| Herold, Florian (2005): The Evolution of Reciprocity, Trust, and the Separation of Powers: Essays on Strategic Interactions under Incomplete Contracting. Dissertation, LMU München: Faculty of Economics |
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Herold_Florian.pdf 652Kb |
Abstract
This dissertation is composed of three self-contained essays on strategic interactions under incomplete contracting. Chapter 1 considers the evolution of reciprocal preferences in a setting where individuals live in separate groups. Chapter 2 analyzes the costs and benefits of a separation of powers in an incomplete contracts framework. Chapter 3 finally shows that, even when important parts of a relationship could be arranged perfectly by a complete contract, contractual incompleteness can arise endogenously if the proposal of a complete contract is perceived as a signal of distrust.
| Item Type: | Thesis (Dissertation, LMU Munich) | |
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| Keywords: | Evolution of Reciprocity, Trust, Incomplete Contracts, Separation of Powers | |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics | |
| Faculties: | Faculty of Economics | |
| Language: | English | |
| Date Accepted: | 27. January 2005 | |
| 1. Referee: | Schmidt, Klaus M. | |
| Persistent Identifier (URN): | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-32479 | |
| MD5 Checksum of the PDF-file: | 6794577fef357a4ad2afd3ed86693a95 | |
| Signature of the printed copy: | 0001/UMC 14398 | |
| ID Code: | 3247 | |
| Deposited On: | 16. Mar 2005 | (UTC) |
| Last Modified: | 16. Oct 2012 07:46 | (UTC) |
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