification of diversity,” used in reference to the US, points to a multitude of different ethno-racial affiliations present in the country. This ethnic diversification has led America to be commonly associated with the notion of the melting pot as well as the birthplace of assimilation and multicultural thought.²⁶⁸ The United States has definitely become one of the most popular destinations for world immigration, with the renowned Statue of Liberty, a symbol of a welcoming mother greeting new immigrants, the

²⁶⁵ Exceptions may be observed in some cases, when some significant news or new data published at the beginning of 2011 were considered indispensable for the analysis.

²⁶⁶ See subchapter 4.4.1.

²⁶⁷ Schuck, P. H. (2006). *Diversity in America: Keeping Government at a Safe Distance*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 94.

Diversity as an ideal, according to Schuck, started to emerge in the framework of the Immigration law of 1965, which established American preferences in immigration policies. How the American diversity as ideal and diversity as reality can be harmonized by national and local governments is a question addressed both by Schuck and this dissertation.

²⁶⁸ Hollinger, D. A. (1995). *Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism*. New York, NY: Basic Books, p. 79. For more on the origin of integration and assimilation theories in the American experience, see subchapter 2.1.1.

“huddled masses yearning to breathe free,” and offering them hope for a better life “beside the golden door!”²⁶⁹

Secondly, people of different cultures who found themselves together in one country, started to create a sense of unity. However, neither a common history nor the same blood could bind immigrants in the US together, but only a shared set of ideals. As Seymour Martin Lipset confirms, “[b]eing an American is an ideological commitment. It is not a matter of birth. Those who reject American values are un-American.”²⁷⁰ Indeed, a set of American values, the American Creed, first coined by Gunnar Myrdal,²⁷¹ is considered one of the building blocks unifying people of many traditions and various cultural backgrounds. Historically, the Founding Fathers expressed the American Creed, laying the foundation for the United States in the Declaration of Independence and in the Constitution. As Henry Bischoff points out, “[f]rom such ideas a civic culture emerged that valued liberty, established an increasingly participatory democracy, included a bill of rights, and fostered open economic opportunity.”²⁷² As a result, the national unity in diversity of many ethno-racial groups has emerged. The motto *E Pluribus Unum*, out of many one, first used as a symbol for the political unity of the thirteen-state-country in the first Great Seal of the United States, has become a symbol of the American ideal.²⁷³ Certainly, the bonds among members of this American unity are much stronger than those among the countries in the European Union. The old and still common celebration of the American ideal of diversity has made the United States appear to be an immigration country in a way which no European immigration country ever has.

Although different cultural influences have been incorporated into the values of the American Creed, tolerance towards “otherness” is not unlimited. In fact, the American immigration and integration system works through the binary opposition of inclusion and exclusion: American versus “alien.” The challenge of striking a balance between the two American ideals, creating unity while respecting diversity, are part and parcel of American politics and culture. As a result, the third important symbol of the US as a nation of

²⁶⁹ From Emma Lazarus’ poem, *The New Colossus*, 1883. These lines were engraved on a bronze plaque on the pedestal of the Statue of Liberty in 1912.

²⁷⁰ Lipset, S. M. (1990). *Continental Divide: the Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada*. London: Routledge, p. 19.

²⁷¹ Myrdal, G. (1944). *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*. New York, NY: Harper & Bros.

²⁷² Bischoff, H. (2002). *Immigration Issues*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, p. 119.

For a more comprehensive discussion of the key layers of the American Creed see Huntington, S. P. (1981). The American Creed and National Identity. *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony*, 36-41.

A more updated interpretation of the American Creed as five basic tenets: liberty, equality, individualism, democracy, and the rule of law is to be found in: Ostendorf, B. (1996). Inclusion, Exclusion and the Politics of Cultural Difference. In P. O. Stummer and C. Balme (Eds.), *Fusion of Cultures* (pp. 207-223). Amsterdam: Rodopi.

²⁷³ *E pluribus unum* has become the national motto of the United States. It appears on the obverse side of the seal, on official US documents, and on most US currency.

immigrants emerged with the hyphen. Hyphenated America has become “an emblem of the immigrant bargain,” which is a consequence of the failed Americanization movement.²⁷⁴

Endless discussions exist among researchers about the question of which expression – diversified, unified or hyphenated – best describes the American nation of immigrants. Judging which concept is more appropriate or adding new perspectives to this debate is beyond the scope of this paper.²⁷⁵ Nevertheless, it can be argued that being American will always be an issue in the US national mode of integration as will be discussed in a later section of this chapter. As Jacoby rightly points out, referring to American political principles, “much as we celebrate the hyphen, one side of it is more important than the other.”²⁷⁶ The same principle also applies to American integration policies.

The second dimension of the US scale of diversity – diversity as fact – is much easier to measure owing to a wide range of available statistics and demographic reports on immigrants in the US.²⁷⁷ Based solely on the quantity and quality of available sources on US immigration, it might be assumed that monitoring ethnic diversification is a top priority at both state and national levels. In fact, the US government started publishing statistical data on immigration as early as the 1890s,²⁷⁸ whereas the first data on the birthplaces of the US population stem from the 1850 decennial census. Such a long-established system of regular data collection makes historical and comparative research on migration trends across the whole nation, particular states and at the local level much easier than on the other side of the Atlantic.²⁷⁹

The diversity of immigration in the US can be perceived through the prism of various categories of immigrants in the US statistics, which differ significantly from European ones. According to the Census Bureau, the term “foreign born” refers to a person with no US citizenship at birth, and includes naturalized citizens, lawful permanent residents, refugees and asylees, people on certain temporary visas, and the unauthorized. On the other hand,

²⁷⁴ See Jacoby, T., op. cit., p. 295.

²⁷⁵ For a comprehensive analysis of how American immigration policy has been used as a tool of American nation building from the colonial period to the present, see Zolberg, A. R., op. cit.

²⁷⁶ Jacoby, T., op. cit., p. 314.

²⁷⁷ In the dissertation I use US immigration sources, as recommended in Batalova, J., Mittelstadt, M., Mather, M., and Lee, M. (2008). *Immigration: Data Matters*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, and Population Reference Bureau.

These include: the US Census Bureau from various years, the American Community Survey, the 2000 decennial census, and the 2009 Current Population Survey; the US Departments of Homeland Security and State; resources from the Migration Policy Institute (MPI); resources from the Pew Hispanic Center. A big part of the data quoted comes from the statistical update in the article: Batalova, J. and Terrazas, A., op. cit.

²⁷⁸ United States Department of Homeland Security. (2010). *Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2009*. Washington, DC: US Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics.

²⁷⁹ In comparison to some EU countries, where available statistical data varies significantly (e.g. comparing few Polish sources with extensive German sources), US statistical sources on the foreign born population are detailed and comprehensive. On the other hand, monitoring integration is still underdeveloped, in comparison to Germany, for example. For an analysis of the US mode of integration, see subchapter 4.1.2.

the term “immigrant” in US statistics refers only to people granted legal permanent residence in the United States, also known as LPRs.²⁸⁰ However, for the purpose of this dissertation the term “immigrant” will be used interchangeably with foreign born people, following the standards set out in the introduction and also a common practice in US migration reports.²⁸¹

With reference to statistics on immigration youth, two types of immigrant children have to be distinguished: second-generation immigrant children, who are US-born children with at least one foreign-born parent; and first-generation immigrant children, which include any foreign-born children with foreign-born parents, collectively called children with immigrant parents (hereafter immigrant children). Nationwide research on this group of children is quite difficult to interpret due to certain shortcomings of existing data.²⁸² The available data on immigrant children comes from the decennial census and American Community Surveys, which did not ask respondents for their parents' country of birth if they did not live together in the same household. Consequently, the statistics collected on immigrant children reflect only those who reside with at least one parent. The majority of this population is under the age of 18. By the same token, research on the educational performance of second generation immigrant children is limited to local surveys and longitudinal studies.²⁸³

Despite variations in the intensity of incoming flows of immigrants into the United States in the two last centuries, the average number of all immigrants across the 50 states makes the US the top immigration host country in the world.²⁸⁴ The overall percentage of immigrants in the US population has been constantly increasing since its record low in 1970 (4.7%). According to the Census Bureau's 2009 American Community Survey, the current US immigrant population, estimated at 38,517,234, stood at 12.5% of the total US population in 2009.²⁸⁵ Immigrant children and youth (aged 5 to 24) accounted for almost 15% of all foreign born.²⁸⁶ The predominance of immigrants from Central America and Asia among all

²⁸⁰ Definition from United States Census Bureau. (n.d.). *American Fact Finder Glossary*.

²⁸¹ See chapter 1.

²⁸² The most recent census data comes from 2000. The Census Data of 2010 was not available at the time of writing.

Nationwide data collection on third generation immigrants in the US does not exist, in contrast to the recently introduced system of data collection on people with migration backgrounds in Germany, see subchapter 4.5.3.

²⁸³ For example, see The Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS), a decade-long panel survey conducted in San Diego, CA, and Miami/Ft. Lauderdale, FL. For the results see Portes, A. and Rumbaut, R. G. (2006). *Immigrant America: A Portrait*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. For an analysis of methods of data collection on second generation immigrants in the US see Heckathorn, D. D. (2006, October). Studying Second-Generation Immigrants: Methodological Challenges and Innovative Solutions. *Migration Information Source*.


²⁸⁴ United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs, *International Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision*, in Population Database: <http://esa.un.org/migration/>

²⁸⁵ This figure is still a bit below the record of 14.8% in 1890. The historical context for immigration in the US after WW II will be presented as background information with reference to historical insights into immigration in California and Arizona in subchapters 4.2.1 and 4.3.1.

²⁸⁶ Among them, 6.5% of the foreign born were between 5 and 17 and 8.4% were between 18 and 24 years age of age. These figures do not include second generation immigrant children due to limited

foreign born marks an important shift in recent immigration patterns.²⁸⁷ Of the entire foreign born population in 2009, the most numerous group according to the country of birth came from Mexico, which comprised almost 30% of the foreign born residing in the US. Mexico was followed by the Philippines, India and China, excluding Hong Kong and Taiwan (see graph 1).

Graph 1 Ten Source Countries with the Largest Populations in the US as Percentages of the Total Foreign-Born Population in 2009.



Source: The US Census Bureau's American Community Survey 2009

A distinct part of the US immigration landscape is shaped by refugees and asylees.²⁸⁸ For more than two decades refugees in the US have constituted one-tenth of the annual immigration into the country. They are beneficiaries of the well-known US Refugee Program (USR), which in cooperation with the UN Refugee Agency UNHCR has resettled more refugees than all of the other 24 current resettlement countries combined. Among new arrivals in 2009 74,602 refugees were reported, half of them under 25 years of age.²⁸⁹ The

statistical data. Available estimates come from 2009 report 16.9 million children age 17 and under with at least one immigrant parent.

²⁸⁷ For example, in 1960 almost every fourth immigrant (more than 23%) in the US had been born in Italy or Germany. In 2009 they accounted for less than 3% of the foreign-born population.

²⁸⁸ According to the US definition, refugees and asylees are persons who sought residence in the United States in order to avoid persecution in their country of origin. Persons granted refugee status applied for admission while outside the United States. Persons granted asylum applied either at a port of entry or at some point after their entry into the United States. United States Department of Homeland Security. (2010). *op. cit.*

²⁸⁹ Accordingly, in 2009 the top resettlement countries were the United States, followed by Australia (6,720) and Canada (6,582). Germany (2,064) had the largest number of resettled refugees in Europe in 2009.

number of resettled immigrants in 2009 was almost three times higher than during the steepest fall-off in resettlements in 2002 (when 26,765 refugees were accepted), though this figure is still far from the peak in 1980, when more than 200,000 refugees were admitted. Iraq, Burma, and Bhutan were the three top countries of origin in 2009.²⁹⁰

The number of foreign born who have successfully applied for asylum has been constantly decreasing since 2001 (with the exception of a small increase from 2005 to 2006), when almost 40,000 people were granted the status of asylees. Today the number of new asylees has decreased by almost 50% (to 22,119 in 2009). Nearly half of all asylees came from China (28%), Ethiopia (5%), Haiti (4.5%), Colombia (4.5%) and Iraq (4.1%).

It should be noted here that the average level of immigration presented for the whole US does reflect existing differences between US states. Graph 2 provides an overview of the geographical distribution of immigrants in the US. States also differ in terms of the main countries of birth of immigrants, which will be discussed in more detail in the subchapters on California and Arizona. However, certain general new trends in immigration patterns are worth mentioning here.

Although the long-established immigrant destinations, such as California (9,947,000), New York (4,178,000), Texas (3,985,000), Florida (3,484,000), and New Jersey (1,759,000), were still on top in 2009, other immigration destinations have been rapidly growing in popularity over the last decade, primarily in the Southeast and Midwest.²⁹¹

The states with the largest percent growth of the immigrant population between 2000 and 2009 include South Carolina (76.9%), Alabama (67.5%), Tennessee (67.1%), Delaware (64.9%), and Arkansas (63.2%) (see graph 3). Geographical resettlement patterns, in turn, are usually determined by the location of family members or pre-existing ethnic communities of incoming refugees. Almost one-half of all refugees were resettled in one of six states: California (15%), Texas (11%), New York (5.9%), Arizona (5.8%), Florida (5.6%) and Michigan (4.7%).


See UNHCR Resettlement Service, Division of International Protection. (2010). *UNHCR Projected Global Resettlement Needs 2011*. Geneva: UNHCR.

For historical insight into the development of refugee resettlement across the US, see Singer, A., and Wilson, J. H. (2006). *From 'There' to 'Here': Refugee Resettlement in Metropolitan America*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press

²⁹⁰ Followed by numerous groups from Iran, Cuba, Somalia, Eritrea, Vietnam, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Burundi. The annual admissions ceiling for refugees, which the President, in consultation with Congress, establishes prior to the beginning of each fiscal year, has declined by almost two-thirds in the last 31 years: to 80,000 in 2011. Many pro-refugee advocates persistently call for either increasing or abandoning the ceilings. See United States Department of State (2010). *Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2011: Report to the Congress*.

²⁹¹ Singer, A. (2009). *The New Geography of United States Immigration*. Brookings Immigration Series 3. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Graph 2 US States Ranked by Percent of Foreign Born in 2009



Source: The US Census Bureau's American Community Survey 2009

No demographic picture of immigration situation in the US would be complete without mentioning the magnitude of undocumented immigration. For years the issue of the unauthorized population has been the most contentious subject in political and social debates on immigration.²⁹² Consequently, there are many surveys monitoring unauthorized immigrants. As of January 2009 the Department of Homeland Security estimated 10.8 million unauthorized resident immigrants, of whom 63% entered before 2000 and 62% were from Mexico.²⁹³ These figures are corroborated by the estimates presented in the most recent report by the Pew Hispanic Center, from February 2011, which reported 11.2 million unauthorized immigrants living in the United States as of March 2010 (up to 3.7% of the nation's entire population), almost three times more than in 1990, but 8% less than in March 2007. Besides Mexico, the majority of undocumented immigrants are reported to come from Central America (12%), Asia (11%), South America (5%), and the Caribbean (3%). However, the recent years have seen a decrease in the size and annual inflows of unauthorized immigrants, predominantly among those who come from Latin American countries other than Mexico.²⁹⁴ Similarly, a decline in the population of undocumented foreign born children (immigrants under the age of 18) was noted: from 1.5 million in 2000 to 1.1 million in 2009. However, during the same period, the number of US-born children with at least one unauthorized parent increased by 42% from 2000 to 2009, when they numbered 5.1 million.

As a result, the percentage of children living in the households facing possible deportation of one or both parents must have grown significantly. Living in fear and with no access to public services for their family members integrating this group of US immigrant youth is much more challenging.²⁹⁵

Despite slight decreases, recent trends in the number of unauthorized people living in the US, the fact that 28.5%²⁹⁶ of all foreign born people in the country have an unregulated status, concerns both pro- and anti-amnesty activists and policymakers. In fact, the fierce discussions about unauthorized immigrants quite often seems to eclipse American pride in the "diversity ideal," which acknowledges the potential of immigrants and recognizes their

²⁹² See the section on the implications of legal status for integration in subchapter 4.1.3.

²⁹³ Hoefer, M., Rytina, N., and Baker, B. C. (2010). *Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States*. Washington, DC: US Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics.


²⁹⁴ The annual inflow of unauthorized immigrants to the United States was down by nearly two-thirds in the March 2007 to March 2009 period in comparison to the period March 2000 to March 2005. This data is based on the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey of 50,000 households each month. Passel, J. S., and Cohn, D. V. (2011). *Unauthorized Immigrant Population: National and State Trends, 2010*. Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center.

²⁹⁵ For more insights into the challenges of integration management of undocumented people in the US, see the section on the importance of legal status for integration in this subchapter and subchapters on San Diego and Phoenix in chapter 5.

²⁹⁶ This figure marks a decline of 3% from 2007. See Passel, J. S. and Cohn, D. V. (2011), op. cit.

valuable contribution to a multicultural society. In fact, the issue of irregular immigration appears omnipresent in any discussions of immigrant integration.²⁹⁷

Graph 3 US States Ranked by Percent Change in the Foreign-Born Population, 2000 to 2009



Source: MPI Data Hub (Migration Policy Institute)

²⁹⁷ The impact of this hot topic on many integration measures and the every-day life of immigrant youth will be discussed in the next section, analyzed in greater depth with reference to the public political discourse on immigration in Arizona and California, and finally highlighted by discussing the challenges for local integration management in San Diego and Phoenix.

4.1.2 US Mode of Integration

Both US history as a nation of settlers and contemporary responses to large-scale immigration, presented above, have tended to create an inaccurate image of the United States as a country where integration processes run smoothly. In fact, integration has been and continues to be a very painful and even violent process. The constant struggles of certain ethnic groups past and present to gain acceptance as equal members of American society serve as historical evidence of the ongoing challenges of immigrant integration.²⁹⁸ In fact, the success of newcomers' efforts toward integration and that of the second generations has not been determined so much by their migration backgrounds as by their race. Despite the great achievements of the Civil Rights Movement, exclusion from or inclusion in American society was and unfortunately still is determined by the skin color of the US residents. Current debates about integration in the US more often focus on the Latino population than on any other ethnic group. In fact, since most of the unauthorized immigrants are Hispanic, in some cases American citizens with brown skin are already potential suspects or integration outcasts. As my empirical research on the US case studies indicates, "the whites" sometimes have misgivings about the integration achievements of "the browns," regardless of whether an individual was born in the country or had just crossed the US border.²⁹⁹ The current situation may be reminiscent of the stigmatization of the black population or Native Americans in previous centuries. Paradoxically, those who were not in fact immigrants were expected to adapt to the culture of the white mainstream population of immigrants. Consequently, "a partial decoupling of migration and integration issues" in the US policies is nothing new.³⁰⁰

According to the principles outlined in the US Civil Rights Act, equal access to American opportunities for all people can be understood as integration into American society.³⁰¹ In fact, the US national mode of integration has its roots in the notion of the equality of all ethnic groups, without a special focus on immigrants. As Donald Kervin notes, the interplay between the rights and "integration" of immigrants is unique to the American

²⁹⁸ For an overview of integration challenges from the perspective of certain migration groups in US history, see Hochgeschwender, M. (2009). Migration – Religion – Integration: das Beispiel der Iren in den US. *Policy. Politische Akademie*, 30, 6-7.

²⁹⁹ For an analysis of the fear of the browning of America, expressed in Samuel Huntington's concept of the Clash of Civilizations see Ostendorf, B. (2005). "What Do You Mean 'We' White Man?" Samuel Huntington und die Krise der mexikanischen Einwanderung. *IMIS-Beiträge*, 27, 25-52.

³⁰⁰ Ibid.

³⁰¹ Rudiger, A. (2005). An Anglo-American Perspective. In R. Süßmuth and W. Weidenfeld (Eds.), *Managing Integration: The European Union's Responsibilities towards Immigrants* (pp. 16-25). Washington, DC: Bertelsmann Foundation and the Migration Policy Institute, p. 20.

experience: “The application of these core protections to non-citizens (i.e. civil rights) represent a fundamental form of ‘integration’ in our constitutional system.”³⁰²

Supporting the integration of immigrants was not part of any official American policy in the post-Second World War period. Integration measures for people under international protection, which have been administered by the Federal Refugee Resettlement Program since 1980, are merely a notable exception.³⁰³ Despite the ostensible guarantee of equal constitutional rights for all in the Civil Rights Act, certain federal policies restricting public benefits for non-citizens, introduced in 1996, started to delay the potential integration of some immigrants.³⁰⁴ As a result of legislative changes and the intensified surveillance of newcomers after 9/11 policy makers and migration think-tanks in the US began to debate integration with reference to migration. Only recently did the Federal Government demonstrate greater interest in managing immigrant integration. In fact, integration policies at local levels still remain ad hoc, under-funded, and lacking in any federal coordination strategy.

A growing consensus among American migration experts and local community-based organizations is arguing that federal immigrant integration tools, such as funding and a national plan for integration, are essential. Advocates for this position argue that the issue of immigrant integration should be more central to the nationwide calls for “comprehensive immigration reform,” a long desired reform that is supposed to overhaul the current immigration system which is unable to manage demographic, economic and social challenges arising from current immigration trends.³⁰⁵ As MPI experts claim, the laissez-fair approach to integration fails to address new challenges, such as increasing immigration flows since the 1990s, new immigrant destinations in the US, the rapid expansion of the number of unauthorized immigrants, the increasing number of low-income children of immigrants, and limited English proficiency among the student population.³⁰⁶

Just as there is no formal US integration policy, no official definition of integration exists either. Although extensive secondary literature on the concept of integration does

³⁰² Kervin, D. (2007). Immigrant Rights, Integration and the Common Good. In M. Fix (Ed.), *Securing the Future: US Immigrant Integration Policy, A Reader* (pp. 46-47). Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, p. 45.

³⁰³ For an overview of the official policy towards immigrants in the 19th century Americanization Movement, see chapter 2. Integration measures for refugees will be discussed in a later section of this subchapter.

³⁰⁴ See the section on the importance of legal status for integration in subchapter 4.1.3.

³⁰⁵ For examples of attempts to include integration policy into comprehensive immigration reform, see: - Fix, M. (2007). Comprehensive Immigration Reform. An Overview. In M. Fix (Ed.), *Securing the Future: US Immigrant Integration Policy, A Reader* (pp. III-XXVI). Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute;

- Stolz, R. (2009). *Principles of Immigration Reform. Immigration Reform in The 111th Congress*. Reform Immigration for America.

³⁰⁶ Meissner, D., Meyers, D. W., Papademetriou, D. G., and Fix, M. (2006). *Immigration and America's Future: A New Chapter*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, p. 72.

exist, only a few US federal agencies have made any attempt at defining integration.³⁰⁷ A more intense discussion was initiated in 2004 with the three-year project Building the New American Community (BNAC), funded primarily by the Office for Refugee Resettlement (ORR).³⁰⁸ The project was considered an “experiment,” faced with the absence of a national integration policy and federal integration initiatives. It focused on integration strategies among various stakeholders in refugee and immigrant assistance in three cities, Lowell (MA), Nashville (TN), and Portland (OR). The findings identified social and economic conditions and provided an incentive for the 2006 creation of the Integration Working Group (IWG) by the ORR. The goal of the group was to review and analyze the process of refugee integration into local communities in the United States. One of the first tasks was to develop a working definition of integration.³⁰⁹ After a round of consultations and modifications, the group members agreed upon a definition. According to their definition:

Integration is a dynamic, multidirectional process in which newcomers and the receiving communities intentionally work together, based on a shared commitment to acceptance and justice, to create a secure, welcoming, vibrant, and cohesive society.³¹⁰

As the IWG rightly points out, this definition focuses more on the integration process than expected integration outcomes, which became central to another federal integration project, the Task Force on New Americans. The Task Force, which operated for more than two years, was a federal interagency initiative launched by President George W. Bush at the time of the establishment of IWG (June 2006) whose target was to “help legal immigrants embrace the common core of American civic culture, learn our common language, and fully become Americans.”³¹¹ The Task Force, as its final report states, was established “to highlight the importance of successful immigrant integration to the nation” and inspire the development of a national strategy for integration efforts. The report, however, was very

³⁰⁷ For examples of American literature on the concept of integration, see chapter 2.

³⁰⁸ Coalitions to develop and experiment with integration strategies were formed in Lowell, Nashville and Portland, and assisted by a national team of policy analysts, advocates and researchers from the National Conference of State Legislatures, the National Immigration Forum, the Southeast Asia Resource Action Center, The Urban Institute, and the Migration Policy Institute. See the project report: Ray, B. K. (2004). *Building the New American Community Newcomer Integration and Inclusion Experiences in Non-Traditional Gateway Cities*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

³⁰⁹ The current definition is the latest one as revised many times by IWG members. During my visit to the ORR in April 2008 and in unrecorded conversations about the IWG Group I learned that the long revision process of the definition focused on small details, e.g. substituting the word “tolerance” with the word “acceptance.” Such a process shows the increasing importance of defining integration and the symbolic politics of integration not only in Europe but also in the US. On symbolic politics, see chapter 2.

³¹⁰ Gilbert, P., Hein, M., and Losby, J. (2010). *Exploring Refugee Integration: Experiences in Four American Communities*. Washington, DC: ISED Solutions.

³¹¹ Task Force on New Americans. (2008). *Building an Americanization Movement for the Twenty-first Century: A Report to the President of the United States from the Task Force on New Americans*. Washington, DC: US Department of Homeland Security.

ambiguous regarding a consistent definition of integration, combining it with the common and overdetermined concepts of adaptation and incorporation into the American nation. As one can read:

The integration efforts described in this report are a federal call to action that defines a modern-day Americanization movement [...] Americanization is the process of integration by which immigrants become part of our communities and by which our communities and the nation learn from and adapt to their presence. Americanization means the civic incorporation of immigrants; this is the cultivation of a shared commitment to the American values of liberty, democracy and equal opportunity.³¹²

In fact, the Task Force focused on promoting the ideology of the old Americanization movement in the form of a new so-called Americanization Movement for the Twenty-first Century, in which integration is employed as a better-sounding alternative to assimilation.

The rhetoric of this new Americanization Movement is reflected in the officially declared concept of integration measures which are now defined by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in terms of civic integration. Accordingly, the federal strategy for civic integration activities targets only those who aspire to American citizenship and provides “instruction and training on citizenship rights and responsibilities [and] information and tools necessary to successfully integrate into American civic culture.”³¹³ Neither the Task Force’s groundwork nor the above understanding of civic integration as a final, completed stage in becoming an American citizen is consistent with the aforementioned process-oriented concept of integration, proposed by IWG. Consequently, much still has to be done to conceptualize integration in terms of one coherent and generally accepted formal definition for US integration policy.

As no formal definition of integration has yet been developed, federal integration policy is still fragmented. No single federal agency is solely dedicated to developing and monitoring integration policies. Nevertheless, a number of agencies from various US departments, which oversee state legislation and funding programs that touch on various parts of immigrant lives, do have an impact on the process of immigrant integration at the state and local levels.

The only comprehensive federal integration program is run by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) through the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). The program is aimed at refugees and asylees, victims of severe forms of human trafficking, certain Amerasians from Vietnam, Cuban and Haitian entrants, and unaccompanied alien children (henceforth referred to collectively by the ORR as “refugees”). Since its

³¹² Ibid., p. X

³¹³ United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. (2008). *US Civics and Citizenship Online Resource Center for Instructors*.

establishment by the 1980 Refugee Act, the ORR has been offering programs and grants, as well as supporting and cooperating with State Refugee Coordinators and local partners, to provide target groups with assistance upon their arrival and over the longer term. The goal of the assistance is to help refugees and asylees achieve economic self-sufficiency as quickly as possible in the first six to eight months after their arrival.³¹⁴ The traditional resettlement programs, as administered by the states, initially provide refugees with funding for food, shelter and clothing, medical care for up to eight months³¹⁵ and social services (like education, health care, and mental health services) for up to five years. The state agencies coordinate with local branches of 11 National Voluntary Resettlement Agencies (so-called VOLAGs),³¹⁶ which in turn partner with other local resettlement organizations (affiliates), in some states forming a well-organized refugee assistance network.³¹⁷

Some alternatives to state-managed programs include funding opportunities for resettlement agencies which can apply directly to the ORR for assistance. Examples of such programs are the Matching Grant (MG) Program for VOLAGs offering refugee assistance projects which provide employment for periods of four to six months, or the Wilson Fish Program, which also focuses on the economic self-sufficiency of refugees (while providing assistance for a longer period of time) and network-building in local communities where immigrants are resettled. Moreover, many ORR discretionary programs are awarded competitively to public and private non-profit organizations which engage in different fields of refugee integration, for example School Impact Education grants to assist schools receiving large numbers of refugee children or the Microenterprise Development Program, offering training and technical assistance in business plan development and other skills refugees need in order to become successful entrepreneurs.³¹⁸ Despite a wide range of funding opportunities for refugee integration, many recent reports on the refugee situation have

³¹⁴ To measure early self-sufficiency, indicators of employment and family income are used at 30, 90, 120, and 180 days after arrival.

³¹⁵ If the applicants do not meet the eligibility requirements for entering federal benefits programs, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly food stamps) are available. The ORR provides Refugee Cash Assistance (RCA) and Refugee Medical Assistance (RMA) for up to eight months from the date of their eligibility for the program.

³¹⁶ VOLAGs have cooperative agreements with the US Department of State Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM). The PRM provides reception and placement services to newly arrived refugees in the United States. There are more than 10 nationally-recognized VOLAGs in the US, some of them have more experience with refugees than the USRP. VOLAGs include Church World Service (CWS); World Relief Corporation (WR); Ethiopian Community Development Council (ECDC); Episcopal Migration Ministries (EMM); International Rescue Committee (IRC); Kurdish Human Rights Watch; the US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI); the US Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB); the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service (LIRS); the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS); the State of Iowa, Bureau of Refugee Services.

³¹⁷ For more details on Arizona and California see subchapters 4.2 and 4.3.

³¹⁸ This information was obtained during my visit to the ORR in April 2008 and materials provided by Ron Munia, Co-Director, Division of Community Resettlement (DCR), Office of Refugee Resettlement Administration for Children and Families, Department of Health and Human Services

drawn attention to the dire need for increasing available funds.³¹⁹ Similarly, federal funding for resettlement assistance is too little and provided for too short a time to enable refugees to achieve self-sufficiency and integration, which poses a big challenge for the ORR administration and for efficient labor market integration in the US in the US Resettlement Program.

Other agencies which are responsible for immigration policy, apart from the US Resettlement Program, were restructured by the Homeland Security Act, signed by President George W. Bush in the aftermath of 9/11 in November 2002. Accordingly, the functions of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which was abolished in March 2003, were transferred from the Department of Justice and divided among three offices of the newly-created Department of Homeland Security (DHS). As Berndt Ostendorf points out, this relocation marked a significant change in the perception of immigration and integration, which are not only a focus of consideration for the economic stability of the US labor market, as in the past, but simultaneously became first and foremost a subject of national security policy.³²⁰

Of the three new offices of the DHS, the USCIS is the federal stakeholder in the program for civic integration mentioned earlier.³²¹ As a spearhead of the Task Force on New Americans, the USCIS concentrated on promoting the ideology of the new Americanization Movement. At the end of 2008 the Task Force launched the US Government's official web portal for new immigrants and immigrant-receiving communities, *WelcometoUSA.gov*,³²² which provides immigrants with basic information on life in the US and the government. One of the civic integration tools *Welcome to the United States: A Guide for New Immigrants and Communities* offers educational materials and training methods on the rights and responsibilities of citizenship (e.g. a *Civics and Citizenship Toolkit*).³²³

³¹⁹ Although there was an increase in the per capita grant funds throughout the period from FY2006 to FY2010, many refugee resettlement agencies have called for further increases in budget planning for ORR grants. See:

- Adess, S., et al. (Eds.). (2009). *Refugee Crisis in America*. Washington, DC: Human Rights Institute Georgetown Law.

- Bruno, A. (2011). *US Refugee Resettlement Assistance*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.

³²⁰ The INS had previously been located in the Department of Labor, which was transferred to the Department of Justice in 1940. For more on the impact of 9/11 on the immigration debates and public discourse in the US, see Ostendorf, B. (2007). *Einwanderungsland USA? Zwischen NAFTA und Terrorismus*. Rat für Migration: Politische Essays zu Migration und Integration, 1.

³²¹ Civic integration is only one of many USCIS tasks, which include processing citizenship applications, family reunification, work authorization, an E-verification system, humanitarian programs (including processing applications for refugee status and asylum), inter-country adoption programs, and researching genealogy. The other two agencies, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP), deal with immigration enforcement and border security.

³²² *WelcometoUSA.gov*. Home page: <http://www.welcometoUSA.gov>

³²³ At the time of my field research in Phoenix and San Diego, in 2008, the *Guide* had just been launched and translated into several languages. During my telephone consultations about USCIS integration programs, the Public Officer talked me into ordering the newly-published Polish translation

Since naturalization still remains one of the ultimate goals of federal integration measures, the focus on citizenship courses, which are supposed to prepare immigrants for US citizenship, comprise the core of the development of USCIS integration measures. Their purpose is to make immigrants perform competently at naturalization interviews and to pass tests.³²⁴ For example, the Citizenship Resource Web-based portal, launched in September 2010, offers user-friendly access to information specifically divided into sections for learners, teachers, and community-based organizations. Although the portal primarily focuses on promoting citizenship courses, it also presents examples of promising local practices, which not only increases access to citizenship services but also engages “the general public in the successful integration of newcomers” (e.g. recruiting volunteer English language assistants or initiating an information campaign on immigrant cultures).³²⁵ The exchange of best practices on topics other than naturalization might one day lead to a shift away from the USCIS’s focus on civic education towards a more comprehensive vision of integration.

Just recently, the USCIS started offering funds for integration, supplementing the Department of Education’s existing civic education grant program, which will be described in the next section. USCIS Citizenship Grants aim to expand the number of citizenship preparation programs for selected community-based organizations. Since its first year of operation, in 2009, the program has expanded in budget, categories of possible applicants, numbers of beneficiaries, and scope. In fiscal Year 2011, the USCIS is offering three competitive grant funding opportunities, with a total budget of \$8.5 million, designed “to help prepare permanent residents for citizenship and promote immigrant integration.”³²⁶ More specifically, only those organizations can apply for grants which aim to provide permanent residents with citizenship instruction in civics and English (in Citizenship and Integration Direct Services Grant Programs) or with other sub-applicants create comprehensive long-term capacity programs for citizenship courses and naturalization services (in the National Capacity Grant Program). Although the USCIS grant programs do not directly support integration measures for the labor market integration of immigrant youth, naturalization is a very important step toward guaranteeing each young immigrant security and social benefits.

Besides recently allotted integration funds, the USCIS reaches out states and local communities through the Office of Public Engagement, which cooperates with other USCIS

free of charge. The enthusiasm and pride in spreading the news about their “integration work” was remarkable.

³²⁴ For more on naturalization tests, see subchapter 4.1.3.

³²⁵ Citizenship Resource Website: <http://www.uscis.gov/citizenship>

³²⁶ The Office of Citizenship offered its first grant program in 2008. Under the 2008 Omnibus Appropriations Act, the Office of Citizenship was able to provide a total of \$450,000 in grants to support citizenship preparation programs. The FY 2008 funding opportunity was restricted to two organizations in New York City: the Northern Manhattan Coalition for Immigrant Rights, and the Citizens Advice Bureau (now called Bronx Works). The past two years has seen a significant increase in funding over previous years. In 2009, the USCIS awarded 13 community-based organizations a total of \$1.2 million to expand citizenship preparation programs, followed in 2010 by \$7.8 million granted to 75 organizations.

field offices across the states in order establish good communications between the USCIS agency and local stakeholders (such as governors, legislatures, mayor's offices, employers, and community-based organizations). A national network of Community Relations Officers (CROs) across the US, which is managed by the USCIS Community Relations and Engagement Division, is seeking to establish a dialog between the Federal Government and immigrants and immigrants and the receiving communities. The Officers monitor local partnerships and give feedback to the USCIS Agency on local programs and integration initiatives for immigrants in the regions for which they are responsible.³²⁷

Both the USCIS and the ORR could be considered the forerunners of still skeletal federal integration policies. Other integration measures in other federal agencies, which will be highlighted in the next sections of this chapter, contribute to the patchwork of integration programs, which can facilitate the transition of immigrant youth into the labor market. Moreover, the emerging bottom-up network of local non-governmental organizations and governmental integration stakeholders plays a crucial role in the lobby work seeking the development of a US mode of integration. It is worth noting that the current language on integration, which is quite new at the federal level, describes many processes which were taking place at the local level for generations without much federal attention. In fact, much of the integration work of these local organizations had simply gone unnoticed for a long time. Only recently have these organizations started to unite through new nationwide integration initiatives such as the annual National Immigrant Integration Conference (which met for the first time in 2009)³²⁸ or the US Immigrant Integration Network (which first met in 2010).³²⁹

Indeed, any plans for comprehensive immigration reform must take into consideration the experience of bottom-up initiatives, whose integration work for immigrant youth will be discussed in the US case studies in chapter 5. As Doris Meissner rightly points out: "the admonition against fixing what isn't broken should be a guiding principle in examining the issues underlying immigrant integration."³³⁰ Moreover, only by analyzing the importance of legal status for integration processes in the US can one really begin to understand why most

³²⁷ The efficiency of this work depends on the size of the region the CRO has to monitor. For example, while doing my empirical research in Phoenix in 2008, one officer was responsible for the two states of Nevada and Arizona.

³²⁸ After two successful conferences with a growing number of participants, 300 attendees in Denver in 2009 and 475 attendees in Boston in 2010, the event is going to be continued in October 2011 in Seattle, WA. Again, policy makers and community-based organizations, service providers and the governmental sector are going to decide on pending issues for fostering integration policies at the local, state and national levels. See National Immigrant Integration Conference (NIIC), <http://www.integrationconference.org>

³²⁹ The creation of the Network by the Migration Policy Institute's National Center on Immigrant Integration Policy was inspired by the MPI's E Pluribus Unum Prize, a national awards program that since 2009 has annually provided four \$50,000 prizes to exceptional initiatives which promote immigrant integration. See E Pluribus Unum Prize. Web page: <http://www.migrationinformation.org/integrationawards/>


³³⁰ Meissner, D. (2007). Introduction. In M. Fix (Ed.), *Securing the Future: US Immigrant Integration Policy, A Reader* (pp. I-II). Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

federal immigrant integration measures target civic education and transforming immigrants into New Americans.

4.1.3 Legal Status

The US is not only known worldwide as a nation of immigrants but also as a nation of laws. Indeed, the country boasts a complicated set of categories of potential legal ways of entering and remaining in the country, categories which entail different constraints or benefits for immigrants. Thus, structural integration of the youth residing in the US depends to a great extent on a “continuum of consent,” i.e. the degree to which the government has consented to their stay in the country.³³¹ Whether immigrant youth have the status of temporary visitors, legal permanent residents, US citizens or belong to the undocumented population determines their welfare situation and consequently their path toward successful integration into the labor market.

Graph 4 Legal Status of the US Foreign-Born Population, 2010



Source: Pew Hispanic Center, 2011

Foreigners residing in the US temporarily on a particular type of visa are formally called temporary admissions or non-immigrants.³³² They constituted the smallest group of all

³³¹ Fix, M. (2007), op. cit.

³³² There are 24 temporary visa categories and more than 70 subcategories of nonimmigrant admissions, encompassing a wide range of specialized purposes. The system has been the object of much criticism from the MPI for being unnecessarily complex and not efficiently meeting labor market

foreign-born people in the US in 2010 (see graph 4). Since they have been allowed to enter the US only for a specific purpose, they are restricted to engaging temporarily in the particular array of activities specified by their visa, and they are eligible for few benefits and services. Legal Permanent Residents (LPRs), who, as previously mentioned, are the only group of foreigners officially called immigrants,³³³ also known as Green Card Holders, have a permanent right to live and work in the United States. However, their eligibility for federal and state benefits and grants also varies. Refugees, asylees, and those LPRs who have worked for a longer period of time in the US, or have served in the military, have access to a wide range of social assistance. Other LPRs face different eligibility requirements, dependent on the type of benefits and state regulations. Since the enactment of the controversial Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996, many restrictions have been imposed on the eligibility of many legal immigrants who have been in the United States for less than five years. As a result, their lack of access to core social federal benefits may negatively impact the welfare situation of immigrant youth from low-income families.³³⁴ Although LPRs vary in their access to federal and state benefits, they can be still regarded on the whole as the most privileged group of non citizens in the US, together with refugees, who enjoy nearly the same privileges as US citizens.

People seeking legal permanent residence in the United States can apply either from outside the United States or by obtaining LPR status once inside the United States. They can qualify for LPR status through three main immigration streams, guaranteed by US immigration law: family reunification, employment sponsorship, or humanitarian protection (refugee and asylum adjustments one year after admittance as a refugee or asylee). In certain cases an applicant may be granted Conditional Permanent Residence for two years (e.g. as a family member of a US citizen; or an immigrant entrepreneur), which requires a petition for the removal of a set conditions 90 days before their green card expires. Over the

needs. See Meissner, D., Meyers, D. W., Papademetriou, D. G., and Fix, M. (2006). *Immigration and America's Future: A New Chapter*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, p. 37.

³³³ For more insight on who is an official immigrant in the US, see also the later section of this subchapter.

³³⁴ PRWORA's restrictions refer to four major federal means-tested benefit programs: the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly food stamps), the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant programs, and Medicaid. The 1996 welfare law authorized states to determine which immigrants qualify for state-funded benefits as long as the state legislation is not more restrictive than the standards set by PRWORA. Some states have restored state-based benefits not available for immigrants ineligible under federal law. Only government-subsidized health insurance was restored through the reauthorization of the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) of 2009, which expanded the programs to cover legal immigrant children. PRWORA turned into a highly disputed piece of legislation, raising huge barriers to immigrant integration. For more discussion see:

- Fix, M. (Ed.). (2010). *Immigrants and Welfare: The Impact of Welfare Reform on America's Newcomers*. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation Publications;

- Wasem, R. E. (2010). *Noncitizen Eligibility for Federal Public Assistance: Policy Overview and Trends*. Federal Publications. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service;

- Motomura, H. (2006). *Americans in Waiting*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

last few years many backlogs have been reported in processing applications for LPRs, which prolong the waiting period of immigrant youth seeking LPR status. There have been improvements in recent years, especially in reference to family reunification processing for minor children of LPRs.³³⁵

Another option for people from overseas to settle in the US as LPRs is to take part in a diversity lottery. The Diversity Immigrant Visa Program, which was created in 1990, randomly selects winners of Green Cards. The number is set at an annual quota of 55,000 visas. Applicants for the status of diversity immigrant have to meet certain eligibility requirements: they have to come from countries with low rates of immigration to the United States and possess an adequate level of education or work experience.³³⁶

Due to restrictions in the 1996 welfare reform law, citizenship is the only gateway to full structural integration for a young person, the only option for developing their potential with social and legal protection. Besides eligibility for federal grants and scholarships, US citizens possess other additional rights which are often not available to LPRs. These include the right to vote in federal, state and local elections, to serve on a jury, perform certain federal jobs, and run for elected federal office. Probably the most important right for immigrants is the right to residential security, i.e. protection against deportation.³³⁷ Consequently, citizenship is probably the most valued status, primarily for practical rather than patriotic reasons, a sense of loyalty and commitment to the US as advanced by the federal government. Moreover, another encouraging factor for applying for US citizenship is the fact that people naturalized as US citizens usually need not give up citizenship in their country of birth.

US citizenship is granted according to either the *jus soli*-principle, based on birth in US in line with 14th Amendment to the US Constitution, or the *jus sanguinis*-principle, which means that at least one parent was born in the US. Recent state proposals and anti-immigration coalitions across the US have been trying to strip *jus soli* rights from children of unauthorized immigrants, a topic that will be discussed in later sections of this chapter. Securing US citizenship after birth is relatively easy for LPRs. They need only live in the US as a permanent resident for at least five years, or three years if married to and living with a US citizen. LPRs are granted immediate citizenship upon joining the military.³³⁸ As required

³³⁵ Backlogs occur for two main reasons: 1) the government's cap on employment-based permanent visas for foreign workers and their families, and 2) processing delays of applicants' documents. See Batalova, J. and Terrazas, A., op. cit.

Comparing statistics from US State Department from 2006 and 2010, the period from the date of submission of an LPR application to its processing by the USCIS decreased from almost six years to eight months. Based on my comparison of data from: US Department of State, Visa Bulletin No. 95, Vol. VIII, July 2006 and US Department of State, Visa Bulletin, No 27 Vol. IX, December, 2010.

³³⁶ The level is high school education or its equivalent; or two years of work experience within the past five years in an occupation requiring at least two years' training or experience.

³³⁷ See United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. (2007). *Welcome to the United States: A Guide for New Immigrants*, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.

³³⁸ A person who wants to apply for naturalization has to: 1) Live in the US as a permanent resident for a specific period of time (Continuous Residence); 2) Be present in the US for specific time periods

by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), each candidate, in addition, has to pass a naturalization test in civics and English.³³⁹

The last decades have witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of naturalizations. On average about 140,000 lawful permanent residents were naturalized each year in the 1970s, almost 500,000 in the 1990s, and more than 600,000 in the 2000-2008 period.³⁴⁰ Data from *2009 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics* reports 743,715 naturalizations in 2009, of which nearly 20% were young immigrant adults between the ages of 18 and 29 (see table 2).

For nearly 4% of the entire population, the percentage who were estimated to be residing in the US illegally in 2010, the path to American citizenship is currently blocked. In fact, their future in the US is in question due to a number of recent, controversial laws at the federal and state levels, directed against “illegals,” and the continuing lack of a comprehensive immigration reform program which might pave the way to legalization. The last amnesty program, passed by the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), dates back to 1986,³⁴¹ when the scale of unauthorized immigration was still insignificant compared to the current figures. In addition, some unauthorized immigrants might be able to obtain Temporary Protected Status (TPS), initially for a period of between 6 and 18 months, under a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990 but then possibly face returning to unauthorized status.³⁴²

(Physical Presence); 3) Spend specific amounts of time in a particular state or USCIS district (Time in State or USCIS District); 4) Behave in a legal and acceptable manner (Good Moral Character); 5) Know English and be familiar with US history and the form of government (English and Civics); 6) Understand and accept the principles of the US Constitution (Attachment to the Constitution). Ibid., pp. 93-100.

³³⁹ Section 312 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The new US naturalization test, in use since October 2008, became a requirement for all naturalization applicants on October 1, 2009. It consists of a civics component on American history and the government (10 civics questions from a list of 100 questions), and an English oral, reading and writing component. Data collected since October 1, 2008 indicates that applicant performance is relatively consistent with that of the previous test (in 2010 the pass rate was 92%, compared to 91% in 2008). See United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. (2010). Applicant Performance on the Naturalization Test - September 2010.

³⁴⁰ The number of naturalizations reached a record high of more than 1 million during the presidential elections in 2008. For more on naturalization trends in the US, see Passel, J. S. (2007). *Growing Share of Immigrants Choosing Naturalization*. Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center.

³⁴¹ Two groups of immigrants were eligible for legalization under the IRC of 1986: 1) foreign born people who had been unlawfully residing in the United States since before January 1, 1982 and 2) foreign-born people employed in seasonal agricultural work for a minimum of 90 days in the year prior to May 1986. According to Nancy Rytina's report, almost 2.7 million persons-nearly nine in ten applicants for temporary residence-were ultimately approved for permanent residence, see Rytina, N. (2002). *IRCA Legalization Effects: Lawful Permanent Residence and Naturalization through 2001*. Paper presented at The Effects of Immigrant Legalization Programs on the United States: Scientific Evidence on Immigrant Adaptation and Impacts on U.S. Economy and Society, The Cloister, Mary Woodward Lasker Center, NIH Main Campus, October 25.

³⁴² The data is very limited, but this “quasi-legal” group may account for as much as 10% of the unauthorized population. See Passel, J. S. and Cohn, D. V. (2011), op. cit.

Table 2 People who obtained Legal Permanent Resident, Refugee, Asylee and Citizen Status in the US, 2009

	Total	Youth (15-29 years of age)*	Youth percentage share of the total
<i>LPRs</i>	1,130,818	346,489	30.6
<i>Refugees</i>	74,602	25,217	33.8
<i>Asylees</i>	22,119	4,752	21.5
<i>Naturalized</i>	743,715	148,187	19.9

* In the case of naturalized youth, 18- 29 years of age

Source: My own calculations based on *2009 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics*

Immigrants, seeking better employment opportunities than those available in their home countries, are attracted by the steady demand for low-skilled workers in the US and strive to find ways to start their lives “in the promised land.” The sources of unauthorized immigrants are various. According to available sources, “illegal” immigrants have entered the United States without valid documents, overstayed the terms of their temporary visas or otherwise violated the terms of their entry. Passing through border control with fake documents or making dangerous border crossings and escaping official inspection have been the most commonly reported practices. The decisions of many undocumented labor immigrants to bring children and families and settle down have resulted in a significant number of undocumented immigrant youth. Like their parents, they are barred from obtaining federal benefits except for emergency and Medicaid. Moreover, they face legal apprehensions and obviously hardship in their school-to-work transition.³⁴³ Their situation is becoming even more uncertain faced with the development of the federal “enforcement-first,” otherwise known as the “enforcement only,” approach in federal immigration policies in the last two decades. Firstly, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 strengthened enforcement rules, making any immigrant at risk of immediate deportation for minor offences and barred from legal reentry for up to ten years.³⁴⁴ Secondly, legislation in the aftermath of 9/11 imposed further restrictions on the undocumented. Among other border enforcement provisions, The Real ID Act of 2005 barred immigrants unable to document their legal status from obtaining driver's licenses.³⁴⁵

³⁴³ According to the Pew Hispanic Center report, in March 2008, i.e. the year of my empirical research, immigrants aged 15-29 constituted 33% of all unauthorized immigrants in the US. Passel, J. S. and Cohn, D. V. (2009). *A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States*. Washington DC: Pew Hispanic Center.

³⁴⁴ The deportation procedures hastened by the IIRIRA affect both legally and illegally residing immigrant youth, and their families, who have been found guilty of minor offences, which raises the concern of human rights advocates, for example: Baum, J., Jones, R., and Barry, C. (2010). *In the Child's Best Interest? The Consequences of Losing a Lawful Immigrant Parent to Deportation*. Berkeley, CA: University of California.

³⁴⁵ A driver's license in American society, where the car is so important, is one of the keys to self-sufficiency (getting to and from work) and consequently immigrant structural integration.

The US enforcement-only immigration policies have gained nationwide attention since 2006, following massive, peaceful immigration protest marches organized in cities across the US. The protest marches were a reaction to the extreme anti-immigration proposal of the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, which would have made not only the presence of the unauthorized a felony offence but also providing these immigrants with service and assistance.³⁴⁶ Although the proposal to criminalize undocumented and those who provide them with aid has not yet passed, further plans on the part of the federal government and state legislatures to restrict unauthorized immigration have been introduced. The campaign for a Comprehensive Immigration Reform and the still unsuccessful fight to pass the Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, which would allow for the legalization of an educated group of undocumented immigrant youth, are still contentious and both continue to gain opponents and proponents among Republicans and Democrats.³⁴⁷ For example, the recent attempts to repeal birthright citizenship for the US-born children of unauthorized immigrants, proposed by so-called Birthright Citizenship Act of 2009, represents an ongoing debate about the legal rights of immigrants and their US-born “anchor babies,” to use the language of anti-immigration movements, who obtain US citizenship rights in this way under current legislation.³⁴⁸

In conclusion, the legal framework for immigrants’ presence in the US does not appear to facilitate the integration of immigrant youth, unless they aspire for naturalization once they turn 18. Indeed, young immigrants need to become US citizens to be able to receive full rights and access to benefits necessary for their transition from adolescence into secure adult life. Moreover, the process of integration for a significant percentage of young US citizens who live in mixed status households may be impaired by an atmosphere of fear that their family members may be deported at any time.³⁴⁹ It is worth mentioning that federal legal constraints can either be strengthened or eased by state legislatures and public

³⁴⁶ For an analysis of the development of the “enforcement first” approach, see:

- Magner, T. (2007). *Immigration Reform: Failure and Prospects*. Cambridge: Center for International Studies;

- Wasem, R. E. (2007). *Immigration Reform: Brief Synthesis of Issue*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.

³⁴⁷ For more on the DREAM Act, see the later sections of this chapter. Highly politicized public discussions about immigration issues in the US originate from unresolved conflicting positions on immigration legislation even within the same political parties. For more about the framework of the US immigration debate among Democrats and Republicans from historical and current perspectives, see Ostendorf, B. (2007). *Einwanderungsland USA? Zwischen NAFTA und Terrorismus*. Rat für Migration: Politische Essays zu Migration und Integration 1.

³⁴⁸ According to a recent MPI report, instead of shrinking the size of the unauthorized population the Birthright Citizenship Act would likely expand it. For more on the fallacies of the Birthright Citizenship Act 2009 and potentially dangerous implications, see Van Hook, J. (2010). *The Demographic Impact of Repealing Birthright Citizenship*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

³⁴⁹ In 2008 mixed-status family groups, that is, families comprised of one or more unauthorized immigrants and their US citizen children, numbered 8.8 million people. See Passel, J. S. and Cohn, D. V. (2009), op. cit.

discourse, which will be discussed in reference to California and Arizona in the next subchapters.

Obtaining citizenship is by far the best path to immigrant integration. Nevertheless, the barriers and provisions for integration which exist for immigrant youth in the US states are also determined by federal policies in the field of education and the labor market.

4.1.4 US Integration Frameworks for Education and Labor Market

The self-sufficiency and independence expected of individuals in achieving their goals, the values promoted in daily life, are visible in the laissez-faire attitude toward immigrant education and the immigrant youth transition from school to work on the part of the US federal government. The expression “sink or swim” has often been used in migration research to describe a general American attitude toward the educational needs of immigrants and their advancement on the local labor market.³⁵⁰ However, a few federal immigrant programs and some legislation, which will be examined in this section, may provide assistance to some young immigrant “swimmers.” This section will outline the situation of immigrant youth across the nation and the federal response to their integration into the educational, vocational training, and labor market systems, which have an impact on state and local policies to a certain extent.

Only in the late 1960s (with the Bilingual Education Act of 1969) did the federal government start recognizing the inequalities of the educational opportunities for an immigrant population with a limited ability to speak English.³⁵¹ Today, the support of the federal government is still dependent upon the decisions of state and local governments and their education policies. Federal contributions to what are generally ad hoc US immigrant integration policies mark a gradual yet important change in the federal involvement in immigrant integration management in the traditionally highly-decentralized American education system.


The responsibilities and funding for the US education system are divided among many actors: the federal government, the states, local authorities, individual schools, and institutions of higher education. The federal government generally plays the role of an “emergency response system,” a means of filling gaps in state and local support for

³⁵⁰ As Frank F. Furstenberg and others remark, the parental emotional and material support for the privileged youth groups still help them to “swim.” However, in the US the young must learn to navigate the educational system and the labor market system on their own quite early. In fact, immigrant youth “sink” much earlier and more often, lacking knowledge and resources within their immigrant family. See Furstenberg, F., Settersten, R., and Rumbaut, R. G. (2005), op. cit.

³⁵¹ This is relatively late, considering the massive waves of immigration to the US earlier in the 20th century. See Murray, J., Batalova, J., and Fix, M. (2007). *Educating the Children of Immigrants*. In M. Fix (Ed.), *Securing the Future: US Immigrant Integration Policy, A Reader* (pp. 125-152). Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

education when critical national needs arise.”³⁵² In fact, there is no national Ministry of Education. The nationwide leadership role of the federal Department of Education (ED) in US education is focused on raising national and local awareness of the educational challenges and best practices across the states in teaching and learning.

Graph 5 Education System in the US



Source: The National Center for Education Statistics

³⁵² United States Department of Education. (n.d.) The Federal Role in Education. Overview.

The states administer most aspects of education at K-12 (which includes elementary and secondary levels) and postsecondary levels (see graph 5). Among other duties, the states are responsible for providing funding for public education, setting policies for learning and teaching standards, and assessments, except for higher education. They also exercise oversight over educational services for special needs populations, including English Language Learners (ELLs).³⁵³ Local communities operate schools, implement state laws and policies, develop curricula, supervise professional teaching staffs, and sometimes develop their own educational policies. Consequently, most policies and programs for immigrant students are developed and implemented either at the school district level, governed by school boards (in public schools at the elementary and secondary levels), or individual school level (in private schools or institutions of higher education).

Similarly, the greater part of nationwide spending on education at all levels comes from state, local (usually through property taxes) and private sources. According to a recent federal report, the federal contribution to elementary and secondary education for school year 2010-2011 is about 10.8 percent, which includes funds not only from ED but also from programs at other federal agencies, directly or indirectly supporting immigrant population at all ages.³⁵⁴ The federal contributions still seem insufficient in view of the resulting problems that American education and vocational systems currently face.

The ELL performance gap is considered one of the most challenging issues confronting the US education system at present. The demands for programs and the implementation of legislation targeting ELL immigrant youth has been growing along with the massive increase in immigrants over the last few years.³⁵⁵ According to the results of the US Census Bureau's American Community Survey, more than half of the whole foreign population five years of age and older were reported to be non-proficient users of the English language. Of more than 5.3 million students enrolled in the 2007-2008 school year, almost half million children were ELL students,³⁵⁶ an increase of more than 50% over the last 10 years. In addition, some worrisome trends were present in the results of the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), the only on-going and nationally representative assessment of K-12 students in the US. According to the 2010 NAEP report the average reading score for twelfth-grade ELLs was lower and their reading performance

³⁵³ In national statistics, either ELL or Limited English Proficient (LEP) is used to refer to people who are still in the process of learning English. In the dissertation the term ELL is used.

³⁵⁴ US Department of Education (n.d.), op. cit.

³⁵⁵ For more information on educational statistics, see later parts of this subchapter.

³⁵⁶ ELLs may also include cases of US non-immigrant students of low literacy. However, it is commonly accepted that the increasing number of immigrants is generally responsible for the increasing number of ELL students in US public schools. It should be noted that the exact definition of ELL may vary between states. On the need to standardize ELL testing, see Wolf, M. K., Herman, and J. L., Diete, R. (2010). *Improving the Validity of English Language Learner Assessment Systems. CRESST Policy Brief 10*. Los Angeles, CA: University of California, National Center for Research on Evaluation, Standards, and Student Testing (CRESST).

more often below basic level in 2009 when compared to 2005.³⁵⁷ The number of non-proficient English speakers differs significantly from state to state but generally more than 55% of all schools across the US deal with ELL students.³⁵⁸

Graduation rates and attendance at postsecondary education institutions by immigrant youth are other challenges for immigrant integration into the US education system. Although the number of foreign-born youth (aged 16 to 19) in 2009 who were not enrolled in school and who had not obtained a high school diploma or equivalent³⁵⁹ decreased by 11% in 2009 compared to 2000, it still stood at more than double the rate of native speakers. The drop-out rate of foreign born students in secondary schools stood at 12.4 compared with 4.8 for native born in 2009.³⁶⁰ Inequalities were also reported in 2009 for college enrollment between the foreign born and native born populations between 18 and 24 years of age: 32.8% and 42.8% respectively. Striking differences are also to be seen in the general education level of the population 25 years of age and above: 20% of foreign born people had only a 9th grade education or less compared to 3.5% of the native born population. However, it is significant that, according to longitudinal studies of immigrants, in some US states members of the second generation perform better academically than first generation immigrants.³⁶¹

Finally, the situation of unauthorized students who aspire to higher education remains an unresolved issue for the federal government. While states and localities are obliged to respect the right of every child, regardless of immigration status, to attend public K-12 education, access to postsecondary education is not always equal for all immigrant youth and depends on state laws.³⁶² Foreign students have to pay out-of-state tuition, since they do not have state residency. In most states, unauthorized students are treated like foreign students, although they might have been residing in a given state since early childhood. Because they are unauthorized, they cannot apply for federal and state student loans and

³⁵⁷ United States Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics. (2010). *The Nation's Report Card: Grade 12 Reading and Mathematics 2009 National and Pilot State Result*. Washington, DC: US Department of Education.

³⁵⁸ United States Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, (2009). *Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS), Public School, BIE School, and Private School Data Files, 2007–08*. Washington, DC: US Department of Education.

³⁵⁹ An equivalent such as the General Education Development (GED) is obtained by those who did not succeed in completing high school. Although the GED is usually recognized by employers and universities, it is common knowledge that high school graduates have better chances on the labor market than GED holders.

³⁶⁰ Secondary School education does not end until age 18 or completion of the 12th year of school. Compulsory education varies from state to state but usually starts with 6 and ends with 16. This statistical profile of the foreign-born population is based on Pew Hispanic Center tabulations of the Census Bureau's 2009 American Community Survey (ACS). Pew Hispanic Center. (2011, February 17). *Statistical Portrait of the Foreign-Born Population in the United States, 2009*.

³⁶¹ Portes, A. and Rumbaut, R. G., op. cit.

³⁶² Since the mid 2000s some state and local attempts have been made to override this rule regarding the right of unauthorized children to elementary and secondary education; see Olivas, M. A. (2010, September). *Plyler v. Doe: Still Guaranteeing Unauthorized Immigrant Children's Right to Attend US Public Schools*. *Migration Information Source*.

scholarships.³⁶³ Consequently, they can rarely afford the costly undergraduate programs at universities which lead to bachelor and master degrees.³⁶⁴ A more feasible option for them is to earn an associate degree at a community college, which may have lower prestige but at the same time lower tuition fees. Nevertheless, even this option is still inaccessible to many undocumented in most of the states, Moreover, even at the secondary level chances are not equal for all immigrants. In so-called transition programs of middle and early college high schools students can usually gain a college education by taking college level introductory courses in selected subjects and thereby earning some credits while still enrolled in free secondary education public schools. This option is ruled for undocumented high school students, unless they pay out-of state tuition for college classes.³⁶⁵

In recent years the US Federal Government has intensified efforts to tackle some of the challenges mentioned above by developing programs, drawing up legislation and drafting reform plans to improve immigrant integration. Federal attention has been directed for the most part towards the needs of ELL immigrant youth. In fact, federal law requires that schools address the needs of English language learners by providing them with adequate programs and effective staff so that they can overcome language barriers and participate meaningfully in mainstream educational programs.³⁶⁶ At the same time there is no national language policy and the states and school districts are free to choose their own educational approaches for teaching ELL students. The following instructional methods are common: bilingual education, dual language instruction, English as a second language (ESL), and immersion. The choice often depends on state legislations. The recent tendency to move away from bilingual classes has resulted from some restrictive language policies in some states.³⁶⁷

³⁶³ For example federal Pell Grants, as defined by the Higher Education Opportunity Act 2008. Very often immigrant children were brought to the US at a very early age by their undocumented parents. Under current law, they are considered illegal, there is no process for legalizing their status, and they live in constant danger of being discovered as illegal aliens, detained, incarcerated and deported. For more on the situation of unauthorized immigrants, see subchapter 4.1.3.

³⁶⁴ Community colleges offer vocational certificate programs or award Associate of Arts (AA) or Associate of Science (AS) degrees after two years. Their graduates may transfer to four-year colleges or universities for undergraduate programs (see Graph 5). Some community colleges have automatic enrollment agreements with local four-year colleges, where the community college provides the first two years of study and the university provides the remaining years of study, sometimes all on one campus.

³⁶⁵ Out of state tuition at four year higher education institutions may be more than double that of in-state tuitions (out-of-state tuition and fees at public, four-year colleges and universities average \$19,595 per year compared to average an in-state cost of \$7,605 per academic year in 2010/11. See College Board New York. (n.d.). Trends in College Pricing 2010.

³⁶⁶ See Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

³⁶⁷ For an overview of the recent English-only proposition, see Gándara, P. and Hopkins, M. (2010). *Forbidden Language: English Learners and Restrictive Language Policies*. New York, NY: Columbia University, Teachers College Press.
For an interesting analysis of the various approaches to the recruitment of bilingual education teachers through US-Mexican teacher exchange programs, see Terrazas, A. and Fix, M., op. cit.

In addition to the requirement that the rights of ELLs be respected, federal legislation has established a central accountability mechanism for students' results, including those of ELL students across the United States. The accountability system is monitored by the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), reauthorized in 2001 as the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB). The goal of NCLB is for all students, including immigrants, to improve their education results, achieving 100% academic proficiency by 2014, as measured by Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) standardized state tests. The Title III State Formula Grant Program, administered by the ED's Office of Elementary and Secondary Education (OESE), offers federal monies to states for the education of ELL students. These monies are to go for such things as English language instruction, services for ELL students (including immigrant students), family literacy and parent outreach programs, and professional training for staff. The money is allocated to school districts with a certain number of ELL students. If the schools fail to guarantee ELL students achieve adequate progress, as tested against annual measurable achievement objectives set by each state, they may face funding cuts and be forced to reorganize curricula, change teaching methods, replace staff or even close. NCLB also requires that schools and districts expand immigrant parents' involvement in the education of their children, which is especially challenging for schools which have yet to establish a good partnership with community-based organizations for outreach to immigrant populations. School districts and critics of NCLB have hotly disputed whether the demands of the NCLB are workable in practice. Despite the addition of amendments in 2008, the Act is still considered outdated by many practitioners and policymakers and yet still planned for reauthorization by the Obama Administration in 2011. Nevertheless, NCLB is still considered the most important piece of legislation for the education and integration of immigrant youth at the elementary and secondary school levels.³⁶⁸

The Office of Migrant Education within the ED offers another method of assisting immigrant youth in learning English in Migrant Education Programs. The programs provide financial support to state educational agencies, institutions of higher education or other institutions serving migrant children and their families to improve the educational and academic opportunities at different levels of schooling.³⁶⁹ Since the migrant workforce has

³⁶⁸ For a more thorough analysis of the impact of NCLB on the education of ELL students, see Balaova, J. and Fix, M. (2007), *op. cit.*

At the time of writing, President Barack Obama has just announced in his State of the Union Address the need for pending reforms of the Act. For the full text of the State of the Union Address, see Obama State Of The Union Speech 2011. (2011, January 26). The Huffington Post.

The work on the reforms is accompanied by recent research and nationwide consultation on the reforms with educators and policymakers for the future, for example the forthcoming volume publishing the first in-depth US Department of Education-funded study *Title III Evaluation*, contracted by American Institutes for Research. For more on this study, see the website of the American Institutes for Research.(n.d.). Title II Evaluation.

³⁶⁹ A migrant child is defined in federal regulations as a person who is "a migratory agricultural worker or a migratory fisher; or who, in the preceding 36 months, in order to accompany or join a parent, spouse, or guardian who is a migratory agricultural worker or a migratory fisher has moved from one

largely been dominated by foreign-born migrants in recent years, immigrant youth comprise the largest group of the beneficiaries.³⁷⁰ Basically, two programs target immigrant youth in their school-to-work transition: The High School Equivalency Program (HEP), for those 16 years of age or older who have left school; and the College Assistance Migrant Program (CAMP), for the first years of migrant students' college education.

Additionally, the ED's Office of Vocational and Adult Education offers yet another venue for enhancing the language and education performance of immigrant youths by granting funds to states through Adult Education Programs. These programs, among others, finance literacy programs (Adult Basic Education), GED preparation (Adult Secondary Education) and English Language Acquisition for adults and school-leavers over 16 years of age who are not enrolled or not required to be enrolled in secondary school under state law.³⁷¹

Finally, educational assistance to immigrant youth is partially supported by the Department of Health and Human Services through the ORR's Refugee School Impact Program for services which target school-age refugees (between 5-18 years of age). These programs may include "English as a Second Language instruction, after-school tutorials, programs that encourage high school completion and full participation in school activities."³⁷²

Much as the federal government might support the education of immigrant youth residing legally, no federal money can be spent on the unauthorized population, whose access to higher education is frequently restricted. One of the solutions advocated by immigrant-rights groups would be passing the aforementioned DREAM Act. It is a federal proposal which has been discussed every year in Congress since 2001 but never successfully brought up for a vote.³⁷³ This bill would provide certain undocumented immigrant students the opportunity to earn conditional residency and, upon completion of certain requirements, put them on the path to citizenship. They would have to be US high school graduates, have good moral character, have arrived in the US as minors (16 years or younger), and would have to have been in the country continuously for at least five years

school district to another; or in a state that is comprised of a single school district, has moved from one administrative area to another within such district; or as the child of a migratory fisher, resides in a school district of more than 15,000 square miles, and migrates a distance of 20 miles or more to a temporary residence." See United States Department of Education. (2008, July 29). Improving the Academic Achievement of the Disadvantaged; Migrant Education Program. *Federal Register*, 73 (146), Rules and Regulations.

³⁷⁰ Gellat, J., and Fix M (2007). Federal Spending on the Immigrant Families' Integration. . In M. Fix (Ed.), *Securing the Future: US Immigrant Integration Policy. A Reader* (pp. 41-80). Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, p. 61.

³⁷¹ OVAE offers supplementary grants for civic education, which have also been supported by small USCIS grants since 2008.

³⁷² See the Administration for Children and Families (ACF). Web page: <http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/about/divisions.htm>

³⁷³ The last attempt to bring the bill up for vote failed in 2010, when the DREAM Act was passed by The House of Representatives on December 8, 2010. The Act was blocked by a Senate filibuster ten days later.

prior to the bill's enactment. The students would obtain temporary residency for a period of six years. Within the six year period, a qualified student would have to attend 2 years of postsecondary education, or serve in the military for two years, in order to earn permanent residency and the opportunity for citizenship. If a student did not comply with either the college requirement or the military service requirement, temporary residency would be withdrawn and the student would be subject to deportation. The DREAM Act is believed to be a golden opportunity for many undocumented youth who at the moment seem to have no future. Therefore, the legislation remains on the political agendas of many pro-immigration community agencies across the US.³⁷⁴

Although academic education and high-skill qualifications are highly valued on the American labor market, the newest prognoses and research on the demands of 21st century US labor trends emphasizes an impending need for modernizing the US vocational training system. Consequently, current nationwide debates about the necessary reforms of the whole system for all does not broach the issue of individual target groups, like immigrants. Similarly, to the best of my knowledge little research has been conducted on foreign-born students in vocational training in the US. In order to understand the challenges of the transition of immigrants into the US labor market, a closer look at how vocational education functions is required.

Recent statistics show a worrying gap between enrollment and graduation from postsecondary education. According to projections by the Center on Education and the Workforce at Georgetown University, by 2018 the US economy will have created some 47 million job openings, of which one third will require that workers have a bachelor's degree or higher and another third will call for postsecondary occupational credentials or an associate's degree. Consequently, in order to help young people make the transition from secondary education to well-paying jobs, stronger focus needs to be put on high-quality career education, with career-oriented programs.³⁷⁵ The vocational education system in the US, which the Department of Education recently renamed Career and Technical Education

³⁷⁴ According to MPI analysis, slightly more than 1.9 million unauthorized youth and young adults would meet the age, time in country, and age at arrival requirements to obtain a conditional legal status under the latest versions of the DREAM Act. See Mittelstadt, M. (2010). *MPI Updates National and State-Level Estimates of Potential DREAM Act Beneficiaries*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

³⁷⁵ More than two thirds of high school graduates now go to college within two years of graduating, but less than half of them have obtained either an associate's or bachelor's degree by their mid-twenties, (data from the Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement, collected between 2006-2008). These trends are thought to result from a nationwide "college for all movement" among education policy makers who have paid too much attention to strengthening community colleges and too little to vocational training programs and apprenticeships. See Symonds, W. C., Schwartz R. B., and Ferguson R. (2011). *Pathways to Prosperity: Meeting the Challenge of Preparing Young Americans for the 21st Century*. Pathways to Prosperity Project, Harvard Graduate School of Education.

(CTE),³⁷⁶ is deemed outdated, under-funded and lacking the support of the federal government and the political elite across the US. However, federal efforts to reform “the neglected stepchild of education reform” are currently under way.³⁷⁷

The general lack of interest in the development of vocational education has its roots in the past. At the beginning of the twentieth century, vocational courses were offered only by high schools and mainly attended by students from low-income families. The fact that the majority of the students came from ethnic groups resulted in vocational education being viewed as “a dumping ground for students of color.”³⁷⁸ Consequently, cultural biases and prejudices stopped political elites from investing in occupational courses. Unfortunately, as recent research on the American education system shows, the beginning of the twenty-first century has witnessed similar trends.³⁷⁹

Over time, however, the vocational education system has been extended to postsecondary and adult education levels. Current CTE courses are offered at secondary levels, by middle schools and high schools, and at the postsecondary level, by vocational and technical institutions as well as community and technical colleges, which also offer academic degrees.³⁸⁰ Additionally, short programs lasting less than one year offer training or refresher courses in specific occupational subjects.³⁸¹ The majority of the institutions which provide career and technical courses are private (except for the middle schools, high schools, and some colleges) and are often operated on a for-profit basis. They are, however, approved and regulated by state governments.³⁸² Since the CTE system is highly decentralized, strengthening the vocational education system could prove to be very challenging. Nevertheless, some noteworthy federal efforts to set CTE standards have been already made.

³⁷⁶ For more on the development of the CTE system in recent years, see Levesque, K., et al. (2008). *Career and Technical Education in the United States: 1990 to 2005* (NCES 2008-035). Washington, DC: National Center for Education Statistics, Institute of Education Sciences, US Department of Education, p. 78.

³⁷⁷ United States Department of Education. (2011, February 2). The New CTE: Secretary Duncan's Remarks on Career and Technical Education.

³⁷⁸ Symonds, W. C., Schwartz, R. B., and Ferguson, R., op. cit.

³⁷⁹ For more on the historical development and debates on the need for system reforms, see - Gray, K. (2001). The Role of Career and Technical Education in the American High School: A Student Centered Analysis. *The Journal for Vocational Special Needs Education*, 24 (1), 15-25; - Valentine, J. C., Hirschy, A. S., and Bremer, C. D. (2009). *Systematic Reviews of Research: Postsecondary Transitions - Identifying Effective Models and Practices*. Louisville, KY: National Research Center for Career and Technical Education;

- Lerman, R. I. (2009). *Training Tomorrow's Workforce: Community College and Apprenticeship as Collaborative Routes to Rewarding Careers*. Washington, DC: Center for American Progress.

³⁸⁰ The American education system is more comprehensive than other national education systems which draw lines between academic and vocational institutions, e.g. in Germany or Poland. In fact, in the US the same educational institutions provide varying levels of degrees, e.g. community colleges offer associate degrees as well as courses which do not carry academic credit but lead to certification by industry or professional associations.

³⁸¹ See Levesque, K., et al., op. cit.

³⁸² Only state-accredited institutions can provide training that is commonly accepted in other states and by employers and licensing authorities outside the home state.

Federal regulations about the CTE system are set in the Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Act of 2006 (Perkins IV), administered by the Office of Vocational and Adult Education (OVAE). According to these regulations, CTE is an elective system: students at secondary and postsecondary education levels can choose one or more CTE courses from 16 so-called career clusters, i.e. “occupational categories with industry-validated knowledge and skills statements that define what students need to know and be able to do in order to realize success in a chosen field.”³⁸³ The Act requires states to cooperate between levels and form agreements with secondary agencies, postsecondary institutions, businesses, and labor organizations to deliver programs, services, and academic counseling. The aim of the cooperation is to provide students during their last years of secondary and first years of postsecondary education a vocational education pathway, known as Tech Prep education study programs. In order to support the states’ accountability for CTE, federal grants offered through Perkins IV are awarded to states through a formula based on the states’ populations in certain age groups and on per capita income. The money is divided between states among CTE local actors to develop vocational curricula and encourage the emergence of local CTE consortia.

It remains to be seen how the shortcomings of the current CTE system will be addressed by states under the forthcoming amended formula of the current Perkins Act, which is due for reauthorization in 2012. The need for educators to cooperate with employers in creating Tech Prep courses as well as increasing opportunities for young adults to participate in work-based education are considered priorities for future reforms. That more apprenticeships are needed is common knowledge but the federal government has still done little to address this shortcoming. In fact, the current number of available federally-administered apprenticeships is still quite negligible. Nationwide, there are only about 470,000 apprentices in programs registered with the Department of Labor by the federal Office of Apprenticeship of the Department of Labor (DOL).³⁸⁴ It is questionable whether the marginalized young adults, including certain sectors of immigrant youth, have access to these interesting but scarce offerings.³⁸⁵ The status of immigrant youth in the CTE and the job training system has not yet been a subject of discussion at the federal level. Considering proposals from youth advocacy groups to align the NCLB act with the Perkins act and to

³⁸³ See the website of the Perkins Collaborative Resource Network (PCRN), <http://cte.ed.gov/index.cfm>

³⁸⁴ For each year of the apprenticeship, the apprentice normally receives 2,000 hours of on-the-job training and a recommended minimum of 144 hours of related classroom instruction provided by a sponsor: employers, employer associations or labor-management organizations. Apprenticeship programs are operated by both the public and private sectors (the sponsors register programs with federal and state government agencies). Approximately 28,000 apprenticeship programs are registered across the nation. See United States Department of Labor’s Office of Apprenticeship. Statistics page <http://www.doleta.gov/oa/statistics.cfm>

³⁸⁵ As R. I. Lerman points out, “Apprenticeship is particularly appealing as a way of integrating minorities, especially minority young men, into rewarding careers.” Lerman, R. I., op. cit.

support the development of integrated academic and technical curriculum could be an important step forward to help marginalized groups in their transition from school to work.³⁸⁶

Another feasible improvement of the US vocational education system would be to intensify the cooperation of business educators with state workforce agency partnerships supported by the DOL.³⁸⁷ In fact, alongside the Department of Education and Department of Health and Human Services, the DOL is the third important federal stakeholder in smoothing the transition of American youth from school to work in the US. Although none of the DOL's programs focuses specifically on immigrant youth, most of them indirectly target all lawful permanent young residents, who can benefit from the services described below.

Besides the apprenticeship program mentioned above, for almost half a century the DOL has run the Job Corps, America's largest and most comprehensive residential education and job training program for at-risk youth from low income families.³⁸⁸ In addition, youth-related workforce service providers can apply for federal funds available under the Workforce Investment Act (WIA).³⁸⁹ The WIA, administered by the Division of Youth Services of the Employment and Training Administration (ETA), is the principal source of funding for job training projects in the US. Under the WIA, each state is divided into one or more workforce areas, monitored by one or more workforce investment boards. Each board establishes strategic priorities, develops a workforce investment budget and a network of employment services, called One-Stop Career Centers, which assist job seekers in completing job applications and potential employers in finding good candidates for their openings. In cooperation with state and local Workforce Investment Boards, the federal government coordinates youth workforce systems and oversees state strategies in preparing youth for employment and/or postsecondary education across the country.³⁹⁰

Whether and how local youth service providers reach out to immigrant youth in partnership with the WIA system is not being monitored, and in fact, none of WIA regulations specifically targets immigrant youth. Only recently has the DOL started cooperating with the ORR through the Refugee Employment Collaboration program, the first direct involvement on

³⁸⁶ See Brand, B. (2008). *Supporting High Quality Career and Technical Education through Federal and State Policy*. Washington, DC: American Youth Policy Forum.

³⁸⁷ For more suggestions on how to better integrate education with occupational training and to focus on disadvantaged groups receiving training in cooperation with the workforce system, see Holzer, H. (2008). *Workforce Development and the Disadvantaged, New Directions for 2009 and Beyond*. Washington, DC: Urban Institute.

³⁸⁸ The program, established in 1964, targets youth between 16 and 24 who can train for and be placed in jobs at 124 centers nationwide. Job Corps is also open to English language learners and provides ESL courses.

³⁸⁹ Each year the Department of Labor sends WIA money to states for Adult, Dislocated Worker and Youth Activities programs. For regulations on Youth Activities, see the United States Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration (ETA). (2000, August 11). The Workforce Investment Act Title I Final Rule. *Federal Register* 65, (156).

³⁹⁰ A WIA federal formula-funded youth program is allocated for projects serving legally residing low-income youth, between the ages of 14 and 21, who face barriers to employment. See the website of the Division of Youth Services at the ETA's Office of Workforce Investment. http://www.doleta.gov/youth_services/

the part of the DOL in activities for immigrants. Since 2007 this informal initiative has concentrated on developing common strategies to assist refugee services in becoming partners with local workforce investment agencies.³⁹¹ It can only be hoped that more initiatives of a similar nature will emerge to promote networking among federal agencies in developing measures focusing on the integration of immigrant youth into the labor market across the US.

Integration of immigrant youth either into the US education system or the labor market might constitute an additional burden for those who have already obtained qualifications or had job experience abroad and are now seeking recognition of their foreign degrees and certificates. Consequently, as the latest research findings demonstrate, many highly skilled immigrants are forced to take jobs below their occupational status when they move to the US. According to this research, legal permanent residents with US postsecondary education degrees were three times more likely to work in high-skilled sectors than those with foreign credentials.³⁹² These worrisome statistics may result from the lack of a transparent framework for the recognition of foreign qualifications in the US.

As the Federal Department of Education confirms, no single authority in the US deals with recognizing foreign degrees and other qualifications. Similar to the European divisions of professions, two general categories are distinguished: over 50 regulated professions require a US license or an official certificate while other unregulated occupations oblige an immigrant to fulfill the requirements determined by an employer. The following three state or local authorities are officially recognized by the federal government:

1. The admitting school or higher education institution, for students who seek to study in the United States and who are presenting credits or qualifications earned abroad;
2. The hiring employer, for individuals seeking work and who are presenting degrees or other qualifications earned abroad; and
3. State or territorial licensing boards, for individuals seeking to practice regulated professions in a jurisdiction of the United States and who are presenting degrees or other qualifications earned abroad.³⁹³

A young person who wants to transfer academic credits to a US educational institution or get their credentials translated into US equivalencies has to contact one of the institutions above. These in turn usually refer to independent credential evaluation services, which are generally

³⁹¹ For more information see Administration for Children and Families (ACF). (n.d.). ETA/ORR Refugee Employment Collaboration.

³⁹² See Batalova, J., Fix, M., and Creticos, P. A., *op. cit.*

³⁹³ See the United States Network for Education Information (USNEI). (n.d.). Recognition of Foreign Qualifications.

paid for either by the individual or sometimes by the employer. A standard for the recognition of qualifications exists for particular professions, but only at the state level rather than the federal level. Some states do not recognize foreign credentials at all for certain professions. Consequently, each state makes its own choices and decisions may vary from state to state. Generally, there is little transparency in validation methods applied to non-licensed occupations and decisions are taken on a case by case basis. To date, no government agency has tasked with monitoring the establishment of services for the evaluation of foreign credentials or for ensuring the uniformity of interpretations, recommendations, and the procedures of the evaluation process. However, such attempts have been made by some private national associations.³⁹⁴

Since the whole system of credentials is quite complex and confusing for state and local authorities, without proper counseling young people are probably not aware of all the options they have.³⁹⁵ As critics of the current recognition procedures agree, “what is missing in the United States is a national-level coordination of the activities and standards,” which should be applied by state and local government offices as well as private evaluation services, professional associations and employment agencies.³⁹⁶

This depiction of federal integration measures, with reference to education and the workforce, should be complemented by a general examination of the situation of immigrants on the labor market. Though the effectiveness and ways of applying the tools mentioned above may vary from state to state, certain variables remain universal: a legal framework for the employment of foreign workers, nationwide demographic trends in workforce development, and challenges triggered by the recession for the situation of immigrant youth. These variables combine to create a difficult environment for state and local management of immigrant integration.

Access to the labor market in the US varies according to the type of permit of stay and work permit an immigrant has, but the same general rules apply to all young workers in the US. Upon turning 14 they are allowed to work only in certain occupations and with daily

³⁹⁴ The two nationwide associations of private foreign educational credential evaluation services which strive to formulate and maintain ethical standards in the field of foreign educational evaluation are the National Association of Credential Evaluation Services (NACES), with 20 members, and the Association of International Credentials Evaluators (AICE).

³⁹⁵ If such help is not provided at the local level, an immigrant cannot count on any federal support. As the ED advise: “you can select a credential evaluation service yourself. You can search for credential evaluation services on the Internet, but you should know that there is no federal or state regulation of such services.” See United States Department of Education, International Affairs Office. (2008, February). Recognition of Foreign Qualifications: Information for Individuals Seeking to Study in the United States.

³⁹⁶ See Batalova, J., Fix M., and Creticos, P. (2008). *The Employment Pathways of Skilled Immigrants in the United States*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. For an overview of institutional reforms that might improve the process of recognizing the educational and professional credentials of immigrants, see Creticos, P. A., et. al. (2007). *Employing Foreign Educated Immigrants, A Report for the Joyce Foundation*.

hour limit. At the age of 16 their rights expand to all fields of work which have not been declared hazardous by the Secretary of Labor. Finally, at the age of 18 young people can work in any legal job for any number of hours.³⁹⁷ From the perspective of immigration law, integrating a young immigrant into the labor market is relatively easy only when the immigrant has been granted legal permanent residency in the US. As noted previously, obtaining LPR status, which authorizes a person to work permanently in the United States, can be challenging.³⁹⁸ The openness of the labor market for temporary immigrants who come for the purpose of work is restricted by the conditions of a given visa category. Those who come to the US on any other visa category than employment are generally not authorized to work in the US.³⁹⁹

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) also sets strict regulations on granting a work permit to anyone who seeks admission or status as an immigrant for the purpose of permanent or temporary employment.⁴⁰⁰ The process involves a number of government agencies and, of course, a future employer, who must first obtain Foreign Labor Certification for the future employee from the Department of Labor. The DOL must certify that “there are not sufficient United States workers who are able, willing, qualified, and available at the time of application for a visa and admission to the United States and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor” and that “the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.”⁴⁰¹ Once the admission of a foreign worker has been approved by the DOL, the employer must submit an immigration petition to the USCIS of the Department of Homeland Security. According to official estimates, the filing process can vary between months and years.⁴⁰²

Moreover, by law each employer has to comply with the employment eligibility verification requirements, introduced by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. According to this act, all employers must verify the identity and employment authorization of anyone they hire after November 6, 1986.⁴⁰³ In turn an employee must be able to present documentation that establishes his/her identity and employment authorization in case of

³⁹⁷ See the DOL's Website *Youth Rules*, dedicated to youth employment in the US: <http://www.youthrules.dol.gov/>

³⁹⁸ Only refugees (including spouses and children over the age of 14) are authorized to work in the United States. One year after being admitted to the United States, refugees are required by statute to apply for legal permanent resident status, see subchapter 4.1.3.

³⁹⁹ Certain exceptions may apply to students and exchange visitors. However, they must first obtain permission from an authorized official at their school.

⁴⁰⁰ Temporary workers come on various employment visa categories. Permanent workers, so-called employment-preference immigrants, receive green cards through sponsorship from their US employers.

⁴⁰¹ The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC. 1101.

⁴⁰² United States Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration (ETA). (n.d.) Foreign Labor Certification Questions and Answers.

⁴⁰³ To comply with the law, employers must complete the Employment Eligibility Verification, Form I-9. See United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. (n.d.) *The Handbook for Employers*.

routine workplace audits conducted by the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). In order to make the process of employment eligibility verification more effective, a nationwide internet-based E-Verify system has been established.⁴⁰⁴ Although participation in E-Verify is voluntary for most companies, it is mandatory for employers with federal contracts or subcontracts. In addition 14 states have imposed their own additional obligations. Though the number of new E-verify enrollments is growing,⁴⁰⁵ the system is still being revised and has been criticized for its ineffectiveness: high error rates, abuse, identity fraud, and high cost. Nevertheless, E-verify is considered an important federal attempt at securing the US labor market against unauthorized immigrants. Along with other immigration enforcement measures, such as militarizing the borders and building security walls along US borders, E-verify has been controversial among critics of the creation of “Fortress America.” They usually point to the limitations of the US immigration system which ignores labor market needs. As Gordon H. Hanson points out, “legal mechanisms for low-skilled immigrants, at least in their current form, are not designed to meet the changing demands of US employers.”⁴⁰⁶ In fact, many immigrants, attracted by the demands of the low-skilled job market in the US, cannot find an easy, legal way to take up employment. As a result, it is becoming clear that the integration of immigrants into the US labor market requires a more flexible system for obtaining a US visa and participating in new guest worker programs, which have been lacking for almost 50 years.⁴⁰⁷ The US recession, which has been going on since December 2007, has changed the demands of the US labor market: it has mostly hit the low-skilled sector.⁴⁰⁸ Nevertheless, unauthorized immigrants still constituted of 5.2% of workforce in 2010.⁴⁰⁹

⁴⁰⁴ The electronic screening system was launched in 1997 as a pilot project. In 2005, under the Bush Administration, it was strengthened, expanded and then officially renamed the E-Verify Program in 2007. For more on the strengths and weaknesses of the system and plans for future reform, see Meissner, D. and Rosenblum, M. R. (2009). *The Next Generation of E-Verify: Getting Employment Verification Right*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

⁴⁰⁵ Currently, the system screens 20% of new hires, see Rosenblum, M. R. (2011). *E-Verify: Strengths, Weaknesses, and Proposals for Reform*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

⁴⁰⁶ Hanson, G. H. (2009). *The Economics and Policy of Illegal Immigration in the United States*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.


⁴⁰⁷ The last guest worker program, the Bracero Program, operated in the US from 1942-1964. For more on the shortcomings of US immigration Policies on Border Enforcement with reference to labor market needs and integration, see Massey, D. S., Durand, J., and Malone, N. J. (2002). *Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration*. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.

⁴⁰⁸ The available data show that in 2008, the unauthorized still represented 25 percent of farm workers, 19 percent of building and maintenance staff, 17% of construction labor, 12% of employees in food preparation and serving, 10% of production labor, and 5% of the total civilian labor force. See Passel, J. S. and Cohn, D. V. (2009), op. cit.

⁴⁰⁹ In December 2008, the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) declared that the United States was one year into a deep recession of unforeseeable duration. See National Bureau of Economic Research. (2008). *Determination of the December 2007 Peak in Economic Activity*: NBER Report. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.

At first glance, it might seem that the young immigrants who were lucky enough to have authorization to work do not face so many hurdles in their integration into the labor market. Firstly, as Papademetriou and Terrazas remark, the workplace itself has always been “a powerful immigrant integration institution” in the US, providing ample opportunities for upward mobility to all willing to work hard to achieve their goals.⁴¹⁰ Secondly, immigrants have always fared quite well on the US job market in comparison to natives. According to the OECD study mentioned earlier, in 2007 the unemployment rate of young immigrants (between the ages of 20 and 29) was approximately the same as that of the children of natives (see graph 6).⁴¹¹

Graph 6 Unemployment of Children of Immigrants and Children of Natives Aged 20-29 and not in an Educational Program, 2007



Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2010). *Equal Opportunities? The Labor Market Integration of the Children of Immigrants*. Paris: OECD Printing

In fact, in contrast to many European countries, unemployment among immigrants in the United States almost never differs by more than 1 percentage point from unemployment among natives. However, as the authors of the Report *Immigrants and the US Economic Crisis* point out, the seemingly favorable statistics do not reflect the different experiences of different ethnic groups nor so-called “alternative hardships,” such as underemployment or labor market marginalization.⁴¹² These are the challenges that immigrant youth sometimes

⁴¹⁰ Papademetriou, D. G., and Terrazas, A. (2010). Immigrants and the US Economic Crisis: From Recession to Recovery. In D. G. Papademetriou, M. Sumption, A. Terrazas et al., *Migration and Immigrants Two Years after the Financial Collapse: Where Do We Stand?* (pp. 22-43). Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

⁴¹¹ Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2010), op. cit.

⁴¹² Underemployment refers to the situation when an immigrant takes up a job which the native population is unwilling to take up or when he/she works below their education or skill level, often

face which are rarely discussed in comparative statistics and can really only be analyzed in depth through local empirical research. Moreover, since the recession hit the youngest segment of the US working population hardest, the aftermath of the crisis may see the raising of additional hurdles for immigrant youth in their transition into the US labor market system.⁴¹³ Fortunately, the federal government has thus far not taken any drastic measures to restrict labor market access to immigrants. Quite the contrary, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 extended benefits for the long-time unemployed and increased federal funding for education, which both native and immigrant youth can benefit from.

In conclusion, looking at the US mode of integration, the integration policies in education and the labor market which targets immigrant youth, it seems that much is yet to be done to create a coherent US integration strategy which would set standards for all 50 US states. However, the federal government's hands-off approach to integration challenges is not only typical for the issues of immigrant integration but also applies generally to all social conflicts, which have always been solved at state and local levels. As Peter H. Schuck notes: "Compared to other nations, the United States looks more to the fragmented, integrative processes of civil society than to programmatic initiatives launched from the center[.]"⁴¹⁴ This makes the US approach somewhat similar to the European Union's approach of usually creating nonbinding integration principles for the EU member states. On the other hand, the new nationwide integration initiatives and the increase in the lobby work of policy advisors for the development of federal integration strategies, presented in this subchapter, mark a promising shift in focus away from immigration enforcement and towards immigrant integration. The change of discourse on immigration in the US towards integration was also noted during the first National Integration Conference in 2009:

While the media focuses on the border, we gather to focus on the 17% of the American workforce that is foreign born, the 25% of American school children who have an immigrant parent, and the organizations that support and share in the process of moving millions of newcomers toward becoming Americans.⁴¹⁵

Only time will tell whether nationwide bottom up movements, like the NIC network, will result in more active governmental intervention in the management of immigrant integration at the state and local levels.

working part-time (becoming a so called involuntary part-time worker). Labor force marginalization results from long-term unemployment and discouragement among immigrant workers seeking job positions. See Papademetriou, D. G., and Terrazas, A. (2010), op. cit.

⁴¹³ The impact of the recession on the young generation has been analyzed by Papademetriou, D. G., and Terrazas, A. (2009), op. cit.

⁴¹⁴ Schuck, P. H., op. cit., p. 317.

⁴¹⁵ Eva A. Millona, co-chair, National Immigrant Integration, Executive Director Massachusetts Immigrant & Refugee Advocacy Coalition; from conference documentation on the NIC website.

4.2 California

Ethnic diversity and immigration have always been part and parcel of the social structure of California, the most populous state with the highest number and percentage of foreign-born inhabitants in the US.⁴¹⁶ Since the annexation of California in 1850 the percentage of immigrants has fluctuated but never gone below 8% of the entire population. The first peak was reached after the massive immigration movements during the Gold Rush (38.6% in 1860), gradually declining towards the middle of the 20th century, and then moderately increasing up to the present.⁴¹⁷ According to the most recent projections, the population of California will continue to diversify, although the popularity of California among new immigrants has started to wane.⁴¹⁸ The ups and downs of immigration inflows throughout its history have led American researchers to classify California as one of the traditional US immigration states, with the highest numerical growth of foreign born but not the most rapid percentage growth.⁴¹⁹

It is beyond the scope of this study to analyze in great depth the reasons for the changing dynamics of immigration in California. However, it might be fair to assume that the dynamics correspond to the ups and downs of life in California, e.g. better job opportunities versus unaffordable housing. In addition, immigrants in California have always had to confront two sides of life there. On the one hand, the Golden State lures immigrants with many opportunities and promises of a life of opulence and comfort; on the other hand, it has become a trendsetter for anti-immigration movements across the US and a testing ground for much controversial legislation. In fact, the more recent liberal state policies towards immigrants stand in sharp contrast to many less noble episodes in California's history of dealing with immigrants. The California Aliens Land Law of 1913⁴²⁰ or the infamous Angel Island on the coast of California, the so-called Ellis Island of the West, a place of

⁴¹⁶ These figures are significantly higher than the national average even; for a comparison within the US see Graphs 2 and 3.

⁴¹⁷ Lopez, E. (1999). *Major Demographic Shifts Occurring in California*. Sacramento, CA: California Research Bureau, p. 1.

Gibson, C. and Lennon, E. (2006). Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born Population of the United States: 1850 to 2000. *Population Division Working Paper 81*. Washington, DC: US Bureau of the Census.

⁴¹⁸ Johnson, H. (2011). *California Population: Planning for a Better Future*. San Francisco, CA: Public Policy Institute of California.

Bohn, S. (2009). *New Patterns of Immigrant Settlement in California*. San Francisco, CA: Public Policy Institute of California.

⁴¹⁹ Bump, M., Lindsay, L. and Silje, P. (2005). The Growth and Population Characteristics of Immigrants and Minorities in American's New Settlement States. In E. M. Goździak and S. F. Martin (Eds.), *Beyond the Gateway: Immigrants in a Changing America* (pp. 19-56). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, p. 20.

⁴²⁰ The California Alien Land Law of 1913, with a few exceptions, prohibited those who were not eligible for citizenship (i.e. under the Naturalization Act of 1870 all foreign born of Asian descent) from owning real property. The Act was a response to anti-Asian sentiment among voters. The law was repealed by popular vote in 1956.

Mertz, T. (2003). California Alien Land Law. In S. I. Kutler (Ed.), *Dictionary of American History*. 2003.

disillusionment for many immigrants awaiting entrance into California in the first half of 20th century, constitute only a few examples of the many radical steps taken to restrict “unwanted” immigration into the state. Moreover, the more recent rise of anti-immigration movements, such as the Minutemen Project, the Save our State initiative, or the construction of the US-border fence which began on the southwestern border of the City of San Diego,⁴²¹ have made many immigrants feel unwelcome there. Nevertheless, immigrants in California also have the backing of strong pro-immigration advocates. The fact that California had the first sanctuary cities in the US⁴²² and had been an initiator of the largest pro-immigration march against anti-immigration legislation in Congress in March 2006, which has spread around the US,⁴²³ demonstrates that the life of many, especially undocumented immigrants, can be made more tolerable there than in other parts of the US.

These contrasting attitudes towards the big share of Californian immigrants and consequently towards their integration will be examined in the next sections of this subchapter. Suffice it to say, these attitudes create a unique set of conditions for life and integration for immigrant youth in California. In fact, the metaphor of California as “a theme park roller coaster” could also be used to describe the reality of immigrant integration in this traditional immigration state, where immigrants even more than other citizens “experience the exhilarations of both ups and downs” of living in California.⁴²⁴

4.2.1 Historical Context of Immigration

The immigration and ethnic landscape in California today has been shaped by both domestic and international migration movements which occurred in the second half of the 20th century. During the last decades of the last century, the number of immigrants and the ethnic diversity of California changed significantly. The first twenty years after World War II saw a significant increase in domestic net migration from other states, which was made a more important contribution to population growth than did international migration. Only in the

⁴²¹ The construction of the border fence in California started well before the multi-year, multi-billion-dollar federal program Secure Border Initiative, which went into effect in November 2005. In fact, construction of the preliminary fence had already begun in San Diego in 1990. Stana, R. M. (2009). *Secure Border Initiative Fence Construction Costs*. Washington, DC: DIANE Publishing, p. 5.

⁴²² Sanctuary cities usually do not allow police and city officials to be engaged in, and municipal funds to be used for law enforcement targeting illegal immigrants. Sanctuary policies instruct city employees not to notify the federal government of the presence of undocumented living in their communities. See Salvi, S. (n.d). *Sanctuary Cities: What are they?* Ohio Jobs & Justice PAC.

⁴²³ The first march was organized on March 10 in Chicago, but the LA marches which took place on March 25 were the largest across the nation.

⁴²⁴ David G. Lawrence’s comparison of California to “a theme park roller coaster” refers to the general living conditions for all California citizens, regardless of their citizenship status. I apply his metaphor to illustrate the challenges of managing immigration and the integration of immigrants in the state. Lawrence, D. G. (2009). *The Politics of Diversity* (6th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, p. 4.

1970s did net international migration begin to make a greater contribution to California's population growth.⁴²⁵

Already during the Second World War, as part of the Second Great Migration in the US, African Americans began to move to California in large numbers to work there in the emerging defense industries.⁴²⁶ As a result California led all states in the inflows of blacks, turning into "a major black migrant 'magnet'" in the late 1960s and the 1970s.⁴²⁷ According to the US Census Bureau, between 1940 and 1970 the black population in California grew from 1.8% to 7% of the state's population.⁴²⁸ During the 1960s, on the other hand, California had the lowest rate of foreign-born inhabitants in its history as a US state, when the number of immigrants accounted for a mere 8.5% of the population of California as a whole. Since then, the number of foreign born has grown rapidly, reaching its peak in 2007 (27.4%).⁴²⁹ At the same time, the Afro-American population left the state in droves at the end of the century. As a result of the third New Great Migration across the US, triggered by urbanization and better work opportunities in the southeastern United States, many blacks moved to Georgia, Maryland, Florida, Virginia, and North Carolina.⁴³⁰ As William H. Frey points out, the role of California changed "from a major black migration destination to a major migration origin." According to Frey's calculations, during the late 1990s California witnessed the first negative net migration among the Afro-American population. Moreover, there has also been a significant shift in the number of European immigrants. While in the 1950s, half of California's immigrants came either from Canada or Europe, by 1990 their numbers had dropped dramatically, to less than 10%.⁴³¹ At the same time, two immigration inflows contributed to the rapid increase in the foreign-born population at the end of the 20th century: Hispanic and Asian immigrants, as we will see below.

⁴²⁵ Lopez, E., op. cit., p. 1.

⁴²⁶ The Second Great Migration (1940-1971) was the voluntary migratory movement of more than five million African Americans seeking better job opportunities in the North, Midwest and West, including California, in order to escape the brutal working and living conditions of the rural South. The post-war exodus was much larger in scale than the First Great Migration Movement (1910-1940). As a result of the two movements, more African Americans were living in cities than in rural areas and thus they had become a highly urbanized and better educated population. See:

- Holt, T. C. (n.d.). *The Second Great Migration, 1940-70. In Motion: The African- American Migration Experience*. Chicago, IL: The Schomburg Center for Research on Black Culture. University of Chicago;

- Paddison, J. (n.d.) *1921-present: Modern California — Migration, Technology, Cities*. Oakland, CA: Calisphere California Digital Library.

⁴²⁷ Frey, W. H. (2004). *The New Great Migration: Black Americans' Return to the South, 1965–2000. The Living Cities Census Series*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, p. 1.

⁴²⁸ Gibson, C. and Jung, K. (2002). *Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals By Race, 1790 to 1990, and By Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, For The United States, Regions, Divisions, and States. Population Division Working Paper 56*. Washington, DC: US Bureau of the Census.

⁴²⁹ Gibson, C. and Lennon, E., op. cit.

⁴³⁰ Since 1965, de-industrialization of the northeast and midwestern cities, accompanied by more jobs in the South and improving racial relations have started to attract African Americans to move. See Frey W. H. (2004), op. cit.

⁴³¹ Camarota, S. A. (1998). *The Impact of Immigration on California Summary and Analysis of Immigration in a Changing Economy: California's Experience. Immigration Review*, 32.

The need for low-skilled field workers in the California agricultural sector sparked the post-war immigration of Mexican Americans, one of the largest minority groups in 20th century California. Mexicans came to the US either as contract workers, who were recruited in California until 1964 through the Bracero Program, or as undocumented labor migrants hired by farm owners and ranchers, who very often rejected the costly recruitment procedures required by the Bracero Program and thus arranged employment privately. Such practices resulted in increasing border control and enforcement operations in 1954, known as Operation Wetback. Through often aggressive sweeps in California and other border states in search of unauthorized workers, the US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) removed over one million Mexicans.⁴³² During the entire period of the guest-worker program, approximately 80% (4 million out of a total of 5 million recruited) worked in California. According to US census data estimates, in 1970, after the Bracero Program had been concluded, 53% of all Mexicans immigrants in the US resided in California, in comparison to 36% in 1940.⁴³³ At the same time, Latinos in California grew in political strength and number and launched movements against the discrimination in employment, housing, and education that Hispanic Americans faced.⁴³⁴ Since the late 1960s, when Mexican immigration was restricted for the first time by a federal ceiling on immigration from the Western Hemisphere, legal immigration has dropped significantly. Simultaneously, the so-called “undocumented migrant era” in US immigration began: During the years 1965 to 1985, a period of porous borders and unrestricted hiring of undocumented workers, two-thirds of all undocumented Mexican immigrants in the US went to California.⁴³⁵ Most of them were initially temporary, male migrants coming for seasonal agriculture work, which nobody else wanted to take up. However, by the end of 1990s, both the immigration of undocumented and documented Mexicans into the US had transformed from temporary migration to larger scale, long-term settlement, when more women began to join their

⁴³² Wetbacks was the discriminatory term used for those Mexicans, who came to the US without authorization but has been extended to Mexicans and Latinos in general. Martin, P. L. (2004). Mexican Migration to the United States: the Effect of NAFTA. In D. S. Massey and J. E. Taylor (Eds.). *International Migration: Prospects and Policies in a Global Market* (pp. 120-130). New York, NY: Oxford University Press, pp. 120-121.

⁴³³ Massey, D.S., Durand, J., Malone, N. J., op. cit., p. 59.

⁴³⁴ For example, a migrant farm worker labor union, the United Farm Workers, was established in California in 1966 to protest against hazardous working conditions, low pay, job insecurity, and more. The union gave rise to the larger La Raza movement, The National Council of La Raza (NCLR), the leading Hispanic advocacy organization in the United States. See Paddison, J., op. cit.

⁴³⁵ The ceiling for Mexican Immigration was one of the immigration restrictions for the Western Hemisphere, imposed by the 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 and extended the limit to 20, 000. The first numerical limits on immigration were imposed by the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1924. See Massey, D.S., Durand, J., and Malone, N. J., op. cit., p. 70.

spouses in the US.⁴³⁶ At the same time, population growth rates were also noted among Hispanics of Central or South American descent, who along with the Caribbean population, were the third Hispanic minority group present in California after World War II.⁴³⁷ Because the stronger border enforcement which began after the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 initially concentrated only on certain districts along the Californian-Mexico border (i.e. San Diego and El Paso), most undocumented immigrants still entered the US through California.⁴³⁸ Only following the escalation of enforcement operations in the mid-1990s (e.g. Operation Hold-the-Line in El Paso in 1993, followed by Operation Gatekeeper along the California border in 1994) were those trying to cross the border illegally assumed to have moved to other points outside of California.⁴³⁹ Nevertheless, despite stronger border enforcement in the last decade of the 20th century, in 15 years the number of unauthorized immigrants in California increased by more than one million (from 1500 thousand in 1990 to 2650 thousand in 2005).⁴⁴⁰ It is worth mentioning that although in 2004 the majority of them were thought to have come from Mexico (65%), numerous other groups were reported to have come from other countries in Latin America (16%) and Asia (15%), and a very few from Europe and Canada (3%).⁴⁴¹

Asian immigration has led to the development of a major minority group in California, second to the Mexicans, which significantly changed immigration percentages there in the last century. During the first decades after the Second World War, inflows from Asia remained slow due to strict federal legislation against Asian immigration and the state Alien Land Law, which prohibited Asian immigrants from owning land. Once discriminatory state

⁴³⁶ The trends were a result of the legalization program of 1986) for some undocumented (see subchapter 4.1.3) and increasing cost of illegal border crossing, which consequently lowered return probabilities among undocumented. Ibid., p. 132.

⁴³⁷ Reyes, B. I. et al. (2001). *A Portrait of Race and Ethnicity in California. An Assessment of Social and Economic Well-Being*. San Francisco, CA: Public Policy Institute of California.

⁴³⁸ As Massey reports, "by the middle 1990s nearly two-thirds of the traffic in undocumented migrants entered the United States by way of California." Massey, D.S., Durand, J., and Malone, N. J., op. cit., p. 107.

⁴³⁹ The extent to which the border enforcement was effective in deterring Mexicans from entering the US remains uncertain. Border Patrol supervisors were charged with falsifying records and altering intelligence reports, in order to mislead the public about the program's effectiveness. Following investigations by the Department of Justice's Office of the Inspector General (OIG), although no evidence of fraud could be found, problems in the appropriate management of Operation Gatekeeper were reported. See Office of the Inspector General (OIG), US Department of Justice. (1998, July). *Operation Gatekeeper: An Investigation into Allegations of Fraud and Misconduct. Special Report*. Border enforcement in California and along the southwest border has raised many questions about efficacy and concerns about dangers, not only among policy makers but also among migration researchers and human rights activists; for example, see:

- Cornelius, W. A. (2001). Death at the Border: Efficacy and Unintended Consequences of US Immigration Control Policy. *Population and Development Review*, 27 (4), 661-685;

- Border Angels Group, a non-profit organization founded in 1986 in San Diego, CA, aims to "stop unnecessary deaths of individuals traveling through the areas located around the United States and Mexican border," see Border Angels web page: <http://www.borderangels.org/>

For more on Border Angels see subchapter 5.2.1 on San Diego.

⁴⁴⁰ Passel, J. S., and Cohn, D. V. (2011), op. cit.

⁴⁴¹ Fortuny, K., Capps, R., and Passel, J. S. (2007). *The Characteristics of Unauthorized Immigrants in California, Los Angeles County, and the United States*. Washington, DC: Urban Institute.

legislation was annulled in 1952 and federal sanctions on Asian immigrants were finally lifted in 1965,⁴⁴² California became the primary destination for several waves of Asian immigrants coming to the US. Rapid growth was first observed in the 1970s, among Chinese and Filipinos, followed in 1980 by groups from South Korea and South Eastern Asia. Consequently, as the Public Policy Institute of California reports, in 1990 California played host to most of the nation's Asian immigrants: It was home to 50% of all Filipinos and Southeast Asians living in the US, 40% of the Chinese and Japanese, nearly one-third of all Koreans, and 20% of Asian Indians.⁴⁴³ Asian immigration continued in the early 1990s despite the recession in California, with net migration remaining strongly positive in contrast to that of other immigrant groups. By the late 1990s, their educational performance had started to improve exceed and their labor market integration was considered quite successful, with 80% holding managerial and professional positions or positions with moderate incomes.⁴⁴⁴

Asians also rank among the largest refugee groups resettled in California since 1975. Before 1990, refugees seeking shelter primarily came from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos as a result of the Vietnam War. Since the first years of the resettlement programs across the US, California has resettled the largest number of refugees (by 2010 over 688,000 refugees). More recent groups of refugees resettled in California have come from Iran, Vietnam, countries of the former Soviet Union, Iraq, and Africa, which has served to increase the ethnic heterogeneity of the state.⁴⁴⁵ As a result of the new post-war immigration trends and the unprecedented migration of white residents to other states since the 1990s, at the turn of the 21st century California was declared a majority-minority state. By the same token, it took its place among the few states whose racial composition is less than 50% non-Hispanic whites, which elsewhere comprises the majority of the population.⁴⁴⁶

⁴⁴²The Immigration Act of 1924 barred all aliens ineligible for citizenship from immigrating to the US, thus eliminating most Asians, and established quotas for national origin, biased in favor of northern and western Europeans. In 1952 the McCarran-Walter Act removed the racial bars to naturalization and in 1965 the Immigration Act repealed the discriminatory national origin quotas. Ancheta, A. N. (2006). *Race, Rights, and the Asian American Experience*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP.

⁴⁴³ Reyes, B. I., et al., op. cit.

⁴⁴⁴ The number of Asians holding managerial and professional positions or positions with moderate incomes became close to the number of whites in the same positions. Hispanics, in turn, followed by Afro-Americans, had much higher rates in lower-earning occupations, such as operators, fabricators, laborers, service providers, farmers, forestry officials, and workers on fishing vessels. Ibid., p. 116.

⁴⁴⁵ Office of Refugee Resettlement. (2007). *Report to Congress FY 2007*. Washington, DC: US Department of Health and Human Services.

California Department of Social Services. (2010). *Fact Sheet, Refugee Resettlement Program*.

⁴⁴⁶ At the time of writing, four states are majority-minority states: Hawaii, New Mexico, California, and Texas. The Census Bureau estimates of people's race are based on self-identification questions on US Census questionnaires and on state and county population estimates which use administrative records on births, deaths and migration. For more on US census methodology see <http://www.census.gov/popest/topics/methodology>

4.2.2 Immigration Scale

Following the massive inflows of the second half of the last century, since the turn of the new millennium the immigration landscape has become more stable. In fact, the percentage of foreign born among Californians has not changed much in the past decade and remained steady at around 26-27 % (still the highest rate of all states). As mentioned earlier, immigrant inflows started to take new directions across the US and immigrants' migration patterns at the moment increasingly reflect the pattern of native-born residents moving away from California to other states. As a result, California is no longer the top destination for new arrivals and the number of foreign born youth is likely to decrease if the trend continues. The demographics of immigrant youth is already much lower than the California average: in 2009 immigrants aged 5-24 accounted for 12.4% of all youth in the same age group.⁴⁴⁷ Nevertheless, numerically California is still home to the largest percentage of foreign born in the US (see graph 2).

The top countries of origin of immigrants in 2009 still reflected recent historical immigration patterns: 43.3% were born in Mexico, 7.9% in the Philippines, and 5.3% in China (excluding Taiwan) (see graph 7). However, as the latest analysis *New Patterns of Immigrant Settlement in California* shows, new immigrants do not necessarily join the old, established immigrant enclaves. Instead, they are seeking new locations with little history of immigration but better prospects for integration into the workforce. According to the study, economic opportunity seems to play a major role in immigrants' decisions on location. California counties with the largest immigrant populations in 2000 (i.e. Los Angeles and Orange, Santa Clara and San Diego Counties) experienced much lower growth in immigrant population than the new immigrant destinations of Alameda, San Bernardino, Riverside, Kern, and Sacramento Counties.⁴⁴⁸

Available statistics do not enable us to determine the location of most undocumented immigrants. In total, as of 2010, California had the largest number of unauthorized (2.55 million) nationwide, which accounted for nearly a quarter of the entire undocumented population living in the US.⁴⁴⁹ Moreover, as in the last century, California's labor market is quite attractive to unauthorized migrants, with 1.85 million in the labor force in 2010. Drawing

⁴⁴⁷ These reflect my own calculations, based on the US Census Bureau, 2009 American Community Survey.


⁴⁴⁸ Los Angeles County still has the largest number of immigrants of all counties. See the results of the report, estimated for the period 2000-2007, which included only immigrants between the ages of 18 and 64.

See Bohn, S., op. cit.

⁴⁴⁹ This figure, however, represents a decrease of almost 20% from 1990. Like all other immigrant inflows, the unauthorized also tend to choose new destinations across the US. See Passel, J. S. and Cohn, D. V. (2011), op. cit.

on available statistics from 2004,⁴⁵⁰ when every seventh child had parents whose status was unregulated, it might be assumed that many immigrant youth today are still confronted with the challenges of clandestine life, which is not conducive to a smooth transition from childhood to adulthood nor to easing integration processes.

Graph 7 Foreign-Born Population in California in 2009



Source: The US Census Bureau's American Community Survey 2009

When considering the immigration landscape of California today, one naturally shifts the focus to the ethnic composition of the state. As a matter of fact, as mentioned before, ethnic diversity has always been key to the discussion of immigrant integration in the US.⁴⁵¹ The fact that California has become a majority-minority state, despite the slowing of new inflows of immigrants, has already raised many concerns about integration in the state in the future, in which a declining white, non-Hispanic population dominates many areas of social, economic and political life in California. The current demographic picture merely confirms the continuing decrease in the white population, which marks the next phase in California's demographic evolution.⁴⁵² According to the most recent report of the Greenlining Institute, California is not going to stop here. The state, which was once comprised of former white settlers, is projected to be inhabited by a Latino majority in the near future. According to recent projections from the California Department of Finance, by 2040 people of color will represent nearly 70% of the state's population, of which 48% will be Latinos.⁴⁵³ In fact,

⁴⁵⁰ Fortuny, K., Capps, R., and Passel, J. S. (2007), op. cit.

⁴⁵¹ See the previous subchapter.

⁴⁵² For an interesting analysis of the demographic composition in California, see Baldassare M. (2000, September 7). California's Majority-Minority Milestone: What Lies Ahead? *San Diego Union-Tribune*, pp. B-11.

⁴⁵³ Significant growth is also expected among the Asian American population, who are supposed to represent 13% of the state's population. See Byrd, D. (2010). *California's New Majority*. Berkeley, CA: Greenlining Institute.

current debates on immigration and integration in the state are inseparable from the issue of the increasing ethnic diversification of California.

4.2.3 Public and Political Discourse

As the US state with the largest number of immigrants, California has always seemed to play the role of paradigm in managing immigration for other US states. As William A. V. Clark, remarks, “[What] happens in California tomorrow is likely to happen in the nation as a whole the day after tomorrow.”⁴⁵⁴ Until recently, when its neighbor Arizona took over the role, the state had been considered a testing ground for various pro- and anti-immigration initiatives.⁴⁵⁵ Certain state laws on immigration, which will be briefly considered here, provide the best example of the California “roller coaster ride” in political discourse on integration, which has shaped California’s varied attitudes towards immigrants over the course of the last two decades. These laws have to be seen in connection with the US federal mode of integration, discussed previously, which taken together create a specific integration climate for immigrant youth in California: affected by past extreme anti-immigrant measures and recent more liberal policies towards both documented and undocumented inhabitants.

The three main initiatives introduced by those Californians seeking to fight ethnic and immigration diversification and to stop the socio-economic progress of minorities in California at the end of the 20th century will be considered here. Firstly, California’s racial politics of the 1990s has grown to symbolize anti-immigrant attitudes throughout the US. Proposition 187 (the Save our State Initiative), which was intended to exclude undocumented immigrants from state services (including education, welfare, and health care), was approved by 59% of California voters in 1994.⁴⁵⁶ Although the California Supreme Court ruled the proposition unconstitutional, it became a model for future federal anti-immigration legislation, like PRWORA and the Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.⁴⁵⁷ Moreover, the prejudice against immigrants, fueled by a huge number of undocumented people living in California, persists. As Ostendorf points out, illegality does not foster

⁴⁵⁴ Clark, W. A. V. (1998). *The California Cauldron: Immigration and the Fortunes of Local Communities*. New York, NY: Guilford Press, p 1.

⁴⁵⁵ In recent years Arizona has assumed this function, see subchapter 4.3 on Arizona.

⁴⁵⁶ Martin, P. L. (2004). The United States: The Continuing Immigration Debate. In W. A. Cornelius, T. Tsuda, P. L. Martin, and J. F. Hollifield (Eds.), *Controlling Immigration: a Global Perspective (2nd ed.)* (pp. 50-85). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, p. 73.

An interesting account of the impact of Proposition 187 on the daily life of immigrant youth is presented by Julio Cammarota who conducted research on Latino youth immediately after the proposition was passed. See Cammarota, J., op. cit.

⁴⁵⁷ Massey, D. S. (2005). *Five Myths About Immigration: Common Misconceptions Underlying US Border-Enforcement Policy*. Washington, DC: American Immigration Law Foundation and Immigration Policy Center.

immigrant integration, which turns out to be quite true for California.⁴⁵⁸ The willingness of Californians to cooperate with immigrants to improve the integration of minorities was put up to a vote again in 1996, when Proposition 209 (the California Civil Rights Initiative) was passed. The law ended Affirmative Action programs in California, which up to that point had guaranteed many underprivileged ethnic groups easier access to education and the workforce. Finally, in 1998 an anti-bilingual education bill, Proposition 227 (the English for the Children Initiative), restricting the free choice of immigrant education, was passed. The proposition was intended to end bilingual education in the state, replacing it (with a few exceptions) with one-year Structured English-Immersion (SEI) courses for ELL students. As language education reports confirm, the proposition has not been evenly implemented across California and some school districts have developed alternatives, such as dual language education, in which immigrant students' native languages are seen as an asset rather than a complication.⁴⁵⁹ Nevertheless, those who came out in support of the new law are considered advocates of the ideology of "forceful assimilationism," which has given California a reputation as being anti-immigrant and more precisely anti-Latino, dividing public discourse and research on immigration there.⁴⁶⁰ According to the Little Hoover Commission, an independent state oversight agency, immigrants have been depicted either as illegal aliens, who have no respect for the rule of law, or as noble individuals braving hardship for their families and future."⁴⁶¹

Since the turn of this century, however, the focus of public and political discourse on immigration in California seems to have become less biased, and some important steps have been taken by the state to offer important benefits to immigrant youth, often denied in other parts of the US. This change in political discourse may have been influenced by several factors, among them the reduced number of both documented and undocumented immigrants moving into California, a shift in the focus of enforcement policy towards other states bordering Mexico, and the recognition that immigrants and ethnic minorities represent

⁴⁵⁸ „Die Illegalität erhöht die Nichtintegration.“ See Ostendorf, B. (2005) op. cit., p. 46. Unjustified fear of bilingualism and biculturalism are also core to Huntington's new ideology of The Clash of Civilizations.

⁴⁵⁹ Students from a single language background learn together with English-speaking students. See: - Linton, A. (2007). Dual-Language Education in the Wake of California Proposition 227: Five Cases. *Intercultural Education*, 18 (2), 111-128;

- Gándara's, P. (2005). Learning English in California: Guideposts for the Nation. In M. M. Suárez-Orozco, C. Suárez-Orozco, and D. Baolian Qin (Eds.), *The New Immigration* (pp. 219- 232). New York, NY: Routledge.

⁴⁶⁰ For an analysis of the two main anti-immigration ideologies in California – “intransigent natives,” which calls for making immigrants ineligible for privileges enjoyed by US citizens, and “forceful assimilationism” which perceives multilingualism as having a divisive impact on the fabric of American society, see Rumbaut, R. G., and Portes, A. (2001), op. cit., p. 271. Little Hoover Commission (2002). *We The People. Helping Newcomers Become Californians*, Sacramento, CA: Little Hoover Commission, p. 3.

potential voters in elections, given the fact that the state is now a minority majority state.⁴⁶² Consequently, in California the prevailing tensions among average people on such immigration issues as the costs and benefits of immigration for the state seem to have waned in comparison to other states (see Arizona in the next subchapter). As a report by the Progressive States Network notes, along with some other states which have some of the largest numbers of undocumented immigrants (but not including Arizona), for quite some time California has been “quietly promoting policies based on the integration of new immigrants” which has not received as much media attention as the anti immigrant propositions in the past did. In fact, in comparison to other states, California can boast one of the most integrative state policies passed in the last decade in the US, although certain sticking points about rights for unauthorized immigrants remain unresolved.⁴⁶³ One of these sticking points is the crucial integration policy for the youth into the education system. Accordingly, regardless of their immigration status young immigrants can benefit from provisions in The California Immigrant Higher Education Act of 2001 (AB 540) which grants in-state tuition rates at California’s public colleges to students who have completed three years at a California high school and earned a high school diploma or equivalent.⁴⁶⁴

Over time, many other pro-immigration bills have been passed which offer extra benefits for immigrants, who are not eligible for federal support. In fact, already right after passing PRWORA California created CalWORKs State Only funded program to aid those non-citizens who cannot receive federally funded TANF. In addition, since 2006, cities and counties have been authorized to provide aid to all residents who would not be eligible under requirements of PRWORA (SB 1534). Moreover, since 2007 (under provisions included in SB 77) educational facilities have been required to give priority to immigrants liable to lose federal funds under PRWORA in the allocation of resources for ESL courses, and since 2008 Californian law (AB 88) has provided preparation services for citizenship and

⁴⁶² Naturalized adults, immigrants eligible for naturalization, and young-adult citizen children of immigrants combined represent 7.7 million potential voters in California. These individuals, with close ties to the immigrant experience, will represent 29% of all potential voters in 2012. Paral, R. et al. (2008). *Integration Potential of California's Immigrants and Their Children: New Estimates of Potential New Voters at the State, County, and Legislative District Levels*. Sebastopol, CA: Grantmakers Concerned with Immigrants and Refugees.

⁴⁶³ For example, at the time of writing California had still not approved the bill from September 2003, sponsored by former Governor Gray Davis, which would have given immigrants the opportunity to obtain a California driver’s license. For a comparison between California state immigration and integration policies and those in other states see Progressive States Network. (2008). *The Anti-Immigrant Movement that Failed: Positive Integration Policies by State Governments Still Far Outweigh Punitive Policies Aimed at New Immigrants*. New York, NY: Progressive States Network, p. 12.

⁴⁶⁴ California is one of ten US states which had passed in-state tuition legislation by the time of writing: the others are Illinois, Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and Washington. Nevertheless California SB 1, which would have permitted an undocumented immigrant student who attended California high schools for at least 3 years to receive state financial aid, was vetoed in 2007.

naturalization.⁴⁶⁵ In addition, the E-Verify employment verification program, which has been the subject of great debate at the federal level, has thus far not been implemented in California, although many employers have voluntarily signed up for the program.⁴⁶⁶

Despite the above-mentioned provisions for immigrants, little has changed in the debate on immigrant integration, which has not been the focus of attention at the state or national level. The Office of Immigrant Assistance, established in 2001 within the California Department of Justice, is the only state agency which directly targets immigrants.⁴⁶⁷ The scope of its operations is restricted to legal advice for the victims of discrimination and work exploitation. No other state programs focus on immigrant integration, beyond those federal measures for integration already discussed. The recommendations of the Little Hoover Commission Report in 2002, called for the creation of The Golden State Residency Program, have yet to be implemented. The program would target immigrants willing to declare their commitment to obtaining citizenship and participating actively in community life, obeying the law, developing their English proficiency and gaining legal employment. In turn, the state would grant participants eligibility for a range of benefits comparable to those of citizens.⁴⁶⁸ Recent years have seen other integration proposals from community-based associations trying to shift political and public discourse towards the concept of immigrant integration, similar to that at the nationwide level.⁴⁶⁹ The California Immigrant Integration Initiative (CIII) is another recent statewide integration campaign, established in 2007 to strengthen the immigrant integration infrastructure throughout the state. This Initiative represents a joint effort on the part of members of California's non-profit network of foundations, Grantmakers Concerned with Immigrants and Refugees (GCIR). The initiative seeks to engage municipal and county governments in developing integration programs, funding opportunities in local communities, and helping local organizations manage immigrant integration. Although *GCIR's Immigrant Integration Toolkit* is reminiscent of the USCIS federal agency's integration instruments, the thematic scope of GCIR's work far exceeds the USCIS integration agenda, which is restricted to civic integration programs.⁴⁷⁰

⁴⁶⁵ Selected from the data base of The National Conference of State Legislatures. Home Page: <http://www.ncsl.org/>

⁴⁶⁶ As of January 2011, 20,800 employers had enrolled in the system, which is the highest number among the US states in which where the enrollment is not obligatory. See Meissner, D. and Rosenblum, M. R., op. cit.

⁴⁶⁷ United States Office of Immigrant Assistance. Web page: <http://caag.state.ca.us/immigrant/index.htm>

⁴⁶⁸ Little Hoover Commission, op. cit., p. 3.

Although the program would be voluntary, the concept is reminiscent of the obligatory integration contracts planned in Germany, see subchapter 4.5.4.

⁴⁶⁹ See subchapter 4.1.2.

⁴⁷⁰ Grantmakers Concerned with Immigrants and Refugees. (2006). *GCIR's Immigrant Integration Toolkit, Investing in Our Communities: Strategies for Immigrant Integration*. Sebastopol, CA: Grantmakers Concerned with Immigrants and Refugees.

Although the GCIR seems to be an important integration state initiative, no organizations which I interviewed mentioned either this or any other statewide integration network.

It remains to be seen how public and political discourse will respond to the subject of integration of immigrant youth, which does not seem to play any special role for the California state government. It is only through the work of state agencies, like the California Department of Education and the California Employment Development Department (EDD), that federal funds from the Workforce Investment Act and federal funds for ELLs are channeled to local communities which engage in work with immigrant youth. Despite the absence of any strong state support for integration of immigrant youth, California does not block local integration initiatives, something which cannot be said of some other states in the US.

4.3 Arizona

From the years after World War II until recently, little was to be heard in migration reports about immigrants moving to Arizona. Only at the turn of this century did the state begin to be considered not only a center for Native American folk arts and crafts and the breathtaking landscape of one of the seven natural wonders of the world, but also as an emerging gateway for both international and state migration. The rapidly developing state, initially a preferred destination for snowbird migration of domestic retirees, has turned into a more permanent destination for many young, working age newcomers, enticed there by the growth in jobs and affordable housing.⁴⁷¹ In the decade between 1990 and 2000, the percentage increase in the number of foreign born inhabitants was estimated at 135.8%, a figure that started to attract the attention of migration researchers and led them to classify Arizona among the five top new immigration settlement states.⁴⁷² Moreover, in the meantime many American citizens, also attracted by the positive economic prospects, have moved there from other states and started to contribute to overall population growth.⁴⁷³ Once a remote and sparsely populated region, Arizona is now projected to be the third most-populous state in the west.⁴⁷⁴ The fact that practically all new settlers, both native and immigrant, “start their lives anew” in Arizona would seem promising for immigrant integration. At first glance, the most common remark among Arizonans, “Everyone in Arizona is from

⁴⁷¹ Frey distinguishes the New Sunbelt, which became first major destination for domestic migration at the turn of the century, from Melting Pot states such as California, which experienced outflows of the native population, Frey, W. H. (2002). Three Americas: The Rising Significance of Regions. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 68 (4), 349-355.

⁴⁷² Accordingly, new settlement states had growth rates in foreign born of more than 100% between years 1990-2000. The other states were Georgia, North Carolina, Colorado, and Nevada; see Bump, M., Lindsay, L., and Silje, P., op. cit., p. 21.

⁴⁷³ In years 1990-2000, Arizona was the second most rapidly growing state after Nevada (40%). Perry, M. J. et al., (2001). *Population Change and Distribution. Census 2000 Brief*. Washington, DC: US Census Bureau.

⁴⁷⁴ With 6.5 million residents, the population of Arizona ranks 14th nationally; see Hager, E. and Garcia, J. (2010). *Global Arizona 100, A New Century, A World Stage*. Phoenix, AZ: Morrison Institute for Public Policy, ASU.

somewhere else,”⁴⁷⁵ gives the impression that the state might turn out to be a pioneer in managing American unity in diversity. The last few years, unfortunately, show that, on the contrary, Arizona has become a national symbol of anti-immigration sentiment, enforcing harsh policies against the undocumented. Racial profiling and the infamous practices of sweeps and deportations of undocumented people in immigration communities, conducted by Sheriff Joe Arpaio’s Office in Maricopa County, home to more than half of the state’s residents, bode badly for local immigrant integration efforts. In recent years, Arizona has become the perfect breeding ground for copycat punitive immigration policies, modeled on California’s past anti-immigration bills. Currently, it seems almost impossible to achieve the noble goal of unifying the state, which former Governor Napolitano advocated two years before she left office in 2009: “I believe this independent, confident, growing state of ours can be even stronger. It can become the ‘One Arizona’ [...] – a state, and a state of mind, that fits the hopes and dreams of our people.”⁴⁷⁶ In fact current immigration issues in Arizona have divided not only the state but the whole nation, which makes the purported American ideal of E Pluribus Unum appear quite unrealistic. We could speculate that the outburst of anti-immigration attitudes in Arizona is the result of the post–Second World War migration landscape in the state and anti-Latino rhetoric which has begun to dominate public and political discourse in recent years.

4.3.1 Historical Context of Immigration

Relatively few sources exist and little research has been done on the post-World War II immigration landscape in Arizona. In fact such an analysis might shed light on the reasons behind the current controversies there over immigration.⁴⁷⁷ In fact, most historical immigration studies focus on the largest city in Maricopa County, Phoenix, which is also the most important concentration of immigrants in Arizona.⁴⁷⁸ Nevertheless, like the rest of the state of Arizona, even the state capital was not among the prime US immigration destinations in the Southwest at the beginning of the second half of the 20th century. As Cecilia Menjivar and Lisa Magaña point out, Phoenix “was mostly a stopping point for immigrants en route to other US destinations.” It is worth noting that in the first years after Arizona became a state

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁶ Napolitano, J. (2007, January 8). State of the State Address, 48th Arizona Legislature First Regular Session.

⁴⁷⁷ For an overview of the research and reports on the subject of immigration to Arizona in the 20th century, see Menjivar, C. and Magaña, L. (2005). Immigration to Arizona: Diversity and Change. In S. Eddy et al. (Eds.). *Arizona as a Border State – Competing in the Global Economy* (pp. 149-166). Phoenix, AZ: Arizona Town Hall.

⁴⁷⁸ This pattern is similar to Warsaw in the case of Poland.

immigration rates remained significantly high.⁴⁷⁹ In subsequent years, there was a dramatic decline from 24.1% in 1920 to Arizona's lowest point of 4.3% in the 1970s. Even the Second Great Migration failed to bring many Blacks to Arizona. From 1940 to 1960, in Arizona the population increase among Afro-Americans population was reported at only 0.5%.⁴⁸⁰ However, Phoenix, which was expanding in these years, did attract a significant number of black newcomers from the South with new jobs in construction and other services.⁴⁸¹

Until the late 1980s, Arizona was usually a secondary destination for immigrants, who saw it as a cheaper but less attractive alternative to California. Of course, as a border state with Mexico, more and more Mexican workers were coming to Arizona, both as part of the Bracero Program, which was in effect until the mid-1960s, and illegally, which prompted researchers to classify Arizona as a traditional destination for Mexican immigrants.⁴⁸² The undocumented, who, as in California, became a target of Operation Wetback, mentioned above, were an easy and cheap labor force for Arizona farmers. However, the massive inflows of Mexican immigrants came much later. At the beginning of the 1990s, when labor demand started to shift geographically, Arizona became an attractive destination for immigrants, both documented and undocumented, able to compete with California. Between 1988-1998, when employment in California grew by 15%, the job market in Arizona increased by 40%.⁴⁸³ In the twenty-five years since 1980, the percentage of immigrants going to Arizona rose from 2.5% to 7.5%.⁴⁸⁴

The migration of the undocumented population to Arizona was a response to the stricter border controls in California, particularly after Operation Gatekeeper in 1994, which forced people to try to cross the border through the inhospitable deserts and mountains of southern Arizona.⁴⁸⁵ As statistics from the Pew Hispanic Center show, in the years 1990-

⁴⁷⁹ Arizona, which became a US state on February 14, 1912, was the last contiguous US state to be admitted.

⁴⁸⁰ The percentage grew from 3% to 3.3% of the whole population of Arizona. See Gibson, C. and Lennon E., op. cit.

⁴⁸¹ In 1960, more than 20 thousand Afro-Americans were reported, which constituted 4.8% of the population of Phoenix. See Whitaker, M. C. (2007). *Race Work: The Rise of Civil Rights in the Urban West*. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, p. 15.

⁴⁸² Along with California, New Mexico, Texas, Illinois; see Leach, M. A., and Bean, D. (2008). The Structure and Dynamics of Mexican Migration to New Destinations in the United States. In D. S. Massey (Ed.), *New Faces in New Places: The Changing Geography of American Immigration* (pp 51-74). New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, p. 51.

⁴⁸³ Massey, D. S. and Capoferro, C. (2008). The Geographic Diversification of American Immigration. In D. S. Massey (Ed.), *New Faces in New Places: The Changing Geography of American Immigration* (pp. 25-50). New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, p. 32.

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 39.

⁴⁸⁵ The shift to illegal entry points in Arizona has increased the likelihood of deaths of undocumented border crossers. The Tucson Sector in southern Arizona has reportedly been the site of the vast majority of recovered bodies in the new millennium. The largest number of deaths between 1995-2005 were reported among those between 18 to 29 year-old, that is 47% of 668 whose ages were known. For a comprehensive report on the death toll of border crossers in Arizona, see Rubio-Goldsmith, R., McCormick, M. M., Daniel Martinez, D., and Duarte, I. M. (2006). *The "Funnel Effect" and Recovered Bodies of Unauthorized Migrants Processed by the Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner*,

2007, the number of undocumented rose from 90,000 to 500,000. As a result, Arizona became the center of roundups⁴⁸⁶ and anti-immigrant vigilante activities as well as citizen militias, which started fueling anger and fear of “the invasion of illegals” among some Arizona residents.⁴⁸⁷ Some groups, like the American Border Patrol or the Minutemen Project, either moved from California or emerged as newly-established state anti-immigration movements, like Protect Arizona Now, an initiator of a number of anti-immigration bills.⁴⁸⁸ At the same time, Arizona also began to witness new activism on the part of pro-immigration organizations, which organized peaceful pro-immigration March of 2006 and started to focus attention on the situation of the undocumented in the state.⁴⁸⁹

Because Mexicans comprised a majority of the immigrants coming to Arizona in the period after the Second World War, the common perception remains that immigration to Arizona is only about Mexicans and, moreover, predominantly undocumented Mexicans.⁴⁹⁰ In fact, Latinos make up only one part of a very diverse population in Arizona. First, as mentioned earlier, better conditions for the resettlement of Asians, following the passing of the 1965 Immigration Act, have given rise to inflows of Asian Indian, Filipino, and Korean populations since 1965 and Vietnamese and other Southeast Asian groups since 1975.⁴⁹¹ Although Arizona has not been *the* magnet for Asian immigration that California has been, at

1990-2005. Tucson, AZ: Binational Migration Institute, Mexican American Studies and Research Center, University of Arizona.

For a comprehensive history of undocumented immigration and the indispensable role of illegal aliens in the development of the US, see Ngai, M. M. (2004). *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

⁴⁸⁶ For example there were the Chandler Roundups in 1997, a joint operation between local police and the US Border patrol, who swept through the city, stopping and questioning thousands of Latinos about their legal status during the raids, finally arresting 432 who could not immediately provide documents. Among those arrested were people who were later able to produce documents.

See Varsanyi, M. W. (2008) Immigration Policing Through the Back Door: City Ordinances, the 'Right to the City,' and the Exclusion of Undocumented Day Laborers. *Urban Geography*, 29 (1), 29-52.

Many activists are now warning against a repetition of the 1997 raid, arguing that the new immigration-enforcement law will put the same strain on communities across Arizona.

Boehnke, M. (2010, April 28). Arizona Immigration Law Revives Memories of 1997 Chandler Roundup. *The Arizona Republic*.

⁴⁸⁷ Barry, T. (2005). Immigration Debate: Politics, Ideologies of Anti-Immigration Forces. *Immigration Daily*.

⁴⁸⁸ The next subchapter provides more detailed information on anti-immigration bills in Arizona.

⁴⁸⁹ The activities of the California-based Border Angels group started working in the region of the Arizona-Mexico border. The rise of The Center for Community Development and Civil Rights at Arizona State University is another noteworthy initiative, established in January 2005 by Raul Yzaguirre, the former President and CEO of the National Conference of La Raza. As I learned from the staff of the Center, at which I conducted most of my interviews in Phoenix, Yzaguirre's decision to move to Phoenix was inspired by his commitment to establishing a human rights research center and to leading advocacy at the heart of the anti-immigration movement. More examples of pro-immigration groups in Arizona will be discussed in subchapter 5.2.2 on Phoenix.

⁴⁹⁰ During my empirical research on integration management in Phoenix, most of the topics concerning integration of immigrants were related to Latinos. Menjivar and Magaña confirm my observations. See Menjivar, C. and Magaña, L. op. cit., p. 149.

⁴⁹¹ Oberle, A. and Li, W. (2008). Diverging Trajectories: Asian and Latino Immigration in Metropolitan Phoenix. In A. Singer, C. B. Brettell, and S. W. Hardwick (Eds.), *Twenty-First-Century Gateways: Immigrant Incorporation in Suburban America* (pp.85-102). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

the turn of the 21st century Asians started contributing to the large immigration inflows, reaching about 12% of all immigrants in 2005. Moreover, Arizona has also opened the gates to an increasing number of refugees which has only increased the ethnic diversity of the state. In the early 1980s, most refugees came from Vietnam (58%) and Cambodia. Bosnians and Cubans and refugees from Somalia and Sudan were the largest groups in the early 1990s, whereas more Iraqis and Somalis have been resettled there in the last 15 years. In fact, the number of refugees has grown significantly in recent years, from 2420 in 2000 to 4320 in 2010. As a result, Arizona currently ranks fourth in the number of refugees resettled in the US. Indeed, the Refugees Resettlement Program has contributed significantly to the present immigration landscape, which is rarely emphasized in debates about immigration in Arizona today.⁴⁹²

4.3.2 Immigration Scale

Despite rapid outflows of immigrants due to increasing anti-immigration discourse, which will be examined later, Arizona still ranks as the young immigrant destination in the US. Between 2000 and 2009, the foreign-born population in Arizona grew by 41 percent, which is above the national average (see graph 8). In 2009 the 925,376 registered immigrants constituted 14% of the entire population, putting Arizona in 9th place in the US ranking of states with the highest percentage of foreign born inhabitants. Immigrant youth aged 18-24 accounted for more than 9% of foreign born, which reflects the average for Arizona as a whole. Nevertheless, statistics show the foreign population is on average older than the overall population of Arizona. Immigrant children aged 5-17 account for merely 7% of all foreign born in comparison to 18.9% of the whole population of all young Arizonans in the same age group.⁴⁹³


Graph 8, using data from 2009, shows the predominance of Mexicans among immigrants. They constituted by far the large majority of foreign born from Latin America, who account for almost 70% of the immigrant population. The Asian population was the second largest foreign group, followed by Europeans and then Canadians (see graph 8). Consequently, the white-skinned immigrant population is shrinking. With the steady increase in immigration and the continuing demographic boom of the Latino population, Arizona may soon follow California's footsteps and become a majority-minority state. Back in 2009 white people who were not Hispanic constituted a mere 57.3% of the population as a whole. However, unlike in traditional immigration states, immigrants in Arizona have formed

⁴⁹² Administration for Children and Families (ACF). (n.d.). Refugee Arrival Data by Country of Origin and State of Initial Resettlement.

⁴⁹³ 18.9% is the largest percentage among all age groups of Arizona, which, from a demographic perspective, is growing rapidly. The comparison is based my own calculations using data from the US Census Bureau, 2009 American Community Survey.

neighborhoods which cannot be distinguished along ethnic lines.⁴⁹⁴ In fact, few ethnic enclaves exist in the new metropolitan areas, like Phoenix. New arrivals usually settle wherever they find enough jobs and affordable housing, which makes the geography of immigration in Arizona more heterogeneous and less racially segregated.

Graph 8 Foreign-Born Population in Arizona in 2009



Source: The US Census Bureau's American Community Survey 2009

Finally, the fact that the unauthorized population has actually been declining in Arizona for the past couple of years may surprise anyone reading reports published by anti-immigration movements of invasions of illegal aliens. As the Pew Hispanic Center reports, the undocumented population is estimated to have declined by 100,000 between 2007 and 2010. Nevertheless, the current estimate of 400,000 unauthorized immigrants constitutes 6% of the entire population. This puts the state in 5th place in the ranking of US states with the largest percentage of “illegal” immigrants and in 8th place among the states with the largest number of unauthorized immigrants.⁴⁹⁵

4.3.3 Public and Political Discourse

Summarizing the various debates which are currently taking place and the political climate around the issue of immigration in Arizona is one of the most challenging tasks of this research. In a very short span of time, Arizona has gained prominence for having some of the toughest anti-immigration laws in the country. The emerging signs of “fortress Arizona”

⁴⁹⁴ Menjívar, C. and Magaña, L., op. cit.

⁴⁹⁵ Passel, J. S. and Cohn, D. V. (2011), op. cit.

are, in fact, not only to be found at the Mexican border but first of all in people's minds.⁴⁹⁶ In fact, a comprehensive analysis of recent developments in discourse on immigration and integration in Arizona, and its impact on other US states, would require writing a separate book. Moreover, emotional responses to human rights violations and racism may run high among those who watch or read reports about new crackdowns on undocumented immigrants, massive deportations, and the hopeless situation of many unauthorized immigrant youth in the state, which in turns discourages many documented immigrants from remaining in the state as well. Consequently, there might be a strong tendency toward reductionism as well as emotionalism in reviews of the serious social and political divisions in Arizona at the moment.⁴⁹⁷

Disillusionment and the insecurity that comes with living in constant fear of deportation are common among immigrants in Arizona, which strongly diminishes any faith immigrant youth might have in a prosperous future in the state. The intensification of anti-immigration sentiment, fueled by new, strict immigration laws against unauthorized immigrants and increasing opposition to anti-immigration crusaders is dividing not only the state but the nation as a whole. Consequently, any discussion of integration policies in Arizona is overshadowed by the core issue: who is allowed to stay and who should be forced to leave the country; or, in other words, who is for and who is against enforcing Arizona's anti-immigration laws. Integration debates then come down to the question of having documents or not. "If you don't have papers, you'd better pack your bags" seems to be the current stance of the Arizona government on the potential integration of young immigrants.

It is worth mentioning, however, that law enforcement practices in Arizona differ geographically, depending on local officials' attitudes towards immigration. In fact, Arizona has given these officials quite a lot of authority over organizing workplace raids and deportations, which has already given rise to a number of controversies at the federal level. The most controversial practices are those of Joe Arpaio of the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office, "America's Toughest Sheriff," as he calls himself.⁴⁹⁸ Statistics obtained by the Associated Press show that his office was responsible for about a quarter of the national total

⁴⁹⁶ A fence crosses approximately 650 miles of the 2,000-mile US-Mexico border, about 30 percent of the border. Nearly half of the fence was built in Arizona, with the rest equally divided between California, New Mexico and Texas. See Arizona Border Fence Section to be Replaced. (2011, March 1). *The Arizona Republic*.

⁴⁹⁷ Quite unexpectedly, at the commencement of my empirical research in the state in 2008, I found myself in the hot spot for discussions about "legal versus illegal immigrants," which at that time had not become the most topical issue on the other side of the Atlantic in Europe. Much as the reports coming to Europe covered the emerging anti-immigration climate in Arizona, the reality of dealing with integration issues on-the-spot went beyond my expectations. My personal experience with confronting immigrants' problems during my one-month stay in the state was very emotional and cannot really be communicated in the dissertation.

⁴⁹⁸ See Arpaio, J. and Sherman, L. (2008). *Joe's Law: America's Toughest Sheriff Takes on Illegal Immigration, Drugs, and Everything Else that Threatens America*. New York, NY: AMACOM Div American Mgmt Assn. Arpaio is currently under federal investigation on allegations of civil rights violations.

of 115,841 deportation cases since 2007.⁴⁹⁹ Along with deportations and workplace raids, the policy of so-called “Attrition Through Enforcement” has dominated Arizona immigration legislation for the last couple of years. The idea behind this policy is to create such harsh living conditions for unauthorized immigrants that they would rather leave the state of their own volition than wait to be deported. As state Rep. John Kavanagh told the Arizona Republic, “it’s about creating so much fear they will leave on their own.”⁵⁰⁰ Such a slow but effective law enforcement approach allegedly results in the massive outflows of unwanted immigrants without many pangs of conscience from Americans and without the media attention and bad publicity which massive deportations normally involve. One of the fiercest advocates of such tactics, the think tank Center for Immigration Studies, points out that “political support for a new commitment to enforcement might well be undermined if an exodus of biblical proportions were to be televised in every American living room.”⁵⁰¹ However, what was not anticipated by the proponents of the Attrition Through Enforcement strategy is the fact that not only are undocumented deterred from remaining in the state but many legally residing immigrants are also choosing not to stay. They are leaving the state, either because they have close family ties with unauthorized or some are members of their circle of friends or simply because they no longer feel secure in a state where the fear of racial profiling and harassment of legal immigrants hinders their integration and their attempts at achieving a “normal” life. In fact, in contrast to the fears projected by the proponents of the new enforcement strategies, public attention has been drawn to the poignant stories of many immigrants from mixed-status families who are fleeing Arizona. As the CNN reported, these are the stories of people who are leaving the state which “allowed them to achieve the American dream and is now the state which took it away.”⁵⁰² According to estimates from April 2010, nearly 100,000 undocumented immigrants had left the state. It is still impossible to estimate just how many of them are young immigrants who had planned on a future in Arizona, but it is reasonable to assume they are moving to other states or returning to their countries of origin due to the proliferation of harsh policies.

Immigrant integration policies in Arizona are rather scarce. Apart from the implementation of federal integration initiatives through the Arizona Department of Education for ELL students and federal monies for Workforce Investment Programs for youth, distributed by the Arizona Department of Economic Security, Arizona cannot boast of any notable integration plans targeting immigrant youth. In fact, Arizona is now regarded as a

⁴⁹⁹ See the article Gamboa, S. (2010, July 28). Arizona Helped Deport Thousands Without New Law. *The Washington Times*.

⁵⁰⁰ González, D. (2010, April 28). Arizona Immigration Law Could Drive Latinos Out Of State. *The Arizona Republic*.

⁵⁰¹ Krikorian, M. (2005, May). Downsizing Illegal Immigration: A Strategy of Attrition Through Enforcement. *CIS Backgrounders and Reports*.

⁵⁰² Gutierrez, T. (2010, July 22). *Fleeing the American Dream*. CNN Video Report.

state with one of the most punitive immigrant policies against undocumented immigrants implemented in the first decade of the 21th century.⁵⁰³ Generally speaking, the integration of immigrant youth into the labor market is currently complicated by strict limits on employment and little state support for ELL students who are supposed to learn in monolingual classes. Arizona Proposition 203, English for Children, which passed in 2000, abolished bilingual education and replaced it, as we have seen, with immersion programs for ELL students. Significantly, more than one in every ten ELL student dropped out during the 2008/2009 school year.⁵⁰⁴ Although modeled on California's Proposition 227, the bilingual education bill in Arizona is much stricter, reducing the opportunities for parents to apply for waivers.⁵⁰⁵ The other Arizona law which directly affects students is Proposition 300, signed in 2006, which denies undocumented students in-state tuition at public colleges and universities in Arizona. The students are barred from any state monies and can only apply for limited privately-funded scholarships to continue their education. The only integrative education policies, passed 2007 and 2008, provide for classes for immigrant and adult education in school districts, so-called "Americanization work," and state monies for English immersion classes. At the same time punitive immigrant policies were making their way through the Arizona legislature. Passed in 2007, Arizona's employer sanction law prohibits employers from hiring undocumented workers. Employers face suspension or revocation of their business licenses if they fail to comply. Moreover, since 2008 they are obliged to sign up for the E-Verify employment verification program. All this legislation has created an environment in which integration issues began to be associated with sanctions against the undocumented in public and political discourse and to pave the way for the realization of attrition through enforcement.

The practice of attrition through enforcement gained momentum in the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (known as SB 1070), signed by Republican Secretary of State of Arizona Jan Brewer⁵⁰⁶ in April 2010. The new law, which is widely considered the US' toughest Immigration enforcement legislation, triggered a national controversy and legal battle between the state of Arizona and the federal government over its constitutionality. After filing a lawsuit against the state, the Justice Department found that federal law preempted the new law and blocked its most controversial provisions just one

⁵⁰³ Progressive States Network, *op. cit.*

⁵⁰⁴ In comparison, the drop out rate among ELL students in California was 50% lower (5.3%). ELL students constitute 24.2% of all students in California and 11.5% of all students in Arizona. See Consolidated State Performance Report data from United States Department of Education. (n.d.). EDFacts SY 2008-0 for Arizona and California.

⁵⁰⁵ For a comparison of California's Proposition 227 with Arizona's Proposition 203, see Crawford, J. (2000). *English-Only v. English-Only A Tale of Two Initiatives: California and Arizona.*

⁵⁰⁶ She replaced Democratic Governor Janet Napolitano, who was promoted to Secretary of Homeland Security in the Obama administration. Napolitano vetoed several bills similar to SB 1070 during her term as Governor of Arizona.

day before it was due to take effect on July 29, 2010.⁵⁰⁷ Among other things, under the preliminary injunction all state and local enforcement officials were released from the obligation to investigate people's immigration status "if reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien who is unlawfully present in the US."⁵⁰⁸ The federal judge also struck down the section which required immigrants to carry their alien registration papers with them at all times. Nevertheless, the modified SB 1070 banned the practice of sanctuary cities in Arizona. Consequently, the little room for maneuvering in managing the integration of undocumented immigrants, which sanctuary cities had once enjoyed, disappeared with the new law.

As I write, the national debate over the lawsuit has not been exhausted. Arizona has appealed the federal government's decision to the United States Court of Appeals and the future of the legislation is uncertain. The case of SB 1070 is reminiscent of California's highly controversial Proposition 187, which has never been implemented, and many critics of the immigration "maelstrom" have warned Arizona against repeating the mistakes made by its neighbor.⁵⁰⁹ However, the key figures behind SB 1070, State Senator Russell Pearce, who sponsored the bill, and State Governor Jan Brewer, who signed it, do not seem to be deterred by ongoing lawsuits or protesting voices from across the nation.⁵¹⁰ In fact, more new immigration restrictions are being prepared, which might have an enormous impact on the future of immigrant youth in the state. Among other provisions of the planned legislation, undocumented immigrants would be prohibited from driving in the state and enrolling in school. School officials would be compelled to ask prospective students for proof of citizenship. Moreover, citizenship through birth in the US would be denied to children of undocumented parents, so that these children's access to education would also be limited.⁵¹¹

It should be kept in mind that the impact of the rapidly developing anti-immigration discourse in Arizona goes beyond unauthorized immigrants. As many opponents of new legislation affirm, all citizens might feel targeted and fear racial profiling. Such fears have even been confirmed by United States District Court Judge Susan Bolton. As she declared,

⁵⁰⁷ Arizona Immigration Law (SB 1070). (2011, February 24). *The New York Times*.

⁵⁰⁸ Arizona State Senate, (2010, January 15). Fact Sheet for SB 1070.

⁵⁰⁹ Thomas Saenz warned against merging "political symbolism and populist pandering" into a dangerous policy, comparing "the folly" of Californian Proposition 187 with Arizona SB 1070. See Saenz, T. A. (2010, April 21). Huge Risks of Arizona Immigration Law. *Special to CNN*.

⁵¹⁰ The authors of controversial immigration legislation belong to a Washington, DC-based organization, The Immigration Reform Law Institute (IRLI), an organization supporting the extremist Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), which advocates limits on immigration such as "a temporary moratorium on all immigration except spouses and minor children of US citizens and a limited number of refugees." See <http://www.fairus.org/> Henry Fernandez, from the opposition organization, Center for American Progress, provides an overview of protesting reactions and arguments against implementing legislation similar to SB 1070 in the US. See Fernandez, H. (2010). *Fighting Back Against Copycat Immigration Laws Like Arizona's*. Washington, DC: Center for American Progress.

⁵¹¹ Information about these plans were made public in February 2011, which is outside the timeframe set for data collection in my dissertation. Due to the enormous impact they have on the political discourse of immigrant youth integration, these most recent developments are mentioned.

passing all provisions of SB 1070 would increase "the intrusion of police presence into the lives of legally present aliens (and even United States citizens), who will necessarily be swept up."⁵¹² Due to the tension created by the legislation, many immigrants – both documented and undocumented – are leaving Arizona, which poses a serious challenge for Arizona's future prosperity. Indeed, the focus of political and public discourse on immigration shifts back and forth between questions about possible human rights violations and serious economic repercussions which Arizona might face. The future of Arizona business is now threatened by national and international protests against the new immigration law, which involve boycotts of contracts and conventions by businesses, investors and tourists from other states and countries. Economists estimate that as a result of the controversies over SB 1070 and current social and political divisions, the overall annual losses (i.e. in sales or wages, taxes) may reach as high as \$54bn per year.⁵¹³

On the other hand, broad public support for Arizona's strict immigration law has not waned. Reports of nationwide anti-immigrant organizations have long fueled anti-immigration sentiment in Arizona, creating fertile ground for strict legislation. The strongest arguments in favor of the new legislation cite the purportedly huge costs of keeping undocumented immigrants who pose a threat to US security. Although pro-immigration groups claim that SB 1070 supporters are using faked data to make their case, in 2010 more than 60% of Americans reportedly approved of the strict immigration law and more than 20 states plan to introduce bills similar to Arizona's.⁵¹⁴ Consequently, we are already well beyond an isolated, distinct discourse on immigration limited to one state. The new wave of activism against federal immigration law which Arizona's actions inaugurated seems to be infecting other states as well.⁵¹⁵ The rhetoric of "Arizonification,"⁵¹⁶ a newly-coined term, seems to be spreading across the whole nation. States are being challenged to take a position for or against strict immigration enforcement measures. The turmoil is inspired by the state which, as Morton M. Kondracke puts it, "has recently become renown for Minuteman vigilantism, death threats against politicians and judges, talk-radio demagoguery, and bullying of Latinos

⁵¹² Lacey, M. (2011, February 23). Arizona Lawmakers Push New Round of Immigration Restrictions. *The New York Times*.

⁵¹³ Arizona Employers for Immigration Reform (n.d.). *Presentation: Avoiding Arizona Immigration Mistakes*.

⁵¹⁴ According to FBI crime statistics, crime declined in Arizona over the last decade even as the immigrant population increased.

Fernandez, H. (2010). *Fighting Back Against Copycat Immigration Laws Like Arizona's*. Washington, DC: Center for American Progress.

⁵¹⁵ Chishti, M. and Bergeron, C. (2011, January 18). States Assert New Activist Immigration Role in Altered Political Landscape. *Migration Information Source*.

In fact, the activism is the result of a longer process of states and cities usurping more power to enforce immigration law; for an analysis see Varsanyi, M. W. (2009). *Rescaling the "Alien," Rescaling Personhood: Neoliberalism, Immigration, and the State*. Working Paper 173. San Diego, CA: Center for Comparative Immigration Studies.

⁵¹⁶ The term Arizonification was coined by the editor of the Capitol Hill Roll Call, Morton M. Kondracke. See Kondracke, M. M. (2011, January 18). 'Nativist Lobby' Is Winning on Immigration. *Roll Cal*.

and rival politicians.” Time will only tell to what extent other states view Arizona’s immigration policies as a pattern to imitate or to boycott. It is quite possible that the immigrants leaving Arizona for immigration gateways may inspire similar strict anti-immigration measures and state activism. Consequently the dialogue recently begun on integration in the US may once again be overshadowed by the discourse on immigration enforcement rather than network-building for the integration of immigrant youth, unless comprehensive immigration reform from the federal government manages to resolve the tensions which have divided Arizona and the rest of the nation.

4.4 The European Union

4.4.1 EU Scale of Diversity

The enlargement of the European Union in 2004 and in 2007 by twelve new member states has definitely contributed to an intensification of the debates about the EU as a multicultural entity, sometimes compared to that of the US. As noted by Belgian researcher Marco Martiniello in 2006, “diversification of diversity,” an expression originally used by Hollinger in reference to the cultural landscape of the US, could now easily be applied to the EU.⁵¹⁷ The present EU, consisting of 27 member states,⁵¹⁸ with candidates for membership on a waiting list, is a showcase for even more diverse migration groups and consequently greater challenges to integration management across the EU. The diversity in the EU is reflected both in the cultural diversity of its member states and in their various levels of immigration. The new EU member states, like Poland, have only recently been faced with immigration. Others, like Germany, have dealt with immigration and integration challenges for many years, but are still discussing and modifying their integration policies.

“Diversity of diversification” in the EU is best reflected in immigrant population in the EU. The number of all foreign citizens in the EU amounted to 30.8 million (6.2% of the total population) as of January 2008.⁵¹⁹ As Stavros Lambrinidis, Vice-President of the European Parliament points out, “this number could make up a 28th Member State” and would be the seventh largest in size.⁵²⁰ More than one third (11.3 million) of foreign citizens came from the EU member states. However, the proportion of foreign citizens varied significantly across the

⁵¹⁷ Martiniello, M. (2006). How to Combine Integration and Diversities: The Challenge of an EU Multicultural Citizenship. In R. Lewis, *Multiculturalism Observed: Exploring Identity* (31-48). Brussels: VUB Press, p. 31.

Hollinger, D. A. (1995). *Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism*. New York, NY: Basic Books.


⁵¹⁸ “The EU member states” will be used throughout the paper in reference to current 27 member states of the European Union.

⁵¹⁹ Foreign citizens refer to persons who are not citizens of the country in which they reside. They also include persons of unknown citizenship and stateless persons.

⁵²⁰ European Integration Forum. (n.d.). Summary Report of the Third Meeting 24 – 25 June 2010, Brussels.

countries between 0.1% in Romania, Poland, Bulgaria and Slovakia to 43% in Luxembourg (see graph 9). Therefore, each EU country must be examined separately in terms of its experience with migration. In 2008 more than 75% of all foreign citizens in the EU27 lived in Germany (7.3 million), Spain (5.3 million), the United Kingdom (4.0 million), France (3.7 million) and Italy (3.4 million).⁵²¹ Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom were also the countries with the largest absolute numbers of young non-EU foreigners aged 15-29 (1.8, 1.4, and 1.25 million respectively) in 2007.⁵²²

Graph 9 Population of Foreigners in the EU27 Members States, 2008 (in %)



Source: Eurostat, 2009

The land of origin of foreign citizens varies greatly between the EU member states. In six member states, the largest single group of foreign citizens accounted for more than 30% of the total foreign population in the EU. The highest percentage of foreign citizens from one single country was registered in Greece (64% of foreign citizens were from Albania), Slovenia (47% from Bosnia and Herzegovina), Hungary (37% from Romania), and Luxembourg (37% from Portugal).

⁵²¹ Vasileva, K. (2009). Citizens of European Countries account for the Majority of the Foreign Population in EU-27 in 2008. *Eurostat Statistics in Focus*, 94. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.

⁵²² European Commission, Directorate-General for Education and Culture (2009). *EU Youth Report 2009*. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

In light of this diversity of experience and different national modes of integration within the European Union, it would be impossible to specify one common mode of integration across all EU countries. Nevertheless, the EU is developing a common immigration policy according to the principle of subsidiarity and with respect to differences in legal systems and transposition in different EU member states. As part of its immigration policy the EU can provide some instruments of support for local integration measures, which can be considered significant milestones for the European dialog on the management of immigrant integration.

Mobility and demographic changes in the European Union are the main factors driving the development of migration and integration strategies in Brussels. In fact, there is a relatively high net migration rate in the EU, which in 2008 was almost three times higher than the rate of natural population growth.⁵²³ Moreover, immigrants, especially those in the younger generations, have become a necessity for the EU in view of the aging EU population and a projected decrease in the EU working-age population (between 15-64 years of age) from 67.2% in 2007 towards about 57% of the total in 2050.⁵²⁴ Already in 2006 “receiving and integrating migrants into Europe” were considered one of the key policy responses to demographic changes.⁵²⁵

4.4.2 EU Mode of Integration

Nevertheless, there is no common EU integration policy which is binding for all EU member states, as integration policies still remain within the competencies of the member states. Integration measures are steered at the EU level by the Open Method of Coordination (OMC).⁵²⁶ The EU revisions of the implementation of national action plans in integration policies in each EU member states can theoretically put them under peer-pressure to take actions for reaching the goals of the EU mode of integration.

Like other EU member states, both Poland and Germany are under the same umbrella of general European Union’s immigration policies. The area of integration policy remains within the competencies of the Directorate General Justice, Freedom and

⁵²³ “Net migration” is understood as a difference between the number of immigrants and the number of emigrants.

⁵²⁴ European Commission, Directorate-General for Education and Culture, (2009). *EU Youth Report 2009*, op. cit.

As of 2007 young people aged 15-29 constituted 19.4% of the total population within the EU. A projected share of young people in 2050 is estimated at 15.3% of the total population.

⁵²⁵ Commission of the European Communities. (2006). *The Demographic Future of Europe – From Challenge to Opportunity*. COM(2006) 571 final.

⁵²⁶ Regarded as a supranational governance tool, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), exercised in the EU, is a form of EU soft law, which does not require the EU member states to change their legislation but only to exchange information, run consultations and reach agreement on the implementation of common EU objectives concerning a given policy.

Security of the European Commission.⁵²⁷ The policy areas on immigrant youth and their labor market integration are at the crossroads with other indirect EU policies in education (within the competencies of the European Commission's Directorate-General for Education and Culture (DG EAC) and employment (within the competencies of the European Commission's Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion).⁵²⁸

Assessing the quality of coordination between these units goes beyond the scope of this paper. However, the tools which they use to facilitate integration management in the EU member states and their cities are presented below.

The development of the EU integration framework began only quite recently. After the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, which for the first time established the competencies of the European Community for immigration and asylum, the Tampere Program is considered the first step toward creating a common EU immigration policy. Its beginning dates back to 1999 when the European Council in Tampere agreed on the necessary elements for immigration policies, like ensuring "that migrants benefit from comparable living and working conditions to those of nationals." Moreover, the European Council emphasized the need for "the approximation of national legislations on the conditions for admission and residence of third country nationals."⁵²⁹ The results of Tampere agenda were presented in the Communication from 2000 which recognized a common responsibility on the part of the EU member states for network building among different sectors at the local level. As the Communication states, "micro-level actions" should be based on partnerships between regional and local authorities and their political leaders, especially from larger towns where immigrants usually settle. Accordingly, for the first time the crucial role of cities as practical work sites for integration has been officially recognized in the EU integration framework.⁵³⁰ Ever since then the EU has been slowly gaining more importance in complementing the primary responsibility of its member states for the management of immigrant integration.

⁵²⁷ Formerly there was a Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and Security. As of 1st July 2010 that DG is divided into: DG Justice and DG Home Affairs. DG Justice consists of three directorates: Civil Justice, Criminal Justice, and Fundamental Rights and Citizenship. DG Home Affairs is similarly divided into three directorates: Internal Security, Immigration and Asylum, and Migration and Borders.

⁵²⁸ In 2008 the DG Education and Culture opened a debate on how education policies could solve integration challenges for immigrant youth (Green Paper on "Migration and Mobility: Challenges and Opportunities for EU Education Systems"). The Commission undertook public consultations, the results of which were released at the end of 2009. The following issues were identified as priorities:

- Closing the gap in school achievement between immigrant children and their peers;
- Accommodating increasing numbers of pupils with different mother tongues and cultural perspectives;
- Developing school methods of building intercultural skills;
- Adapting teaching skills and building bridges with migrant families and communities;
- Preventing schools from becoming segregated and improving equity in education.

See European Commission. (2009). Results of the Consultation on the Education of Children from a Migrant Background SEC(2009) 1115 final.

⁵²⁹ Commission of the European Communities. (2000). Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a Community Immigration Policy. COM(2000) 0757, p. 1.

⁵³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

The development of integration actions at the EU level can be divided into the following five- year stages: the Tampere Council meeting and EU actions which followed (1999-2003), the Hague Program (2004-2009) and, currently, the Stockholm Program (2010-2014). These developments have resulted in EU measures in three subfields of the EU integration framework: 1) binding and non-binding policies (hard and soft laws), 2) network building and 3) financial support.⁵³¹

The binding normative framework refers to the EU *acquis*, which sets minimum standards on the admission and integration of different categories of third-country nationals.⁵³² The directives for residence security, equal treatment and some socio-economic rights for the immigrants who want to come to EU countries have thus far been implemented. Only the most recent and controversial Blue Card directive is still under review.⁵³³ The Blue Card directive is supposed to be an instrument to encourage the inflow of highly skilled workers, giving them a right to work and live in any EU country, except for Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. The directive has been rightly criticized as one of the measures which actually hinders the integration of resident immigrants into the local labor market.⁵³⁴ In fact, the directive diverts attention away from the immigrant youth residing in the EU countries and instead towards the integration of potential “ready made,” highly skilled workforce from abroad. Such a strategy does not apply any Positive Youth Development strategies for using immigrant potentials, already existing in a given country. The Blue Card

⁵³¹ Elisabeth Collett, the EU policy analyst, distinguishes three main strands in the EU work on immigrant integration: 1) the normative framework, 2) the framework for exchange of information and experience, and 3) the funding of integration projects. In my dissertation Collett’s analysis has been extended by the recent Community actions in 2009/2010.

Collett, E. (2008). *What does the EU do on Integration?* Brussels: European Policy Center.

⁵³² The *acquis* in reference to different categories of immigrants is ruled by the following directives:

- Family reunification: Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification;
- EU long-term resident status: Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 on a long-term resident status for third country nationals who have legally resided for five years in the territory of a member state;
- Students: Council Directive 2004/114 of 13 December 2004 on the conditions of admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service;
- Researchers: Council Directive 2005/71 of 12 October 2005 on the facilitation of the admission of researchers into the EU.

⁵³³ Blue Card for highly-skilled workers: Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment. The directive had to be implemented by all EU member states by June 2011. Neither Poland nor Germany has implemented the Blue Card directive yet.

The term Blue Card was coined by the European think tank Bruegel, inspired by the United States’ Green Card. See Bruegel. Home page: <http://www.bruegel.org/>

⁵³⁴ The debate was brought to the attention of the public during the conference “Mobility and Inclusion,” organized by the Heinrich Boell Foundation in Berlin in February 2010. During the conference EU alternative strategy to the blue card scheme was proposed. One of the interesting postulates referred to investing in young immigrants. According to the proposed paper, the EU should ensure that the “native” labor force, including the resident migrant population, is properly trained and integrated into the labor market. See Parkes, R. and Angenendt, S. (2010). *After the Blue Card. EU Policy on Highly Qualified Migration. HBS Discussion Paper*. Berlin: Heinrich Boell Foundation.

Directive is a warning sign that the international focus on some assumed EU integration measures for a specific group of immigrants may ignore the integration needs of others and overshadow existing important soft laws, which facilitate integration measures at the local level. These soft laws within the EU non-binding normative integration framework aim at establishing a common interpretation of the process of immigrant integration and EU key priorities for integration actions in all EU member states.

Common Basic Principles (CBPs) for Immigrant Integration Policy in the EU represent one of the soft laws on integration, in which integration is defined as “a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation.”⁵³⁵ CBPs were proposed in the Hague Program and adopted by the European Council in 2004 in order to inaugurate a more coherent European framework on the integration of third-country nationals (non-EU citizens). CBPs are a non-binding set of basic guiding principles on the basis of which EU Members can judge and assess their own integration efforts. The principles refer to the core eleven points, which have already given rise to other supportive integration mechanisms still in development:

1. Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States.
2. Integration implies respect for the basic values of the European Union by every resident.
3. Employment is a key part of the integration process and is central to the participation of immigrants, to the contributions immigrants make to the host society, and to making such contributions visible.
4. Basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history, and institutions is indispensable to integration, enabling immigrants to acquire this basic knowledge is essential to successful integration.
5. Efforts in education are essential in preparing immigrants, and particularly their descendants, to be more successful and more active participants in society.
6. Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and private goods and services, on an equal basis to national citizens and in a non-discriminatory way is an indispensable foundation for better integration.
7. Frequent interaction between immigrants and citizens of the Member States is a fundamental prerequisite for integration.
8. The practice of diverse cultures and religions is guaranteed under the Charter of Fundamental Rights and must be safeguarded, unless practices conflict with other inviolable European rights or with national law.

⁵³⁵ See 1st point of the CBPs in Council of the European Union. (2004, November 19). 2618th Council Meeting. Press Release, Council Document 14615/04.

9. The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of integration policies and measures, especially at the local and regional levels, is a key to effective integration.
10. Mainstreaming integration policies and measures in all relevant policy portfolios and levels of government and public services is an important consideration in public policy formation and implementation. The principle of engaging civil society is also endorsed.
11. Developing clear goals, indicators and evaluation mechanisms are necessary to adjust policy, evaluate progress on integration and to make the exchange of information more effective, so as to transfer good experience.⁵³⁶

The above list clearly shows that the CBPs encompass all aspects of immigrant integration: structural, cultural, interactive and identificational elements. Some CBPs postulates are of special interest for this paper: postulates on immigrant employment, education, language, and finally mainstreaming integration measures (points 3, 4, 5, and 10 of the CBPs). These points are considered the most crucial for the successful application of Affirmative Integration Management to the integration of immigrant youth into the labor market. A successful mechanism for monitoring the stages of the implementation of CBPs in the EU member states does not yet exist. However, the future development of such monitoring is supported by two other tools within the EU integration framework: network building and funding for integration projects.

In the 2005 Common Agenda for Integration the European Commission proposed a set of concrete measures and mechanisms to put the Common Basic Principles into practice.⁵³⁷ The Agenda outlines new and already existing measures for networking and exchanging best practices for integration: the network of National Contact Points on Integration (since 2003) and Annual Reports on Immigration and Integration (since 2004), Handbook on Integration for Policy-Makers and Practitioners (since 2004), European Web Site on Integration (since 2009) and the European Integration Forum (since 2009).

The National Contact Points on Integration (NCPs) were created back in 2003⁵³⁸ as an EU-level intergovernmental network of governmental experts from the EU member states in charge of national integration policy. As the Common Agenda states, “NCPs will continue

⁵³⁶ This is only a summary of the full version of the Common Basic Principles (CBPs) for Immigrant Integration Policy provided by the European Policy Center. EPC (European Policy Center) and KBF (King Baudouin Foundation) Multicultural Europe Team. (2005). *Beyond the Common Basic Principles on Integration: The Next Steps*. Issue Paper 27. Brussels: European Policy Center, pp. 4-5.

⁵³⁷ Commission of the European Communities. (2005). A Common Agenda for Integration. Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union, COM(2005) 389 final.

⁵³⁸ Commission of the European Communities. (2003). Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Immigration, Integration and Employment. COM(2003) 336.

to play an important role in monitoring progress across policy fields and in ensuring that efforts at national and EU level are mutually reinforcing.” They are supposed to contribute to the exchange of information and best practices and to identifying priority areas in integration management.⁵³⁹ Three Annual Reports (2004, 2006, and 2007) on Immigration and Integration have been prepared thus far as a result of the cooperation of NCPs. The reports summarize the actions taken by the EU member states to reach CBPs and contribute to the exchange of best practices in integration, which has turned out to be central to publishing the *Handbooks on Integration*.

The idea of developing a *Handbook on Integration for Policy-Makers and Practitioners* came from the EU member states at the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003. The *Handbook* is supposed to serve as a guide for policymakers and practitioners in developing and promoting integration management. The three editions of the *Handbook* were prepared by the Migration Policy Group (MPG), an independent consultant to the European Commission.⁵⁴⁰ The *Handbooks* are based on the cooperation of the European Commission with the National Contact Points on Integration, particularly on the outcome of technical seminars hosted by the ministries responsible for integration in different EU member states. They consist of theoretical input on the subject of integration as well as practical methodological guidelines, including challenges and solutions for integration management, especially in the area of actions recommended in the CBPs.⁵⁴¹ The subject of gaining immigrant youth entry into the labor market has also found a place in the third edition of the *Handbook on Integration* (2010) as the final issue discussed.

It is probably still too early to evaluate the impact of the *Handbooks* on the development of local integration initiatives. The fact that the handbooks have been translated into all EU languages should facilitate dissemination of their postulates among local integration stakeholders. The *Handbooks* have developed the community of practitioners across the EU, whose work is supposed to be continued within other integration measures of the Common Agenda, namely integration websites and meetings of the European Integration Forum.

⁵³⁹ The National Contact Points are to provide information on the state of the implementation of the CBPs, which present the outcomes in a subjective way. A more objective EU guided monitoring mechanism, which would also benefit the labor market integration of immigrant youth, might be more useful.

⁵⁴⁰ Published in 2004, 2007 and 2010, respectively.

⁵⁴¹ The *Handbooks* cover practices and lessons learned in reference to specific thematic subjects:
- “substantive” topics: civic participation, urban housing, economic integration, acquisition of nationality and practice of active citizenship, immigrant youth, education and the labor market;
- “methodological” topics: strategies and governance approaches used for implementing successful integration strategies in reference to: the introduction of newly arrived immigrants and refugees, indicators for measuring integration, mainstreaming, integration governance, awareness-raising, and migrant empowerment, dialogue platforms. See European Commission, Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and Security. (2010). Introduction. In *Handbook on Integration for Policy-Makers and Practitioners* (3rd ed.) (pp. 8-12). Brussels: Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and Security, p. 8.

The European Web Site on Integration (EWSI), which was launched in April 2009, provides a platform for networking on supporting immigrant integration, aiming to exchange policies and practices with other policy makers and practitioners with similar interests and fields of integration work. I would describe the website as an ongoing online integration handbook. In fact, the website is continuously updated by contributors from the European, national, regional and local levels of integration work: international organizations, EU civil society networks, academics and policy experts, and business and social networks. As one can read on the website, the integration portal serves as a documentation facility, on-line data collection tools for good practices, and finally a platform for the direct exchange of information between stakeholders.⁵⁴² The EWSI helps find project partnerships, funding, current research reports and offers an online forum. It is questionable whether the website is used on daily basis as a communication tool between integration stakeholders across the EU.⁵⁴³ Currently it functions at least as a widely accessible and clearly structured navigation tool for integration networking among the EU member states, which is very useful at a time when there is a boom in integration research, networks and online platforms in Europe. Only time will tell whether the EWSI actually fulfills its ambitious plans to become “Integration at your fingertips” and to focus a bit more specifically on networking for immigrant youth.⁵⁴⁴

Parallel to the establishment of the EWSI in April 2009 the development of the European Integration Forum started. The Forum is a consultation mechanism between the civil society and the European Commission in cooperation with the European Economic and Social Committee. The Forum enables the European and national civil society organizations⁵⁴⁵ and representatives of the NCPs to exchange opinions, run consultations with the representatives of national institutions, and prepare recommendations and own-initiative reports to support the EU Agenda on integration. At the time of writing there have been three meetings so far. None of them have specifically dealt with the integration of immigrant youth into the labor market. However, relevant subjects, such as labor market discrimination against immigrants, brain waste, and a proper dialog between teachers and educators for education of immigrant children, have been discussed as priorities for the EU integration agenda. Like the EU Integration Website, the EU Forum is still a new tool for integration mainstreaming among stakeholders at all levels, whose success remains to be seen.

Besides the above mentioned instruments for networking on integration within *2005 Common Agenda on Integration*, other efforts have been made to cooperate at both national and local levels in the EU. One of these instruments is the European Migration Network,

⁵⁴² See European Web Site on Integration (EWSI). Home page: <http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/>

⁵⁴³ While I am writing the last update on the Forum was registered almost a year ago.

⁵⁴⁴ Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and Security. (2010), op. cit., p. 17.

⁵⁴⁵ These are mostly EU umbrella organizations, which have memberships in the EU member states. It is assumed that small local NGOs lack financial resources for participation in such meetings.

which was first launched in 2003 as a pilot project⁵⁴⁶ and currently functions as a permanent structure under the direct responsibility of the Directorate General for Home Affairs. The Network aims to cooperate transnationally in order to support EU policymaking in the areas of migration and asylum. It consists of the EU member states' national governments: seventeen members (including Germany) and five observers (including Poland). The initiative requires that its members develop a national network, which would monitor a particular migration or asylum topic. Although integration policy is not the primary focus of the network, the country reports and the EMN comparative report on policies of reception and integration arrangements for immigrants and unaccompanied minors may contribute to the EU member states' involvement in the integration of young immigrants.

Integrating Cities is another measure outside the framework of the EU Agenda 2005 worth mentioning.⁵⁴⁷ The program was launched in Rotterdam in 2006 in the form of a partnership between the network of European cities Eurocities and the European Commission's DG Justice, Freedom and Security, to work on the implementation of CBPs at the local level. The cooperation was based on a series of conferences promoting integration of immigrants in urban areas.⁵⁴⁸ The process has led to the development of *Eurocities Charter on Integrating Cities*, signed by the mayors of 17 cities. The *Charter* commits its signatories to promoting immigrant integration among policy-makers, service providers, employers and buyers of good and services. Among other postulates, the *Charter* recognizes the following needs for action in reference to immigrant youth and their integration into the labor market:

- support equal access for migrants to services to which they are entitled, particularly to language learning, employment, and education;
- reflect our city's diversity in the composition of the city's workforce across all staffing levels;
- ensure that all staff, including staff with a migrant background, experience fair and equal treatment by their managers and colleagues; and respect diversity and equality issues.⁵⁴⁹

The *Charter* is at the same time an example of a bottom-up EU initiative, which calls for the commitment of EU institutions to all three fields of action: anti-discrimination legislation and diversity policies, integration funding, and benchmarking. The initiative also

⁵⁴⁶ The European Migration Network (EMN) was launched in 2003 as a pilot project by the Thessaloniki European Council (2003). The current approach of the EMN was established in 2008, see Council of the European Union. (2008). Council Decision of May 14, 2008 establishing a European Migration Network 2008/381/EC.

⁵⁴⁷ See Integrating Cities home page: <http://www.integratingcities.eu/>

⁵⁴⁸ Rotterdam 2006, Milan 2007, Berlin 2009, London 2010.

⁵⁴⁹ *Eurocities Charter on Integrating Cities*. Retrieved from Integrating Cities home page <http://www.integratingcities.eu/>

proves that horizontal cooperation at local levels across the EU member states is possible.⁵⁵⁰

Finally, a financial support system for integration projects constitutes the third subfield of the EU integration framework. A number of EU financial instruments, tailored to a specific target groups and project goals, can also support the integration of immigrant youth into the labor market.

The financial mechanism for integration measures started with the Preparatory Actions for the Integration of Third-country Nationals - INTI (2003-2006), which promoted transnational cooperation for the integration of people who are not EU citizens. More specifically, the program aimed to foster a dialogue with civil society, develop integration models, evaluate best practices, and set up a network in the field of immigrant integration at the European level.⁵⁵¹ A relatively small budget of €18 million was granted to support transnational projects between several EU member states. The involvement and financial support was not equally distributed across all countries. Especially the new EU member states (among them Poland) were not represented enough in comparison to the largest beneficiaries of the project like Italy or Germany.⁵⁵²

The INTI experience led to the establishment in 2007 of the European Fund for the Integration of Third Country Nationals, also known as the European Integration Fund (EIF). This program benefits from more extensive financial support, with a budget of €825 million for the period 2007 – 2013, as planned in 2005 Common Agenda for Integration. The Fund supports the implementation of integration processes of third country nationals into the EU member states, of activities to develop, monitor and evaluate integration measures for the third country nationals, and supports the exchange of information and best practices and co-operation between integration stakeholders within a given EU member state and with other EU Countries. The EIF budget is divided among bids for calls for proposals and tenders for community action proposed and managed by the Commission and national programs, which are managed by the EU member states.⁵⁵³ According to the Commission's strategic guidelines and following consultations with the Commission, each beneficiary state was supposed to develop their own multi-annual programming strategy (2007-2013) for the use of the resources they receive each year.

⁵⁵⁰ For more on the role of cities for immigrant integration see chapter 5.

⁵⁵¹ For example, the aforementioned Eurocities network was one of the beneficiaries of the INTI Program.

⁵⁵² A lack of information about the INTI program, a comparably low number of third-country nationals, consequently a low level of awareness about integration problems as well as a comparatively low number of NGOs specialized in the field of integration are considered the main reasons for low involvement on the part of the new member states in the activities supported by the INTI program. Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and Security. (2009). *Final Report. The Evaluation of the INTI Program*.

⁵⁵³ Only 7% of the total annual resources each year are allocated to community action, the rest is spent on national programs.

The European Refugee Fund (ERF) is currently the second important financial support system for integration. Similar to the EIF program, it functions on the basis of community action and national programs.⁵⁵⁴ The budget of €566 million for the Program 2008-2013 is distributed among the EU member states on the basis of criteria relating to the number of asylum seekers and persons benefiting from international protection in a given EU country.⁵⁵⁵ Among other priorities the ERF supports the efforts of the EU member states to grant reception conditions and potential integration into the labor market to refugees, displaced persons and the beneficiaries of subsidiary protection.⁵⁵⁶

The third complementary support program for integration management of immigrant youth on the labor market is the funding managed by the DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion within the European Social Funds (ESF) program.⁵⁵⁷ The ESF is one of the EU Structural Funds, set up as early as 1957 to reduce differences in prosperity and living standards across the EU member states and regions. ESF Funding is spread across the EU member states and regions, in particular those where economic development is less advanced. The community initiative Equal (2000-2006) was implemented within the ESF until 2008, supporting the development of actions to prevent discrimination against immigrants on the labor market. The new Progress program 2007-2013, which is managed by the Commission in the form of calls of tenders and proposals continues to complement the previous EQUAL program, focusing on employment, social inclusion and protection, working conditions, non-discrimination and gender equality.

All of the above mentioned financial mechanisms, which are run by two EU DGs: DG Home Affairs and DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, are considered the main EU stakeholders in the integration of young immigrants into the labor market. They are also complemented by a number of other sources of EU funding.⁵⁵⁸ Some financial sources come

⁵⁵⁴ Only 10% of the total annual resources each year are allocated to community action, the rest is spent on national programs.

⁵⁵⁵ The European Refugee Fund has been in place since 2000. Currently, the third phase of the Fund is running within the Program 2008-2013.

⁵⁵⁶ Other objectives of the ERF actions involve: fair and effective asylum procedures and resettlement of UNHCR recognized refugees; emergency action, promotion of good practices in the field of asylum, protection of the rights of persons requiring international protection; and improvement of the work of asylum systems in the EU member states.

⁵⁵⁷ In 2011 the DG changed its name from DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities to DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion.

⁵⁵⁸ A good overview of the EU integration projects and funding opportunities has been compiled in the volume European Commission, Directorate-General for Research. (2009). *Moving Europe: EU Research on Migration and Policy Needs*. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

The following projects were founded within the 7th Framework Program in relation to immigrant youth:

- EDUMIGROM – Ethnic Differences in Education and Diverging Prospects for Urban Youth in an Enlarged Europe;
- EUMARGINS – On the Margins of the European Community. Young Adult Immigrants in seven European Countries;
- GEITONIES – Generating Interethnic Tolerance and Neighborhood Integration in European Urban Spaces.

from the European Regional Development Fund of the DG Regional Policy⁵⁵⁹ or the DG Education and Culture, which engages in immigrant integration by supporting the Lifelong Learning Program and the Youth Program.⁵⁶⁰

If one would like to apply Heckmann's terminology for national integration modes to the EU perspective, all three pillars of the EU integration framework – policies, mainstreaming, and funding – can be considered a specific EU mode of integration. This integration mode is not free of conceptual traps and some shortcomings, constantly revised at ministerial conferences and by European think-tanks.⁵⁶¹

One of the controversies refers to the language which is used for immigrants. In fact, the terminology used in the EU law determines the national and local integration actions, restricting the available funds to specific target groups. Many terms have been used in EU policies and legislation in reference to immigrants such as labor migrants, family members admitted under family reunion arrangements, refugees, and persons enjoying international protection. As evidenced by the above analysis of the EU integration strategy, the controversial term “third country nationals” (TCNs) is commonly used today for immigrants. For example, the official target group of the European Integration Fund are legally resident “third-country nationals, who are defined as any persons who are not nationals of an EU member state.”⁵⁶² This definition of immigrants excludes naturalized immigrants and EU-EEA intra migrants, who should not be overlooked in EU steps toward immigrant integration.⁵⁶³ These groups seem to have been ignored in the CBPs postulates, which only targets immigrants outside the EU. In fact, the European ideal of equal opportunity for all EU citizens in any EU member state is still far from a reality.⁵⁶⁴

⁵⁵⁹ For example see the European Program for Urban Sustainable Development (URBACT) project supporting EU city networks and their integration strategies.

⁵⁶⁰ There are four sub-programs of the Lifelong Learning Program, which fund projects at different levels of education and training for EU Nationals: Comenius for schools, Erasmus for higher education, Leonardo da Vinci for vocational education and training, Grundtvig for adult education. The Youth Program support projects related to intercultural education, school integration of migrant pupils and social inclusion for disadvantaged youth.

For more on the role of the EU programs and Actions within the field of education of immigrant children and youth see European Commission. (2008). Green Paper: Migration and Mobility: Challenges and Opportunities for EU Education Systems, SEC(2008) 2173.

⁵⁶¹ So far four EU Ministerial Conferences on Integration have taken place in the EU: Groningen 2004, Potsdam 2007, Vichy 2008, Zaragoza 2010.

The Migration Policy Group or the European Policy Center are examples of EU think-tanks active in the field of EU integration policies.

⁵⁶² See *Glossary* on the website of the European Migration Network: <http://emn.intrasoft-intl.com/Glossary>

⁵⁶³ Throughout the dissertation the term “EU-EEA intra migrants” for immigrants from EU and EEA countries is used only in cases when legislation differences between them and other immigrants need to be discussed. In all other cases the general term “immigrants” will be applied to both groups.

⁵⁶⁴ Thanks to the provisions of migratory mobility of EU citizens, EU-EEA intra migrants are thought not to require extra integration measures. However, there are groups that need support, particularly with regard to education, vocational training and enabling their children to enter the labor market. For more on the need to integrate EU-EEA intra migrants in the new host society see Bosswick W. and Heckmann F., op. cit., p. 19.

Similar controversies about EU terminology concern the existing dividing lines between target groups of the two aforementioned EU funding programs, which often hinder the effectiveness of local integration programs. In fact, the beneficiaries of international protection cannot get assistance from the European Integration Fund as they fall under the European Refugee Fund. This division was made in the Hague Program in 2004, which split the procedures for dealing with immigrant integration into two strains: those for refugees and those for others.⁵⁶⁵

Finally, persons with unregulated status cannot be formally funded by any of the EU financial mechanisms. These restrictions make target groups of the EU Integration Fund quite limited. As the interviews in both Germany and Poland show, these EU conditions have been very problematic for practical work at the local level.⁵⁶⁶

Restricting integration programs to only one group of beneficiaries is often very difficult for both practical as well as humanitarian reasons. For practical reasons, quite often a wider range of immigrants unofficially benefit from projects officially aimed at just one target group.⁵⁶⁷ For humanitarian reasons, making differences between people on the basis of their migration status does not seem an appropriate strategy to integrate immigrants into the local environment. Similar difficulties with division lines among immigrants apply to education mobility. EU-EEA intra migrants can enjoy many more privileges granted by EU study exchange programs in comparison to third country nationals who are excluded from certain educational benefits.⁵⁶⁸ The EU mode of integration should be more inclusive especially with regard to immigrant youth.

The DG Education has already made an attempt to expand the target groups of integration activities for immigrant youth. In its recent study on migration the terms “children from a migrant background,” “children of migrants” and “migrant pupils” are used to refer to the children of all persons living in an EU country where they were not born, irrespective of

⁵⁶⁵ Common European Asylum System (CEAS), developed in Tampere 1999 and in Hague Program 2004 formulates common minimum standards for a fair and efficient asylum process, conditions for the reception of asylum seekers, rules on the recognition of different statuses for international protection of refugees, subsidiary and other forms of protection. With reference to immigrant youth integration it might be criticized for its shortcomings in integration settings for asylum seekers. In fact, the EU member states can decide whether to grant asylum seekers' access to freedom of residence and movement, schooling in the mainstream classroom, the labor market, vocational training, and full housing and healthcare options. Huddelstone's report presents an interesting critical analysis of EU integration measures for refugees.

Huddleston, T. (2010). *EU Support for Integration: what about Beneficiaries of International Protection? A User's Guide to EU Standards, Funds and Cooperation*. Brussels: Migration Policy Group.

⁵⁶⁶ The challenges for financing local activities with EU Funds are discussed in the case study analysis, in chapter 5.

⁵⁶⁷ The restrictions often force integration practitioners to find room to maneuver in order to effectively run their projects, for example by not including all data on actual participants in integration programs in project reports.

⁵⁶⁸ For example, as opposed to TCNs, EU-EEA intra migrants do not have to pay for a study semester abroad in another EU country. For more on education programs for third country nationals see the next subchapter.

whether they are third country nationals, citizens of another EU member state or naturalized citizens of the host EU member states.⁵⁶⁹ Unfortunately, no similar changes in the terminology are foreseen in future developments of the EU integration mode, which could ease the coordination of integration programs at national and local levels. However, a new context for EU integration policy presents a more promising scenario for greater EU involvement in the future in national and local integration processes of member states.

The forthcoming EU policy context is set by the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, which was adopted by the European Council in October 2008.⁵⁷⁰ One of five basic commitments of the Pact is the promotion of integration. The implementation of these commitments is one of the tasks of the Stockholm Program, adopted in December 2009 by the European Council. The Stockholm Program recognizes the potential that immigrants bring to a host country, stating that “the successful integration of legally resident third-country nationals remains the key to maximizing the benefits of immigration.”⁵⁷¹ Moreover, the commitment to a increased involvement of the EU in immigrant integration in the EU member states should be supported by developing new instruments of cooperation: the European Modules for Migrant Integration and European Indicators to evaluate the results of national integration policies.⁵⁷² Finally, the Lisbon Treaty provides a new legal context for integration. While the Treaty still excludes formal harmonization of integration policies, it allows the European Parliament with the EU Council to provide incentives and support for integration procedures of the EU member states.⁵⁷³ This is a historical move towards the enlargement of the EU competencies in the integration policies of the EU member states.

Time will only show to what extent the ambitious plans to tackle various aspects of integration policies with these new instruments will improve the management of integration measures for providing immigrant youth access to the labor market at national and local levels of the EU member states.

⁵⁶⁹ European Commission. (2008), op. cit.

⁵⁷⁰ Council of the European Union. (2008). European Pact on Immigration and Asylum 13440/08, ASIM 72.

⁵⁷¹ Section 6.1.5 of the Stockholm Program.

Council of the European Union (2010). The Stockholm Program – An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting the Citizens 16484/1/09 REV 1 JAI 866 + ADD 1.

⁵⁷² Common European modules are intended to constitute an established point of reference that can be adapted to different contexts and can contribute to the design of integration programs across Europe.

See European Commission. (2010). Commission Staff Working Document. The Consolidation of the EU Framework on Integration Report to the 2010 Ministerial Conference on Integration, SEC(2010) 357 final.

⁵⁷³ “The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, may establish measures to provide incentives and support for the action of Member States with a view to promoting the integration of third-country nationals residing legally in their territories, excluding any harmonization of the laws and regulations of the Member States.” See Article 79.4 of the Treaty of Lisbon.

European Union. (2007). Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 2007/C 306/01.

4.4.3 EU Integration Frameworks for Education and Labor Market

The general EU integration policies, presented above, cannot be analyzed in reference to citizenship, education, and labor market structure. They are unique for each EU member state and will be discussed in reference to Poland and Germany in the next sections of this chapter. However, the EU education and labor market frameworks within the Open Method of Coordination set standards for the EU countries and may influence their management of the process of integrating immigrant youth. It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the entire EU education and employment strategy. Only particular areas of the recently developed European Youth Strategy, Lifelong Learning Program, and the European Employment Guidelines will be discussed as instances of the EU's indirect integration measures for immigrant youth.

The European Youth Strategy dates back to the first framework for European cooperation on the issue of youth from 2002⁵⁷⁴ and the European Youth Pact from 2005.⁵⁷⁵ The Youth Pact is a political instrument which aims to promote the participation of young Europeans in three main fields: employment, integration and social advancement; education, training and mobility; and reconciliation of family life and working life. The EU for the first time took into account the existence and circumstances of non-European youth residing in the EU as part of the EU Youth Strategy in *EU Youth Report 2009*. The report provides numbers of non – European immigrants and acknowledges their contributions and the need for integration measures, focusing mainly on the EU funded project UP2Youth which targets young immigrants' transition from school to work.⁵⁷⁶ Moreover, the report draws attention to the unequal access to opportunities by those with a migrant background, referring to them as “third culture kids,” a rather controversial phrase.⁵⁷⁷

The EU Youth Report, which should be regarded as a milestone in addressing immigrant youth at the EU level, is a supporting document for the new cooperation framework outlined in the strategy *Youth – Investing and Empowering* from 2009. The document presents new new EU youth strategy with eight fields for action (among them

⁵⁷⁴ Council of the European Union. (2002, June 27). Resolution Regarding the Framework of European Cooperation within the Youth Field, 2002/C 168/02.

⁵⁷⁵ During the meeting of the European Council in Lisbon (March 2000), the Heads of State and Government launched a Lisbon Strategy aimed at making the European Union (EU) the most competitive economy in the world and achieving full employment by 2010. The European Youth Pact was adopted as part of the revised Lisbon Strategy in 2005. See Council of the European Union. (2005). Presidency Conclusions 7619/1/05.

⁵⁷⁶ The UP2Youth project was funded under the 6th framework Program of the European Union from May 2006 till April 2009 and involved research partners from 15 countries (Germany, Denmark, France, Italy, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Portugal, Spain, Finland, Romania, Austria, Slovakia and Ireland), For more see Directorate-General for Education and Culture (2009). *EU Youth Report 2009*. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

⁵⁷⁷ As in the case of “third country nationals,” the prefix “third” establishes a controversial ranking of youth. Employing such a categorization, the question arises who are the “first” and “second” youth with a migration background?

education, employment, and entrepreneurship), recognizing young people as one of the most vulnerable groups in society and acknowledging the need for a youth policy. The proposed youth policy is based on principles similar to those of the AIM policy proposed in my dissertation. As the EU Council states, youth policy can only develop in cross-sector cooperation at national and regional levels of policymaking.⁵⁷⁸ Unfortunately, the EU Strategy itself does not refer to immigrant youth directly.

In the field of education and training the EU youth supportive measures basically refer to the Lifelong Learning Program, and various International co-operations in education and training with non EU countries.⁵⁷⁹ There are also common European frameworks and tools to enhance the recognition and quality of competencies and qualifications, which by the same token comprise the EU transparency education framework for non EU countries. The European Qualifications Framework (EQF) establishes eight reference levels describing what a learner knows, understands and is able to do, so-called “learning outcomes.” Each level of national qualification in the EU member states should correspond to the EU reference levels, ranging from basic (Level 1) to advanced (Level 8). This should ease a comparison between national qualifications, enhance recognition of qualifications and ensure that people do not have to repeat their education/training if they move to another country. The EQF applies to all types of education, training and qualifications, from school education to academic, professional and vocational. The recognition of foreign qualifications in all EU member states is regulated by the Professional Qualifications Directive and supported by the EU NARIC Network (National Academic Recognition Information Centers).⁵⁸⁰

As regards EU employment strategies, the European Employment Guidelines set out common binding regulations for the EU member states in reference to both young people and immigrants. Accordingly, integrating immigrants and minorities is considered “particularly essential.” The EU member states should guarantee that no young person is left behind

⁵⁷⁸ In addition, similar to the AIM principles, the EU Council warns against duplicating existing integration mechanisms and calls for improving “knowledge-base and effective dissemination of best practice.” See Commission of the European Communities. (2009). An EU Strategy for Youth – Investing and Empowering. COM(2009) 200 final, p. 12.

⁵⁷⁹ The following programs exemplify EU cooperation with third country nationals:

- Erasmus Mundus: enhancing quality in higher education through scholarships and academic co-operation worldwide;
- Jean Monnet: promoting teaching and research on European integration;
- Tempus: building cooperation between the EU and neighboring regions;
- Edulink: capacity-building and regional integration in higher education in ACP (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific) states and regions;
- Alfa: supporting co-operation between higher education institutions in the EU and Latin America.

⁵⁸⁰ European Parliament and Council. (2005). Directive on the Recognition of Professional Qualifications 2005/36/EC.

The NARIC network is an initiative of the European Commission, created in 1984. The network consists of national centers, which aim to provide information concerning the academic recognition of diplomas and periods of study undertaken in other countries.

Other EU measures in the field of recognition of qualifications in the EU member states concern the development of Europass, the European Credit System for VET (ECVET), and the European Quality Assurance Reference Framework for VET (EQARF).

without training or employment and that the employment gaps between third-country nationals and EU citizens be reduced “in line with any national targets.”⁵⁸¹ Since the EU Employment Policy is based on the Open Method of Coordination, these guidelines leave the EU member states much room to maneuver. Fortunately, recent trends point to a further pro-immigration discourse in EU employment strategies. The guidelines for 2010 call for a policy of inclusive growth, “removing barriers to labor market participation especially for women, older workers, young people, disabled and legal migrants.” The guidelines should be implemented through National Reform Programs on the part of the EU member states,⁵⁸² which will be monitored by the Commission. The Programs should be developed in accordance with the EU labor market strategy of flexicurity and the new *Europe 2020 Strategy for Jobs and Growth*.⁵⁸³ First, the principle of flexicurity supports the transition of workers into better jobs, “upward mobility” and the development of their talents. Consequently it harmonizes with the Positive Youth Development strategy. Both strategies could be complimentary in the EU member states’ policies for integrating immigrant youth into the labor market. Secondly, the first target of Europe 2020 Strategy for Jobs and Growth refers to integration of immigrants and young people into the labor market.⁵⁸⁴ Out of seven “flagship initiatives” to reach the targets of Europe 2020 Strategy, three of them are particularly important for immigrant youth integration into the labor market: Youth on the Move, An Agenda for New Skills and Jobs, and European Platform against Poverty. The last one refers directly to immigrants, aiming to develop a new promising agenda for their integration in order to enable them to “take full advantage of their potential.”⁵⁸⁵

Recent developments in the EU employment strategy demonstrate that the importance of immigrants and young people has been acknowledged in both the general EU education and employment frameworks, in addition to direct integration policies within the DG Home Affairs. The success of the EU supportive mechanism for immigrant integration

⁵⁸¹ “Every unemployed person should be offered a job, apprenticeship, additional training or other employability measure; in the case of young persons who have left school within no more than 4 months by 2010 and in the case of adults within no more than 12 months.” The Guidelines were approved by the Council in 2008 for a three year period. Council of the European Union. (2008). Council Decision on Guidelines for the Employment Policies of the Member States 10614/2/08 REV 2.

⁵⁸² Council of the European Union. (2010). Council Decision on Guidelines for the Employment Policies of the Member States Part II of the Europe 2020 Integrated Guidelines SEC(2010) 488.

⁵⁸³ “Flexicurity aims at ensuring that EU citizens can enjoy a high level of employment security, i.e. the possibility to easily find a job at every stage of active life and have a good prospect for career development in a quickly changing economic environment.” Commission of the European Communities. (2007). Towards Common Principles of Flexicurity. COM(2007) 359.

⁵⁸⁴ Of five core targets of EU Strategy 2020 the first one aims “to raise to 75% the employment rate for women and men aged 20-64, through the greater participation of young people, older workers and low-skilled workers and the better integration of legal migrants.” European Council. (2010). Conclusions EUCO 13/10.

⁵⁸⁵ For more on all flagship initiatives see Commission of the European Communities. (2010). Europe 2020. A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth. COM(2010) 2020.

depends in part on the coordination of different DGs on the issue of immigrant integration. However, it is generally up to the national modes of integration of the EU member states and local integration management as to how these EU principles and guidelines on integration will benefit immigrant youth in the EU countries.

4.5 Germany

Germany has the highest number of foreign citizens among the EU member states. Although the country has experienced a decreasing inflow of foreigners in recent years⁵⁸⁶, more than one fifth of all foreign citizens in the EU were living in Germany as of January 2009.⁵⁸⁷ Past massive inflows of immigrants date back to the second half of 20th century. Ever since the post-war guest worker programs, which were in effect until 1973, Germany was an “undeclared” country of immigration, which turned out to be one of the most important immigration countries in the world.⁵⁸⁸ Germany’s migration and integration policies have in fact been developing very slowly over time. As many migration researchers point out, immigrants have been living in “a social paradox” in Germany.⁵⁸⁹ They were residing in an immigration country which until the beginning of the 21st century had not addressed existing integration needs for immigrant population.

There are many speculations in research about the reasons for Germany’s reluctance to officially admit their status as an immigration country. Migration cycle theory posits that Germany has followed a general pattern of transition into one of the mature immigration countries in Europe. According to this theory mature (or “old”) immigration countries received most immigrants during the third quarter of the 20th Century or before. A significant percentage of the newcomers remained after the crisis of the mid-70s. Family reunions had started to take place before that date, and greatly intensified afterwards. Consequently, a significant portion of the population of mature immigration countries, like Germany, have a migration background which dates back several generations. In most mature immigration

⁵⁸⁶ From 685,000 in 2001 to 574,000 in 2008.

See Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development. (n.d). *Inflows of Foreign Population into OECD Countries*.

⁵⁸⁷ Eurostat: 31,9 million of foreign citizens in the EU, 7,2 million in Germany, 22,6% of foreign citizens in 2009

See Eurostat. (2010, September 7). Foreign Citizens Made up 6.4% of the EU27 Population. *Eurostat News Release 129*.

⁵⁸⁸ Thränhardt, D. (1995). Germany: An Undeclared Immigration Country. *New Community*. 19-36, p. 21.

⁵⁸⁹ For example:

- Kolb, H. (2008). *Immigration into a Non-immigration Country: the German Experience*. Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung;

- Bade, K. J. and Oltmer, J. (Eds.). (2004). *Normalfall Migration: Deutschland im 20. und frühen 21. Jahrhundert*. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung;

- Oberndörfer, D. (2005). The German Perspective. In R. Süßmuth and W. Weidenfeld (Eds.), *Managing Integration: the European Union's Responsibilities towards Immigrants* (pp. 12-15). Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

countries a significant legislative gap existed between real demands for efficient migration and integration policies and the actual time the appropriate legislation was implemented, which also occurred in the case of Germany.⁵⁹⁰

However, the transition of Germany into an immigration country must also be understood through the lens of German post-war history and a specific political migration discourse prevailing in the country. Both of these factors suffice to explain why immigration had long been taboo in German politics.

First, as Holger Kolb points out, for a long time Germany was unable to finish its nation-building project and was thus obliged to deny its immigration and integration reality. The German reunification in 1990 represented a turning point, which led to the end of the period of self-renunciation. Secondly the public debates about German guiding culture (*Leitkultur*) and a parallel society (*Parallelgesellschaft*) which have exploded recently may be a sign of a deeply ingrained fear of immigration. It was only after the terrorist attacks that the issue of real integration problems has been more present in public discourse. The Immigration Act of 2004 constituted an important step on Germany's turn from informal to formal immigration country.

The complexity of both the historical background to German nation building and the early 21st century political changes in the German government make Germany an interesting case study, which shows just how rapidly a national integration strategy may emerge after a long "official silence." In light of recent policy developments, Germany as an old unofficial immigration nation-state has made its millennium breakthrough in official debates on migration and integration, which turned the republic into a reborn immigration country.⁵⁹¹

4.5.1 Historical Context of Immigration

The immigration landscape in Germany today has been shaped by four main population inflows in the post war period. These included ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet states, so called (*Spät-)*Aussiedler, Jews from the successor

⁵⁹⁰ The concept of "migration cycles" is based on the assumption that all European nation-states alternate between being countries of emigration and of immigration in similar stages (cycles). The theory distinguishes between certain typologies of EU migration countries, according to the development of migration processes in a given country. The theory was investigated by European researchers in the project *Mediterranean and Eastern Central European Countries as New Immigration Destinations in the European Union* (IDEA), carried out in 2007-2009. For more on the migration cycle theory and the outcomes of the research group see Arango, J., et al. (Eds.). (2010). *Europe: the Continent of Immigrants Trends, Structures and Policy Implications*. IDEA Working Paper, 13.

This new European typology of EU countries is reminiscent of one of the other divisions of the US states and certain metropolises into immigration gateways, developed by American scholar Audrey Singer, see subchapter 5.1.

⁵⁹¹ To examine the rapid development of the migration and integration debate look at Bommers, M., and Krüger-Potratz, M. (Eds.). (2008). *Migrationsreport 2008. Fakten – Analysen – Perspektiven*. Frankfurt a. M.: Campus Verlag.

states of the former Soviet Union⁵⁹², other groups searching for international protection (asylum-seekers) as well as guest workers. Although the first two groups are not a main focus of the current political and social debates about integration policies, they should still be considered immigrants, who may experience integration challenges just like any other immigrant group.

In the first years after the Second World War Germany underwent massive population movements. In the period 1945–1950, about ten million people (forced laborers and former prisoners) left Germany and returned to their home countries. At the same time, as a result of forced resettlements, 7.9 million refugees and expellees were residing in the Federal Republic of Germany, and 3.6 million in the German Democratic Republic, according to the 1950 Census. In other words, right from the very beginning the Federal Republic of Germany was actually a country of immigration.⁵⁹³

Furthermore, a significant increase in the migration of ethnic German resettlers took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a result of the fall of the Iron Curtain and the end of the travel restrictions of the former Communist countries. From 1988 until 2005 a total of three million ethnic Germans entered Germany, mostly from Poland, Romania, and the former Soviet Union. However, the number of German repatriates arriving annually has been declining since the mid 1990s (from 397,073 in 1990 to 3,360 in 2009) when the government started to take restrictive measures to stop massive returns.⁵⁹⁴

The political changes in Central and Eastern Europe triggered other massive migration movements of the second and third migration groups to Germany: asylum seekers and persecuted ethnic Jews. The number of asylum applications rose significantly in the second half of the 1980s and reached almost 440,000 in reunified Germany in 1992, with the most numerous groups from Turkey, Yugoslavia, Iraq, and the Russian Federation. In the 1990s, Germany granted asylum to more people than any other European country. Such a large number of applicants resulted from the political turmoil of the time, like the war in the former Yugoslavia, the Civil war in Sri Lanka and the crackdown on the Kurdish minority in Turkey. In fact, Germany was considered an attractive destination country because it had the

⁵⁹² Jews are distinguished from other refugees. As Bade points out, they have “a special collective status which is similar to that of recognized asylum seekers.”

Bade, K. J. (2008, September 18). Immigration and Integration in Germany. *Deutschland Online*.

⁵⁹³ Fassmann, H. and Reeger, U. (2008). “Old” Immigration Countries. *Synthesis Report*. IDEA Working Paper 3, p. 11.

⁵⁹⁴ The restrictive measures to stop massive returns of ethnic Germans included: aid to ethnic German communities in countries of origin; a quota system; and the requirement that ethnic Germans from the countries once part of the former Soviet Union prove they had faced discrimination because of their German ethnic origins in order to immigrate to Germany. For more on integration of ethnic Germans, see:

- Dietz, B. (1999). Ethnic German Immigration from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union to Germany: the Effects of Migrant Networks. *IZA Discussion Paper Series, 68*. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor;

- Özcan, V. (2007). Country Profile: Germany. *Focus Migration (1)*. Hamburg: Hamburg: Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI).

most liberal asylum laws in Europe, a quite attractive support system for refugees and enjoyed good geographical location between the West and East of Europe. In fact, for many immigrants applying for asylum was one of the few ways to regularize their stay in Germany at that time.⁵⁹⁵

As a reaction to the high number of asylum applicants, restrictions of the fundamental right to asylum were introduced in 1993, which significantly reduced the annual number of asylum applications but thereby increased illegal immigration.⁵⁹⁶ Since that time, those entering Germany from countries considered “free of persecution” or so-called “safe third countries” could no longer be granted the basic right of asylum. Other rules started to apply to Jews from the former Soviet Union, who had begun emigrating to the GDR already in 1990. Jewish immigrants do not need to prove that they have been persecuted in order to immigrate to Germany. The preferential resettlement procedure for Jewish immigrants is officially considered legitimate in light of “the background of Germany’s historic responsibilities.”⁵⁹⁷

Guest workers were the fourth important immigration strand after the Second World War. They were recruited to Germany in order to fulfill labor shortages mainly in the low skilled industrial sector during the German post-war economic boom.⁵⁹⁸ The massive inflow of immigrants started after 1961. At that time steady economic growth and the construction of the Berlin Wall, which cut off the flow of workers from East Germany, resulted in increasing labor shortages in West Germany. The largest groups were migrants from Italy, Spain, and Greece. Only at the end of the 1960s was there an increase in Yugoslavs and Turks. In total, from the late 1950s until 1973, the year when Germany entered an economic recession and recruitment was finally stopped, some 14 million foreign workers came to Germany, of whom

⁵⁹⁵ Since the end of the recruitment program in 1973, there were no other better options for immigrants than to apply for a refugee status in Germany. Germany had no comprehensive immigration law at that time. Consequently in the early 1990 more than 30% of all migrants entering Germany were asylum seekers. See more Klusmeyer, D. B., and Papademetriou, D. G. (2009). *Immigration Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany: Negotiating Membership and Remaking the Nation*. Oxford: Berghahn Books, p. 137.

⁵⁹⁶ Consequently, the annual number of asylum applications was falling since the end of the 1990s from more than 104,000 in 1997 to just over 19,000 in 2007. Only the recent years saw a slight increase: 2008 (22,085) and 2009 (27,649).

See Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. (2010). *Azyl in Zahlen 2009*. Nuremberg: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees.

However, there are no reliable estimates on the number of “illegal” immigrants who have come to Germany. See more on illegal migration in Germany subchapter 4.5.5.

⁵⁹⁷ German National Contact Point for the European Migration Network (EMN). (2009). *Annual Policy Report 2009*. Nuremberg: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, p 11, and p. 108.

Because of the preferential treatment of Jews one should distinguish them from other asylum seekers. Until 2004, the Act on Measures in Aid of Refugees Admitted under Humanitarian Relief Program (the so-called Quota Refugee Act) served as the legal basis for admitting Jewish immigrants. Since the new Immigration Act came into effect in 2005, admissions have been based on instructions from the Ministers and Senators of the Interior of the federal states, in accordance with the Residence Act.

⁵⁹⁸ Between 1955 and 1968, the German government signed recruitment agreements first with Italy (1955), Spain and Greece (both 1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965), and Yugoslavia (1968).

about 3 million stayed and were joined by their families. During the whole period of the “guestworker program,” a consensus prevailed both in the government and society that the immigration of the recruited labor migrants was merely a temporary episode, and thus there was no need to integrate them. They were expected to leave soon.⁵⁹⁹ In fact, many of these “guest immigrants” settled, obtained residence permits, and were joined by their foreign spouses. Nowadays many children of these immigrants still live in Germany.

The second wave of temporary labor programs reemerged soon after the fall of the Iron Curtain, this time exclusively from Central and Eastern Europe, among them Yugoslavia (1988), Hungary (1989), and Poland (1990). In 2002, a total of 374,000 temporary work permits were granted, the majority of them for Polish citizens. Guest workers were recruited either as trainees, contract workers, or for seasonal work in several categories (e.g. they received temporary residence and work permits ranging from three months for seasonal workers to a maximum of two years for contract workers, usually for construction projects). With the enlargement of the EU in 2004, Germany, like many other “old” EU states, introduced exceptional measures restricting access to the labor market for the new EU member states until 2011. This restriction is yet another indication of German regulation of immigration inflows tested throughout the post war period and used with great discretion.

4.5.2 Immigration Scale

The above mentioned post war immigration inflows and more recent ones have shaped the immigration landscape today. As a result of many long-term migrations to Germany in the post-war period, many immigrants have raised generations of children, who obtained German citizenship, and were no longer visible in traditional statistics on foreigners. In an attempt to differentiate these generations from the native German population, the German Federal Office for Statistics and Regional Offices for Statistics started collecting data on people with a so called “migration background,” a quite controversial categorization, which was introduced for the first time in 2005 in the national registration of Microcensus.⁶⁰⁰ People

⁵⁹⁹ Bade, K. J. (2007). Versäumte Integrationschancen und nachholende Integrationspolitik. In K. J. Bade and H. Hiesserich (Eds.), (2007). *Nachholende Integrationspolitik und Gestaltungsperspektiven der Integrationspraxis* (pp. 21-95). Göttingen: V&R Unipress.

The situation of guest workers in Germany can be compared to the current allegedly temporary character of migration in Poland. Although the scale of migration in Poland cannot be compared to the massive inflows of migrant workers into Germany at the end of the 20th century, a similar way of thinking can be noticed among some Polish circles who keep neglecting any needs for immigrant integration. Many argue, it is still too early to take integration measures for migrants who are thought to be only in the country temporarily.

⁶⁰⁰ People with a migration background belong to one of the following groups:

- foreigners both born abroad or in Germany,
- naturalized foreigners,
- ethnic German repatriates,
- children with at least one parent who fulfils the above criteria.

in Germany who were either born abroad and migrated to Germany or who are German residents or naturalized citizens from the second or even third generation of children of immigrants, are labeled as having a migration background.

Consequently, the magnitude of immigration in Germany can be perceived in two ways. In a more standardized and common method of registering immigrants in international immigration statistics, immigrants who do not have citizenship in the host country are counted as foreigners. However, a new method of collecting data on people with a migration background has recently become more common in the newest German research as well as in international research and statistics on migration and immigrant integration. Both approaches are still employed by policy makers, which sometimes causes confusion when comparing data from different sources in policy papers and migration reports.⁶⁰¹ Consequently, both methods of counting immigrants, as foreigners and as people with a migration background, are meaningful and cited in my research. The level of immigration in Germany presented below is through the lens of two sources of recent data.⁶⁰²

As of the end of August 2009 there were 7.2 million people living in Germany who did not have German citizenship, which equates to 8.7% of the population.⁶⁰³ Immigrant youth (between 15 and 25 years of age) amount to 889,200. More than half of foreigners were long term immigrants with residence permits for more than 15 year and almost two thirds of non-German citizens came from the countries outside the EU (64.7%) (see graph 10).

The immigration population is not evenly distributed across the country and differs from one federal state to the next. Only 2.8% of the entire foreign population live in the states of the former GDR. The largest percentage of foreigners of the whole population is located in

Rühl, S. (2009). *Grunddaten der Zuwandererbevolkerung in Deutschland*. Nuremberg: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, p. 16.

⁶⁰¹ Among both policy makers and social workers in Germany there is a strong tendency to use the rhetoric of people with migration background with reference to estimates about the immigration landscape in Germany. For more on the implications and controversies surrounding the use of the category "migration background" see the next section on the political and public discourse.

⁶⁰² The statistical data from the most recent sources come from 2009, or if not available from 2008 statistics:


- Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. (2010). *Migrationsbericht 2008*. Berlin: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees;
- German National Contact Point for the European Migration Network (EMN), op. cit.;
- Destatis, (2010). *Ausländische Bevölkerung, Ergebnisse des Ausländerzentralregisters*. Fachserie 1 Reihe 2 – 2009. Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt;
- Destatis, (2010). *Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund. Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus 2009*. Fachserie 1 Reihe 2.2 – 2009. Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt.

⁶⁰³ The Central Register on Foreigners records foreigners who are resident in Germany and have registered with the alien authorities. This register provides information about citizenship, status under residence law, duration of residence, age and marital status. In addition, information is available on the overall population that is the German and the foreign population which builds on the population census and the data reported by the registration authorities of the *Länder* (local population registers-AZR). These data make it possible to depict the geographical distribution of foreigners. The statistics provided in this dissertation are taken from both of the sources, depending on the information required. However, it is important to note that the two sources of statistics differ slightly. AZR are always lower, since they register only foreigners who reside in Germany longer than 3 months: the AZR estimated number of foreigners as of the end 2009 at 6.69 million.

Hesse and the metropolitan areas of Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg with more than 11%, followed by Bavaria, North Rhine-Westphalia, and south-western part of Baden Wuerttemberg.

The largest immigrant groups reflect the composition of the former guest workers, as noted in the previous section. Turkey, Italy, former Serbia and Montenegro, Poland, Greece, and Croatia belong to the top immigration countries (see graph 10). It is worth noting that 20-30% of immigrants from these countries were born in Germany with the highest percentage being those of Turkish descent, at 33%. Only Polish immigrants were the exception with the lowest percentage of Poles born in Germany at 3.8%.

Graph 10 Foreign Population in Germany in 2009




Source: Destatis, 2010

The register of people with a migration background makes it much easier to track the long-term stay of post-war immigrants in Germany, who might have already become naturalized by the time of data collection on foreigners. According to the Microcensus 2009, nearly one fifth of the total population of Germany (16.0 million) has a migration

background.⁶⁰⁴ Among them there are 2.3 million young people between 15 and 25 years of age.

More than two thirds of the population with a migration background are foreign born, while 5.1 million of those with a migration background had no migration experience (they were all born in Germany), and these young people today constitute a big share of the youth population.⁶⁰⁵ The percentage of people with migration backgrounds among the youngest generation is disproportionately high in German metropolitan areas. In 2008 more than half of the children under the age of 15 living in large cities such as Frankfurt, Munich and Stuttgart came from a migration background.⁶⁰⁶

Graph 11 People with a Migration Background in Germany, 2009
(in thousands)



Source: Microcensus, 2009

Looking at the whole population of people with a migration background in Germany, the major ethnic groups come from the countries of former guest workers, like the majority of foreigners. Most of the people with a migration background have their roots in Turkey (3.0

⁶⁰⁴ The number of people with a migration background rose from 15.1 million in 2005 to 16.0 million in 2009. Of the population with a migration background, 8.8 million people are of German nationality (in contrast to the 7.2 million foreigners mentioned earlier). In other words 10.8% of the population in Germany, who would be considered German citizens in international statistics on migration, have migration roots.

⁶⁰⁵ Because fewer immigrants are coming to Germany, the growth of this group in recent years has mainly contributed to the growth in the percentage of people with a migration background in the German population as a whole. People with migration backgrounds are much younger than the whole population, the average age being 34.7 in comparison to 45.6 for the rest of the population which shows that the young generation of people with a migration background is quite significant in Germany.

⁶⁰⁶ Deutsches Institut für Internationale Pädagogische Forschung (DIPF), et al. (2010). *Bildung in Deutschland 2010*. Bielefeld: Bertelsmann, p. 18.

million), the former Soviet Union (2.9m), the former Yugoslavia (1.5m), and from Poland (1.5m). Former guest workers (excluding those from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia) amount to 1.7 million, with the most numerous groups those from Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain (see graph 11 and graph 12). A geographical distribution of people with a migration background shows the same pattern as the one seen among foreigners: 81.2% live in the former West Germany. Hence, it might be concluded that long term migration patterns from the last century continue to prevail both in terms of ethnic diversification as well as the geographical distribution of immigrants in the country.

Although the number of immigrant residents still remains quite stable (with a slight decrease in 2009 by about 0.5% in comparison to 2008), a decreasing trend in the inflows of new immigrants has been noted in recent years (since the mid-1990s).⁶⁰⁷ In 2008 about 574,000 immigrant arrivals were recorded, out of which 57.6% were from the EU member states. Looking at recent immigration trends it is obvious that some old components of immigration flows have started disappearing. The main countries of origin of immigrants in 2008 were still Poland and Turkey, although in comparison to previous years these numbers decreased as well.⁶⁰⁸ Overall, the year 2008 saw a constant decrease in immigration for the purpose of family reunification, particularly of third-country nationals⁶⁰⁹ as well as in the immigration of ethnic German repatriates and their family members.⁶¹⁰ 72% of all repatriates who came to Germany after 1950 still reside there. While about 85,000 ethnic German repatriates came to Germany with their family members in 2001, the figure dropped after 10 years to less than 4,000 people in 2009. A similar decreasing trend can be seen in the resettlement of Jews. Only 1008 Jewish immigrants were resettled in 2009, which is less than 10% of the total number of Jews coming to Germany in 2004.⁶¹¹

There are, however, new immigration countries appearing on the horizon, which might alter the immigration landscape in Germany in the near future. Since 2007 more citizens from the newest EU member states, Romania and Bulgaria, started coming to

⁶⁰⁷ In 2006, the lowest immigration numbers were recorded since German reunification, with approximately 559,000 foreigners.

⁶⁰⁸ In the case of immigration from Turkey, 2008 saw the lowest number of inflows of Turks since 1983. Net migration with regard to Poland was negative for the first time in 2008. However, since most Polish immigrants are seasonal workers, they are not registered in the German statistical database.


⁶⁰⁹ In 2008, approximately 40,000 people moved to Germany for family reunification in comparison to the highest rate, over 85,000, in 2002. One reason for a lower number of such cases might be the introduction of compulsory language tests for immigrants who come on the basis of family reunification. Since September 2007 foreign spouses of third country nationals who live in Germany have to prove a basic knowledge of German before coming to Germany in order to obtain a residence permit. It is quite a controversial legislation, as the process of learning German still in the host country is often challenging, especially for the candidates from countries with high illiteracy rates or a lack of foreign language courses.

⁶¹⁰ Most of them are from Russian Federation, Kazakhstan Poland, and Romania.

⁶¹¹ German National Contact Point for the European Migration Network (EMN), op. cit., p. 11, and p. 108.

Germany.⁶¹² Moreover, more numerous groups of asylum seekers, mostly Iraqi and Afghani applicants have been requesting protection in Germany. They account for an increase in all applications in 2009 by 25.2% in comparison to 2008 (after steady fall in the years between 2001 and 2007). The rise in asylum applications has generally contributed to a growth in the percentage of the young population in Germany. In fact, more than two thirds of all applicants are under 30 years of age.⁶¹³

Graph 12 People with a Migration Background from Europe in Germany, 2009



Source: Microcensus, 2009

However, despite an increase in asylum applications, the German asylum system has not been very generous. The total protection ratio fell from 37.7% in 2008 to 33.8% in 2009. Of all applicants, 1.6% were granted asylum, 26.6% were recognized as refugees under the Geneva Convention and 5.6% were given subsidiary protection. The protection ratio in 2009 was highest for asylum seekers from Iraq (63.9%) and Afghanistan (58.6%), with most of the Iraqi asylum seekers being recognized as refugees under the Geneva Convention and most of the Afghani applicants being granted subsidiary protection. North Rhine-Westphalia, Bavaria, and Baden-Württemberg were the states with the highest acceptance quotas estimated for 2009.⁶¹⁴

⁶¹² The figures are 7% from Romania and 3.5% from Bulgaria in 2008.

⁶¹³ The proportion of youth aged 16-25 amounts to 31.7% of all applicants.

⁶¹⁴ The geographical distribution of asylum seekers in Germany is made on the basis of the acceptance quotas of the individual federal states according to the so-called Königstein Key (*Königsteiner Schlüssel*). The latter is calculated annually on the basis of state revenue and state population.

Among other regular inflows of immigrants, a positive ratio of immigration inflow has been recorded among foreign students, which further adds to the number of immigrant youth in Germany. In 2008, there was an increase of 9% in the number of foreign students who started their studies in Germany, with a total of 58,350 students.⁶¹⁵

In reference to irregular migration, the knowledge about real numbers and the life situation of undocumented immigrants in Germany is rather fragmentary.⁶¹⁶ There are a couple of rough estimates regarding the overall figures of undocumented immigrants in Germany. The most recent ones come from 2004 after the accession of ten new EU member states. Accordingly, there are between 500,000 and 1 million irregular foreign residents in the country. The estimates of irregular migration are based only on qualitative studies and some statistical indicators which can never reflect the actual size of the clandestine residence and work. Available numbers on irregular migration point to decreasing inflows of undocumented immigrants since 2000.⁶¹⁷ Serbia, Turkey, Vietnam, the Russian Federation, and Iraq are the top five countries represented in the statistics on irregular migration.⁶¹⁸ Additionally, qualitative research studies point to irregular immigrants from some Latin-American countries (Brazil, Ecuador), Africa (Ghana, Cameroon), and Asia (Philippines), who do not appear in official statistics.

It is worth mentioning however, that the available data does not reflect cases of illegal employment. The numbers apply only to illegal residence. Consequently, the number of people illegally residing in Germany probably fell significantly following the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007, when a large proportion of undocumented people from countries today part of the EU were automatically legalized.⁶¹⁹

⁶¹⁵ In 2008 the top ten countries of origin for foreign students both from the EU and third-country nationals were the following countries: China, France, US, Spain, Poland, the Russian Federation, Italy, Austria, Turkey and India.

Federal Ministry of Education and Research. (2010). *Berufsbildungsbericht 2010*. Bonn: Federal Ministry of Education and Research.

For more on education and integration policies see subchapter 4.5.6.

⁶¹⁶ There are several paths assumed to be the main irregular entryways into Germany, which again cannot be proven by quantitative studies. The use of visa-free entry and then obtaining illegal employment, overstaying a visa or irregular entry without documents are considered the most common ones. For more on irregular migration see subchapter 4.5.5.

⁶¹⁷ In total 8,394 decisions on expulsion were made in 2008 (slightly more than in 2007), which points to a general decreasing trend. See German National Contact Point for the European Migration Network (EMN), op. cit.

⁶¹⁸ Available data is based on three main numbers, which have fallen since 2001: unauthorized entries (from the Federal Police), persons suspected of residing illegally (from Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik, PKS) and asylum applications (from the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, BAMF). Only the latter indicator saw a slight increase in 2008 and 2009. Although asylum applicants are granted a temporary regularization for the time of the asylum procedure, most asylum applications are rejected, which it can be assumed results in decisions to stay illegally.

For more see Kovacheva, V. (2010). *Security Challenges and the Composition of Irregular Resident Populations in Europe: Overestimating the Young Men?* Working Paper 8. Hamburg: Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI), Database on Irregular Migration.

⁶¹⁹ However, they may still work in the shadow economies without a work permit. For more on the legal framework for granting a work permit see the next section of this chapter.

All available data indicate that the majority of undocumented immigrants are between 20 and 40 years old.⁶²⁰ It might be assumed that a significant stock of older immigrant youth belong to the majority of irregular immigrants in Germany, which have important implications for the scope of this research.

4.5.3 Public and Political Discourse

The development of public discourse on immigration and integration in Germany at the turn of the 21st century reflects an important shift in the nation state which has transformed itself from an unofficial immigrant country into an official one. Firstly, the rhetoric of “a reluctant land of immigration,” which receives but does not “want” immigrants used to concentrate on the issues of unwanted immigrants who flooded into the country.⁶²¹ Such a self-perception in Germany as “the boat is full” prevailed during a period of massive inflows of asylum seekers in the nineties. As German media researchers point out, until 2000 the German media coverage fueled negative attitudes towards immigrants.⁶²²

With the political changes in Germany when the red-green coalition government took office in 1998, the political discourse on integration became part of a political game between the pro-immigration left-wing government (social-democratic SPD and the Green Party) and conservative right-wing parties of the opposition (coalition CDU/CSU and the Free Democrats FDP). The Independent Commission on Migration, which was set up in 2000 to present recommendations for structuring immigration and integration, fostered public discourse on facilitating immigrant integration in German society. The Commission recommended adopting an integration policy of “*Fördern und Fordern*” (supporting and requiring), now a commonly used concept in political integration discourse, which is based on a mutual obligation on the side of both the state and immigrants to work for immigrant integration.⁶²³

⁶²⁰ For more, see Cyrus, N. (2008). Undocumented Migration in Germany. Counting the Uncountable: Data and Trends across Europe. Country Report – Germany. Clandestino Project.

⁶²¹ Martin, P. L. (1994). Germany: Reluctant Land of Immigration. In *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective* (pp. 189-227). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

⁶²² Kovacheva, V. (2010). *Irregular Migration in Germany since the Turn of the Millennium – Development, Economic Background and Discourses*. Working Paper 5. Hamburg: Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI), Database on Irregular Migration, p. 20.

⁶²³ The Independent Commission on Migration (*Unabhängige Kommission „Zuwanderung“*) unofficially called The “Süssmuth Commission” was chaired by former Bundestag President Rita Süssmuth, CDU. In its 2001 report the Commission recommended individual integration contracts, obliging the state to offer integration courses to new immigrants, and obliging immigrants to participate in these courses as well as to pay part of the expenses. This report led to a new immigration law which finally came into force in January 2005.

See Unabhängige Kommission „Zuwanderung.“ (2001). *Zuwanderung gestalten - Integration fördern. (Structuring Integration - Fostering Integration) Bericht der unabhängigen Kommission "Zuwanderung," Berlin, 4. Juli 2001*. Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern.

For more on the role of the Commission, see Bosswick W. and Heckmann F., op. cit.

The turn of the 21st century was also marked by a heated discussion about the principles of German guiding culture (*Leitkultur*)⁶²⁴ and fear of isolated ethnic communities, so called parallel societies, in which immigrant minorities live and work. The guiding culture, according to the government opposition parties, was supposed to be the basis for the integration of immigrants, which was understood as one-sided assimilation. Learning the German language, professing loyalty to the German nation and accepting German legal and politician institutions were the core points of the collective identity immigrants should adopt to be successfully integrated.⁶²⁵ This ethno-nationalistic rhetoric became the negative buzzword of the year⁶²⁶ and is still highly contentious. *Leitkultur* is contrasted with a more integration friendly concept of the German culture as “a work in progress,” which embraces and welcomes diversity.⁶²⁷ The battle over the question to what immigrants should actually integrate constantly recurs in national integration debates.

The official self-perception of Germany as an immigration country and the recognition of pending needs for immigrant integration in the political and public discourse are determined by factors other than political changes in German government at the turn of the century. Three public topics, especially interesting within the scope of this paper, have been pushing integration debates back and forth from pro integration efforts towards mistrust of diversity: demographic changes, security concerns, and educational success of immigrant children.

First, recent concerns about an ageing population have sparked discussions about the need for more immigrants. The fact that German nationals, 44.5 years, have the highest median age of all EU countries and a declining birthrate are serious arguments for attracting more immigrants to ensure future economic and demographic stability in the country.⁶²⁸ The

⁶²⁴ The term “*Leitkultur*” was first used in Bassam Tibi’s 1998 book *Europa ohne Identität* (Europe without Identity). This German-Arab sociologist defined the concept in terms of common European values and was not referring solely to German culture. It was only in 2000 when Christian-Democratic Party politicians (among them Friedrich Merz, then leader of the CDU) started using the concept, advocating limits on immigration and immigrants’ duty to assimilate to a core German culture. Tibi, B. (1998). *Europa ohne Identität? Die Krise der multikulturellen Gesellschaft*. München: Bertelsmann.

⁶²⁵ The core points were included in the position statement of the opposition party to the Independent Commission, “Arbeitsgrundlage für die Zuwanderungskommission der CDU” For more see Klusmeyer, D. B. and Papademetriou, D. G., op. cit., p. 137.

⁶²⁶ Unwort des Jahres. Walter Jens nominiert “Deutsche Leitkultur.” (2000, November 4) *Spiegel Online*.

⁶²⁷ As Otto Shily points out, “German culture is a work in progress. It is helpful for immigrants to learn a bit about the history of Germany, the culture, the music. They do not have to put aside their own cultural background. We are happy that a young Turkish man still has the chance to speak Turkish and to have his knowledge of the Turkish language, because he also becomes a bridge between Turkey and Germany.”

Myers, J. (2005, November 21) German Immigration Issues (interview with Otto Shily). *Public Affairs Program*. Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs

⁶²⁸ Vasileva, K. (2010). Population and Social Conditions. *Eurostat Statistics in Focus*, 45. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, p. 6.

recent figures on negative net migration worry demographers.⁶²⁹ The successful management of immigrant integration may facilitate German competitiveness to get more immigrants and change, as Klaus J. Bade puts it, the “not exactly inviting” image of Germany.⁶³⁰ Good integration policies are supposed to be a good business card for Germany in the European competition for the best talents. In the face of the above mentioned demographic challenges, immigrant youth are slowly gaining special attention from a shrinking German population. Both politicians and public media have started realizing the benefits of investing in the young generation already in the country.

Demographic changes in Germany however are gradual and have been anticipated for decades. Moreover, the problem of an ageing population affects many industrialized countries and Germany is merely one of the most striking examples.⁶³¹ In fact, shocking and sobering events, such as the terrorist attacks of 9/11, provoked much more heated integration discussions in German society. Apart from security concerns, dilemmas about integration of Muslim immigrants into the Western world have become especially topical in Germany, home country to the Hamburg-based terror cell responsible for 9/11 attacks. In fact, the 2001 terrorist attacks were a wake up call for Germany to take action to address immigrant integration, which had previously been ignored. Currently, immigrants who fail to integrate into German guiding culture are supposedly considered a potential threat to homeland security.

Fears of “otherness” and fundamentalism among Muslims, whose population is estimated at about 4 million in Germany, coincided with a still ongoing “headscarf dispute.”⁶³² The dispute was brought about by the court case of a Turkish teacher who was banned from wearing a headscarf in 1998 as a violation of the requirement of neutrality by government officials. Although, the teacher won her case in 2003, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the federal states could prevent teachers from wearing headscarves in classes. This episode triggered a national debate about the limits of tolerance and integration requirements for immigrants. The amount of attention one piece of Muslim attire has gained proves that the

⁶²⁹ In 2008 for the first time in the last quarter of this century Germany became a net emigration country. 56 thousand more people left Germany than arrived. The gap narrowed down to 13,000 in 2009.

Destatis. (2010, May 26). *Wanderungen 2009: wieder mehr Personen nach Deutschland gezogen*, Press Release 185.

⁶³⁰ People in other countries are allegedly put off by Germany's reputation for not welcoming foreigners, an image “that is not exactly inviting,” as Klaus J. Bade told the *Hamburger Abendblatt* newspaper. *Graying Germany Contemplates Demographic Time Bomb* (2010, May 27). *Spiegel International Online*.

⁶³¹ For more on the role of international migration in addressing global challenges of worldwide demographic discrepancies see Angenendt, S. (2009). *Die Zweiteilung der Welt überwinden Warum demografische Ignoranz gefährlich ist. Internationale Politik, 11/12*, 60-67.

⁶³² According to the German Conference on Islam (DIK), between 3.8 and 4.3 million Muslims with a migrant background live in Germany, which makes Islam the country's second-largest religion after Christianity. Most Muslims are immigrants or were born here as children of immigrants, and generally come from Turkey, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iran, Morocco, and Afghanistan.

debate about the German self-perception as a homogenous country is not yet over, especially given the latest fears of Muslim cultural influences in Germany.⁶³³

Finally, the results of the PISA 2000 study proved important news, which focused public attention on immigrant integration, this time especially on the integration of immigrant youth. The difficulties experienced by first and second generation immigrant children in the German education system, revealed by the study, raised the question of possible deficits in German immigration and integration policy. This time, the focus of the integration discourse shifted from obligations imposed on immigrants towards the actions taken by the receiving society in order to secure equal opportunities for disadvantaged immigrant youth in German schools. The PISA 2000 study has paved the way for the inclusion of the issues of immigrant youth into the political discourse on integration policies of the federal government.⁶³⁴

In the face of the above mentioned media stimulus and the development of national integration policies in the new Immigration Act of 2004 the term “integration” has evolved into a catch word for current political and public discussions. As some researchers agree, the term “integration” has replaced the former rhetoric of assimilation in Germany, as a more political correct expression and a positive symbol in politics.⁶³⁵ In fact, the term “assimilation” has connotations with the exclusionist policies of the former *Ausländerpolitik* in Germany, as in all other Western European countries.⁶³⁶ However, it is worth noting that integration

⁶³³ The headscarf remains a contentious and touchy symbol of Muslim integration, which still impacts the attitudes of some employers towards veiled potential job candidates, as mentioned in the subchapter 5.2.3 on the Munich case study.

Moreover, the recent release of Thilo Sarrazin’s book *Deutschland schafft sich ab: Wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen* is yet another example of the recurring heated debates on Muslim integration in Germany. In his book the author argues that Muslim immigrants are a drag on German prosperity and more generally immigration has a lethal impact on the country.

Sarrazin, T. (2010). *Deutschland schafft sich ab: Wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen*. München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt (DVA).

⁶³⁴ The OECD Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) is the largest international comparative education study surveying the competencies and skills of fifteen and sixteen year-olds in reading, math and science. In the 2000 study 43 countries took part in the survey. According to the study poor test results of insufficiently integrated immigrant children were one of the reasons for Germany’s unsatisfactory PISA test scores.

See What a Difference Immigration Law Makes. (2005, January). *IZA COMPACT*, 9-10. For a more extensive discussion of immigrant integration into the German education system in light of the PISA study see subchapter 4.5.6. For more on the comprehensive results of PISA 2000 see Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development. (2003). *Literacy Skills for the World of Tomorrow. Further Results from PISA 2000*. Paris: UNESCO Publishing.

⁶³⁵ Bosswick, W. and Heckmann, F., op. cit.

Bommes, M. (2006). Einleitung: Migrations- und Integrationspolitik in Deutschland zwischen institutioneller Anpassung und Abwehr. In M. Bommes, W. Schiffauer (Eds.), *Migrationsreport 2006. Fakten – Analysen – Perspektiven* (pp. 9-31). Frankfurt a.M.: Campus Verlag, p. 11.

⁶³⁶ *Ausländerpolitik* in Germany (in translation: policies on foreigners) is still used in reference to general migration and integration policies in the country. However, as interpreted in this paper, *Ausländerpolitik* has connotations with the policies of the last decades of the 20th century, characterized by the German denial of the multicultural structure of its society and its self-perception as a non-immigration country.

In Simon Green’s critical view such “politics of exclusion” until 2002 can be interpreted as an umbrella term of “discrete policy areas, only tangentially connected” which together could not address the challenges of immigration in Germany.

courses and programs are not something totally new but have only recently hit the headlines as a result of the development of the symbolic politics of integration.⁶³⁷ Indeed, immigrant integration has become a symbol of the unresolved challenges faced either in security, education or cultural diversity. Similarly, much of the public discourse on immigrant integration in Germany has been focused so far on missed opportunities, negative integration outcomes, worst case scenarios and deficits in immigrant youth. The dimension of integration debates is also rather unpredictable: either the topic “integration” hits the headlines as an immediate reaction to new provocations in international or home affairs or disappears for a time until the next “shocking” news report emerges.

Less emotional dialog regarding migration issues and integration challenges has been initiated by the lobby organization Council for Migration, active since 1998, and the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration (SVR), established in 2008.⁶³⁸ According to the SVR’s most recent annual report, from 2010, the presumed integration crisis and the exclusion of immigrant populations do not reflect the realities of immigrants’ lives in Germany. Alongside many lingering challenges, there are some success stories which have not yet been recognized by German society.⁶³⁹ According to the results of SVR’s *Integration Barometer*, the degree of integration in Germany is satisfactory or even good, quite the contrary of prevailing opinion which maintains integration efforts have failed.⁶⁴⁰ As the study confirms, both immigrants and the host society have a positive attitude

Green, S. O. (2004). *The Politics of Exclusion: Institutions and Immigration Policy in Contemporary Germany*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, p. 26.

For more insights into the term “Ausländer” and “Ausländerpolitik” in Germany see:

- Penninx, R. (2005). Integration of Migrants: Economic, Social, Cultural and Political Dimensions. In M. Macura, A.L. MacDonald, W. Haug (Eds.): *The New Demographic Regime. Population Challenges and Policy Response* (pp. 137-152). New York/Geneva: United Nations;

- Bade, K. J. (1993). Ausländer- und Asylpolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Grundprobleme und Entwicklungslinien. In U. Mehrländer (Ed.), *Einwanderungsland Deutschland* (pp. 51-67). Bonn: Verlag J.H.W. Dietz Nachf.

⁶³⁷ For more, see subchapter 4.5.4.

⁶³⁸ The Council for Migration (*Rat für Migration, RfM*) was established in 1998 as a response to a group of migration researchers who drew attention to the lack of consistent migration and integration policies in Germany at that time. Until 2008/2009 it remained active as an advisory body for migration and integration policymakers and migration researchers, publishing reports, essays and organizing conferences to raise public awareness of the need for migration and integration policies across the federal states. The RfM gave rise to the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration (*Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration, SVR*), which slowly took over the RfM’s functions and incorporated some of its members. Since its establishment in 2008, the SVR has published expert reports on questions of integration and migration politics in the form of annual reports, statements and short expertise. For more information see <http://www.svr-migration.de/>

⁶³⁹ Other points in the report will be raised in later sections of this chapter.

Bade, K. J., et al. (2010). *Einwanderungsgesellschaft 2010. Jahresgutachten 2010 mit Integrationsbarometer*. Berlin: Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration.

⁶⁴⁰ Several recent migration studies also deny successful integration in Germany. For example, in his recent book, Stefan Schmid shows that expectation about what integration means differs significantly among German and Turkish youth.

Schmid, S. (2010). *Integration als Ideal – Assimilation als Realität. Vorstellungen von jungen Deutschen und türkischstämmigen Migranten über ein Leben in Deutschland*. Göttingen: V&R Unipress.

toward immigration and integration. In fact, despite existing shortcomings in integration initiatives on the part of the government, integration and migration have finally entered the political mainstream in Germany, which is a milestone for the development of a national mode of integration.

4.5.4 National Mode of Integration

As mentioned above, for a long time Germany put off dealing with immigrant integration at the national level. The Immigration Act of 2004 should be considered the most important “official step” towards the development of a German national mode of integration. The Act is the first German immigration law which contains regulations on the integration of immigrants at the national level. It has laid the ground for a new political integration framework and for new administrative structures responsible for integration at various levels of governance.

“Promoting the integration of foreigners permanently living in Germany” has officially become one of the most important tasks of home affairs policy.⁶⁴¹ Interestingly enough the concept of “integration” was not clearly defined in the Immigration Act 2004. In fact, the Act includes few references to integration in its statement on the purpose of the government’s integration measures: “to acquaint foreigners with the way of life in the Federal territory to such an extent as to enable them to act independently in all aspects of daily life, without the assistance or mediation of third parties.”⁶⁴² This ambivalent definition does not yield a clear answer to the question of which role the host society plays in the integration process. However, in later official integration documents, reports and summits of the German government, successful integration is more often interpreted through the lens of mutual cooperation on the part of both the receiving society and the immigrants.⁶⁴³ Moreover, the Government’s Nationwide Integration Program 2010 emphasizes that integration measures

⁶⁴¹ Federal Ministry of the Interior. (n.d.) Integration Policy.

⁶⁴² The Residence Act, section 43.

⁶⁴³ As one can read in BAMF’s 2007 publication, “integration is regarded as a reciprocal process, which requires effort from both parties. Whilst the receiving society provides immigrants with integration support, particularly in the areas of language support and advisory services, immigrants are called upon to actively learn the German language and to comply with the laws and social order of the receiving country.”

See Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. (2007). *Integration in Germany. Support Networking Dialogue*. Nuremberg: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, p. 5.

Moreover, the BAMF Integration Report from the following year reinforces the understanding of integration as a two-way process: “It is only possible to live together peacefully and with respect for each other in the long term if the immigrants feel themselves to be a part of society, and if society in turn accepts them as equal members.”

See Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. (2009). *Integration in Germany-Annual Report 2008*. Nuremberg: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, p. 3.

should be also directed towards the host society which needs to open itself to growing cultural diversity.⁶⁴⁴

Since the Immigration Act 2004 took effect in January 2005, the national mode of integration in Germany has become a highly institutionalized national integration strategy. The strategy is based on new competencies on the part of federal institutions as well as some key new processes in national integration policies, which will be elaborated below.

Although Germany is a federal state and the competencies of the federal ministries are quite limited, the Federal Government has taken a strong role in coordinating and setting standards for integration policies. All legislation on migration, refugee and resettlement policies are regulated by federal laws (such as issues of nationality, freedom of movement, immigration and emigration, national identity cards, registration issues and foreigners' rights of residence). The only major policy areas which are relevant for immigrant integration and which are regulated by the federal states are education, research and police affairs, whereas labor market and youth policies are already to a certain extent controlled at the national level.⁶⁴⁵

With the Immigration Act 2004, a new centralized integration administration was established. At the federal institutional level the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI), with its Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF)⁶⁴⁶, assumes primary responsibility for migration and integration policies. Additionally, in coordination with the BMI, the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (BMAS) now regulates legislation on the employment of immigrants and their integration into the labor market. Since 2005 the BAMF has undertaken the tasks of developing and implementing integration courses for immigrants, promoting integration projects, submitting reports to the Federal Government on the promotion of integration and developing the Nationwide Integration Program. The Immigration Act 2004 also promotes the Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration to the rank of a state minister. The Commission is appointed by the federal government as an advisory body for legislative projects on migration and integration and also functions as a promoter of the integration of migrants who are permanently resident in Germany.⁶⁴⁷

As regards integration policies for immigrant youth at the federal level, the Federal Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth plays an important role as a supporter of a network of more than 400 youth migration services (*Jugendmigrationsdienste, JMD*) across the nation. These services offer counseling and assistance in developing

⁶⁴⁴ Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. (2010). *Bundesweites Integrationsprogramm*. Nuremberg: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, pp. 9-11.

⁶⁴⁵ For more see Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. (2009), *op. cit.*

⁶⁴⁶ Until January 2005 the BAMF was the Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees. See the Residence Act, section 75.

⁶⁴⁷ See sections 92-94 of the Residence Act.

individual integration plans for young immigrants between 12 and 27 during their transition from school to work.⁶⁴⁸

Federal coordination of local integration policies takes place through twenty-two branch BAMF offices, which are spread across all German federal states. Moreover, each federal state has its own Commissioner for the Integration of Immigrants (*Integrationsbeauftragte*), who advises the government of a federal state in all matters regarding integration and immigration policy. The scope of the activities and initiatives of the state commissioner may vary from federal state to federal state. Generally each commissioner is responsible for the development and implementation of a so-called “integration concept” and initiatives aimed at promoting intercultural understanding at the institutional level. The commissioner is also supposed to cooperate with local municipal authorities; welfare and charity organizations; institutions, networks and other assemblies organized by immigrant groups active in the field of integration. All commissioners are also expected to cooperate with the Federal Commissioner for Integration of Immigrants, other commissioners in other states of Germany and with local municipal authorities.

National and state integration policies are intended to be complementary to local integration measures at the municipal level. The BAMF local agencies still rely heavily on other local organizations for hands-on experience in local integration work. The BAMF offices delegate most of their practical work to welfare agencies⁶⁴⁹ and networks of municipal authorities with civil society organizations.

In fact the real origin of the national mode of integration in Germany has its roots in bottom-up organizations at the local level, which are now important stake-holders in top-down integration policy. In many cases city mayors have played and continue to play a leading role in advancing local integration programs, supporting a so-called “intercultural opening” of the administration (e.g. recruitment of more staff from a migration background and intensified efforts to confront immigrant integration challenges) or strengthening the role of the consultative bodies of immigrants in local politics. In fact, non-profit initiatives are considered the first considered initiators of local integration policies in Germany (e.g. community organizations, worker’s groups, schools, kindergartens, and immigrant organizations).⁶⁵⁰

⁶⁴⁸ The Federal Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth has recently embarked on the nationwide integration initiative “Jugend stärken” for disadvantaged youth. The youth with migration background are in main focus of the program.

⁶⁴⁹ The six largest agencies in Germany are: Catholic Caritas, Protestant Diakonie, the *Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle* for Jews in Germany (ZWST), the labor movement’s *Arbeiterwohlfahrt* (AWO), the non-partisan umbrella organization *Deutsche Paritätische Wohlfahrtsverband* (DPWV), and the German Red Cross.

⁶⁵⁰ The integration policy at the local level was present long before Immigration Act 2004. In fact, quite often cities were the forerunners of immigrant integration efforts with their own integration concepts and strategies when comprehensive national and state integration policies did not exist or were still

Four significant processes in the development of a German national integration policy can be distinguished: the development of integration courses, implementation of the National Integration Plan, development of the aforementioned Nationwide Integration Program and the establishment of the German Islam Conference. The integration of immigrant youth has become one of the main priorities of all four of these official national integration processes as the below examples will show.⁶⁵¹

The integration courses represent the core element of the state-run integration measures.⁶⁵² The courses are generally obligatory for all newly arrived immigrants outside of the EU or for those immigrants who entered Germany since January 1, 2005 or EU citizens who face problems with employment or have special integration needs.⁶⁵³ Those who refuse to take the courses can be fined by up to €1,000 or have their social benefits cut. In other cases immigrants who wish to attend such a course may sign up if there are sufficient seats available in the course. The participants must as a rule pay a symbolic fee of one Euro per lesson, which is supposed to thereby increase their motivation.⁶⁵⁴ The standard course consists of a 600 hour language course and a 45 hour orientation course on the German legal system, history and culture.⁶⁵⁵ After passing the final exam, participants are awarded an "Integration Course Certificate," which offers certain advantages, such as easier access to unlimited settlement permits or naturalization.⁶⁵⁶

Since their introduction in 2005, integration courses have been growing in the number of participants and new types of courses have been developed for different target groups: youths, women, parents, and the illiterate. The special courses include both language

underdeveloped. Integration policies at the local level, however, remained divided between numerous bodies, usually demonstrating a lack of coordination and communication. See:
- Heckmann, F. (2010). *Recent Developments of Integration Policy in Germany and Europe*. Bamberg: European Forum for Migration Studies, p. 6;
- Uhl, K. (2005). Germany. In R. Süßmuth and W. Weidenfeld (Eds.), *Managing Integration: the European Union's Responsibilities towards Immigrants* (pp. 156-160). Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, p. 156;
- Bommers, M. (2006), op. cit.
Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration. (2009). *The National Integration Plan: Driver of Integration Policy*. Berlin: The Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, p. 2.

⁶⁵¹ Discussing all federal activities in integration policy is beyond the scope of this paper. The next sections of this subchapter will give only a brief overview of those integration measures, which are considered important for this paper: the integration of immigrant youth.

⁶⁵² Regulated by Integration Course Ordinance (*Integrationskursverordnung, IntV*) of December 13, 2004, last amended by the First Ordinance Amending the Integration Course Ordinance dated 5 December 2007.

⁶⁵³ The Labor Agency may oblige those immigrants who receive unemployment benefit II to attend an integration course. The local foreign affairs offices determine what equates to "special integration needs." For more detailed regulations see Sections 44 and 44a of the Residence Act.

⁶⁵⁴ Based on an unrecorded interview with the local BAMF agency in Munich.

⁶⁵⁵ "Framework Curriculum for Integration Courses – German as a Second Language" was developed by the Goethe Institute in cooperation with Ludwig Maximilian University in Munich (LMU) and Friedrich Schiller University in Jena (FSU) on behalf of the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI).

⁶⁵⁶ They are also eligible for an unlimited permit of stay. In addition, the necessary period of residency can be reduced from eight to seven years.

lessons, increased to 900 hours, as well as the same 45 hours of orientation lessons, as in a standard integration course. The Youth Integration Courses are offered to young immigrants up to 27 years of age as part of compulsory education programs in preparation for school attendance or for higher or vocational education in Germany. The courses are run in cooperation with the aforementioned nationwide youth migration services, which helps to adapt BAMF's integration offering to the local needs of immigrant youth.⁶⁵⁷

The 2007 National Integration Plan (NIP) and the annual National Integration Summits are key national measures to make integration policy a joint strategy for all involved in integration work at federal, state, and local levels. The National Integration Plan consists of more than 400 ambitious goals for all integration actors to work towards a sustainable integration policy. The federal government, federal states, local authorities, migrant organizations, institutions and organizations from science, media, culture, sports, trade and industry, trade unions and religious groups are all committed to fulfilling these 400 goals. Promoting learning the German language, obtaining an education and qualifications, and expanding labor market opportunities are among the ten core issues of the Plan.⁶⁵⁸ Following the NIP's Progress Report, the cooperation of the federal government both with state actors and industry brought about further concrete commitments for an inclusive approach towards immigrants in the field of education and employment.⁶⁵⁹ The NIP of 2007 was developed into the future National Action Plan with clearly set-out deadlines for the achievement of the NIP's goals.⁶⁶⁰

The work at the NIP has been discussed at four National Integration Summits, which formed the basis for the discussion of integration work and the development of the NIP at the local levels of states and cities. Beginning in 2006 the Summits were organized at the

⁶⁵⁷ The Youth Integration Courses have been in development since their initial implementation in 2007, when the attendance level was rather too low. In 2008 only 111 young people took part nationwide. The intention in 2009 was to extend the offer with job application counseling, integrated internships, and greater orientation towards the practical application of skills to address the immediate needs of immigrant youth during the transition from school to work.

⁶⁵⁸ See Bundesregierung. (2007). *Der Nationale Integrationsplan Neue Wege – Neue Chancen*. Berlin: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung.

⁶⁵⁹ Among them:

- the Training Pact concluded between the federal government and top organizations in German industry authorized a series of concrete steps (agreed upon at the Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education of the States of the Länder, KMK) to help migrants get into training and employment and thereby achieve greater long term success;
- a "Charter of Diversity" committing the signatories to an inclusive corporate culture in recognition of valuable language and cultural skills of people with a migration background.

See Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration. (2009), op. cit.

⁶⁶⁰ Representatives of the federal government, state governments, local authorities, migrants and private stakeholders officially commenced their collaborative work on the National Action Plan during the fourth National Integration Summit in November 2010.

For more on the future national action plan see Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration. (2010). *8. Bericht der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration über die Lage der Ausländerinnen und Ausländer in Deutschland*. Berlin: The Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, p. 28.

initiative of the Federal Chancellor (in 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2010). In addition two Youth Integration Summits in 2007 and 2008 offered consultations with youth with a migration background about their integration needs and consulted them about Federal Government plans for new integration measures.

The development of the Nationwide Integration Program is the third national integration measure which, along with integration courses, is regulated by the Immigration Act. The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees has been developing the Program since 2006 on behalf of the Federal Ministry of the Interior in cooperation with individuals who are involved in integration work.⁶⁶¹ The aim of the integration program was to take stock of the existing integration program offered by the federal government, states, local authorities, and other providers and to make recommendations and establish strategies for successful integration in line with the NIP. Key areas for immigrant youth integration into the labor market were analyzed in depth and evaluated: language support and vocational language training, integration into the workplace, education, and recognition of qualifications. The Nationwide Integration Program builds on the subjects and preliminary work of the NIP and assist in its further implementation. Along with the NIP, core recommendations of the Integration Program are supposed to form the basis for the future integration action plan.⁶⁶²

Finally, national integration measures have recently started to focus on a single group of immigrants, Muslims, as a significant population inside Germany. The German Islam Conference (*Deutsche Islam Konferenz*, DIK), headed by the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs has become a formalized platform for dialog between the State and Muslims. The conference, brought into being in 2006, gathers federal, regional and local authorities and Muslim organizations which aim to foster social cohesion, sound inter-religious relations and the integration of Muslims in Germany.⁶⁶³ The first phase of the DIK, from 2006-2009, consisted in the work of thematic groups, which developed recommendations for future

⁶⁶¹ According to the Residence Act, the following stakeholders are included: federal states, local authorities, commissioners for foreigners and integration drawn from the federal government, the Federal Government's Commissioner for Repatriation Issues, religious communities, trade unions, employers' associations, social welfare organizations and other social associations with an interest in the field, particularly immigrant organizations.

⁶⁶² The development of an integration program was a series of consultations and evaluations of integration policies which started in 2006 and concluded with the September 2010 release of the final version of the Integration Program.

See Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. (2010). *Bundesweites Integrationsprogramm*, Nuremberg: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees.

⁶⁶³ The DIK was set up by the German Minister for Internal Affairs Wolfgang Schäuble. In 2010 the new Minister Thomas de Maizière announced the continuation and extension of the German Islam Conference, focusing on practical implementation of the previous work. On May 17, 2010 during the DIK meeting the program of work for the next legislative period of three years was approved. Key areas for institutional co-operation and integration-related project work include promotion of gender equality and prevention of extremism, radicalisation and social polarisation. The program issued thus far, however, has not focused on labor market integration issues. At the time of this writing it can be only assumed that the issue of immigrant youth will remain an area of interest.

See Deutsche Islam Konferenz. (2010, May 18). "Teilhabe stärken" - Auftakt der Deutschen Islam Konferenz in der zweiten Phase.

action in four areas: values, religious issues, the economy and the media, and security and fundamentalist Muslim movements. Quite significantly, the integration of immigrant youth became an important point of discussion during third plenary session in 2008, a fact which unfortunately has not gained much media attention. The working group "The Economy and the Media as Bridge-builders" focused especially on the area of school education. As the working group concluded, some special integration programs were for schools needed, such as intercultural trainings for the staff in kindergartens and pre-schools, improved cooperation between parents with migration backgrounds and schools, and additional language teaching parallel to everyday schooling.⁶⁶⁴

The integration strategy in Germany is highly institutionalized and, especially within the DIK, it seems to be rather politicized. However, besides the above-mentioned platform for discussions, summits and strategies for future integration actions, there is also financial support for local integration practitioners. Both federal and EU Funds allocated for Germany are administered and distributed by BAMF.⁶⁶⁵

The latest news, information about all of the national integration measures mentioned above together with the main integration project contactors are updated on the BAMF's website in the section "Welcome to Germany." The section is a central national information platform on integration, containing practical tips for newly arrived immigrants and integration stakeholders in Germany.⁶⁶⁶ The portal makes the national mode of integration more accessible for all who do not deal with integration policies on a daily basis. However, the website without doubt presents the subject of immigrant integration in Germany in a much more positive light than is generally reported by the media.⁶⁶⁷

Much as the theoretical concepts about integration are present in German national integration reports and research analysis, another important issue has begun to occupy the attention of policy makers, namely how best to measure the success of immigrant

⁶⁶⁴ According the DIK's 2008 interim report, the topics of "Transition between school and work" and "Requirements of the economy" were supposed to be discussed at the next plenary session. Unfortunately I was unable to find any evidence that these topics were addressed in the DIK's work in the next plenary session in 2009 or in 2010.

Federal Ministry of the Interior. (2008). *Deutsche Islam Konferenz (DIK): Zwischen-Resümee der Arbeitsgruppen und des Gesprächskreises. Vorlage für die 3. Plenarsitzung der DIK 13. März 2008*. Berlin: Federal Ministry of the Interior, pp. 10-11.

⁶⁶⁵ For example, since 2008 the ESF-BAMF program has allocated funds to service providers who want to teach employment related language skills. For more on vocational language courses, see subchapter 4.5.7.

⁶⁶⁶ The website can generally be considered an immigrant-friendly tool of navigation in a quite confusing system of national integration strategies and national integration measures. Until 2011 there was a separate integration portal: <http://www.integration-in-deutschland.de/>. As of 2011 the portal is not updated anymore and all information on integration are moved to the BAMF's website: <http://www.bamf.de/DE/Willkommen/willkommen-node.html>

⁶⁶⁷ For example, not a single word about the controversial debate surrounding Sarrazin's thesis has appeared on the website.

integration, starting from the structural integration into German society.⁶⁶⁸ The recent process of developing indicators for nationwide integration monitoring constitutes an attempt to standardize integration monitoring across federal states. The indicators may also facilitate establishing future standards for monitoring the integration of immigrant youth in all federal states.⁶⁶⁹

The attempts to monitor integration in Germany challenge the aforementioned questions about the national understanding of integration: is immigrant integration measurable at all and can integration finally be completed? In light of recent developments in the national mode of integration in Germany some migration experts warn that integration should not be formalized in terms of a program which immigrants and the host society are obliged to complete. Integration measures should be offered as a form of counseling, rather than imposed duties.⁶⁷⁰ However, recent plans for integration contracts prove how controversial national mode still is. The contracts, which both newly arrived or established immigrants will have to sign, are supposed to include binding statements about expectations imposed on immigrants (such as improving German language skills, obtaining education and job training) and commitments on the part of German public institutions to provide information and assistance for immigrants. Such steps would impose new national sanctions on immigration and national controls on immigrants' lives in German society.⁶⁷¹ In this light, the participation of immigrant youth in local integration programs might also be negatively impacted. In fact, as anecdotal evidence already shows, youth tend to stay away from anything obligatory during the often difficult transitional process from childhood to adulthood.

⁶⁶⁸ In Germany many attempts have been already made at both federal, state, and commune levels with various approaches and indicators used. In addition, a couple of foundations and private research institutes have also been active in the field of integration monitoring.

Worbs, S. (2010). *Integration in Plain Figures? Approaches to Integration Monitoring in Germany. Focus Migration, Policy Brief 16*. Hamburg: Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI).

⁶⁶⁹ In June 2008 a working group on "Indicator Development and Monitoring" of the federal states was set up, which consists of the ministers and senators of the federal states responsible for integration and statistics: The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, the Federal Statistical Office and the Federal Government Commission for Migration, Refugees and Integration. The group will probably be enlarged by municipalities and migration experts, like the SVR. The working group's recent report focuses on indicators for immigrant youth in the field of school, vocational training and crime.

See Arbeitsgruppe Indikatorenentwicklung und Monitoring. (2010). *Ergebnisse der Pilotstudie Indikatorenentwicklung und Monitoring 2005 – 2008*. Berlin: Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg.

⁶⁷⁰ Dieter Oberndörfer rightly criticizes integration understood as a program which can and must be completed. It should instead be considered an ongoing process in the whole of German society, which should assume responsibility for the success of the process.

Oberndörfer, D. (2007). *Zuwanderung nach Deutschland – eine Bilanz. Politische Essays zu Migration und Integration*. Osnabrück: Rat für Migration.

⁶⁷¹ As the Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration, Maria Böhmer admits, "[A]nyone who wants to live here and work here in the long term, has to say 'yes' to our country. This includes knowing how to speak our language, but also the willingness to participate in our society."

Lawton, M. (2009, November 23). *Germany Wants Contracts to Clarify Immigrant Responsibilities. Deutsche Welle.*

In general, the various integration measures planned at the federal level discussed thus far comprise an apparently comprehensive national integration strategy, gradually impacting more fields of immigrants' lives, including immigrant integration into the labor market. On the other hand, the planned integration measures sometimes remain abstract and are not coordinated among different actors at different levels of the German government (federal, state, and commune). As the SVR notes, even at the federal level there is a lot of overlapping of competencies and competition, for example between BAMF and the Federal Commissioner, which might hinder concrete actions.⁶⁷² According to Bade, recognition of integration challenges in Germany is already widespread across the country, but concrete solutions are still lacking.⁶⁷³

4.5.5 Legal Status

Like in all other EU countries, including Poland, citizens of the European Economic Area (EU-EEA intra migrants⁶⁷⁴) enjoy special privileges, including the freedom of movement, the right to residence, and access to education and the labor market.⁶⁷⁵ In fact, EU citizenship has opened the gates to legality and offered new integration opportunities in Germany for many immigrants from the new EU member states previously residing illegally there. Their structural integration is first of all much easier than that of the third country nationals, who need to meet visa requirements and to obtain residence permits. Like Germans, EU-EEA intra migrants need only register their stay with the residents' registration office in their place of residence, without applying for a residence title. In order to stay longer than ninety days all other foreign citizens in Germany are usually required to have one of the following residence permits: either a Schengen visa for shorter stays, visas issued for specific purposes (e.g. education, gainful employment), temporary residence permits or an unlimited settlement permit. Also persons who enter Germany without a visa must apply for a residence permit for stays of more than three months or stays leading to gainful employment.⁶⁷⁶

There are a few special provisions in the legal framework for granting a residence title for immigrant youth from the third countries. Immigrant youth, like other foreigners, can be

⁶⁷² Bade, K. et. al. (2010), op. cit., p. 83.

⁶⁷³ Grote, T. (2010, September 9). Interview with Klaus Bade. *Nordwestradio Journal*.

⁶⁷⁴ See subchapter 4.4.3.

⁶⁷⁵ EU-EEA citizens in Germany automatically enjoy the same social and economic rights as German citizens with a few exceptions imposed on the citizens of the new EU member states, for whom free access to labor markets has been postponed. Moreover EU-EEA intra migrants enjoy some of the political rights of German citizens, e.g. to take part in local elections. For more on the privileges of EU-EEA intra migrants in the system of education and labor market see the next sections of this chapter.

⁶⁷⁶ For nationals of those countries for which the European Community has abolished the visa requirement see the table of countries whose citizens require/do not require visas to enter Germany see the website of the Federal Foreign Office.

issued temporary residence permits for the purposes specified in the Act of Residence: education or training, gainful employment, humanitarian, political or family reasons. Until the age of 18 children of immigrants are permitted to join their parents entering Germany. If their parents already reside in the country, children are permitted to join their parents until the age of 16. Only in some cases, when a so called “favorable integration prognosis for the child” exists, for instance because the child possesses good knowledge of German, or in case of hardship, is entry also possible after that until the age of 18.⁶⁷⁷

In order to obtain a permanent settlement permit a young immigrant like other immigrants must have held a residence temporary permit for five years and meet some additional requirements, including having a secure income, no criminal record and adequate knowledge of the German language. A foreigner who has been granted asylum or whose deportation has been deferred initially receives a residence permit limited to three years, and then an unlimited settlement permit if the preconditions for asylum continue to apply. Asylum seekers are granted a permission to remain (a so-called *Aufenthaltsgestattung*) which is renewed for six months, as long as the asylum proceedings continue. Immigrants who are obliged to leave Germany, but who cannot leave and the authorities cannot deport for legal and/or practical reasons, can be granted an exceptional leave to remain (a so-called temporary suspension of deportation: *Duldung*). However, the permission to remain and a temporary suspension of deportation are not residence titles, and they restrict immigrants’ access to economic, social and integration benefits (e.g. integration courses). By the same token immigrant youth with one of these statuses have less chance for labor market integration than their peers. They enjoy only “secondary” access to the German job-market.⁶⁷⁸ Moreover self-employment is not permitted for this group of immigrants. In fact, the status of suspended deportation may last many years, which leads to a chain stay of deportation (a so-called *Kettenduldung*) when immigrants are in limbo and not allowed to function in the German host society as legal residents.⁶⁷⁹

As of August 2008 one option for immigrants with an exceptional leave to remain was to apply for a residence permit on the basis of time-limited provisions for old cases.⁶⁸⁰ Immigrants could be granted a residence permit if, on July 1, 2007, they had been continuously residing legally or with an exceptional leave to remain in Germany for eight

⁶⁷⁷ Sections 27 to 36 of the Residence Act.

⁶⁷⁸ “Secondary access to the German job-market” means that with an exceptional leave to remain one can apply for a work permit only after one year of residence in Germany and then go through the complicated procedure of filing an application for a work permit with the Foreigners Authority and the local employment agency. Unpaid work-training and unpaid trial periods typically also require work permit. See subchapter 4.5.7.

⁶⁷⁹ As of May 2010 since 1st July 60,000 people were granted the temporary suspension of deportation status.

See Bade, K. J. (2010), et al., op. cit.

⁶⁸⁰ Since the entry into force of the Directive Implementation Act: the Act on the Implementation of EU Directives on Residence and Asylum Issues of 19 August 2007, see German National Contact Point for the European Migration Network (EMN), op. cit.

years or six years if one or more minor children lived in the household. Additionally, they had to demonstrate adequate knowledge of spoken German and have committed no criminal offence. The residence permit issued under these provisions was initially limited until December 31, 2009 but it could be prolonged if the foreigners could independently make a living largely from their own gainful employment. Many applicants, however, were only granted “a residence permit on trial,” as they were not self-sufficient, in the wake of the economic crisis. The provisions could be extended until December 2011, if the holder of a provisional residence permit had held at least a part-time job for the past six months, as of December 31, 2009 or would have had a part-time job for six months by January 31, 2010.⁶⁸¹

The same rules applied to immigrant youth with “a residence permit on trial,” who had successfully completed school or vocational training by the end of 2009 or were still in training (as this suggests that they are well integrated and will be able to ensure their livelihoods in the future). For children whose parents did not succeed in fulfilling the requirements of the legal regulations governing old cases and who had to leave the country, issuing a separate residence permit was possible. In such cases children had to have been 14 years of age as of July 1, 2007, been unmarried, well-integrated or, in the case of minors, personal custody had to have been guaranteed.⁶⁸² In addition to these provisions, well-integrated unmarried adult children of foreigners whose deportation has been suspended for several years can apply for a residence permit even if they have not lived in Germany for the required eight years.

The route to obtaining German nationality is much longer. As a general rule, immigrants have the right to become naturalized after eight years of lawful residence in Germany. Participation in an integration course can, however, shorten the naturalization period to seven or even six years in the case of a “special integration performance” on the part of the applicant. The waiting time for naturalization can be even shorter for the spouses of German citizens.

Additionally, the reform of the nationality law introduced elements of the *jus soli* principle: obtaining citizenship in the country of birth. As a result, children born after

⁶⁸¹ Holders of a residence permit on trial who were still unable to prove employment which would entitle them to a prolongation of their residence permits could receive another residence permit on trial for two years if they were able to prove that they have tried to find work to provide for their needs and the needs of their family and if it could reasonably be assumed that they would be able to provide for their needs within the next two years.

⁶⁸² It remains unclear what “well-integrated” actually means. According to the definition of the Residence Act (section 104a) they should have adequate knowledge of German language and through their education and personal conduct have been able to adapt to the living conditions of the Republic of Germany and prove that in the future they will continue to do so:
„[...]die deutsche Sprache beherrscht und sich auf Grund seiner bisherigen Schulausbildung und Lebensführung in die Lebensverhältnisse der Bundesrepublik Deutschland eingefügt hat und gewährleistet ist, dass es sich auch in Zukunft in die Lebensverhältnisse der Bundesrepublik Deutschland einfügen wird.“

December 31, 1999 automatically enjoy German nationality⁶⁸³ if one of their parents have been residing in Germany for eight years and had had an unlimited residence permit before the child was born. Obviously, immigrant children born in Germany of parents who are temporarily suspended from deportation cannot benefit from these provisions.

There is an ongoing debate among researchers, policy analysts and immigrants themselves about whether naturalization is an ultimate goal of integration or just one of the tools to full participation in the German host society.⁶⁸⁴ In terms of social and economic rights the permanent settlement permits offer practically everything which German citizens have, so that more and more immigrants opt for the status of denizen, that is the person is not a citizen of Poland but enjoys nearly all rights of citizenship with the exception of the right to vote.⁶⁸⁵ According to statistics and surveys, interest in naturalization has been dramatically decreasing over the last few years. Only some 96,100 foreigners were naturalized in Germany in the course of 2009, much less than the average for the years 2000 to 2007: 140,000 naturalizations per year. Moreover, only 1.95% of those entitled to apply for naturalization took the opportunity to do so in 2009. Dual citizenship in Germany is generally not allowed, hence the necessity of giving up their own nationality might be one of the reasons for immigrants' low interest in applying for German citizenship.⁶⁸⁶ Additionally, the obligatory naturalization test, introduced in 2008, might not be encouraging either.

The decision to renounce their own citizenship might be especially difficult for immigrant youth with dual citizenship who are supposed to decide by the age of 23 at the latest whether they want to have a German passport or have the same one as their immigrant parents, following the "option provision." If they do not make a declaration in favor of German citizenship before the age of 23 and thereby renounce their second citizenship, they automatically lose their German one, unless the authorities decide on its retention. On the other hand, naturalization is still the most popular option among the younger generation

⁶⁸³ The Nationality Act, Section 4.

⁶⁸⁴ As Susan Worbs points out, it is debatable whether the acquisition of German nationality should be considered a milestone or a "keystone" of the process of immigrant integration. See Worbs, S. (2008). *Die Einbürgerung von Ausländern in Deutschland*, Nuremberg: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees.

If integration can be "completed" by the process of getting a citizenship, such an approach rejects the understanding of integration as a process of mutual adaptation on the part of both immigrants and the host society, which is adopted in this paper.

⁶⁸⁵ The word "denizen" applies to those who are not citizens of the country in which they live, but have legal status as a permanent resident and enjoy full social and economic rights. The term was coined by Tomas Hammar in 1990.

Hammar, T. (1990). *Democracy and the Nation State. Aliens, Denizens and Citizens in a World of International Migration*. Avebury: Aldershot.

⁶⁸⁶ There are many exceptions which allow applicants to retain their original citizenship. These exceptions apply to EU citizens, elderly persons and victims of political persecution, as well as those cases when it is legally impossible or economically or personally disadvantageous for applicants to renounce their nationality (e.g. involving excessive costs, degrading procedures or serious economic disadvantages). For more on this see the website of the Federal Foreign Office.

of immigrants. According to statistical data from Microcensus 2006, over 85% of naturalized citizens were under the age of 45.⁶⁸⁷

The arguments I present here as to why naturalization is crucial for the integrating immigrant youth into the German labor market are only educated guesses. First, the right of full political participation in the German electoral process, which is only guaranteed by German citizenship, can make a young person a respectful, fully-fledged shareholder in German democracy, in the eyes of the host society, and in particular in the eyes of a future employer. Secondly, German citizenship removes bureaucratic hurdles during the job application process for immigrants. Finally, there is a political consensus that German citizenship is a sign of identification with German society, which might also facilitate integration into the German workforce.⁶⁸⁸

The positive impact that German citizenship has on labor market integration has also been empirically demonstrated. According to Holger Seibert's report, German citizens with migration backgrounds have better results in their education and labor market performance than immigrants with the same origins who have not obtained German passports.⁶⁸⁹ Microcensus 2008 shows that naturalized youth aged 20-25 with a migration background are more often found to study at German universities than those without German citizenship.⁶⁹⁰ Despite these figures, naturalization is still not considered the most important factor for successful immigrant integration, as the SVR's *Integration Barometer* proves.⁶⁹¹ Indeed, a decreasing number of naturalizations suggests the lack of an awareness of the impact of naturalization on immigrant integration into the labor market.

Undocumented immigrants face little chance for legalizing their status in the near future. As the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees officially admits, "Germany has not taken any measures to legalize the residence of illegal immigrants. It continues to regard legalization critically, not least against the background of the recent economic crisis."⁶⁹² Moreover, the issue of undocumented immigrants has become a strongly tabooed social and political problem. In fact, not only the undocumented but also those who know the

⁶⁸⁷ See Worbs, S. (2008), op. cit.

⁶⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 10.

⁶⁸⁹ The study was based on data from Microncensus 2005 and focused on young adults aged 26-35 with a migration background with and without a German passport. Seibert, H. (2008). *Junge Migranten am Arbeitsmarkt. Bildung und Einbürgerung verbessern die Chancen*. Nuremberg: Institute for Employment Research (IAB) of the German Federal Employment Agency (BA).

⁶⁹⁰ 16% without compared to 21% with German citizenship (not far from the 23% of native Germans). See Federal Ministry of Education and Research. (2010) *Berufsbildungsbericht 2010*. Bonn: Federal Ministry of Education and Research.

⁶⁹¹ The importance of nine integration measures for facilitating immigrant integration were included in the survey (listed according to the highest ratings: decreasing unemployment, offering language courses, propagating democratic values, fighting against discrimination, reducing immigrant crime rates, improving education opportunities, recognizing foreign credentials, advocating tolerance, facilitating naturalization. See, Bade, K. J., et al., (2010), op. cit., pp. 36-37.

⁶⁹² The aforementioned ruling on prolongation of the "residence permit on trial" is not officially considered a means of legalization. See German National Contact Point for the European Migration Network (EMN), op. cit.

undocumented may feel they are endangered, a result of the controversial restrictive Federal legislation regulations of the German Residential Law, which remained unchanged in the 2004 Immigration Act. Consequently, Germany is still the only European country in which not only is staying in the country illegally a criminal act, but providing assistance to those in the country illegally is also considered a criminal act. Similarly, public service employees who fail to report an undocumented person to the Aliens Office are liable to prosecution.⁶⁹³ Only recently have certain public sectors, such as health care and social work services, been exempted from the obligation to provide such information. In addition, those providing help and support to the undocumented on a professional or a voluntary basis do not face any legal consequences for not reporting an undocumented person.⁶⁹⁴ Consequently, support organizations for immigrant youth can also legally counsel undocumented immigrants and plan their integration paths which are much more difficult than for those with residence titles. The recent reforms mentioned above are promising changes in the common federal practice to criminalize undocumented immigrants, which has been the norm thus far.⁶⁹⁵

In fact, the challenges to local communities and public service in dealing with people *sans papiers* remained unrecognized by the federal government for a long time and were left in the hands of local authorities. Fortunately, as a result of intense information campaigns from NGOs and church organizations, along with a great increase in research on the rights of the undocumented in the last few years, the issue of undocumented immigrants has finally garnered political attention at the national level.⁶⁹⁶ Three basic topics have been the focus of public and political debates so far: access to health care, education and economic exploitation of irregular immigrants. The last two issues, especially, are of great importance

⁶⁹³ Sections 87, 95, and 96 of the Residence Act.

⁶⁹⁴ The organizations do not face legal consequences as long as they provide help to the undocumented out of humanitarian reasons, without any profit for themselves.

⁶⁹⁵ The changes were introduced by the General Administrative Regulation relating to the Residence Act in September 2009. Additionally, the same amendments allow for funding the cost of medical help to the undocumented by local social welfare offices.

⁶⁹⁶ See Federal Ministry of the Interior. (2007). *Illegal aufhältige Migranten in Deutschland: Datenlage, Rechtslage, Handlungsoptionen*. Berlin: the Federal Ministry of the Interior.

Catholic Forum "Life in Illegality" initiated by the Manifesto "Life in Illegality" has been one of the most important forerunners of the information campaign on the undocumented across Germany. The forum has given rise to annual conventions (*Jahrestagung Illegalität*), organized since 2005. The meetings gather politicians, policy makers and NGOs to publicly discuss issues of the undocumented children and youth, one of the Forum's priorities.

Katholisches Forum Leben in der Illegalität, (2007). *Manifest Illegale Zuwanderung – für eine differenzierte und lösungsorientierte Diskussion*. Berlin: Katholisches Forum Leben in der Illegalität.

Many of the first studies on the undocumented in Germany focused on local political approaches in the cities. The leading studies include:

- Alt, P. J. (1999). *Illegal in Deutschland. Forschungsprojekt zur Lebenssituation illegaler Migranten in Leipzig*. Karlsruhe: Loeper Literaturverlag;
- Anderson, P. (2003). *Menschen in der Illegalität in München*. München: Landeshauptstadt München, Sozialreferat (for more on the case study of Munich subchapter 5.2.3);
- Krieger, W., Ludwig, M., Schupp, P., and Will, A. (2006). *Lebenslage "illegal": Menschen ohne Aufenthaltsstatus in Frankfurt am Main*. Karlsruhe: von Loeper Literaturverlag.

for the potential integration of immigrant youth into the labor market.⁶⁹⁷ Indeed, pro-immigration researchers and activists consider undocumented children and immigrant youth the most vulnerable group among the *sans papiers*. Consequently, these groups should not be held responsible for their illegal status, mostly determined by parents' decisions to stay illegally in Germany.

Despite the new developments in legislation on the undocumented, the status of undocumented immigrant youth remains grave and is still not recognized in the legal framework for immigrant integration.⁶⁹⁸ Discrepancies between various interpretations of the federal law regarding the undocumented are still quite common at state and commune administrative levels. Different practices across Germany still generate an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty around questions of which integration measures for undocumented youth are still legal and which are criminal.

Generally, the legal status of immigrant youth is of great importance for ensuring their smooth integration into the labor market. Theoretically, acquisition of German citizenship should be the most desired status for all immigrants. Practically, naturalization is still not as significant among immigrants as German politicians and the host society could wish them to be.

4.5.6 Education

The field of education has been the most contentious and emotional issue regarding the integration of immigrant youth in the first decade of 21st century in Germany. At the end of 2001, with the release of the PISA results, Germany for the first time ranked toward the bottom in the international ranking of the competencies and skills in reading, math, and science in comparative international education surveys. Particularly worrying was the high correlation between students' migration backgrounds and students' performance and students' school careers.⁶⁹⁹ In the following years new comparative international data pointed

⁶⁹⁷ For a more comprehensive overview of research done on undocumented migration in Germany with reference to immigrant children and youth see:

- Butterwegge, C. (2010). *Armut von Kindern mit Migrationshintergrund: Ausmaß, Erscheinungsformen und Ursachen*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

- Database on Irregular Migration in Europe, Hamburg Institute of International Economics.

⁶⁹⁸ For a comprehensive update on the situation of the undocumented youth in light of new reforms see Anderson, P. (2011). Young and Undocumented – No future? On the Social and Educational Exclusion of 'Illegal' Young Migrants in Germany. In M. Ziótek-Skrzypczak and G. Gandeberger (Eds.), *Labor Market Integration of Immigrant Youth, Polish and German Perspectives*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Wema.

⁶⁹⁹ Pupils with a migration background with both parents born outside of Germany perform much worse in their reading skills than those with either one or both parents born in Germany. Moreover, the OECD survey demonstrated that students with a migration background are greatly underrepresented among students in grammar schools, which are gateways to higher education. See:

to even more shocking results. The PISA 2003 study showed that the educational opportunities for immigrants decreased the longer they had been in the country: the achievement gap between the “second generation” pupils (with at least one parent born outside the country) and non-immigrant pupils was much greater than it had been with the “first generation” (born outside of Germany). Since the “PISA Shock,” the education system in Germany has been continuously under close scrutiny, subject to debates about the need for reform. The early distribution of pupils into different school systems was recognized as a hindrance to integration and the full development of the intellectual potential of immigrant children.⁷⁰⁰ As a consequence of the unsettling results from international surveys, students with a migration background have begun to be recognized as the most vulnerable disadvantaged group and a primary challenge for integration policies.⁷⁰¹ Moreover, the issue of managing diversity and promoting multiculturalism in education has gained much attention from policy makers.⁷⁰² The results of the SVR’s *Integration Barometer* show that both the native as well as the immigrant population still have a largely negative perception of the performance of schools in ethnically diverse settings.⁷⁰³

In fact, the decentralization of the education system in Germany is not conducive to quick educational changes across all 16 federal states. Because of the German federal structure of governance, debates about the reform of the education system take place at both Länder and Federal levels. According to the Constitution (*Grundgesetz*), education is

- Educational Reporting Consortium. (2007). *Education in Germany. An Indicator-Based Report Including an Analysis of Education and Migration Summary of Important Results*. Bielefeld: Bertelsmann;

- Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Directorate for Education. (2006). *Where Immigrant Students Succeed - A Comparative Review of Performance and Engagement in PISA 2003*. Paris: OECD Publications.

⁷⁰⁰ Baumgratz-Gangl, G. (2008). Verbesserung der Bildungs- und Ausbildungsbeteiligung von Migrant(inn)en im Übergang Schule - Ausbildung – Beruf. In G. Hentges, V. Hinnenkamp, and A. Zwengel, *Migrations- und Integrationsforschung in der Diskussion: Biografie, Sprache und Bildung als zentrale Bezugspunkte* (pp. 287- 302). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

⁷⁰¹ I will use here the term children with a migration background to refer to immigrant youth. Of course, not all students from immigrant families should be considered disadvantaged but a migration background along with the social background and gender are considered the three main sources of inequalities, see Federal Ministry of Education and Research. (2010). *Berufsbildungsbericht 2010*. Bonn: Federal Ministry of Education and Research.

⁷⁰² There have been three significant milestones in the last 15 years in the official measures to foster the development of intercultural education and competencies among students in Germany. Firstly, the recommendation “Intercultural Education in Schools” by KMK from 1996 conceptualizes intercultural education as a concern for both minorities and mainstream society. Secondly, The Weimar Appeal from 2003, in reference to the integration of Muslims in Germany, recognizes religious and cultural diversity as enriching. Finally, the National Integration Plan from 2007, which includes one chapter on the importance of and plans for integration measures in the fields of “Education, Vocational Training, and Labor Market,” focuses on the development of intercultural competencies in cultural diversity among teachers and students. However, the NIP might be criticized for failing to openly recognize cultural heterogeneity as a priority of education in Germany (the value emphasized in the two previously mentioned official but non-binding declarations: KMK 1996 and Weimar Appeal) See Miera, F. (2008). *Country Report on Education: Germany*. EDUMIGROM Background Papers. Budapest: Central European University, Center for Policy Studies, pp. 11-12.

⁷⁰³ Although, paradoxically, the native as well as the immigrant population generally associate positive personal experiences with ethnic heterogeneity in schools, See Bade, K. J., et al., (2010), op. cit.

subject to the supervisor of the state Ministries of Education, Cultural Affairs and Science as well as the regional authorities (*Bezirksregierung/Oberschulamt*) and the lower-level school supervisory authorities (*Schulamt*). Usually the primary and the lower secondary school sectors and special need school sectors are under the supervision of the local governments, whereas all other types of schools – vocational education, training schools, and the tertiary education sector – are governed by the Ministry. Individual states cooperate with each other through the Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs of the States of the Länder in the Federal Republic of Germany (KMK), which determines core curricula, programs for teacher training and teacher recruitment and decides on national recommendations, agreements and joint reports.⁷⁰⁴ The Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) and the Federal Institute for Vocational Training (BiBB) are the main agencies influencing Vocational Education and Training.⁷⁰⁵

Full time education is compulsory in Germany for children from the ages of 5 or 6 until the ages of 15 or 16 (depending on the State). If a person attends a part-time education program, his/her schooling is obligatory until the age of 18 (including vocational training). Compulsory schooling is free of charge. Since the year 1964 compulsory education includes all children of immigrants with a residence permit.⁷⁰⁶ In most of the federal states compulsory education has also been extended to children of refugees with temporary residence permits and to undocumented immigrant children (in Bavaria since 2005).⁷⁰⁷ In three states (Hesse, Baden-Württemberg und Saarland as of May 2008) undocumented children still have only "the right to schooling" (*Schulbesuchsrecht*) upon the application of their parents, which does not guarantee schooling in cases of organizational or administrative hurdles. Moreover, because teachers from public schools are still obliged to report to immigration authorities once they have been informed about the presence of an undocumented student at school, school attendance of undocumented children is still risky for teachers, students and their parents. According to the latest estimates, in 2008 about 30,000 children of age for compulsory education were without regular status.⁷⁰⁸ It might only be assumed that for reasons of security many children of undocumented parents probably do not attend schools,

⁷⁰⁴ Joint education reporting was inaugurated in 2006. So far three national Education Reports have been published, which constitute a significant source of education statistics for my dissertation.

⁷⁰⁵ In April 2006, the Innovation Circle on Vocational Training was established by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research.

See Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). (2007). *Ten Guidelines for the Modernization and Structural Improvement of Vocational Education and Training*. Berlin: Federal Ministry of Education and Research.

⁷⁰⁶ For the historical background to the introduction of compulsory education for migrants see Hunger, U. (2002). *Vom der Betreuung zur Eigenverantwortung. Neuere Entwicklungstendenzen bei Migrantenvereinen in Deutschland. Münsteraner Diskussionspapiere zum Nonprofit-Sektor, 22.*

⁷⁰⁷ Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration. (2010). *Der Schulzugang von Kindern irregulärer Zuwanderer*. Berlin: Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration.

⁷⁰⁸ Ibid.

despite their right to an education. Only recently has the federal government agreed to take measures to counteract the absurdities and inconsistencies across states in the education of children of undocumented immigrants. The results of the preliminary plans to make education accessible to everybody until the age of 18 regardless of legal status have yet to be seen.⁷⁰⁹

Germany's three-tiered school system is one of the basic concerns among advocates for education reform (see graph 13). The system divides children quite early (usually at the age of 10 depending on the state) into different types of secondary schools based upon their school performance, teachers' recommendations or the decisions of the children's parents.⁷¹⁰ Generally, all children are in school together only for the first four years of schooling. The primary school may be preceded by kindergarten, which the federal government considers an important integration tool for immigrant children at a very early stage of educational and language development.⁷¹¹

After completing primary school pupils are streamed into Secondary Level 1 schools: Secondary General Schools (*Hauptschulen*), intermediate Schools (*Realschulen*) or Grammar Schools (*Gymnasien*). These three educational paths are also offered at comprehensive integrated schools (*Gesamtschulen*), which are considered an alternative structure to the divisive tripartite system.⁷¹² Special Needs Schools (*Sonderschulen*) are aimed at children who cannot attend classes in mainstream schools, either because of learning difficulties or a particular disability.

⁷⁰⁹ Plans for reform at the federal level started with Schäuble's Initiative in 2008. Then German Minister of the Interior, Wolfgang Schäuble, called for legalising school education for undocumented children and by the same token respecting the human right of each child to free access to education. The initiative was followed by a Bundestag discussion in 2009 and active campaigns of social organizations, which resulted in a draft bill by the SPD parliamentary group. See Deutscher Bundestag. (2009). Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Aufenthaltsgesetzes. Gesetzentwurf der Fraktion der SPD. *Bundestag Printed Paper 17/56*.


In March 2010 Maria Böhmer officially announced pending reforms. Such recommendations have been already made among others in the official report Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration. (2010), op. cit., p. 67. At the time of writing, however, the necessary changes have not been approved.

⁷¹⁰ Admission to one of the school types at secondary level depends on the regulations of a given State.

⁷¹¹ Federal Ministry of Education and Research. (2010). *Berufsbildungsbericht 2010*. Bonn: Federal Ministry of Education and Research.

⁷¹² In some German federal states the Secondary General School does not exist and pupils attend a comprehensive school which does not select students by aptitude. Comprehensive schools have also seen their fair share of controversies. There are those who praise the development of comprehensive schools in Germany as a measure against unfair early streaming according to ability. Opponents emphasize either that comprehensive schools actually replicate the same streaming system or that German comprehensive schools in fact ranked below other German schools (e.g. in PISA 2003). - Ehmke, T., Hohensee, F., Heidemeier, H., and Prenzel, M. (2004). Familiäre Lebensverhältnisse, Bildungsbeteiligung und Kompetenzerwerb. In M. Prenzel, et al. (Eds.), *PISA 2003. Der Bildungsstand der Jugendlichen in Deutschland - Ergebnisse des zweiten internationalen Vergleichs* (pp. 225-253). Münster: Waxmann.
- Leffers, J (2008, January 3). Gesamtschule folgenlos - Bildung wird vererbt. *Spiegel Online*.

Graph 13 Education System in Germany.



Source: Eurydice

Courses of education at lower secondary level are expected to prepare pupils for either vocational education or university entrance qualifications achieved at the upper secondary level. People without a formal higher education entrance qualification, but boasting an excellent vocational track record, have almost no chance to enroll in university courses.

Secondary General Schools provide basic general education, focusing on practical subjects, which prepare students for vocational education and training within a dual system.⁷¹³ This dual system of vocational education and training is comprised of two components: in-company training and part-time vocational schooling. The trainees work three or four days a week at the company and spend up to two days at the vocational school (*Berufsschule*). Those who do not succeed in finding an apprenticeship, usually land in the transition system. There are numerous programs with training courses running under the transition system, which is supposed to help young people find future training positions or a job.⁷¹⁴

Graduates from Secondary General Schools can also enroll in full-time vocational schools (*Berufshochschulen*), which prepare pupils for a specific occupation. They introduce

⁷¹³ The vocational training in the dual system is possible for 350 professions. The training companies and the proper provision of training are monitored by the relevant autonomous industrial bodies (Chambers of Commerce). Education in the dual system lasts from 2 to 3.5 years, depending on the particular occupation.

⁷¹⁴ The most established programs are as follows:

- Pre-vocational Training Year (*Berufsvorbereitungsjahr - BVJ*): The BVJ is a one-year course of training usually offered by schools as a full-time program and designed to prepare young people for the demands of vocational training. A clear majority of participants do not have a secondary general school certificate. However, this can be acquired during the course of the BVJ, thus improving the holder's prospects on the market for training places.

- Company-based Introductory Training (*Einstiegsqualifizierung - EQ*) consists of a prevocational work experience placement in a company lasting from 6 to 12 months. Young people have the opportunity to obtain partial qualifications while training for an occupation via qualification modules (*Qualifizierungsbausteine*) and specific vocational modules (*berufsfeldspezifische Module*). On the basis of a testimonial from the company, the successfully acquired entry-level qualification is certified by the Competent Body (e.g. Chambers of Industry and Commerce, Craft Chambers).

- Prevocational Training Measures are provided by the Federal Employment Agency (*Bundesagentur für Arbeit - BA*) (*berufsvorbereitende Bildungsmaßnahmen - BvB*) under Section 61 of the *Sozialgesetzbuch (SGB III)*. The target is young people and young adults who have not undergone initial vocational training, are not yet 25 and have completed their compulsory general education.

- Foundation Basic Vocational Training Year (*Berufgrundbildungsjahr - BGJ*) is basic vocational education which can be completed either in the form of a year at school full-time or in a cooperative form at a company and in a school. Successful completion of the BGJ can be credited as the first year of vocational training in the training occupations assigned to the relevant occupational field. In the BGJ, students receive basic education in a specific occupational field (e.g. metalworking techniques, electrical engineering, business and administration).

- Vocational Qualification Prospects (*Perspektive Berufsabschluss*) is a program of the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF), which was launched at the beginning of 2008 to improve vocational training opportunities for disadvantaged young people and to offer second-chance qualifications for young adults. The intention of the program is to optimize the regional transition management system to support young people requiring special support.

students to one or more occupations, provide them with partial vocational training in one or more training occupations, or guide them through to a vocational training qualification in one occupation. A Secondary General School Leaving Certificate is the only possible general education qualification after the 9th grade. As the lowest possible qualification, the General Secondary School is primarily chosen by disadvantaged children including immigrant students. Intermediate Schools (grades 5-10) offer pupils a more extensive general education, ending with *Mittlerer Abschluss*, and by the same token more opportunities to enroll in upper secondary level courses that lead to further vocational education or higher education entrance qualifications. Grammar School covers both lower and upper secondary level and ends with an *Abitur* as the exit exam, which qualifies the student for university. Gymnasium is considered an elite type of schooling, with a focus on academic achievements aimed at gaining entrance to higher education.⁷¹⁵ A direct transition from vocational education and training to higher education, the so-called third chance education (*Dritter Bildungsweg*), although theoretically feasible, is practically impossible.⁷¹⁶ Consequently, an immigrant youth's future on the German labor market is determined early by his/her choice of one of the tertiary system schools.

A migration background in Germany is usually associated with unequal opportunities and a lower level of education. Indeed, looking at the statistics on German education and the vocational training system, many inequalities between pupils with and without migration backgrounds can be observed. The scale of the problem is not small. In 2008 there were over 800,000 foreign pupils, which made up 8.9% of all pupils in Germany.⁷¹⁷ Students with a migration background accounted for 3.03 million students in all types of secondary education (of this group 2.2 million were born in Germany and had no personal migration experience).⁷¹⁸

The PISA studies from 2000 and 2003 studies as well as the most recent detailed German education statistics from 2008 demonstrate that immigrant youth are distributed unevenly among several types of schools and are greatly underrepresented among pupils who qualify to enter higher education (see graph 14).⁷¹⁹ (

⁷¹⁵ For the list of available schools in the tertiary education sector, see Graph 13.


⁷¹⁶ Since 1990, all *Länder* have introduced various measures for entry into higher education for applicants who possess full vocational qualifications but lack the higher education qualification. However, third chance education (*Dritter Bildungsweg*) only accounts for 1% of all university admissions and 2% of all admissions to universities of applied sciences. See Authoring Group Educational Reporting. (2008). *Education Report 2008. Summary of Important Results*. Bielefeld: Bertelsmann, p. 17.

⁷¹⁷ Destatis. (2009). Fachserie 11, Reihe 1 Schuljahr 2008/2009. Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt, p.7.

⁷¹⁸ Destatis. (2010). Sonderauswertung Mikrozensus 2008, Tabelle 3. Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt.

⁷¹⁹ Data on the distribution of pupils with migration background is still missing. The available statistics differentiate between Germans and foreigners, but they are supposed to be updated in 2011, see Bade, K. J., et al., (2010), op. cit., p. 137.

Graph 14 Foreign and German Students in 2008/2009



Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 11, Reihe 1, 2008/2009

In 2008 only every sixth immigrant pupil was in Gymnasium (13.4%) in comparison to more than every fourth German (28.7%). Immigrants were more often found in Secondary General School: 20% of all immigrant pupils in comparison to only 8.6% of all German ones.⁷²⁰

Another worrying tendency can be observed in Special Needs Schools. Foreign children tend to be overrepresented in this school type, with a 14.4% share of the entire school population. It is worth mentioning that the above trends are not the same for all immigrants, and there are many differences in education performance among different migrant groups based on country of origin.⁷²¹ However, not all statistical data on education differentiates between people of different migration backgrounds, and the overall performance of immigrant pupils turns out rather sobering with a drop-out rate of 14.2% (in comparison to 1.8% among Germans) in 2008. In the face of recent international UNESCO recommendations for equal education opportunities, such ratings have further increased public attention on the segregated German education system, which neglects immigrant kids and consequently the problems of their future integration into the labor market.⁷²²

⁷²⁰ Bad notes, teachers' recommendations and the decisions of immigrant parents, who are not always informed well enough about the German education system often lead immigrant pupils to choose Secondary General School rather than one of the alternatives. As the NIP reports, discriminatory practices against immigrant pupils have been reported among some teachers who do not grade equally and do not provide similar recommendations to pupils with or without a migration background, whose school performance is similar. See Bundesregierung. (2007), op. cit., p. 63.

⁷²¹ In fact, certain nationalities outperform German students, for more details see Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration, (2010), op. cit., p. 93.

⁷²² See United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. (UNESCO). (2009). Policy Guidelines on Inclusion in Education. Paris: UNESCO.

In vocational education and training (VET) the gap between people with and without a migration background is also significant.⁷²³ Youths with migration backgrounds are less successful in obtaining an apprenticeship training position, although every year there are more training positions available. Only 23% of youth with migration backgrounds do not experience any difficulties entering the German dual system of vocational education (in comparison to 35% of students without a migration background).⁷²⁴ According to the 2008 report of the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF), the VET enrolment rate of young foreigners in 2008 was significantly lower than that of young Germans (32.2% in comparison to 68.2%).⁷²⁵ No data is available to confirm whether or not the above statistics include immigrants without residence permits. Since access to VET is dependent on legal registration, getting any kind of vocational training legally is almost impossible for undocumented adolescents, except for those immigrant youth whose deportation has been suspended.⁷²⁶

In 2009, 14.0% of people with a migration background had no secondary graduation certificate and 42.8% were without any vocational qualifications (in comparison to people without a migration background: 1,8% and 19,2% respectively).⁷²⁷ Consequently, more and more immigrant children are at risk of end up in the questionable transition system. There is also a relatively low percentage of university graduates among people with a migration background living in Germany.⁷²⁸

On the other hand, despite tuition fees which have been recently introduced in some German federal states, the tertiary education sector in Germany remains quite attractive for

⁷²³ The number of apprenticeship positions corresponds to the demand in different regions. Many companies complain in certain regions, mostly in the eastern Germany that the vacant training positions cannot be filled. In western Germany, where most people with a migration background live, fewer vacant positions are available. Immigrant youth usually lose the competition against native Germans. In fact, not only are good graduation notes and certificates important, but good connections and network-building are also key to successful applications. For more on current challenges and the prognosis for vacant apprenticeship positions on the German labor Market see Federal Ministry of Education and Research. (2010). *Berufsbildungsbericht 2010*. Bonn: Federal Ministry of Education and Research, p. 21.

⁷²⁴ Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration. (2010), op. cit., p. 111.

⁷²⁵ The VET enrolment rate is derived by calculating the number of young people with a new training contract as a percentage of young people in the same age group in the resident population. See Federal Ministry of Education and Research. (2010). *Berufsbildungsbericht 2010*. Bonn: Federal Ministry of Education and Research, p. 29.

⁷²⁶ See Anderson P.(2011), op. cit. For the exceptions for young foreigners whose deportation has been suspended, see subchapter 4.5.7.

⁷²⁷ Destatis. (2010). *Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund. Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus 2009. Fachserie 1 Reihe 2.2 – 2009*, op. cit.

⁷²⁸ In 2008 the share of new entrants to the transition system among immigrant students accounted for 88% without and 67% with a Secondary General School certificate (in comparison to 75% and 48% of German students). The overall percentage of people with a migration background among students aged 20-30 is significantly lower than that for the population without a migration background (17% in comparison to 23%). See Federal Ministry of Education and Research. (2010). *Berufsbildungsbericht 2010*. Bonn: Federal Ministry of Education and Research.

foreign students.⁷²⁹ In 2008 there was an increase in the number of foreign students who began their studies in Germany. Over 58,000 first year foreign students were reported, 9% more than in the previous year.⁷³⁰

As a result of the unequal access to education in Germany, the federal government has taken up a couple of important measures in an attempt at counteracting the worrying trends, trying to follow the ambitious aims of the National Integration Plan of 2007.⁷³¹ A few federal integration measures directly target young immigrants, while other federal youth integration programs are aimed at all youth groups, regardless of their migration backgrounds.⁷³²

Fostering German language competencies at very early childhood stages has become one of the top priorities on the current federal integration agenda.⁷³³ According to various studies, the existing preparatory German language courses for children prior to starting schools are not very successful, as immigrant children still lag behind German children in language competencies.⁷³⁴ Therefore, the federal government is planning to provide support for early childhood language classes even in daycare centers. For older children of immigrants special transitory classes of intensive German language courses will prepare them to attend regular classes if bilingual education is not available.

Recently the German government has launched supportive actions for language diversity at schools. In a joint statement with other migration organizations, *Integration as a Chance – Together for More Equality*, KMK officially expressed support for the inclusion of the languages of origin of immigrant children in everyday school life and required all federal states to promote language diversity.⁷³⁵ Other federal commitments involve the recruitment of

⁷²⁹ Most take out of foreign students (about 80%) come from Europe and their percentage at German universities varies from 1% to 5% depending on the state. The tuition fees for universities also vary across the states from very low to more than € 600 Euro per semester. As a recent study shows, tuition fees have not influenced the number of new foreign students in Germany.

For more on tuition in higher education in Germany see Hetze, P. and Winde, M. (2010).

Auswirkungen von Studiengebühren. Essen: Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft.

⁷³⁰ Destatis. (2010). *Mikrozensus 2008, Hochschulstatistik*. Bonn: Statistisches Bundesamt.

⁷³¹ See the priorities of the national integration policy in the field of education in the National Integration Plan: Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales. (2008). *Nationaler Integrationsplan - Vertiefte Bilanzierung*. Bonn: Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales, p. 64.

⁷³² In the paper I only cite a couple of measures which are considered the most important for the scope of my research. It is worth mentioning that of the measures discussed/agreed upon during my field research in the years 2007 and 2008 only some have been implemented so far, but were already in planning or the subject of political debate at both national and state levels.

⁷³³ See Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration. (2010), op. cit.

⁷³⁴ The pre-school courses have been introduced in almost all federal states within the last couple of years but neither the language test, nor course curricula or the duration of course have so far been standardized across the country. The courses last from 6 to 18 months depending on the state. For more on the debate, see Bade, K. J., et al. (2010), op. cit., pp. 147-149; Spiewak, M. (2010, October 22). Zu kurz, zu spät, zu abstrakt. *Zeit Online*.

⁷³⁵ Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs. (2007). *Integration als Chance – gemeinsam für mehr Chancengerechtigkeit (Integration as a Chance – Together for More Equality)*.

migrants as kindergarten teachers and the extension of legal provisions for the employment of “consular teachers” for immigrant children’s native-language lessons at schools.⁷³⁶

Education authorities and researchers are still undecided on the extent to which education in an immigrant’s native language facilitates or delays German language acquisition by immigrant youth. Consequently, at the state level different practices and education policies exist either for or against bilingual education.⁷³⁷

Another set of federal commitments to education reform deals with improving access to VET for immigrant youth and smoothing their transition to the labor market.⁷³⁸ More programs are being introduced at the federal level to support all young people, and particularly youth with migrant backgrounds who are “suspended” between school and vocational training in the transition system. However, these measures have also begun to receive criticism for the lack of proper monitoring mechanisms and for not really being effective. According to some critical reports the transition system measures leave youth in limbo. As the statistics suggest, the training opportunities in the transition programs lead to the improvement of individual skills, but not necessarily to actually signing a VET contract or achieving the final VET qualifications. Moreover, 20% to 30% of those who have participated in the transition system programs failed to find an apprenticeship over a period of three years. This is usually a problem of newly arrived young immigrants who still lack an understanding of the German education system. Consequently, the existing transition system

Bilingual education in Germany, like in five other EU countries (Belgium, France, Spain, Luxembourg, and Slovenia), is also supported by bilateral agreements between Germany and some of the immigrants’ countries of origin (Croatia, Greece, Italy, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey), which were concluded at the state level.

Under these agreements, both countries have input in the decision-making process regarding the teaching of the languages of origin.

See Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA P9 Eurydice). (2009). *Integrating Immigrant Children into Schools in Europe: Measures to Foster Communication with Immigrant Families and Heritage Language Teaching for Immigrant Children*. Brussels: Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency.

⁷³⁶ Consular teachers have been employed by the former recruitment countries. Supervised by the responsible consular representative in Germany, they give language lessons at German schools.

⁷³⁷ For example, Bavaria has its own bilingual education system for immigrant pupils who are not able to attend regular classes. They are taught in bilingual classes until their knowledge of the German language has reached an appropriate level. In North Rhine Westphalia, on the other hand, bilingual education at the primary level has been extended to all types of school at the secondary level as a useful tool for the general development of intercultural competences among all students rather than merely a rudimentary measure for immigrants. At the same time accumulation of pupils of the same migration background in the same classes is strongly discouraged, so that immigrant children are exposed to languages other than their native ones. In contrast, CDU politicians from Rheinwald want to stop bilingual classes and substitute them with obligatory German preparatory classes. See *Verpflichtende Sprachtests statt Muttersprachlicher Unterricht* (2010, September 14). *MIGAZIN*. For more on the German and European debate on bilingualism see:

- Bade, K. J., et al., (2010), op. cit., pp. 147-148;

- Heckmann, F. (2008). *Education and Migration, Strategies for Integrating Migrant Children in European Schools and Societies*. Brussels: Nesse, pp. 68-69.

⁷³⁸ Innovation Circle on Vocational Education and Training at BMBF. (2007). *Ten Guidelines for the Modernization and Structural Improvement of Vocational Education and Training*. Berlin: Federal Ministry of Education and Research.

might more accurately be described as “a system on hold,” which leaves youth in limbo rather than guarantees them a smooth transition to future gainful employment.⁷³⁹ Therefore, the training courses may develop so-called “subsidized careers,” which lead to dependence on the transition system rather than independent future work.⁷⁴⁰ As the representatives of employers point out, those who remain “on hold” in the transition system are often stigmatized already for taking part in remedial courses. The trade unions also fear that the regular VET will be replaced by funded training schemes, with more and more young people enrolling in such schemes instead of signing a contract for VET and training for an occupation. As the Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training (BIBB) argues, the system should be further streamlined by coordinating measures between the federal government, the state, and the business sector.⁷⁴¹

Although federal measures have not counteracted the failure of the transition system programs, they try to set standards and foster cross-sector cooperation among the VET initiatives. Since 2004, Federal Government and Trade Associations have been working together in the National Pact for Career Training and Skilled Manpower Development (*Nationaler Pakt für Ausbildung und Fachkräftenachwuchs in Deutschland*) to increase the number of new training positions and to recruit new training companies. In a new plan for the years 2010-2014 the Pact partners have committed themselves to increasing the percentage of youth with a migration background in vocational training and to intensify and structure supporting actions for youth with a migration background nationwide.⁷⁴² Campaigns focusing on the dual education system for both immigrant and ethnic economies, which are regarded as potential key providers of traineeships for immigrants in the future, are an example of such supportive actions. The Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration has recently joined the Pact, taking up some promising responsibilities as a Pact partner. According to the Pact’s new plan, the Ministry will continue to regularly organize VET conferences for Pact partners, migration organizations, schools and state Ministries of Integration, as well as additional annual parents’ conferences with parents’

⁷³⁹ As an SVR report points out the transitional system serves as a metaphorical “parking lot” for students („Mehr Parkplatz als Übergang“) see Bade, K. J., et al., (2010), op. cit., pp. 161-162.

⁷⁴⁰ Opinion on the Draft Report on Vocational Education and Training for the Year 2009 submitted by the group of employees’ representatives on the Board. In Federal Ministry of Education and Research. (2010). *Report on Vocational Education and Training for the Year 2009*. Berlin: Federal Ministry of Education and Research, pp. 56-63.

⁷⁴¹ Opinion on the Draft Report on Vocational Education and Training for the Year 2009 submitted by the BIBB Board, In Federal Ministry of Education and Research (2009), op. cit., pp. 50-52.

⁷⁴² Pact partners include: Federal Employment Agency, Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF), German Association of the Self-employed (BFB), German Chamber of Industry and Commerce (DIHK) e.V, Federation of German Industries (BDI), German Confederation of Skilled Crafts (ZDH), Federal Association of German Employers (BDA), and two new partners as of 2010: The Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration and KMK. Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology. (2010). *Nationaler Pakt für Ausbildung und Fachkräftenachwuchs in Deutschland 2010 – 2014*. Berlin: Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology.

associations. Moreover, the new Pact will continue work in currently existing projects, like the Jobstarter program, which offers funding for additional traineeships, opportunities for second-chance training and the retaking of vocational qualifications (e.g. in the Jobstarter Connect subprogram) and supports companies in providing vocational training (e.g. within KAUSA subprogram for ethnic entrepreneurs).⁷⁴³

The new developments in the federal VET strategy are promising steps towards improving the situation of immigrant youth in the transition period from school to work. Looking at the demographic changes in German society, the federal measures are not surprising. It is definitely in the interest of the German economy and training system to focus on the numerous groups of immigrant youth who will determine future labor market conditions in the country.⁷⁴⁴

It remains to be seen whether or to what extent the above-mentioned federal initiatives will help youth with a migration background to enhance their qualifications. Qualifications are key preconditions for successful integration into the certificate oriented labor market in Germany. In fact, migrants with foreign certificates still face many challenges in getting their qualifications recognized. According to the SVR Report, more than half a million people who have migrated to Germany with foreign certificates are either overqualified for the job positions they hold, have taken up career re-training to get adjusted to the German labor market or have remained jobless. Recognition procedures for the younger generation of immigrants do not give cause for optimism, either. In 2008 63.9% of young foreigners aged 15-35 who had migrated to Germany received their school graduation and vocational training certificates abroad. Of them only 15.3% had their qualifications recognized as equivalent to German ones. In contrast, claims for the recognition of the qualifications of 36.6% people in the same age group were either rejected, still being processed or for some reason the claims had not yet been filed.⁷⁴⁵

This low rate of success in gaining recognition of qualifications obtained abroad results from the lack of a transparent and standardized system of evaluation of foreign certificates across German states. The Central Office for Foreign Education in the Secretariat of KMK is the only national body responsible for information and advice on recognition

⁷⁴³ At the time of writing the Pact has just been prolonged for the second time and the new plan signed for the next four years (on 26 October 2010). The new information campaign "Migrants and Vocation," which aims to win more immigrants and ethnic economies for the dual training system, is supposed to build on Jobstarter. For more information see the website: <http://www.jobstarter.de/>

⁷⁴⁴ This interest was publicly expressed by the Federal Government. Entering the National Pact when Maria Böhmer publicly emphasized that support for immigrant youth in vocational training was a top priority not only for federal integration measures but also for the future success of the German business sector. See Bundesregierung. (2010, October 26). Integrationsbeauftragte neues Vollmitglied des Ausbildungspaktes. *Press Release 395*.
For more on German demographics see subchapter 4.5.2.

⁷⁴⁵ 30% of this group considered the recognition of qualification "not important" while 29% did not provide any information. Based on my own calculations of the results of Microcensus 2008 from Destatis. (2010). *Mikrozensus 2008, Hochschulstatistik*. Bonn: Statistisches Bundesamt.

procedures for all federal states. However, the office does not have any rights to recognize foreign qualifications but merely to assess them. Decision-making is left to the federal states and various local authorities. Local schools decide on the equivalence of the education path of immigrant students with the German education system, whereas universities are responsible for the recognition of foreign graduation certificates, which entitle to study at their institutions.⁷⁴⁶ The competent authorities, responsible for recognition of foreign certificates which entitle the bearers to further vocational education or work in certain professions, are dispersed into hundreds of units across the federal states (e.g. ministries, universities, courts, etc.). However, not all immigrants can make a legal claim for individual recognition of their professional qualifications. A formal recognition procedure depends on the profession or type of education certificate, the location of the future employer in Germany and, finally, on the country in which the qualifications have been obtained. Only qualifications in approximately 60 regulated professions undergo formal recognition procedures in the competent authorities in the state where the employment will be taken.⁷⁴⁷ Recognition of other professions are left to the discretion of employers. Following implementation of the EU Directive (2005/36/EC) in 2007, EU residents in Germany have the right to recognition of their qualifications in professions obtained in other EU member states but regulated in Germany, provided that the level of their qualifications match the German standard. As in the case of Poland, the rules also apply to those non-EU citizens whose qualifications have already been recognized in another EU member state, if they have practiced their occupation at least three years in that country.⁷⁴⁸

Simplification of the complicated process of recognition of foreign qualifications in Germany has recently become one of the top priorities of federal integration policies. The BAMF criticized that the existing “recognition jungle” results not only from the lack of transparency in the recognition process, but also from the lack of networking and of comparable information services.⁷⁴⁹ The Federal Government has taken already some measures toward improving the system, although no concrete changes have been implemented thus far. The information and counseling Network IQ (*Integration durch*

⁷⁴⁶ e.g. certificates equivalent with secondary level certificates in Germany or Bachelor certificates. Germany has signed bilateral agreements on the equivalence of education with many countries. For an overview of all agreements see Database Anabin (*Anerkennung und Bewertung ausländischer Bildungsnachweis*): Home page: <http://www.anabin.de/>

⁷⁴⁷ Access to or practice of regulated professions is conditional upon the possession of certain fixed professional qualifications, regulated by law or administrative provision (e.g. doctors or lawyers). Paradoxically, decisions about the recognition of the same qualifications in regulated professions may differ from state to state.

⁷⁴⁸ For more information on mutual recognition within the EU see subchapter 4.4.3.

⁷⁴⁹ For more on the recent discussion of the main federal stakeholders and of the shortcomings of the recognition system in Germany see

- Bundesministeriums für Arbeit und Soziales. (2009). *Brain-Waste - Anerkennung gestalten, Dokumentation: Fachtagung*. Berlin: Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales.

- Englmann, B. and Müller, M. (2007). *Brain Waste. Die Anerkennung von ausländischen Qualifikationen in Deutschland*. Augsburg: Tür an Tür Integrationsprojekte.

Qualifizierung)⁷⁵⁰ and the Qualification Initiative for Germany⁷⁵¹ are examples of some promising nationwide federal actions, which have contributed to the federal proposal for future reforms. In December 2009 the federal cabinet approved a draft paper by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research that introduces a simple procedure to assess and recognize the qualifications of immigrants to Germany. Since the new law is planned to come into force in 2011, the Ministry of Integration has already begun calling for administrative and legal adjustments at the state level.⁷⁵²

4.5.7 Labor Market

The implementation of current and future reforms in education, vocational training and the recognition of foreign qualifications should increase the size of the workforce with qualifications in Germany. Making good use of the potential of skilled immigrant workers and academics currently residing in or coming to Germany are among the priorities of the new federal advisory body "Alliance for Labor." Established in 2009, the body is tasked with monitoring and analyzing labor market changes and issuing recommendations on steering labor migration, while recognizing at the same time challenges of immigrant youth.⁷⁵³

In general, the access to the German labor market is easier for certain immigrant youth groups. EU-EEA intra migrants or immigrants with an unlimited settlement permit in Germany are not required to have a work permit to take up gainful employment or start their own businesses. Exceptions still exist for citizens from the new EU member states. Due to the EU transitional rules relating to the freedom of movement for workers, nationals from the

⁷⁵⁰ The IQ Network was initiated by the German Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (BMAS) to coordinate measures for integration of migrants into the labor market. The network consists of six focal centers acting nationwide which are organized into thematic study groups. One working area, Recognition of Foreign Qualifications, has been assigned to Bavarian MigraNet (with one of its sister offices in Munich, see more in subchapter 5.2.3). For more information see the home page <http://www.intqua.de/>

⁷⁵¹ The Federal Government along with the federal states initiated the Qualification Initiative during the Qualification Summit in Dresden on October 22, 2009, which aims to enhance the educational success of people regardless of their social or migration background in accordance with the National Integration Plan. The improvement of the recognition system is one of the objectives of the initiative. See Conference of Heads of Government of the Länder. (2008). *Getting Ahead through Education. The Qualification Initiative for Germany*. Education Summit Dresden, 22 October.

⁷⁵² Among other postulates, all immigrants should have a legal claim on an individual recognition procedure for qualifications in both regulated and non-regulated professions obtained abroad. If the qualifications are not equivalent to German requirements, a partial recognition should be granted. In this case the Federal Government should support offers of supplementary specialized education. See Bundesregierung. (2009, December 9). Eckpunkte zur Verbesserung der Feststellung und Anerkennung von im Ausland erworbenen beruflichen Qualifikationen und Berufsabschlüssen. For calls for action at the level of the federal state see Bundesregierung. (2010, October 19). Staatsministerin Böhmer: "Bundesländer müssen schnellstmöglichst eigene gesetzliche Regelungen zur Anerkennung ausländischer Abschlüsse auf den Weg bringen." *Press Release 389*.

⁷⁵³ The Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration is one of the Alliance's consultants. Other members include representatives of the responsible federal ministries and high-ranking representatives of the federal states, trade unions, employers' associations, craft associations, chambers of commerce, business and academia.

ten new EU member states are still required to apply for admission to the German labor market, unless exceptional rules apply.⁷⁵⁴ Despite the transitional rules, the new EU nationals enjoy already a “community preference” over nationals of third countries while applying for a work permit. They are also allowed to become self-employed and to run their own businesses in Germany.⁷⁵⁵

In order to work legally in Germany, all immigrants who do not belong to one of the groups mentioned above have to apply for a residence title (either a visa or residence permit) with a work permit in their respective foreigners’ office or consulates. Both asylum seekers, people with a permission to remain or a temporary suspension of deportation are eligible for a work permit only after one year of residence in Germany.

Third country nationals with no temporary residence permit in Germany face numerous restrictions in gaining access to the German labor market. The recruitment ban on foreign labor, in force since 1973, generally suspends the issuance of work permits to non- and low-skilled foreign workers, although certain exemptions are common, e.g. for certain professional groups based on statutory ordinance, in accordance with labor market needs and bilateral agreements.⁷⁵⁶ In most cases applicants for a work permit still need the approval of the Federal Employment Agency before the Aliens Office or consulate can issue a residence title with a work permit.⁷⁵⁷ The complicated approval procedure also involves the applicants’ future employers, who have to agree with the Employment Agency on the recruitment procedure for a given post offered to a foreigner in order to conduct job market investigation, known as a “priority examination.” This priority examination seeks to find other possible candidates who have priority over third country nationals for employment in

⁷⁵⁴ These restriction on the free access to the German labor market remain in force until 30 April 2011 for countries which joined the EU on 1 May 2004 (EU-8: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Hungary), and until 31 December 2012 for the countries which joined the EU on 1 January 2007 (EU-2: Bulgaria, Romania).

⁷⁵⁵ Section 39 subsection 6 of the Residence Act.

According to a recent analysis more lower skilled EU migrant are attracted to Germany than highly skilled workers. For an analysis of the results of German labor market policies towards the EU accessions countries see Brenke, K., Karl, Y., Yuksel, M., and Zimmermann, K. F. (2009). The Effects of EU Enlargement and the Temporary Measures on the German Labor Market. In M. Kahanec and K. F. Zimmermann (Eds.), *EU Labor Markets after Post-Enlargement Migration* (pp. 111-129). Berlin: Springer.

⁷⁵⁶ It is beyond the scope of the paper to discuss all regulations on the employment of migrant workers in Germany. I focus primarily on currently residing foreigners and those provisions which obviously directly affect the status of immigrant youth temporarily residing in Germany during their transition from school to work.

For detailed information on all rules impacting the employment of migrant workers, see Bundesagentur für Arbeit. (2009). *Beschäftigung ausländischer Arbeitnehmer in Deutschland*. Merkblatt 7. Nürnberg: Bundesagentur für Arbeit.

⁷⁵⁷ New regulations have replaced the dual approval procedure from the Foreigners Act of 1990. The Residence Act consolidated the two permits, the residence permit and the work permit, into a single permit, providing for one stop government, as it were. Before 2005 with the dual approval procedure, immigrant workers had to separately apply for residence (residence authorization) and for access to the labor market (work permit). See Parusel, B. and Schneider, J. (2010). *Satisfying Labor Demand through Migration in Germany. Research Study in the Framework of the European Migration Network (EMN)*. Nuremberg: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees.

Germany. Such a procedure is quite time consuming and requires much involvement on the part of the employer of a potential immigrant worker.⁷⁵⁸

With the Immigration Act 2004 and the new ordinances of 2009, certain immigrants with a residence permit can enjoy exemptions from priority examinations or even the involvement of the Federal Employment Agency. Immigrant youth residing in Germany can benefit from such exemptions, provided that they have come to Germany prior to turning 18 and possess a valid residence permit. In such cases no approval from the Employment Agency for getting a work permit for an apprenticeship is necessary. In addition, no approval is required for obtaining a work permit for gainful employment if immigrants have graduated from German general secondary education schools or have taken part in vocational education.⁷⁵⁹

Skilled immigrants and their family members benefit from a privileged situation when looking for opportunities for a legal work.⁷⁶⁰ Immigrant graduates from German university or other institutions of higher education, as well as immigrants who have completed a recognized vocational training in Germany, are allowed to take up employment without a priority examination. Moreover, immigrant youth with higher qualifications earned in Germany have the right to stay in the country after graduation for one year to look for employment without a priority examination.⁷⁶¹ In addition, qualified immigrant youth whose deportation has been temporarily suspended may be granted a residence permit for the purpose of employment without a priority examination, if they are well integrated and possess occupational qualifications.⁷⁶² If they want to commence a work training program, they can also apply for a work permit without a priority examination.⁷⁶³

⁷⁵⁸ In the labor market review, the Federal Employment Agency has to decide whether the applicant's employment would have "negative consequences on the labor market" (section 39 of the Residence Act). In the priority test it must be ascertained whether any job applicants with labor market priority are available for the job.

⁷⁵⁹ Section 3a of Ordinance on Official Procedures Enabling Resident Foreigners to Take Up Employment (2004, November 22). BGBl. I S. 2934.

⁷⁶⁰ The Immigration Act 2004 does not fully uphold the ban on recruitment of third country nationals from 1973 in Germany. The Act greatly eases access to the labor market for high skilled immigrant workers, granting them a permanent residence permit. Moreover, third country nationals may be granted a residence permit to start their own business if the activity is likely to have a positive impact on the economy of the region.

Two further ordinances extend provisions for immigrants: the Employment Ordinance and the Ordinance on official Procedures. These ordinances enable resident foreigners to take up employment in the Labor Migration Control Act, which entered into force on January 1, 2009. Among other things, the Act makes it easier for university graduates from new EU member states and third countries and for graduates of German schools abroad to emigrate to Germany, improves labor market access for family members of highly-qualified immigrants and grants well-qualified persons temporary suspension of deportation.

⁷⁶¹ Third country nationals' residence permits that were issued for study purposes can be extended for up to one year to enable them to seek employment in the occupations which match their qualifications. See Parusel, B. and Schneider, J., op. cit.

⁷⁶² Section 18a of the Residence Act.

⁷⁶³ Section 10 of the Ordinance on Official Procedures Enabling Resident Foreigners to Take Up Employment. As of January 1, 2009 young foreigners whose deportation has been suspended and

The new regulations in 2009 also made it easier for third country nationals to become self-employed. Now immigrant entrepreneurs need to invest €250,000 (only one fourth of the previously required sum) and create five jobs to prove that their activity is likely to have a positive impact on the economy.⁷⁶⁴

The slow liberalization of German labor market with regard to foreigners has resulted in slightly greater ethnic diversification. In recent years there has been a steady growth in self-employed foreigners on the German labor market. In 2009 their number reached 360,000, 11,000 more than in the previous year. The younger generation of immigrants in particular have contributed to the recent growth.⁷⁶⁵ In 2009 the proportion of the young population with a migration background constituted more than one sixth of the entire population of the gainfully employed over 15 years old (of the 41% without German citizenship: 17% EU nationals and 23% third country nationals).⁷⁶⁶

Despite recent reforms, the legal framework for admission of immigrants into the labor market in Germany still does not guarantee equal chances for getting a job for immigrant youth irrespective of national group. Third country nationals are almost twice as likely to be unemployed as those from the EU member states (18% in comparison to 9.5% of employable people over 15 in 2009).⁷⁶⁷ Many discrepancies in the labor force still exist between people with and without a migration background.⁷⁶⁸ According to Microcensus 2009 data, people with a migration background can more often be found in the lower skilled occupations, while they very rarely take up positions as civil servants or clerks. In fact, the overall proportion of people with a migration background who remain without work is much

who have resided in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany more than one year can be issued a work permit for vocational training in one of the accredited professions without a labor market test (according to section 11 of the Ordinance on Official Procedures Enabling Resident Foreigners to Take Up Employment). They can also receive easier access to education (according to section 10 of the Ordinance on the Admission of Newly-Arrived Foreigners for the Purpose of Taking up Employment)

⁷⁶⁴ Parusel, B., and Schneider, J., op. cit.

⁷⁶⁵ In 2009 there were 78,000 self-employed foreigners aged 25-35, 6,000 more than in the previous year. See Destatis. (2010). *Ausländische Bevölkerung, Ergebnisse des Ausländerzentralregisters. Fachserie 1 Reihe 2 – 2009*. Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt.

Self-employment has become an attractive option especially for those EU nationals who still do not enjoy the full freedom of movement of workers within the EU.

For more on the structure of foreign entrepreneurship see the study:

Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration. (2010). *Wirtschaftliche Selbstständigkeit als Integrationsstrategie*. Berlin: Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration.

⁷⁶⁶ Although in general the percentage of people with a migration background employed in Germany has risen since 2005, the percentage of foreigners among them decreased by 10%: 51% in 2008 in comparison to 41% in 2009. See Federal Government Commission for Migration, Refugees and Integration. (2010), op. cit., p. 158.


⁷⁶⁷ These are my own calculations based on Microcensus Data 2009. Destatis. (2010). *Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund. Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus 2009. Fachserie 1 Reihe 2.2 – 2009*. Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt.

⁷⁶⁸ The overall success of immigrants with German qualifications depends on the immigrants' country of origin. As recent studies show, there are many disparities among national groups, e.g. between Turkish people and citizens from the EU countries. See Bade, K. J., (2010), op. cit., pp. 167- 168.

greater than those without a migration background at all levels of qualification (see graph 15).⁷⁶⁹

Similarly worrisome trends can be observed among the younger population. OECD international comparative data on the unemployment rate of young people in 2007 put Germany at one of the lowest rankings in labor market participation of children of immigrants in the national labor market⁷⁷⁰ (see graph 6). The same OECD study also shows that labor market segmentation exists already at very early stages of immigrants' careers. Children of immigrants take up more job positions in the lower skilled sector and remain underrepresented among clerks and professionals (see graph 16).

Graph 15 The Proportion of Unemployed in 2008 in the age group 25-65 in Germany by levels of qualification (in %)



Source: Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder, Mikrozensus 2008


⁷⁶⁹ In 2008 8% of all qualified workforce with migration background in the age group 25-65 with university certificates remained jobless, in comparison to only 2% without migration background in the same category.

See Federal Ministry of Education and Research. (2010). *Berufsbildungsbericht 2010*. Bonn: Federal Ministry of Education and Research, p. 198 and Graph 15.

⁷⁷⁰ Every fifth young immigrant and almost every fourth native born child of immigrants aged 20-29 who is not in education anymore was unemployed (in comparison to only 15% children of natives). See OECD international studies, on the participation of native and immigrant children into national labor markets:

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2010), op. cit., pp. 32-33.

Graph 16 Employment of Children of Natives and Children of Immigrants aged 20-29 and not in Education, Divided by Occupation, 2007



Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2010). *Equal Opportunities? The Labor Market Integration of the Children of Immigrants*. Paris: OECD Printing

The huge gap between unemployment rates for immigrant and native workers has existed for decades and is not a result of the recent economic crisis. In fact, the crisis has largely affected big companies rather than individual workers. Between 2008 and 2009 unemployment rates for Germans increased by only 0.4 percentage point (from 7.1% in 2008 to 7.5% in 2009), whereas the figure for immigrants is 0.8 points (from 15.7% in 2008 to 16.5% in 2009). It is believed that the government's stimulus package program, which was introduced in February 2009, secured many jobs in large companies across the country.⁷⁷¹ Nevertheless, the highest increases in jobless rates usually affected the medium and high-skilled sector, where migrant workers are generally underrepresented. In contrast to the majority of the EU countries, the recovery of the German economy from the recession began earlier and has gone faster. Consequently, the government has not taken up any specific crises-driven measures to protect native workers against immigrant residents.⁷⁷²

One of the core reasons for the long-lasting marginalization of immigrants in the workforce might be discrimination against immigrants on the part of German employers, which however has not been statistically demonstrated. The recent integration survey (SVR's

⁷⁷¹ Industries and firms in recession were able to take part in the government's "short-time work scheme." In the program the working hours and salaries of full-time employees had to be cut. The government, in turn, took over the social security payments of those with reduced salaries.

⁷⁷² The extension of transitional status for the 10 new EU member states was the only restriction which the government introduced towards potential labor workers newcomers.

Integration Barometer) among people with and without a migration background points at a surprisingly high share of people with a migration background (almost 70%) who claimed they had not experienced any discrimination while working or looking for work. On the other hand, the study suggests that immigrants (mostly people from Turkey and Latin America, Asia and Africa) more often feel discriminated against during their job search in comparison to natives. It remains to be seen whether the new federal projects and campaigns, such as XENOS or *Vielfalt als Chance* (Diversity as an Opportunity), which seek to promote intercultural openness and to fight against discrimination in the workplace, will improve the situation on the local labor market.⁷⁷³

Generally, Germany which is well-known in Europe for its generous social welfare system, offers many supporting programs for those who are unemployed. It is beyond the scope of this paper to elaborate on all of the numerous labor market integration measures which are supported by various offices of the Federal government. These measures indirectly target immigrants who legally reside in Germany.⁷⁷⁴ Some important integration measures for youth, which directly seek to aid people with a migration background (such as Youth Migration Services or BAMF Youth Integration Courses) have already been mentioned in the section on education.

Two other federal initiatives, both of them supported within the European Union European Social Fund and open for all local organizations nationwide, support immigrants on the German labor market. The first of the federal projects is a recently launched BAMF's program German for Professional Purposes of the Federal Ministry for Migration, which combines business-related German lessons, specialist teaching, internships and work placements and company visits. The program targets people who have a migration background and are available for work, i.e. who have registered with the Employment Office. Immigrant youth are also able to benefit from the program if they have completed compulsory education.⁷⁷⁵

The other one, The Federal ESF Program on Labor-market Support for Migrants with a Refugee Background and Refugees with Access to the Labor Market is run by the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (BMAS). The program finances networks which focus on

⁷⁷³ For a comprehensive summary of the federal measures against discrimination taken within the National Integration Plan, see Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales, (2008), op. cit.

⁷⁷⁴ For an overview see the catalog of best federal practices see Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training, GPC - Good Practice Center run by the Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training see GPC home page: <http://www.good-practice.de>

⁷⁷⁵ The courses, which started in 2009 are supported by the European Social Fund (ESF) and organized by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF). Those entitled to participate are recipients of the unemployment benefit under Book Three of the Social Code, of unemployment benefit II under Book Two of the Social Code, as well as persons registered as job-seekers. In addition, employees can apply for the participation if teaching vocation-related German-language skills is necessary in order to retain their employability. For more information see Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. (n.d). Assistance for Migrants.

advising and training and job placement for immigrants, who possess a “residence permit on trial” or immigrants who have the status of temporary suspended deportation or with (at least) secondary access to the labor market. The projects in the established networks have thus far helped many young refugees to start schooling or obtain a training contract.⁷⁷⁶

A labor shortage in the ageing German population, negative net migration, and inequalities in education and labor market outcomes between natives and immigrant constitute the principal challenges for the governments’ plans to improve management of immigrant integration into the labor market.⁷⁷⁷ According to the recent projections, and in contrast to popular opinion, not only the high skilled sector is in need of a foreign labor force. In fact a large number of vacancies are still registered among jobs for unskilled workers, something which is often overlooked in reports on the future need for a qualified labor force and plans for new recruitment strategies.⁷⁷⁸

In conclusion, some improvements can be noted in the federal measures for immigrant integration since 2006, when the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) assessed labor market integration in Germany as in the middle on the scale of best practices in Europe.⁷⁷⁹ With its integration policies and federal programs in the areas of education and the labor market, the federal government has finally started to focus on the potentials of immigrants living in the country and to try to more effectively match the needs of young immigrant job seekers with current job vacancies. It remains to be seen what outcomes of the recent reforms will be and how local organizations and policies will profit from these new

⁷⁷⁶Labor market integration of people with a temporary suspension of deportation stay had been neglected or even rejected by policy-makers for a long time and only gained acceptance recently. The first integration measures which give tolerated persons with many years of residence the prospect for obtaining a right to stay were implemented in 2006. The Federal ESF Program, which has been running since 2008 and has been recently extended until the year 2014, is a significant step by the Federal Government towards finally recognizing the potentials of this long-neglected immigrant group. Thanks to the program young immigrants now have prospects for residence and increasing their chances of finding long-term employment.

Fiebiger, K., et al. (Eds.). (2009). *Interim Report: Milestones and Stumbling Block*. Munich: National Thematic Network on Asylum Seekers.

For more on the legal situation of immigrant youth with a residence permit on trial or immigrants who have temporary suspended deportation status see subchapter 4.5.5.

⁷⁷⁷ Interview with Ursula Von der Leyen:

El-Sharif, Y., Nelles, R., and Wittrock, P. (2010, October 20). Von der Leyen startet das Feilschen um Hartz IV. *Spiegel Online*.

⁷⁷⁸ The national number of high skilled vacancies in the first quarter of 2010 showed the largest shortages in corporate management consulting and controlling, auditors and IT specialists, office jobs and clerks, and engineers. See Parusel, B. and Schneider, J., op. cit.

⁷⁷⁹ The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), a project developed by the EU think tank Migration Policy Group evaluated and compared what governments were doing to promote the integration of migrants in all EU member states and several non-EU countries. It used over 100 policy indicators to present immigrants’ opportunities to integrate into the European societies. According to MIPEX report Germany’s labor market integration measures would achieve best practice if migrants had equal access as EU nationals to vocational training and study grants; and if the state helped them get their skills and foreign qualifications recognized fairly, quickly and cheaply. See Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). Home page: <http://www.integrationindex.eu/>

developments. The case study analysis of Munich will show whether a rapidly developing and quite promising federal integration strategy for integrating immigrant youth into the labor market can practically contribute to local integration management in German cities.

4.6 Poland

Poland is a very interesting case study in migration research: a country with one of the lowest immigration rates in the EU, little governmental interest in national immigration issues and with a surprisingly wide scope of research on migration trends done by either long established or newly emerging migration research centers and bottom-up projects.⁷⁸⁰

The net migration of a given country is usually a deciding factor for its classification as an emigration, transit or immigration country. Poland has long been considered an emigration country with a large number of Polish emigrants both in Europe and in other parts of the world. Polish emigration was and still is a focus of global attention with current speculation and projections on Polish return migration during the world economic crisis. However, a slow change in the discourse in migration research on Poland has taken place since its EU accession in 2004, when Poland began to be perceived as a potential gateway to the Western World and thus a transit country.

Poland is now considered a country in a period of transition from emigration to immigration, a country in an “embryonic stage,” in which emigration is declining and “nucleuses of immigrant settlements are being set up.”⁷⁸¹ Current research on Polish immigration and integration policies therefore emphasizes the onset of social change which may bring about changes in migration patterns and concrete action at the national and local levels of integration policymaking. The fact that Poland is in the early stages of development its integration policy makes it a platform for negotiations among researchers, historians and political and civil society actors, regarding the future of Polish integration and migration flows. On the other hand, debates continue to focus on sheer numbers and statistics of migration inflows and outflows in order to determine whether Poland is still an emigration country or if it has already become a transitional or future immigration country.

Taking a step back from the significance of the numbers and the rhetoric of migration cycle theories,⁷⁸² I would simply call the Polish case a “laboratory for integration management.” In this laboratory integration practice is still developing on a small scale. The national government offers little support for new studies, but there is much optimism and determination among laboratory workers that their experiments will prove useful and broadly

⁷⁸⁰ For example, there exists a long established Center of Migration Research in Warsaw and a newly set up Center for Migration Studies in Poznan.

⁷⁸¹ Górny, A. et al., (Eds.). (2010). *Poland: Becoming a Country of Sustained Immigration*. IDEA Working Paper 10.

⁷⁸² For more on the concept of “migration cycles” see subchapter 4.5.

applicable. This laboratory is located in a central European country on the border between the East and West political post-war powers, the communist and the capitalist, which resulted in unique national conditions for the development of immigrant integration initiatives at the local level.⁷⁸³

The first examination of the history of migration patterns in Poland since the end of the Second World War will concentrate on immigration rather than emigration. Although the latter attracts much more interest worldwide, Polish emigration goes beyond the scope of this research and will be summarized very briefly later.⁷⁸⁴

4.6.1 Historical Context of Immigration

The dynamics of migratory flows in postwar Poland and under communist rule, which diminished the ethnic diversity of the country, are one of the reasons for a relatively low number of immigrants in Poland today. However, before World War II, approximately 31% of the population within the boundaries of Poland were non-Poles.⁷⁸⁵ Following World War II the massive outflow of German war prisoners and ethnic Germans from Poland to Germany took place, and many Polish nationals, either displaced during the war or resettled from the pre-war Polish territories, returned. Poland also experienced a massive outflow of ethnic Jews, Ukrainians, and Belarusians.

As in other communist countries, Poland followed the ideology of ethnic homogeneity and unity within the Soviet Bloc. The priority of the government was to improve settlement conditions for Polish people repatriated from the Soviet Union, while other immigration flows were quite rare.⁷⁸⁶ Those who settled, usually as the spouses of Polish citizens, came to

⁷⁸³ Many insights into Polish migration patterns which are presented in subchapter 4.6 on Poland derive from my research work with Krystyna Iglicka and her publications. See Iglicka K and Ziółek-Skrzypczak, M. (2010). *EU Membership Highlights Poland's Migration Challenges*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

⁷⁸⁴ Right after Poland's accession to the EU, much of the debate about Polish migration patterns concerned massive Polish labor emigration and the impending brain drain in the country. For more on emigration from Poland see subchapter 4.6.2.

Because of a relatively insignificant number of immigrants in Poland, scientific work on immigration and immigrant integration in Poland usually fits into quantitative mode of research, in which numbers and scale of immigration do not play a significant role for research outcomes.

⁷⁸⁵ In the 1930s, the most numerous groups were Ukrainians (16% of the country's population), Jews (10%), Belarusians (6%), Germans (2%), Lithuanians (1%) and Russians (1%) and other less numerous ethnic minorities. For more on the history of ethnic groups in Poland see Drbohlav, D. (2009). *Ethnic Groups - Poland Determinants of Migration*. In D. Drbohlav, Á. Hárs, and I. Grabowska-Lusińska (Eds.), *Experiencing Immigration: Comparative Analysis of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland* (pp. 28-58). IDEA Working Paper 14.

⁷⁸⁶ Repatriates are considered co-ethnics or "Polish foreigners," an important part of the post-war history of Polish immigration. According to Polish law they are not considered foreigners (Repatriation Act of November 9, 2000). There have been three distinct repatriation waves (1944-1954, 1955-1959, and 1997-until now). They have generally been comprised of immigrants from republics neighboring the USSR (Belarus, Ukraine, Lithuania) and Russia, but some have also come from the West. Since many of them do not speak Polish and bring other groups of Polish foreigners to Poland, they should still be considered immigrants, who may need special integration measures.

Poland in student exchange programs, or as trainees and workers from other socialist countries (usually from the USSR, Bulgaria, and Vietnam).

In all communist countries before the collapse of the Iron Curtain in 1989, restrictions on international travel and political and economic isolationism were not conducive to massive migration flows. Polish citizens could not easily leave the country because of the restrictive passport and exit-visa policies.⁷⁸⁷ Similarly, the number of foreign tourists was rather insignificant. Polish law did not permit an inflow of foreign workers or offer any protection to refugees. Consequently, the issues of immigration and integration were hardly raised in Polish politics and public opinion. The Polish communist regime granted political asylum to a large number of political (pro-communist) refugees only twice: to Greece (in the 40s) and Chile (in the 70s). Many of them, disappointed with Polish realities, eventually left the country, either returning to their home countries or heading for Western Europe or Sweden.⁷⁸⁸ Apart from these two governmental actions, Poland did not engage in any other international cooperation for refugee resettlement. Both United Nations as well as UNHCR were considered tools of the Cold War.⁷⁸⁹ Since Poland did not sign the United Nations' Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva Convention) until 1991, other groups of asylum-seekers, who started to seek international protection in Poland in the 80s, were served by the Polish Red Cross. It was the only institution which officially dealt with asylum seekers in Poland.⁷⁹⁰

Because the presence of any foreigner in Polish society was considered quite unusual in the postwar period and international migration was restricted, the collapse of the communist regime in 1989 brought about crucial political and social changes, which had a great impact on migration in Poland. In the years that follow the populations of the former Soviet block countries, Romania, Bulgaria and other countries of Eastern Europe, gradually gained the freedom to travel abroad. As a result of previously concluded agreements, Poland was one of the few countries which East Europeans could easily enter.⁷⁹¹ This fact sparked off a large number of tourist visits and later commercially oriented trips. According to some reports Poland was considered a very attractive western country, or at least "a vestibule to

Ząbek, M., and Łodziński, S., op. cit., p. 76.

⁷⁸⁷ Polish citizens were not allowed to travel with relative freedom until the late 1970s, but in 1981 most western countries imposed visa restrictions. During the suppression of the *Solidarność* movement and the imposition of martial law at the beginning of the 1980s another 250,000 Polish citizens emigrated.

⁷⁸⁸ Grzymała-Kazłowska, A. and Okólski, M. (2003). *Influx and Integration of Migrants in Poland in the Early XXI Century*. CMR Working Papers 50. Warsaw: Center of Migration Research, p. 4.

⁷⁸⁹ Ząbek, M. and Łodziński, S., op. cit., p. 75.

⁷⁹⁰ Halik, T., Kosowicz, A., and Marek, A. (2009). *Imigranci w polskim społeczeństwie*, (Immigrant in Polish Society). Warsaw: Vox Humana.

⁷⁹¹ Until 1989 the agreements were in practice inactive.

the west.”⁷⁹² Indeed, foreign tourists might be considered as “first immigrants” on a larger scale in the consciousness of the people in post-communist Poland.

Increasing inflows of foreign tourists from the East gave birth to prohibited economic activities (e.g. black market trade or illegal gainful employment) among those without a work permit. Those who had one were in minority. Therefore, immigrants usually stayed temporarily, having no prospect for settling permanently. The shadow economy in Poland has been based on short-term contracts between employers and flexible commuting migrants, usually traveling from the Ukraine several times a year, according to the demands of the clandestine employment.

The Vietnamese community formed a quite unique group of immigrants. Their presence in Poland dates back to the economic cooperation and exchange of students and staff in the 1970s (when 800 Vietnamese students entered Polish universities). Some of them married and stayed in Poland, some left, however still maintaining ties with Poland. The transition and opening of borders in Poland and the Vietnamese perestroika, which stimulated the rise in entrepreneurship, caused renewed waves of Vietnamese citizens to Poland. Encouraged by new economic opportunities, they immigrated back to Poland or joined already Vietnamese relatives established in Poland, setting up family businesses.

In reference to legal labor migration the number of work permits granted each year has steadily increased over time.⁷⁹³ Many legal labor immigrants were highly-skilled academics, who came to Poland attracted by Polish demands for specific qualifications, or managers and delegates of transnational corporations from the West and Asia, which established their sister companies in Poland in order to invest in the cheap post-communist country. It is questionable how long they intended to stay, but certainly their presence in Poland represented a significant step towards diversification of Polish post-communist society, if only on a very small scale.⁷⁹⁴

The political changes of the 90s were also connected with the violent civil wars in former Soviet Bloc regimes or federal States (especially the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia) and ethnic cleansing in countries soon to be divided into separate nations, which led to an influx of asylum seekers in Poland, especially from Albania, Armenia, Bosnia, and Romania.⁷⁹⁵ Since Poland signed the Geneva Convention in 1991, the country has had the right to grant refugee status. Ever since then the country has experienced a steadily

⁷⁹² Grzymała-Kazłowska, A. and Okólski, M., op. cit., p. 18.

⁷⁹³ The number of work permits issued increased from initial 3,000 work permits in 1990, through 11,000-13,000 in the mid-1990s, and 16,000-17,000 by the end of the decade, up to 25,000 in 2002. However, this data might not reflect the real numbers of immigrant workers as almost every second permit was a renewal or an extension of one already possessed by an immigrant.

⁷⁹⁴ For this category of immigrants Poland was usually an accidental stage in a relatively long chain of residence changes. See Grzymała-Kazłowska, A. and Okólski, M., op. cit., p. 21.

⁷⁹⁵ The influx of asylum seekers in Poland started in march 1990, when the Swedish government deported people from Ethiopia, Somalia, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon back to Poland considering it a safe country after the *Solidarność* movement took power.

increasing number of refugee applications from various countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa: from just over 3,400 in 1998 to over 10,500 in 2009. Since the end of 1990, the majority of applications have come from Russians, most of whom come from the war-torn region of Chechnya.


However, for many asylum seekers, Poland has not been a destination but rather an unintended site for temporary international protection on the way to the West. The requests for protection specifically in Poland have often been unplanned by people on the escape route to Europe. The quite harsh realities of living in Poland without mastery of the Polish language and consequently grave difficulties in entering the labor market do not encourage asylum seekers to settle there. Accordingly, Poland has frequently been described more as a stop on the way rather than an anchor for those who seek more permanent destinations.

The character of circular and temporary immigration of non-EU immigrants to Poland was supposed to change with Poland's entrance into the EU in 2004 and to the Schengen zone in 2006. For a number of reasons immigration was expected to become more stable, resulting in more immigrants with long-term or permanent residence in Poland. First, Poland's geopolitical position as an EU member state with borders (becoming an Eastern border country of the EU) to the West could become attractive to the neighboring non-EU nationals who could easily live in the EU as well as in a close vicinity to their home countries. Secondly, the Schengen regime was theoretically supposed to reduce the inflows of irregular immigrants and prohibited trades of circular immigrants on the eastern border. On the other hand, since the labor markets were opened to all new and old EU member states in 2007, a rather advantageous situation on the Polish labor market was supposed to be conducive to the inflow of qualified migrants from the EU which the Polish labor market needed.⁷⁹⁶ These projections remain mere speculations.

In fact, Poland's accession to the EU brought about radical changes in migratory patterns in both quantitative and qualitative dimensions of emigration but to a lesser degree in immigration. On the eve of EU enlargement more people were leaving Poland than entering. Nevertheless, the gap was still narrowing. The highest net migration loss started two years after Poland's accession to the EU. The year 2006 shows a rapid increase in emigration: more than twice as many as in the previous year left the country. However, a slow but steady increase in the number of registered immigrants has been seen in the years since 2004 (see graph 17). Entering the EU in 2004 and the Schengen area in 2007, has definitely made Poland a part of the European migration management program, although the current immigration scale is still rather insignificant as evidenced below.

⁷⁹⁶ Poland was the only member of the European Union that did not fall into recession in 2008/2009 and that has continued to grow economically.

Graph 17 Annual Emigration and Immigration in Poland, 2004 to 2009
(in thousands)



Source: Central Statistical Office

4.6.2 Immigration Scale

The brief summary of Poland's unstable immigration inflows in the post-war period presented above is likely to raise many questions about the current composition of immigration to Poland, the share of immigrant youth in the immigration stock and the outlook for the future. Unfortunately, no adequate statistical data is available, which can calculate the total number of immigrants in Poland. The 2002 census estimates the number at only 49,221 people, which makes up a mere 0.1% of the total population.⁷⁹⁷ The most widely represented nationalities in the 2002 census were Ukrainians (20%), Russians (8.8%), Germans (7.5%), Belarusians (5.8%), and Vietnamese (4.3%). However, migration experts considered these numbers to be far too low.

There are also some shortcomings in the current data on immigration of foreigners from the Central Population Register of the Central Statistical Office (CSO), which monitors all new residents coming to Poland who have registered for permanent residency, not only foreigners. It is noteworthy that in the CSO's definition, an immigrant is a person coming to Poland from abroad in order to settle permanently, so there is no differentiation among incoming Polish citizens and foreigners.⁷⁹⁸ Moreover, not all immigrants qualify for permanent residency, for which a special permission is required.

⁷⁹⁷ The Population Census collected migration data in Poland for the first time since the Second World War in 2002.

⁷⁹⁸ For more on the fluid concepts in Polish migration discourse see the next section of this subchapter.

There are also several other statistical sources which can only provide a rather sketchy picture of the level of immigration in Poland, for example a register of residence card holders. Again, the latest number of residence card holders – 92,574 (0, 24% population) as of the end of 2009 – does not encompass all foreigners residing in Poland. Along with the unanticipated number of undocumented immigrants, neither EU citizens nor work permit visa holders are included in these statistics.⁷⁹⁹ In fact, the register of work permits related to the employment of foreigners, the register of those employed in companies with 10 or more workers, which specifies foreign workers, or the Polish Labor Market Survey are two additional sources of scattered statistical data on immigrants in Poland. According to Polish researchers on migration, this maze of decentralized foreigner registration systems cannot be expected to yield high quality data.⁸⁰⁰ Such imprecise databases set up on confusing definitions of migration groups cannot accurately reflect the reality of the scale of immigration.

Keeping in mind the shortcomings of available statistical data, it might be concluded that the largest national groups of non-EU immigrants in Poland (both legal and illegal) stem from the eastern Europe and Asia: the Ukraine, Belarus, Vietnam and Armenia. Russian and Moldovan nationals and, recently, Chinese belong to the majority as well (see table 3 and table 4).⁸⁰¹ Such different constellations of immigrant ethnic groups suggest different challenges for the process of immigrant integration. While Eastern Europeans from neighboring countries find it quite easy to mingle with the Polish host society, the process of integration is much more difficult for the groups who come from elsewhere – immigrants from very different cultures who live in ethnic enclaves like the Vietnamese or Armenians and Chechens live according to quite different religious and cultural values, which may be problematic for Polish society.⁸⁰² In fact, for more than 10 years the majority of refugee applications have come from Russians, most of whom are from the war-torn region of Chechnya, and recently from Georgia. Both groups, along with other Far Eastern immigrants, contribute to the ethnic and cultural diversification of Polish-European society, although still on a relatively small scale. It is noteworthy, however, that not all Polish regions display this diversity.

The distribution of immigrants in Poland is strikingly uneven across voivodeships.⁸⁰³ The twenty refugee centers in Poland are located mostly in the central part of Poland (8

⁷⁹⁹ It is difficult to estimate how many EU citizens are currently residing in Poland, as nobody knows whether they fulfilled their EU obligation to register or cancelled their registration in case of departure.

⁸⁰⁰ Górný, A., et al. (Eds.), op. cit., p. 10.

⁸⁰¹ Since 2010 there has been a significant growth in the number of Chinese immigrants.

⁸⁰² The members of these Asian ethnic enclaves usually engage in their own enterprises, like trade or gastronomy. The Vietnamese, especially, have a high level of cooperation and self organization, very often making them self-sufficient and independent of Polish labor markets
Igllicka, K. (2008). *Poland: Waiting for Immigrants. But Do We really Want them?* Center Studi de Politica Internazionale (CeSPI), Country Papers, p. 8.

⁸⁰³ Poland consists of 16 administrative units or voivodeships.

refugee centers are in the Masovian Voivodeship), a couple in the less economically prosperous eastern and southern regions of Poland (Podlaskie, Silesian, Lublin) and only 2 in the West and North (Lubusz, and Kuyavian-Pomeranian Voivodeships). The majority of immigrants, with the exception of refugees, are predominantly concentrated in the Masovian Voivodeship, with the highest concentration in Warsaw. In 2009 residence card holders in this region outnumbered by almost four times those in the south regions. The only exception to this distribution pattern can be observed for the places of residence of the EU-EEA intra migrants registered in Poland, who are concentrated both in the Masovian Voivodeship and the northeastern border region with Germany (the West Pomeranian Voivodeship).⁸⁰⁴ Different distributions of immigrants in different regions strongly influence the levels of sensitivity to the issue of immigrant integration, which vary in different locations in Poland. Different levels of public awareness of challenges of immigrant integration, in turn, reflect various approaches to immigration and integration management evident in the analysis of Polish case studies.⁸⁰⁵

It must also be considered that the confusing numbers on Polish immigration do not include those who stay without documents. Despite a strict migration regime, the inflow of irregular immigrants is common. Assessing their numbers is quite difficult. According to the most recent reports on undocumented immigrants in Poland there are no studies which estimate the total number of irregular immigrants currently residing in Poland. The Vietnamese are the only group, which has been the subject of a deeper analysis among researchers. This immigrant group reveals irregularities in regard to both length of stay and work. The Migration Policy Unit in the Ministry of Interior and Administration was the first institution to count immigrants of Vietnamese origin residing legally in Poland. The Ministry claims that probably one in two Vietnamese living in Poland is an irregular immigrant, which means between 12,000 and 22,000 undocumented people.⁸⁰⁶

⁸⁰⁴ Office for Foreigners. Statistics.

⁸⁰⁵ The case of Masovian Voivodeship with the highest number of immigrants is the linchpin of running public debates on integration and immigration in Poland. The fact that Warsaw has the biggest number of immigrants among all Polish cities was conducive to choosing this region for my migration empirical research. However, it is equally interesting to monitor a recent slow rise of empirical research on other regions, for example in the city of Poznan. In 2009 the Center for Migration Studies in Poznan started running empirical projects in this field. For the first results of their work, see Center for Migration Studies: <http://www.cebam.amu.edu.pl/>

⁸⁰⁶ Iglicka, K. and Gmaj, K. (2008). *Undocumented Migration. Counting the Uncountable: Data and Trends across Europe. Country Report – Poland*. Clandestino Project.

Table 3 Total and Top Six Nationalities Granted Temporary Residence Permits in Poland, 2004 to 2009
(Country order by 2009 figures)

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
<i>TOTAL</i>	25,425	22,625	22,376	23,240	28,865	30,567
<i>Ukraine</i>	8,518	8,304	7,733	7,381	8,307	8,489
<i>Belarus</i>	2,008	1829	1,647	1,992	2,380	2,452
<i>Vietnam</i>	1,875	1704	1,496	1,496	2,580	2,389
<i>China</i>	415	606	383	672	1,205	1,963
<i>Russia</i>	1,605	1,495	1,393	1,265	1,468	1,366
<i>Armenia</i>	1,793	1,418	1,199	1,273	1,452	1,287
<i>Top six total</i>	16,214	15,356	13,851	14,079	17,392	17,946
<i>Top six as a percentage of all permits</i>	64%	68%	62%	61%	61%	59%

Source: Office for Foreigners, Statistics

Table 4 Total and Top Five Nationalities Granted Settlement Permits in Poland, 2004 to 2009

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
<i>TOTAL</i>	5,094	4,064	3,255	3,124	3,625	2,938
<i>Ukraine</i>	1,905	1,654	1,438	1,609	1,685	1,280
<i>Belarus</i>	472	645	602	567	640	638
<i>Russia</i>	527	376	286	224	255	146
<i>Vietnam</i>	486	216	138	125	162	121
<i>Armenia</i>	226	148	110	91	116	88
<i>Top five total</i>	3,616	3,039	2,574	2,616	2,858	2,166
<i>Top five as a percentage of all permits</i>	71%	75%	79%	84%	79%	74%

Source: Office for Foreigners, Statistics

Among irregular immigrants there are also those who treat Poland as a springboard to the EU. A rapid increase in the number of asylum seekers from Georgia since April 2009 in Poland is part of a new wave of irregular immigrants from Asia. Since there are no visa

requirements for Georgians entering Belarus, crossing the Polish-Belarusian border is often the easiest and the cheapest way for them to enter the EU.⁸⁰⁷

According to the Office for Foreigners, in total 21,890 decisions on expulsion have been issued to undocumented immigrants between 2006 and 2008. However, this number cannot help with figuring out the actual number of undocumented immigrants. Other available estimates about various groups of undocumented immigrant refer solely to the numbers of irregular workers in shadow economies. Considering the circular undocumented labor migration, Ukrainian citizens constitute the largest group of illegal workers in Poland. They usually find employment in the household sectors, such as cleaning, cooking, caretaking of children and the elderly, construction or agricultural sector or open-air markets in Poland.⁸⁰⁸

Unfortunately, the percentage of immigrant youth in Poland remains unknown. Based on the statistics from the Central Statistical Office in Poland (CSO) it might be assumed that the young generation, 20 to 29 years of age, together with a significant number of newborns and children up to 4 years old are the most numerous groups among immigrants in Poland. Consequently, it might be concluded that Poland is slowly starting to attract more young foreign newcomers, although one has to remember that the CSO's data also includes returning Polish migrants. Obviously, none of the available estimates reflects the situation of undocumented immigrant youth, who might still not be visible on the Polish black market. Their numbers, their access to education and their transition from school to adult life have not been monitored thus far.

The only evidence of a rise in legal foreign residents from the younger generation is to be found in those enrolled in higher education. It has been estimated that 15,862 foreign students were studying in Poland during the academic year 2008/2009, an increase of more than 2 thousand over the previous academic year. The largest groups came from the Ukraine, Belarus, Norway, the US and Canada. It would be difficult to predict whether these groups plan to stay longer. The anecdotal evidence suggests that western students are usually attracted by low fees in Poland for higher education and that they will probably head back to their home countries upon completion of their degrees.

On the one hand, return trends of young foreign students and unstable circular patterns of immigration to Poland appear to counter any arguments for intensified measures for the integration of young immigrants. On the other hand, public interest in the integration of

⁸⁰⁷ As statistics from the Office for Foreigners confirm, from April to December 2009, 4,174 Georgian citizens applied for asylum, all of them unsuccessfully. Although controversial deportations continue, Georgian hopes have not diminished: during the first six months of 2010 565 Georgians still applied for asylum. According to the ECMI's report there are cases where Georgians are trying to cross borders between Poland and other Schengen countries, which puts Poland at the crossroads for many undocumented migrants heading for the EU.

See Thomsen, J. (2009). *The Recent Flow of Asylum-Seekers from Georgia to Poland. ECMI Brief 22*. Flensburg: European Center for Minority Issues.

⁸⁰⁸ Iglicka, K. and Gmaj, K, op. cit.

immigrants should not depend on immigrants, their numbers and the length of their planned stay. In the massive global movement of migrants, who are in this country one day and the next in the neighboring one, temporary migration and temporary stay have become more common. The lack of prospects for immigrants to settle in Poland does not invalidate efforts toward their integration. Quite the contrary, successful integration into the host society can encourage immigrants to prolong their stay if they find good conditions for the development of their potential. Still the insignificant size of the immigrant population, apparent in the poor statistical data on Polish immigration, and mundane speculations about who the current immigrants are and for how long they want to stay in Poland hinder any constructive political and public discourse on migration and integration.

4.6.3 Public and Political Discourse

Several factors influence the present public discourse on immigration and integration in Poland: 1) the turbulent Polish history, 2) the country's communist past, 3) the accession to the EU followed by massive emigration waves and recent return migration, and finally 4) "the sacred numbers": the ambiguous figures on immigration, which have just been discussed.

First, Poland as a Central European country was extremely vulnerable to invasion and partition throughout a significant portion of its post-16th century history. The state, split by neighboring states, was frequently forced to fight for its endangered sovereignty and national unity against foreign influences. This fact has probably shaped and given rise to heated political and public discussions on the protection of Polish cultural homogeneity and fueled the interest of Polish citizens against "the others" from outside the Polish territory and without Polish cultural ties, still visible in the current public discourse on immigration.

The post war communist period in Poland might have reinforced this historically conditioned protectionism. Additionally, communist isolation and eradication of pre-war Polish ethnic diversity has turned an immigrant in Poland into an exotic object of curiosity. An immigrant was not necessary somebody who Poles did not trust but merely somebody, at least an immigrant from the Western Block, who they could rarely see on a daily basis. It seemed inconceivable that under the communist regime somebody from the West would ever decide to come to Poland in order to work and stay longer under unfavorable conditions in a poor country.⁸⁰⁹

Certainly, after the transition to democracy and the opening of the Polish borders the situation changed but an isolationist frame of mind still prevails in the Polish mentality. Those who were able to travel were finally exposed to contact with foreigners, so that a foreigner

⁸⁰⁹ Poland was seen rather as an unattractive destination to live in by all Western countries.

was not “so foreign” anymore.⁸¹⁰ Nevertheless, for a long time ordinary people remained in their protective confinement, exposed only to things Polish, as something safe and normal. Only the younger generation with new travel possibilities can change public attitudes of fear and uncertainty about immigrants. Thus far, the government has not made much of an effort to ease immigrant inflows, except for the actions toward the repatriation of ethnic Poles, a refugee program, selective and restricted labor market openings since 2006 and recent labor market legislation.⁸¹¹

Much of the political and social discourse since the Polish EU accession has focused on the image of Poland as an emigration country. Indeed, as statistics show, nearly 2 million Poles have left the country, mostly young Polish emigrants, who left the Polish labor market unfulfilled and in need of a new labor force. Surprisingly, immigrants are still treated more as an unavoidable consequence of migration movements than a structural necessity and source of economic benefit. In fact, there are very few governmental incentives to make Poland attractive for immigrants to settle.⁸¹² The political concerns have focused on questions of how to attract Polish emigrants back, rather than how to welcome the foreign labor force. In November 2008 Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk launched a governmental campaign entitled, “Have you got a plan to return?” Its aim was and is to facilitate the smooth return of emigrants and to put on view the new economic opportunities in Poland.⁸¹³ The government’s efforts to trigger massive Polish remigration are currently part of a political campaign to demonstrate the stability and prosperity of the country. However, such actions only reinforce the Polish mind-set that theirs is a country of emigration rather than a potential destination for immigrants.

As a result, little has been done to facilitate active civic participation on the part of immigrants in decision-making processes in Poland, so that immigrants remain absent from the political scene. In fact, civic engagement of immigrants is publicly visible only in their cooperation with pro-immigrant NGOs and other civil society actors (like research institutes) who engage in immigrant integration work and try to raise the allegedly “homogenous” society’s awareness of the presence of immigrants in Poland.⁸¹⁴ These bottom-up initiatives

⁸¹⁰ The introduction of visa restrictions in most West European countries in 1981 limited the options for travel abroad until the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989.

⁸¹¹ For more information on the labor market for immigrants, see subchapter 4.6.7.

⁸¹² Of course, the Polish tourist infrastructure and Polish tourism has seen great improvement, which of course does not solve the problem of the complicated legal procedures necessary for immigrants to settle and take up employment in the country. For more on legal regulations concerning settlement and work in Poland, see subchapter 4.6.5.

⁸¹³ Some of the elements of this program are contained in a guidebook titled *A Returner. Navigation for Returning Migrants* and an internet service (www.powroty.gov.pl) for all Polish nationals who have already decided to leave the countries they emigrated to. See Baranowska, A., et al. (Eds.). (2009). *A Returner. Navigation for Returning Migrants*. Warsaw: Centrum Rozwoju Zasobów Ludzkich.

⁸¹⁴ See more on the national mode of Integration in Poland and the case study on Warsaw, subchapters 4.6.4 and 5.2.4.

have only recently begun, so that that the general societal discussion of immigration and integration is slowly changing.

The perception that Poles are still homogenous is also reinforced by the sacred statistical numbers of foreigners. As mentioned above, these figures do not reflect the real scale of immigration due to the lack of a centralized data collection system for different groups of immigrants. As a result, the low immigration rating discourages decision-makers at the institutional levels from discussing the importance of immigrant services or integration work. In fact, the statistics serve as a hidden support for reactive rather than proactive immigration and integration actions. The anecdotal evidence appears to show that “it does not pay off” to set up extra services for immigrants, whose presence is rather insignificant in Polish society.⁸¹⁵

Polish migration researchers agree that the reactive measures in migration and integration issues have been undertaken as a response to internal (such as the Polish transformation process and labor market needs) as well as external stimuli. Polish Memberships in the EU and the Schengen area have undoubtedly stimulated the development of Polish migration policy, which has been created in a top-down way, as a reaction to external EU regulations and the Polish commitment to *acquis communautaire*.⁸¹⁶ However, the EU requirements for institutional and legislative adaptation to EU immigration policies by the EU member states does not apply to the measures of integration policies.⁸¹⁷ These measures are still highly influenced by the political and public discourse on immigrants in Poland, presented above. This unique Polish discussion, characterized by post-communist isolationism, neglect of immigrants and new trends toward openness and Europeanization of Polish society, constitutes the background for the current national mode of integration in Poland.

4.6.4 National Mode of Integration

The development of a national mode of integration in Poland is determined by a relatively underdeveloped framework for general migration policy in Poland, which is still “under construction.” There is neither an institutional structure responsible for migration management nor a single policy document which conceptualizes the principles and goals of Polish immigration policy. The lack of direction for such a development is reflected in the

⁸¹⁵ The citation comes from my personal conversation with a representative of the National Health Insurance System, who commented on the proposal to provide a foreign language brochure on the healthcare system in Poland.

⁸¹⁶ Since 1997 the need for Poland's compliance with the *acquis communautaire* has resulted in three restrictive amendments to the 1997 Alien's Act (the most recent one in April 2005). Polish EU Accession also contributed to the establishment of new institutional structures, such as the Office for Repatriation and Refugees, and the Council for Refugees, which is an independent body of appeal.

⁸¹⁷ For more on non-binding EU integration measures see subchapter 4.4.

institutional structure responsible for migration matters. Although the Ministry of Interior and Administration officially coordinates the state's activities in the field of migration policy, the division of competencies in relation to migration is scattered across many administrative bodies in different ministries with no transparent hierarchy. As a result of the confusing framework for cooperation in migration issues, Poland lacks any comprehensive immigrant integration strategy. The main unit responsible for immigrant integration management at the national level is the Department of Social Assistance and Integration in the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.⁸¹⁸ The unit determines the entire area of social assistance in Poland. Consequently, immigrant integration is only one of its many activities.

Until recently integration processes had been aimed at only one group of immigrants, those with refugee status. The first attempts of integration programs for this group in Poland date back to the early 1990s, targeting a significant wave of refugees from the former Yugoslavia at that time. The concept of the integration of refugees was only introduced into Polish legislation in 1996. Since then local governors (voivodes) have been responsible for coordinating measures for integrating refugees in their voivodeships.

Integration programs are restricted to the assistance of persons under international protection. The Individual Integration Program (IIP), agreed upon between the County Family Support Centers and a foreigner does not exceed one calendar year, which is usually too little to result in any positive outcome. During this period of time a program participants are provided with cash benefits for maintenance and coverage of expenses connected with learning Polish language, contributions to health insurance and the costs of specialized guidance services, finding accommodation, and social work activities.⁸¹⁹ As of May 2008 these provisions have been extended to immigrants with subsidiary protection status. Only a few of these provisions, such as shelter, meals and financial aid in critical situations, are also granted to those with 'tolerated' status.⁸²⁰ In 2007 only 521 refugees were beneficiaries of these programs. Of this group, only 17 took advantage of the subsidies for language courses. Because County Centers for Family Support are usually understaffed the extent to which the agencies can really address immigrants' needs and boost their motivation to integrate is questionable.⁸²¹ No other integration measures at the national level exist for other groups of immigrants in Poland.

⁸¹⁸ The Ministry of Interior and Administration overviewed the coordination of integration measures until 1998, when the former Ministry of Social Affairs was transformed in 2005 into the current Ministry of Labor and Social Policy which overtook this function.

⁸¹⁹ Based on the Act on Social Assistance of March 12, 2004.

⁸²⁰ Subsidiary protection status is granted to those who do not fulfill the requirements for becoming a refugee but who would be endangered upon return to their countries. Tolerated status may be granted when refugee and subsidiary protection status has been rejected.

⁸²¹ According to Katarzyna Gmaj's assessment of the situation in 2007, refugees rarely integrated into the Polish society. The prospect for success on the labor market, rather than integration programs, stimulated immigrant determination to integrate in Poland.

The shortcomings of integration policies in Poland relate to the lack of proper definitions and of a conceptual framework for integration measures. Basic “fluid concepts,” such as integration and immigrants are still problematic. First of all, the process of integration has yet to be defined in any legal document. Until recently *Proposals for Actions Aimed at Establishing Comprehensive Immigrant Integration Policy in Poland* from 2005 had been the only official document which sketches out the limited national integration processes and plans for their future development.⁸²² Secondly, there is no consistent definition in Polish legal documents of who is an immigrant. As mentioned earlier, a person who has permanently settled in Poland is considered an immigrant. This definition, for instance, does not exclude people with Polish citizenship who have returned to Poland from abroad to register for permanent residency. Consequently, the meaning of the term “immigrant” in Poland is very confusing with reference to the concept of immigrant integration policy. “Polish immigrants” definitely face different challenges for integration than “foreign immigrants.”⁸²³

If an attempt were made to apply the above mentioned definition of an immigrant in Poland to potential immigrant integration measures, such measures would in reality only target a very limited number of immigrants: those with permanent residency. As a result, integration of newly-arrived immigrants would be of little importance, as the eligibility for “immigrant integration programs” requires that a foreigner stay in Poland for an extended period in order to obtain a settlement permit.⁸²⁴ Such a perception still seems to prevail in the existing Polish legal system (see below). However, the recent debate on the need for “pre-integration measures” for asylum seekers, who are awaiting a decision on their refugee applications, has increased the public focus on the issue of integration. Since integration procedures are quite often too long, the need for providing immigrants access to the

Gmaj, K. (2007). 'Do it yourself.' Immigrants' Integration to Polish Society. In K. Iglicka and K. Gmaj (Eds.), *Integration Policies in the EU and the US* (pp. 51-56). Warsaw: Center for International Relations.

⁸²² Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. (2005). *Proposals for Actions Aimed at Establishing Comprehensive Immigrant Integration Policy in Poland*. Warsaw: Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. In April 2011 a new document has just been published by the Interministerial Team for Migration. The document outlines the future plans for the development of integration policies in Poland. Ministry of Interior and Administration. (2011). *Polityka migracyjna Polski - stan obecny i postulowane działania* (Poland's Migration Policy – State of the Art and Postulated Actions). Warsaw: Ministry of Interior and Administration.

⁸²³ Throughout this chapter I use the term “immigrant” according to the definition of immigrants provided in chapter 1, Introduction. However, at this point in the text I use the term “immigrants” in quotation marks to indicate differences between the Polish definition and the definition employed in my research. In Polish legislation, to my understanding, an immigrant is considered “cudzoziemiec,” which directly translated into English stands for “a person from a foreign land.” In the translations of Polish documents into English the terms “alien” or “foreigner” are used. These terms are usually found in most legal documents, the official discourse of administrative institutions, as well as in public debates on immigration. For example, the Polish Act of Aliens of 2003 does not include a single word in reference to “an immigrant” in my understanding. See also references to public discourse on immigration in this subchapter.

⁸²⁴ A person of citizenship other than Polish can get a settlement permit after 5 years in the country. For more see subchapter 4.6.5.

structures of society, e.g. by learning the Polish language, has begun to receive broader recognition.⁸²⁵

In addition to the very limited national integration measures addressed only to people under international protection (refugees and people with subsidiary protection status), the Polish legal system offers immigrants access to the rights and opportunities which apply to Polish citizens: social assistance benefits, health care, unemployment and family benefits, as well as the right to education. Some of these rights (with the exception of social and health care benefits and the right to education) require permanent residency, which limits integration opportunities for short term immigrants.⁸²⁶ Having to wait as long as five years to access the aforementioned provisions may be one reason why few immigrants decide to stay longer in the country.

No examination of the Polish national mode of integration, as described in this section, would be complete without mentioning the strong support of bottom-up integration initiatives acting locally. This sector has been developing for a long time, especially in Warsaw. In fact, work on immigrant integration has been on the agenda of several well established NGOs and charities like Polish Humanitarian Action or the Polish Red Cross for many years, which in the past received little recognition and support from Polish governmental organizations. In fact, the issue of immigrant integration has only recently reached a broader audience among local authorities and ministries in Poland. A recent boom in new immigrant programs and integration measures has been made possible through an allocation of the European Fund for the Integration of Third Country Nationals (EIF).⁸²⁷ These new opportunities for starting integration work have resulted in promising new network-building among new service providers for immigrants with the state actors, such as County Family Support Centers. Unfortunately the integration of immigrant youth, especially in their transition from school to work, is still not a focal point of local integration initiatives.⁸²⁸ Anecdotal evidence suggests a couple of NGOs do recognize the need to start special programs for immigrant youth and are eager to cooperate internationally with more experienced partners.⁸²⁹

⁸²⁵ For further discussion of this topic see subchapter 5.2.4 on Warsaw.

⁸²⁶ See later sections of this chapter on citizenship, education and labor market.

⁸²⁷ The EIF funds have been allocated to Poland since 2008. There are many doubts about the effectiveness of the work of the Polish EIF Implementing Body of Polish Government, which allocates the EIF money to beneficiaries of the program. The existing bureaucratic procedures are often too confusing and funds are paid out to NGOs with delays, as many organizations report. See subchapter 5.2.4.

⁸²⁸ It might be due an anticipated relatively low number of second-generation immigrants, who are still invisible in available statistics on immigrants.

⁸²⁹ A Polish-German Conference "Integration Network for Immigrant Youth" in Bad Liebenzell, Germany, in May 2010 brought together a few Polish organizations eager to partner with German integration NGOs in the field of immigrant youth integration. As a result, the Integration Network for Immigrant Youth has been established, which is intended to facilitate cooperation between Polish and international integration stakeholders. For more see <http://www.integration-network.eu>

In addition to the NGOs' work and advocacy the EU and the European Fund are an important motivating factor for the national ministries to commence dealing with the issue of an increasing need for immigrant integration. In fact, Polish policy makers have recently become slightly more interested in immigrant integration of foreigners in Poland. In 2007 the Ministry of Interior and Administration established a Working Group on the Integration of Foreigners within the Interministerial Team for Migration established in the same year.⁸³⁰ The results of its work will be presented in the future Migration Strategy for Poland, which is also expected to address the issue of immigrant integration strategy for Poland.⁸³¹ According to preliminary projections and conclusions after the Working Group's three-year long consultations, the issues of the integration of immigrants' children, which have thus far been neglected, have finally been recognized as key priorities for future migration strategy.⁸³²

Another promising program calling for cooperation between governmental sectors on immigrant integration was launched in 2010 with the project International Organization for Migration (IOM): Cooperation as a Way to Integration, funded by the EIF (*Współpraca drogą do integracji*).⁸³³ Thanks to EU financial support, the project set up a National Platform of Cooperation, which gathers together different stakeholders in migration policies and integration measures, including ministries, local administration, NGOs and migrant organizations. The regular consultations are supposed to assist in establishing a constructive framework for future National Migration and Integration Strategy.

It is still too early to talk about any Polish integration strategy for immigrants in Poland. However, the abovementioned recent developments in the national mode of integration in Poland gives some hope for the potential establishment of future national integration management within the area of immigrant youth on the labor market as well.

4.6.5 Legal Status

An immigrant youth's access to citizenship, education and the labor market in Poland depends on which category of residence permit the person has. Immigrant youth from the European Economic Area are not required to hold a residence permit to reside in Poland. Consequently, they enjoy more privileges than other immigrants in a number of ways, which will be discussed in this and the next sections of this chapter.

⁸³⁰ Translated from Polish: *Grupa Robocza do Spraw Integracji Cudzoziemców* and *Międzyresortowy Zespół do Spraw Migracji*.

⁸³¹ At the time of writing the Inter-ministry Team for Migration plans to announce the Polish Migration Strategy by the end of 2010.

⁸³² The final conference of the project Polish Migration Policy: Its Principles and Legal Aspects was held in Warsaw on November 23, 2009.

⁸³³ For more on the IOM in Poland in the field of integration work for immigrants see the Warsaw case study.

Poland boasts a quite complicated system of legal statuses. Apart from the various types of residence visa, there are three categories of a residence permit, which regulate the legal status of immigrants: a residence permit for a specified period of time (a temporary residence permit), a residence permit for a permanent stay (a settlement permit) and a residence permit for a long-term EC resident. An immigrant without permanent residency has limited access to social and economic benefits, thus limiting their structural integration into the society. Requirements for getting permanent residency are quite stringent. Among other requirements, an immigrant has to continuously reside legally in the territory of Poland for at least five years or two years if he or she is the spouse of a Polish citizen.⁸³⁴

Permanent residency is a key to obtaining Polish citizenship. Naturalization requires a minimum five year legal stay in Poland with a settlement permit or at least three years of marriage with a Polish citizen and a settlement permit. Polish citizenship is automatically extended to the children of the naturalized person. Once the children are over 16, they must decide for or against becoming Polish citizens.

A permanent stay permit is the most valued among immigrants for two main reasons. Firstly, since it is granted for an unlimited period of time, there is no need for immigrants to cope with bureaucratic hurdles to extend their residence permits every two years, as is required with temporary residence permits. Secondly, permanent residency informally grants the status of Polish denizen. Consequently there is little interest in gaining Polish citizenship among immigrants, especially if they will be forced to surrender their citizenship in their home countries.⁸³⁵

In conclusion, permanent residency, not naturalization, is a key to integration into the labor market for immigrant youth in Poland. Polish citizenship is granted at birth to children if at least one of their parents already possesses Polish citizenship, regardless of the birthplace (*jus sanguinis*). Permanent residency is granted to children born in Poland to those who possess permanent residency or are under the custody of people with permanent resident permits. Therefore, the children of immigrants who have not legally resided in Poland longer than five years are automatically ineligible for permanent residency. Youth who apply for refugee status or political asylum and are awaiting the decisions are naturally also excluded from the rights of a permanent resident. Moreover, the adult children of

⁸³⁴ A stay in the Republic of Poland is regarded as continuous if no absence period has exceeded six months and the total absence has not exceeded ten months unless the result of:

- 1) performance of professional duties or performance of work outside the territory of the Republic of Poland upon a contract concluded with an employer whose registered office is located in the territory of the Republic of Poland;
- 2) accompanying a spouse performing his/her professional duties or work in circumstances referred to in point (1);
- 3) medical treatment.

⁸³⁵ Polish law does not prohibit dual citizenship and there are no penalties for its possession. However, people with dual citizenship are treated as if they are solely Polish citizens in territorial Poland. See Act of Citizenship. (1962). Journal of Laws 2000, No. 28, item 353.

permanent residents who come as part of family reunification are initially granted a temporary permit, not automatically a permanent one.

It should also be kept in mind that there may be a significant number of undocumented immigrant youth living in Poland. There are hardly any statistics in Poland on the undocumented, to say nothing of estimates of their age.⁸³⁶ The assumption is that thanks to the Polish government's cooperation with the EU Border Agency Frontex (with headquarters in Warsaw) and the application of Schengen zone regulations, which restrict the number of visas issued, strong border control will probably restrict future inflows.⁸³⁷ For those who stay illegally, there have been limited measures of regularization in Poland. However, relatively few undocumented immigrants have taken advantage of potential amnesties due to the severe requirements.⁸³⁸ As a result, very few options currently exist for gaining legal status.

Moreover, no official measure for integration of undocumented immigrants into the Polish host society is permitted. Currently civil society organizations in Poland are discussing the needs of immigrants *sans papiers* more openly. However, without any financial support pro-immigration activists form organizations which are hardly in a position to provide integration help to the undocumented. In fact, the prime source of money for most of integration projects in Poland comes from EU Funds, which are restricted to taking action on behalf of authorized immigrants. Very few projects for the undocumented have been founded by private donors. Although few organizations are willing to admit it publicly, some attempts are being made to include young undocumented immigrants in language courses or job training programs for regular immigrants, simply by not asking about their legal status.⁸³⁹

4.6.6 Education

Polish national education authorities had for a long time shown little concern for the education of immigrant children. Challenges of immigrant education were usually first experienced and discussed at the lowest levels of school administration, by schools and

⁸³⁶ For estimates of the number of undocumented people living in Poland see a former section of this subchapter.

⁸³⁷ A foreigner can cross Polish borders and remain on Polish territory if they possess a valid travel document and a visa, unless they are citizens of EEA countries or come from a state bound by a bilateral agreement with the EU on the visa-free regime.

⁸³⁸ During the course of the first Amnesty Program in 2003 2,747 illegal immigrants (out of 3,512 applications) were able to change their status from irregular to regular. During the second Program in 2007 1,244 out of 2,028 applicants got a legal status. Among other strict conditions, the biggest obstacle for undocumented immigrants was the requirement to prove the length of their illegal stay in Poland. In order to get the legal status the immigrants had to have resided in Poland at least since January 1997, which was impossible for those without any documents. Currently there is a running campaign for a new abolition. See Iglicka, K. (2008), op. cit.

⁸³⁹ See more on the controversies about helping undocumented in Poland in subchapter 5.2.4. on the case study of Warsaw.

educational boards. Only the development of education policies in recent years or even months, moving towards including immigrant pupils in the ministerial education statistics and preparatory Polish cultural and language courses, marks a slow yet positive change.

The national education policy in Poland is developed and carried out centrally, while the administration of education and the running of schools, pre-school institutions and other educational establishments is decentralized. The Ministry of National Education is responsible for almost the entire education system, with the exception of higher education which is under the supervision of the Minister of Science and Higher Education. The Ministry supervises educational content, sets educational policy and, by the same token, determines the access of immigrant children to education. However, the implementation of these rules is left in the hands of the Local Educational Boards, or with education superintendents in each Polish province.⁸⁴⁰

The Polish Constitution guarantees the right to education, whereas the Act on the Education System sets the frame for compulsory education of children from seven years old until their graduation from gymnasium, usually at the age of 16 or in some cases until 18 (if a child fails to complete an educational program within the usual timeframe). According to a new regulation on the admission of foreigners to Polish schools, as of April 2010 education is free of charge for all immigrant children regardless of their status in public primary, secondary and all types of upper-secondary schools until the age of 18⁸⁴¹ (see graph 18). This new regulation also simplifies admission procedures. Immigrant children unable to provide certificates of their past education are admitted following an interview with the school head and upon written declarations of their parents about the number of years of schooling. The interviews have to be conducted in the school candidates' native languages if their knowledge of Polish is not adequate.


⁸⁴⁰ The responsibility for the administration of public kindergartens, primary schools and gymnasias has been delegated to local authorities (*gminy*). Districts (*powiaty*) now have statutory responsibility for administering upper secondary schools, artistic and special schools. The voivodeships (*województwa*) perform a co-ordinating function, supervising the implementation of the Ministry's policy and providing pedagogical supervision.

⁸⁴¹ Before the New Regulation on Admission of Foreigners into Polish Schools was adopted on April 1, 2010, education in public schools was free of charge for all immigrants only until the secondary level. Consequently, free post-gymnasium schools, necessary for obtaining a first vocational qualification, were not available to all. Undocumented immigrants could not continue their education for free (including vocational training and apprenticeships) unless they were granted a scholarship, which was almost always impossible to obtain due to their irregular status.

Post-gymnasium schools include (see Graph 18):

- basic vocational schools which lead directly to a diploma attesting to vocational qualifications and possibly further education in supplementary schools
- those which lead to the *Matura* certificate (upon passing the *Matura* examinations) which entitles students to enter tertiary education: upper secondary school, specialized upper secondary schools offering education in specializations of general vocational education, and technical upper secondary schools.

Graph 18 Education System in Poland



Source: Eurydice

Since school assignment depends on where the children live, the number of immigrant children is disproportionately higher in districts close to refugee centers. These schools face the greatest challenges of managing immigrant youth integration, as they have little experience with multicultural classes. Until recently, with the exception of Polish

language classes, there had been no preparatory courses for newly enrolled children, who were unable to follow the Polish syllabus. Since the new above mentioned regulation from 2010 became law, remedial classes can be provided along with Polish language courses.⁸⁴² Moreover, immigrant children have now the possibility of having their own education assistants, who can support them in confronting communication difficulties and intercultural misunderstandings within a given school community.

Schools can apply to their local education boards for additional funds for language and tutorial courses for immigrant pupils. However, many schools are still unaware of such provisions, which stems from the fact that information sharing about the recent reforms has been insufficient.⁸⁴³ It is to be hoped that the new opportunities for integration measures in schools will become better known and more efficient over time.

There are still many other hurdles with reference to managing immigrants' education, which have already been recognized by Polish research and have been confirmed by my interviews in the city of Warsaw. First, the lack of cooperation of schools with immigrant parents and, at the same time, the refusal to accept the presence of immigrant children at schools by parents of Polish pupils are issues that require greater attention from teachers. Another challenge involves exam procedures, which prohibit any additional time for immigrant children or a teacher's assistance in solving particular exam questions and tasks. Finally, the shortage of statistical data on the education on immigrant children in Polish schools has ensured that the issue has not gained sufficient attention from the general public. In fact, little is known about current numbers of immigrant pupils.⁸⁴⁴ On the basis of the provisional data from the Ministry of National Education, it can only be assumed that the number of foreigners in Polish schools has ranged between 4,000 and 6,000 in the recent years. In fact, more exact figures on immigrant populations at schools, including their ethnic backgrounds and the geographical distribution, might be important for planning national integration policies particularly at local levels.

The immigrant population is much more visible and better documented at the higher education level. According to the statistics they constituted 0.9% of the student population in the academic year 2008/2009. More than 500 students came from the Ukraine, Belarus, the US, and Taiwan.⁸⁴⁵

⁸⁴² Earlier Minister of National Education regulations from October 4, 2001 only offered free Polish language classes.

⁸⁴³ For more about schools' lack of awareness of organization procedure for Polish language courses for immigrant pupils, see Gmaj, K. and Iglicka, K., op. cit.

⁸⁴⁴ See the remarks about the role of statistics on public discourse, subchapter 5.2.4.

For more on the above mentioned shortcomings in the statistics on immigrant education in Poland see Gmaj, K. (2011). Immigrant Pupils – Realities and Challenges of Polish Schools. In M. Ziótek-Skrzypczak and G. Gandeberger (Eds.) *Labor Market Integration of Immigrant Youth: Challenges for Education and Economy in Germany and Poland*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Wema.

⁸⁴⁵ Central Statistical Office. (2010). Higher Education Institutions and Their Finances in 2010. Warsaw: Central Statistical Office.

The right to higher education is guaranteed to all immigrants holding a residence permit (visa or residence cards or citizens of the EU member states). However, unlike Polish students, immigrants have to pay tuition, which is not fixed and depends on the type of university and the major. Students may be exempted from paying tuition by the head of a higher education unit on a case by case basis. As a rule each student must have a residence permit to be able to enter any higher education institution. However, exceptions to this rule are not ruled out. Anecdotal evidence suggests that no clear pattern exists for acceptance or rejection of undocumented candidates who apply for admission directly to the head of a given unit.

If immigrants have completed their secondary education abroad, recognition of foreign academic qualifications is a prerequisite for their admission to higher education in Poland. Their certificates may be recognized on the basis of existing bilateral agreements on the equivalence of education with other countries or if such an agreement does not exist through the process of nostrification. Nostrification is a procedure which compares foreign certificates to Polish ones by competent authorities who can either accept or reject an application for nostrification. Education superintendents of a given region make decisions with regard to school and maturity certificates.⁸⁴⁶ Higher education institutions, which are authorized to confer the academic degree of PhD in the corresponding field of study to the one completed abroad are responsible for recognizing higher education diplomas (university degrees).⁸⁴⁷ Such a recognition system is thoroughly decentralized in Poland and seems quite complicated for an individual seeking a responsible authority. Fortunately, the Department of Recognition of Diplomas at the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, a central coordinating and counseling body, offers assistance at the national level to both individuals and institutions.

Similarly, there is a national Unit for Coordination of the Professional Qualification Recognition System, which can help immigrant youth and immigrant service providers find an authority responsible for recognizing professional experience gained abroad.⁸⁴⁸ According to employees at the Unit there has been a strong increase in the demand for consultations by potential employers and employees.⁸⁴⁹

⁸⁴⁶ The requirement to recognize immigrants' school certificates below the level of secondary education was abandoned with the new regulation of April 2010, which provides immigrant children in Poland easier access to primary school.

⁸⁴⁷ Minister of Education and Science. (2006, April 6). Regulation on the Nostrification of School Certificates and Maturity Certificates Obtained Abroad. Journal of Laws, No. 63, item 443. Minister of Education and Science. (2006, February 24). Nostrification of Higher Education Diplomas Obtained Abroad. Journal of Laws of 3rd March, 2006, No. 37, item 255 with further amendments.

⁸⁴⁸ This system is regulated by the EU Recognition of Professional Qualifications Directive 2005/36/EC, see subchapter 4.4.3.

⁸⁴⁹ According to my telephone conversation with one of the workers in the Unit, there is a steady growth in the number of immigrants who seek advise on the recognition of foreign qualifications in Poland (with 8- 10 phone calls a day answered in the Unit).

There is a list of more than 330 so-called regulated professions in Poland with the list of the authorities entitled to recognize the professional qualifications in a given field. If the profession is not regulated in Poland, the decision on the recognition of foreign qualifications can be made by the employer, who can require the recognition of education obtained abroad.

No studies thus far have monitored the success of this complicated procedure for the recognition of both academic and professional qualifications. Moreover, little is known at the national level of the extent to which immigrants have to do jobs which are below their academic qualifications. Therefore, the degree of success with regard to the coordination of the recognition procedure can only be speculated on by local site research and the basis of individual cases. The awareness of the problem is crucial to evaluating the educational opportunities for young immigrants and their qualifications on the labor market. In fact, the situation on the labor market is not always conducive to the employment of foreign workers on an equal basis with Poles.

4.6.7 Labor Market

The employment figures for legal immigrants in Poland is regarded as insignificant due to the relatively low number of immigrants as well as due to the quite complicated application procedure for getting a work permit. In fact, the procedure is complicated for all parties in the application process: immigrants, potential employers and local agencies. First, employers must first apply to the appropriate voivode for a work permit for the immigrant who they wish to employ.

A work permit can be issued after the status of the local labor market has been evaluated by the regional Labor Market Agency. Beginning in the 1990s the application procedures were changed a number of times with the goal of creating longer and stricter application procedures until the Polish labor market experienced shortages. Then, the first liberalization steps were taken, which was regarded as a promising sign for boosting foreign employment in Poland. In August 2006 the right to employ workers from the Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia without work permits for three months in a given period of six months was granted for the agricultural sector and one year later in the construction branch. The pressure on the labor market for skilled and unskilled workers forced further modifications. On February 1, 2008 the legal duration of work without a work permit was extended from three to six months in a given period of twelve months for Ukrainians, Belarusians and Russians. These provisions have been also extended to the nationals of the countries that signed mobility partnerships with the EU: for Moldavians (June 2008) and Georgians (November 2009). The new law from January 2009 changed the former two-step employment procedure into a simpler one-step process and reduced the number of

documents required for work permit applications. These new developments seem to facilitate immigrant employment. According to recent data from the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, in 2009 there was a significant increase in work permits issued to immigrants (from 18,022 in 2008 to 29,340 in 2009).

However, there are still a number of cases where immigrants are exempted from the requirement of having a work permit. For this reason one should not draw conclusions about the level of immigrant employment based on the number work permits issued. In fact, the amount of legal employment is quite hard to measure due to a lack of comprehensive data. Estimates range from 0.07 to 0.55 % of the total population employed in the national economy in last few years, depending on various data sources.⁸⁵⁰

The legal framework in Poland makes legal employment possible without any work permit to all citizens of the European Union member states, Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland, or who have a permanent stay permit or are under international protection (refugee status, a tolerated stay or subsidiary protection). Generally, those with a visa or a residence permit for a specified period of time are required to have a work permit. There are, however, many exemptions from this rule. For example, immigrant students and immigrant graduates from Polish schools may take up legal employment. Since in most cases immigrant youth do not need to have a work permit, it is important to look at other potential restrictions on their access to the Polish labor market.

First, the level of unemployment and the status of the local labor market, which differs in all the Polish regions, has just as strong an impact on employment as the legal right to work for immigrant youth. The unemployment rate fluctuated in the years 2007-2009⁸⁵¹ but was generally quite stable in comparison to the overall increase experienced across the EU. The Polish national labor market has not become more protective towards employment of nationals because of the current recession. According to the IOM's report, the Polish government has not made any attempts to introduce more restrictive admission policies due to the economic crisis. Similarly, Poland did not introduce any restrictive admission policies at the time of the crisis, like some other EU countries did.⁸⁵² In fact, the economic recession has not sparked any significant changes in the number of work permits issued in Poland. It might also be assumed, though due to the lack of appropriate data one cannot say with certainty, that the economic crisis has not played an important role for the employment of those who do not need work permits, either.

Secondly Polish employers' skepticism about employing foreign workers might be another deciding factor for immigrant integration into the labor market. In fact, employers

⁸⁵⁰ Górný, A. et al. (Eds.), op. cit.

⁸⁵¹ Unemployment and Labor Market in Poland 2010. (2011, January 10). *Portal Instytucji Rynku Pracy* (Portal of Labor Market Institution).

⁸⁵² Koehler, J., Laczko, F., Aghazarm, C., and Schad, J. (2010). *Migration and the Economic Crisis in the European Union: Implications for Policy*. Brussels: Research and Publications Division, IOM.

might not be aware of all legal measures required to employ an immigrant, so that the unclear procedures or lack of promotion of foreign workers on the Polish labor market makes the demand for the foreigners quite insignificant. As Polish researchers acknowledge, immigrants are often thought to be taking jobs away from native workers rather than complementing native workers, a point repeatedly emphasized by my interviewees. Employers usually hire foreign workers when they cannot find Polish ones with the proper skills (e.g. can speak a foreign language or have international experience that immigrants usually have) or when the position has been left vacant by Polish workers and cannot be easily filled.⁸⁵³ However, employers seem to be less reluctant to employ immigrants once they have already had a good experience with one from the same ethnic group.⁸⁵⁴

Finally, the segmentation of the Polish labor market among different ethnic groups is another important factor for the successful integration of immigrants into the Polish workforce.⁸⁵⁵ This ethnic segmentation has its roots in the Polish transition period, during which the labor market was opened for new investments from the West and cheap labor from the East. Consequently, since the opening of the borders in the 1990s foreigners from Western Europe and the US have found employment on the primary labor market only, people from Asia have been employed in the primary and secondary sectors whereas foreigners from the former Soviet Union have primarily worked in the low skilled sectors of the secondary labor market.⁸⁵⁶ By the same token, the irregular labor market was and still is supported by the employment of the Eastern transit migrants from the East in the low-skill sector. The exact figures are not known but according to various estimates they oscillate between 0.4 and 3.5 % of the Polish workforce.⁸⁵⁷ However, the aforementioned recent changes in regulations regarding seasonal workers in 2006 might have contributed to regularization of irregular workers from Eastern Europe and consequently reduced illegal employment.⁸⁵⁸ The reforms may be regarded as one of the very few first steps taken towards labor market integration for youth from the East seeking employment in Poland. On the one hand, the seasonal work program is aimed at circular migration and temporary migration, whose main objective is not long-term integration.⁸⁵⁹ On the other hand, the program may encourage and enable immigrant youth from the East to look for a longer term legal work opportunities in Poland. This might happen through new contacts and networks

⁸⁵³ Ibid.

⁸⁵⁴ See subchapter 5.2.4.

⁸⁵⁵ The segmentation of the labor market refers to the division of the labor market into two sectors: the primary and secondary sectors, see subchapter 2.2.

⁸⁵⁶ Iglicka, K. (2000). *Ethnic Division on Emerging Foreign Labor Markets in Poland during the Transition Period*. Warsaw: Center of Migration Studies.

⁸⁵⁷ Górný, A. et al. (Eds.), op. cit.

⁸⁵⁸ The policy has probably resulted in an increase in the number of employers' declarations to employ currently unregistered immigrants, substituting unregistered employment for the legal employment of foreigners.

⁸⁵⁹ As mentioned before seasonal programs impose the requirement that immigrants leave the country after a period of six months, see subchapter 4.6.5.

they might build during the seasonal work, so that they would not need to risk clandestine and insecure work.

The labor market's ethnic segmentation not only puts immigrants at the risk of having little job security but also of having jobs, which do not match their qualifications. Although, as mentioned before, no reports are available detailing how many immigrants' qualifications have been recognized in Poland, based on my interviews in Warsaw it appears that both long-term and temporary migrants in the low sector find it difficult to make use of their qualifications. In many cases immigrants also have qualifications which do not match Polish labor market needs.⁸⁶⁰ In fact, third country nationals in Poland face similar hurdles as in other EU countries in matching their current jobs with the qualifications they have obtained. The complicated recognition procedures, elaborated in the last section, is not solely a Polish problem. Unfortunately, in 2006, in the European rating on Integration, MIPEX, Poland was the second to last place in the area of open labor market access to immigrants.⁸⁶¹ Time will show whether the first simplifications of the procedure for making a work permit application and the introduction of more attractive seasonal programs will create more opportunities for both immigrants living in Poland now and those who come here in the future.

In the country where labor is officially allowed as of the age of 16 and where the birth rate is decreasing, in the future a demographic priority might lead to opening the Polish labor market to those young immigrants who seek future employment across Europe after graduation. Most of the current talks about foreign labor in the media are about the forthcoming 2012 UEFA European Football Championship (EURO 2012), which has sparked a need for foreign labor mostly in the secondary sector. However, the EURO 2012 is instead an incentive to fill the labor market gap for low skilled workers in the construction sector, which does not necessarily foster immigrants' potential or their upward mobility.

The issue of integration measures on the labor market in Poland is still not recognized at national level. Consequently, integration of one specific group of immigrant youth has not won enough attention among policy makers either. The Polish national mode of integration still does not offer favorable conditions for integration management at the local level. The facilitating measures seem to come from the EU level rather than from the Polish national government. The extent to which these EU and national integration frameworks and instruments facilitate and hinder management of local integration will be presented in the Polish case study of the city of Warsaw in chapter 5.

⁸⁶⁰ See my interview with the Polish Humanitarian Action on the case of certain professions from Chechnya, appendix 9.

⁸⁶¹ The EU Framework for Qualifications of Third Country Nationals is still in development in most of the EU member states, see subchapter 4.4.3.

5 Local Integration Management in the City Case Studies

The different top-down contexts for local integration management of immigrant youth on both sides of the Atlantic, presented in chapter 4, demonstrate just how difficult it is to establish one universal approach to integration. Neither the US nor the EU has thus far been successful in creating a single approach and probably will never be. In fact, even individual US states and EU countries have yet to develop immigrant policies which could be applied universally at the local level. Integration management of immigrant youth in cities, which are the primary gateways for immigrants in countries and states, is powerfully impacted by unique local factors which have not yet been mentioned in the analysis of the top-down framework. Consequently, this chapter will present local integration frameworks and practical efforts toward immigrant integration in city case studies focusing on San Diego, Phoenix, Munich and Warsaw. Two levels of consideration and two modes of analysis, collective and separate, are at work here. Firstly, the cities will be briefly examined from a comparative perspective as the context and gateways to integration for both young immigrants and the receiving society. Secondly, the integration work of local organizations will be analyzed separately for each local case study against the background of top-down national and state policies and the cities' own mode(s) of integration.

5.1 Local Context: City Integration Profiles

Drawing on the AIM thesis, which posits that integration is a multi-dimensional process resulting out of the encounter between the receiving society and immigrants, two contexts of integration should be differentiated: city integration contexts for immigrants and city integration context for the receiving society. These contexts will be presented through the prism of the available statistical data from the end of 2009, the time which marked the completion of empirical data collection in these cities.

The first context is presented in table 5, which gives an overview of the cities' demographics and employment conditions against national averages (in the case of Munich and Warsaw) or state averages (in the case of San Diego and Phoenix). In fact, the size and economic prosperity of a given city determines the level of available opportunities for young immigrants behind its gates. All case studies are quite prosperous metropolises in their respective countries and states with a high potential for attracting immigrants from local areas. Although the situation on the labor market is slightly worse in American cities in comparison to the European ones, overall all cases represent booming economic centers, commonly regarded as places with lots of employment opportunities. This might be one of the deciding factors in respect to why immigrants choose these cities as their destinations.

Table 5 City Integration Context for Immigrants
(Data for 2009)

	San Diego	California	Phoenix	Arizona	Munich	Germany	Warsaw	Poland
<i>Total Population, [thousand]</i> ¹	1,306	38,293	1,594	6,596	1,330	81,802	1,714	38,167
<i>Area [km²]</i>	963	423,970	1,344	295,254	310	357,114	516	312,679
<i>Unemployment rate</i> ²	10.3 %	12.2 %	8.3%	9.7%	5.8%	7,8%	2.9%	11.9 %
<i>Average salary *hourly **monthly</i> ³	22.53 \$*	23,82 \$*	19.50 \$*	19.67 \$*	[4290 \$] *	4608 \$ **	1561 \$ **	1107 \$ **

Sources:

¹ 2009 American Community Survey, German Federal Statistical Office (Destatis), Central Statistical Office in Poland

² US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Statistisches Amt München – ZIMAS., Polish Central Statistical Office

³ Government Revenue in the United States of America, Eurostat, Statistisches Amt München – ZIMAS. (Available data are only for the State of Bavaria, it is assumed that the average salary in Munich is higher).

City integration context for the receiving society refers to the migration situation which native residents confront in these cities. The numerical picture of this situation is presented through the scale and types of migration inflows into the cities in table 6. In comparison to the other cities' migration situation, Warsaw significantly differs, with the share of foreigners of the total population more than 20 times lower. The most diversified immigrant groups in 2009 were found in Munich whereas the largest proportion of one single group was reported in Phoenix (61% of Mexicans). The percentage of immigrant youth among whole youth population was very high in Munich (28%) and quite large in Phoenix (22%), whereas fewer young immigrants were reported in San Diego (15% of the whole young population).

While the countries of immigrants' origin are similar in American cities, no such trend can be seen in Munich and Warsaw. Such a difference could be viewed as surprising, since the difference in distance between the two cities in two neighboring US states and the two cities of two neighboring EU varies by only slightly more than 300 km.⁸⁶² This shows that the metropolis of Warsaw still attracts the traditional Polish immigrants from the countries of the former Soviet-Bloc: Asians and East Europeans.

⁸⁶² The distance between Warsaw and Munich is 810 km, between San Diego and Phoenix 490 km.

Table 6 City Integration Context for the Host Society
(Data for 2009)

	San Diego ¹	Phoenix ²	Munich ³	Warsaw [Masovian Voivodeship] ⁴
Total foreign born	325,819	346,430	308,569	No data available [33,930]
Percent foreign population	25%	22%	25% (36% people with a migration background)	[0,7%] (?)
Share of immigrant youth of total youth *(18-24) **(18-25)	15%*	25%*	28%**	No data available
Top 5 countries of origin (percentage of all foreigners)	Mexico (61%) Canada (4%) India (3%), Philippines (3%) China (2%)	Mexico (48%) Philippines (13%) Vietnam (5%) China (4%) Iraq (2%)	Turkey (13%) Croatia (8%) Austria (7%) Italy (7%) Greece (7%)	[Ukraine (20%) Vietnam (16%) Belarus (8%) Russia (6%) China (3%)]
Gateway category ⁵	emerging gateway	post-World War II gateway	continuous gateway	pre-emerging gateway (coming soon?)

Sources:

¹ 2009 American Community Survey. Data on top 5 countries of origin refer to San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA Metro Area.

² 2009 American Community Survey. Data on top 5 countries of origin refer to Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ Metro Area.

³ Statistisches Amt München – ZIMAS.

⁴ Polish Office for Foreigners. Due to the shortcoming of the Polish methods of collecting data on immigrants, data on foreigners are only available for voivodeships, not for the cities. According to the estimates from 2002, 71 % of foreigners in Masovian Voivodeship lived in Warsaw.⁸⁶³ It is assumed that today foreigners account for about 1,5% population in Warsaw. Improvements in monitoring the numbers of immigrants in Poland are expected in 2011.

⁵ On the basis of Audrey Singers' terminology, see chapter 3.

5.2 Integration Work

Differing city integration profiles lead to unique conditions for the development of integration initiatives within city gates. On the other hand, organizations in the local case studies frequently face similar challenges in carrying out integration work locally. The analysis of the similarities and differences in managing the integration of immigrant youth in the different cities will be guided by the thematic topics of the interview questions employed in the research.⁸⁶⁴ Accordingly, the following issues, which focus on the labor market integration of immigrant youth, will be discussed in each case study against the background of top-down integration policies and the local integration context:

- understanding of immigrant integration
- integration challenges

⁸⁶³ Piekut, A. (2008). *Foreigners in Warsaw*. Warsaw: Center of Migration Research.

⁸⁶⁴ For more on interview question groups, see subchapter 3.6.

- integration measures
- reaching out to immigrants and the host society
- network-building

I would like to point out from the beginning that the analysis of the local case studies will be based on data collected during the period of my field work in the cities, which preceded certain important developments in both the state and national policies discussed in chapter 4.⁸⁶⁵ Moreover, the account of local integration management will be presented through the lens of interviews held with a limited number of organizations and therefore cannot be considered comprehensive enough to draw general conclusions about all organizations working in the field of immigrant integration in a given city. Nevertheless, the profiles of the organizations interviewed encompass all important fields of work toward the integration of immigrant youth: education, workforce development, special refugee programs,⁸⁶⁶ as well as municipal offices involved in immigrant integration work. It is noteworthy that the scope of the programs discussed is not always restricted to the particular city but sometimes encompasses other metropolitan regions. Appendix 2 provides an overview of the interviewees and their institutions on a city by city basis.

5.2.1 San Diego

5.2.1.1 Perception of Immigrant Integration

It is almost impossible to avoid the subject of undocumented immigrants when talking about immigrant integration in the border city San Diego, “the birthplace” of the first border fence on the Mexican–US border. Nevertheless, few respondents’ interpretations of the integration process were determined by the legal status of the immigrants. Perhaps because of the proximity to Mexico and the fact that immigrants have always been an integral part of San Diegans’ daily lives, undocumented immigrants seem to have already blended into the city structure.⁸⁶⁷ As the 2007 Immigration Survey of San Diego County Voters showed, most respondents believe that undocumented immigrants are trying to make a better life for themselves and their families and returning all undocumented immigrants in the US to their countries of birth is impractical.⁸⁶⁸

⁸⁶⁵ Consequently, changes in the scope of integration work as well as the positions of interviewees in their organizations may have undergone certain changes in the meantime. For more on the empirical research methodology, see chapter 3.

⁸⁶⁶ Refugee programs often constitute a separate and distinct unit of immigrant integration work.

⁸⁶⁷ This contrasts with those in new immigration gateways for unauthorized populations, like in Phoenix.

⁸⁶⁸ See the report: Immigrant Rights Consortium of San Diego County (2007). *Immigration Survey of San Diego County Voters*. Presentation.

From the outset, most of the organizations I interviewed interpreted immigrant integration through the lens of their program goals: integration stands for what they are trying to achieve through their work. Two interesting interpretations of integration, proposed by Pedro Rios from American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), illustrate the processes of integration in San Diego: survival in the short term and adaptation in the long term. In the long run, as Rios pointed out, for those who do not have a work permit but wish to stay there is no standard way to integrate into the labor market. In practice, however, many immigrants simply want to survive and fit in, to be able to earn money, and later return to their home countries. They have no aspirations to become American citizens. Consequently, the AFSC views integration as a formal relationship between immigrants and Americans which can be proved by documents. As Rios maintained, “[i]n a more realistic sense, integration is acquiring the job where they can get their paycheck to meet the immediate needs of their families [...]”⁸⁶⁹

Following the principles of the US Refugee Program, Mike McKay at Resettlement Agency Catholic Charities considered the integration of immigrants into American society as the process of immigrants “getting on their own feet” and becoming independent: “that is the work of the agency, to make them [refugees] realize they have to start on their own like every American has to do.” In other words, integration of immigrant youth means that they have the same opportunities as American youth. According to McKay, nobody will give immigrants assistance in achieving the goals which every American has to achieve on his or her own, e.g. obtaining an entry-level job to afford studying. Consequently the sooner immigrants learn the language, the better their chances of speeding up the process of attaining equal opportunity with other Americans.⁸⁷⁰

In fact, not only English language skills but also bilingualism were emphasized quite often by most interviewees as a key to success in San Diego for both immigrants and Americans. As Bobby Brown from Job Corps remarked, “[i]t is increasingly important to speak Spanish now. It can hinder them [immigrants] not to speak English, but it is a plus to speak Spanish. No matter how we stand on immigration issues, it is important that folks are bilingual.”⁸⁷¹ San Diego is a living example of how both immigrants and the host society influence each other and change the demands of the local labor market and the conventions of social interaction.⁸⁷² Many organizations interviewed emphasized the indispensable contributions immigrants make to the development of local economies. As Kurt Farrington from Youth One Stop Career Center reported, people in San Diego “have been dealing with

⁸⁶⁹ Interview SD/1.

⁸⁷⁰ Interview SD/13.

⁸⁷¹ Interview SD/7.

⁸⁷² During my field visit to an informal pickup site for day laborers in front of the Home Depot in San Diego, I came across a group of seven men waiting to be hired. Ironically, there was one American man who was not able to communicate with the other six who were immigrants and spoke only Spanish.

immigrants for years” and consequently the immigrant population has become deeply involved in the economic structure of the city.⁸⁷³

However, fast integration through gaining employment as quickly as possible, is not always considered the best option for young immigrants. As Christina Piranio, coordinator of Youth Programs at the International Rescue Committee (IRC), pointed out, immigrant youth should first learn about the American system of education and become familiar with the norms and values, in order to feel that a city is a safe and secure place, not only physically but also psychologically. San Diego should become the place where they can be accepted as they are: “Integration is about learning from the standpoint where you really are and at the same time celebrating where you really come from ...”⁸⁷⁴ Consequently, the development of immigrants’ emotions and skills should be fostered by setting high career expectations, like a college education sometime in the future. “Education should be first” - said Somsack Thongchanh, a police service officer and the coordinator of the San Diego Asian Youth Organization (SDAYO).⁸⁷⁵ In fact, many organizations admitted that some immigrants seek only fast and easy employment opportunities but do not want to learn English and obtain an education. By the same token, young immigrants easily go through a downward integration to the margins of San Diego society. In fact, a lack of motivation among immigrants often results in drug addictions and frustration, Waldo Lopez from the Day Labor Center observed.⁸⁷⁶ Consequently, many organizations regard the labor market integration of immigrant youth as more than getting a low-skilled job but first and foremost as something requiring continuing education.

Immigrants’ involvement in their communities was considered the third important element, alongside employment and education, for immigrant integration. Since many immigrants in San Diego still cluster within ethnic enclaves,⁸⁷⁷ the development of their own organizations and leadership skills in their communities is considered a higher priority. As the representatives of SDAYO emphasized, they want to see their community involved in their youth programs: “everybody is supposed to be a leader.”⁸⁷⁸ According to the philosophy of the community development agency Casa Familiar in the community of San Ysidro, the next important step for immigrant integration is to find a way to “integrate outside of the community” and to “live up to [the standards of] a larger and more diverse society.”⁸⁷⁹ In other words, integrating into the city in San Diego is not merely a question of mixing in with the host society but also with other immigrant groups.

⁸⁷³ Interview SD/11.

⁸⁷⁴ Interview SD/4.

⁸⁷⁵ Interview SD/5.

⁸⁷⁶ Interview SD/6.

⁸⁷⁷ See subchapter 5.1.

⁸⁷⁸ Interview SD/5.

⁸⁷⁹ Interviews SD/2 and SD/3.

5.2.1.2 Integration Challenges

One integration challenge young immigrants face is breaking away from their own communities and escaping future labor market segregation. As many organizations emphasized, the connections immigrants have to establish are prerequisites for finding a job in the city.⁸⁸⁰ In fact, immigrants' networks are often restricted to their ethnic communities. Consequently, the occupations of certain immigrant groups do not reflect the level of their skills but common ethnic origins. As Doug Elliot at Career Development Services remarked, the first generation of every group of immigrants confronts similar difficulties and people do not even realize that certain ethnic groups are working in certain professions. A stereotype in San Diego is that East Africans (usually from Somalia and Ethiopia), for example, work as taxi drivers, while Iraqis and Iranians find employment in liquor stores, Mexicans work predominantly as cooks, even in Chinese restaurants, and Filipinos take jobs as nurses.⁸⁸¹

Without providing more specific details, the IRC claimed that some refugee groups even seek illegal employment in their established communities, which of course has a negative impact on their future employment opportunities.⁸⁸² As Elliot pointed out, although San Diego is a big city, it tends to operate at times like a small town, and it is very easy to earn a certain reputation. Therefore, immigrant youth need to learn the system of getting a job in the city: "it is actually not about who you know, but who knows you," Elliot said. Consequently getting outside the ethnic community and gaining a reputation as a reliable and skilled worker is one sign of integration success for immigrant youth.

Credentials are certainly tools which can help immigrants to establish a good reputation as an educated professional. As counselor Sheyla Castillo from Transfer Academy remarked, "the tricky procedure of evaluation of foreign qualifications" in the US makes life difficult for educated immigrants in San Diego. Paradoxically, too many credits earned abroad may hinder acceptance by a university.⁸⁸³ As Castillo asserted, sometimes immigrants attend a particular higher education institution in San Diego only because the institution director is more lenient about formal recognition than in other schools.

In general, young immigrants in San Diego have found integration easier, and they are more willing to take risks, in comparison to older generations of immigrants, according to my source at Casa Familiar. On the other hand, they have to become more confident in using verbal and non-verbal communication to adjust to American realities. Quite often this takes place at the cost of rejecting their own cultural values and traits, as well as their

⁸⁸⁰ Interviews SD/4, SD/8, SD/11, and SD/16.

⁸⁸¹ Interview SD/4.

⁸⁸² Interview SD/8.

⁸⁸³ Students earn three credits for each course they take at the university level. If students have too many credits, they might be considered seniors so some universities will not accept them. Interview SD/10.

language, even in a society as multicultural as San Diego.⁸⁸⁴ Marilyn Harvey from Transfer Career Center argued, “American society is more much into the looks, hair, body ... I know the students who take the wrap-up off when they enter the school.”

Finally, the perseverance and motivation of immigrant youth quite often depends on parental involvement as well as the country of origin. For example, high drop-out rates have been reported by Job Corps among those who have an affiliation with the Mexican border city of Tijuana. It seems that having relatives just across the border sometimes distracts young immigrants from completing their education in San Diego. As Brown admitted, immigrant students often leave the campus, cross the border, and Job Corps staff never hear from them again. Supposedly, they usually leave for family reasons. Either they have to earn a living or take care of their families in Mexico.

Integration challenges immigrant youth face in San Diego are obviously harsher for the undocumented than the documented. Federal programs such as Job Corps or youth programs funded by WIA money are unavailable to the undocumented in San Diego and elsewhere. Those without a work permit cannot easily find employers because companies have become more cautious about hiring somebody with a fake social security number, locally known as *chuecos*.⁸⁸⁵ They prefer to hire immigrants with a regulated status, which automatically improves employment prospects for refugees.⁸⁸⁶

Nevertheless, due to the introduction of slightly more liberal immigration policies in California, the problems which unauthorized immigrant youth face in San Diego are not as bad as those faced by immigrants living in Arizona cities.⁸⁸⁷ First of all, under the provisions of the California Immigrant Higher Education Act (AB 540) certain undocumented immigrants are granted in-state tuition, which guarantees them equal access to higher education with all other California residents,⁸⁸⁸ although undocumented students still cannot apply for federal and state grants and loans. Because the City of San Diego boasts “don’t ask, don’t tell” sanctuary policies,⁸⁸⁹ most of the public and private organizations interviewed tend to be more open about the issues of unauthorized youth, either trying to find funds for their education or options for legalizing their status, as the next section of this subchapter will show. Consequently, the undocumented can approach many institutions with more trust and less fear of deportation, although the ICE raids in the vicinity of the cities are still common. In fact, most undocumented immigrant youth, hereafter immigrant border youth (IB youth),⁸⁹⁰

⁸⁸⁴ Interview SD/5.

⁸⁸⁵ As mentioned before, the E-verification system is still not obligatory in California.

⁸⁸⁶ Interview SD/13.

⁸⁸⁷ Compare with next subchapter 5.2.2.

⁸⁸⁸ For more on AB 540, see subchapter 4.1.1.

⁸⁸⁹ For more on sanctuary cities in the US, see subchapter 4.2.

⁸⁹⁰ I use the term “immigrant border (IB) youth” to describe undocumented youth, who work illegally in US border areas. Although these youth do not live in the city, the problem is still considered significant by the organizations in the city which deal with young immigrants.

live in rural areas surrounding the City of San Diego and are thus excluded from the protection offered by the sanctuary policies. As Rios pointed out, more recently IB youth have often been as young as eleven. They try to make ends meet working in the fields around San Diego to support their families across the border. For this segmented group, AB 540 cannot help them deal with their disadvantages and insecurities about the future: they lack English language fluency, cultural competence, access to education resources, and can easily fall prey to border vigilantes. They are often completely dependent on their employers, working every day in the fields or on construction sites without much hope or time for any educational advancement. In fact, some of them abandoned their education and aspirations in their home countries to earn in the US.⁸⁹¹

5.2.1.3 Integration Measures

No official City of San Diego immigrant integration policy exists which would set the framework for immigrant integration work. The Citizens Equal Opportunity Commission and the Human Rights Commission are the city agencies which advise the mayor, City Council, Civil Service Commission, and other agencies of city government on issues concerning equal opportunity, including equal opportunity in employment for various ethnic groups in San Diego.⁸⁹² Nevertheless, without much steering from the city, various public and private non-profit organizations offer a wide range of measures for integrating immigrants of various age groups into the labor market. Quite often they have a long tradition of working within various ethnic communities in the city and its surroundings.

Integration work for youth is either part of the comprehensive intergenerational community programs, like those of the community development agency Casa Familiar or specific youth projects, which rarely aim only at immigrant youth. Integration work for refugees in the ORR programs in San Diego is one of the few exceptions. The resettlement agency Catholic Charities, federally funded by ORR's Wilson Fish Program, is responsible for orientation programs solely targeting refugee families. The programs provide language training and a case manager for each refugee family. The manager acts "as an anchor" for refugee youth by offering them potential educational opportunities and fast job placement options.⁸⁹³ On the other hand, the IRC, another leading resettlement agency in San Diego, has managed to develop programs for other disadvantaged immigrant youth, primarily through funds from private donors. "That is why we are able to serve not only the refugee

⁸⁹¹ Based on my unrecorded conversations with Border Angels and IB youth during my field visits to the rural areas and canyons around San Diego, where undocumented immigrants from Oaxaca tend to reside.

⁸⁹² See City of San Diego. Citizens Equal Opportunity Commission. Web page: <http://www.sandiego.gov/eoc/about/commission.shtml>

⁸⁹³ Interview SD/13.

population but anyone who is in the need,” said Piranio, explaining the rationale behind fundraising from sources other than the ORR program.⁸⁹⁴ As a result the IRC’s After School Youth Program can provide additional academic assistance and college preparation resources to all immigrant newcomers at the Crawford Educational Complex, one of the most diverse campuses in the San Diego Unified School District. In addition to educational support, the IRC organizes enrichment activities, such as workshops, tournaments, and field trips to the City of San Diego. All of these activities aim to develop the young people’s skills, interests, tolerance of cultural differences, and to foster integration with the community outside of the school and the white American society.⁸⁹⁵ The main pedagogical method of the program is to establish dialog with young immigrants rather than provide authoritarian teaching. As the program manager pointed out:

We do not encourage to change students. We often have to communicate that things are done different in the US, so sometimes you have to change to be successful [...] We do not teach them that in the classroom, but in conversation[,] we provide this space for conversation during the program activities. You can call it counseling, [but] we do not.⁸⁹⁶

In fact, this interdisciplinary immigrant youth program has become a model for other refugee agencies, as the next subchapter will show.

Surprisingly, not all youth programs promote a similar intercultural dialog between different ethnic groups, as promoted by the IRC program. As the representatives of SDAYO admitted, they are open for everybody; however, they do not mix activities with other ethnic groups such as the African Youth Program or the Latino Youth Program: “Everybody has the same goal to work within your own ethnic groups.”⁸⁹⁷ Of note, though, is the fact that SDAYO focuses on the development of leadership and organizational skills under the supervision of adult advisors from the San Diego Police Department. The activities range from fun activities to fundraising and establishing contact with the business sector for SDAYO’s young members, who are usually 13-18 years of age. It is a unique cooperation between immigrant youth and police officers who exemplify a true commitment to immigrant integration and youth development, breaking down the barriers of fear and mistrust of the police in the ethnic communities.⁸⁹⁸

⁸⁹⁴ Interview SD/4.

⁸⁹⁵ The white students are a minority (10%) in the Crawford Educational Complex. The city complex, located in the City Heights neighborhood, is one of the most neglected areas, with high poverty and violent crime rates related to cultural clashes in the city. Interview SD/4.

⁸⁹⁶ Interview SD/4.

⁸⁹⁷ Interview SD/5.

⁸⁹⁸ The emotional engagement of Police Officer Somsack Thongchanh in youth activities and the strong bond with their members which I noticed during my meeting with him and SDAYO members at the San Diego Police Office was unquestionable. Interview SD/5.

The San Diego Police Department's immigrant integration initiatives are in fact rather small in comparison to those of other important San Diego public stakeholders in youth labor market integration. San Diego Continuing Education (SDCE), a non-credit educational institution which is part of the San Diego Community College District (SDCCD), the public community college division in the city, provides a wide range of courses and programs, most of which are free, to support older immigrant youth who need ELL or GDE preparation courses, citizenship classes, or want to proceed with higher education.⁸⁹⁹ A special, relatively new unit – Career Development Service – focuses exclusively on the transition into the workforce of all interested applicants for the career preparation program. The unit offers workforce counseling, online resources, contacts with employers, job fairs, and labor market information. As career counselor Elliot put it, his service functions as “workforce brokers,” mediating the relationship between the business community and the students.⁹⁰⁰

Another noteworthy new division of the SDCE, the Advanced ESL Transfer Academy, offers extra counseling to higher-level ESL groups with at least a Bachelor's degree. As the Academy's counselor Castillo remarked, her clients usually have different backgrounds and educational needs than limited-literacy ESL students. They do not necessarily want to immediately find jobs but hope to develop their English competencies and professional careers in the US. Workshops on the US education system, labor market education opportunities, and recognition of qualifications are at the core of the innovative program.⁹⁰¹ Additionally, as a local coordinator of CalWORKs confirmed, SDCE also offers eligible documented young adults with children a state welfare work-study program.⁹⁰² During the intake assessment, the counselor helps eligible immigrants determine their personal interests, strengths, and the job fields which would best match their qualifications and/or interests.⁹⁰³

Moreover, in cooperation with the San Diego Unified School District, the San Diego Community College District provides a unique opportunity to less motivated and younger students to get a taste of college education and on-the-job training in a 16 week program at City Middle College (CMC). The aim of the program is to boost the motivation and confidence of low-performing students who are at risk of dropping out of Garfield High School, a San

⁸⁹⁹ The San Diego Community College District consists of three community colleges (San Diego City College, San Diego Mesa College, and San Diego Miramar College) and the public, non-credit educational institution San Diego Continuing Education with six campuses in San Diego: Center City, César Chávez, Educational Cultural Complex (ECC), Mid-City, North City, and West City. See the website <http://www.sdccd.edu/public/district/>

During my empirical research in San Diego, I was able to reach the coordinators of labor market integration programs in San Diego City College and ECC (interviews SD/8, SD/9, SD/10.)

⁹⁰⁰ Interview SD/8.

⁹⁰¹ Both Career Development Services and the Transfer Academy were newly-established services at the time of my June 2008 field visits.

⁹⁰² CalWORKs is a California welfare program which benefits those non-citizens who are not eligible for the federally funded TANF.

⁹⁰³ See my conversation with CalWORKs' intake coordinator Juan Serrano, interview SD/16.

Diego school with many immigrant students, both documented and undocumented. Each student who participates in the program goes through a preparation course, a so-called “get-ready-for-the-catapult/boot camp,” on the school premises. The course focuses on team-building, creative problem-solving, study skills, and career awareness. Only later does a student attend college classes, assisted by a private mentor, usually a college peer student. Employment preparation courses, including visiting various vocational programs, and career planning are important components of the college units. Finally, the course ends with a two week internship. As one CMC counselor noted, the program has successfully lowered the drop out rate and helped more Garfield students improve their educational performance.⁹⁰⁴

One of the important funding sources for workforce development measures for eligible youth in the city comes from the Local Workforce Investment Board of the San Diego Workforce Partnership, a non-profit organization that manages job-training programs, including one-stop career centers, on behalf of the City and County of San Diego. The Workforce Partnership grants federal WIA money not only to public institutions like the San Diego Community College District, but also to many youth service providers who facilitate the school-to-work transition of at-risk youth, aged 14 to 21. Some of the providers target more specific groups, like the One Stop Youth Center which serves only pupils from a nearby Juvenile Court and Community School (JCCS): students who were expelled or are delinquent, living with a foster family, homeless, gang-affiliated, or on probation. Others youth service providers like ACCESS YES Transition Network are open to a wider variety of groups of low-income students who are either enrolled in a regular public high school and need assistance in obtaining a high school diploma, or those who attend Charter Schools or simply want to sign up for GED courses.⁹⁰⁵ Nevertheless, each of the WIA youth providers can also serve immigrant youth with documents, following WIA criteria guidelines.

However, helping those without a Social Security Number is only possible in cases when the regulations of program donators do not explicitly prohibit serving the undocumented population. Consequently, the After School Youth Program of IRC, financed by the California Department of Education’s ASSETs Program, is open to all immigrants regardless of their status.⁹⁰⁶ Similarly, Casa Familiar manages to obtain city and county community development grants which do not exclude services to the undocumented. As

⁹⁰⁴ During my interview at City Middle College, many of the issues discussed were connected with raising funds for undocumented students (see sections below). At the request of the interviewee, the conversation was not recorded and her last name is not used. For more information on City Middle College, see the description of the CMC program at the website of the San Diego City College <http://www.sdcity.edu/AcademicPrograms/ProgramsofInstruction/CityMiddleCollegeCMC>

⁹⁰⁵ Only during my interview with the One Stop Youth Career Center did I find out that not more than 10% of their clients were immigrants. See Interview SD/11. Due to time constraints of my field work in San Diego I was unable to approach those youth providers whose primary clients are immigrant youth. For example, I was not able to talk to ACCESS, which generally serves immigrants, as I learned during one of the monthly meetings of the *Workforce Partnership Youth Council* at the end of my stay in the city.

⁹⁰⁶ Interview SD/4.

Andrea Skorepa confirmed, “everybody can come to us; we do not care if you have papers or not.”⁹⁰⁷ Moreover, most of the organizations interviewed were talking openly about those who provide assistance to undocumented immigrants and, as they admitted, they tend to refer their undocumented clients to those who can provide help. For instance, the CEO of Workforce Partnership Mark Cafferty frankly admitted that resource centers at One Stop Career Centers are generally open to the public and consequently the undocumented can also use them.⁹⁰⁸ Some organizations, like ACCESS, even advertise their services to the undocumented population on their websites: “For nearly ten years, we have directed our efforts toward assisting Mexican immigrants, especially those who have no legal status in the US.”

Moreover, undocumented people are the main focus of the work of some pro-immigration groups in the city, the organization Border Angels among them. Founded by Enrique Morones, Border Angels gathers volunteers and activists fighting racial-discrimination crimes against immigrants. In the San Diego area, their main goal is to prevent the deaths of individuals crossing the Imperial Valley desert areas and the mountain areas surrounding San Diego County. In the city, they provide undocumented day laborers water and food at the informal pick-up sites and also hold community forums with immigrants, encouraging them to integrate, to get an education and better jobs. The Project Voice, a more structured integration program for the undocumented, led by the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), trains immigrant communities on leadership and labor market rights in the US.

Nonetheless, some organizations remain wary of talking about serving the undocumented. As Elliot admitted,

The official policy is “don’t ask, don’t tell.” We do not ask people whether they are here legally or illegally, and we do not want them even to tell, because when they tell, once we find out, technically we are not supposed to teach them.⁹⁰⁹

Similarly a CMC counselor was afraid of talking openly about funds raised to pay the tuition for college classes for undocumented students or to support the activities of Migrant Rights Awareness (MIRA), a student support group for undocumented students at the campus where she works. Neither Job Corps in San Diego, nor Day Labor Center wanted to elaborate on the activities of those who support immigrants without documents on the record. Nevertheless, it seems that there is a lot more transparency around the issue of providing help to undocumented youth in comparison to Phoenix, as subchapter 5.2.2 will show.

⁹⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁰⁸ Unfortunately, due to a technical problem, the interview with CEO Mark Cafferty was not recorded.

⁹⁰⁹ Interview SD/8.

5.2.1.4 Reaching Out to Immigrants and the Host Society

Many well-established public services for education and vocational training in San Diego, like San Diego Community College District or Job Corps, need no special methods for recruiting in the city. San Diego Continuing Education is one of the largest institutions of its kind in the US and continuing education courses are well-known among immigrants.⁹¹⁰ “Job Corps sells itself on its own [...] There are lots of things we can offer a younger person they cannot get anywhere,” Brown said. Immigrant youth usually learn about these opportunities by word of mouth, and few organizations think they need to run information campaigns. According to SDAYO, peer pressure is the best technique to involve others: “pulling my friends is pulling your friends.”⁹¹¹

Offering comprehensive family programs for immigrant communities is an important way of engaging immigrant youth in education and in labor market readiness courses. As Skorepa pointed out, a holistic approach to organizing educational programs for the community is very important. Adults who come to Casa Familiar to attend Parent Education Programs encourage their children to participate in a wide range of projects targeting youth: for example, courses in entrepreneurship or modern technology.⁹¹²

Certainly few integration offers can reach those who live outside the communities, like San Ysidro where Casa Familiar works. Just the same, some immigrant youth on the margins are not aware of the opportunities they have. To my question “Porque no quieres aprender Inglés (Why don’t you want to learn English),” a young day laborer from Guatemala in his 20s who couldn’t speak English said that he did not know anything about English language courses although he had been in San Diego for several years. Similarly, IB youth cannot even think about accessing the wide range of ESL courses in the sanctuary city. Fortunately, some clandestine civil society initiatives, friends of the Border Angels, try to give them a small taste of integration into American society and education. Weekly meetings after church services are a common place for English tutorials. This is a potential site for IB youth to come into contact with other immigrants and those Americans who want to interact with them and help the unauthorized in the local San Diego area.⁹¹³

Many of the above-mentioned integration initiatives targeting immigrant youth are the work of US born San Diegans. In fact, some institutions and agencies offer volunteer or paid opportunities to engage in work for underprivileged and immigrant youth. For example, the IRC recruits college students who are seeking internship opportunities in the field of

⁹¹⁰ Sánchez L. (2011, January 5). Training Provides Jobless Fresh Start. *San Diego Red*.

⁹¹¹ Interview SD/5.

⁹¹² Interview SD/2.

⁹¹³ Anti-immigration vigilantes set fire to one of the parishes which hosted undocumented immigrants in 2008. Because of the anti-immigrant atmosphere and acts of violence in the area, the sites of these gatherings and informal work for border youth education is secret.

education as volunteer tutors for The After School Program. San Diego City College students, in turn, are recruited as paid CMC mentors to assist Garfield students in their first college classes. Activist groups like Border Angels bring together volunteers to work with IB youth or to assist border crossers on the deserts. Through media campaigns as well as scientific research, the AFSC makes waves about immigrants' potential and the civil rights of immigrants, breaking taboos about unauthorized immigration in the city.

5.2.1.5 Network-Building

Network-building for immigrants, including immigrant youth, is an integral part of the integration work of civil society organizations in San Diego. In fact, during most of the interviews I was referred to at least three other partner organizations with which I should get in touch to get a more comprehensive understanding of the management of integration work in the city. Education about network building for immigrant rights is at the forefront of community building programs, like Project Voice of the AFSC, which provides guidelines and technical support for cooperation between immigrant communities and potential allies. As Rios pointed out, “[e]ach community group is not alone; they are part of a larger network. Our challenge is to help them and to find the way to communicate with each other.”⁹¹⁴ Additionally, the AFSC chairs the San Diego Rights Consortium (SDRC), a notable example of a fairly new (established in 2007) cross sector collaboration of twenty-two community, faith, labor, and legal organizations, based in the city (see appendix 3) The core goals of the network include supporting comprehensive immigration reform, fighting anti-immigration policies that violate the human rights of immigrants, educating immigrants about their rights, and informing the public about the important contributions immigrants make to the local society.⁹¹⁵

The City of San Diego Human Relations Commission's membership in the SDRC marks a significant engagement on the part of the city government in integration initiatives for immigrants. Moreover, the city also indirectly supports network-building among main workforce stakeholders through a consortium with San Diego County in the Workforce Partnership. Regular meetings of the Workforce Partnership Youth Council gather county youth service providers who are beneficiaries of WIA grants, and offers a platform for exchanging ideas and potentially collaborating on the issues of immigrant youth. It is not clear, however, to what extent the grant winners are willing to collaborate. Mark Nanzer from the Metro Region Career Center could only confirm that competition among NGOs hinders

⁹¹⁴ Interview SD/1.

⁹¹⁵ See San Diego Immigrant Rights Consortium. (n.d.). Memorandum of Understanding of the San Diego Immigrant Rights Consortium.

cooperation.⁹¹⁶ As a contact at Casa Familiar warned, many non-profits have become “for profits,” they have lost passion and have just become service providers, boasting about what they are doing. She also admitted that some immigration activists “[...] believe in their own press and are talking the talk but not walking the walk.”⁹¹⁷ However, it might be argued that they do not want to get headlines out of vanity but simply want bring to light local immigration issues that the wider public – both local and national – may not be aware of.⁹¹⁸ This is true for local organizations like Border Angels, who are not part of any national or worldwide network as are the International Rescue Committee or the American Friends Service Committee. In fact, for smaller organizations, going public is an important way of creating networks, gaining recognition, attracting volunteers, and reaching out to possible sponsors for their integration work.

5.2.2 Phoenix

5.2.2.1 Perception of Immigrant Integration

In none of the other case studies is immigrant integration such a controversial topic as in Phoenix. At the time of my empirical research in May 2008, nearly a year and a half after the passing of Proposition 300 and a full year after the passing of Arizona's Employer Sanctions Law, Phoenix was already the hot spot for US debates on immigration policies. Consequently, the interviewees' interpretation of immigrant integration presented here usually depends on the point of reference: integration of documented or undocumented immigrant youth. In fact, in Phoenix having legal status in the US is considered the main prerequisite for successful integration. The idea seems to be that once you have a job, you have already been integrated into the city. “Just” to be able to work legally you have to show proof of your legal residency. Jany Deng, a Somalian refugee at the AZ Lost Boys Center, claimed that if you do not have a job you will be isolated from your community. Interestingly enough, employment was considered even more important than education and learning the English language, since “[once you have a job] you have the resources to be a positive member of the community, which means you pay taxes, you are mobile, you buy food, and you are not a drain on the society.”⁹¹⁹ Accordingly, in order to integrate you have to compete, you have to learn the language on the work site, and you must overcome cultural barriers. The approach to integration at the AZ Lost Boys Center is reminiscent of the general position

⁹¹⁶ Interview SD/12.

⁹¹⁷ Interview SD/2.

⁹¹⁸ In fact, many of the interviewees were eager to share information about their work and were glad to hear that the information about what happens both in Phoenix and San Diego may reach a wider audience in Europe.

⁹¹⁹ Interview P/12.

of the ORR on the integration of refugees in the United States, which puts an emphasis on resettled people becoming self-sufficient in the shortest possible period of time.⁹²⁰ For obvious reasons, educators offered other points of views, placing great value on schooling as the first step toward integration. Post-high school education and college courses were thought to keep immigrants on the track to success. The ORR subcontractor, IRC in Phoenix, also questioned the pressure put on immigrant youth to make their way into the labor market as quickly as possible. “Children should be children. In the long term we want to help them to develop into the labor market. We want to focus on how to develop them into adults rather than how they are part of the labor market now,”- pointed out Jennifer Doran, program manager of the IRC’s Family and Youth Services.⁹²¹ Moreover, education also constitutes a way of surviving and integrating into society for youth without a Social Security Number. Trino Sandoval at Phoenix College argued that continuing education, and not job placement, seems to be the only reasonable plan for the near future for all undocumented youth, who will otherwise face harsh punishment for working in Arizona.⁹²²

The City of Phoenix has no agency which deals with immigrant integration as a concept and there is no official city policy. Generally, the phrase “immigrant integration” appears to be rarely used in the city government’s daily work.⁹²³ Many of the community-based organizations interviewed also seemed unclear about what integration actually meant once they started thinking about the concept during the interviews. Consequently, those who deal with integration work on a daily basis usually called the process something else. Several reasons for these differences could be observed. Jacquelyn Ehrenberg of the Florence Project, which provides legal services to men, women, and unaccompanied children detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in Arizona, admitted that in her organization they have not defined integration, as they lack the capacity to develop any comprehensive programs which would address services other than legal counseling.⁹²⁴ Charles Shipman, Arizona State Refugee Coordinator with headquarters in Phoenix, drew attention to differences in the understanding of integration between Europe and the US: “In America, even in refugee resettlement, you talk about dependence and independence and not about integration.”⁹²⁵ Shipman went on to say that integration is more about giving immigrants equal access to opportunities and freedom of choice in the American society, but said immigrants must choose what they want. Consequently, integration in America does not so much involve taking care of immigrants as European models seem to imply. In fact, similar to

⁹²⁰ For more on the concept of integration developed by the ORR, see subchapter 4.1.2. For more on a similar approach to integration by refugee agencies in San Diego, see subchapter 5.2.1.1.

⁹²¹ Interview P/10.

⁹²² Interview P/8.

⁹²³ Based on unrecorded informal conversations with representatives of the Public Information Office, the City of Phoenix.

⁹²⁴ Interview P/6.

⁹²⁵ Interview P/13.

the federal level, the rhetoric of integration is quite new in Phoenix. Raul Yzaguirre, former President and CEO of the National Council of La Raza (NCLR) remarked, “we don’t often use the word integration in this country.”⁹²⁶

No organization interpreted integration as a two way process which also imposes changes on the American society, as if a binary opposition existed between the two groups: the immigrants and American society. Identification with a given group depended on the background of a particular organization or interviewee. Obviously, representatives of Latino organizations, such as Friendly House or Chicanos por La Causa, seemed to identify with the Latino immigrant population. Acculturation to them is forgetting their Latino roots; assimilation, in turn, means working hard, learning English but still living in the worlds of two cultures, as Yzaguirre pointed out.⁹²⁷

The subject of immigrants in the workforce is a very loaded issue in light of the recently-introduced, obligatory E-verification system in Arizona and the lack of a comprehensive immigration reform program in the country. Bitterness and skepticism seemed to prevail among civil society organizations which serve the undocumented in Phoenix.⁹²⁸ Anthony Alberta, from Chicanos por la Causa, summarized the approach of American society to the labor market integration of immigrants ironically: “I am encouraging you and your grandchildren to pick lettuce because we will need somebody to do so.”⁹²⁹ He saw the core problem of illegal employment being agricultural employers who offer illegal work in the fields, rather than urban life in Phoenix. In general, the impression that immigrant integration in Phoenix is a very touchy issue prevailed among most of the respondents from both governmental and non-governmental organizations. None of them seemed to approve of federal migration policy, harsh Arizona immigration laws, and the controversial raids of Sheriff Joe Arpaio in Maricopa County. Many of these issues, in fact, overshadowed discussions of integration challenges for immigrant youth in Phoenix.

5.2.2.2 Integration Challenges

Propaganda against the undocumented hinders the integration of immigrant youth in Phoenix, for both those with and without papers, and causes a rift in discussions on local integration challenges. In fact, those organizations which deal with both groups on a daily basis tend to shift their attention towards the integration hurdles of the unauthorized population, which for obvious reasons are more challenging than those of legally-residing

⁹²⁶ Interview P/5.

⁹²⁷ Ibid.

⁹²⁸ Because of the current controversies over the issue of undocumented immigrants in Arizona, at the request of some of the interviewees who serve the undocumented population in Arizona, some names and the names of some organizations cannot be used in the dissertation.

⁹²⁹ Interview P/3.

immigrants. In fact, the hot topic of the precarious situation of people without documents in Phoenix fairly often took over all discussion about possible challenges faced by other immigrant groups, who were sometimes no longer even considered “immigrants.”⁹³⁰ On the other hand, in interviews with representatives of the City of Phoenix agencies and refugee resettlement agencies, who are not supposed to serve the undocumented, concentrated primarily on other groups of young immigrants, who purportedly mingle with others and do not stand out as a special, vulnerable group.⁹³¹

At the postsecondary education level, those who have papers have no trouble obtaining financial aid, a part time job, or gaining admission to a work-study program, Sandoval pointed out.⁹³² However, teachers at the K12 level pointed to education challenges such as the lack of bilingual education and enough ESL language programs or the lack of parental involvement in the education of their children. Those whose immigrant parents do not understand the American education system face more challenges in Phoenix.⁹³³ Nevertheless, at the high school level, a high drop out rate is reported among both immigrant and American youth. Therefore, remedial tutoring and motivation programs are needed for both groups, without clearly differentiating who is an immigrant and who is not, as the work of the youth service provider Arizona Call a Teen Center emphasized.⁹³⁴ In fact, motivation is sometimes even higher among immigrant students than natives. Sam Georgia from Job Corps Phoenix argued that immigrant students are even more motivated and independent. Their integration into Job Corps is said to be quite high there:

They take more advantage of the education and not as much of social activities; they try to more get a job and earn money [...] They strive a lot harder to accomplish what they are set up to do. They know what they want, they devote themselves to prospering in the future. They are on a mission. [...] They don't play the games, they are not yet Americanized.⁹³⁵

However, organizations which tend to deal more with refugees in Phoenix put more emphasis on the difficulties than the opportunities young immigrants face: a lack of trust in people, the struggle with cultural barriers, post-traumatic stress disorder, constant competition with natives for jobs, and gaining recognition of the potential they brought from their home countries.⁹³⁶ On the other hand, as in San Diego, refugees are much better off on

⁹³⁰ Sometimes during my interviews in Phoenix, immigrants were only associated with the unauthorized population. To my question whether one of the programs under discussion was for immigrants, the answer was: “No, for immigrants not; it will be for people who have a social security number.” See interview P/15.

⁹³¹ Interview P/9.

⁹³² Interview P/8.

⁹³³ Interviews P/11 and P/15.

⁹³⁴ Interview P/14.

⁹³⁵ Interview P/7.

⁹³⁶ The story of Riang, the older brother of my interviewee Jany Deng, one of the first Sudanese refugees in Arizona was one of the most moving cases of integration challenges which I heard during my field work in Phoenix. In 1997 because of his allegedly unresolved difficulties with integrating into

the labor market, ironically because of Arizona's harsh E-verification policy. They are considered a safe group of workers who can prove their legal status. Consequently, employers are more eager to approach resettlement agencies in search of potential workers.⁹³⁷

Generally, undocumented youth live in the shadow of Phoenix and have few options for integrating into the city workforce system. Most of those who have remained in Phoenix, despite Arizona's new immigration law, are probably hoping that a miracle will occur some day and once the DREAM Act or some federal comprehensive immigration reform is passed, they will be able to obtain legal status and start working without fear of deportation.

Apprehended as a result of the enforcement strategy practiced by Sheriff Joe Arpaio in Maricopa County,⁹³⁸ long before SB 1070 was passed young undocumented people had been especially vulnerable to a fast removal procedure. As Carmen Cornejo, executive director of CADENA,⁹³⁹ a Phoenix-based activist group for undocumented students, declared, the young just lack knowledge of their legal right to contact a lawyer. When stopped by ICE they are easily persuaded to agree to a voluntary departure, land in jail, and await removal. Since a car is still the most common means of getting around the city, driving without valid documents is the most common trap for undocumented youth in Phoenix.⁹⁴⁰

The young who aspire to college or university degrees but cannot prove their legal status in Arizona are often forced to abandon their educational goals due to expensive out-of-state tuition they would have to pay. Sandoval reported that the tuition at Phoenix College is more than double for non-residents and the enrollment rate at the college has significantly decreased since the passing of Proposition 300. In addition, as mentioned previously, Proposition 300 blocked all access to state- and city-funded scholarships for talented but unauthorized students in Phoenix.⁹⁴¹ Yvonne Watterson, a renowned advocate for undocumented students and, at the time of my stay in Phoenix, principal of GateWay Early College High School in Phoenix, sadly confessed that the situation has become so grievous that the best option for all unauthorized students is simply to leave Phoenix. The best advice she could give to her undocumented students, given the current legislation in Arizona, was: "Go to a different state, go to a sanctuary city, go where you can get a license, where you can enjoy being young...[...] you should be able to move with confidence through your

the new society, in an act of desperation Riang unexpectedly opened fire in one of the refugee resettlement agencies in Phoenix. He was fatally shot by the police. See interview P/12.

⁹³⁷ Interviews P/3 and P/10.

⁹³⁸ Although "the terrain" for the sweeps organized by Sheriff Joe Arpaio does not cover the City of Phoenix, potential driving routes may cross through both city and county jurisdictions. Consequently driving through the metropolitan region of Phoenix was very risky for undocumented even before Phoenix lost its status of sanctuary city in May 2008. For more on city versus county jurisdictions in dealing with the undocumented in the US, see Versanyi, M. (2008), *op. cit.*

⁹³⁹ Comité de Apoyo para el Desarrollo Estudiantil de la Nación Americana (Committee for the Development and Support of American Students).

⁹⁴⁰ Interview P/16.

⁹⁴¹ For more on Proposition 300, see subchapter 4.3.3.

city.”⁹⁴² Nevertheless, the inspiring stories of Watterson’s undocumented students, who managed to graduate from Early College High School programs thanks to private donations, show the stamina and resilience of underprivileged immigrant youth in coping with the challenges of living in Phoenix. “They need the DREAM, and they will preserve it until it is a reality,” Watterson strongly believes.⁹⁴³

Paradoxically, stringent law enforcement policies against the undocumented in Phoenix have caused great hardship for some documented immigrant youth in making the school to work transition. Adolescents from mixed status families are often compelled to earn a living for their families or even to take care of their younger siblings, who are orphaned, for all intents and purposes, since their parents have been deported from Phoenix.⁹⁴⁴ Additionally, the fear of parents being deported leaves a deep scar on the development of school-age children, as Tammy Tusek, principal of Crockett Elementary School, reported.⁹⁴⁵ In fact, integration challenges in Phoenix affect not only the undocumented but also people with brown skin color who are frequently suspected of being illegal aliens and thus face racial profiling, as many organizations attested. Luis Enriquez, from Friendly House, pointed out that the problem of “Brown America” is spreading across the nation but is especially noticeable in Arizona and Phoenix.⁹⁴⁶

5.2.2.3 Integration Measures

Similar to San Diego, most of the organizations interviewed in Phoenix do not restrict integration measures to young immigrants only but reach out to all members of a given community who fulfill the eligibility criteria. The City of Phoenix itself has no special office or grants targeting immigrants. The tools for labor market integration, administered by the city, are open to all documented residents of Phoenix. Cases of discrimination against immigrants in the workforce inside the city limits are handled together with the complaints of all citizens by the city’s Equal Opportunity Department and its subdivision, the Phoenix Human Relations Commission.⁹⁴⁷

Since no large ethnic enclaves exist in Phoenix, organizations which offer services to people in the local surroundings, such as the Golden Gate Community Center or Friendly

⁹⁴² Interview P/1.

⁹⁴³ A bilingual book, *Documented DREAMs*, edited by Yvonne Watterson is an impressive collection of undocumented students’ autobiographical thank-you notes to private donors for their college education. Watterson, Y. (2008). *Documented DREAMs*. Mesa, AZ: Hispanic Institute of Social Issues, p. XI.

For more on scholarships for undocumented students in Phoenix, see the next subchapter.

⁹⁴⁴ Interview P/14.

⁹⁴⁵ Interview P/11.

⁹⁴⁶ Interview P/4.

⁹⁴⁷ See City of Phoenix. Phoenix Human Relations Commission. Web page: <http://phoenix.gov/eod/commissions/commissionshr/index.html>

House, attract mixed target groups, which include both immigrants and the native born. This bodes quite well for immigrant integration. The AZ Lost Boys Center, which primarily serves Sudanese, is a noteworthy exception. In fact, it is one of the few organizations in Phoenix which serves immigrants from a particular country of origin. Regardless of the participants' ethnic background, the eligibility criteria for most community services depend on restrictions imposed by the grant regulations through which the program is funded. The rules usually refer to the legal status of potential program participants, which is currently under special scrutiny in Arizona. Federal and state money and grants from the City of Phoenix formally rule out the possibility of aiding undocumented youth. In practice, only through private donations can organizations help all young people, regardless of their residence status, deal with integration measures. Additional criteria are imposed on the local ORR contractors, VOLAGs. For example, the International Rescue Committee is obligated to limit target groups to the youth eligible according to the federal ORR regulations adopted by the IRC's main financial supporter, the Arizona Refugee Resettlement Program.

The Phoenix Workforce Connection (PWC) at the Community and Economic Development Department of the City of Phoenix is the most important grant provider for comprehensive youth programs, which facilitate labor market integration of all low-income teens and young adults, aged 14 to 21, in Phoenix who "are experiencing circumstances that make it difficult [...] to find and keep a job," including documented English Language Learners.⁹⁴⁸ It is an important venue of recourse for the development of such integration measures as career counseling, work readiness, internships, work experience, leadership development, classroom skills training, and GED preparation.⁹⁴⁹ The PWC functions as the Local Workforce Investment Board for the area of the City of Phoenix. In accordance with the federal Workforce Investment Act, the PWC runs One-Stop Career Centers for adults and offers WIA grants, among others, for youth programs to the seven largest youth service providers in the city, Chicanos por la Causa and ACYR among them. As Sharler Barnett, a counselor at ACYR, put it, they "do a lot of everything" for the youth, which means providing almost all labor market integration measures as defined in this research.⁹⁵⁰ ACYR's comprehensive programs offer a wide variety of school-to work transition tools (e.g. GED courses, online or personal assistance in self-assessment, career goal setting, outside as well as within their own charter school Center of Excellence High School) and by the same token great flexibility in the ways young people can develop their potentials: "pretty much they get to choose what is going to work best for them," Barnett said. Chicanos por la Causa

⁹⁴⁸ See the description of ACYR's Youth Programs funded by Workforce Investment Act (WIA), retrieved August 15, 2011 from <http://www.azcallateen.k12.az.us/WIA/wia-for-youth.html>

⁹⁴⁹ See interview P/9 and City of Phoenix. Youth Career Services. Web page: <http://phoenix.gov/econdev/phxwc/youth/ythcareer.html>

⁹⁵⁰ Interview P/15. See also the catalog of criteria for labor market integration measures for immigrant youth in subchapter 3.5.

offers a similar, nearly complete “workforce development packet” for all eligible youth, except for assistance with the evaluation of foreign credentials services, which is the task of Friendly House, another big player in youth training programs, and one financed by the City of Phoenix.⁹⁵¹ In fact, the well-organized structure of the labor market integration measures of these organizations results in part from their long tradition of serving the Phoenix community, sometimes more than half a century. For example Friendly House, established by the Phoenix Americanization Committee back in 1920, started off serving the foreign born, teaching English and citizenship to newly-arrived immigrants in Arizona. “We were the Americanization movement,” as Enriquez proudly admitted. Only in the 1960s did the organization extend the scope of its work to a wider community, focusing on education, employment, training, and social services for all needy families.

Some organizations’ long tradition of running social services in Phoenix has made them familiar, and given them a reputation as trustworthy and reliable in the local area, which appeals to potential public and private donators.⁹⁵² Younger and not-so-well established initiatives face much greater hardship in finding enough staff and financial capacity to accomplish their work for immigrant youth. Starting a new program for a particular target group, like refugee youth in a new IRC Youth Program in Phoenix, seems much easier: there are federal and state grants for such programs. In addition, private donors are not afraid of investing their money in a service which assists refugees and not “illegals.”

The successful fundraising campaigns run by the refugees in the AZ Lost Boys Center, a relatively new refugee organization in Phoenix, is a noteworthy exception to this rule.⁹⁵³ Through yearly marathons, Journey of Hope Dinners, or the Cow Project, the Sudanese can practice their entrepreneurship skills and develop the center together.⁹⁵⁴ Those who serve the undocumented are forced to rely on the generosity of brave private donors. Fundraising for the undocumented in Phoenix is quite challenging, given the current hostile environment. On the one hand, as Ehrenberg optimistically noted, there are still some ways of changing the perception of helping the undocumented, unaccompanied minors they serve:

I at least get in front of somebody to talk about them. If they give me five minutes to talk about what we do, they do not necessarily have that negative opinion that they have had at the back

⁹⁵¹ Friendly House is the only organization I came across in my field work in Phoenix which offers assistance in coping with the complicated US system of evaluating foreign credentials.

⁹⁵² The long list of private state and federal grants to Chicanos por la Causa which I received during my interview showed the discrepancies in resources available to them and to other, smaller organizations.

⁹⁵³ AZ Lost Boys Center was established in 2003 and from the very beginning struggled to raise funds.

⁹⁵⁴ The Cow Project is an entrepreneurship program for Sudanese people in Phoenix. The cow is an important part of Sudanese culture and the economy. Following their tradition from home, refugees make cows out of clay, fire and glaze them to make small sculptures which are then sold to the public. All profits from the Cow Project go toward scholarships so refugees can finance their education. See interview P/13 and the Cow Project website: <http://www.azlostboyscenter.org/cow.html>

of their minds about illegal aliens [...]. The foundations and corporations that give me some time see the human rights interest of immigration. They see it [donating money] as an investment in human rights.⁹⁵⁵

The efforts of indomitable Principal Watterson to raise money for the out-of-state tuition for college classes for her undocumented students, who comprised 22% of all students in Early College High School in 2008, are another noteworthy example of the hardships which educators face in helping immigrant youth without Social Security Numbers. Watterson's campaigns turned out successful. Thanks mostly to anonymous donors, the students were able to graduate from Early College High School, often with flying colors. Their achievements should make it possible to change the perception of the undocumented in Phoenix. As 15-year-old graduate Nora wrote in her thank-you note to her donor:

I wish from the bottom of my heart that others could see beyond the fact that we are not American citizens and pay more attention to our grades, our dedication, and the positive impact we will definitely have on Arizona. Thank you for seeing this, for believing in us, and for supporting our dreams with your contribution.⁹⁵⁶

However, future prospects for helping those young people are not good in face of the increasingly hostile anti-immigration environment in Phoenix. Michael Crow, president of Arizona State University (ASU), was forced to discontinue the Sunburst Scholarship which aided undocumented students at the University⁹⁵⁷ and Principal Watterson was quite suddenly fired.⁹⁵⁸ Crow's initiative was not totally abandoned but merely moved to an affiliated non-profit organization and given a new name, the American Dream Fund. However, the future of the fund is uncertain due to the lack of new donors.

It seems that the safest way for those who want to help immigrant youth, regardless of their status, is simply not to ask who, among the people they serve, has a social security number. One of my interviewees claimed the requirements from their grant makers do not oblige them to know if a client is documented or not. In the recruitment office for ELL classes in this organization, a sign posted warned against giving any information not required when signing up for the course: "We do not ask your country of origin and it is not a requirement for eligibility."⁹⁵⁹ Similarly, nobody is forced to ask parents about their migration status when they participate in the American Dream Academy, an educational program in the American school system for immigrant parents run by the ASU. However, working with the unauthorized population "gives a bad cast on everything" in Phoenix, as Tusek declared when talking about working in her school where most of the people in the pupils' families do not have

⁹⁵⁵ Interview P/6.

⁹⁵⁶ Watterson, Y. (Ed.), op. cit., p. 14.

⁹⁵⁷ See Quizon, D. (2009, November 5). Without Papers, not without Hope. *State Press*.

⁹⁵⁸ Kossan, P. (2008, December 17). Celebrated Principal Fired from Charter. *The Arizona Republic*.

⁹⁵⁹ Interview P/2.

social security numbers.⁹⁶⁰ Consequently, many integration initiatives seem to go underground, and big organizations fear losing state and federal grants if information about their work for the undocumented becomes public. One frequently receives evasive answers like, “The only people we can help are those documented; there is nothing we can do for undocumented” to the question: Do you work with the undocumented? Some organizations were even surprised that I inquired about their work with the undocumented. “Why do you want you to get yourself into something that is so controversial?” one person asked me. Probably a similar question prevents many private donors from getting involved in secret initiatives for the undocumented, which might possibly hurt their business and damage their reputation in Phoenix.

5.2.2.4 Reaching Out to Immigrants and the Host Society

Since few of the above-mentioned integration measures exclusively target immigrants, with the exception of the fundraising for the undocumented and programs for refugees, there are not many methods of reaching out solely to the immigrant population. Moreover, the organizations I interviewed did not typically mention any special measures they would need to find youth interested in their programs. As in San Diego, Job Corps’s recruitment procedures are generally well known, therefore no extra information campaigns are necessary to recruit candidates.⁹⁶¹ Similarly, it is common knowledge that colleges in Phoenix, like in all other US cities, have an open enrollment procedure which also encourages immigrant youth to sign up for the courses. Nevertheless, according to Sandoval, high school or college counselors or faculty members are said to advise those, like undocumented youth, who cannot afford the tuition to take fewer credits but to at least start or continue their education. Quite often the students can also get college assistance in finding financial aid for the future.⁹⁶²

Noteworthy examples of positive reinforcement in developing workforce skills among youth come from youth themselves. As ACYR reported, word of mouth is the most effective method of attracting immigrant youth who have to cope with similar language challenges: “They will flock to us because, as I said, they want to take advantage of the opportunity. You have to touch at least one of them [...] and they will tell all other friends.”⁹⁶³ Similarly Sudanese refugees learn about the good experiences of members of the AZ Lost Boys and, attracted by these positive stories, find their way to the organization. “They have to come individually. You cannot force them” says Sarpicio.⁹⁶⁴

⁹⁶⁰ Interview P/11.

⁹⁶¹ Interview P/7.

⁹⁶² Interview P/8.

⁹⁶³ Interview P/14.

⁹⁶⁴ Interview P/12.

Nevertheless, a couple of organizations show greater ingenuity in reaching their target groups. For example, Golden Gate Community Center has developed a unique way of addressing the real needs of the local community by conducting surveys on specific wishes and expectations about their programs. By the same token, as Daniel Zaopata, director of Family Education asserted, they try to avoid duplicating the services of other organizations.⁹⁶⁵ The American Dream Academy, in turn, on behalf of the principle of a given school participating in the Academy's parental education program, sends special invitation letters to parents of immigrant students. Maria Luis admitted that it is sometimes challenging to persuade undocumented parents to participate in the program, since as a rule they prefer to avoid contact with any public institution.⁹⁶⁶

Talking about integration with immigrants to American residents in Phoenix also seems challenging. The best way to gain the support of donors and to raise the interest of the people of Phoenix in a given organization's activities toward integration is simply to assure them that the organization is legal and does not provide any assistance to the undocumented. The emphasis on the fact that, first of all, the organizations want to teach immigrants the rule of the law in the country is very important. Friendly House talked about their official public relations strategy in the following way:

We let people know we are part of the system. We are not here to break the law; we are here to help enforce the law. We do not help undocumented people; we help the people who are here, help people in transition. We are a transition organization and help people to link them and to facilitate so they will not get into trouble, so that they understand the regulations, the laws of the country, the rules about how to get a job, what is acceptable and not [...]⁹⁶⁷

On the other hand, it seems that people are sometimes aware of the unfair approach to undocumented youth in Arizona and find indirect ways of informing potential clients that their services are available to people without documents. Codified language is one of the methods. For example, instead of declaring "we accept undocumented," they assure potential clients: "We treat you with dignity and respect."⁹⁶⁸ In fact, most of my respondents seemed to sympathize with the unauthorized but quite often were too cautious to openly talk about it.

CADENA bravely breaks this silence, fighting for the passage of the DREAM Act. As Cornejo said, she and her organization have nothing to lose.⁹⁶⁹ This non-profit organization provides information to undocumented youth, visits congressional representatives and

⁹⁶⁵ Interview P/2.

⁹⁶⁶ Interview P/15.

⁹⁶⁷ Interview P/4.

⁹⁶⁸ Interview P/8.

⁹⁶⁹ As Cornejo admitted, she does not need to worry about her reputation in the city or to be afraid of ruining her business or career. Luckily enough, she does not need to earn a living, as she can rely on her family and devote herself wholly to her lobbying work. Interview P/16.

senators, and actively reaches out to local students, scholars, and teachers to educate them about the legal implications of being an undocumented youth and how to defend student rights. CADENA enlists anonymous volunteer teachers who spread information on the DREAM Act and who monitor the situation and bring to the attention of the media and the general public serious cases of students in detention centers or other abusive situations related to the lack of legal status. CADENA has also created a *Know Your Rights* Brochure, a web site, and educational resources to teach students about their rights, other educational opportunities, changes in immigration law, and private scholarship funding options.⁹⁷⁰ Looking at the organization, it seems that the vehement anti-immigration mood in Arizona has inspired a few passionate counter-movements in the state capitol Phoenix.

5.2.2.5 Network-Building

Most organizations are aware that cooperation on the issue of immigrant integration at the local level is needed to leverage resources in order to better serve the community. At the same time, however, they are involved in a competition for funds and a good reputation. Interestingly enough, as Luis reported, cooperation among NGOs is more complicated than when NGOs cooperate with public institutions.⁹⁷¹ When the social functions of two institutions are different they complement each other and send each other clients, e.g. Phoenix College refer students to Friendly House. It must be much more complicated when the organizations are competing for the same funds, like for example from two important stewards of cooperation for immigrants' integration in Phoenix – the Arizona Refugee Resettlement Program and the Phoenix Workforce Connection. Their representatives both admitted that it is not always easy to allocate money, and they wished they were able to provide more funds to all their partners.⁹⁷²

Nevertheless, even if the organizations are forced to compete, they are aware of their own constraints. They want to tap into the skills of others who are experts in a given area and do not want to offer the same services. As AZYR admitted, their goal is to meet the basic needs of the youth they are serving.⁹⁷³ In fact, nearly all organizations interviewed mentioned using the expertise of others if available. Moreover, many talked about their more frequent attempts to involve the business sector in their work, either through funds or job placement opportunities for their clients. There are, however, niches in networking which cannot be always filled. As Ehrenberg pointed out, the Florence Project is the only organization in the

⁹⁷⁰ CADENA also contributed to the creation of the aforementioned bilingual book *Documented DREAMs* by Yvonne Watterson.

⁹⁷¹ Interview P/15.

⁹⁷² Interviews P/9 and P/13.

⁹⁷³ Interview P/14.

area that works for unaccompanied minors, and they are eager to find any partners. They network every spare minute they can.⁹⁷⁴

Few of the interviewed non-profit organizations, however, are involved in networks outside the state, except for networking with the National Conference of La Raza. Only one organization mentioned involvement in a cooperation with other states, (e.g. the American Dream Academy collaborates with the precursor of their program for parents, the Parent Institute for Quality Education [PIQE] in California). This lack of cooperation is surprising, given the fact that other states have much more experience in dealing with immigrant integration. No federal integration network-building seemed to be meeting any success at the time of my interviews in Phoenix. Few knew about the federal Task Force initiative and those who did found it to be quite useless. "They have good intentions [...] but there is nothing to be implemented."⁹⁷⁵ Most of the organizations appear to be searching for their own solutions to their own particular local challenges of working with immigrants, rather than thinking about national or supranational network-building on a larger scale.

5.2.3 Munich

5.2.3.1 Perception of Immigrant Integration

As a result of the recent development of a federal German immigrant integration policy and the emergence of an official Munich City Integration Policy, the concept of immigrant integration has become a widely used operational term for many public institutions and private non-profits serving immigrant youth in the city. In fact, many of the organizations interviewed view their immigrant services as part of Munich's newly-developed Intercultural Integration Concept - an important tool for facilitating integration work in the city.

The Concept was unanimously approved on February 20, 2008 by the Munich City Council and since then it has served as the core principle and guideline for all municipal decisions, projects, plans and city services which might have an impact on integration.⁹⁷⁶ Accordingly, the city of Munich's Intercultural Integration Concept, which has become an integral part of the official Munich City Integration Policy, contains a definition of integration:

For us, integration means the long term process that immigrants go through of becoming involved in core areas of society and of bonding with others in the community to achieve equal opportunities. Both the newcomer and the long-standing member of a community are equally

⁹⁷⁴ Interview P/6.

⁹⁷⁵ Interviews P/4 and P/5.

⁹⁷⁶ Maria Spohn, manager of the Office for Intercultural Affairs, said that the process of implementing integration policies differs from department to department, but since the implementation of the Concept in 2008 all municipal services are obliged to recognize it (the Intercultural Integration Concept) as their own definition of immigrant integration. See interview M/3.

responsible for [the] success or failure of this process. Our vision of integration respects and values cultural diversity and promotes [the] potential that such diversity offers.⁹⁷⁷

The integration concept points to core indicators of integration in the life of Munich residents, which encompass most of the key prerequisites for labor market integration of immigrant youth, as adopted in this research. According to the concept, the main most important fields of actions for integration should include: “intercultural mainstreaming; promotion of participation; education; vocational training and job market; language training; fighting discrimination.”⁹⁷⁸ Additional integration guidelines for life in the city are thought to facilitate the immigrant integration process as summarized in the Eleven Principles of the Munich City Integration Policy.⁹⁷⁹ They include three important prerequisites for successful integration which were usually emphasized by the interviewees: recognizing diversity as valuable for the city, valuing the potentials of immigrants, including their mother tongues, and the professional experience gained in their home countries, and finally the inclusive vision of the integration of all city residents without exception. Principle 2 emphasizes that “Integration concerns everybody,” which again highlights the shared responsibility for the integration of all immigrants on the part the receiving society. The concept does not exclude undocumented people in the city, although, as Philip Anderson, the leading researcher on the unauthorized population in Munich pointed out, the inclusion of this important sector of immigrant life in the city is not explicit enough: “Allerdings schließt dieses ansonsten solide und fundierte Konzept ‘Illegale’ nicht ausdrücklich mit ein – was ich sehr bedauerlich finde.”⁹⁸⁰ Nevertheless, it is significant that the city of Munich is renowned for its openness and concern for the unauthorized, including the undocumented immigrant youth. The so-called *Münchner Modell* (Munich Model), which has been an official city policy since 2005, does embrace the undocumented. The model is based on a study conducted by Anderson, commissioned by Munich City Council. The study’s conclusions and calls for action, published in August 2003,⁹⁸¹ resulted in the creation of a set of promising social and health provisions for undocumented people.⁹⁸²

⁹⁷⁷ Stelle für Interkulturelle Arbeit der Landeshauptstadt München. (2009). *Intercultural Integration Concept. Outline*. München: Stelle für Interkulturelle Arbeit der Landeshauptstadt München.

⁹⁷⁸ Ibid., compare with the Catalog of Criteria of Labor Market Integration Measures in subchapter 3.5. With its own indicators for integration, Munich seems to be following a trend in Germany as well as in the EU of trying to measure integration.

⁹⁷⁹ See appendix 4.

⁹⁸⁰ See interview M/17. As Anderson points out, the Munich City Council, which has been ruled by a coalition of Social-Democrats and the Green party since the early 1990s, presents a clearly articulated interest in and concern for the situation of immigrants *sans papiers* in the city.

See Anderson, P. (2011), op. cit.

⁹⁸¹ See Anderson, P. (2003), op. cit.

⁹⁸² For more on the Munich Model with reference to education policy, a later section of this subchapter.

Both the Intercultural Integration Concept and the implementation of the study's conclusions have created a path beyond German taboos regarding the unauthorized⁹⁸³ and formulated an official structure for approaching the subject of immigrant integration, which has been cited by many of the organizations interviewed.⁹⁸⁴ Nevertheless, the interviewees still had their own particular way of interpreting integration. A couple of respondents who have been dealing with the concept of integration on a daily basis were a bit skeptical about overusing this word.⁹⁸⁵ Barbara Bornemann at the IG Jugendmigrationsdienst (IG JMD) pointed out that 50 people will have 50 different opinions about what integration entails. For job counselors working with unemployed immigrants in the Munich Sozialbürgerhaus, integration was considered first and foremost “die Einbindung in den ersten Arbeitsmarkt,” depending on immigrants' abilities and efforts to adapt to the city's labor market demands. The responsibility of the receiving society for the success of this process tended to be neglected.⁹⁸⁶ Other interviewees, primarily those from NGOs, revealed their own particular visions of immigrant integration which were more in line with the Intercultural Integration Concept. Interestingly enough, all of them were opposed to using the notion of assimilation when talking about immigrants. Manfred Bosl, head of the non-profit *InitiativGruppe – Interkulturelle Begegnung und Bildung e.V. (IG)*, said, “man kann auf ein Slogan komprimierend sagen ‘Bildung ist Integration.’”⁹⁸⁷ For Angela Illmberger, principal of the general secondary school in Ramersdorf, one with the highest percentage of immigrants in Munich, integration involves respect for other cultures in their educational environment: “Kenntnisse erwerben bis Fähigkeiten haben. In Rahmen der Interkulturalität lernen [...] im Umgang mit ganz vielfältigen Biographien und Erfahrungen der Kindern.” Accordingly, she perceived assimilation as “eine platte Geschichte” which simply does not happen in real life. As she pointed out, none of her immigrant students comes to the school as a *tabula rasa*, without any cultural norms and experiences from their home countries.⁹⁸⁸ Similarly Cuman

⁹⁸³ As Birgit Poppert of Café 104 remarked: “In München, man kann hier darüber sprechen ohne komisch angeschaut zu werden.” Her services for the undocumented are not a clandestine activity. but are advertised as an official service point for the undocumented on the organization's website, in flyers, and in the directory of non-profits in Munich. See interview M/4.

⁹⁸⁴ In response to my question: “How does your organization understand integration of immigrants in the city?” most interviewees referred me to the intercultural Integration Concept of the City of Munich.

⁹⁸⁵ As Regina Ober, from the Office of Housing and Migration remarked
 „„Ich bin schon am Zweifel von dem Begriff [Integration]. Kann der Prozess abgeschlossen sein? Teilhabe und Ressourcen und Gesellschaft klingt viel besser...” See interview M/12.

⁹⁸⁶ Clearly such a standpoint does not reflect a more comprehensive vision of integration as a two-way process in the Intercultural Integration Concept, which in theory should be promoted by every social service in Munich. However, at the time of my empirical research the Concept had just been approved. It is interesting to follow the analysis of the progress of implementing the Concept's principles. The recently-published Integration Report is the first of a planned series, which the City of Munich plans to publish every three years.

See Ketterer I. (Ed.). (2011). *München lebt Vielfalt. Interkultureller Integrationsbericht 2010*. München: Stelle für interkulturelle Arbeit der Landeshauptstadt München.

⁹⁸⁷ Interview M/8.

⁹⁸⁸ Interview M/1.

Naz, head of the Foreigners' Advisory Council, strongly opposed any kind of "einseitige Anpassung" and the predominance of the *Leitkultur*, both of which have created a hierarchy of cultures in Germany.⁹⁸⁹ Alberto Martínez, a priest at the Spanish Catholic Mission and a renowned advocator of the undocumented in Munich, drew attention to the fact that a solid identity and an awareness of their immigrant background and cultural roots is a prerequisite for the successful integration of young immigrants.⁹⁹⁰

Apart from education and a respect for the value of other cultures, a couple of organizations also emphasized the strong role of the service providers in showing immigrants how to take advantage of the opportunities the receiving society offers to immigrants in Munich. Consequently integration is not merely about providing all residents same chances, following the US equal rights integration model, but also showing immigrants how they can benefit from them: "es nutzt nicht nur Zugang zu schaffen und dann Leute alleine zu lassen," pointed out Kerstin Schmitt, youth intercultural trainer at the INKOMM project Center.⁹⁹¹ In fact, several organizations interviewed seem to take on the role of caretaker and guide for immigrant youth in confronting challenges they might face in the city.

5.2.3.2 Integration Challenges

The perception of integration challenges facing immigrant youth in Munich is still influenced by the national controversies surrounding education gaps and differences in school performance between Germans and those coming from a migration background.⁹⁹² On the question about hurdles to the integration of immigrant youth into the labor market, most of the interviewees started off by citing the failed education system in the German federal states. In fact, the city of Munich, although governed by a liberal coalition, is trapped in the conservative Bavarian education system, governed at all education levels by the Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Unterricht und Kultus. At the time of writing, the Ministry does not foresee any school reforms which would reduce early age school segregation. Immigrants still end up in the lowest-ranked schools, as exemplified by the general secondary school in Ramersdorf,⁹⁹³ while they are underrepresented in Gymnasium (secondary schools for university-bound students).⁹⁹⁴ Consequently, as *Hauptschule* graduates many immigrant children find it much more difficult to obtain apprenticeships in Munich, losing in competitions with *Realschule* graduates. The controversial transition

⁹⁸⁹ Interview M/2.

⁹⁹⁰ Interview M/6.

⁹⁹¹ Interview M/14.

⁹⁹² See subchapter 4.5.

⁹⁹³ Interview M/1.

⁹⁹⁴ For the most recent update on Munich education statistics, see Ketterer, I. (Ed.), op. cit.

programs, discussed earlier, are the only alternative.⁹⁹⁵ Referring to each student who was not successful in finding a position for vocational training, Illmberger soberly remarked: “Das ist so eine Missachtung seiner Leistungen, der er wirklich gebracht hat.”⁹⁹⁶ Lack of recognition of the achievements of immigrant youth often leads to frustration and helps to maintain the high dropout rates among students who already know that they do not have the same chances as natives and that they are widely perceived as losers.⁹⁹⁷ Moreover, the school achievements of immigrants are purportedly not the sole deciding factor in granting apprenticeships. Margret Spohn, manager of the Office for Intercultural Affairs within the Social Services Department of Munich, pointed out the preliminary results of a longitudinal study from the German Youth Institute in Munich on the school-to-work transition, which showed that immigrant students face more difficulties in obtaining training positions than their peers with the same grades but no migration background.⁹⁹⁸ Similar discrimination was also observed among employers who, because of cultural differences and different physical appearances, do not want to employ youth from certain immigrant groups. Sabine Nowack, office manager of the Sozialbürgerhaus Pasing reported that one of the main integration hurdles she could see for her clients is a “deutliche kulturelle Abweichungen.” In Munich, the headscarf is a symbol of “eine schlechte Integration,” as she puts it.⁹⁹⁹ In fact, those of Nowack’s clients who wore headscarves, generally Turkish girls, turned out to have no chance of employment in their dream jobs as perfumery assistants.¹⁰⁰⁰ Moreover, as many interviewees pointed out, the aspirations of immigrant youth, especially of those who face many more difficulties than others due to their unregulated legal status in Germany, are much higher than people might expect.¹⁰⁰¹ As Martinez pointed out, not all young immigrant boys dream about becoming a car polisher, an image commonly promoted in public discussions of integration. The “successful” young immigrant who graduated from the *Hauptschule* said Martinez, is quite often presented as the role model for immigrant integration.¹⁰⁰² In fact, Martina Unger, a social worker from the Schlau project, sadly noted that many young skilled immigrants fail to pass a wide variety of assessment centers or admissions tests, commonly used by employers in Munich to select potential future employees, sometimes only because of a mere three words that they were not able to

⁹⁹⁵ See subchapter 4.5.6.

⁹⁹⁶ Interview M/1.

⁹⁹⁷ As Cuman Naz from Foreigners’ Advisory Council remarked: “Immigranten sind immer als Verlierer produziert, immer als Kinder mit Defiziten behandelt.” See interview M/2.

⁹⁹⁸ Interviews M/3 and M/14.

⁹⁹⁹ Interview M/ 6.

¹⁰⁰⁰ “Meine Kunden möchten nicht so bedient werden” is the usual reaction of potential employers. See interview M/6.

¹⁰⁰¹ This is especially true of immigrant youth with a temporary suspension of deportation, for whom getting a work permit for an apprenticeship is often a difficult task in Munich. See interviews M/9 and M/10.

¹⁰⁰² Martinez referred to one of the public discussions on integration in Munich during which he served as a panelist together with a “successful” immigrant car polisher. See interview M/5.

decipher. Although the Munich labor market is generally perceived to be the most open in Germany, my interviewees often considered employees' expectations too high.¹⁰⁰³ As a result, despite their high aspirations and qualifications gained abroad, many young immigrant job candidates fail when they lack a command of written and spoken German. Only a couple of foreign languages are generally recognized as an asset, depending on the company, said Bornemann in talking about her experience with potential employers in Munich. Additionally, the system of recognizing foreign credentials is no less confusing than in other parts of Germany. Spohn critically remarked, "Es ist ein absoluter Wildwuchs in Deutschland."¹⁰⁰⁴

For those in Munich without a residence permit, challenges to labor market integration must be analyzed at a very different level. Rather than discovering how to fulfill their aspirations, the undocumented first have to learn how to survive in a country under whose laws they are considered criminals. As Poppert suggested, for this group integration would mean decriminalizing their presence in the city.¹⁰⁰⁵ The school system, not to mention vocational training, is inaccessible or only possible once they have taken state exams which require documentation. The other (punitive) option, as Anderson admitted, is to obtain falsified documents.¹⁰⁰⁶ Fortunately, the integration policies and a wide variety of integration measures in Munich are designed to alleviate the school-to-work transition challenges of both documented and undocumented youth.

5.2.3.3 Integration Measures

Although the rhetoric of integration is fairly new in the city of Munich, the work toward the integration of immigrants is not innovative, as in many other German cities.¹⁰⁰⁷ Integration measures must be seen as the continuation of services offered back in the 1970s by many long-established organizations, like traditional welfare agencies or such civil society initiatives as the IG in Munich. Friederike Goschenhofer, from the municipal network REGSAM, remarked that in the 1970s organizations offering services to immigrants were not thought to be providing integration tools but assistance to guest workers who were not expected to stay long in Munich.¹⁰⁰⁸ At the same time, the city was the first German municipality to start analyzing the situation of the increasing number of immigrants in the

¹⁰⁰³ Robert Hanslmaier from the Department for Labor and Economic Affairs in Munich asserted that the country of origin quite often does not play any significant role but soft skills and certificates do. On the other hand, as he admitted, discrimination may also happen simply on the basis of a given applicant's address, as the zip code can already reveal a lot about the social and ethnic background of immigrants. See interview M/13.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Interview M/3.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Interview M/4.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Interview M/17.

¹⁰⁰⁷ See Bommers, M. (2008) op. cit.

¹⁰⁰⁸ "Damals ging es weniger um Integration aber um Hilfestellung. Nur in den letzten zehn bis fünfzehn Jahren hat sich hier die Ansicht durchgesetzt, Menschen werden hier dauerhaft leben." See interview M/11.

city.¹⁰⁰⁹ The expansion of integration measures is impressive, and it is impossible to list them all here. At more than 100 pages, the organization directory of the Foreigners' Advisory Council,¹⁰¹⁰ which includes a wide range of direct services targeting immigrants, many of them focusing on immigrant youth, indicates the wealth of services offered.¹⁰¹¹

The involvement of the City Council in the management of the city's integration policies is remarkable. The Munich Intercultural Integration Concept not only frames the official discourse on integration in the city, but first and foremost it provides measures and structure for intensive work toward the so-called mandatory intercultural mainstreaming.¹⁰¹² The Office for Intercultural Affairs manages the implementation of the Eleven Principles of the Munich City Integration Policy and the mainstreaming process throughout all city departments.¹⁰¹³ The intercultural training programs, which have been or are still to be conducted in the departments, emphasize the importance of the potential of employees from migration backgrounds for the promotion of the intercultural opening in city governance. These principles require some important reforms in recruitment procedures. Spohn indicated that the focus of the job recruitment criteria is shifting from academic achievement demonstrated by school and job certificates towards candidates' intercultural competencies. By the same token, the Office for Intercultural Affairs hopes to foster intercultural openness and improved employment opportunities for immigrants from inside the city apparatus. Internal German language courses for the city's immigrant employees constitute extra integration measures to reduce language difficulties.¹⁰¹⁴

Since the city council does not have separate funds for immigrant integration services, according to Spohn, each department is responsible for providing services open to immigrants and creating programs using their own budget, possibly supplemented by state and federal funds or external EU funds. The strong involvement of the city in the integration of young immigrants into the labor market can be seen in both direct and indirect measures for young immigrants. The service of 13 Sozialbürgerhäuser, led by the Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Beschäftigung München GmbH (ARGE), 50% of whose clients come from migration backgrounds, is widely considered one of the most important coordinators of indirect

¹⁰⁰⁹ The study "Kommunalpolitische Aspekte des wachsenden ausländischen Bevölkerungsanteils in München," published by the city in 1972 is considered the beginning of the development of today's integration concept. See Ketterer, I. (Ed.), op. cit., p. 21.

¹⁰¹⁰ Ausländerbeirat München. (2010). *Migrantinnen und Migranten in München: Vereine, Gruppen, Initiativen, Beratungsstellen und Institutionen - ehrenamtliches Engagement*. München: Ausländerbeirates der Landeshauptstadt München.

¹⁰¹¹ The small sample of organizations interviewed only reflects a small fragment of the mechanism of immigrant integration management.

¹⁰¹² See Stelle für Interkulturelle Arbeit der Landeshauptstadt München. (2009), op. cit.

¹⁰¹³ Spohn noted that her office is not a separate department does not reflect well on Munich, since other cities have established separate departments for integration. However, the office coordinates with all city departments, which makes it the lead manager of integration policies in the city. For more on the developments of the integration concept and the role of the Office of Intercultural Affairs in Munich, see interview M/3.

¹⁰¹⁴ Interview M/3.

integration measures for immigrant youth receiving Unemployment Benefit II. Together with psychologists special job counselors, so-called U25 counselors, direct young unemployed persons to youth service providers in the city which offer immigrant integration courses (among them integration courses financed by BAMF), language courses, and coaching for job-applications.¹⁰¹⁵ Some of the service providers are part of the network of Verbundprojekt Perspektive Arbeit (VPA),¹⁰¹⁶ coordinated and financially-supported by the Department for Labor and Economic Affairs, City of Munich. Many school-to-work transition measures which indirectly target immigrant youth are located in schools. For example, Jugendliche an die Hand nehmen (JADE) is a school project, led by the city and supported by ARGE and the Federal Employment Agency, which offers career and job preparation training courses for pupils in 44 general secondary schools in Munich.¹⁰¹⁷ In view of the fierce competition for apprenticeship positions, the training courses aim at increasing the chances of successful application for all students without any positive discrimination in favor of immigrant children.¹⁰¹⁸

However, some integration programs aim specifically at immigrant youth. The network of eight Jugendmigrationsdienste in Munich offers personal counseling to all people aged 12 to 27 with a migration background and a regular residence status. The scope of the services differs and depends to a great extent on the individual work of the counselor with the client. One of the JMD services, "ein Geschenk von der Bundesregierung,"¹⁰¹⁹ as Bosl called it, focuses specifically on work-readiness skills and career counseling. Counselor Bornemann explained that the aim of her work is first of all "Löcher stopfen" and showing immigrant youth the skills they should develop. The Individual Integration Plan, which the client determines with the assistance of the counselor, is based on an analysis of individual skills and goals. Bornemann described her approach as follows: „Ich lasse die Leute wie sie sind, damit sie lernen sich in ihrer Persönlichkeit zu zeigen und das zu vertreten oder dazu kommen; ‚wo will ich hin?‘. Das geht immer darum, dass die Klienten selbst für sich herausfinden: was passt

¹⁰¹⁵ It remains debatable whether the counselors are biased against immigrants and whether or not they positively reinforce the aspirations of immigrants or rather downplay their potential because of the migration background. My impression after visiting one Sozialbürgerhaus in Munich and interviewing several people is that much training on intercultural competence for the job counselors is still needed. See interviews M/2, M/6, and M/13.

¹⁰¹⁶ Verbundprojekt Perspektive Arbeit (VPA) is part of the comprehensive Münchner Beschäftigungs- und Qualifizierungsprogramm (MBQ). MBQ is the largest city employment program nationwide (with a budget of €28 million and 110 labor market integration projects in 2010). See the MBQ website <http://www.muenchen.de/mbq/> and interview M/13.

¹⁰¹⁷ Interview M/11.

¹⁰¹⁸ Illmeberger argues that no differentiation should be made among children based on their migration background. Accordingly, INKOMM, the cooperative partner of Illmeberger's school, offers intercultural job training to more and less advantaged students. See interviews M/1 and M/14.

¹⁰¹⁹ Like many other interviewees, Bosl was quite ironical about federal integration policies, which were developed by the federal government much too late. Nevertheless, federal programs like the JMDs are considered indispensable for the IG Jugendmigrationsdienst to improve its integration services, which they have been offering for years. See interview M/8.

für mich?“¹⁰²⁰ Such an approach to case management appears to be a successful Positive Youth Development strategy for immigrant integration, if also very time consuming. Bornemann called for more staff as the demand for counseling is steadily increasing. Fortunately, the rapid development of new integration projects at the IG is helping to partially counterbalance this growth. In fact, the IG is said to be the largest non-profit organization in Munich and, among other immigrant services, provides free or low-cost education and work-readiness training to immigrant youth in the city. It is always on the look out for new funds and new ideas for integration projects.¹⁰²¹ Interestingly enough, the organization does not focus solely on disadvantaged immigrant youth from the lowest-ranked schools but also supports those who have attended *Gymnasium* and *Realschule* and aspire to higher education. Indeed, the organization needs this latter group as role models to boost the motivation of other immigrants at the IG: “Wir brauchen erfolgreiche Leute, die die Multiplikatoren für die andere sind.”¹⁰²²

The MOVA plus project, run by the Department for Labor and Economic Affairs, is another interesting innovative program in Munich, primarily helping immigrants to establish contacts with the business sector and apply for internships. The project reaches out to non-German entrepreneurs in Munich, who might potentially offer apprenticeship positions to immigrant youth and to bridge the gap between the business world and integration service providers who want to support the school-to-work transition of immigrant youth. In fact, as many interviewees emphasized, the involvement of the corporate sector in immigrant integration is still not at the level it should be. Other deficits in integration management include the lack of adequate support for the recognition of foreign qualifications. However, the issue has finally been addressed by the city. The Office of Housing and Migration has become involved in the national IQ Network, which inspired the establishment of the first city counseling service for recognition of foreign qualifications in Munich.¹⁰²³

Despite a wide range of integration offerings for immigrant youth, underprivileged immigrant youth still stand in the shadow: without a permit of residence they have little access to educational support measures. In fact, many service providers are restricted by the guidelines of their federal or EU fund programs (like EIF or BAMF), which prohibit providing services to those who are not legal residents. Two significant education initiatives sponsored

¹⁰²⁰ Interview M/7.

¹⁰²¹ At the time of the interview, the IG had 25 projects. Now new projects are on the horizon (e.g. providing after-school German courses to immigrant students at schools, organized in cooperation with Ludwig Maximilian University in Munich and the Mercator Foundation. For the latest developments, see the IG website: <http://home.initiativgruppe.de/> For more on the development of IG integration projects since its foundation in 1971, see interview M/8.

¹⁰²² For example, one of the self-help groups at the IG Muslim student group offers tutoring to “brother and sisters” who face educational challenges at secondary schools. The engagement of theirs and other faith-based groups’ in Munich is considered an invaluable resource for the IG’s integration work. See interview M/8.

¹⁰²³ At the time of writing, the new Servicestelle zur Erschließung ausländischer Qualifikationen has just been launched. For more on the IQ Network, see subchapter 4.5.6.

by the city of Munich, Schlau School and Project FLÜBS at the Münchner Volkshochschule (MVHS), offer young asylum seekers the opportunity to attend free German courses, prepare for secondary school final exams, and/or help them find vocational training and their first jobs. Despite Munich's open policy towards the undocumented, no city monies can be used officially for this group. Commenting on the Munich Model, Spohn said: "Die Stadt macht nichts, was illegal ist. Wir haben nationale Verpflichtungen. Wir nutzen nur die Spielräume. Jede Stadt könnte das machen." The city's suggestion that schools not check the residential status of students is the city's only integration measure for undocumented people addressing educational restrictions.¹⁰²⁴ Several better known, smaller initiatives help undocumented youth with their education, for example the Jesuit private gymnasium, which does not charge people *sans papiers*, and the Spanish Catholic Mission which primarily assists undocumented Spanish-speaking immigrants in Munich and provides legal counseling and German language courses. Finally Café 104, whose services focus for the most part on medical help to the undocumented, provides information and counseling on social services as well as educational assistance for the undocumented in the city.

5.2.3.4 Reaching Out to Immigrants and the Host Society

Most of the organizations interviewed do not employ any special techniques for reaching out to immigrants and encouraging them to use their integration services. The majority of young immigrants come to them of their own accord, because they need the services and help the organizations offer. Another important reason is that they are required to do so by federal law. Those who want to receive unemployment or social benefits or attend German schools are obliged to contact ARGE job counselors and attend language and integration courses and job preparation training, if needed. Integration courses are obligatory for many newcomers, regardless of their social status.¹⁰²⁵

Cooperative agreements between organizations and schools are another way immigrant youth find their way to labor market integration programs. Usually, teachers have

¹⁰²⁴ As Anderson noted, "Die LHS München zumindest versucht, den Schulbesuch von Kindern in der Illegalität – innerhalb des eng gesetzten rechtlichen Rahmens – zu ermöglichen. Kinder sollen in der Schule durch mündliche Angaben von ihren Eltern mit Migrationshintergrund angemeldet werden können, d. h. keine Meldebescheinigung oder Pass oder ähnliches muss vorgelegt werden." See interview M/17. Other actions of the Munich Model involve collaboration with service points for medical service for people without health insurance, a hotline service for anonymous counseling by the Aliens' Office on "Ways Out of Illegality," and Round Tables organized as a platform for the collaboration of the city with civil society organizations which have access to the undocumented population. For an update on the latest developments of the Munich Model, see Landeshauptstadt München. (2010). *Wir haben sie nicht vergessen: 10 Jahre Umgang mit Menschen ohne gesicherten Aufenthaltsstatus in der Landeshauptstadt München. Das Münchner Modell*. München: Landeshauptstadt München.

¹⁰²⁵ At the time of my research, the integration contract had not become obligatory in Germany. See reference to the national mode of integration in Germany, subchapter 4.5.4.

to integrate language and work-readiness programs and workshops, organized by a given service provider at schools, into the regular school curriculum. As some organizations emphasized, the role of the immigrants' parents in motivating their children should not be overlooked. The parents' lack of involvement in their children's education can sometimes be quite surprising: "Man muss Eltern dazu begeistern, wenigstens einen Schreibtisch den Kindern zur Verfügung zu stellen."¹⁰²⁶

Finally, word of mouth recommendations for integration services, either coming from participants or alumni, also brings new waves of applicants. In fact, many organizations lack sufficient capacity to assist all who come to them. Most of the interviewees reported that they needed more staff and more funds to be able to meet the increasing demand for integration services for immigrant youth. As Unger disclosed the Schlau School has a long waiting list of applicants. Other organizations would willingly extend their offers but, because their organizations are understaffed with paid personal and their services often depend on volunteerism, they are not able to expand.¹⁰²⁷ Although many service providers for immigrant youth operate in Munich, they are well-connected and refer clients to each other. Only the undocumented seem to remain on the margins, and it is hard to see them reaching those who could help. The story of Martinez' undocumented friend who, after living in Munich for seven years, was still not sure of the location of Marienplatz, the central market square in Munich, makes it clear that for the undocumented in Munich "life in the shadow" is not merely a figurative expression.¹⁰²⁸ Consequently, the recently-established city hotline serving people *sans papiers* is receiving more calls than anticipated.

Information campaigns on immigrant integration and media activities sponsored by many integration stakeholders in the city show that the city has taken the task of mobilizing Munich residents very seriously. As an interviewee at REGSAM pointed out, it is very important to show the public positive examples and the success stories of immigrants prospering in the city, focusing on their potential rather than their shortcomings as the PISA study does.¹⁰²⁹ A wide range of intercultural events, panel discussions, intercultural happenings, research project presentations on cultural diversity are on the daily cultural program.¹⁰³⁰ In fact, all the interesting offers can at times be overwhelming.

¹⁰²⁶ Interview M/8.

¹⁰²⁷ For example Café 104, IG JMD, and Flüchtlingsrat.

¹⁰²⁸ For example, although the undocumented can generally apply to the Schlau School, few have done so thus far, according to Unger. On the other hand, the doors to Café 104 never seem to close. It might be that there a couple of well-established organizations which the undocumented are not afraid to trust. See interview M/4.

¹⁰²⁹ Interview M/11.

¹⁰³⁰ Such cultural events are also the best way to find opportunities to network with other integration stakeholders (see subchapter 5.2.3.5.) The events in which I was able to take part during my field work in Munich provided me with invaluable insight into integration work in Munich. To name just a few events from the time frame 2009-2010:

According to many interviewees, the past few years have seen society start to assume their responsibility for integrating immigrants into the city, in line with the recommendations found in the Intercultural Integration Concepts. The city council publicly supports intercultural diversity in the city's political, social, and business affairs, e.g. by signing the *Charta der Vielfalt* or through close cooperation with the Foreigners' Advisory Council.¹⁰³¹ Moreover, the city is also open to the subject of the undocumented and supports all information campaigns and research on the subject of integration, including integrating the undocumented. For example, the award for social commitment and personal courage, *Münchner Lichtblicke*, organized yearly since 2000 by the association *Lichterkette*¹⁰³² in cooperation with the City of Munich and the Foreigners' Advisory Council, brings to the attention of the public people and organizations that are not yet well-known and whose work and commitment to the integration of all immigrants in the city deserves recognition.¹⁰³³

Labor unions have also lobbied for the integration of immigrants into the city and fought against workplace discrimination. Ulrich Gammel of the regional Bavaria *verdi* section briefly described *verdi* engagement in integration campaigns in Munich:

Wir laden Vertreter der Migranten in unserer Organisation zu Sitzungen, Veranstaltungen und Aktionen ein. Wir führen Seminare zu migrationspolitischen Themen durch, wie z.B. Gegen Rassismus und Rechtsradikalismus und für den Erwerb von mehr Multikultureller Kompetenz. Es gibt bei *verdi* eine „Richtlinie zur Migrationspolitik“ und eine „Programmatische Erklärung zur Migrationspolitik.“¹⁰³⁴

Moreover, individual organizations launch advertising campaigns which is an important way of recruiting native citizens for involvement in integration initiatives for and with young immigrants. By the same token, reaching out to the public is yet another way of ensuring the continuing existence of an organization. Many interviewees reported that they

- A series of discussions by the Munich Kammerspiele Theater, LMU and Goethe Institute in cooperation with the Allianz Kulturstiftung and the Bayerischen Rundfunks (Hörspiel und Medienkunst).

- Seasonal IG JMD intercultural events.

- *Tag des ausländischen Unternehmers*, organized by the Department for Labor and Economic Affairs, during which successful immigrant entrepreneurs spoke about their achievements.

- A book release party promoting the results of the migration research project, *München migrantisch - migrantisches München*, at the Institute of Ethnology, LMU.

See the project's publication, Hess, S. and Schwertl, M. (2010). *München migrantisch - migrantisches München*. München: Herbert Utz Verlag.

¹⁰³¹ Cuman Naz reported this in my interview with him (interview M/2). For more on the federal initiative *Charta der Vielfalt*, see subchapter 4.5.7.

¹⁰³² The initiative emerged from the organizers of the first German candle-light rally against xenophobia and racism, in December 1992 in Munich. See Austen, H., et al. (Eds.). (2010). *10 Jahre Förderpreis Münchner Lichtblicke*. München: Lichterkette e.V., die Landeshauptstadt München und der Ausländerbeirat München.

¹⁰³³ Café 104, Alonzo Martinez, and the Schlau project have all been the *Lichterkette* prize-winners (interviews M/4, M/5, and M/11).

¹⁰³⁴ Interview M/18.

are constant searching for volunteers and donors to guarantee the continuing functioning of their organizations.¹⁰³⁵

5.2.3.5 Network-Building

Information campaigns and public events on immigrant integration support network-building, during which many integration stakeholders meet and establish cooperations. In fact, most of the integration programs and initiatives, mentioned thus far, are based on cross-sectional cooperation between schools, organizations, and the city council. An important task for schools is finding a reliable partner interested in a long term cooperation, investing in schools, and which is not interested in action merely for the sake of action, as Principal Illmberger warned.

As many organizations affirmed, networking at the local level is often quite successful. Bosl happily remarked,

Ganz viele Institutionen arbeiten mit uns, je nach Projekt und dessen Schwerpunkt. Früher wollten die Schulen nicht so viel mit außerschulischen Einrichtungen zu tun zu haben, jetzt haben wir ganz viele Kooperationen und Verträgen mit Schulen, z.B. für Projekte zum Übergang: Schule-Beruf. Vielmehr, ARGE und Bundesagentur für Arbeit schicken uns den Menschen, also in jedem Bereich unserer Arbeit gibt es die Kopperationspartner.¹⁰³⁶

In fact, cooperative networks for the integration of immigrant youth are so complex that only by means of graphs could the interviewees from some organizations clearly explain the interdependencies with other integration stakeholders, e.g. schools, ARGE, the city council, and others. As the example of IG JMD's cooperative network in appendix 5 shows, the work of IG JMD has many synergies with other governmental and non-governmental institutions in the city. Networking with the business sector appears to be the greatest challenge for many organizations and their job counselors. The coordinator of the MOVA plus project said that approaching entrepreneurs in Munich to cooperate on integration projects in the city requires excellent public relation skills and special persuasive strategies, which are not necessarily the strong points of social service providers.

Surprisingly, one respondent remarked that competition among organizations is not conspicuous because the needs and demands for immigrant youth services still exceeds the capacities of the existing organizations.¹⁰³⁷ On the other hand, competition for funds is never easy, especially for new and little-known initiatives like Lotsenprojekt Pontis. In such cases, networking with a bigger and better-known partner when applying for funds is a common

¹⁰³⁵ This is usually true of Munich non-profits.

¹⁰³⁶ Interview M/8.

¹⁰³⁷ Interview M/11.

solution.¹⁰³⁸ The city of Munich reportedly tries to balance the distribution of money for integration projects to different institutions, so that no monopoly develops.

The content of the present integration concept was discussed in detail during more than 50 meetings with a range of charity and immigrant organizations and labor unions before it was finally implemented in 2008.¹⁰³⁹ In fact the city unites organizations together within broader or more specific fields of integration work, including youth services. The Verbundprojekt Perspektive Arbeit (VPA) gathers 27 service-providers of work-readiness programs for long term unemployed residents of the city, with a special focus on immigrants. Round Tables bringing together organizations which deal with the undocumented and asylees also receive city support. In fact, municipal representatives are not only participants but are also, to a great extent, initiators of networking, both with integration practitioners as well as migration researchers.¹⁰⁴⁰

Along with the introduction of new integration initiatives in Germany, presented in chapter 4, cooperation and communication among the interviewees, especially in Munich, with other federal states and cities has increased significantly. For example, the Office of Housing and Migration was recently selected the seat of the Bavarian branch of the nationwide IQ Network, which coordinates cooperative projects for research on labor market integration in Bavaria. Augsburg MigraNet Transferstelle is the Munich role model for managing the issues surrounding the recognition of foreign credentials. The Munich Model, in turn, is promoted as one of the best approaches on the part of a municipality for welcoming the undocumented in the country. Moreover, small scale integration projects in Munich have been modeled on local best practices in other cities, for example the MOVA plus project is modeled on its forerunner in Hamburg and the Lotsenprojekt Pontis on the well-established Lotsenprojekt in Berlin.

In contrast to the above-mentioned positive examples of networking and the exchange of best practices, the cooperation of city authorities with federal agencies seems to be a little more troublesome. My contacts claimed that federal agency BAMF's regulations are not flexible and that administrators do not respect local, well-established ways of managing integration projects which the City of Munich has been using for many years, long before the federal integration policy took effect back in 2005.¹⁰⁴¹ Although the BAMF is respected as a valuable source of funds for integration courses, most respondents had many misgivings about bureaucratic hurdles and the strict regulations (like the restriction of funds

¹⁰³⁸ Interview M/15.

¹⁰³⁹ Interview M/3.

¹⁰⁴⁰ In fact, the theoretical background of the Intercultural Integration City Concept is based on the cooperation with F. Heckmann, whose integration theory was discussed back in chapter 2. See Sorg, U., and Spohn, M. (2008). *Grundsätze und Strukturen der Integrationspolitik der Landeshauptstadt München*. München: Stelle für Interkulturelle Arbeit der Landeshauptstadt München.

¹⁰⁴¹ For example the city used to compensate the cost of transportation to integration courses which BAMF currently does not allow.

and integration courses only to people with resident status), which sometimes hinders the cooperation. Surprisingly, none of the interviewees expressed any interest or enthusiasm for a cooperation with the Bavarian state network, the Bayerisches Integrationsforum of the Bavarian Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, Family, and Women's Issues. The role of the Bavarian Commission for the Integration of Immigrants in coordinating integration initiatives in the city, similarly, has contributed little to the development of integration policies in Munich and has generally created little interest in those interviewed.¹⁰⁴²

In view of the various possibilities of forming networks with local and national integration stakeholders, little room is left for cooperation with other countries. Looking for funding opportunities with other countries, especially from the new EU member states (which usually bodes well for receiving EU funds), is probably the most common incentive for seeking partners abroad.¹⁰⁴³ Many interviewees wish they could be more engaged in European network-building, which happens too sporadically, but would be a good way to tackle common challenges, like integration measures for asylees or the undocumented.¹⁰⁴⁴ Most of the smaller youth providers focus exclusively on local work to solve challenges immigrant youth face there and cannot invest any more time in examining what is happening elsewhere in the world.

5.2.4 Warsaw

5.2.4.1 Perception of Immigrant Integration

Despite the lack of a national integration strategy in Poland, several years ago a few non-profit organizations in Warsaw started providing services to facilitate immigrant integration into the city. Since the issues of immigration and integration are just emerging in Poland, at the time of my research there were not yet many immigrant service providers based in the Polish capitol. Nevertheless, because the largest proportion of immigrants in Poland resides in Warsaw, the city was still considered the center of integration programs on a national scale.¹⁰⁴⁵

¹⁰⁴² The Bavarian Integration Concept, issued in the aftermath of Integration Concept in Munich, does not introduce any innovations to the city management of integration. See Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung, Familie und Frauen. (2008). *Leitlinien zur Integration von Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund: „Integration lohnt sich“ - Beschluss des Bayerischen Ministerrats vom 10. Juni 2008*. München: Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung, Familie und Frauen.

¹⁰⁴³ The application for EU funds for some understaffed organizations is reportedly very complicated. See interview M/9.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Interviews M/3, M/4, and M/11. The engagement of the Office of Housing and Migration with international partners in a number of the EU projects is a notable exception.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Looking at the statistics of the two calls for proposals from the European Integration Fund (EIF) in 2007 and 2008, the majority of beneficiaries were based in Warsaw. Consequently the sample of 16 interviewed organizations (see appendix 2) may be considered more representative for the local

The aims of integration work, as described by the interviewees, sometimes varied significantly. The regional Polish office of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) drew on a clearly-defined official IOM integration concept, which is supposed to apply to all IOM fields of work around the globe.¹⁰⁴⁶ *IOM and Migrant Integration* was the only official document I was referred to during the interviews which conceptualizes the immigrant integration process. Even the Warsaw Family Support Center, a branch of the national County Family Support Centers, which are responsible for carrying out the Individual Integration Program (IIP) for foreigners with humanitarian protection status in Poland,¹⁰⁴⁷ operates without any top-down guidelines on what integration actually involves.¹⁰⁴⁸ Consequently, in the view of individual counselors at the Center, the process should lead to self-sufficiency and life independent of the social benefits of the IIP. Moreover, integration is subject to an agreement between a beneficiary and an IIP social counselor, which only theoretically makes both parties responsible for the successful completion of the integration process.¹⁰⁴⁹

Nevertheless integration has become the core program for some organizations which were inspired by the emergence of the new funding possibilities from the European Integration Fund (EIF) in Poland. They are finally able to offer integration measures aimed not only at refugees and asylum seekers but also other groups of immigrants with a documented status in Poland. Consequently, the issue of integration “is no longer so exotic,” as a person at the Polish Migration Forum, an EIF beneficiary, put it.¹⁰⁵⁰ Nevertheless, most of the organizations, even those which have been granted EU monies, are opposed to the EU idea of limiting the process of integration just to immigrants residing legally in a city. Accordingly, the Association for Legal Intervention (SIP) emphasized a strong need for “pre-integration measures”.¹⁰⁵¹

If you want to talk about a reasonable integration process for immigrants you should think about their integration from the very moment they arrive in Poland, and not from the time at

integration management than those in the other case studies See Implementing Authority for European Programs in Poland (n.d.). Results of the EIF Calls for Proposal 2007 and 2008.

¹⁰⁴⁶ “Successful integration is a two-way process that involves mutual adaptation of migrants and the host society, as well as equality of rights and obligations. It involves acceptance by the host society and adjustment by the migrant. It is not something that happens once in a static manner. Integration is a dynamic relationship between two communities.” See International Organization for Migration. (2006). *IOM and Migrant Integration*. Geneva: IOM.

¹⁰⁴⁷ For more on the IIP, see subchapter 4.6.4.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Interview W/12.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Because the center is understaffed, IIP counselors are simply unable to fully engage in individual case management.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Interview W/9.

¹⁰⁵¹ Polish respondents called for pre-integration measures which would help immigrants awaiting the regularization of their status in the country, but which still do not exist. Of note is the fact that pre-integration programs in different national contexts can refer to preparatory courses for immigrants before they leave their home countries, like German language courses organized in the sending countries for immigrants heading for Germany.

which their status becomes legal. Legalization procedures sometimes last many months or years and just letting them eat and drink in refugee centers but not thinking about their integration is not very smart. Learning self-sufficiency in a couple of days, which many would expect of immigrants once they have obtained legal status, is simply unrealistic.¹⁰⁵²

Most interviewees tended to believe that immigrants should not be left alone to deal with the difficulties inherent in integration and that city residents should offer assistance.¹⁰⁵³ Moreover, they viewed immigrant integration as a crucial step in triggering a sociological change in Polish society, which, because of the long period of isolation in the post-Second World War era, is still not open enough to accept other cultures.¹⁰⁵⁴ “Many Polish citizens might not tolerate Muslim immigrants rolling out their carpets and starting pray on the floor during the school breaks, as they do in our school,” a Polish language teacher from *Lingua Mundi* pointed out. Therefore, integration is more about getting to know each other and promoting mutual acceptance on the part of both the newcomers and the host society – the ideals close to the vision of a multicultural society, which Warsaw finally has a chance to achieve.¹⁰⁵⁵ As a matter of fact, the city government of Warsaw has only recently started acknowledge the growing cultural diversity of their city in its official documents. Warsaw’s current social strategy involves recognizing the increasing number of immigrants in the city, whose integration is a prerequisite for social cohesion inside the city gates, as well as the challenges integration brings with it.¹⁰⁵⁶

5.2.4.2 Integration Challenges

In no other city case study did interviewees report so many differences in the integration challenges of immigrant youth, on the basis of the country of origin, as in Warsaw.¹⁰⁵⁷ In fact, the situation of the two dominant Asian immigrant groups in the city, Chechens and Vietnamese, was often contrasted with the circumstances of the two largest

¹⁰⁵² Interview W/13.

¹⁰⁵³ The Fu Shenfu Migrant Center is an exception. As center coordinator Jacek Gniadek pointed out, all integration courses would not be needed if all immigrants had work permits. Accordingly, the integration process will take place automatically once immigrants are granted the right to work (interview W/15).

¹⁰⁵⁴ For example, see interviews W/11, W/15, and W/16.

¹⁰⁵⁵ For more on Polish isolationism from immigrants in the post WWII period, see subchapter 4.6.1.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Many interviewees pointed to the strategy as a milestone in the city’s changing approach to immigrants. See The Council of the Capital City of Warsaw (2008, December 18). *Strategy for the Development of Social Problems for Years 2009-2020*.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Although different integration challenges for different immigration groups were obviously reported by interviewees in all city case studies (as in the cases of the Turkish in Germany or Mexicans in San Diego and Phoenix), they were made most explicitly by the interviewees in Warsaw. They focused sometimes on only one particular ethnic group of immigrants, Chechens, which presented quite a challenge for keeping to my scope of research. I will resist profiling and will not focus on particular immigrant groups in the rest of this chapter. In fact, the evaluation of the integration challenges based on country of origin goes beyond the scope of my research.

groups of East Europeans, Belarusians and Ukrainians. Because of a cultural background similar to that of Poles and special provisions on the Polish labor market, discussed in subchapter 4.6, most organization do not consider the East Europeans to be such a “problematic group” to handle as people from Chechen or Vietnamese enclaves.

Two main factors account for the segregation of these two groups in the city. First, regulations from the Office for Foreigners keep Chechens in separate refugee centers for fear of potential inter-ethnic conflicts with other immigrant groups. Secondly, the Vietnamese are well established in their own districts, and do not seem to be eager to mingle with other Warsaw residents.¹⁰⁵⁸ Consequently, breaking away from their ethnic enclaves was considered one of the most common barriers to integration for immigrant youth. Paradoxically, as the counselor from Family Support Center pointed out, immigrant families often hinder integration measures on the part of service providers.¹⁰⁵⁹ In fact, discussing integration challenges in Warsaw led to the airing of many complaints about the unwillingness of these two culturally-distant groups to learn the Polish language, get to know Poles, or to enter the Polish labor market, as if only the immigrants shouldered the burden of confronting integration challenges. For example, one of the teachers at the Lingua Mundi language school reported that in her classes too many immigrants of a particular ethnic group used to stir up conflict with others.¹⁰⁶⁰

The alleged unwillingness and low motivation of some young school-age and working-age immigrant groups to learn Polish could be explained by several factors, according to most interviewees. Firstly, primary and secondary schools in Warsaw are still ill-prepared to accommodate immigrant children: assistance with Polish language and additional tutoring was still uncommon in schools when I was carrying out my research.¹⁰⁶¹ In fact, most schools are afraid of accepting immigrant children, who might potentially lower their performance rankings. The usual practice of separation of pupils into Polish and immigrant classes was harshly criticized by Krystyna Starczewska, a principal at a private secondary school.¹⁰⁶² Education and learning the Polish language in ethnic enclaves is not motivating. The Office for Foreigners reported that few of those eligible immigrants actually attend such classes in the refugee centers.¹⁰⁶³

¹⁰⁵⁸ For an interesting volume of reports on the different integration challenges of different immigrant groups in Warsaw, and in Poland more generally, see Grzymała-Kazłowska, A. (Ed.) (2008). *Między jednością a wielością. Integracja odmiennych grup i kategorii imigrantów w Polsce (Between Unity and Diversity. Integration of Different Groups and Categories of Immigrants in Poland)*. Warsaw: Center of Migration Research.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Interview W/12.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Interview W/5.

¹⁰⁶¹ The New Regulation on Admission of Foreigners into Polish Schools was adopted in 2010. See subchapter 4.6.6.

¹⁰⁶² Interview W/16.

¹⁰⁶³ Interview W/4.

Secondly, due to the lack of command of the Polish language and difficulties in gaining recognition for their credentials, high-skilled young immigrants have little chance of obtaining jobs which meet their expectations.¹⁰⁶⁴ Teresa Stępnia, a job counselor at Polish Humanitarian Action (PAH), reported that some of the qualifications are useless on the Polish labor market (e.g. refugees who specialized in the war industry in their home country have no chance of finding work in this field in Warsaw). “Getting a job often requires giving up your ambitions,” Stępnia admitted.¹⁰⁶⁵

Finally, the generally quite harsh conditions on the Polish labor market for third country nationals, presented in subchapter 4.6, complicate the smooth transition of immigrants into the workforce, even in Warsaw, the city with one of the lowest unemployment rates and the most prosperous economy in Poland. As a result of restrictive regulations, the labor market in the city still tends to protect Polish workers, asserted Marek Roman, job counselor at one of Warsaw’s employment agencies.¹⁰⁶⁶ Discrimination against foreign workers who are not from the West is still prevalent.¹⁰⁶⁷ Employing foreigners in sectors which are not affected by shortages of Polish workers is more the exception than the rule.¹⁰⁶⁸ “Colorful” immigrants are attractive for ads and media, but are considered less reliable as workers.¹⁰⁶⁹ Finding illegal work seems to be less problematic, and quite often immigrants with documents and a work permit still end up working illegally, noted Jacek Gniadek at Migrant Center.¹⁰⁷⁰ In fact, illegal work is sometimes the only way to survive in Poland’s most expensive city.¹⁰⁷¹ Unfamiliarity with the rules governing the employment of foreign workers and ignorance of an employee’s legal rights hinder immigrants’ legal access to work. Most interviewees insisted that further education on employment regulations is needed for both employers and immigrants.

All of these challenges, in turn, lead to disillusionment among some immigrants, especially asylum seekers. The first metropolis across the EU border, Warsaw, is not the dream destination they had expected. Many young immigrants receive no positive reinforcement from the Polish education system or the labor market, which lowers their motivation for integrating. Consequently, the demand for integration measures is huge.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Interviews W/1 and W/13.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Interview W/2.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Based on an unrecorded, informal conversation.

¹⁰⁶⁷ “The West” in this context refers to the old EU countries, the US, and Canada.

¹⁰⁶⁸ One of the advertisements in *Lingua Mundi* read: “I employ all: both black or yellow.” See interview W/5.

¹⁰⁶⁹ Stępnia claimed the easiest jobs to arrange for immigrants are hand-clappers for TV shows. See interview W/2.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Interview W/15.

¹⁰⁷¹ Most of the interviewees complained that renting a flat in Warsaw was too expensive. See for example interviews W/8, W/11, and W/12.

Agnieszka Kosowicz, founder of the first online Polish migration counseling service for immigrants, said that many seek assistance anonymously.¹⁰⁷²

5.2.4.3 Integration Measures

Although in comparison to the other city case studies relatively few measures for immigrant integration exist, a boom in integration projects for immigrants began around the time of my research in Warsaw. Many of those interviewed were working on initiatives that had been in place for no longer than two or three years, or were just at the point of starting their integration work.¹⁰⁷³ Great enthusiasm and strong belief in the mission of helping immigrants was evident among the interviewees, because almost all of their projects were new in the field in Warsaw.

On the other hand, since the majority of their projects generally relied on short-term EU funding,¹⁰⁷⁴ concerns about the sustainability of the various projects was among the biggest challenges the organizations were then facing. In fact, the majority of the organizations are understaffed and the personnel capacities do not allow them to work efficiently as both fundraisers and service providers. For example, the closing of the Intercultural Center for Labor Market Adaptation (MCAZ), the only organization which had offered not only Polish language courses but also workforce readiness skills and vocational training programs for immigrants, because of a lack of funds, was heart-breaking.¹⁰⁷⁵ At the time of my research no other project had appeared on the horizon to fill the gap in labor market integration measures. As Aleksandra Chrzanowska from the Association for Legal Intervention (SIP) pointed out, many immigrants come to her organization and ask for an alternative to MCAZ courses.¹⁰⁷⁶

The City of Warsaw does not provide special grants to subsidize integration programs for immigrants but does support projects aimed at general social integration in the city. By the same token, some of the organizations interviewed can count on financial aid from the city in the form of grants for Warsaw social programs. However, such aid does not suffice to run an integration project without additional EU funds.¹⁰⁷⁷ Similarly, the governor of the Masovian Voivodeship has just started co-financing the first three-year long EU funded program Information Center for Foreigners, run by the SIP in cooperation with the Polish

¹⁰⁷² Interview W/9.

¹⁰⁷³ The oldest of the organizations interviewed, Polish Humanitarian Action (PAH), started providing humanitarian aid to immigrants in the middle of 1990, when the first refugee groups appeared in the city.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Such funding sources include the European Refugee Fund (ERF), the European Fund for the Integration of Third Country Nationals (EIF), and the European Social Funds (ESF). See subchapter 4.4.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Interview W/7.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Interviews W/7 and W/13.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Interview W/3.

Migration Forum, which was still in the start-up phase at the time of my research. The Center began by offering immigrants legal counseling and assistance in dealing with the government offices responsible for legalizing their stay in Warsaw.¹⁰⁷⁸ In fact, of the national integration programs mentioned above, IIP is the only integration measure in the city which is almost fully financed by governmental monies from the governor, the organ responsible for the implementation of IIP in the Masovian Voivodeship.

Most of the organizations where I interviewed staff members have thus far provided Polish language courses, legal counseling and general intercultural activities like “getting to know each other” with introduction courses to Polish culture, cuisine and traditions and that of the immigrants’, too.¹⁰⁷⁹ Apart from individual job counseling run by one counselor at the PAH, no intensive job readiness courses for immigrants were available within the scope of the programs offered by the organizations I interviewed at the time of my research. Unfortunately but not surprisingly, then, no integration measures could be reported which specifically targeted immigrant youth. The work readiness programs available to youth in the city and sponsored by the governmental agency Youth Job Corps (*Młodzieżowe Hufce Pracy*) rarely reached immigrants. However, demand for such programs was generally acknowledged and a new project was already on the horizon.¹⁰⁸⁰

Because of financial constraints, the funding source started to determine the type of service. As my interviewee at the IOM explained that in light of the new possibilities of getting funds through EIF programs, those who began to regularly offer language courses for refugees with ERF funding came up with new projects for third country nationals.¹⁰⁸¹ These funds, however, require that the undocumented be excluded from these services. Few organizations which do not rely solely on EU money – like the PAH, the Migrant Center or the Raszyńska School – can provide services to all who come.¹⁰⁸²

Organizations apparently try to use the opportunity of obtaining funds through the new EU financial mechanisms in Poland in order to find ways of providing immigrants with various kinds of help. However, they sometimes launch programs without researching exactly which integration measures are needed and how they can best reach the target group. In fact, many of the projects should probably be considered experiments and testing grounds for potentially better programs in the future. As Dorota Przymies from Survival Foundation asserted, the best way to find out about immigrants’ needs is learning by doing.

¹⁰⁷⁸ The project was still in the preparatory phase at the time of my research. For the project plans, see interview W/13.

¹⁰⁷⁹ For example the Via Foundation or the Raszyńska School.

¹⁰⁸⁰ For example, the WCPR was developing the EU-funded project “Integration towards Self-sufficiency” for disadvantaged social groups, which was also supposed to target immigrant youth.

¹⁰⁸¹ Interviews W/10 and W/15.

¹⁰⁸² However, as some confirmed off the record, although they are officially forbidden to do so, they assist the undocumented, who can always be included in the project’s report as people seeking regulated status. See interviews W/2, W/15, and W/16.

Only after she had been employing immigrants in her own organizations could she finally fully understand the challenges immigrants face on the Polish labor market.¹⁰⁸³

5.2.4.4 Reaching Out to Immigrants and the Host Society

Reaching out to immigrants is much easier when the organization employs immigrants as coworkers, as Survival Foundation does. The mutual trust between immigrants and the organization seems to be much stronger, so no official barrier exist between “us,” the competent native staff, and “you,” the poor immigrant seeking help. Nevertheless, since there are many organizations on the “immigrant integration market,” it seems that those organizations which initially provide assistance, like the individual job counseling offered by PAH, or the legal services of the Helsinki Foundation or SIP, tend to lack the resources – the staff, money, and time – to be in a position to encourage more immigrants to come to them. Moreover some “more well-established”¹⁰⁸⁴ immigrant service providers have also been directly contacted by the Office for Foreigners, which has recently become eager to cooperate with NGOs to tackle integration challenges in refugee centers.

For new programs, finding target groups is more challenging. The organizations come up with more or less successful methods of learning the needs. Lingua Mundi’s online survey, which seeks to gather information about the need for language courses of possible applicants for their new EIF funded integration courses, is an interesting attempt to discover immigrants’ expectations. The organizers of the first planned youth job preparation courses were still in doubt about how to attract immigrant youth. Finally, as Gniadek ironically put it, some organizations trying to develop new ideas for EIF projects invite immigrants to meetings but they do not manage to bring them back again.¹⁰⁸⁵ The most successful method of reaching out is literally going in to the communities where immigrants live. The Migrant Center, for example, leaves their offices and takes their Polish language services to remote locations on the outskirts of the city, to those who are not able to commute into the city center. Diversity Foundation, in turn, has come up with an innovative project, a so-called Mobile Immigrant Consultation Point at the Bazaar in the Warsaw Stadium area, the work site of many undocumented immigrants and thus a symbol of multicultural life in Warsaw.¹⁰⁸⁶ The Foundation’s workers used to mingle with the market sellers’ customers and in informal talks inquired about immigrants’ problems and offered legal counseling.

¹⁰⁸³ Interview W/1.

¹⁰⁸⁴ In Warsaw, “long established” can be used to describe organizations which have been functioning no more than a couple of years.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Gniadek ironically calls them “came-ate-and-went-away” events and courses (for example integration cooking courses) which are not useful for immigrants. See interview W/15.

¹⁰⁸⁶ The mobile point became a permanent consultation point with newly-established headquarters at the Forum in 2009.

Along with an increase in the number of integration projects targeting immigrants, more campaigns and intercultural events were also organized in the city. The most famous of these events, the yearly celebration of World Refugee Day, coordinated by PAH, and World Migrant Day, organized by IOM, are now no longer the only campaigns which raise awareness of diversity in the city. At the same time smaller scale projects (like intercultural events for the community at the Raszyńska School, the library project Network for Knowledge on Migration,¹⁰⁸⁷ or the City Council's project Diverse Warsaw, aimed at fighting discrimination against people based on race or ethnic origin) are concrete signs that people have begun to talk about immigrants in the city. Still, as many organizations complained, this has not led to an increase in volunteers nor prompted the business sector to greater engagement in integration management.

5.2.4.5 Network-Building

The cooperation between integration stakeholders has started to develop only recently. The coordinator of the governmental program IIP, WCPR builds coalitions with language service providers, like Lingua Mundi, or runs consultation programs with Warsaw employment agencies. Less cooperation was reported among non-profits which have only begun to emerge in Warsaw. On the one hand, they still apparently want to work independently or they simply lack the capacity to run partnership projects, which are always time-consuming. On the other hand, some of the interviewees were working for organizations which were not well known enough to be considered reliable partners for others at the time of the interview. Katarzyna Kubin, working at the Forum for Social Diversity, the most recently founded organization of all those interviewed, noted a certain degree of discrimination against small organizations:

From our side, we were very open to cooperation. It was necessary for us, because in order to be treated seriously we had to have a stable partner. We did not have anybody, none of the more established institutions wanted to cooperate with us. So we started building our organization on our own, from scratch... Only when we started passionately organizing our Mobile Immigrant Consultation Point did others get interested. Now we know that we started from the wrong point. First you have to develop your innovative ideas. Once you put them into practice and show that they work, you should then set up your organization and form partnerships.¹⁰⁸⁸

¹⁰⁸⁷ The project is coordinated by the Polish Migration Forum, which distributes books or raises funds for publications of migration research for the associated libraries in Warsaw and across Poland.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Interview W/14.

However, since there are not many service-providers for immigrants, the organizations know each other quite well, and they quickly learn about new, emerging initiatives. Once they get to know each other better, they usually form coalitions in applications for EU funds to run future EIF projects together. The most important niche for consultations was legal counseling, but none of the organizations mentioned any kind of network-building for immigrant youth.

Some of the bigger players started establishing working groups or consultations which sought to identify immigrants' needs and potential integration partners to improve integration management in the city. The first of such initiatives formed in 2005, when the IOM invited both governmental and non-governmental organizations, among others a couple of existing migrant associations in Warsaw, for consultations. At the meetings they identified a need for changes and improvements in the situation of immigrants in the city, which were summarized in the IOM report *Empowering Migrants*.¹⁰⁸⁹ Similar reports are usually follow-ups of consultations or conferences on migration and integration which have recently started to take place with more frequency. For example, the newly-established (in 2008) Forum for Foreigners, by Masovian Voivode, invites all interested integration stakeholders from the city to join together to diagnose the current situation of immigrants and work to find solutions. One of the biggest challenges is to motivate employers and the business sector in general to take part, the coordinator of the Masovian Forum stated.¹⁰⁹⁰ The central Polish government, though, has also engaged in networking with NGOs, at IOM's National Platform of Cooperation for Migration Strategy in Poland, a majority of whose members come from Warsaw.¹⁰⁹¹

The level of cooperation is slowly increasing among cities across Poland, spurred by the Warsaw-based organizations. Compared to other European countries, in turn, the city still lags behind other EU metropolises in participating in European networks for international cooperation on immigrant integration. A boom in international migration projects among Polish researchers is a notable exception.¹⁰⁹²

In sum, as many respondents agreed, most of the initiatives for network-building focus on identifying the problems, and holding discussions and consultations. Przymies argued:

There is a good cooperation with governmental institutions like the Department for Migration Policy or the Office for Foreigners, but it involves only consultation. Somebody writes a good

¹⁰⁸⁹ For the IOM English summary of the report, provided by the interviewee Janina Owczarek see appendix 8.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Interview W/6.

¹⁰⁹¹ See national mode of integration in Poland, subchapter 4.6.4.

¹⁰⁹² Information on new integration research projects with a significant number of Polish researchers, mostly from Warsaw, is accessible at the European Web Site on Integration EWSI.

report on that, adds it to the list of the organization's activities and that's it. In fact, immigrants, who should be the real beneficiaries, do not profit from this networking.¹⁰⁹³

Nevertheless, many respondents expressed great hope that the preliminary cooperation on programs connected with immigrant integration will bring about more concrete action in the near future.

5.3 Summary: Comparing the Incomparable

The above analysis of integration work in the city case studies reveals a wide spectrum of both similar and different approaches to this work not only on the part of organizations in different cities of two neighboring EU countries and two neighboring US states, but also among various interviewees inside the gates of the same city. Consequently, it is not possible to draw clear dividing lines between cases and generalize about a specific mode of integration in each city, which accordingly gives shape to the work of all organizations in each city. In fact, much as each individual immigrant experiences integration differently and finds his or her own way to integrate, in a similar way organizations pursue the goal of integration work in various ways, more or less efficiently and more or less innovatively.

Whether the concept of integration is defined by the municipalities, or how they choose to define it, may be considered a deciding factor for an organization's approach to immigrant integration, as can the status enjoyed by a particular organization. However, as the analysis thus far has shown, there is no single, deciding factor. Many other issues, set the conditions for immigrant integration management in a given organization. These conditions will be summarized in the conclusion in chapter 6.

Nevertheless, my field work and the investigation of particular aspects involved in managing the integration of immigrant youth into the labor market, presented earlier in this chapter, provides a basis for arguing that in each case study a certain, unique atmosphere relating to the subject of immigrant integration exists. This context defines the presence of immigrants and their integration as an aspect of urban life that is either an ordinary feature of daily life (in San Diego), a controversial issue (in Phoenix), a trend (in Munich), or a novel development (in Warsaw). Interestingly enough, these different discourses on integration in the cities, reflected in the work of the organizations interviewed, correspond to Singers' typologies of American immigration gateways, which I also ascribed to the EU case studies.¹⁰⁹⁴

¹⁰⁹³ Interview W/1.

¹⁰⁹⁴ See subchapter 3.2.

- 1) In the border city San Diego, an established, post-World War II gateway, the issues of immigrant youth are on the agenda of many youth programs, regardless of whether their target audience is native or foreign-born. Consequently, the immigrant youth who need integration assistance are lumped together with other disadvantaged young people in poor communities, which were also sometimes densely populated by segregated, ethnic population groups. Although the issue of the undocumented is by no means off the table, it is not as emotional or controversial, at least within the city,¹⁰⁹⁵ as in the capitol of Arizona.
- 2) In Phoenix, a rapidly-growing emerging gateway, integration management of immigrant youth is narrowed down to the controversies around the issue of providing help to the undocumented or deporting them. In such an atmosphere, avoiding the subject of immigrants might be the safest way for the organizations to continue providing services to immigrant youth. As a result, though, three distinct groups have emerged: strong advocates of undocumented youth, fierce opposition to the undocumented, and timid, integration service providers who want to help but are too wary to talk about their aspirations publicly and openly build networks.
- 3) In Munich, which I consider a continuous gateway, the subject of immigrant integration and the concept of integration has become one of the city labels for the promotion of intercultural openness and tolerance in the conservative state of Bavaria. Consequently, the city boasts many integration programs directed at immigrant youth and fertile ground for network-building for many service providers in the city. Moreover, immigrant integration has turned into a trendy catchword used at many cultural and political events in the city, which can have two affects: it either encourages the involvement of Munich residents or overwhelms them somewhat with theorizing about integration processes.
- 4) In Warsaw, which in the future I believe will become a pre-emerging gateway, integration stakeholders are still struggling to find a way to welcome new immigrants. Nevertheless, the boom in new ideas, plans, and enthusiasm is remarkable. The first integration networks are still in the process of learning about each other, discovering ways to reach out to immigrants, finding out how best to tap into the available EU resources for integration programs, and cooperating with international partners. It seems that in the city where the subject of integration is

¹⁰⁹⁵ One should not forget about the dire situation of IB youth in the canyons or the undocumented crossing the mountains and deserts in the city surroundings. See subchapter 5.2.1.

still quite new, the establishment a common strategy is needed to develop “mature” integration management which also embraces immigrant youth.

It is important to emphasize again that these unique circumstances for dealing with the issue of integrating immigrant youth to a large extent result from the top-down contexts of supranational, national, and state integration frameworks, presented in chapter 4, which therefore complicates a comparison of the city case studies. These top-down contexts are often overlooked in comparative studies of local integration practices, which try to evaluate best and worst practices across different cities without taking into consideration external, national conditions. In fact, an example of a best practice in Warsaw, the Mobile Immigrant Information Point, would not work very well in Phoenix, a city in which immigrants are quite wary of being stopped and questioned about their migration status by strangers and/or the police.

The climate for integration management in each of immigration gateways presented here cannot reflect the wealth of new insights and information about methods of providing tools for immigrant integration on the part of the local society which are sometimes similar and sometimes different within and across case studies. Nevertheless, the incongruity of the transatlantic top-down and local contexts for integration brings into focus certain patterns, which will be presented in the concluding chapter.

6 Conclusions

Bringing the research to an end evokes reflections about what has been done, what still needs to be done and the desired outcome of the study presented here, all of which is summarized in this chapter. I will first offer answers to the core research questions introduced at the beginning of the dissertation, then elaborate on the limitations of the research and prospects for further study, and finally suggest recommendations for integration work for immigrant youth in line with the Affirmative Integration Management (AIM) approach as proposed in this dissertation.

6.1 Research Findings

The research findings from the analysis of the influence of the top-down integration policies and the city contexts for integration management will be gathered into two sections. The first catalog will provide the answer to the first two research questions, presenting the factors which were found to influence the development of local initiatives aimed at integrating young immigrants into the labor market. The discussion following will explain how these factors determine the options for taking action by utilizing Affirmative Integration Management for immigrant youth. The implementation of Positive Youth Development strategies, which aim at developing the human capital of immigrant youth, is a prerequisite for implementing AIM. Consequently, the identification of factors which facilitate or hinder the realization of AIM at a given organization will provide the answer to the second research question: which factors enable the host society to tap into the potential of young immigrants?

The second catalog will present the similarities and differences in the US and EU case studies, based on the research findings. In so doing, the study's third research question will be answered: can the exchange of integration policy research and practical experience with integration management in the United States and the European Union be useful –are lessons learned from this exchange transferable?

6.1.1 Affirmative Integration Management in Practice

Based on an analysis of the transatlantic examples of local labor market integration initiatives for helping young immigrants gain access to the labor market, several important factors have been found in the US, Germany and Poland which influence the direction of the development of integration measures offered by the host society's institutions.¹⁰⁹⁶ The results

¹⁰⁹⁶ The definition of the host society is narrowed down to the representatives of local government and important civil society institutions at the city level; these are the stakeholders in education and labor market systems and immigrant integration policies, as defined in subchapter 2.3.

suggest that the integration work of any given institution in each case study depends on the local, national, and sometimes even supranational context of immigrant integration policy-making. At the same time many internal factors, at the local level of a given institution, which determine the character of the integration measures offered to immigrant youth, have been observed. Table 7 encapsulates the most important internal and external factors which determine the prospects for taking action after the institution of AIM, hereafter AIM factors:

Table 7 External and Internal AIM Factors

The catalog of the most important factors which determine the possibilities of taking action following the institution of Affirmative Integration Management for immigrant youth on the labor market

External	Internal
1. Development of a city's integration strategies and integration monitoring	1. The institution's understanding of its role in the immigrant integration process
2. Available funds for the development of integration measures	2. Target groups of integration measures
3. Structures for network-building and cooperation with regard to the school-to-work transition of young immigrants	3. The variety of direct and indirect integration measures
4. The influence of top-down integration policies	4. The willingness to cooperate with other organizations on the development of efficient immigrant integration programs
5. Political and public discourse on the integration of immigrants	5. The scope of information campaigns about integration services

Table 7 clearly shows that to a large extent external factors restrict organizations in developing their integration work. At the same time, as the table illustrates, they depend considerably on their own internal organization and philosophy. Both internal and external variables will be briefly summarized here.

The development of integration strategies and monitoring at the city government level is a factor encouraging local organizations to engage in integration work. Integration concepts and a city's network of civil society actors demonstrate that immigration is not a taboo subject and that it deserves greater attention and commitment from city residents. Broad support for integration work on the part of the city government may open new possibilities for organizations to tap into a city's resources, such as platforms for consultation and partnerships with governmental and non-governmental integration stakeholders. It is

even better if such platforms also focus particularly on strategies for the development of youth services in the city.

Municipal, state, national, or, in Europe, EU funds are indispensable financial resources for the development of integration programs for immigrant youth, usually run by non-profit organizations. In addition, funds should also, ideally, be provided by the local business sector. The lack of financial stability of integration service providers often dooms their innovative initiatives to failure. Moreover, short-term grants are not the best solution to their financial constraints, as the amount of effort and engagement the organization puts into a single project is not proportional to the long term effect. In fact, integration stakeholders without stable financial incomes are under constant pressure to seek new funds before the current grant ends and cannot focus on improving their services. Additionally, grant makers' restrictive regulations narrow the scope of integration work of organizations (e.g. the proviso that services for immigrant youth be limited to the documented).

Stand-alone programs for immigrant youth from a single service provider are much more often affected by financial constraints than those run through partnerships. Moreover, single programs are sometimes less effective than those run in cooperation with stakeholders in various fields of integration work: workforce development or the educational system (e.g. employment agencies or educators). In fact, network-building is one of the best possible avenues to pulling together different resources, funds certainly, but even more important different areas of expertise which make it possible to organize more comprehensive youth programs targeting immigrants. Consequently, structures available for network-building may significantly improve integration services.

National integration network-building and national integration funds are a necessary complement to local resources. However, it is questionable whether national regulation of integration policies always fosters the development of integration work for local organizations. For example, regulations on the provision of obligatory integration courses which are too strict reduce the maneuverability of local service providers and often impose unnecessary red tape. At the same time, top-down restrictions do not always respect a given organization's expertise in integration work and sometimes fails to respond to the particular needs of some immigrant groups.

Finally, as mentioned in subchapter 5.3, the local atmosphere for integration work with immigrant youth can range from enthusiasm and support to a lack of awareness to heated discussions about "illegals" and the fear of "foreign cultures." Consequently, the local environment can either promote or impede the development of integration initiatives. Heated political and public debate on the subject of immigration may also hinder the involvement of volunteers and employers in programs for immigrant youth.

Despite a wide range of external AIM factors, the importance of the internal structure of organizations cannot be overlooked. In fact, the method of approaching immigrant youth is to a large extent dependent on the personal attitudes of the staff toward the subject of immigrant integration and youth development. Whether the staff understand the integration process as a shared responsibility or merely the task of the immigrant is essential. Different approaches were observed in the research, ranging from more demanding to more cooperative. The ideal situation would be to engage immigrant youth in the development of services for their peers, which would give them a chance to develop their organizational and entrepreneurial skills. Moreover, if an organization perceives the integration process as the fastest possible way to self-sufficiency, they may easily fail to notice the potential of certain immigrants and/or their aspirations to further education, while persuading them to take the first available jobs.

If possible, organizations should not be exclusive and should be ready to offer their services to all immigrant youth in need. Unfortunately, the regulations of many grant makers restrict the target groups. Very often those without legal documents are out and cannot expect any positive reinforcement in their struggles to obtain an education and to integrate. However, many solutions can be found, like applying for additional grants or offering counseling to the excluded target groups outside the strict structure of the funded programs. Perseverance and belief in the mission of helping all young immigrants, regardless of their ethnic backgrounds or legal status, can work miracles.

The range of integration measures an organization offers is another internal factor which supports practicing AIM. More comprehensive services, which offer not only language training but also remedial tutoring, courses in self-assessment, or the development of workforce skills, can better address the challenges faced in making the school-to-work transition. Moreover, indirect immigrant integration measures, which are offered to both native and immigrant youth, may foster even better integration processes. Since an organization's capacities do not always allow providing "a full package" of labor market integration services, networking with others is indispensable.

The willingness to take part in network-building is usually beneficial for both sides: the immigrants and the organizations. Integration projects in partnerships enhance the capacities of the partners. Consequently, potential competitors for the same funds become partners in one comprehensive project. However, selectiveness in networking is also important. Because of the boom in networking proposals, international conferences, meetings, and exchanges of best practices, the real goal of providing high-quality integration services to local immigrant youth may easily be forgotten.

The organizations which seek to offer comprehensive immigrant youth programs make great effort at not only establishing constructive networks but also reaching out to

youth and the local population, if their services are still not widely known. Activism and information campaigns are an essential part of their work. On the other hand, like networking advertising should not overshadow the actual mission of the organization. Non-profits can easily turn into for-profits and project coordinators into people seeking celebrity and recognition. In fact, the immigrant youth who need help are often on the margins of the society, away from schools where integration services reach and beyond the reach of the employment agencies who can sometimes connect young job-seekers with school-to-work transition programs. Finding methods of reaching out to immigrant youth on the margins is a necessity for AIM practitioners.

In conclusion, for immigrant youth service providers both internal and external factors determine whether the local society is able to evaluate and tap into potential of young immigrants. The interplay of all these factors reveals just how multidimensional the process of integration management is. The external factors were not found to fully support the integration work of the organizations interviewed in any of the case studies, as the analysis showed. Similarly, none of the organizations, governmental or non- governmental, were able to successfully cope with all the internal pitfalls hampering the implementation of AIM principles. Better practices and practices best avoided have been identified. However, I would be wary of labeling any service the best one and any case study the example for all others to follow. Achieving the status of the best immigrant youth service provider is only possible when no improvements are needed. But bringing resources together and exchanging information about what can be done better is the best way to achieve the target of employing Positive Youth Development strategies with immigrant youth.

6.1.2 Exchange of Transatlantic Perspectives on Integration

Research findings not only show points of difference but also many points of convergence among the factors influencing the management of immigrant integration and research on it in various local, state and national contexts in the United States, Germany, and Poland. Table 8 presents a catalog of these similarities and differences, which I recommend as a basis for further comparative research on immigrant integration in the EU countries and the US.¹⁰⁹⁷

Looking at the table, it seems that the list of differences is actually counterbalanced by points of overlap which support the exchange of integration policy research and practical experience of integration management in the US states and the EU countries. Six dimensions of comparative transatlantic research will be briefly summarized here.

¹⁰⁹⁷ See implications for further study in subchapter 6.2.

Table 8 The Catalog of Similarities and Differences among the EU and US Case Studies for the comparative transatlantic research framework.

Differences	Convergences
1. History of immigration	1. Immigration as “a structural necessity”
2. Immigration scale: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - immigration numbers - immigrant groups - availability of statistical data 	2. The importance of good practices exchanges: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - integration of management solutions, independent of statistics
3. Public and political discourse on migration and integration: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the country's self - image - the government's and the society's “body languages” 	3. Fortress America – Fortress Europe
4. “National and local mode of integration”: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - levels of governance and division of competencies in immigration and integration policies - different terminology: immigrant, foreigner, migration background, integration as “fluid concepts” 	4. Common issues within national modes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - local problems v. top-down national integration measures - need for cooperation across sectors - language and integration courses, naturalization tests, and indicators of immigrant integration - centralization of integration policies
5. Legal status: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the path to citizenship: <i>jus soli</i> v. <i>jus sanguinis</i> - the role of citizenship in gaining access to education and the labor market 	5. Right to stay and integrate: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - controversies about unauthorized immigration - rejection of integration measures for unauthorized immigrant youth
6. Education and vocational training systems and characteristics of the local labor market	6. Knowledge-driven economy: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - need for cooperation between educators and employers - need for recognizing immigrants' potentials

First, what lies behind the current situation regarding immigration and integration in a given place is, not surprisingly, dependent on its particular history with migrant movements, which have shaped the various attitudes towards immigration in the local communities in evidence today. Such an argument could rule out the possibility of comparing US and EU cases were it not for the fact that different histories do not always translate into different present and future developments. The United States, Germany and Poland are currently facing common challenges: immigrants are needed, therefore they should be accepted or perhaps even invited. As Dietrich Thränhardt and Robert Miles noted back in 1995, “immigration has become a structural necessity” for North America and wealthy capitalist

European countries.¹⁰⁹⁸ Such a message is echoed in some of the demographic and economic projections being made today for the US and the EU, which warn of aging native populations and foresee positive contributions by immigration to the local economy on both sides of the Atlantic.¹⁰⁹⁹

Secondly, the volume of migration and the ethnic diversity of the incoming populations in a given location represent yet another factor influencing integration management. The intensity of integration measures is assumed to be proportional to the scale of migration. As Roger Waldinger points out:

As long as immigrants are few and their resources limited, only close associates are able to access help. But the buildup of a population inevitably expands and diversifies the types of social networks that an immigrant community includes. Greater numbers then create the basis for institutions, both formal and informal that bring immigrants together in recurrent, systematic, and more durable ways.¹¹⁰⁰

“Greater numbers” of immigrants at least make their presence visible and recognizable to those in the host society who are in a position to implement integration measures (like governmental and non-governmental organizations). In fact, it is necessary to have available data on migration so as to raise public awareness about the need for integration. The lack of statistical data on migration is challenging not only for comparative researchers but also for activists in organizations working toward immigrant integration who seek approval for the integration initiatives they have planned. As most of the integration and migration reports, press articles and interviews cited here point out, numbers do matter in public discourse if one wants to persuade or prove, accept or reject proposals, new ideas, or reforms.

However, whether the size of the immigrant population enhances the quality of the available integration measures is debatable. Different migration numbers and the ethnic diversity of transatlantic case studies are no reason to abandon regional comparisons. In fact, good practices and innovative solutions do not necessarily depend solely on the scale of migration. As new international integration exchange platforms and reports verify, a wide spectrum of integration management solutions come from various localities in different countries with different immigrant groups across the US and the EU.

¹⁰⁹⁸ Thränhardt, D., and Miles, R. (1995). Introduction: European integration, migration and processes of inclusion and exclusion. In D. Thränhardt, and R. Miles (Eds.), *Migration and European Integration. The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion* (pp. 1-14). London: Pinter, p. 1.

¹⁰⁹⁹ For some examples, see the following reports:

- Giannakouris, K. (2010). Regional Population Projections EUROPOP2008. *Eurostat Statistics in Focus 1*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union;

- Peri, G. (2010). *The Impact of Immigrants in Recession and Economic Expansion*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

¹¹⁰⁰ Waldinger, R. (2001). Strangers at the Gates. In R. Waldinger (Ed.), “*Strangers at the Gates*” *New Immigrants in Urban America* (1-30). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, p. 16.

Thirdly, each case study in the transatlantic research framework is set in a given political context, which strongly influences public discourse and political decisions. Many differences exist in governmental “body language” and societal “body language” in California, Arizona, Germany, and Poland. However, their global settings vis-à-vis overall trends in US and EU immigration policies are similar. In fact, there are common tendencies to approve exclusive strategies to allow needed immigrants in and to prevent unwanted immigrants from entering and living in “Fortress America” and “Fortress Europe.” The concept of “Fortress Europe,” coined by critics of the exclusive EU immigration policy after the Schengen Agreement in 1985, is currently being used with reference to the US as “Fortress America.” This new usage derives from the constant failure of immigration reform and the literal fortification of the American borders.¹¹⁰¹ A similar rhetoric of immigrant exclusion is widespread on both sides of the Atlantic.

The fourth point of differences refers to various modes of integration analyzed in chapter 4. Integration management functions differently in the US and the EU member states, which are influenced by different immigration policies, different decision-making structures, and different divisions of competencies in the countries. Additionally, what forms the national mode of integration in a given country derives from the official and unofficial language used in reference to immigration and integration. The connotation of such fluid concepts as immigrants, foreigners, people with migration backgrounds still differs from country to country and shapes political and social attitudes differently.¹¹⁰² On the other hand, the need for coordinating integration management across sectors, according to the AIM theory, can be seen in organizations at both national and grassroots levels, regardless of differences in the use of immigration and integration terminology. Similarly, some common trends appear in the debate on modes of integration in the EU and the US such as language and integration courses, naturalization tests, or indicators of immigrant integration. Moreover, centralization of integration measures is currently underway on both sides of the Atlantic: the integration policy is on the agenda for both the federal government of the US and the European Commission of the EU.

The fifth point, which bears an enormous influence on models of integration management, concerns the immigrant’s path to citizenship and all the rights and benefits granted by citizenship. Access to citizenship varies from country to country and poses different challenges for those who are already “in the club” or those who are still standing on the outside wanting to come in.

While the rules for obtaining citizenship may vary, the US and the EU countries have to confront the issue of what to do with “the unwanted” who have already entered the

¹¹⁰¹ Franz, B. (2006). Fortress America? Efforts in Fence Building, Controlling Migration, and the Creation of a New Managed Migration System. *IMIS-Beiträge*, 30, 23-44.

¹¹⁰² For more on fluid concepts in integration policies, see Ray B. (2002), op. cit.

country. The nature of the debate on undocumented immigrants already in the country depends on the size and scale of the “problem,” but the challenge to integration service providers remains the same: officially they are not allowed to help anyone, unless “loopholes” are found. This makes integration management for immigrant youth without legal status a taboo of sorts and thus a highly controversial issue.

Finally, managing the school-to-work transition of immigrant youth is intimately connected with education and labor market policies, which are unique in each of the case studies. Education systems and the degree of access to education, vocational training, and labor markets for immigrant youth determine potential integration measures. However, on both sides of the Atlantic, similar challenges exist with reference to education and the economy. Education is considered a key labor market integration factor in the knowledge-driven economies both in the US and the EU member states. Recognition of immigrant assets (as signified by bilingual education and/or recognition of foreign qualifications, for example) and cross-sector involvement in labor market integration management (also by such key stakeholders in labor markets as employers) are common problems in the case studies, independent of their labor market and education systems. The experiences of transition and the pathways of immigrant youth might be similar in the EU countries and the US where education is no longer a luxury but a necessity.

In sum, despite different national and local contexts for immigrant integration in the US and the EU countries and their cities, the exchange of integration policy research and practical experience of integration management should be considered a valuable source of potential solutions to common challenges faced by policymakers and organizers of programs for immigrant youth on both sides of the Atlantic. Surprisingly, the incongruity in the case studies showed many common aspects of policymaking processes at national, state and local levels and practical integration work. Some good practices may turn out to be transferable, while others will remain in the realm of unachievable goals. Nevertheless, the transatlantic exchange among researchers and practitioners helps to raise awareness of those integration problems which have not yet been recognized at the local level by municipalities or integration service-providers or by national governments both in the US and in the EU.

6.2 Research Limitations

The limitations of my transatlantic study on managing immigrant integration derive from the challenging nature of transatlantic comparative research, further complicated by disparities between the case studies; from restrictions imposed by the applied research methods; and from the amount of time available for the empirical work.

Because of different levels of governance in the United States, Germany, and Poland, a clear, comprehensive, and structurally comparable presentation of all top-down integration contexts for the city case studies was simply not possible. The top-down context for the case studies has been narrowed down to focus on those elements which have the greatest impact on the development of the local management of immigrant integration: the European and national contexts for Munich and Warsaw and the national and state contexts for San Diego and Phoenix. However, other entities at the level of the federal German states, Polish voivodeships, and the US counties also have a strong influence, though probably not as much, on direct integration policies as well as on education, labor market systems, infrastructure, and available public and financial resources in the cities, which might hinder or facilitate integration measures for immigrant youth.

As the findings showed, the incongruity of the US, German, and Polish national modes of integration, of other policies investigated relevant to the topic, as well as the incongruity of city case studies brought attention to new perspectives on managing immigrant integration and conducting transatlantic research on immigrant integration in the EU and US case studies. Nevertheless, as with every case study research project, the choice of cases definitely impacts the research results so no general conclusions can be drawn regarding integration management in German, Polish, or US cities.

Additionally, the dissertation is a policy-oriented research project and cannot provide any in-depth and unbiased assessment of the success of the local integration measures examined. Much as it is important and intriguing to monitor opinions about service providers and to investigate their achievements, it was not possible to analyze policy outcomes. For such an undertaking, including the opinions of the receivers of immigrant youth services about the methods and shortcomings of the institutions interviewed would be crucial.

Moreover, because some underprivileged ethnic groups were over-represented in the cities, the focus of discussions about the integration of immigrant youth was frequently on the unsuccessful youth. Obviously the picture of successful immigrant youth and some good experiences with young immigrants on the part of integration stakeholders might have been overshadowed by stories about the struggles of the underprivileged with integration challenges. Again, consulting immigrant youth would counterbalance the sometimes biased

opinions of the interviewees, overwhelmed by problems of the less privileged immigrants which they have to confront on a daily basis.

Finally the time constraints of my empirical work in Poland and the US did not allow contacting and consulting all important integration stakeholders in the cities nor to consult representatives of the business sector. For the same reason, I was not able to track all changes and developments in integration services in each city following the conclusion of my field visits.

6.3 Implications for Further Research

It is hoped that the study can provide incentives for further transatlantic scientific inquiries addressing some of the important aspects, mentioned above, not covered in the dissertation.

Consequently, it would be interesting to do follow-up research in other cities from the same US states and EU countries in order to examine how their local integration management functions under the influence of the same top-down integration contexts. At the same time it would be advisable to extend the scope of the transatlantic research to other US states and EU countries, using the proposed framework for transatlantic research on managing immigrant integration.

Moreover, there is a strong need to investigate the involvement of business sectors in integration measures for immigrant youth and the potential of cooperating with civil society actors and local governments. As the research pointed out, so far little network-building exists in this sector and more research on potential areas for cooperation as well as the monitoring of recruitment procedures of young immigrants would be beneficial for both immigrant youth service providers and local governments.

Another research gap in all countries investigated was found in the national frameworks for the recognition of foreign qualifications and their practical implementation at the local level. US, German, and Polish frameworks for this are still underdeveloped and a study of recent EU incentives might be a good point of reference for a transatlantic exchange.

Next, the application of Positive Youth Development strategies in managing immigrant integration is strongly recommended for further study. The possibilities of practicing PYD strategies as a proper avenue for guiding immigrant youth into the labor market is universal, regardless of a country's history, immigration flows, or the conditions of the local labor market. PYD is still in the developmental phase and it is to be hoped that testing the application of the proposed Affirmative Integration Management approach among various integration stakeholders will contribute to PYD research. Moreover, research on

success stories of immigrant youth might offer a needed boost of confidence, demonstrating to the host society that managing immigrant integration can yield positive results.

Finally, as the dissertation showed, integration of undocumented immigrant youth is a common challenge for all case studies. More research is needed to break the silence and taboos around this challenge in other cities, both in the US and the EU. As the Munich example shows, one piece of research can work miracles and give rise to the unanticipated development of city models for welcoming undocumented youth.

6.4 Looking Ahead

It is believed that improving things in the world can be done most successfully by looking at what already exists and comparing different methods of organization. The exchange of various practices and policy solutions on how to better manage the integration of immigrant youth is intended to offer practical suggestions for both integration policy-makers, at different levels of governance, and local practitioners. The research findings presented in the dissertation should stimulate such progress. The following final remarks and recommendations should encourage the development of better immigrant integration strategies at both the national and local levels.

- 1) It seems that neither a highly structured and regularized immigrant integration policy, which narrows down the integration process to formalized contracts, nor a hand-off approach, on the part of the government, to the integration challenges of immigrant youth is a good solution for the development of local integration initiatives. Ideally resources and funds for network-building and integration programs should be provided by national frameworks, but still a certain amount of room to maneuver, with regard to their use, should be left to the discretion of “local moderators of integration.”¹¹⁰³ The development of EU integration tools for facilitating the establishment of integration programs in the EU member states may be worth emulating.
- 2) National awareness-raising about the contributions and success stories of immigrants, regardless of their immigration status, is needed. The host society may then find it easier to welcome the newcomers and, at the same time, immigrants themselves may feel that their migration background is not an obstacle but an asset.

¹¹⁰³ See Bommers, M. (2008), *op. cit.*, p. 187.

- 3) The volume of immigration should not determine the degree of governmental engagement in awareness-raising campaigns about integration and integration management. In fact, xenophobia, and anti-immigrant vigilante actions may develop quickly and exert a strong impact on the local society's attitudes towards young immigrants and hinder their personal development.
- 4) Positive Youth Development strategies should be considered the key methods in education and vocational training programs for immigrant youth. Cooperation in the development of such strategies should involve different sectors: educators, administrators, and employers.
- 5) Despite sometimes unfavorable circumstances, externally, for instituting the principles of Affirmative Integration Management, local youth service providers should not abandon their efforts to provide the best options for the development of each immigrant youth's potential. In fact, much of the success depends not on national and local integration policies but on the commitment of youth service providers to their work. Joining resources with other local service providers may prove beneficial in overcoming organizational and financial challenges.

Finally, when discussing strategies for managing immigrant integration, it is important to remember the abstract and subjective issues involved in moving to a new country. Each new immigrant experiences the new rules of the game in his or her own individual way, which cannot be anticipated by any integration program or business plan for integration management. In fact, we are still talking about services by and for people, and each person has his or her own personal history, character, and capabilities. No integration strategy can guarantee success. It can only invite both natives and immigrants to join together to cooperate with each other for social equality. The success of this endeavor depends on the individual work of both actors.

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Appendix 1

Interview questions

1. To what extent does your organization deal with immigrants on a daily basis (both documented and undocumented) and what is their ethnic background?
2. How does your organization understand/ define integration of immigrants in your city?
3. What are the prerequisites for successful integration of young immigrants in general and specifically into the labor market?
4. What has changed in the course of the last ten years in the situation of young immigrants in general and specifically on the labor market in Phoenix?
5. What are the challenges which young immigrants face on the labor market in your city? How does this situation differ among ethnic groups and from the situation of the natives?
6. What role does your organization play in the integration of young immigrants in general and specifically into the labor market? Do you organize any programs or courses to help young immigrants to receive better education and job market opportunities? Are they available for undocumented immigrants as well?
7. How would you estimate the degree of discrimination based on immigration status at the workplace in your city?
8. Does your organization cooperate with the business sector to foster the internalization and diversification of the workforce of your city, promoting an immigrant workforce? If so could you please provide some best practices or challenges for dealing with employers?
9. How do you reach immigrants (programs, initiatives, counseling)? How do you reach those who have no interest in integrating?
10. How do you network and cooperate with other organizations, local government, municipalities, and enterprises in the field of integration of young immigrants into the labor market in your city?
11. How do you cooperate with citizens in this field (campaigns, mobilization, social projects)?
12. How do you finance programs for immigrants within your organization? Do you receive any city, state or federal financial support? If so, please specify.
13. Is there any degree of cooperation between the organizations in different cities and states and other countries (exchange of best practices) in the field of immigrant integration?
14. How does the current political situation in your country affect the situation of young immigrants on the labor market in your city and the work of your organization?
15. Do you have any statistical information concerning the sources and amount of funds your organization receives from the state and federal government to serve immigrants? Please name the programs if possible.
16. What challenges will your organization face in the near future to work effectively toward the integration of young immigrants into the labor market in your city?

Appendix 2

Interview tables

The interviews from San Diego, Phoenix, and Munich are recorded on the CD attached to the back cover of the dissertation.

Selected parts of the interviews with the organizations in Warsaw are in appendix 9.

Table A1 Interviewees and the Organizations They Represent in San Diego.

Code	Organization	Interviewee/Position (Position held at the time of the interview)	Comments/Website
SD/1	American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) San Diego	Pedro Rios Program Director - San Diego Area	Co-chair of the San Diego Immigrant Rights Consortium. http://afsc.org/office/san-diego-ca
SD/2	Casa Familiar	Andrea Skorepa CEO and President	A community development agency in the community of San Ysidro. http://www.casafamiliar.org
SD/3	Casa Familiar	Olivia Ravillo Project Coordinator	http://www.casafamiliar.org
SD/4	International Rescue Committee, San Diego	Christina Piranio Youth Program Manager	One of the role models for IRC in Phoenix. http://www.rescue.org/us-program/us-san-diego-ca
SD/5	San Diego Asian Youth Organization (SDAYO)	Somsack Thongchanh Police Service Officer four teenage members of SDAYO	SDAYO was initiated by the San Diego Police Department, Community Relations Office. http://www.sandiego.gov/police
SD/6	Ser Pacific Beach Employment Center Pacific Beach Office	Waldo Lopez Center Coordinator	One of few agencies in San Diego which organize employment of day laborers and give them a "shelter."
SD/7	San Diego Job Corps Center	Bobby Brown Center Director	A federal residential education and job training program for at-risk youth from low income families. http://www.sandiegojobcorps.org
SD/8	Career Development Services at San Diego Continuing Education	Doug Elliot Career Counselor	http://cds.sdce.edu/
SD/9	Transfer Academy at San Diego Continuing Education	Sheyla D. Castillo Counselor	http://www.sdce.edu/
SD/10	Transfer Career Center at San Diego City College	Marilyn Harley Director	http://www.sdcity.edu/transfer/
SD/11	Youth One Stop Career Center San Diego County	Kurt Farrington Work Readiness Assistant II	The Center serves students that are expelled, delinquent, foster, homeless, parenting, gang

	Office of Education/Juvenile Court and Community Schools		affiliated, or on probation, not necessarily immigrant youth. https://www.sdcoe.net/jccs2/?loc=metro-wr&m=1
SD/12	Metro Region Career Centers	Mark Nanzer Manager	Located in the City Heights District, with high number of refugees. http://www.ccdsd.org
SD/13	Catholic Charities Diocese of San Diego	Michael McKay Department Director	One of VOLAGs in San Diego. http://www.ccdsd.org
SD/14	City Middle College (CMC) at San Diego City College	Kimi Rodriguez Mc Swain Adjunct Counselor	http://www.sdcity.edu/AcademicPrograms/ProgramsofInstruction/CityMiddleCollegeCMC
SD/15	San Diego Workforce Partnership	Mark Cafferty President and CEO	Due to technical problems, the interview was not recorded. http://www.sandiegowork.com
SD/16	CalWORKs, Continuing Education	Juan Serrano, Intake Coordinator	http://www.sdce.edu/services/calworks.htm

Table A2 Interviewees and the Organizations They Represent in Phoenix.

Code	Organization	Interviewee/Position (Position held at the time of the interview)	Comments/Website
P/1	GateWay Early College High School	Yvonne Watterson Principal	Watterson's work for undocumented students in Phoenix impacted the scope of this dissertation. Only after meeting with the principal did I realize that the issue of the undocumented should be also in focus of my field work.
P/2	Golden Gate Community Center	Daniel Zapata Director of Family Education	http://www.goldengatecenter.org
P/3	Chicanos por la Causa	Anthony J. Alberta Vice President	http://www.cplc.org
P/4	Friendly House	Luis Enriquez Coordinator of Adult Education/Workforce	http://www.friendlyhouse.org
P/5	Center for Community Development and Civil Rights at Arizona State University (ASU)	Raul Yzaguirre Executive Director	A former President and CEO of the National Council of La Raza (NCLR) http://cdcr.asu.edu
P/6	Florence Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project	Jacquelyn Ehrenberg Funds Manager	http://www.firrp.org
P/7	Job Corps	Sam Georgiou Support Services Manager	A federal residential education and job training program for at-risk youth from low income families. http://phoenix.jobcorps.gov
P/8	Phoenix College	Trino Sandoval Interim Associate Dean of Custom Training and Education	http://www.pc.maricopa.edu
P/9	Phoenix Workforce Connection, City of Phoenix	Cynthia M. Spell Deputy Community and Economic Development Director	A person highly interested in networking for immigrant integration in Phoenix. http://phoenix.gov/econdev/phxwc/index.html
P/10	International Rescue Committee in Phoenix	Jennifer Doran Family and Youth Services Program Manager	http://www.rescue.org/us-program/us-phoenix-az
P/11	Crockett Elementary School	Tammy Tusek Principal	http://www.balsz.k12.az.us/education/school/school.php?sectionid=8
P/12	AZ Lost Boys Center	Ralph J Serpico Executive Director Jany Deng Program Manager	The Center hosts the Cow Project, an innovative entrepreneurship initiative: http://www.azlostboyscenter.org/cow.html

P/13	Arizona Department of Economic Security	Charles Shipman State Refugee Coordinator	Shipman coordinates the Refugee Resettlement Program for the whole State of Arizona. https://www.azdes.gov
P/14	Arizona Call-A-Teen Youth Resources, Inc. (ACYR)	Sharler Barnett Program Manager Tim Valenica Youth Program Coordinator	http://www.acyraz.org/
P/15	American Dream Academy (ADA), the Center for Community Development and Civil Rights at ASU	Maria Luisa Program Coordinator	The interview covers a personal and emotional story of the interviewee who experienced lots of challenges herself after coming to the US as an undocumented student from Mexico. http://cdcr.asu.edu/Programs/american-dream-academy-ada
P/16	CADENA (Comité de Apoyo para el Desarrollo Estudiantil de la Nación Americana)	Carmen Cornejo Executive Director	A strong advocate for undocumented students and the DREAM Act. http://www.dreamactaz.org/

Table A3 Interviewees and the Organizations They Represent in Munich.

Code	Organization	Interviewee/Position (Position held at the time of the interview)	Comments/Website
M/1	Hauptschule an der Fühlichstrasse, Ramersdorf	Angela Illmberger Principal	The school is located in one of the districts with the highest share of immigrants, mostly asylees and undocumented in the city. 80% of pupils are estimated to have a migration background.
M/2	Ausländerbeirat (Foreigners' Advisory Council)	Cuman Naz Head	No special integration programs are administered by the Council. It is an important political representative of immigrants in Munich and focuses mostly on lobby work. http://www.auslaenderbeirat-muenchen.de/
M/3	Stelle für Interkulturelle Arbeit (The Office for Intercultural Affairs)	Margret Spohn Office Manager	The lead manager of the Intercultural Integration Concept of the City in Munich. The name "Frau Spohn" has risen to a key symbol of intercultural work of the City of Munich.
M/4	Café 104	Birgit Poppert Project Coordinator	The organization, which started as a clandestine organization in 1998, now has grown to the best known non-profit, which serves the undocumented in Munich. http://www.cafe104.de/
M/5	Spanische Katholische Mission München (Spanish Catholic Mission)	Alberto Martínez Parish Priest	A very unique interview which turned into a less formal conversation about working for the undocumented people in Munich. http://www.misioncatolica-munich.de/
M/6	Sozialbürgerhaus Pasing	Sabine Nowack Office Manager	One of 13 Sozialbürgerhäuser, led by the Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Beschäftigung München GmbH (ARGE).
M/7	IG JMD Jugendmigrationsdienst	Barbara Bornemann Counselor	At the seat of IG InitiativGruppe, one of JMDs in Munich. http://www.jmd-verbund.de/home/index.html
M/8	IG InitiativGruppe (Interkulturelle Begegnung und Bildung e.V.)	Manfred Bosl Director	This non-profit has the most impressive integration offer for immigrants of all ages among the organizations which I have encountered in Munich. http://home.initiativgruppe.de/

M/9	Schlau School (Schulanaloger Unterricht für unbegleitete, minderjährige Flüchtlinge)	Martina Unger Social Worker	Along with the school for asylees, Unger works for another initiative Heimaten e.V. – Netz für Chancengerechtigkeit, which aims at integration of both German and immigrant youth in the city. http://www.schlau-schule.de/ http://www.heimaten.de/
M/10	Flüchtlingsrat	Monika Steinhauser Coordinator	The interview concerns mostly the situation of asylum seekers in Germany and particularly in Munich. http://www.muenchner-fluechtlingsrat.de
M/11	REGSAM (Regionalisierung sozialer Arbeit in München)	Friederike Goschenhofer REGSAM Moderator	The municipal network REGSAM is divided into 16 districts which aim to coordinate local social work, including work with immigrants. http://www.regsam.net/de/00_startseite.php
M/12	MigraNet Amt für Wohnen und Migration (The Office of Housing and Migration)	Regina Ober MigraNet Coordinator	One of the key coordinators of the EU and national projects for immigrants which are administered at the level of the City of Munich. http://www.muenchen.de/Rathaus/soz/wohnenmigration/integrationshilfen/185129/migranet.html
M/13	Referat für Arbeit und Wirtschaft (The Department for Labor and Economic Affairs)	Ulrike Schulz MOVA plus Coordinator Robert Hanslmaier Project Coordinator	MOVA plus tries to mobilize apprenticeship training positions with non-German entrepreneurs in Munich. http://www.movaplus.de/ http://www.muenchen.de/arbeitsundwirtschaft http://www.muenchen.de/mbq/
M/14	AWO (Arbeiterwohlfahrt München)	Kerstin Schmitt Social Worker	Kristina Schmitt coordinates intercultural trainings INKOMM for both school staff and students. http://www.awo-muenchen-migration.de/
M/15	Lotsenprojekt Pontis	Stefan Dehne Project Initiator	At the time of the interviews the project was just about to start. http://www.diakonie-hasenbergl.de
M/16	Die Münchner Volkshochschule (MVHS)	Ingrid Veicht Manager of the Office: Deutsch, Migration und Integration	Coordinator of the project FLÜB&S – Flüchtlinge in Beruf und Schule, one of few projects

			supported by the City of Munich which offers language courses and education for asylees. http://www.mvhs.de/
M/17*	University of Applied Sciences in Regensburg	Philip Anderson Professor for Migration and Intercultural Social Work at the Faculty of Social Sciences	The author of the study on the undocumented in Munich. His recommendations resulted in creating by the City the Munich Model. http://www.philip-anderson.de/english.htm
M/18*	verdi	Ulrich Gammel Fachbereich 6, Ressort C Landesbezirk Bayern	http://muenchen.verdi.de/

* Two additional interviews M/17 and M/18 could not be conducted face-to-face and are based on written responses to interview questions sent via email (see appendix 6 and appendix 7).

Table A4 Interviewees and the Organizations They Represent in Warsaw.

Code	Organization	Interviewee/Position (Position held at the time of the interview)	Comments/Website
W/1	The 'Ocalenie' (Survival) Foundation	Dorota Przymies Deputy of the Board	The only organization among those which I interviewed which employs immigrants. http://www.ocalenie.org.pl/
W/2	Polish Humanitarian Action (PAH), the Center for Refugees and Repatriates	Teresa Stępnik Job Counselor	http://www.pah.org.pl/
W/3	Polish Humanitarian Action (PAH), the Center for Refugees and Repatriates	Małgorzata Gebert Head	http://www.pah.org.pl/
W/4	Office for Foreigners	Ewa Piechota Public Relations Officer	The office is a central authority of governmental administration responsible for matters with respect to entry of immigrants in the territory of Poland, their transit, granting refugee status, asylum, tolerated stay and temporary protection. http://www.udsc.gov.pl/
W/5	Foreign Language Teaching Foundation Lingua Mundi	Adam Brańko Head Małgorzata Sas Polish Language Teacher	Since 2005 the organization has been organizing language courses for refugees. http://www.linguaemundi.pl/
W/6	The Office of Mazowieckie Province Governor	Andrzej Rybus-Tołoczko Director of Cooperation with Social Self-Government.	http://www.mazowieckie.pl/eng/province_governor.html
W/7	Intercultural Center for Labor Market Adaptation (MCAZ)	Marta Piekut Intercultural Trainer	The project has finished, and the website has closed.
W/8	The Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights	Agata Forys Program Coordinator of Legal Assistance to Refugees and Migrants	The interview concerns mostly the issue of legal status of immigrants in Poland. http://www.hfhr.org.pl/uchodzcy/
W/9	Polish Migration Forum	Agnieszka Kosowicz President of the Board	http://www.forummigracyjne.org/en/
W/10	International Organization for Migration, Poland	Janina Owczarek Project Coordinator	Poland belongs to the IOM since 1992. The office is an active initiator of networking for immigrants among governmental organization and non-profits across Poland. http://www.iom.pl/
W/11	VIA Foundation	Elżbieta Staniszevska	The scope of the foundation is

		Deputy of the Board	labor market integration of all underprivileged groups in Poland. http://www.via.org.pl/
W/12	Warsaw Family Support Center (WCPR)	Dorota Rosiecka Social Counselor	The governmental agency which implements Individual Integration Programs (IIP) in Warsaw.
W/13	Association for Legal Intervention (SIP)	Aleksandra Chrzanowska Coordinator of Section for Immigrants	An interesting example of enthusiasm for new initiatives and integration work for immigrants among non-profits. http://www.interwencjaprawna.pl/
W/14	Foundation Forum for Social Diversity (FFRS)	Katarzyna Kubin Deputy of the Board Coordinator of the Welcome Center in Warsaw	The Foundation was in the process of formation at the time of my interview. http://www.ffr.org.pl/
W/15	The Fu Shenfu Migrant Center	Jacek Gniadek Missioner	http://www.migrant.pl/
W/16	Raszyńska School	Krystyna Starczewska Principal	One of few lower secondary schools in Warsaw which is famous for education programs for refugee pupils. http://www.bednarska.edu.pl

Appendix 3

San Diego Immigrant Rights Consortium

Table A5 Members of the San Diego Immigrant Rights Consortium

1	<p>American Civil Liberties Union of San Diego & Imperial Counties (ACLU) National legal organization advocating for individual rights on a broad array of issues affecting individual freedom in the United States. http://www.aclUSndiego.org/</p>
2	<p>American Friends Service Committee Quaker organization founded in 1917 that includes people of various faiths who are committed to social justice, peace, and humanitarian service. http://www.afsc.org/sandiego</p>
3	<p>American Immigration Lawyers Association, San Diego (AILA) National legal association of immigration lawyers established to promote justice and advocate for fair and reasonable immigration law and policy. http://www.aila.org/</p>
4	<p>Angeles del Desierto Volunteer group that does search and rescue operations in the desert and mountainous regions of the border between the United States and Mexico. http://www.thedesertangels.org</p>
5	<p>California Immigrant Policy Center The Policy Center seeks to inform public debate and policy decisions on issues affecting the state's immigrants and their families in order to improve the quality of life for all Californians. http://www.caimmigrant.org</p>
6	<p>Catholic Charities Faith-based community service ministry of the Catholic Diocese of San Diego that advocates for a just society on behalf of the poor and promotes self-determination for all. http://www.ccdsd.org/</p>
7	<p>Catholic Relief Services Faith-based organization that assists the impoverished and disadvantaged worldwide. http://www.crs.org/</p>
8	<p>Center for Social Advocacy Community organization promoting positive attitudes and actions that ensure respect, acceptance and equal opportunity for all people. http://www.centerforsocialadvocacy.org</p>
9	<p>City of San Diego Human Relations Commission City commission that conducts and promotes activities that foster mutual respect and understanding; and protects basic human and civil rights. http://www.sandiego.gov/human-relations</p>
10	<p>Employee Rights Center Legal service organization that educates employees about their rights and advocates for them as</p>

	<p>needed. http://www.weberc.net</p>
11	<p>Equality Alliance An effort to build a network for working in coalition across ethnic, cultural, and geographic boundaries on issues of equality. http://www.equalitysandiego.org</p>
12	<p>Escondido Human Rights Committee Grassroots human rights organizations that educates and advocates on behalf of immigrants and other community members in Escondido.</p>
13	<p>Interfaith Committee for Worker Justice of San Diego County (ICWJ) Grass-roots, faith-based organization educating and mobilizing San Diego religious communities to support issues and campaigns that will sustain lives with dignity for workers and their families by such means as improving wages, benefits, and working conditions. http://www.ICWJ.org</p>
14	<p>International Rescue Committee (IRC) One of the first to respond, one of the last to leave. For 75 years, the International Rescue Committee has been a leader in humanitarian relief. http://www.theirc.org</p>
15	<p>Little Saigon Foundation We shall engage in the economic revitalization, enhancement of social justice, and promotion of cultural diversity of Vietnamese communities in San Diego. http://www.littlesaigonsandiego.org</p>
16	<p>National Lawyers Guild, San Diego (NLG) Legal association dedicated to the advocacy of immigrants, criminal defendants and other clients. http://www.nlg.org</p>
17	<p>No Border Wall No Border Wall is a grassroots coalition of groups and individuals united in our belief that a border wall will not stop illegal immigration or smuggling and will not make the United States any safer. http://www.noborderwall-take-action.blogspot.com/</p>
18	<p>Oceanside Human Rights Council Community college based human rights organizations that educates and advocates on behalf of immigrants and other community members in Oceanside.</p>
19	<p>San Diego Foundation for Change To create a passionate community of support for progressive leaders and organizations in the San Diego/ Tijuana region. http://www.foundation4change.org</p>
20	<p>South Bay Forum Non-partisan PAC committed to addressing the educational, socioeconomic, and political needs of the San Diego South Bay community while building coalitions with other communities. http://www.southbayforum.com/</p>
21	<p>Trans-Border Institute</p>

	<p>The Trans-Border Institute (TBI) was created in 1994 with two main objectives: 1) to promote border-related scholarship, activities and community at the University of San Diego, and 2) to promote an active role for the University in the cross-border community.</p> <p>http://www.sandiego.edu/peacestudies/tbi/</p>
22	<p>UURISE</p> <p>Unitarian Universalists (UUs) are a justice seeking people with a rich history of effecting change by taking social action.</p> <p>http://uurise.org/</p>

Source: San Diego Immigrant Rights Consortium: <http://immigrantsandiego.org/>

Appendix 4


Eleven Principles of the Munich City Integration Policy

1. Integration depends on the recognition of common, free and democratic standards.
2. Integration concerns everybody and is a process of mutual understanding and negotiation in the case of conflicting interests. Integration strengthens the sense of solidarity in a community.
3. Integration in a European city must be based on the promotion of non-isolation and socio-geographical mix in all sections of the community.
4. Integration key resources are language skills in both German and a person's native language.
5. Integration means recognizing and developing diversity, as well as enabling political participation and equal opportunity for involvement in urban society.
6. Integration can only be achieved if institutions adopt a policy of intercultural orientation and intercultural mainstreaming.
7. Integration means decisive action to combat discrimination and racism.
8. Integration recognizes the existing potential of the people of Munich.
9. Integration stands for equal access for all to information, education, culture and the arts, sports, job opportunities, housing, social services and healthcare regardless of age, gender, skin color, religion, social and cultural origins, disabilities, philosophy, sexual orientation.
10. All integration measures and the entire municipal policy regarding people of immigrant background are checked as regards their impact on women and men, as well as on girls and boys. The impact of all measures on the acceptance of lesbians, gays and transgender also has to be examined.
11. Integration must have something specific to offer to each target group.

Source: Stelle für interkulturelle Arbeit der Landeshauptstadt München. (2009). *Intercultural Integration Concept. Outline*. München: Stelle für Interkulturelle Arbeit der Landeshauptstadt München.

Appendix 5

IG JMD's cooperation network for labor market integration of immigrant youth



Source:

IG – InitiativeGruppe Interkulturelle Begegnung und Bildung e.V., Jugendmigrationsdienst

Interview M/17 with Philip Anderson, a migration expert on the situation of the undocumented in Germany.

- 1) *Gibt es Schätzungen, wie viele illegale Immigranten zur Zeit in München wohnen?*

Schätzungen sind immer auf diesem Gebiet schwierig. Man geht aber prinzipiell von einer Reduzierung der Zahl der Menschen in der Illegalität seit dem EU Beitritt der Erweiterungsländer im Mai 2004 aus. Nichtsdestotrotz würde ich nach wie vor von einigen Tausenden, womöglich zwischen 10 und 20,000 Personen in der Illegalität in München ausgehen. Die wichtige Unterscheidung zwischen „einfach“ („nur“ Schwarzarbeit) und „doppelt illegal“ (zusammen mit fehlendem Aufenthaltsstatus) ist auch zu treffen.

- 2) *Was verstehen Sie unter Integrationspolitik? Gibt es eine Integrationspolitik für illegale Immigranten in Deutschland, Bayern, München?*

An dieser Stelle verweise ich auf das Integrationskonzept der Stadt München (zu beziehen über die *Stelle für interkulturelle Arbeit*, Kontaktperson: Dr. Margret Spohn). Allerdings schließt dieses ansonsten solide und fundierte Konzept „Illegale“ nicht ausdrücklich mit ein – was ich sehr bedauerlich finde.

- 3) *Welche Voraussetzungen gibt es für eine erfolgreiche Integration der jungen Immigranten in die Aufnahmegesellschaft?*

Integration ist unter deutschen Bedingungen ohne Aufenthaltsstatus kaum möglich. Schon die jungen Menschen mit unsicherem Status (d.h. mit einer Duldung) haben enorme Schwierigkeiten, eine Bildung zu erhalten bzw. eine Ausbildung zu machen. Gleichberechtigter Zugang zu Bildung, Erlernen der deutschen Sprache (mit entsprechender Sprachförderung), die soziale Integration von Familien, Zugang zu den Errungenschaften des Sozialstaates – gerade für junge Menschen – sind alle notwendige Voraussetzungen für eine Integration. Allen voran wäre die Möglichkeit, eine Berufsausbildung zu machen, für solche Jugendlichen die essentielle Voraussetzung – ohne Aufenthaltstitel ist diese Option aber praktisch ausgeschlossen.

- 4) *Wie schätzen Sie die Situation der ausländischen Jugendlichen ohne Papiere in der Schule und auf dem Arbeitsmarkt in München?*

Die Situation ist sehr schlecht; aber in München immerhin besser als sonst wo, weil die LHS München zumindest versucht, den Schulbesuch von Kindern in der Illegalität – innerhalb des eng gesetzten rechtlichen Rahmens – zu ermöglichen. Kinder sollen in der Schule durch mündliche Angaben von ihren Eltern mit Migrationshintergrund angemeldet werden können, d.h. keine Meldebescheinigung oder Pass oder ähnliches muss vorgelegt werden. Dadurch wird das Signal gesendet, dass die Kinder in die Schule kommen *sollen* – das Recht auf Bildung geht in den Augen des Münchner Stadtrats vor. Bis zum Übertritt in die weiterführende Schule kann ein punktueller Schulbesuch deshalb erfolgen, dann kommen aber offizielle Vorgänge nach außen (Ummeldungen, Übertritte, Prüfungen etc.) und die Kinder tauchen in die Illegalität wieder unsichtbar ab.

Eine Ausnahme stellen, private bzw. kirchliche Schulen dar, die sich z. T. öffentlich dazu bekennen, Kinder in der Illegalität aufzunehmen (Beispiel: das Privatgymnasium der Jesuiten in München). Ihre Begründung: Das Recht auf Bildung ist ein international verbrieftes (Menschen-)Recht, das vor aufenthaltsrechtlichen Fragen den Vorrang haben muss. Zugang zum Beruf bzw. zu einer Berufsausbildung ist, wie oben ausgeführt, kaum möglich. Solche Jugendlichen versuchen schwarz zu jobben und irgendwie zu überleben. Sie sind dadurch naturgemäß ungeschützt und maximal ausbeutbar.

- 5) *Was kann man in diesem Zusammenhang noch verbessern? Gibt es irgendwelche pro-aktive Maßnahmen? Wo entstehen die Hürden? Wer kann Projekte für illegale Immigranten finanzieren?*

Es gibt die Schäuble Initiative vom Herbst 2008, den Schulbesuch von Kindern in der Illegalität zu ermöglichen. Innenminister Schäuble will anscheinend dieses Thema mit den zuständigen

Ministern auf Länderebene aufgreifen. Die Initiative ist zwar löblich, der Minister ist aber *qua* Funktion nicht zuständig, d.h. wird seine Initiative abgelehnt, kann er mit Fug und Recht behaupten, er habe sein Bestes getan, die zuständigen Kollegen (d.h. die Kultusminister) wollten aber leider nicht...

Zugang zu Integrationskursen nicht vom Aufenthaltsstatus abhängig zu machen, wäre ein guter erster Schritt, um die Integration von jungen Menschen in der Illegalität zu ermöglichen. Der entscheidende Schritt ist aber – und hier ist der Gesetzgeber auf Bundesebene gefragt – der illegale Aufenthalt zu einer Ordnungswidrigkeit von einer Straftat abzustufen. Dies würde der gesamte Bereich der Arbeit mit dieser Zielgruppe entkriminalisieren – und die Arbeit vieler Professionen von Ärzten/innen zu Sozialpädagogen/innen erleichtern. Zu diesem mutigen Schritt ist aber der deutsche Staat m. E. in voraussehbarer Zeit nicht fähig oder willens. Aus diesem Grund gibt es (Ihre letzte Teilfrage) keine offiziellen Finanzierungsmöglichkeiten für Projekte für Menschen in der Illegalität und die Förderung ihrer gesellschaftlichen Integration. Es gehen nur Projekte mit Verschleierungscharakter, d.h. mit angeblich anderer Zielgruppe.

- 6) *Was hat sich innerhalb der letzten Jahren geändert in der Situation der ausländischen Jugendlichen ohne Papiere in München (innerhalb der letzten 25 Jahren)?*

Es gibt mehr kommunale Aufmerksamkeit in den letzten Jahren für die Problematik der Menschen in der Illegalität insgesamt. Die Kommune München bietet ein Beispiel dafür, dass man innerhalb eines eng gestalteten rechtlichen Rahmens, einiges für die Menschen- und soziale Rechte dieser Zielgruppe tun kann. (Für den aktuellen Stand der Entwicklung kontaktieren Sie Dr. Margret Spohn der *Stelle für interkulturellen Arbeit* der LHS München). Darüber hinaus aber gab es wenig konkrete Änderungen (außer im Einzelfall durch gelegentliche Bleiberechtsregelungen oder ein großzügiges Auslegen der Ermessensspielräume durch manche Sachbearbeiter/in – gerade bei Jugendlichen). Ansonsten stehen Verbesserungen noch aus.

- 7) *Wie kommt man an die Immigranten heran, die an einer Integration bisher kaum Interesse zeigten?*

Sprachkurse und Beratungsangebote durch Basisinitiative, die Vertrauen in den *Communities* genießen und mit „Illegalen“ zusammenarbeiten, sind sicherlich wichtig. Insgesamt können „*Outreach*“ Projekte, welche die Selbstorganisationen der Migranten erreichen, gefordert. Aber dies ist insgesamt unter den herrschenden Bedingungen in Deutschland schwierig, denn „Integration“ von „Illegalen“ ist auch nicht von staatlicher Seite erwünscht! Man kann deswegen m. E. nicht von einer implizierten „Bringschuld“ diesbezüglich seitens der Menschen in der Illegalität (d.h. von einer fehlenden Integrationsbereitschaft) ausgehen.

- 8) *Gibt es und wenn ja, wie entsteht die Netzwerkbildung und Zusammenarbeit mit anderen Organisationen, lokalen Regierung, Unternehmen auf dem Gebiet Integration der ausländischen Jugendlichen ohne Papiere?*

Es gibt kaum eine Netzwerkbildung, so weit mir bekannt, lediglich kleine Netzwerke von engagierten Einzelpersonen und ganz wenigen Basisinitiativen, z.B. *Cafe 104* oder die Anlaufstelle von *Ärzte der Welt* in München (jeweils medizinische Versorgung und Rechtsberatung). Netzwerke spezifisch für Jugendliche existieren, so weit ich weiß, nicht. Die meisten Menschen in der Illegalität leben in einer getrennten Lebenswelt. Ihr Hauptziel ist in der Regel „nicht auffallen“ und finanziell über die Runden kommen bzw. für das eigene (Migrations-) Projekt sparen.

Es verhält sich allerdings anders bezüglich der Arbeitswelt. Menschen in der Illegalität müssen arbeiten und die (ethnischen und andere) Netzwerke helfen sich gegenseitig, v. a. wenn es um Gelegenheitsjobs geht: privates Baugewerbe, personenbezogene Dienstleistungen, Betreuungsaufgaben in Privathaushalten, Reinigungsbewerbe, kleine und mittlere Unternehmen mit flexiblem Arbeitsbedarf – diese sind alle Bereiche in denen auch Jugendliche in der Illegalität Arbeit finden können. Längerfristige Beschäftigungsmöglichkeiten ergeben sich in der Regel nur dann, wenn man sich falsche Papiere von guter Qualität ergattern kann.

9) *Wie arbeitet man mit den Einheimischen in München (Mobilisierung der Bevölkerung-Sensibilisierung für das Thema: illegale Immigranten)?*

Es gibt recht offene Journalisten/innen und Medienvertreter/innen, die vor allem Berichte über die soziale und menschenrechtliche Lage verfassen. Politische Aktivitäten der Basisinitiativen wie *Ärzte der Welt* (z.B. Ausstellung über die Lebenssituation und öffentliche Diskussionsveranstaltung beim Kulturfestival *Tollwood* im Dezember 2007, Ausstellung und Infoveranstaltungen zum Leben in der Illegalität im Kulturzentrum Gasteig im März 2008) zielen auf die Aufklärung der lokalen Bevölkerung ab, und sind wertvoll.

Darüber hinaus hat ein Verein, bestehend aus Wohlfahrtsverbänden, Basisinitiativen und städtischen Vertretern im Laufe des Jahres 2008 einen Fonds für die medizinische Behandlung von Nichtversicherten ins Leben gerufen (vorrangig „Illegale“). Dieser Fond will Gelder für die medizinische Versorgung sammeln und auch öffentliche Aufklärungsaufgaben übernehmen.

10) *Lassen sich gemeinsame Ziele der lokalen und überregionalen Politik von Integration der Menschen ohne Papiere zusammenstellen?*

Vor allem sind die Kommunen auf diesem Gebiet aktiv, weil sie die sozialen, bildungs- und gesundheitlichen Probleme der Menschen in der Illegalität am Intensivsten mitbekommen. Das Thema Menschen- und Sozialrechte ist in das Gremium der Kommunen, den *Deutschen Städtetag* eingebracht worden. Es geht um die (über-) lebenswichtigen Themen wie Gesundheitsversorgung, Schulbesuch und Lohnverprellung. Wichtig ist ebenso die Arbeit des katholischen Forums (und des daraus hergeleiteten Manifests gleichen Namens) *Leben in der Illegalität*, um die Thematik überregional auf die politische Tagesordnung zu setzen. Bund und Länder stellen sich aber bisher quer. Es wird von politischer Seite konsequent verweigert, auf dieser Ebene einen Handlungsbedarf zu erkennen. Man könnte es so formulieren: In Deutschland wird die zivilgesellschaftliche „Basis“ in der Gesellschaft mit diesen Problemen allein gelassen, obwohl hunderttausende von Menschen in der Illegalität – und ihre Angehörige in diesem Lande betroffen sind.

11) *Wie berücksichtigt man die Anweisungen der EU-Behörden im Bereich Integrationspolitik?*

Die Vorgaben der EU-Integrationspolitik entwickeln sich konstant und bringen eine Menge Verbesserungen für Zugewanderte mit gesichertem Status (z.B. Impulse für flächendeckende Sprach- und Integrationskurse), aber: Menschen in der Illegalität profitieren davon nicht – weil rigoros (und auf Betreiben vor allem der Bundesregierung, bzw. des Bundesinnenministeriums) zwischen legalen und illegalen Zuwanderern unterschieden wird. Eine konsequente Abschottungs- und Ausweisungspolitik, welche zwecks Effizienz EU-weit harmonisiert werden soll, ist das Ergebnis. Mit anderen Worten: Menschen in der Illegalität soll laut EU Politik immer konsequenter von Strukturen und Leistungen der Integrationspolitik ausgeschlossen werden. Man unterscheidet hiermit nach den stereotypen Vorgaben einer ordnungspolitisch orientierten Sicht der Dinge zwischen *guten/legalen/erwünschten* auf der einen und *schlechten/illegalen/unerwünschten Zuwanderern/innen* auf der anderen Seite.

12) *Gibt es und wenn ja, wie funktioniert eine internationale Kooperation auf dem Gebiet Integration der Jugendlichen ohne Papiere?*

Ich kenne keine Kooperationsansätze, weder innereuropäisch oder transatlantisch, spezifisch für Jugendliche. Es gibt natürlich lose Vernetzungen auf diesem Gebiet zwischen Forschern/innen. Lediglich die Arbeit von *PICUM (Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants)* als vernetzende Initiative in Brüssel weist allgemein auf die grenzüberschreitenden menschenrechtlichen Kooperationsmöglichkeiten durch *Best Practice* Beispiele (Gesundheit, Schule, Sozialberatung, Arbeit) auf diesem Feld in dieser Richtung.

13) *Welche Herausforderungen stehen vor München in Bezug auf die Integration der ausländischen Jugendlichen ohne Papiere?*

1. Mehr Wissen über die Situation von jungen Menschen in der Illegalität sicherstellen, 2. Mehr Bewusstsein darüber in der Bevölkerung erreichen. 3. Die Gesundheitsversorgung (Zugang zur Behandlung, Vernetzung, therapeutischer Bedarf, sexuelle Aufklärung,

Gesundheitsfond usw.) sicherstellen. 4. Das Thema Ermöglichung des Schulbesuchs als Menschenrecht auf Bildung öffentlich und politisch voranbringen. 5. Insgesamt die fehlenden Integrationsoptionen für Jugendliche publik machen und politisch offensiv zum Thema machen. 6. Zu diesen Themen kommunale, landes- und bundespolitische Partner und Verbündete suchen. Stichwort: die bisherige systematische und strukturimmanente Exklusion dieser Menschengruppe, vor allem aber der Kinder und Jugendlichen beseitigen!

München, Januar 2009

Appendix 7

Interview M/18 with Ulrich Gammel, verdi

1) *Was versteht Ihre Institution/was verstehen Sie unter Integrationspolitik?*

Verdi akzeptiert, dass Deutschland ein Einwanderungsland ist. Daher unterstützen wir geregelte Zuwanderung, sprich Migration. Migranten brauchen ausreichende und qualitativ hochwertige Integrationsangebote. Zugewanderte haben ein Recht auf Integration in die Gesellschaft, umgekehrt hat die Gesellschaft das Recht, dass Migranten die Integrationsangebote auch nutzen. Integrationsangebote müssen darauf abzielen, den Zugewanderten eine Teilhabe am öffentlichen Leben und im Arbeitsmarkt zu ermöglichen.

2) *Welche Voraussetzungen gibt es für eine erfolgreiche Integration der jungen Migranten in die Aufnahmegesellschaft, allgemein und spezifisch: in die Arbeitswelt?*

Sprachkenntnisse und das Angebot der Gesellschaft, sich diese sprachlichen Kenntnisse zu erwerben. Auch gehört die Interkulturelle Kompetenz zu diesen Voraussetzungen, denn ohne gegenseitige Kenntnisse über die Herkunftsländer ist ein verstehen wollen und ein verstanden werden kaum möglich.

3) *Wie schätzen Sie die Situation der Jugendlichen mit dem Migrationshintergrund auf dem Arbeitsmarkt in München?*

Sie ist schlechter als die der deutschen Jugendlichen. Die Ausbildungsbeteiligungsquote sank in Bayern in den letzten 10 Jahren bei ausländischen Jugendlichen von 40 % auf 25%, bei deutschen Jugendlichen sank sie von 71 % auf 65%.

4) *In wieweit unterscheidet sie sich von der Situation der deutschen Jugendlichen? Spielt Geschlecht der jungen Migranten eine Rolle?*

Die Ausbildungsbeteiligungsquote sank in Bayern in den letzten 10 Jahren bei ausländischen Jugendlichen von 40 % auf 25%, bei deutschen Jugendlichen sank sie von 71% auf 65%. Ob das Geschlecht eine Rolle spielen kann vermutlich bejaht, aber nicht belegt werden.

5) *Ist Arbeitsmarktdiskriminierung ein Problem in München?*

Unabhängig von der Staatsangehörigkeit findet bei Ausbildungsplätzen in den letzten Jahren ein „Verdrängungswettbewerb“ statt. Das kann – je nach Branche – auch sogenannte Regelarbeitsplätze betreffen. Hier spielen Defizite bei der Schul- und Berufsausbildung eine große Rolle. Ein höherer Anteil von ausländischen als deutschen Schülern verlässt die Hauptschule ohne Abschluss, das sind in Bayern über 20%! Klar, dass dies zu faktischen Benachteiligungen im Berufsleben führt.

6) *Was kann man in diesem Zusammenhang noch verbessern? Gibt es irgendwelche pro-aktive Maßnahmen?*

Verschiedene Forderungen werden hier von uns aufgestellt:

- Mehr Investitionen im Bildungsbereich
- Flächendeckende, ganztägige interkulturelle und qualifizierte Vorschulangebote
- Eine Schule für alle Kinder, keine Trennung nach Schultypen
- Anerkennung der Herkunftskultur und –sprachen der Kinder sowie deren Förderung im Kindergarten und in der Schule
- Überarbeitung der Lehrpläne unter interkulturellen Gesichtspunkten

7) *Was hat sich innerhalb der letzten Jahren geändert in der Situation der ausländischen Jugendlichen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt in München (innerhalb der letzten 25 Jahren)?*

In Bayern leben ca. 19% und in München ca. 24 % Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund. In Bayern nahm der Anteil der ausländischen Jugendlichen an der Gesamtzahl der Auszubildenden in den letzten 15 – 20 Jahren ab. 1994 lag die Zahl der ausländischen Jugendlichen noch bei 9,8%, heute liegt er unter 5%!

- 8) *Welche Rolle spielt Ihre Institution für die soziale Integration der ausländischen Jugendlichen und ihre Integration auf dem Arbeitsmarkt?*

Migration braucht Partizipationsmöglichkeiten, Zuwanderung braucht Akzeptanz und Abbau von Vorurteilen! Wir fördern die Integration von Migrantinnen und Migranten bei den Wahlen zu Betriebs- und Personalräten, sowie zu Jugend- und Auszubildendenvertretungen. Verdi richtet auf Bundes-, Landes- und Bezirksebene Arbeitskreise für Migrationspolitik ein.

- 9) *Wie erreichen Sie Ihre Zielgruppen? Wie kommt man an die Migranten heran, die an einer Integration bisher kaum Interesse zeigten (Programme, Projekte, Beratung, Förderungsangebote)?*

Wir laden Vertreter der Migranten in unserer Organisation zu Sitzungen, Veranstaltungen und Aktionen ein. Wir führen Seminare zu migrationspolitischen Themen durch, wie z.B. Gegen Rassismus und Rechtsradikalismus und für den Erwerb von mehr Multikultureller Kompetenz. Es gibt bei verdi eine „Richtlinie zur Migrationspolitik“ und eine „Programmatische Erklärung zur Migrationspolitik.“

- 10) *Wie entsteht die Netzwerkbildung und Zusammenarbeit mit anderen Organisationen, lokalen Regierung, Unternehmen auf dem Gebiet Integration der ausländischen Jugendlichen im Bereich Arbeitsmarkt?*

In den betrieblichen Vertretungsorganen Betriebs- und Personalräte, gewerkschaftliche Vertrauensleute wird die Zusammenarbeit von deutschen und ausländischen Kollegen tagtäglich gelebt und geprobt. Zur Erkämpfung von migrationspolitischen Zielen, wie z.B. einer Wahlplattform zu Landtagswahlen, werden die in Frage kommenden Organisationen eingeladen, dies organisiert unser Dachverband DGB.

- 11) *Wie arbeitet man mit den Einheimischen (Mobilisierung der Bevölkerung- Sensibilisierung für das Thema: Integration der Jugendlichen mit Migrationshintergrund)? – (Programme, Projekte?)*

Es werden auf Sitzungen und Seminaren Workshops zum Thema Migration gebildet. Wir sehen gemeinsam Filme und Vorträge an und diskutieren diese kritisch. Die Zusammensetzung ist gemischt, deutsche und Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund. Bei fast jeder gesellschaftspolitischen Aktivität von verdi sind deutsch und ausländische Kollegen miteinander aktiv: Streik, Demonstrationen, Kundgebungen.

- 12) *Lassen sich gemeinsame Ziele der lokalen und überregionalen Politik von Integration zusammenstellen?*

Ja, dies haben wir jetzt vor den Landtagswahlen in Bayern gemacht. Es gibt ein mehrseitiges Programm „Integration durch Partizipation“ welches die Gewerkschaften (DGB, IGM, verdi u.a.) und die Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Ausländerbeiräte Bayerns erstellt haben und der Politik und den Wählern vortragen, veröffentlichen.

- 13) *Wie berücksichtigt man die Anweisungen der EU-Behörden im Bereich Integrationspolitik? Ist eine einheitliche EU-Integrationspolitik in der Zukunft möglich (persönliche Meinung)?*

Antwort: Wenn alle demokratischen Kräfte an einem Strang ziehen ist es möglich. Durch EU-Antidiskriminierungs-Richtlinien wurden die Grundlagen für das deutsch „Allgemeine Gleichbehandlungsgesetz“ geschaffen und das ist gut so!

- 14) *Gibt es und wenn ja wie funktioniert eine internationale Kooperation auf dem Gebiet Integration der Jugendlichen im Bereich Arbeitsmarkt. Gibt es einen Informationsaustausch mit amerikanischen Städten (Transatlantischer Austausch)?*

Antwort: Es gibt solche Projekte, wobei der Befragter hier keine derzeitigen nennen kann. Als Schüler hat er selbst Brieffreundschaften nach US / Dayton gehabt, was für die internationale Verständigung und Völkerfreundschaft persönlichkeitsbildende Akzente setzte.

15) Welche Herausforderungen stehen vor Ihrer Institution in Bezug auf die Integration der ausländischen Jugendlichen?

Antwort: die Gewerkschaften haben hier noch viel zu leisten und gehen es an. Die Integration innerhalb der Gewerkschaft und der deutschen Gesellschaft ist eine Querschnittsaufgabe für verdi, die „Migrantinnen und Migranten“ wurden auf unserem Bundeskongress 2007 satzungsgemäß als „Gruppe“ innerhalb der Organisation aufgewertet. Die Schaffung von Akzeptanz für Zuwanderung ist eine zentrale Aufgabe der wir uns stellen. Mit Vereinbarungen gegen Diskriminierung und mit Initiativen in den Betrieben für Gleichbehandlung, Toleranz und Akzeptanz wollen wir dies erreichen.

Politische Forderungen dazu sind:

- Gezielte Förderung Jugendlicher mit Migrationshintergrund im Übergang von Schule und Berufsleben
- Mehr jugendliche Migranten müssen in den Öffentlichen Dienst eingestellt werden
- Mehr Ausbilder mit Migrationshintergrund einstellen
- Vermehrte Anerkennung ausländischer Berufsabschlüsse bei uns
- Spezielle berufliche Weiterbildungsangebote für ausländische Kolleg/innen.
- Regelmäßige Bayerische Berichte zum Ausbildungs- und Arbeitsmarkt unter dem Aspekt Migration.

München, August 2008

Appendix 8

Summary report of IOM consultations with public officials and NGOs in Warsaw in the years 2005-2006

“EMPOWERING MIGRANTS: INTEGRATION THROUGH INFORMATION AND TRAINING OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND NGOs”

IOM Warsaw

Final conclusions and recommendations

The compiled conclusions and recommendations were formulated during the national meetings (debate and national workshops) that were organized in the frames of the project.

1. INTEGRATION POLICY:

- 1.1 Integration of immigrants is a multilateral process in which both immigrant communities and the host society are engaged. Integration requires activities from both sides.
- 1.2 The creation of integration policy targeting immigrants, not only refugees, is required.
- 1.3 Regarding regular and irregular migrants, the possibility of regularization of the residence/stay was identified as a factor that influences the process of integration. Specific problems of groups of irregular immigrants who live in Poland and who have already integrated into the Polish society were identified and presented by representatives of migrant communities. Those immigrants, mostly Vietnamese and Armenians, lack of possibility of regularization of their residence/stay, because of the following reasons:
 - lack of identification document from country of origin and fear of contacting the administration of that country
 - fear of contacting the Polish administration, fear of expulsion

The creation of a possibility to regularize the stay and receive work permit for the mentioned groups of irregular migrants in Poland might bring economic benefits for the Polish state. The lack of possibility of getting the residence permit and work permit restrains the integration into the labor market and generates the growth of the black market.

2. INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS – COOPERATION AMONG INSTITUTIONS AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

- 2.1 The cooperation and exchange of information among public administration, NGOs, and migrant communities on migrant integration issues are necessary elements of effective activities supporting the process of integration of immigrants.
- 2.2 The access of immigrants and institutions from different sectors (public administration, NGOs, migrant community organizations) to information on migrant issues is a basic condition of successful integration.

3. INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE LABOR MARKET

BARRIERS AND SOLUTIONS

- 3.1 The following barriers and problems of access of immigrants to the labor market were identified:
 - complicated, two stages (promise to receive work permit and work permit at the later stage) and time-consuming procedure to receive work permit which cost has to be covered by employers; moreover employers are obligated to deliver in persons all documents concerning the foreign employees to a labor office
 - lack of possibility to regularize the stay and receive work permit (see 1.3.)
 - lack of sufficient knowledge of the Polish language
 - lack of knowledge on legal rules in Poland
 - lack of proper qualifications (qualifications that are in demand)
 - possibility of illegal employment

- high costs of employment which employers have to cover
- very low payments for the unqualified workers
- very often fee-for-task agreements are offered by employers; the migrant workers who are employed under this agreement are lack of employee's social benefits
- negative stereotypes on foreigners

3.2 The following solutions of identified problems were proposed:

- simplification of procedure to receive residence permit; one stage procedure should exchange two stage procedure - residence permit and work permit should be contained in one legal document
- creation of effective professional information system and legal advice service
- increase the number of employees in public administration responsible for migration issues, including the access of immigrants to the labor market (in Masovian Voivodeship, average number of beneficiaries applying for work permit per year is 30.000, around 6.000 written answers are prepared and provided to beneficiaries per year; currently the administration staff responsible for issuing of work permit includes 13 people)
- professional training for the public administration staff responsible for migration issues, including those dealing with the access of immigrants to the labour market; the training should be carried out in order to increase the level of knowledge on the access of foreigners to the labour market and on general immigrants' issues.
- creation of possibility for immigrants to attend free language courses

LABOR MARKET POLICY

3.3 The economic indicators and economic benefits should determinate the access and flow of immigrants to the labor market.

3.4 The need for the following activities in the field of labor market policy and immigration policy was identified: detailed analysis of the labor market in relation to the current demographic changes; identification of the economic sectors and professions in which there is a need for migrant workers. Access of migrant workers to these sectors and professions should be facilitated.

BLACK MARKET

3.5 The problem of the black market was identified. The government should counteract the black market because:

- the black market negatively affected the State Treasury
- in the black market, the workers rights are not respected

3.6 In the current legal frames, employment on the black market is profitable for both foreign workers and employers. However, the punishment much more affects a foreign worker than an employer.

4. ACCESS OF IMMIGRANTS TO THE HEALTH CARE

4.1 The children of foreigners do not have access to the health care including vaccinations. This practice is a violation of the basic human rights.

4.2 The foreigners very often are sent from one doctor to another, from one hospital to another. The reason behind the fact is the lack of information from which source the cost will be covered. The public health care service in Poland does not possess sufficient knowledge on immigrants groups in Poland, on their situation and rights. Therefore, the information campaign and seminars on the access of foreigners to the health care system targeting people working in health care system is needed.

4.3 The immigrants do not have sufficient information on access to the health care system and their rights. The information campaign on foreigners' access to the health care system in Poland targeting third country nationals is needed.

4.4 The lack of coordination with regards to the access of foreigners to the health care system was identified.

4.5 The administrative discrepancy that functions on the practical level was identified. A foreigner who wants to be insured in the National Health Fund is requested to provide the identification number PESEL that is given with the residence card. However, to get a residence card the insurance is needed.

5. INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS IN THE CULTURAL FIELD

5.1 Regarding the integration of immigrants in the cultural field, it was agreed that bicultural identity is a safe identity for both migrants and host society. The bicultural identity includes the elements of the culture of the country of origin and the culture of host society. The migrant communities should have the right and possibility to express their identity and culture of origin and participate in the culture of host country adding their own cultural background rooted in the country of origin.

5.2 The need for information about possibilities of fundraising of organization of cultural events and for improvement of organizational skills (including preparing the project – financial and logistic part) of representatives of migrant community organizations was identified.

Compiled by Janina Owczarek
IOM Warsaw

Appendix 9

Selected parts of the interviews with the organizations in Warsaw¹¹⁰⁴ (translated from Polish)

Interview W/1

The 'Ocalenie' (Survival) Foundation - Dorota Przymies

On integration measures:

With illegal immigrants there is the problem that most of the NGOs in Poland are dependent on the EU Funds, which do not allow supporting illegal immigrants. So, the organizations have to help within their own capacities... You know, I cannot state it officially that we help illegal people. But we turned nobody down here. This is our rule.

We do lots of things from our own pocket. We have started a so called "chip in" action: gathering people and funds for offering immediate service, if such is needed, to the immigrants without papers, like health care or legal counseling.

On integration challenges:

People are not aware of the integration challenges immigrant face here in Poland and in Warsaw. In fact, the best way to find out about them is learning by doing. Only after I had started employing immigrants in our organization could I finally fully understand what you have to go through applying for a work permit, or what I have to explain to them as an employer, for example basic rules about signing work contracts. As far as I know we are the only NGO that employs foreigners in Poland for its projects.

On integration policy:

There is a lack of NGOs and practitioners who are experienced in running integration programs, especially preparation courses for labor market integration. There are no special programs for immigrant youth. In fact, many of refugee youth here belong to the lost generation. No transition programs exist for them: school-to-work. We need a synchronized campaign to change it. Only few legal service providers exist for immigrants, but it is not enough. We have to expand the offer.

On network-building:

With the City of Warsaw we have great connections. They understand us and appreciate what we do and the new City' *Strategy for the Development of Social Problems* is promising. Neither can I complain about various forms of consultations. There is a good cooperation with governmental institutions like the Department for Migration Policy or the Office for Foreigners, but it involves only consultations. Somebody writes a good report on that, adds it to the list of the organization's activities and that's it. In fact, immigrants, who should be the real beneficiaries, do not profit from this networking.

¹¹⁰⁴ The selected parts mostly refer to points pertaining to interview question groups, which have been discussed in the section on integration work in Warsaw, see subchapter 5.2.4.

Interview W/2

Polish Humanitarian Action (PAH) - Teresa Stępnia

On integration challenges/undocumented:

Everybody who comes here needs an individual modeling, "reshaping." I usually say, "give me a man and I will find him or her a job." But it is not so easy. First of all, they have to speak Polish. Then they have to be flexible enough to adapt to the needs of the Polish labor market. We need to make them realize that getting a job often requires giving up their ambitions. In fact, it is easier for highly skilled immigrants to accept a job below their qualifications than for those who only graduated from high schools. They say: I have *Matura* [high school certificate in Poland], so I will not clean!" Moreover, a lot of refugees have qualifications that do not match our needs here, like Chechens who have qualifications in the war industry. They ask me quite often: "Do you have some war-related work for me?"

The undocumented are of course here among us. I am trying to help everybody who comes to us. We are quite successful in finding immigrants some very short term jobs, for example hand clappers for TV shows. As the TV moderators say, they are needed there, they are "colorful" and therefore attractive for the media.

On cooperation and campaigns:

Unfortunately, I do not know many organizations which provide job counseling for immigrants, I used to cooperate with the Intercultural Center for Labor Market Adaptation. It was very rewarding for both sides. But they do not exist anymore.

When it comes to international cooperation, there are many projects, but I do not take part in them. Please ask my younger coworker. I am trying not to develop and expand, but to be useful. I am 62, maybe I will still work two years. I have no capacities to organize campaigns, no time, no resources. I can really hardly "breathe" here. In fact, I was happy to be able to find some time for the interview with you.

Interview W/3

Polish Humanitarian Action (PAH) - Małgorzata Gebert

On integration measures:

We are very happy to have some volunteers who provide free Polish language courses, so we do not need to check the legal status of those who come here. When the course is funded by the governmental or EU money, then problems arise, and many absurd and awkward situations occur. For example, during the course of the program, immigrant may lose their status when they receive a negative decision on their application for asylum. Consequently we would be supposed to throw them out...

On reaching out:

We do not do run any large scale information campaigns; we do not have any funds for it. We did try and we will try gain releasing our regular refugee newspaper. We were successful doing this, but after 3 years our funding ended. Now we have gotten money so we plan to issue the paper in three languages. We have a good network of distributors: like employment agencies or family support centers, so we hope to succeed again. We do not reach out to the residents of the city with any campaigns, we do it once a year, organizing a Refugee Day.

Interview W/4

Office for Forigners - Ewa Piechota

On integration challenges and integration measures:

Learning Polish language is only a right not an obligation for those who are in refugee centers. In fact, few are interested in learning Polish, usually 4 to 10 refugees take part in the language courses in the centers. Usually 2-4 hours a week. Women and men take part in classes separately because of their cultural rules and beliefs. Quite often women do not attend courses at all. Foreigners very often skip courses and do not prepare for classes. Consequently they do not improve. Learning in the refugee centers can be regarded only as pre-learning, so that a foreigner can communicate with social workers and all necessary welfare institutions he or she has to get in touch with.

Moreover, it is important to note that the Office for Foreigners is not supposed to provide any integration programs and courses, but is only responsible for issuing a positive or negative decisions regarding foreigner's application for humanitarian protection in Poland.

Since the beginning of its work, the Office has been trying to guarantee foreigners best possible measures for their pre-integration. Among others, it enables all possible NGOs and international organizations to work in the refugee centers. A number of new organizations with new services for immigrants has been rapidly increasing recently.

Interview W/5

Foreign Language Teaching Foundation Lingua Mundi - Małgorzata Sas

On integration measures:

We have been on the language education market for 13 years; however we started providing Polish language courses for refugees only in 2005.

We realized that the language course is a bit too little, and the extension of language courses to workforce-readiness programs is needed. If we had more money we would organize job-preparation courses. We would be more eager to cooperate with other organizations so that we would provide vocational language courses and they would organize trainings.

We used to have lecturers and workshops on job searching tools and about job agencies, but unfortunately the cooperation with employment agencies stopped, as the external financial aid to the program was canceled. Because the scale of immigration is not big enough, Polish government does not want to invest money in integration programs. However, the recent changes in the discourse on immigration seem to be promising.

Now we are running two EU projects: one from the EU Refugee Fund for people with a humanitarian protection status and the other new one for third country nationals. Consequently, we cannot accept illegal immigrants for the EU-funded courses. We used to have a small course financed by our Foundation, which functioned quite well, but now our budget is reduced. But I have to admit there were no people this year with this sort of problem. Nobody with illegal status came to us this year.

On reaching out to immigrants:

Still we are looking for the ways to reach out with our courses to eligible immigrants.

We set up an internet portal www.polskanadobre.eu [Poland for good]. Still we cannot tell you anything about the results. We want to invite immigrants to collaboration and exchange of ideas on how the integration services should be provided. We would like to find out who can be a beneficiary of our program.

It is hard to estimate how many of our clients are young, as we do not have any statistics. Most of them are over 20 years old. We're not planning to organize any courses for immigrant youth in this year. In fact, we used to have a language course for the youth but because Chechens were overrepresented there and they stirred up conflict with others, we gave the courses up. However, we do have individual consultation open for anybody from our clients, so everybody, including young immigrants can come to us and talk about their problems and get our advice.

On integration challenges:

Immigrant on the Polish labor market face lots of problems getting a job, but I would not call it discrimination. I would say it is natural and logical that an employer wants to employ somebody whose qualifications can be more applicable and can be recognized. But there are few exceptions. For example, we used to have an advertisement that read "I employ all: both black or yellow." We knew this employer; he has a very good experience with refugees.

I do not think that Poles are discriminatory, but it should be taken for granted that some time is needed to get used to immigrants. Many Polish citizens might not tolerate Muslim immigrants rolling out their carpets and starting pray on the floor during the school breaks, as they do in our school.

Interview W/6

The Office of Masovian Province Governor - Andrzej Rybus-Tołoczko

On network-building:

At the beginning of the year 2008 four NGOs, based in Warsaw initiated consultation rounds with us about the challenges of immigrant integration in the city. We started regular meetings and established The Forum for Foreigners. Now we intend to meet every three months with local NGOs and organizations engaged in working with immigrants in the voivodeship. We are actually open for everybody who wants to come. It is a sort of information bazaar for us: getting to know what is going on around the subject of immigrants. The meetings are also supposed to integrate clerks from our office and raise awareness of the importance of the issue in many sectors. However, it is very challenging to encourage business sector for any sort of sponsorship or involvement in our initiatives. In fact, many companies have recently given up financing some local NGOs here...

We are about to start out new project Information Center for Foreigners in cooperation with the Polish Migration Forum, and the Association for Legal Intervention. It is difficult to say what will come next. As you probably know, there is no integration policy and there is no strategy for integration either nationally in Poland or locally in Warsaw. The Forum is one step towards its formation.

Interview W/7

Intercultural Center for Labor Market Adaptation (MCAZ) - Marta Piekut

On integration-measures:

Currently many initiatives within the EU seek to find out the needs for integration work, and whether planned projects can be of any use. People exchange best practices, write recommendations, and organize conferences ... I am not sure what is their outcome. Looking at our national policies nothing has changed. I can imagine that more time is needed to implement any recommendations on integration policies at the national level,

More years are needed if not dozens of years to take any action, as long as we rely only on single short-term projects, we still cannot talk about any national migration or integration strategy. In fact all of these projects are treated here [in Poland] as experiments. No matter what comes out of them, the aim is to collect data, learn more about local situation etc. The fact that somebody can get a job through the program is only a positive side-affect. Because the most important thing is to experiment, to spread information, and to pass your recommendations to the higher level.

Our projects had to end, a couple of publications were published, but the idea is not continued...

Interview W/8

The Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights - Agata Forys

On integration measures:

I am talking a lot about money, but unfortunately if you want to do something for immigrants you have to have the means to do it. So far there have been no resources from the State. The only existing Individual Integration Programs are illusionary. In fact, social workers have so many clients in the Family Support Centers that individual counseling is almost impossible. Providing for some basic needs, like finding accommodation for refugees in Warsaw, is already a big problem, let alone individual counseling.

I think that for our private sector it is still a little bit too early to think about sponsoring any integration programs for immigrants. It is much easier to for businessmen to raise money for building a well in Sudan or building a school. Let's put it bluntly, they are not as controversial as sponsoring for example Chechens in Poland. In fact, our service to immigrants may be disturbing for some people.

We are planning to develop more projects for immigrants coming to Poland for reasons other than humanitarian. In general the number of refugees is decreasing, although you can never foresee what will happen in the near future.

Interview W/9

Polish Migration Forum - Agnieszka Kosowicz

On reaching out:

My ideal is to network with other organizations for the common goal: to raise awareness about immigrants in Poland and to get immigrants acquainted with Poles and Polish life.

I think now that there is a lot more action in the field of immigrant integration. Because of the new EU funds and grants, the subject is "no longer so exotic." Many interesting activities are on the rise. There is still chaos though, as there is no common understanding on what the integration is. People still do not realize that pre-integration measures are very important for those who are waiting to get their status legalized in the country.

On integration measures:

The library project Network for Knowledge on Migration which I currently run with over 10 libraries across Poland is one of the indirect measures for immigrant integration. In the project we try to distribute books and raise funds for publications on migration research, integration, and anti-discrimination movements.

We also run the Online Migration Info Service. First it was supposed to address Poles who would like to inquire about legal rights of foreigners, intercultural events etc. It turned out very quickly that more immigrants are approaching us than natives. They are looking for our assistance on various

issues ranging from legalization of the status to job market and education offers. The project operates thanks to the EU funds, but we do not differentiate between who is legal here who is not among the users of our service. In fact, they seek help anonymously. More or less we realize who uses this info-line...

Interview W/10

International Organization for Migration IOM - Janina Owczarek

On integration concept:

I need to refer you to our official IOM definition of integration, which we adopt as the principle of functioning of our organization. You can find it on our website. For us integration is a two way process, which relates to adaptation. Adaptation is adjustment and is not as strong as assimilation. By adapting you do not need to reject your cultural identity. Assimilation entails adjusting to only one of the sides, and usually ends up with the rejection of your own culture.

On integration challenges:

There is a very slow change in Poland in the Polish doctrine of labor market protectionism for Poles. Polish law still promotes Polish people on the labor market. The doctrine resulted from a bad economic situation after the Polish transition period. At that time, people believed that they have to secure their position against foreigners. We strongly believe it should be changed. Labor market should be open for immigrants to fulfill the current niches. Moreover, we shouldn't expect that foreigners would come here only for a short period of time and leave soon.

On network building:

We started a good platform for networking, both nationally and internationally within the EU project Empowering Migrants: Integration through Information and Training of Public Officials and NGOs, which took place in Poland, Czech, Slovakia, and Hungary from May 2005 till April 2006. We were examining the situation on the Polish labor market for immigrants and their integration and compared it with the situations in the countries of our project partners. We conducted research among clerks and employers in Warsaw, focusing on four core aspects of integration: culture, labor market, access to health care, and too a lesser extent education. At the end of the project we invited NGOs, public officials, and migrant organizations in Poland to take part in a series of workshops and discussions on intercultural trainings and integration of immigrants in Poland. For many participants it was the first chance to meet the representatives of migrant organizations. We have published the results and recommendation in the report, which has been widely read. I can send you per email the summary of the recommendations.

On integration measures:

At the time of our running the project most of the Polish NGOs did not deal with any services aimed at economic migrants. They were restricted by the available EU funds only to the programs for refugees. Only recently with the new EU pool of money for third country nationals has it changed, so that many organizations started switching focus of their work to new target groups.

Having good experience with the project, now we have just started building the Platform of Cooperation for Migration Strategy in Poland. By the same token, we try to promote the idea that migration can bring about good benefits if it is only governed in a good way.

Interview W/11

VIA Foundation - Elzbieta Staniszewska

On integration measures:

We are quite a new organization. Since our beginning we started organizing psychological and legal counseling for refugees, and we have contracts with the Warsaw Family Support Center. We still do not have any programs for the youth, but we are planning on organizing one in the near future.

We always start our courses with so called mobilization activities or integration activities, which allow each participant to learn about the diversity of cultures we have here: celebrating different holidays of the immigrants' host countries, or cooking together.

In fact, people best integrate when they are in touch with people of another culture. For example, I strongly oppose the trend to segregate Chechens into separate courses.

We often organize some excursions together or so called immersion integration courses showing new immigrants how to find a doctor, a job advertisement, or even how to validate a bus ticket.

Personally I think that a right integration takes place when they [immigrants] are led by the organization like ours. We try to disperse them and mingle them with us. So we do not do so much on job market integration but social integration. There are many social problems, society is not so open. For example, immigrants face many problems with renting a flat in Warsaw...

Interview W/12

Warsaw Family Support Center - Dorota Rosiecka

On integration concept and integration measures:

Implementing national Individual Integration Programs, we cannot rely our work here on any formal national definition of integration. It does not actually exist. Only the fields of work for immigrants integration are regulated by law: cash benefits for maintenance, coverage of cost of learning Polish, and contributions to health insurance and guidance services, like finding accommodation.

When it comes to the question about national integration policy I would like to escape it and in a diplomatic way refer you to the ladies from the national Bureau for Social Policy, they are responsible for integration policy, I would not like to take a stance on that if I may.

You can imagine, sometimes it is very difficult, we have to stick to the rules of law and we cannot provide help to those who are still waiting for the decision on their legal status. Sometimes it is really heart-breaking when we have to refuse assistance, but we are dealing with the governmental money here. It is not a matter of our good or bad intention.

In our work we can see many integration challenges for newcomers here, especially for those from some particular ethnic groups. Sometimes we think that immigrants would function better here if they quickly become self-sufficient and independent of their family members and break away from their ethnic groups.

The fastest integration happens among people from Ukraine or Belarus. We do not like to talk about conflicts, but really some problems can be observed among Chechens. We heard rumors that when they are mixed with other they behave much better. On the other hand, getting feedback from our clients on their language courses we used to hear that they did not feel good there because there were too many Chechens.

We do not have lots of teenagers as clients here. But soon we are starting a new project Integration towards Self-sufficiency for disadvantaged social groups, which is also supposed to target immigrant youth. We are still struggling to figure out how to reach immigrant youth for the program.

Interview W/13

Association for Legal Intervention (SIP) - Aleksandra Chrzanowska

On network-building and integration measures:

No coherent integration policy exists. Moreover, we can't say that the institutions which deal with foreigners cooperate with each other.

When the Office for Foreigners is responsible for dealing with candidates for refugee status, as they called them, they do not think about very crucial first experience of immigrants with the host society which is detrimental for their future integration. We were trying to make the Office realize that they should take care of the time period when asylum seekers are waiting for the decisions. If you want to talk about a reasonable integration process for immigrants you should think about their integration from the very moment they arrive in Poland, and not from the time when their status becomes legal. Legalization procedures sometimes last many months or years. Letting them just eat and drink in refugee centers but not thinking about their integration is not very smart. Learning self-sufficiency within a couple of days, which many would expect of immigrants once they have obtained legal status, is simply unrealistic. The Office did not take our arguments seriously. The officials there think that it is not worth investing in people if we still do not know if the people have to leave the country soon. Maybe now the situation is slowly changing and they start to cooperate with us. So far we have had two meetings with them.

Few labor market integration programs exist. A very good project the Intercultural Center for Labor Market Adaptation functioned very well. Unfortunately its funding ended. Since one year it does not exist any more, and the foreigners keep coming to us and asking where they can sign up for similar courses.

Neither do I know anything about services for immigrant youth. It is an enormous problem...

Interview W/14

Foundation Forum for Social Diversity (FFRS) - Katarzyna Kubin

On network-building:

From our side, we were very open to cooperation. It was necessary for us, because in order to be treated seriously we had to have a stable partner. We did not have anybody, none of the more established institutions wanted to cooperate with us. So we started building our organization on our own, from scratch... Only when we started passionately organizing our Mobile Immigrant Consultation Point did others get interested. Now we know that we started from the wrong point. First you have to develop your innovative ideas. Once you put them into practice and show that they work, you should then set up your organization and form partnerships.

Now we have won the EU grant for both mobile and permanent points. We are starting this month and we will have more to say in a few months. The composition of our team has changed and grown. For half a year we started gathering people knowledgeable about the procedures of legalization and integration into the Polish labor market system. In fact some of them, mostly from Ukraine and Belarus, had to go through similar procedures of getting adjusted to the reality here.

Interview W/15

Fu Shenfu Migrant Center - Jacek Gniadek

On integration concept and measures:

We were established in 2005 by the Divine Word Missionaries. The idea was to provide legal counseling, language courses and socialization activities for all immigrants irrespective of their legal status. Most of those who come to the Center are Vietnamese, who have still an unauthorized stay in Poland and work illegally.

Our stance on people without papers can be summarized by three claims of John Paul II in his Message for the World day of Migrants and Refugees in 1996: "no man is illegal," "everybody has the right to emigrate," and "everybody has the same rights as persons regardless of possessing citizenship." The goal of the organization is to pave the way to the legalization of anybody who wants to stay in Poland.

On reaching out:

We want to reach out with our service to remote places on the outskirts of the city to those who are not able to commute to the Center. For example, now we go once a week to Vietnamese and Chinese communities in remote Wólka Kosowska.

Now many organizations open their offices in Warsaw, they advertise their Polish language courses and are waiting for clients. I teach in a Vietnamese bar and commute on my own. I started a year ago, I did not know any Chinese person there. Through one contact I was able to get to know the community better. What will come out of this: I do not know, I do not care, the most important thing is that thanks to my presence there I show them that I am not afraid of talking to

foreigners. I also show it to other Poles: "look at me; there is nothing to be afraid of when living with immigrants."

On integration challenges:

Integration problems stem from the fact that many of immigrants do not have a work permit or can use social benefits. The problem is for example with Africans or Chechens, they are used to social benefits here, they use it as long as they can. Asians, if I may generalize, want to work, they are real entrepreneurs. They want to have their own business, this is their dream: to be independent of the machinery: the state.

If immigrants have a work permit they do not need any integration projects, like cooking courses for example: they will come for the first time, they will eat and then they would never come again. And then the organizers have problems how to find the target groups. In fact, first you have to test, examine the environment. Even if you have great ideas, they should meet real needs.

Interview W/16

Raszyńska School - Krystyna Starczewska

On reaching out:

In our school we have created the culture of acceptance and tolerance. We adopted special education program: "Diversity that enriches us", and within the program we run several diversity projects. We experience lots of challenges in dealing with cultural differences in our school. We have to teach kids some basic rules, for example that girls are equal to boys. However, we also learn a lot working with many refugee kids. We try to melt with them and we do not have any cases of aggressions or larger conflicts. We also reach out to parents and school community through our intercultural festivals.

Most of immigrant students come from refugee centers in Warsaw, the Office for Foreigners usually send them to us. We do not check papers; everybody can come here. They do not need to pay for the school. Thanks to our scholarship funds we are able to raise money for their education. Moreover, we also try to find volunteers for extra tutorials for many refugees kids we have here.

We are quite unique as most of public schools do not want to take refugees students, who might lower their performance rankings. Moreover, it is also a big challenge to make parents accept the fact that refugee kids can have some privileges, like they do not need to pay tuition, as it is common in non-public schools like ours, and they can have extra tutorials.

We still do not focus so much on the career development of our immigrant kids. We think that they first need to be immersed in education and develop their potential. Our task is to educate and integrate immigrant students.

CURRICULUM VITAE

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